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International Atomic Energy Agency

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## FORTY-FOURTH (2000) REGULAR SESSION

### RECORD OF THE SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna  
on Monday, 18 September 2000, at 3.20 p.m.

President: Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(44)/INF/18.

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Delegates are kindly requested to bring their own copies of documents to meetings.

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Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Bangkok Treaty	Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Biological Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction
Chemical Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO PrepCom	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
G-7	Group of Seven [leading industrial countries]
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
R&D	Research and development
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SIT	Sterile insect technique
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Y2K	Year 2000

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## ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

### (a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION

1. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended that the agenda for the current session consist of all the items on the provisional agenda set forth in document GC(44)/1 and the supplementary item contained in document GC(44)/1/Add.1.
2. With regard to the allocation of items for initial discussion, the Committee recommended that all the items listed in documents GC(44)/1 and GC(44)/1/Add.1 be taken up for discussion as indicated in those documents.
3. With regard to the order of items, the Committee recommended that the order of items proposed in document GC(44)/1 be maintained; the supplementary item in document GC(44)/1/Add.1, entitled "Outcomes of the NPT Review Conference relevant to the activities of the IAEA", should be included immediately after item 18, entitled "Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications", with the remaining items renumbered accordingly.
4. Mr. TIWARI (India) said it was inappropriate to include the supplementary item just mentioned by the President in the agenda of the General Conference. Now in its 44th year, the Agency pre-dated the NPT, and the General Conference had previously not been asked to devote time to the outcomes of an NPT Review Conference. Even when the NPT had entered into force, it had not been thought necessary to devote an agenda item to the matter. The General Conference risked setting an unfortunate precedent.
5. Rather than pressing for a General Conference resolution endorsing their self-congratulatory attitude, the beneficiaries of what was a discriminatory treaty should be seeking to establish a timetable for implementing an unequivocal commitment to global nuclear disarmament.
6. Mr. FRANK (Israel) said his delegation had reservations with regard to the proposed inclusion of the supplementary item in the agenda of the General Conference. Although fully aware of the importance attached by many delegations to the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was very concerned about the precedent which the General Conference would set by focusing on a text adopted by an international forum in which not all of the Agency's Member States had been entitled to participate and about the unnecessary divisive debate on issues not directly related to the Agency's mandate to which the supplementary item might give rise.
7. Subject to the reservations expressed by India and Israel, the General Committee's recommendations regarding the agenda for the current session were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

8. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended that the Conference set Friday, 22 September as the closing date of the forty-fourth regular session and Monday, 17 September 2001 as the opening date of the forty-fifth regular session, which would be held in Vienna.

9. The Committee's recommendation was accepted.

REQUEST FOR THE RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS  
(GC(44)/INF/15)

10. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee, which had had before it a request for the restoration of voting rights submitted by Iraq pursuant to the second sentence of Article XIX.A of the Statute, recommended that Iraq's right to vote during the present session of the General Conference not be restored, being of the view that the failure of Iraq to pay the amount necessary in order to avoid application of the first sentence of Article XIX.A of the Statute was not due to conditions beyond its control.

11. Mr. AL-JANABI (Iraq) said that, until the imposition of the illegal embargo on Iraq in 1990, his country had never been in debt to the Agency. Pursuant to certain United Nations Security Council resolutions, however, all Iraqi funds in international banks had been frozen, thus preventing Iraq from transferring its statutory contributions to any United Nations organization.

12. Urging delegations to consider Iraq's situation objectively, without reference to the double standards that certain countries were applying in order to prevent Iraq from voting in international organizations, he requested that the General Committee's recommendation be put to the vote.

13. The PRESIDENT invited the Conference to vote, by a show of hands, on the General Committee's recommendation that Iraq's right to vote during the present session not be restored.

14. There were 44 votes in favour of the General Committee's recommendation and 2 against, with 20 abstentions. The Committee's recommendation was accepted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1999 (resumed)  
(GC(44)/4)

15. Mr. ELZUBAIR (Sudan), having welcomed the decision of the General Conference to approve Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that the Middle East continued to be a source of worldwide concern owing to the nuclear capabilities of Israel and that country's refusal to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. He hoped that the General Conference would adopt the draft resolution on "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat" to be

submitted by Arab Member States, since it was time for the international community to take decisive steps in dealing with the Israeli nuclear threat now that all Arab States had acceded to the NPT.

16. Welcoming the 1999 increase in the implementation rate for technical co-operation between the Agency and Sudan and the approval in 1999 of a Country Programme Framework for 2000-2005 based on Sudan's strategic economic programme, he said that Sudan greatly appreciated the services provided by Agency experts. In addition, he emphasized the importance attached by Sudan's authorities to the visits which the Deputy Director General for Technical Co-operation and the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Sciences and Applications had paid to his country.

17. Sudan was very grateful for the Agency's work in the area of nuclear applications, especially the support of the Agency for efforts to combat endemic diseases in Africa. It hoped that the Agency would help to combat malaria, more than 90% of the cases of which occurred in Africa.

18. No increase in the target for contributions to the TCF was being proposed despite the fact that the Group of 77 and China had agreed to the termination of the "shielding" system relating to contributions towards the safeguards component of the Regular Budget. That was most regrettable.

19. In conclusion, he said that his country attached great importance to the Agency's role in the field of international peace and security and in the promotion of development and expressed the hope that all Member States would fulfil their obligations vis-à-vis the Agency.

20. Mr. DEMCHUK (Belarus), welcoming the growing reputation of the Agency and the broadening of its activities, said that it was difficult to imagine the future of mankind without nuclear power.

21. Although Belarus would not begin construction of a nuclear power station during the next ten years, it would continue scientific research relating to the use of nuclear power and carry out feasibility studies relating to the construction of a nuclear power station in due course. In those feasibility studies, it would be necessary to take into account the importance attached to nuclear safety by the Belarus population following the Chernobyl disaster and Belarus's general economic situation.

22. In its domestic and foreign policy, his country was guided by the principles of nuclear non-proliferation. It had acceded to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, subsequently concluding a safeguards agreement with the Agency. It had been one of the first States to sign the CTBT. Also, in support of the Agency's efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation it had recently joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

23. His country welcomed the Agency's activities relating to the security of nuclear materials and other radiation sources waste and to the prevention of illicit trafficking in them.

24. Belarus was fulfilling all the obligations arising out of its safeguards agreement with the Agency and was considering the possibility of the conclusion of a Protocol additional to that agreement. In that connection, his country was grateful for the way in which the Agency's Secretariat was supporting the preparations for a regional seminar on the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol which was to be held in Minsk in November.

25. Belarus was already implementing some safeguards-strengthening measures: Agency inspectors had been granted access to hot cells in order that they might take swipe samples, and the Government had in June given approval for the installation of a remote monitoring system at the "Sosny" Science and Technology Complex.

26. Belarus, which was participating in the work of the open-ended group of experts considering whether there was a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, would, if a decision to revise the Convention was taken, endeavour to ensure that account was taken of the interests of those countries which did not have the infrastructures and financial resources necessary for strengthened physical protection at the national level. In that connection, he was sure that the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission to Belarus which had taken place in May 2000 would help to resolve his country's problems with regard to the physical protection of nuclear material.

27. Belarus, which was participating in the Agency's illicit trafficking database programme, would like to see an increase in the number of participating countries. Also, it would welcome the holding of a seminar for countries of Central and Eastern Europe similar to the one held in December 1999 for the countries of Central Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

28. As the Agency's radiation protection recommendations were not binding, many countries were being guided by their own principles in establishing radiation monitoring systems. That could lead to complications at the borders between countries with different approaches to radiation monitoring and with monitoring equipment of differing sensitivities; shipments passing unhindered through countries with lenient regulations might well be held up at the border crossings into countries with stricter regulations. It was therefore important to develop - possibly with Agency participation - a universal approach. The technical requirements had been worked out through the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Programme (ITRAP), and the next step should be to formulate recommendations with regard to monitoring system principles and to common regulatory goals for the purpose of co-ordinating activities for the detection of unauthorized transboundary movements of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

29. Belarus would welcome greater international co-operation in the area of nuclear safety. For its part, it had signed and ratified all the international safety conventions in force, and had also signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, for which the ratification procedures were under way.

30. Safety in the use of nuclear technology was a subject of particular interest to Belarus in the light of the Chernobyl disaster. Regrettably, however, the consequences of the disaster



were no longer a focus of international attention. The economic, social and humanitarian aspects of the disaster, which were compounding the difficulties of Belarus's transition to a market economy, should not be underestimated, and he hoped that the draft resolution entitled "Radiological criteria for long-lived radionuclides in commodities (especially foodstuffs and wood)" submitted to the General Conference by Belarus would receive broad support. The Chernobyl disaster had made the world aware of the need to strengthen nuclear and radiation safety, but the peoples of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia seemed to be paying the price of that awareness.

31. A recent report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation was an example of the bias which existed with regard to the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster: it drew on arbitrarily selected data, hardly any of which had been provided by Belarus scientists, and gave an incomplete and tendentious account of the post-Chernobyl situation in the countries affected. In the preparation of future documents, use should be made of more reliable epidemiological data covering the entire post-Chernobyl period obtained in Belarus, Russian and Ukraine by means of a single methodology

32. Agency technical co-operation activities could help to rebuild the Belarus public's confidence in nuclear technologies, and he was grateful to the Deputy Director General for Technical Co-operation and his staff for the technical assistance provided to his country. Belarus appreciated the valuable role played by the Department of Technical Co-operation in technology transfer and welcomed the Department's "Partnership in Development" approach. Outsourcing would undoubtedly contribute significantly to TCDC, and Belarus stood ready to host further training courses held under the auspices of the Department.

33. In order to meet future challenges, the Agency should pay greater attention to the development of nuclear technologies. Efforts to identify areas where new nuclear technologies could be applied and to improve existing nuclear technologies had stagnated, and he trusted that the Agency would take the steps necessary for restoring the balance between the three pillars of its work. In that connection, it was worth recalling the initiative announced by Russia's President Putin at the Millennium Summit in New York; implementation of that initiative would contribute significantly to nuclear non-proliferation, environmental protection and nuclear safety.

34. Belarus had completed the domestic procedures for acceptance of the amendments to Articles VI and XIV of the Statute adopted by the General Conference, and it hoped that many other Member States would follow its example.

35. Despite a difficult economic situation aggravated by the need to cope with the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, Belarus was the only Member State to have agreed to a five-year plan for the payment of its arrears. It would continue to do its utmost to meet its financial commitments to the Agency.

36. Finally, having commended the work done by the Agency in 1999 and endorsed the Agency's programme and budget for 2001, he expressed the hope that the Agency would continue to play its unique role in helping to resolve the global problems faced by mankind.

37. Mr. INTINI (Italy) said that the 2000 NPT Review Conference had represented an important step in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT was playing a vital role in promoting international peace and security, and the Agency's safeguards - with Protocols additional to safeguards agreements - were essential for providing credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. His Government expected to complete the procedures for ratification of the Protocol additional to Italy's safeguards agreement with the Agency early in 2001.

38. There was a need to keep a careful watch over the situation in the DPRK, and the Iraqi authorities should fully implement the Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq so that the Agency could complete the task assigned to it by the Security Council.

39. Italy welcomed the recent announcement by the President of Ukraine that the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant was to be closed down permanently before the end of the year.

40. The Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention were important for the attainment of a widespread safety culture based on internationally accepted standards.

41. Italy, which was greatly concerned about the safety of nuclear research reactors, supported the idea of the Secretariat's developing an international protocol or similar legal instrument to deal with the problem. Italy was also concerned about the persistent occurrence of incidents involving orphan sources, and it therefore attached great importance to the Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials.

42. Italy's Ministry of Industry had recently issued guidelines for the safe management of radioactive waste resulting from past nuclear activities in Italy. The envisaged waste management programme would require a strong national effort with international support.

43. Expressing support for the Agency's technical co-operation activities, which could lead to national investments by recipient countries in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he welcomed the consensus recently reached in the Board of Governors, under the skilful guidance of Ambassador de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, on the financing of those activities. He hoped that the consensus would pave the way to ensuring that the financial and human resources devoted to Agency technical co-operation were assured, predictable and sufficient to meet the relevant objectives envisaged in the NPT and the Agency's Statute.

44. Welcoming the results-based approach to programming and budgeting advocated by the Director General, he said that it was essential that Member States and the Secretariat prioritize the Agency's activities with a view to reconciling zero real budgetary growth with the requests made of the Agency by Member States and the Agency's statutory obligations. The recommendations of the Senior Expert Group and of bodies like the recently established Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications (SAGNA) could be helpful in that connection.

45. The budgetary situation of the Agency had reached the point where new approaches were necessary if the Secretariat was to continue carrying out its tasks effectively and

efficiently. At the same time, his country was concerned about the Agency's increasing reliance on extrabudgetary resources, which was undermining the control of Member States over the budgeting process and making strategic planning more difficult. The fact that some 23% of the financial resources for safeguards were extrabudgetary might result in a weakening of the effectiveness of the safeguards system, a matter of particular concern to his country.

46. Expressing support for the current process of restructuring the Regular Budget and reconsidering priorities, with a view to closing the gap between the tasks assigned to the Secretariat and the resources available for carrying them out, he said that there was room for further economies and efficiency gains.

47. As a major and reliable contributor of financial resources, his country would like to see its commitment to the Agency reciprocated by the Secretariat when considering applications for senior posts from under-represented Member States.

48. Italy would continue to work actively with the Secretariat and with other Member States in examining priorities, with a view to ensuring that the Agency's activities were sharply focused and fully responsive to important needs and matched by the resources available.

49. Mr. AGHAZADEH (Islamic Republic of Iran), having welcomed the approval of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, expressed the hope that the recent Millennium Session of the United Nations - an idea put forward by the President of his own country - would lead to a millennium of peace based on dialogue among civilizations. A world governed by wisdom and prudence was not compatible with the spreading of weapons of mass destruction. The international community had succeeded in prohibiting chemical and biological weapons worldwide, and the Islamic Republic of Iran believed that now was the right time to prohibit nuclear weapons through a convention similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

50. His country, which had put forward the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in 1974, regretted that Israel was still showing no sign of embracing the NPT or entering into an equivalent legally binding commitment. Israel's attitude was not only preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, but also undermining peace and stability throughout the region. The international community should pressure Israel into heeding international appeals, the most recent of which had been made by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which had called upon Israel to adhere to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which was concerned that Israel's attitude might result in a dreadful - and futile - arms race, greatly appreciated the Director General's untiring efforts to help resolve a vital regional and global problem.

51. The Islamic Republic of Iran, all of whose nuclear activities were covered by Agency safeguards, wished to see the Agency's safeguards system strengthened and also more done to promote the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. In his view, the

Agency's safeguards system would be strengthened by the conclusion of Additional Protocols and the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes would be promoted by the lifting of restrictions on the supply of necessary equipment.

52. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that nuclear power could help to meet the energy needs of most developing countries, as the President of the Russian Federation had suggested, if the necessary international effort under the Agency's auspices was made.

53. Mr. ZBIDI (Tunisia), having welcomed the approval of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that his country attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. It was especially interested in the possibilities offered by small and medium-sized reactors (SMRs) for power generation and seawater desalination, and it would like to see an intensification of the Agency's activities relating to SMRs. At the same time, it was grateful for the Secretariat-organized evaluation of a siting study for a nuclear desalination plant in Tunisia. It looked forward to the Agency's continuing support for the efforts to meet its population's increasing demand for potable water.

54. Tunisia was trying to co-operate more closely in the field of nuclear science and technology with other Arab countries, either on a bilateral basis or within the framework of bodies such as the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, with which it would like to see the Agency intensifying its co-operation.

55. Referring to the regional technical co-operation project on "Pollution monitoring in the marine environment" (RAF/7/003), the aim of which was to enable the countries of North Africa to assess radioactive and non-radioactive pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, he expressed the hope that European countries with a Mediterranean shoreline would support the project.

56. Tunisia, which was interested in promoting scientific and technical co-operation among African countries in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, had hosted a number of AFRA activities and stood ready to continue hosting such activities.

57. The Agency had continued to support Tunisian research projects relating to the use of nuclear techniques in medicine, agriculture and industry, and France was supporting a project involving the installation of an electron accelerator at the National Centre for Science and Technology. His country greatly appreciated the support which it was receiving.

58. Tunisia, which was endeavouring to pay its assessed contributions towards the Regular Budget and its TCF target shares in full, was very grateful to those countries which were paying very substantial contributions into the TCF.

59. Tunisia considered that widespread co-operation in nuclear, radiation and waste safety and effective opposition to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials were essential for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. It would therefore like to see all States which used nuclear techniques acceding to the relevant international legal instruments.

60. With regard to the transport of radioactive materials, the Mediterranean Sea was a sensitive sea lane, and Tunisia was very much aware of the risks associated with that activity and would like to see the relevant transport regulations tightened up in the interests of greater safety.

61. However, emphasis on safety - and on safeguards - should not be allowed to have an adverse effect on the Agency's technical co-operation activities. Greater efforts must be made to establish an optimum balance between safety, safeguards and technical co-operation within the Agency.

62. Tunisia, which had been involved in the drafting of - and had ratified - the Pelindaba Treaty, was ready to start negotiating a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency. His country would like to see the Agency's safeguards system being applied universally and all weapons of mass destruction eliminated. It was therefore very concerned about Israel's persistent refusal to become a party to NPT and place all its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards - steps which would strengthen confidence among countries in the Middle East and help to bring about the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

63. In conclusion, he said that his country, which believed that the Board should be enlarged and restructured in the light of the Agency's growing membership, looked forward to the early entry into force of the amendment to Article VI of the Statute which the General Conference had approved in 1999.

64. Mr. YERMILOV (Ukraine), having welcomed the Conference's approval of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that President Kuchma of Ukraine had recently confirmed that the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station was to be closed. The last operating reactor (Unit 3) would be finally shut down by 15 December 2000.

65. On 15 August 2000, Ukraine had signed a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The agreement, which covered all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities in Ukraine, was being implemented successfully.

66. The decision to close the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station had not been an easy one for his country, owing to difficulties in the national energy sector and in the economy as a whole. Fortunately, agreement had been reached with the EBRD regarding loans to finance completion of Unit 2 of the Khmel'nitski Nuclear Power Station and Unit 4 of the Rovno Nuclear Power Station, and it was expected that the EBRD's Board of Directors would take the corresponding positive decisions in the near future. However, the Khmel'nitski and Rovno Nuclear Power Stations would not be generating power by 15 December, the deadline for the shutdown of Unit 3 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. The only solution to the resulting power supply problem would seem to be the provision by Western countries of financial resources for the purchase of additional fossil fuel.

67. The technical problems of decommissioning the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station were enormous, but Ukraine was receiving assistance - for which it was most grateful - from the

European Community, the G-7 and the United States with the establishment of the necessary infrastructure, including a spent fuel storage facility and radioactive waste treatment facilities.

68. An extraordinarily difficult aspect of mitigating the effects of the Chernobyl accident was the ongoing transformation of the "Shelter" into an environmentally safe system. The first stage of the operation was now coming to an end, and the second stage would begin soon. On the whole, Ukraine was pleased with the way in which the work was proceeding and with the support being received from the other participating countries and the EBRD. Following the recent visit of the Director General to Ukraine, his country was looking forward to receiving support also from Agency experts.

69. Ukraine, which knew from experience the cost of underestimating safety problems, was supporting the Agency's efforts to achieve higher levels of safety in the utilization of nuclear energy. Earlier in the year, the Ukrainian Parliament had ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Paris Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and had adopted legislation on the licensing of activities connected with the utilization of nuclear energy. It was fair to say that the legislative basis for the safe utilization of nuclear energy in Ukraine now existed.

70. In Ukraine, nuclear power plants would for the foreseeable future - together with fossil-fuelled power plants - constitute the basis for electricity generation, and work was under way on preparing a national programme of nuclear power development through 2010 and a further development outline through 2030.

71. Ukraine had voluntarily renounced the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and was prepared to actively support the Agency's efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In that context, it had signed a Protocol additional to its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency and was represented in the group which was considering whether the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material needed to be revised.

72. In the six years since Ukraine had signed the NPT, the legislative basis necessary for safeguards implementation in Ukraine had been created and an SSAC had been established. Agency safeguards inspections were taking place without undue problems, regular reports on the status of safeguards implementation in Ukraine were being prepared with Secretariat assistance, and information exchange between Agency and Ukrainian specialists was significantly reducing the risk of illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

73. Ukraine, which greatly appreciated the technical assistance provided by the Agency, looked forward to continued co-operation in important areas such as strategic planning for nuclear energy development, the enhancement of safety at nuclear power plants, the extension of power reactor operating lifetimes, and planning for the decommissioning of power reactors.

74. In conclusion, he thanked the Secretariat and the Director General for the work done by them during the past year and said that Ukraine would continue to fulfil its international obligations relating to the safe use of nuclear energy and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

75. Mr. HIKAM (Indonesia), having welcomed the Conference's approval of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that his country remained committed to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency had been ratified and was being implemented.

76. Earlier in the year, at an ASEAN-Agency workshop on the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty, Indonesia had proposed the establishment of an ASEAN safeguards system, with a view to - inter alia - strengthening mutual trust among ASEAN members.

77. Scientists and engineers of Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) had increased the capacity of the TRIGA Mark II research reactor in Bandung from 1000 kW to 2000 kW, and the "TRIGA-2000" had achieved criticality on 13 May 2000. The Agency's assistance in that connection was greatly appreciated.

78. His Government had recently issued regulations on nuclear and radiation safety and on nuclear energy utilization which would facilitate implementation of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources.

79. His country was grateful to the Agency for assisting its Nuclear Energy Control Board with a regional workshop on "Strengthening national capabilities to respond to radiological emergencies" and one on "The development of a legal framework governing the safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive material". The time had come for countries of the Asia-Pacific region to develop their own capabilities for responding to radiological emergencies, and his country looked forward to the holding of further such workshops.

80. In order to ensure their sustainable development, countries with limited fossil fuel resources should diversify their energy supply systems to include the renewable and the nuclear option. In that connection, Indonesia greatly appreciated the information being provided by the Agency on the potential role of nuclear power. It also greatly appreciated the support being given by the Agency to the introduction of nuclear power through the use of small and medium-sized reactors for electricity generation and seawater desalination.

81. Indonesia, which had greatly benefited from technical co-operation with the Agency, stood ready to share its expertise with and make its scientific facilities available to other developing countries. In that connection, it would like the Agency to increase its efforts in support of TCDC.

82. Welcoming the Agency's Technical Co-operation Strategy and the "Partners in Development" concept, he said that the Agency's technical co-operation activities were consistent with his Government's policy of placing strong emphasis on end-users and the socio-economic impact of science and technology. In keeping with that policy, Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency had established partnerships with ministries, provincial governments, universities, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the development of nuclear techniques and their application in improving the general living conditions of the Indonesian population.

83. Finally, having recalled that, at a meeting with the Director General, the President of Indonesia had reaffirmed his country's support for the peaceful application of nuclear technology and had stressed that the Indonesian Government had an open mind regarding the nuclear power option, he said that Indonesia looked forward to further fruitful collaboration with the Agency through the latter's technical co-operation programme and within the framework of RCA.

84. Mr. NOOR UDDIN KHAN (Bangladesh) said that the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, who was firmly committed to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, greatly appreciated the efforts of the Director General and his staff.

85. The problem of arsenic contamination of groundwater had assumed massive proportions in Bangladesh, which planned to use a combination of conventional and nuclear techniques in carrying out the necessary investigations; it was hoped that those investigations would lead to efficient management of the country's groundwater resources. A nation-wide project for assessing levels of pesticides in food items was under way, with a view to optimizing the use of pesticides and thereby reducing pesticide damage to human and animal health and to the environment.

86. Bangladesh, which had adopted radiation safety legislation and regulations, was now strengthening its radiation safety infrastructure. Intensive training was being provided for the users - and regulators - of radiation facilities. As regulatory functions were not independent of promotional functions with the existing institutional arrangements, the creation of a separate regulatory agency was planned.

87. Bangladesh, which was benefiting from the Model Project on "Upgrading radiation protection infrastructure in the East Asia and Pacific region", would like the Agency to initiate a separate project on that topic within the RCA framework.

88. His Government, which had launched a nuclear power action plan, intended to invite international tenders for the country's first nuclear power plant. An invitation to tender and a site report had been prepared by the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, and the legal basis for a "Nuclear Power Authority of Bangladesh" was currently being formulated.

89. Bangladesh greatly appreciated Agency technical assistance, particularly in areas such as human resources development, and hoped that such assistance would continue. Its involvement in RCA projects was providing excellent opportunities for the sharing of experience, expertise and resources on a regional basis, and it looked forward to a diversification and intensification of RCA activities. It was grateful to the Agency, UNDP and its other RCA partners.

90. Bangladesh intended to continue playing an active role in the area of non-proliferation, and in that connection his Government had informed the Secretariat of its decision to conclude a Protocol additional to Bangladesh's safeguards agreement with the Agency. As an expression of its support for the CTBT, his Government had recently consented to the establishment of a seismic monitoring station in Bangladesh.



91. His country was concerned about the fact that the Agency's promotional activities were being scaled down relative to safeguards. That trend might discourage those countries which -like Bangladesh - supported nuclear non-proliferation but were keen to take advantage of nuclear technology, and perhaps embark on nuclear power generation. It was important to strike a proper balance between the Agency's promotional and regulatory activities.

92. Mr. SANON (Burkina Faso), having welcomed the approval of the Central African Republic, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan for membership of the Agency, said that, as could be seen from the Agency's annual report for 1999, nuclear power was still accounting for a large share of world electricity generation. Most nuclear power plants were in developed countries, however, and he therefore called for easier access to information on the role that nuclear power could play in developing countries.

93. Commending the Agency's regional or sub-regional approach to technical co-operation with African countries, he expressed particular appreciation of the Agency's support for efforts to eliminate rinderpest in Africa. Such efforts should be backed by the timely payment by Member States of their full shares of the targets for contributions to the TCF.

94. Since joining the Agency, in 1997, Burkina Faso had been participating fully in its activities. It had become a party to AFRA in 1999 and had set up an inter-ministerial body responsible for co-ordinating co-operation with the Agency. A national workshop on radiation protection had already been held in Burkina Faso with Agency support.

95. Burkina Faso had participated in several seminars and workshops held under Agency auspices, and had been represented by its Minister for Animal Resources at a recent Burkino Faso-Mali-Agency meeting on preparations for a project to combat animal trypanosomiasis by means of the SIT.

96. The International Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials held in Dijon, France, in 1998 had rightly highlighted the need for national systems of control for ensuring the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials. His country therefore welcomed the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources referred to in document GC(44)/7.

97. Ms. SHABANGU (South Africa), expressing appreciation of the Agency's recent involvement in a review of the technical and economic feasibility, the safety and the nuclear non-proliferation aspects of her country's Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, said that the Agency's report would be important for decision-making about a possible expansion of nuclear power generation in South Africa.

98. There had been a significant increase in technical co-operation between South Africa and the Agency, and the implementation rate for Agency technical co-operation projects in South Africa was very high. The process of drawing up a CPF for South Africa had been completed, and should result in a rewarding programme of further technical co-operation both with the Agency and with other African countries.

99. A Center for Postgraduate Education in Radiation Protection and a Regional Center for Isotope Studies in Ground Water had been established, with Agency assistance, at the University of Witwatersrand. With the help of such institutions, South Africa would continue to support AFRA activities and other efforts to bring about an “African Renaissance”.

100. Revised nuclear safety legislation had been adopted in South Africa in February 2000, and extensive safety reviews had been carried out at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant during the past year - including reviews to ensure that the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant, and the national electricity network, would not be affected by Y2K problems.

101. A national radioactive waste management policy and strategy was being developed, with a view to South Africa’s becoming a party to the Joint Convention.

102. Radioactive waste was continuing to be generated in the decommissioning of front-end nuclear fuel cycle facilities which had previously operated in South Africa. A programme for fully assessing such decommissioning waste, with a view to its subsequent safe management, was under way, and her country greatly appreciated the guidance provided by the Agency in that connection.

103. Welcoming the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, she said that in the nuclear non-proliferation area there existed a “strategic partnership” between the Agency and the international community; the proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be prevented and nuclear disarmament could not be achieved through the efforts of a single organization or a single State.

104. South Africa welcomed the steps being taken to strengthen the Agency’s safeguards system. The challenge - to successfully integrate elements of traditional safeguards with measures which had only recently become available into an effective and efficient whole - required to some extent a change in safeguards culture. The only way of solving the problem of increasing safeguards obligations at a time of severe budgetary restrictions was a flexible system from which traditional elements not in line with modern requirements had been removed. South Africa hoped that the Secretariat’s safeguards integration efforts would not only enhance the nuclear non-proliferation regime but also result in tangible benefits for the countries subject to safeguards agreements.

105. In conclusion, she welcomed the Conference’s approval of Azerbaijan, the Central African Republic and Tajikistan for membership of the Agency.

106. Mr. KADRI (Algeria), having welcomed the fact that Azerbaijan, the Central African Republic and Tajikistan had been approved for membership of the Agency, said that the 2000 NPT Review Conference, over which a representative of his country had presided, had highlighted the importance of the Agency’s role in helping to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Agency’s need for adequate financial and human resources. The General Conference should do all it could to ensure that the measures called for in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference were actually taken.

107. Referring to the Pelindaba Treaty, he said that Algeria would like to see all African countries acceding to it and implementing its provisions.

108. His country, which had signed and would soon ratify the CTBT, was closely following the progress towards its entry into force and supporting the work of the CTBTO PrepCom.

109. Through its Atomic Energy Commission, his country was intensifying its relations with the Agency in several areas, especially safeguards and technical co-operation.

110. Algeria, which had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, was following with great interest the activities aimed at strengthening the Agency's safeguards system. The Atomic Energy Commission was establishing an SSAC, and in that connection a footnote a/ project entitled "Nuclear material accounting and control laboratory" had been included in the Agency's technical co-operation programme for 1999-2000. As no outside donor had been found for the project, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Agency had agreed to fund it jointly.

111. With regard to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, he said that they should be expanded, made more effective and conducted more efficiently - and the financial resources for them should be predictable, dependable and sufficient.

112. In Algeria, nuclear techniques were being applied increasingly in medicine, agriculture, industry, environmental studies and R&D. The technical co-operation project proposals submitted by Algeria for 2001-2002 indicated the extent of its interest in the use of those techniques in numerous sectors.

113. Welcoming the extension of AFRA for a further five years, he called for revitalization of the activities being carried out within the AFRA framework. However, AFRA projects should not be strengthened at the cost of bilateral co-operation between the Agency and individual African countries.

114. Algeria's Atomic Energy Commission had introduced revised procedures for licensing the import, possession and use of radiation sources. Special teams from the Commission carried out inspections at establishments where such sources were used and determined what safety improvements were necessary. Specialized training was being provided for users of radiation sources.

115. Projects relating to nuclear desalination had no future without the active participation of advanced countries. Efforts should be made to show, through demonstration projects, that nuclear desalination was technically and economically feasible and safe.

116. The obstacles to the application of Agency safeguards throughout the Middle East and hence to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region were a matter of legitimate concern to his country. The establishment of such a zone in the Middle East was essential for world peace and security, but it would not happen as long as Israel was not a party to the NPT. As a party to the NPT, Algeria was anxious that Israel also become a party and place all its nuclear installations and materials under Agency safeguards.

117. Algeria, which had joined in the consensus reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, would like the Director General to continue his consultations with all States in the Middle East, especially Israel, with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

118. As regards the amendment to Article VI of the Statute approved by the General Conference in 1999, Algeria believed that the Secretariat should encourage Member States to accept it with a minimum of delay so that it might enter into force soon.

119. Monsignor RÉZEAU (Holy See), after recalling the Director General's official visit to the Vatican in March, said that his delegation attached special importance to the Conference agenda item on "Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Protocol". As one of the 14 States with an Additional Protocol in force, the Holy See would like to see many other States concluding Protocols additional to their safeguards agreements with the Agency.

120. Referring to the agenda item "Measures to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear, radiation and waste safety", he said that dialogue, preventive diplomacy and consensus-building were far preferable in the long run to sanctions, which did not always produce the desired effects and often resulted in the penalization of civilian populations. Fortunately, the Director General and his colleagues were placing the emphasis on dialogue, preventive diplomacy and consensus-building.

121. Moral factors could not be ignored when consideration was being given to mankind's energy needs, although the criteria involved were mainly scientific. The Agency was making commendable efforts to ensure that nuclear techniques were used, correctly and safely, for the development of disadvantaged countries in areas such as agriculture, hydrology, food security and medicine. The Holy See would like to see the Agency stepping up those efforts.

122. Human beings had been given the freedom to organize their lives to the best of their abilities, but they also had a responsibility to administer the universe and its resources as a gift made to all human kind - both the present generation and future ones. In that regard, a balanced exploitation of various energy sources was a distinct possibility, if the advanced countries rationalized their energy consumption and the more disadvantaged countries were enabled to pursue economic development through the use of - for example - hydropower, solar energy and wind energy.

123. Atomic energy held out the hope of real progress for human kind if properly used for the benefit of all. As Pope John Paul II had emphasized, the power of wisdom and love could overcome the growing menace of hate, and science could be made to serve human kind as a whole.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.