THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO IRAQ

Report by the Director General


2. Since the adoption of the resolution by the General Conference, the Director General has kept Member States of the Agency informed on the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions by means of the progress reports addressed by him on the subject to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for submission to the Security Council.¹

3. The present report provides information on the Agency’s inspection activities in Iraq covering the period 1 September 1997 – 31 August 1998 and includes as Annex 1 the chronology of major events that occurred during this period.

4. On 5 August 1998, Iraq declared that it would suspend its co-operation with the IAEA. In a verbal communication with the Iraqi officials the IAEA was informed that suspension of co-operation involved the following:
   - Iraq would continue to facilitate ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) inspections at sites for which Iraq routinely provides declarations under the OMV plan.
   - Iraq would continue to allow IAEA access to locations for the purpose of the collection of environmental samples or the carrying out of radiation surveys.

• Iraq would not permit access to “capable” sites or indeed any sites other than those for which Iraq routinely provides declarations under the OMV plan.

• Iraq would not co-operate in any activity involving investigation of its clandestine nuclear program.

5. On 6 August 1998, the Director General sent a message to the President of the Security Council reporting the Iraqi position.

6. On 11 August 1998 the Director General followed up his message with a letter to the President of the Security Council (Annex 2 refers). The letter stated that the limited activities undertaken in Iraq by the Agency, under the restrictions imposed by Iraq, fell far short of full implementation of the OMV plan and resulted in a significantly reduced level of assurance than would be provided through the full implementation of that plan.

7. The President of the Security Council, on behalf of the members of the Council, replied to the Director General’s letter on 18 August (Annex 3 refers). The letter stated that the Security Council considered Iraq’s announcement to be totally unacceptable and to contravene the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Secretary General and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq on 23 February 1998. The letter also emphasised the need for an early resumption of dialogue between Iraq and the Agency, reiterated the Council’s support for the full implementation of the Agency’s mandate in Iraq, noted that the Agency should report to the Council on all occasions that it deemed necessary and stated the Council’s readiness to respond favourably to progress made in the disarmament process.

8. The Director General will keep the Board informed of any significant developments in the status of the IAEA operations in Iraq and will similarly brief the General Conference.
Overview of reports to the Security Council

1. Document GOV/INF/827, dated 19 November 1997, contained the text of the fourth consolidated six-monthly report submitted by the Director General to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996). Part One of that report provided a description of the work done by the IAEA during the period 1 April 1997 to 1 October 1997 in the implementation of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). Part Two of that report provided an overview of the activities undertaken by the IAEA since it began in May 1991 the implementation of its obligations under paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991) to carry out on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities and to destroy, remove, or render harmless any nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-usable material, their subsystems and components and any related research, development, support or manufacturing facilities. Attachments to the report provided: a description of the components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme; a chronology of major events; a tabulation of materials and equipment destroyed, removed or rendered harmless under IAEA supervision; and summaries of the IAEA's twenty-nine inspection campaigns.

2. Document GOV/INF/827 reported that there were no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme objective of producing nuclear weapons nor were there indications that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material or had otherwise acquired such material. It also reported that there were no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance and that all weapon-usable nuclear material (research reactor fuel) has been removed from Iraq.

3. Document GOV/INF/827 further reported that there were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which had evolved of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme and the information contained in Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD). The report, however, cautioned that some uncertainty was inevitable in any countrywide verification process which seeks to prove the absence of readily concealable or disguisable objects or activities.

4. GOV/INF/1998/6, dated 4 February 1998, reported on the visit of an IAEA Technical Team to Iraq from 19 to 21 December 1997. The main purpose of the visit was to clarify the five matters identified in paragraph 75 of GOV/INF/827, in order to attempt to reduce uncertainties regarding the completeness of the technically coherent picture of
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and to ensure that the IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) activities were tailored appropriately. In this regard Iraq provided to the IAEA information regarding its post-war procurement procedure and undertook to produce, as previously requested, a summary of the technical achievements of its clandestine nuclear programme. During the December 1997 discussions Iraq provided some information regarding a specific offer of external (foreign) assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme but declared itself unable to provide further verifiable clarification regarding the motives behind the concealment activities attributed by Iraq to the late Lt. General Hussein Kamel or regarding the constitution of the so-called “High Government Committee”.

5. Other results of the December 1997 discussions included: Iraq's agreement to try to locate documents and reports prepared by the Iraqi Nuclear Team whose purpose was to interact with the IAEA inspection teams, and Iraq's restatement that it had not identified design options beyond those described in the PC-3 Group Four report “Basic design report of the implosion device”, dated 14 July 1990, and that no experimental programme had been established to validate options identified by computation. Regarding OMV matters, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz stated that there would be no objection to the IAEA's use of fixed wing aircraft for technical monitoring.

6. GOV/INF/1998/13, dated 22 April 1998, contained the text of the fifth consolidated six-monthly report submitted by the Director General to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996). The report provided a description of the work done by the IAEA during the period 1 October 1997 to 1 April 1998 in the implementation of its OMV plan. GOV/INF/1998/13 also reported that, following a series of discussions with the IAEA Action Team, Iraq had produced a summary of technical achievements of its clandestine nuclear programme which was judged by the IAEA to be consistent with the technically coherent picture of that programme.

7. Following the IAEA briefing of the fifth consolidated report to the Security Council, the President of the Security Council issued a statement (S/PRST/1998/11 dated 14 May 1998), which, inter alia, recorded the Council's intention to agree in a resolution that the IAEA dedicate its resources to implement the ongoing monitoring and verification activities of the IAEA under resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, upon receipt of a report from the Director General of the IAEA stating that the necessary technical and substantive clarifications have been made, including provision by Iraq of the necessary responses to all IAEA questions and concerns, in order to permit full implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by resolution 715 (1991). In that regard, the Council requested the Director General of the IAEA to provide the requested information in his report due on 11 October 1998 and to submit a status report by the end of July 1998 for possible action at that time.

9. GOV/INF/1998/16 included a description of the objectives of OMV, the procedures and techniques employed and the overall costs of the implementation of the OMV plan and pointed out that the procedures and techniques employed in OMV were essentially the same as those employed to map out the scope of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. Also included was a statement by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz that Iraq acknowledged the requirement to adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) and, in particular, to enact the penal laws to enforce those measures. Mr. Tariq Aziz further stated that Iraq planned to satisfy the requirement before October 1998.

10. A common element of all the above reports is the IAEA's statement to the effect that it continues to focus most of its resources on the implementation and technical strengthening of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Effective implementation of the OMV plan must be comprehensive and rigorous and, as a result, is intrusive. The effectiveness of the implementation of the OMV plan is critically dependent on the full exercise of the rights of access in the plan. Any diminution of, or interference with, those rights would greatly reduce the value of the assurance provided by the plan. GOV/INF/1998/16 specifically records that the OMV plan does not foreclose the IAEA's right to investigate further any aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and to destroy, remove, or render harmless any prohibited items that may be discovered through such investigations, and confirms the IAEA's intention to continue to investigate the remaining questions and concerns regarding Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, and any other aspect of that programme, as part of its OMV activities.

11. The information reported in the foregoing documents derives from the OMV activities of the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG), from discussions between the Iraqi counterpart and IAEA Action Team Leader during his visits in December 1997, March 1998 and July 1998 and from the results of six technical visits of Action Team personnel, during the period under review (1 September 1997 – 31 August 1998).

OMV activities

12. During the period under review the IAEA has maintained its presence in Iraq through its NMG based at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC). The continuity of this presence was interrupted as a result of actions initiated by Iraq on 29 October 1997, through which it sought to impose conditions on the inspection process.
Iraq's actions resulted in a suspension of the IAEA's OMV activities from 30 October to 22 November and the withdrawal from Iraq of NMG personnel from 14 to 21 November.

13. OMV activities resumed on 22 November, and, for the period 25 November to 4 December 1997, the personnel resources of the NMG were increased in order to carry out an intensive campaign of inspections to re-establish continuity of knowledge of the monitored locations. During that period the NMG carried out a total of 49 monitoring inspections and radiation mapping surveys. The results of these inspections and surveys showed no indications of prohibited activities having been undertaken at the facilities inspected. Furthermore, the inspections and surveys revealed no indications of the movement of materials or equipment except for those movements which had been declared by Iraq and showed that all materials and equipment which had been moved had been returned to their former locations.

14. During the period under review the NMG carried out 473 monitoring inspections at some 180 locations, of which 66 inspections were carried out at locations not previously inspected. The number of OMV inspections carried out to date now totals almost 1500. The majority of those inspections were carried out with no prior announcement and a number of them were conducted in co-operation with the monitoring groups of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

15. The IAEA and UNSCOM have continued their implementation of a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites which, in the judgement of IAEA/UNSCOM, have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction, notwithstanding the lack of evidence or indication of such work. Regular capable site inspections contribute to the effectiveness of the OMV plan in its ability to detect any attempts to conduct proscribed activities. The current total of capable-site inspections is approximately 85. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials, or activities has been detected during these inspections.

16. Other OMV activities include routine interviews of Iraqi personnel in their places of work, but in some cases the lack of availability of these personnel has impeded the interview process. In addition, the transfer of some of these personnel from the state to the private sector has delayed the interview process.

17. The tenth and eleventh radiometric surveys of Iraq's main water bodies were carried out in October 1997 and April 1998, respectively. As with the previous surveys the results show no indication of Iraq having carried out any proscribed nuclear activities but do confirm the sensitivity of the technology through the detection of Iraq's legitimate use of radioisotopes in medical applications. In addition to these surveys, an extensive baseline survey of environmental tritium concentrations was carried out over a 20-day period in November and December 1997. The survey team also collected samples of tree sections to confirm the nature and chronology of past tritium activities.
18. The third aerial radiometric survey in Iraq was carried out from 21 May to 11 June 1998. The 1998 campaign included overflight of sites known to have been active in Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme as well as test flights to verify the technical performance of the sensor system in various configurations. The 1998 campaign incorporated a near-real-time analysis capability that permitted investigation and resolution of anomalies detected during flights by follow-up on the ground. Sites overflown in both 1997 and 1998 showed no statistically significant differences from year to year.

19. Work is in progress to expand and consolidate a number of the currently implemented monitoring procedures and techniques into a Wide Area Environmental Monitoring (WAEM) plan with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the OMV plan in its ability to detect indications of proscribed nuclear activities. In this connection teams of technical experts have visited Iraq to discuss the support requirements for the use of fixed wing aircraft and the facilities required to accommodate high-volume air samplers, as well as to gather meteorological and hydrological data to facilitate the interpretation of WAEM data.

Presidential Site Entries

20. A member of the Action Team participated as a technical advisor in the Secretary General’s February 1998 mission to Iraq which resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretary General and the Government of Iraq. The MOU reaffirmed Iraq’s obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and outlined special procedures for entry into sites identified by Iraq as Presidential Sites.

21. During the period 26 March to 3 April, 15 IAEA experts participated in the Special Group which was established to enter Presidential Sites. The Special Group entered the Presidential Sites for the purpose of establishing baseline data to facilitate any future entry into these sites. The IAEA’s mandated tasks conducted at those sites revealed no immediate indications of the presence of proscribed materials or equipment or of the conduct of prohibited activities.

Iraq's bi-annual declarations under the IAEA OMV plan

22. As previously reported, although Iraq has improved the quality and completeness of its declarations under Annex 2 of the IAEA OMV plan, there is still a need for further improvements in the quality and completeness of these declarations. In addition, the inconsistencies between the information in the FFCD and these declarations must be resolved. In this regard members of the IAEA Action Team will visit Iraq in October 1998 to discuss the adequacy of the Iraq's July 1998 declarations. However, experience indicates that the goal of accurate and complete declarations will only be achieved if Iraq assigns additional technical personnel resources to this task.
Release, relocation and change of use of equipment, materials and facilities

23. In the period under review, Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) submitted 51 requests to the IAEA for approval of the release/relocation of equipment and materials or of the change in use of monitored buildings. Such requests are processed in consultation with the Special Commission. 46 of 51 requests have been approved. Two have been denied, and three are awaiting the provision of additional information by the Iraqi counterpart. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

Export/import mechanism

24. Since October 1996 the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq, jointly administered by UNSCOM and the IAEA, has received notification of some 100 transactions involving the intended export to Iraq of items identified in the Annexes to the respective OMV Plans. Seven of these notifications involved items identified in Annex 3 of the IAEA OMV Plan.

Iraq’s "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" of its clandestine nuclear programme

25. On 25 March 1998 Iraq provided the IAEA with a consolidated version of its Full, Final, and Complete Declaration (FFCD). The 25 March 1998 version of the FFCD completed the editorial task of incorporating the revisions and additions to the 7 September 1996 version, which had resulted from five sets of discussions between the IAEA and the counterpart. As previously reported, there are no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which has evolved of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and the information contained in the consolidated version of Iraq's FFCD.

Summary of technical achievements

26. On 5 February 1998 Iraq provided the summary of the technical achievements of its clandestine nuclear programme, as had been agreed during the December 1997 visit of the Action Team Leader. The need for revisions was brought to the attention of the Iraqi counterpart in two sets of technical discussions conducted from 14 to 19 February and from 26 March to 4 April 1998. The final version of the document was provided to the IAEA on 25 April 1998. IAEA judges the summary to be consistent with the technically coherent picture of that programme.
Summary and Observations

27. There are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weaponusable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance, nor any indication that Iraq has acquired or produced nuclear material other than the nuclear material verified by the IAEA and removed from Iraq in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

28. Although there are no indications of Iraq having achieved its programme's goal of producing nuclear weapons, it is clear that Iraq had made significant progress in weaponisation technologies before April 1991. It is also clear that there remains in Iraq a considerable intellectual resource in the form of the cadre of well-educated, highly experienced personnel who were employed in Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.

29. Some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical verification process that aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or activities. While no indications of the current existence of proscribed equipment or materials in Iraq have been found, the IAEA, despite its extensive inspection activities, cannot, for the reasons previously described, provide absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealable items, such as components of centrifuge machines or copies of weapon-related documentation. Similarly, it should be recognised that OMV measures cannot guarantee detection of readily concealable or disguisable activities, such as computer-based weaponisation studies or small-scale centrifuge cascade development. Furthermore, Iraq's direct acquisition of weaponusable material would present a severe technical challenge to OMV measures and great reliance must be placed on international controls. This inherent uncertainty is compounded by Iraq's lack of full transparency in the provision of information, which, because of the lack of related programme documentation, has resulted in uncertainties regarding the extent of external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and Iraq's actual achievements in some aspects of that programme.

30. With regard to the responses provided by Iraq to the remaining questions and concerns about its clandestine nuclear programme, the IAEA holds no evidence to confirm or refute Iraq's statements that Iraq did not take advantage of any offers of external assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme other than that recorded in its Full, Final and Complete Declaration and that no other relevant documentation exists to support Iraq's stated abandonment of its clandestine nuclear programme, its timing and modalities.

31. Greater transparency by Iraq, in particular regarding the provision of documentary evidence of its achievements in nuclear weapon design and in the identification of the foreign national allegedly involved in an offer of assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, would contribute greatly to the resolution of remaining questions and concerns. Nonetheless, the uncertainties resulting from these questions and concerns do
not prevent the full implementation of the OMV plan. Indeed, such elements of uncertainty are factored into the IAEA OMV plan, which takes fully into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding the production of weapon-usable nuclear material. The OMV plan is predicated on the assumption that Iraq has the knowledge and technical capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future.

32. The IAEA continues to focus most of its resources on the implementation and technical strengthening of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. The OMV plan does not foreclose the IAEA’s right to investigate further any aspect of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme and, as part of its OMV activities, the IAEA will continue to implement that right, through the follow-up of any new information that comes to its knowledge and will destroy, remove, or render harmless any prohibited items that may be discovered through such investigations.

33. In order to further strengthen the overall capability of its OMV plan, the IAEA is currently in the process of expanding and consolidating a number of its technical activities into a wide-area environmental monitoring programme.

34. Effective ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, as required by resolution 687 (1991), must be comprehensive and rigorous and, as a result, is intrusive. The effectiveness of the implementation of the IAEA OMV plan is critically dependent upon the full exercise of the rights of access enshrined in the plan. Any diminution of, or interference with, those rights would greatly reduce the value of the assurance provided through its implementation.

35. Iraq has declared its intention to adopt, by October 1998, the necessary measures to implement its obligations under resolutions 687 and 707, and other relevant Security Council resolutions and the IAEA’s OMV plan, and, in particular, to enact penal laws to prohibit all natural and legal persons under Iraq’s jurisdiction or control from undertaking anywhere any activity that is prohibited for Iraq by relevant Security Council resolutions or by the IAEA’s OMV Plan.

36. Iraq’s current suspension of full co-operation makes it impossible for the IAEA to fully implement its OMV plan, including the exercise of its right to investigate further any aspect of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme. This limited implementation of the OMV plan results in a significantly reduced level of assurance than would be provided through the full implementation of that plan.
The IAEA’s activities concerning Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions

Chronology
(I September 1997 – 31 August 1998)

During the period under review, the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) carried out some 473 monitoring inspections at some 180 locations including 66 locations not previously inspected. These inspections included more than 40 IAEA/UNSCOM joint inspections of capable sites bringing the total of such inspections to 85. The total number of monitoring inspections carried out since the establishment of the NMG in August 1994 now totals almost 1500. The work of the NMG was suspended for a period of 22 days in October/November 1997 as a result of Iraq’s refusal to co-operate with inspectors of US nationality. The continuity of the IAEA presence in Iraq was interrupted for a period of seven days in November 1997 when the NMG was withdrawn from Iraq in response to Iraq’s expulsion of inspectors of US nationality.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>20 October to 30 October</td>
<td>Tenth periodic radiometric survey of Iraq’s main water bodies involving the collection of water, sediment, and biota samples.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 October</td>
<td>Iraq imposes restrictions on inspectors based on nationality.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 October to 22 November</td>
<td>OMV activities suspended in response to restrictions imposed by Iraq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 November to 21 November</td>
<td>NMG personnel withdrawn to Bahrain in response to Iraq’s expulsion of inspectors of US nationality.</td>
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<td>22 November</td>
<td>NMG personnel return to Baghdad from Bahrain. OMV activities resumed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 November to 4 December</td>
<td>Additional staff temporarily assigned to NMG. 49 inspections and radiation mapping surveys to re-establish continuity of knowledge. No indications of prohibited activities detected.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 November to 15 December</td>
<td>NMG conducts baseline environmental tritium survey.</td>
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<td>4 February</td>
<td>Iraq provides draft Summary of Technical Achievements agreed upon during December 1997 visit of Action Team Leader.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 February to 18 February</td>
<td>IAEA Technical Team visits Baghdad to discuss Summary of Technical Achievements. Iraq agrees to revise Summary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 February to 23 February</td>
<td>Secretary General visits Iraq. IAEA Action Team staff member participates in delegation as technical advisor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 February</td>
<td>Secretary General and Iraq sign Memorandum of Understanding reiterating Iraq’s obligations under Security Council resolutions and establishing a Special Group for entry into Presidential Sites.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 March</td>
<td>Iraq provides revision of Summary of Technical Achievements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 March to 25 March</td>
<td>Action Team Leader visits Baghdad to follow up on matters discussed during December 1997 visit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 March</td>
<td>Iraq provides consolidated version of its FFCD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 March to 4 April</td>
<td>IAEA Technical Team visits Baghdad to complete discussions on Summary of Technical Achievements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 March to 3 April</td>
<td>NMG participates in Special Group entries to Presidential Sites. NMG augmented by 15 IAEA experts for site entries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 April to 28 April</td>
<td>Eleventh periodic radiometric survey of Iraq’s main water bodies involving the collection of water, sediment, and biota samples.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 April to 28 April</td>
<td>IAEA Technical Team visits Baghdad to discuss logistics and support requirements for fixed wing aircraft operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 April</td>
<td>Iraq provides final version of its Summary of Technical Achievements of its clandestine nuclear programme. IAEA judges the summary to be consistent with technically coherent picture of that programme.</td>
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<td>14 May</td>
<td>Security Council Presidential Statement requested IAEA Director General to include in his progress report, due on 11 October 1998, information on the status of technical and substantive questions and concerns regarding Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and to</td>
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provide by the end of July 1998, an interim report on those matters for possible action at that time.

20 May to 12 June

31 May to 4 June
IAEA Technical Team visits Baghdad in connection with meteorological and hydrological data requirements for Wide Area Environmental Monitoring plan.

29 June to 3 July
Action Team Leader visits Baghdad for technical discussions on outstanding questions and concerns.

28 July
IAEA Director General submits interim status report to Security Council requested by 14 May Presidential Statement.

5 August
Iraq announces suspension of co-operation with IAEA and the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).

6 August
Director General sends message to Security Council President regarding impact of Iraq's action on the effectiveness of OMV activities.

11 August
Director General sends letter to Security Council President stressing that the limited activities currently undertaken in Iraq by the IAEA, under the restrictions imposed by Iraq, fall far short of full implementation of the OMV plan and result in a significantly reduced level of assurance than would be provided through the full implementation of that plan (Annex 2 refers).

18 August
Security Council President, on behalf of the members of the Council, sends letter to Director General expressing the Council's full support for the IAEA's full implementation of its mandate and emphasising the need for an early resumption of dialogue between Iraq and the Agency (Annex 3 refers).

25 August
Director General sends letter to Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister underlining the importance of Iraq resuming full co-operation with the IAEA with a view to addressing remaining questions and concerns and to enable the IAEA to implement fully its OMV plan, including required inspections.
LETTER DATED 11 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 11 August 1998, which I have received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I should be grateful if you would bring the text of the letter from the Director General to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN
Further to my message to you which was delivered on Thursday, 6 August 1998, I wish to confirm that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is carrying out a limited implementation of its ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan, within the restrictions imposed by Iraq, and is awaiting instructions from the Council on how to proceed further.

In this context I would draw your attention to paragraph 21 of my July status report to the Council (document S/1998/694), which states that "the effectiveness of the implementation of the IAEA OMV plan is critically dependent upon the full exercise of the rights of access enshrined in the plan. Any diminution of, or interference with, those rights would greatly reduce the level of assurance provided through its implementation."

Iraq’s refusal to cooperate in any activity involving investigation of its clandestine nuclear programme makes it impossible for IAEA to exercise a fundamental right, described in my July status report. Paragraph 43 of that report records that IAEA will continue, in the context of its OMV, to investigate, through the follow-up of any new information that comes to its knowledge, the remaining questions and concerns relevant to Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme, as well as any other aspect of that programme and to destroy, remove, or render harmless any prohibited items that may be discovered through such investigations.

Moreover, as stated in paragraph 8 of the October 1997 progress report of the IAEA Director General to the Council (S/1997/779), "the carrying out of joint IAEA/UNSCOM multi-disciplinary inspections at ‘capable’ sites on a regular basis continues to contribute to the effectiveness of the OMV to detect any attempt by Iraq to conduct activities proscribed by Security Council resolutions." The restrictions imposed by Iraq have resulted in the discontinuation of the "implementation of a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites which, in the judgement of IAEA/UNSCOM, are deemed to have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction".

It follows from the above that the limited activities currently undertaken in Iraq by IAEA, under the restrictions imposed by Iraq, fall far short of full implementation of the OMV plan and result in a significantly reduced level of assurance than would be provided through the full implementation of that plan.

I would be grateful if you would bring the text of the present letter to the attention of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed ELBARADEI
LETTER DATED 18 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I am replying to your letter of 11 August 1998 to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/766, annex).

The members of the Security Council take note with concern that Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prevents IAEA from carrying out the full range of its activities, as mandated under the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 687 (1991), which constitute the governing standard for Iraqi compliance.

The members of the Security Council, as their initial reaction, consider that Iraq's announcement is totally unacceptable and contravenes the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Secretary-General and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq on 23 February 1998. The members of the Council note with regret that the announcement was made after a period of improved cooperation and achievement of some tangible results since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding.

The members of the Security Council also take note with concern of your assessment that current circumstances result in a significantly reduced level of assurance than would be provided through the full implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan.

The members of the Security Council reiterate their full support for IAEA and UNSCOM in the full implementation of their mandates. Iraq is obliged under the relevant Security Council resolutions to provide IAEA and UNSCOM with the cooperation necessary for them to undertake their activities, including inspections. You should continue to report to the Council on all occasions that you deem necessary.
The members of the Security Council also express their support for the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy. The members of the Council emphasize the need for an early resumption of dialogue between IAEA and Iraq and will be ready to respond favourably to future progress made in the disarmament process.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
President of the Security Council