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President: Mr. KASEMSARN (Thailand)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda*</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
7	General debate and annual report for 1994 (continued)	1 - 206
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	Lebanon	1 - 5
	Greece	6 - 21
	Australia	22 - 54
	South Africa	55 - 62
	Italy	63 - 70
	Hungary	71 - 81
	Ireland	82 - 94
	Saudi Arabia	95 - 100
	Holy See	101 - 108
	Lithuania	109 - 117
	Brazil	118 - 125
	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	126 - 128
	Venezuela	129 - 136
	Chile	137 - 146
	Qatar	147 - 151
	Egypt	152 - 161
	Ghana	162 - 171
	New Zealand	172 - 185
	Viet Nam	186 - 192
	Ethiopia	193 - 204

[*] GC(39)/27.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(39)/INF/21/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AGNES	Advanced General and New Evaluation of Safety
Agreed Framework	Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECU	European currency unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G-7	Group of Seven
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
ICTP	International Centre for Theoretical Physics (in Trieste)
LDC	Least developed country
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency (of OECD)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OUA	Organization of African Unity
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
TACC	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)
VINATOM	Viet Nam National Atomic Energy Commission

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1994 (GC(39)/3, 26 and Add.1-2)
(continued)

1. Mr. HOBEICA (Lebanon), having expressed his full support for the way in which the Agency was discharging its increasingly important activities to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind, noted that while the decision taken at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely was very significant, the Treaty's extension would not by itself solve all the world's nuclear problems. Universal accession was vital and Lebanon had consistently urged all States to accede to the NPT. In the region of the Middle East there was little hope of achieving peace while Israel continued to refuse to accede to the NPT or submit its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards. Furthermore, Israel continued its occupation of Lebanon in defiance of various Security Council resolutions, including resolution 425, which called upon Israel to withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. Israel constituted a very real threat not only to Lebanon, but to the whole region and indeed the entire world.

2. Apart from safeguards, the Agency's other main objective was the dissemination of knowledge about nuclear technology for the benefit of all peoples of the world. After the destructive war it had suffered, Lebanon had been engaged in unprecedented reconstruction activity, and it looked to the Agency to provide every possible technical assistance and help. The Director General's report on the strengthening of the Agency's technical co-operation activities gave a full account of the various initiatives taken by the Agency to improve the technological capacities of developing countries and to enable them to achieve the objective of sustainable development. Lebanon fully supported the efforts being made to bring technical co-operation provided by the Agency in line with national development objectives. However, the success of the Agency's technical co-operation activities depended largely on the commitment of Member States to provide the necessary financial resources. Lebanon therefore called upon all Member States to pledge and pay their assessed share of the target to the TCF.

3. Lebanon attached great importance to a number of other areas of the Agency's activities: it welcomed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it had signed and hoped to be able to ratify shortly; it also welcomed the preparations being made for the diplomatic

conference on civil liability for nuclear damage and trusted that the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage would be able to complete its work in time to permit the convening of such a conference early in 1996; and it supported the measures taken by the Agency to combat the unlawful trafficking in radioactive materials, which constituted a serious threat to the whole of the international community.

4. Turning to the amendment of Article VI of the Statute, he said that discussions in the Board had shown that there was a willingness on the part of many Member States to amend that Article in order to increase democracy and to ensure fairer geographical distribution in the Board. His delegation hoped that the General Conference would succeed in reaching a consensus on that issue.

5. In conclusion, he was confident that the Agency, one of the most active organizations in the United Nations system, would continue to play a prominent role in reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the interests of worldwide development.

6. Mr. PANAYOTIS TSOUNIS (Greece), after associating himself with the statement made earlier by the delegate of Spain on behalf of the European Union, said he appreciated the efforts made and the results achieved by the Director General and the Secretariat despite the financial constraints and could accordingly endorse the Agency's Annual Report for 1994.

7. In the light of the unprecedented political, economic and technological changes occurring worldwide, the Agency would have to reassess carefully how it could best meet Member States' changing needs over the period up to the year 2000 and beyond. Indeed, it had already begun to respond to those developments, and the new demands placed on it in the international arena as a result of the recent indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, the negotiations on a CTBT and a "cut-off" convention, and also the progress achieved on nuclear disarmament issues, by introducing administrative and structural changes that would enable it to cope with its expanded role.

8. Turning to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, he said that in May 1995 the Department of Technical Co-operation, together with the Greek Atomic Energy

Commission, had organized a regional workshop on project design, management and evaluation techniques which had benefited a number of countries in the preparation and implementation of national projects.

9. On the whole, Greece, which was both recipient and donor, was satisfied with the Department's efforts. However, in order to make still better use of the available funds, the Department should focus on key programmes relevant to country priorities and maximize the use of Member States' facilities, many of which could now be classed as centres of excellence.

10. Since the Chernobyl disaster, his country had followed closely the Agency's substantial efforts to address the urgent safety needs and upgrade the nuclear safety programmes of Member States in Eastern and Central Europe. Greece had recently signed the Nuclear Safety Convention and was contributing actively to the work of the expert group responsible for drafting the equally important convention on nuclear waste management. It also looked forward to the conference on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident to be held in April 1996.

11. Greece appreciated the Agency's considerable contribution towards ensuring that ageing reactors in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe were operated in line with international safety requirements, and noted with satisfaction the Agency's collaboration with the European Union and NEA in providing technical and financial support to Eastern European countries for nuclear safety improvement purposes.

12. In that context the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, in co-operation with the European Commission, intended to hold in December 1995 - for the third time - a training seminar on off-site emergency planning and response to nuclear accidents for experts from Eastern European countries. Moreover, in March, it had signed a bilateral agreement with Romania on the early notification of nuclear accidents and the exchange of information.

13. With regard to the proposed division of the Agency's Department of Nuclear Energy and Safety into two separate departments, he expressed the hope that the decision would lead to the consolidation of all the Agency's safety-related activities in one Department, and that it would not result in substantial additional expense.

14. His country was an active participant in the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage and hoped that sufficient progress would be made on the issue of supplementary funding in connection with the revision of the Vienna Convention to enable the Director General to convene a diplomatic conference in the first half of 1996.

15. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Greece had supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT because it believed strongly that the Treaty and its associated safeguards system, as the most widely accepted legal instruments in the field of arms control and disarmament, represented the best available means of dealing with the new non-proliferation issues resulting from the recently transformed global geopolitical situation. In addition to the indefinite extension of the NPT, two further decisions of historic importance had been taken, namely those on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty. Their acceptance by the world community gave reason to hope that the Treaty could facilitate the attainment of world peace without nuclear threats. Greece trusted that all States party to the NPT and the others which had participated in the New York negotiations would demonstrate a collective commitment to those principles in their future discussions on disarmament and in connection with the planned expansion of the Agency's role.

16. Among the countries which had joined the NPT over the past year his Government welcomed in particular Ukraine, which had acceded as a non-nuclear-weapon State and had signed an agreement with the Agency to implement its safeguards commitments under the Treaty.

17. While also welcoming the positive developments in connection with the framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States, his Government wished to see real progress made towards implementation of the bilateral safeguards agreement with the Agency based on consistent commitment by the DPRK to non-proliferation and security.

18. Some progress had been made at regional level under the Quadripartite Agreement in Latin America, and steps had been taken in Addis Ababa in June towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. In the light of the recent positive developments in the Middle East peace process, it was to be hoped that all States of that region also would

in due course accede to the NPT and place all their nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards.

19. Greece believed that the early conclusion of a CTBT and a "cut-off" convention would make a real contribution to the achievement of non-proliferation objectives; accordingly it urged all countries engaged in those negotiations to redouble their efforts. It appreciated the decision of a number of nuclear-weapon States to extend the 1992 moratorium on nuclear testing until the conclusion of a CTBT and hoped that all the nuclear-weapon States, acting in the spirit of the decisions on nuclear-weapon testing taken by the NPT Review and Extension Conference, would exercise the utmost restraint with regard to possible damage to human health and the environment.

20. His country continued to view with grave concern the evidence that illicit trafficking of nuclear materials was on the increase. It urged the Agency and other international bodies to implement the resolutions which had been passed on that subject and appealed to all parties to strengthen their controls and establish mechanisms to prevent such trafficking. The United Nations, the Agency, the European Union and individual States should endeavour to co-ordinate their efforts in that regard.

21. Turning in conclusion to the area of research and isotopes, he said that the Agency continued to offer excellent services to the developing countries in various fields of science and technology. A number of Greek scientists were involved in such activities, particularly in the area of food irradiation. Greek researchers also benefited from Agency research contracts, and research co-ordination meetings were held at institutes in his country - two had taken place in Athens during 1995. Finally, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, in co-operation with the Medical Departments of the Universities of Athens and Ioannina and the Democritos Nuclear Research Centre, was organizing nuclear medicine courses at Greek hospitals.

22. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that as the custodian of some of the core provisions of the NPT, the Agency had had a significant role to play in the preparations for and successful conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which had been the defining event of the multilateral security agenda since the previous session of the General

Conference. Indefinite extension of the NPT could only help to strengthen the Agency's role as a major contributor to global security in all its dimensions.

23. Australia had been a strong advocate of indefinite extension of the NPT and welcomed the important decision in favour of such extension and the other important commitments which had accompanied it. The principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament - as well as the decision to strengthen the review process for the Treaty - were central to an enhanced regime for non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They could not be discarded or interpreted selectively.

24. That was why there had been such dismay at how soon afterwards a key disarmament commitment had been disregarded - particularly on the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping on Hiroshima of the world's first atomic bomb. Not only Australians were angry that, despite the end of the Cold War and the indefinite extension of the NPT, both China and France had decided to go ahead with nuclear-weapons testing. Governments and members of the public the world over had protested.

25. The conclusion of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty had long been a key objective of the international community and one which Australia had pursued with vigour for well over a decade. Australia expected the Agency to play a role in its implementation. Welcome progress had been made in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament negotiations, with the commitment by three of the nuclear-weapon States - France, the United States and the United Kingdom - to a zero threshold and also to the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996. But continued testing could only give comfort to would-be proliferators and ran the serious risk of souring the atmosphere in which the treaty negotiations were taking place.

26. The international community would have little understanding if - so soon after the NPT Review and Extension Conference - the Agency, as the world's leading forum on atomic energy, did not express a view on the issue, and so the Philippines, on behalf of more than 13 other delegations, had introduced a resolution which articulated some of the international community's concerns about the impact of nuclear testing on non-proliferation

and the environment. It cited the Agency's responsibilities in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and worldwide disarmament - as well as in the application of necessary measures to minimize the risks to life, health and the environment from the uses of nuclear energy. It was a timely reminder of the responsibilities of all States - especially the nuclear-weapon States - to meet their obligations under the NPT and to honour the commitments made at the Review and Extension Conference. The resolution added to the growing body of international opinion and international law demanding action to minimize the impact on health, safety and the environment of all nuclear activities, especially nuclear testing.

27. The sponsors of that resolution had been careful to place it squarely within the mandate of the Agency. His delegation accordingly commended it to the Conference and looked forward to it being adopted without a vote.

28. Australia welcomed the French Government's invitation to the Agency to undertake a radiological assessment of the French nuclear test sites in the South Pacific - a region where many people were naturally sensitive about the effects of nuclear testing on the marine environment, as the sea was their only source of livelihood.

29. If the Agency's findings were to be conclusive and credible, of course, it was essential for the participating scientific experts to be given free and unfettered access to Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls, and also the fullest possible access to the relevant French data, so that they could conduct a comprehensive investigation of the environmental and health impacts of the French nuclear tests. Those questions of access were being discussed between the Agency and French officials, and he looked forward to the report on the outcome of those discussions.

30. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had confirmed the Agency as the competent authority for the independent verification of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in accordance with the NPT and related safeguards agreements. Importantly, the Conference had given strong political support to the authority of the Board of Governors to strengthen further the effectiveness of safeguards. The Conference had noted that Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated, and that the Agency's capability to detect

undeclared activities should be increased. Australia welcomed and strongly supported that endorsement of Programme 93+2 objectives.

31. The Director General's plan to implement the measures described in Part 1 of his report to the Board (document GOV/2807) at an early date on the basis of the Agency's existing authority had been an important step forward, but a system based upon classical safeguards and implementation of those Part 1 measures only would not provide the full assurance of the absence of undeclared activities that was needed. As a minimum, the Agency had to be able to conduct routine inspections at locations other than strategic points. That in turn required the integration of the proposals in Parts 1 and 2 of that report with the current safeguards regime for declared nuclear material.

32. The most recent revelations of an accelerated weapons development programme in Iraq had demonstrated a clear need to enhance the capability of safeguards to detect undeclared activities. They had also demonstrated that universal implementation of the inspection measures proposed under Programme 93+2 was essential. More extensive consultation between the Agency and Member States, the trial of Programme 93+2 techniques and the implementation of Part 1 measures should assist Member States to overcome any reticence about Programme 93+2, and Australia would continue, where possible, to assist the Agency in its work on that programme.

33. His country had long asserted the valuable role played by regional nuclear-weapon-free zones in enhancing regional security and promoting the global non-proliferation regime. Australia itself was a party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The imminent full entry into force of the Tlatelolco Treaty, the co-operation established between the South Pacific Forum and OPANAL, the proposed African nuclear-weapon-free zone and the intention of States in the South East Asia region to develop a similar zone were further illustrations of the value that States across the globe attached to establishing such zones. Australia had been pleased to share with others seeking to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones the experience gained in the negotiation of the Treaty of Rarotonga.

34. Progress in the Middle East peace process should help accelerate the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in that region. Australia endorsed wholeheartedly

the call at the NPT Review and Extension Conference for all those remaining States in the Middle East region not parties to the NPT to accede to it.

35. Australia reiterated the call in the NPT Conference's programme of action for the completion of negotiations on a CTBT no later than 1996 and for the early conclusion of negotiations on a "cut-off" convention. The latter in particular could involve a significant verification role for the Agency. Australia strongly supported the earliest possible placement under Agency safeguards of fissile material transferred from military use.

36. Australia welcomed the framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States as an important contribution to regional and global nuclear security which would provide a basis for resolving the DPRK nuclear issue and ensuring that country's return to full compliance with its existing safeguards agreement. Australia's membership of the Korea Energy Development Organization and its substantial financial contribution attested to its support. At the same time, the existing safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK remained in force and binding, and he commended the Agency for its efforts to monitor the freeze on sensitive nuclear activities and to implement safeguards. The DPRK should co-operate fully with the Agency in that regard.

37. The decision of the NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely reaffirmed the Treaty's legitimacy as the basis of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. He called on all NPT parties which had not yet done so to sign and bring into force their comprehensive safeguards agreements without delay.

38. The States which chose to remain outside the Treaty should be under no illusion - they were a club with a dwindling membership. Their refusal to join the NPT would be regarded with less understanding the longer they chose to remain outside the regime. They should reconsider the merits of joining the rest of the international community in adhering to the NPT and acknowledging that their security would be greater not by acquiring nuclear weapons but by renouncing them.

39. The Convention on Nuclear Safety had been opened for signature at the previous year's session of the General Conference; since then, 59 countries had signed the Convention and nine had ratified it. Australia encouraged all States, particularly those operating or

intending to operate nuclear power reactors, to ratify the Convention at the earliest opportunity. Australia itself hoped to be able to do so by the end of the current year.

40. In the meantime, Australia shared international concerns that all nuclear facilities in all countries should be operated to stringent safety standards.

41. The Agency had made good progress in developing the RADWASS and other Safety Standards documents. High priority should continue to be given to those activities. He trusted that with the transfer of the RADWASS programme to the Division of Nuclear Safety, the programme would suffer no more delays.

42. Negotiations for a convention on radioactive waste management safety had commenced and he welcomed the constructive atmosphere at the first open-ended meeting of the group of experts. He hoped the group would continue to make rapid progress in developing a draft, possibly for consideration by a diplomatic conference in 1997. All States should consider the benefits of participation in those negotiations.

43. As a non-nuclear power producing country, Australia attached importance to the conclusion of a convention on liability for nuclear damage.

44. Australia also supported the Agency's work in the area of illicit trafficking and the security of nuclear materials.

45. The Agency's technical co-operation programme had long been a main avenue for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Over the past year, the Agency had been developing a country programme framework to enable it to respond to the changing interests and needs of Member States and to plan technical co-operation to meet broader national development objectives as a "partner in development". Australia strongly supported that approach.

46. A principal mechanism for change had been the development by the Department of Technical Co-operation of the Model Project concept, which involved rigorous project planning, organization, co-ordination and support from the technical Departments. It had also led to improved formulation of project objectives and performance indicators throughout the programme. The Model Project approach was a means to more effective programme

delivery - and to demonstrating the tangible benefits of nuclear technology. He emphasized his country's particular support for Model Projects aimed at assisting developing Member States to improve radiation protection and waste management infrastructures.

47. Evaluation of projects, their delivery and their end-user impact was important as a legitimate and valuable tool for assessing the value of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. The Department should strengthen its evaluation activities, particularly at the present early stage of the Model Project undertaking.

48. At the same time, the Agency's ability to respond to Member States' interests in the programme was wholly dependent on the availability of resources. All countries should therefore make full and timely payments to the TCF.

49. During 1995, the Board of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization had commissioned a substantial external study for identifying future directions and policies for the Organization. The recommendations were being implemented and a new strategic plan was to be prepared by the middle of 1996. His delegation thanked the Agency for providing helpful assistance in the course of the review.

50. Australia had continued its search for a site for a national repository for low-level and short-lived intermediate-level radioactive wastes generated from medical, research and industrial uses of radioisotopes. A second public discussion paper had been issued. The next phase would involve selection of a preferred region for field investigations, taking into account public comments in response to the discussion paper and the report of a parliamentary committee of inquiry into the management of radioactive waste in Australia.

51. At the 1994 session of the General Conference, his Government had announced further improvements to the arrangements for nuclear regulation in his country. A new Australian institute for radiation protection would have regulatory and licensing power for nuclear and radiation activities at national facilities. Implementation of the new arrangement was expected to be completed in 1996.

52. In a global environment of increasing financial stringency, real budgetary growth could no longer be supported, and the performance of all international organizations was under close scrutiny. His delegation welcomed initiatives to consider the longer-term

orientation of Agency activities. The Agency should continue to rationalize its programme and budget policies and to redirect resources to its priority activities. In that way, the continuing relevance of Agency activities would be assured.

53. In the current year, Member States had spent much time attempting to identify arrangements for the future financing of safeguards and technical assistance. A more equitable and more adequate system of financing safeguards and a more secure system for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a fitting response to the undertakings made by nearly all Member States at the NPT Review and Extension Conference - namely, to make every effort to ensure that the Agency had the resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the area of technical co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

54. Finally, in recognition of the importance Australia attached to the Agency's technical co-operation activities and in acknowledgement of the undertaking made by Australia at the NPT Conference, it was his pleasure to announce that his country would be pledging 1.29 million Australian dollars to the TCF for 1996. At the current rate of exchange, that was almost US \$1 million, or somewhat more than his country's recommended share of the target for voluntary contributions agreed upon by the Board of Governors the previous week.

55. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) welcomed the consensus on the indefinite extension of the NPT reached at the Review and Extension Conference. However, in the light of the worldwide concern that progress should be made urgently in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and the fact that the nuclear-weapon States had agreed to exercise the utmost restraint with respect to nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996, his Government was particularly disturbed by the recent decision of two of the nuclear-weapon States to abandon the moratorium on nuclear testing and to resume their testing programmes - an act that showed cynical disregard for the spirit and letter of the agreement reached at the Review and Extension Conference. South Africa strongly urged the States concerned seriously to reconsider their nuclear testing policy and to rejoin the global moratorium on nuclear testing as a token of their willingness to conclude a CTBT in 1996. At the same time, he commended the other nuclear-weapon States for their continued restraint and urged them to remain committed to the moratorium for the sake of the

confidence-building measures accepted at the Review and Extension Conference, the nuclear-weapon States should avoid a nuclear testing free-for-all that would endanger the whole CTBT exercise.

56. South Africa noted with satisfaction the progress made in establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone and hoped that the draft Treaty of Pelindaba, which would expand the non-nuclear-weapon area of the globe considerably, could be submitted to the General Assembly before the end of the year. His country was actively endeavouring to resolve the outstanding issues and appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to ensure that the Treaty was concluded and the relevant protocols signed after its adoption.

57. As a country with substantial nuclear facilities under safeguards, South Africa was aware of the cost of administering the safeguards system. Accordingly, it had supported the efforts to find a solution to the question of safeguards financing. It was willing to accept that the security which came from the safeguards system came at a price which had to be paid, and so it supported the expansion of the system under the Programme 93+2. Furthermore, as a member of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, South Africa was prepared to seek equitable solutions to the question of export controls and was now in a position to comply fully with the Agency's voluntary universal reporting scheme for nuclear material and specified equipment and non-nuclear material.

58. While South Africa was fully committed to the system of safeguards, it was equally committed to spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all corners of the globe. As a member of the OAU and the NAM, South Africa had a special responsibility to ensure that the needs of developing countries for peaceful applications of nuclear technology were always taken into account. In 1995, it had already hosted three Agency meetings or seminars on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had accepted some 20 Agency fellows and scientific visitors from Africa for further training since the previous session of the General Conference. In addition, South Africa played an active role in AFRA so as to ensure that the benefits of nuclear technology were made available to the countries of the African continent, and through its forthcoming chairmanship of AFRA it would continue to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear technology within the African region. In that context, the LDCs, which were more numerous in Africa than in any other

continent, deserved special attention from the Agency, and he hoped the recently created SAGTAC would give them priority and explore ways of meeting their needs and enabling them to derive practical benefits from nuclear technology.

59. As to the TCF, South Africa would honour its pledge and contribute its share of the target - an amount which did not fully reflect South Africa's total contribution, as it did not include substantial costs incurred for training and development co-operation programmes in the African region. However, South Africa was engaged in a process of fundamental reconstruction and development and so its capacity to contribute to such programmes might be limited in the future.

60. South Africa would also continue to involve itself in other areas of the Agency's activities, such as nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste disposal, and would participate actively in the discussions on liability for nuclear damage and on safety standards. In that connection, his country supported the Secretariat's efforts to establish a common, coherent philosophy for radiation and nuclear safety and the safe disposal of radioactive waste.

61. With regard to the Agency's future, the Director General had rightly noted that the Agency had been recognized by the NPT Review and Extension Conference as the competent authority responsible for verifying and ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements. South Africa strongly supported the idea underlying current discussions on a "cut-off" agreement that Agency safeguards should also be an essential element of the verification mechanism that would be required under such an agreement. It also saw a role for the Agency under a CTBT and encouraged the States negotiating that treaty to give due recognition to the Agency's vast experience in safeguards administration.

62. South Africa welcomed the growing membership of the Agency and urged all Member States to accede to the NPT and to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. For its part, South Africa had shown its firm commitment to non-proliferation through its policy of transparency in all nuclear matters, termination of its nuclear weapons programme and ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. It would assist the Agency wherever possible in preventing the

proliferation of nuclear weapons and in bringing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the developing world.

63. Mr. INDELICATO (Italy), after supporting the statement made by the delegate of Spain on behalf of the European Union, said that the year 1995 had seen many important developments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The decision to extend the NPT indefinitely had been a memorable event, establishing the Treaty on a permanent basis and improving trust and co-operation in the world. Further accessions to the Treaty would now be welcome as positive steps towards the universalization of the principles of nuclear non-proliferation.

64. The extension of the NPT had been accompanied by an important decision on principles and objectives. In addition, there had been a general call for the Conference on Disarmament to complete negotiations on a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996, and for the nuclear-weapon States to exercise the utmost restraint pending the entry into force of such a treaty. Regrettably, no substantial progress had been made in Geneva on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and every effort should be made to overcome the stalemate as soon as possible.

65. The Agency's safeguards programme was the main instrument for combating nuclear proliferation and for assessing the correct implementation of the NPT. Although the programme had produced positive results in earlier years, new situations had arisen calling for further enhancement of the Agency's financial and human resources to enable it to intervene as appropriate. In that context, Italy welcomed Programme 93+2 and supported the principle of special inspections in countries that failed to meet their obligations. For its part, Italy had notified the Director General of all exports of nuclear materials.

66. Italy commended the United States of America for the Agreed Framework negotiated with the DPRK and had decided to provide financial and other support for the consortium established to implement that agreement. As the current holder of the Presidency of the United Nations Security Council, his country also attached the utmost importance to the

delicate issue of Iraq's past nuclear programmes and welcomed the results of the recent missions by the Agency's Action Team.

67. Nuclear safety in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS remained a crucial concern. Following the strong commitment to nuclear safety reiterated at the G-7 summits in Naples and in Halifax, further steps had been taken to enhance Western assistance and co-ordinate initiatives. Short-term actions should be continued, and longer-term ones should be undertaken on a country-by-country basis with a view to encouraging the early shutdown of higher-risk reactors. In that context, he wholeheartedly associated himself with the delegate of Spain in welcoming President Kuchma's decision to close the Chernobyl nuclear power station by the year 2000 as an indication of the Ukrainian Government's willingness to respond to the concerns of the international community.

68. Generally speaking, there was an urgent need to maintain and promote initiatives to improve the safety levels of nuclear power systems, particularly reactors designed in the former Soviet Union. Co-operation with Russia, as the chief depository of design and operating skills for those reactors, was crucial. In the absence of adequate determination to tackle the situation promptly, the deterioration of safety levels could become an even graver source of concern for the international community. Italy appreciated the work done by the Agency in that field and assigned great importance to the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Convention which it hoped to ratify soon. It also looked forward to the completion of the preparatory work on an agreed draft of a convention on the safety of waste management.

69. From 1 January 1996, responsibility for the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste would be handed over to UNESCO. The Agency could be proud of the Centre's long history and its achievements in disseminating scientific knowledge throughout the world, particularly to developing countries. Under the directorship of Professor Miguel A. Virasoro, he trusted the Centre would continue to enjoy the general appreciation it had earned under Professor Abdus Salam.

70. The Italian Government had created a new environmental protection agency two years previously which also acted as the regulatory body in the field of nuclear energy safety.

Together with the existing agency for energy, that body would continue Italy's valued collaboration with the IAEA in scientific and technical fields of common interest.

71. Mr. VAJDA (Hungary), after endorsing the comments made by the delegate of Spain on behalf of the European Union and other associated countries including Hungary, and after welcoming the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia as new members of the Agency, said that the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations was a particularly appropriate time to welcome the indefinite extension of the NPT, which not only promoted international security and stability but also served as a solid basis for peaceful nuclear co-operation among nations, and as means to define a new system of international relations.

72. Hungary was convinced that only an effective safeguards system could provide reliable assurances about the peaceful nature of a country's nuclear activities and had therefore always been a strong and committed advocate of strengthening that system. It supported the measures of Programme 93+2 aimed at strengthening the Agency's safeguards which had been adopted by the Board of Governors and would fully co-operate with the Agency in their implementation.

73. His country had consistently supported the Agency's activities relating to full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions on Iraq and, in the light of the documents recently released by the Iraqi authorities, urged the Agency to analyse and assess the situation and to continue the monitoring and verification process.

74. Hungary had been pleased to note that the Agency's technical team had been able to remain in the DPRK and carry out its task under the safeguards agreement. Although he was aware that the provisions of the Agreed Framework had yet to be fully implemented, he hoped that the Agency would soon be able to perform all the required activities.

75. The illicit trafficking and smuggling of nuclear material was a new phenomenon that posed serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime and was a danger that should be eliminated. A system of enhanced physical protection for nuclear materials should be introduced in every country, and the Agency had an important role to play in facilitating international co-operation in that area. In that connection, Hungary welcomed the

establishment of a consolidated data base providing a reliable source of information that would help Member States and the Agency to assess the real extent of the problem of illicit trafficking. Hungary was ready to co-operate with the Agency in that respect and encouraged all Member States to do the same.

76. Nuclear power remained an indispensable part of the energy supply worldwide, and in Hungary it contributed significantly to meeting the needs for electricity generation. Hungary was aware that the development of nuclear safety was an on-going task for all countries. On a national level, the safety of the Paks nuclear power plant had recently been confirmed by an ASSET follow-up session, and the AGNES project to reassess the safety of that plant had been completed and had concluded that it met the safety standards of Western nuclear power plants of the same age. Some further safety enhancement measures and additional activities had been recommended in the final report. Seismic safety upgrading remained an important problem and was one of the most extensive and costly safety enhancements projects for the next five years, and judging from the previous two years' experience, Agency support would undoubtedly be essential for its success.

77. With the transition to a market economy, privatization of the Hungarian energy sector was imminent. In that connection and with regard to the legislative aspect of nuclear safety in Hungary, a new law on nuclear energy, addressing the problems of liability, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, decommissioning and funding, was under preparation and Hungary wished to thank the Agency and the NEA for their assistance in that endeavour. Furthermore, Hungary was pleased to note that a large number of countries had become parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. His Government had signed and ratified that Convention and was determined to ensure its full implementation.

78. A national radioactive waste management project had been launched under which possible sites for the disposal of low- and intermediate-level waste were to be identified by 1996, and international tenders had been issued to find the most appropriate technology for reducing the quantity of radioactive waste. Construction work on an interim spent fuel storage facility at Paks had commenced, in consultation with the Agency. The implementation of the national radioactive waste management project would be facilitated by appropriate international legal instruments and Hungary hoped for the early conclusion of a

convention on the safety of radioactive waste management in the form of an incentive convention on the lines of the Nuclear Safety Convention.

79. His Government looked forward to the diplomatic conference on the revision of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage which was to be held in 1996, but wished to caution that the conference could not succeed without the political will of all Member States.

80. The Agency's Annual Report for 1994 bore witness to the diversity and value of its activities in all fields of nuclear energy application. The Agency had met its statutory obligations and had improved its technical co-operation activities by developing new initiatives. His delegation welcomed the reduction in the number of operational projects with a view to focusing on fewer and better projects while continuing to meet ad hoc requests. He also strongly supported the extension of the Model Project concept, including the Hungarian Model Project, because of the high implementation rate, impact and effectiveness achieved.

81. His country welcomed the establishment of SAGTAC and hoped that it would assist in finding new, innovative and effective means of improving technical assistance and co-operation. Aware that that activity depended to a large extent on the making and fulfilment of pledges, and to give an indication of its commitment to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, his Government had decided to pledge a voluntary contribution corresponding to its full share of the 1996 target for the TCF.

82. Mr. CONNOLLY (Ireland), endorsing the statement made earlier on behalf of the European Union, recalled that at the thirty-eighth session of the General Conference he had stated that his country wished to see the NPT extended indefinitely and strengthened at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, with improved reviews of implementation and new accessions which would bring it closer to universality. From that perspective, the decisions adopted by the Conference without a vote on 11 May undoubtedly represented a significant achievement. The Irish Government attached the utmost importance to those decisions and would hold fast to them in their entirety in the period ahead.

83. Those decisions were of vital importance for the Agency. The indefinite extension of the NPT secured the future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime which was anchored in the Agency's safeguards system. With the permanence of that system assured, the Agency was better placed to face both existing and new proliferation challenges, and should seize the opportunities now opened up.

84. The agreed arrangements for future five-yearly reviews of implementation of the Treaty would make all States Parties more accountable in the future and the agreed principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament set out, inter alia, a programme of action in nuclear disarmament to which Ireland attached the highest importance. That programme was centred on the completion in 1996 of a CTBT, immediate commencement of negotiations on and early conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate aim of eliminating them - an aim which was a crucial one accepted by all States Parties and should be the core of all future work in that area.

85. With the Treaty extended indefinitely, there was a consequential continuing obligation on all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue nuclear disarmament, and there was a new tangible standard, in the principles and objectives, by which to measure progress towards nuclear disarmament. It was to be hoped that action pursuant to the NPT Conference commitments would consolidate the progress made to date and promote accelerated progress in the future.

86. The NPT Conference was important for the Agency in specific ways. The reports of Main Committees II and III, as adopted by the Plenary, reflected the understandings reached among States Parties to the Treaty on the full range of issues addressed in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on virtually all aspects of the safeguards system, and therefore deserved close attention from all IAEA Member States. He urged all delegations to ensure that ways be found to retain and consolidate the very large measure of consensus achieved in those committees. It was regrettable that it had not proved possible to conclude by agreement the fifth review of implementation of the Treaty.

87. The agreed principles and objectives also contained significant statements on safeguards and on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which had been accepted without a vote at the NPT Conference. The reports drawn up at the Conference and the formulations on those issues were a new and a valuable resource for the Agency's work and it was to be hoped that Agency members would draw on that resource to provide fresh impetus to deliberations both in the General Conference and in the Board of Governors. The ideas contained in those documents should also inform and influence the ongoing work of technical experts and the various programmes executed by the Secretariat.

88. Events since the Review and Extension Conference had vividly demonstrated the strength of international feeling against nuclear weapons testing. Many Governments, including his own, had made their strong opposition to renewed weapons testing quite clear and it was to be hoped that, pending the completion in 1996 of a truly comprehensive test ban treaty, all nuclear-weapon States would exercise the utmost restraint, as the NPT Conference, with their agreement, had enjoined upon them. Everyone concerned would have to play their part in rekindling the hopes and expectations raised by the NPT Conference: the scale of the challenges ahead in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety demanded no less.

89. With regard to the question of nuclear safety in a global context, the existence of vast quantities of separated fissile plutonium and highly enriched uranium worldwide arising from the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the reprocessing of spent fuel continued to be a cause of great concern to his Government. Reprocessing brought serious hazards both from a safety and safeguards point of view, owing to the growing stockpile of and trade in plutonium for which there was no immediate use. That was an unsatisfactory and dangerous state of affairs on which the Agency should take urgent action with a view to ensuring a significant reduction in the amount of plutonium and greater international surveillance of all separated fissile materials. Ireland's exposure to that unsatisfactory situation was highlighted because of the development so close to it of the world's largest reprocessing plant at Sellafield in the United Kingdom where both fissile material and waste were stored.

90. On the question of the operational safety of nuclear installations, the signing of the Nuclear Safety Convention by so many governments in 1994 had been extremely satisfactory,

even though its scope was limited to civil nuclear power plants. It was nevertheless a valuable first step and swift action should now be taken to prepare a convention on radioactive waste management, which should include provisions covering the safety of spent fuel reprocessing facilities; there could be no justification for the exclusion of spent fuel on the pretext that it was not waste. Spent fuel contained both waste and reusable material and as such should fall within the scope of the convention.

91. Another major concern to be addressed related to the level of protection to be afforded to neighbouring non-nuclear countries. The relevant Agency provision on that subject allowed a Member State with a waste facility to impose on a neighbour any effects which were acceptable within the country of origin. That was unfair and totally unacceptable, and Ireland would argue for more equitable treatment and consideration of neighbouring countries in the convention.

92. Ireland remained deeply concerned at the continued growth of nuclear activities at Sellafield, which included reactors, a reprocessing plant, and storage and other nuclear facilities. The concentration of so much nuclear material and activity on one site increased the risks inherent in the nuclear cycle and therefore also the risks to Ireland. Should his country suffer from an accident at that or any other site, there would be no satisfactory system for providing compensation.

93. With regard to liability and compensation for damage to health and the environment in the event of a nuclear accident, it had been evident since Chernobyl that the existing nuclear liability regime was seriously deficient in many respects. Ireland attached great importance to having a modern, improved international regime which would provide adequate, fair and prompt compensation for damage to health and the environment. The forthcoming tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident made it politically imperative for the Agency to reach an early agreement on that matter.

94. Ireland welcomed the efforts of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage over the past two years to follow an integrated approach in dealing both with amendments to the 1963 Vienna Convention and with the elaboration of a supplementary funding convention. It was concerned, however, over the stalemate which had lately

developed and felt that a sense of urgency needed to be imposed on the process by scheduling a diplomatic conference in 1996. While a revised Vienna Convention in itself would be an important element in an international nuclear liability regime, it would not alone contain adequate compensation provisions, particularly where transboundary nuclear damage occurred. The integrated work on both elements should therefore be vigorously pursued over the coming months in order to finalize texts and facilitate the convening of a conference in 1996.

95. Mr. AL-NOWAISER (Saudi Arabia), having welcomed the new Members of the Agency, noted with appreciation the various activities undertaken by the Agency since the previous session of the General Conference with a view to promoting its objectives and meeting its goals. The Agency had many important tasks and had to be ready to respond to unforeseen events and to deal with new challenges.

96. His delegation particularly commended the Agency on its activities to extend the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in various areas, such as industry, agriculture and medicine; its work in developing and promulgating standards or norms to improve nuclear safety; its efforts to establish an international nuclear liability regime; and the measures taken to combat illegal trafficking in nuclear materials. He called on Member States to support the Agency in its work and to make available the necessary financing, noting that extrabudgetary contributions were extremely important.

97. His Government endorsed the proposed initiatives to strengthen the Agency's technical co-operation activities, in particular the partnership-in-development concept and the adoption of an integrated and practical approach to the implementation of technical co-operation projects aimed at enhancing the social and economic impact of projects and improving the technical and scientific capabilities of the recipient countries in various fields of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with a view to enabling them to achieve sustainable development. Saudi Arabia also welcomed the establishment of SAGTAC to evaluate and give advice on the Agency's strategy and policy in that area.

98. With regard to the financing of technical assistance, he noted that there had been extensive discussions and that financial constraints made it difficult for the Agency to respond

to the needs of developing Member States and even more difficult for it to provide assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency and assistance for urgent humanitarian needs to non-Member States. The problems associated with contributions to the TCF needed to be studied very carefully by Member States and the Secretariat in order to find a way of ensuring that the Agency's technical co-operation activities could be fully implemented. Financial difficulties did not affect the TCF alone. Document GC(39)/INF/20 indicated that a large number of Member States had not paid their Regular Budget contributions for 1995. If the Agency was to be in a position to carry out its mandate successfully, Member States' assessed contributions had to be paid in a timely fashion.

99. Safeguards were essential to ensure that nuclear material was not diverted to military purposes from peaceful activities. The establishment of a comprehensive safeguards system would strengthen mutual trust between countries and promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by allowing countries to exchange their know-how. International safeguards could also play a crucial role in the disarmament process. It was particularly regrettable that nuclear tests were still being carried out, and his delegation appealed to the countries concerned to put a stop to such tests. Saudi Arabia hoped that a CTBT would be concluded by the middle of 1996. As to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, that was contingent upon the accession of all countries in the region to the NPT and the application of safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region.

100. Turning to some of the other items on the General Conference's agenda, he said that his delegation particularly welcomed the Agency's activities in connection with the plan for producing potable water economically and the extensive use of isotope hydrology for water resources management. Those two related subjects were extremely important and his delegation hoped that the Agency would continue its work in that area and increase its co-operation with other organizations. As to the financing of safeguards, the financing of technical assistance, and the amendment of Article VI of the Statute, those were all issues that had been discussed at great length. It was to be hoped that the various informal groups studying those extremely important issues would soon be able to find lasting solutions.

101. Mr. ZENARI (Holy See) said that his authorities too welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT and the strong commitment of all parties to its full implementation.

In view of the important role given to the Agency within the framework of the Treaty, States Parties would have to co-operate and accept the Agency's safeguards if the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world was to be achieved.

102. The purpose of the Agency as defined in its Statute was "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity". With the increased environmental awareness in the world, the continued validity of those goals was coming to be seen as an ethical question, like the control of nuclear proliferation. The precedence of ethics over technology was based on the precedence of man over the structures created by him. "Respect for life requires that science and technology should always be at the service of man and his integral development", as Pope John Paul II had put it in *Evangelium Vitae* No. 81. Progress could not be ethically justified unless it was sustained by nature and gave priority to human needs.

103. In previous decades, nuclear energy had played an important role for many countries by promising fast economic growth, but more recently it had come to be perceived by many people as a growing threat to life as such. All countries and the international community as a whole must acknowledge both sides of the problem, the hopes and the concerns, and assume their share of the responsibility for it.

104. However, responsibility presupposed awareness of and ability to assess the consequences, which in turn required the acquisition of both technical and ethical knowledge. When fixing their development goals, States should not be guided by numerical efficiency alone, but should take into account qualitative considerations and human concerns. They were called upon to inform their citizens openly and objectively and to set adequate ethical standards for technical activities.

105. The specific dangers of nuclear technology had to be faced realistically, and human limitations and frailties needed to be borne in mind in the international regulation of nuclear energy. Thus, political changes during recent years had led to a reduction in nuclear armaments and to the opening of borders, developments which together could give adventurers and swindlers an opportunity to smuggle fissionable material. Conflicts during past years had shown the danger of failing to separate civil from military projects. Safety

improvements and the upgrading of ageing reactors also presented difficulties and called for a transparent and objective information policy. With regard to liability for nuclear damage, proper compensation was a question of justice, sharing of risks one of solidarity, and risk assessment one of honesty. Acts whose consequences might exceed the lifespan of many generations required exceptional safety measures. Likewise, errors and unforeseen developments had to be taken into account in the management of radioactive waste.

106. As the economic and widespread use of renewable energy sources was not yet feasible, energy production policies should be developed for the shared benefit of all mankind while preserving the environment and energy sources for the future. Accordingly, a holistic approach to the promotion of nuclear energy was required, rather than concentration solely on technical aspects of safety.

107. The production and consumption of fossil energy needed to be drastically reduced, not only because of the limited supply but mainly because of its environmental impact. There was also an increasing awareness of the need for energy saving. Over and above those considerations, however, was the ethical principle whereby an action could only be justified if the harmful side-effects or risks were less than the harm that would come from omitting the action.

108. The almost universal membership of the Agency showed that the majority of countries considered atomic energy a suitable direction for the future or at least a necessary supplement to traditional sources of energy. Although safety and protection measures were greater than in most other industries, citizens had the right to demand a full assessment of the risks; the ability of the Agency to cope with nuclear hazards therefore had to be maintained and strengthened. An efficient international authority was needed not just to guarantee non-proliferation but also to help avoid the dangers of crime, negligence, human failure and ignorance, and all efforts to further such aims were to be encouraged.

109. Mr. KUTAS (Lithuania), after welcoming the new Members of the Agency, said it was to be hoped that the recent indefinite extension of the NPT would ultimately result in the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Lithuania had acceded to the NPT in 1991 and would consistently carry out its obligations.

110. The recent news about nuclear tests was a cause for grave concern to his delegation, which considered that the CTBT discussions should be intensified with a view to early signature and that all countries, particularly those with nuclear-weapons potential, should be urged to act responsibly and to respect international agreements, bearing in mind that there were no State boundaries where nuclear hazards were concerned, as the tragic consequences of the operation of unsafe nuclear installations in Chernobyl had demonstrated.

111. Nuclear-generated electricity predominated in some countries, including Lithuania, where it currently accounted for over 88% of total electric power. The country had one nuclear power plant at Ignalina, with two RBMK units having a total capacity of 2500 MW. Given that such reactors were considered to be among the more hazardous designs, Lithuania assigned high priority to safety improvement at Ignalina. An extensive safety programme was already under way, thanks largely to financial assistance from Sweden and to Swedish research and development. In addition, Lithuania had received an ECU 33 million grant from the EBRD Nuclear Safety Account, which covered 18 projects. Ignalina's reactors were third-generation RBMKs, and consequently safer than older Soviet-designed reactors, but the implementation of the safety improvement programme should further enhance their safety and ultimately enable Ignalina to operate at an acceptable safety level for its entire design lifetime. Since Lithuania was poor in primary energy sources, it was economically advisable for the country to retain its nuclear power base in the future, and it was grateful to the donor countries and international organizations for the assistance provided to that end.

112. As confirmation of its commitment to nuclear safety improvement, Lithuania had recently acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the ratification process was now under way. It recognized that the implementation of that Convention would require great effort on the part of State institutions, nuclear power plant operators and the regulatory body. A key issue in Lithuania would be to expand the support infrastructure for nuclear research and development as a means of utilizing scientific co-operation more efficiently within the Agency framework.

113. His delegation supported the Agency's approach of discussing the financing of safeguards and technical assistance through informal working groups and open meetings. The question of Member States' contributions to those activities should be reviewed

periodically and a fair scale of assessment determined. In that context, the international obligations of Member States should be taken into consideration in assessing their financial capabilities. It should also be borne in mind that the real economic growth of many countries in transition to a market economy was much slower than had been anticipated some years previously.

114. The Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its safeguards system were much appreciated. Lithuania had done its best to implement the Secretariat's proposals on improved designation procedures and visa requirements for safeguards inspectors. Simplified designation procedures had already been accepted by the Government and the visa regime had been abolished for United Nations Laissez Passer holders to enable them to enter and transit the territory, thus paving the way for no-notice inspections.

115. Lithuania was in the process of establishing a legislative background for its energy sector. The revised version of the draft nuclear energy law, which included regulations on the physical protection of Ignalina, had recently been completed and the Government intended to accede to the relevant international conventions and agreements. His delegation also hoped that the efforts of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage to review the Vienna Convention would be successful and urged that thought be given at an early date to the funding question.

116. Lithuania had signed co-operation agreements with Canada and Poland earlier in the year and was preparing others with Russia, Belarus and Latvia. Its Resident Representative to the Agency had been appointed in November 1994.

117. An increasingly urgent issue in Lithuania was radioactive waste management, and particularly the disposal of spent fuel. In co-operation with a Swedish company, a radioactive waste management plan had been prepared taking into consideration the country's current waste management status, various proposals on waste handling issues, financial appraisals for project implementation, and aspects of project prioritization. Intermediate spent fuel storage projects were under discussion, and the delivery of metal casks for dry spent fuel storage was expected before the end of the year. The situation regarding spent

nuclear fuel disposal was less certain. That issue should be dealt with at the international level, where consideration might be given to the construction of nuclear fuel repositories in some but not necessarily all countries operating nuclear reactors.

118. Mr. de OURO-PRETO (Brazil) said that the end of the Cold War had removed the threat of a nuclear holocaust which had haunted the world for the last half-century. The international community was optimistic that peace and co-operation would emerge in the world instead of the dangers of vast nuclear arsenals capable of wiping out life on Earth. While perils remained - as had been witnessed in the recent outbreak of regional conflicts and domestic upheavals - they were perils of a different nature and insignificant compared with the aftermath of a nuclear war.

119. Notwithstanding its indisputable contribution to non-proliferation the NPT had flaws recognized by even its greatest supporters. Its chief shortcoming was that it legitimized an asymmetry between the nuclear and the non-nuclear States. It seemed illogical that, while nuclear testing was taking place, non-nuclear-weapon States with safeguards agreements were being urged to accept highly intrusive measures under Part 2 of the Agency's Programme 93+2. The asymmetry was thus becoming more pronounced. Brazil's position was clear; it was wholeheartedly committed to non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. In 1994 the Tlatelolco Treaty had entered into force for Brazil, as had the Quadripartite Agreement for the application of safeguards. Implementation of the latter was proceeding smoothly. He hoped that in due course measures foreseen under Part 1 of Programme 93+2 would likewise be implemented. The reservations expressed by his delegation in that regard at the June 1995 meeting of the Board of Governors were, however, still valid, and a technical working group had been set up within ABACC to examine the technical implications of those measures for nuclear activities in Argentina and in Brazil. The Secretariat had no legal mandate under present safeguards agreements for the measures in Part 2 of Programme 93+2, which altered the safeguards approach adopted hitherto by promoting inspections in installations where no nuclear material existed. The current attitude of some nuclear-weapon States would make acceptance of those measures even more difficult, but his delegation was willing to engage in serious discussions regarding Part 2 measures and to renew its proposal, originally made at the June 1995 Board meeting that an

intergovernmental working group be set up to dismiss that matter. His delegation wished to participate in the development of any proposals in that regard. In the end, however, the most effective instrument for enhancement of the non-proliferation system lay in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States, for complete assurance that the goal of non-proliferation had been achieved depended upon the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

120. The Brazilian Government attached importance to improving co-ordination between ABACC and the Agency in the implementation of their tasks under the Quadripartite Agreement. That would improve results and reduce costs in line with one of the priorities of revision of the Agency's safeguards system - rationalization of expenditure. While Brazil was prepared to make a great effort to meet its obligations under the new scheme of safeguards financing, it also expected improvements in the efficiency of the safeguards system.

121. Development of a new technical co-operation strategy involving medium-term country plans and the use of Model Projects had great merits and the concept of result-oriented projects was commendable. In many cases, however, planning in strict conformity with national development objectives and priorities already existed on a national level. His Government therefore felt that technical co-operation priorities should continue to be established by the recipient countries. The interrelation between a future medium-term country planning system and the current biennial programming used by the Agency deserved careful study to ensure that the best possible results in terms of the efficacy and efficiency of the technical co-operation programme were obtained. Special attention should be given to projects aimed at enhancing the scientific and infrastructure development of Member States. Brazil welcomed the establishment of SAGTAC, which it believed would contribute to the improvement of the Agency's technical co-operation activities, and intended to co-operate fully with it. With respect to the financing of technical assistance, his country continued to favour the system based on voluntary contributions which had hitherto yielded satisfactory results.

122. Brazil was pleased with the growing number of countries which were signing and ratifying the Convention on Nuclear Safety, having itself taken steps towards approval of the Convention with a view to early ratification. He reaffirmed Brazil's readiness to take an

active part in future discussions on the rules of procedure and the financial rules of the Convention.

123. His country had participated in preparatory work to draw up a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. However, it feared that greater impetus would be required in order to accomplish that important task. Recalling that the management of nuclear waste was a matter of worldwide concern, he appealed to delegations involved in discussions on a new draft convention to spare no effort in finding consensus solutions to the outstanding problems.

124. The Brazilian Government welcomed the recent attention given by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage to revision of the Vienna Convention and to finding general agreement on a draft convention on supplemental funding. Nevertheless, progress still seemed too slow, particularly on the latter question, to meet the deadline for convening a diplomatic conference that would deal with both issues in the spring of 1996. Priority should be given, in strict conformity with the mandate given to the Standing Committee, to revision of the Vienna Convention.

125. His delegation commended the Director General on measures already taken to increase the number of staff from developing countries and the representation of women in the Secretariat. Much, however, remained to be done in that area, particularly with regard to posts subject to geographical distribution. A wide range of activities, including for example administrative ones, should be taken into consideration in placing suitable candidates, and special attention should be paid to qualitative improvements.

126. Ms. TODOROVA (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) joined previous speakers in welcoming the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia. Noting the Agency's impressive record of achievements, she said that her country was nevertheless in favour of initiatives to improve the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety. In that context, she urged countries with nuclear power plants at critically low safety levels to co-operate closely with the Agency in implementing safety measures and standards. Her country also attached great importance to the Agency's work on radiation protection and radioactive waste management and welcomed the preparation of a country profile for each

recipient Member State as a means of ensuring that safety and waste management infrastructures were commensurate with levels of utilization of ionizing radiation.

127. The new initiatives in technical co-operation would make a significant contribution to national nuclear programmes. An improvement in regional co-operation on problems of common interest was particularly important in that context. Her country appreciated the valuable technical assistance it had received in the areas of animal production, nuclear medicine and, in particular, radiation protection, where strengthening the country's infrastructure was a top priority. As a country in transition, it also needed to introduce a new approach to energy planning and analysis and looked forward to co-operating with the Agency in developing the different energy options, taking into account health and environmental planning considerations.

128. Finally, she invited the Agency to organize training programmes in her country in areas where appropriate facilities and professionals were available.

129. Mr. BOERSNERSTEDER (Venezuela), having welcomed the new members and commended the Secretariat on its work over the past year, said that his country fully endorsed GRULAC's support for the election of Chile and Nicaragua to the Board of Governors. Venezuela had taken part in the discussions on amendment of Article VI of the Statute and, in line with its view on reform of the United Nations system as a whole, felt that the Board should be expanded to take account of recent changes which had taken place in the world and to strengthen the representation of the various regions particularly the emerging and developing areas, so that all would be represented in accordance with their actual importance.

130. Venezuela welcomed the efforts made to increase the number of the Secretariat's staff from developing countries and to raise the proportion of women. As a developing country which, over the past 35 years, had seen a noteworthy increase in the representation of women in its own professions, in government and in the field of science, Venezuela urged the Agency to continue its efforts in that direction.

131. With regard to the financing of technical co-operation and safeguards activities, his delegation was concerned that precedence might be given to the latter to the detriment of the

former. Both activities were equally vital. The world was at risk without nuclear safeguards but, on the other hand, without assistance in socio-economic development the gulf between rich and poor regions would increase even further. In the absence of any magic formula, Venezuela considered that efforts should be stepped up to achieve equally predictable financing for technical co-operation as for safeguards. General Conference resolution GC(XXV)/388, adopted in 1981, should serve as the guideline.

132. Venezuela attached great importance to the technical assistance it received from the Agency. A number of co-operation projects were being carried out within the framework of ARCAL in the fields of medicine, agriculture, industrial development, radiation protection and scientific research and teaching. He reaffirmed his country's support for ARCAL and thanked the Agency for its contribution to that regional co-operative effort.

133. The Agency's safeguards activities were being carried out in the context of a world that had made significant progress towards complete cessation of nuclear activities for non-peaceful purposes. In that regard, Venezuela congratulated Cuba on its decision to join the Tlatelolco Treaty in March 1995. With the accession of Cuba, Latin America and the Caribbean had become the largest and most populous denuclearized region in the world, although the African countries had also made commendable progress towards the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

134. Important advances had also been made at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which had decided by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely, and had also strongly endorsed the international community's efforts to adopt a CTBT in 1996, in accordance with the historic UN General Assembly resolution 48/70 of December 1993.

135. A discordant element in the generally encouraging picture was the continuation of nuclear tests by certain States. Whatever the justification, resumption of tests ran counter to the spirit of the NPT, weakened ongoing efforts towards agreeing on a CTBT in 1996, and discouraged universal accession to such an instrument. Venezuela appealed to those States which had testing programmes to refrain from implementing them.

136. With its long record of active interest in the problems of peace and disarmament, Venezuela strongly supported the Agency's safeguards activities, which were vital for

international security and the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. At the same time, a perfect balance needed to be maintained between those security measures and efforts aimed at an equitable transfer of technologies to further development and well-being. Venezuela was confident in the Agency and its ability to meet those parallel commitments through its safeguards and technical co-operation activities.

137. Mr. PUCCIO HUIDOBRO (Chile), after welcoming the new members, said that the past year had seen Chile's accession to the NPT and the conclusion and entry into force of a comprehensive safeguards agreement between Chile and the Agency. Those major accomplishments were the latest in a series of steps taken by his Government since 1990 as part of a national policy aimed at promoting the non-proliferation and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. His Government noted with great satisfaction that the latter objective had now been achieved for almost the entire region of Latin America and the Caribbean.

138. His Government had long shared the convictions expressed in the preamble of the NPT on the need to avert the danger of a nuclear war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As encumbrances belonging to a world order which the international community was trying to put behind it, nuclear weapons could and should not be considered an instrument conducive to achieving security. In that regard, one of the main responsibilities facing the international community was to end the nuclear arms race and, implement effective nuclear disarmament measures, including a permanent halt to all nuclear-weapons testing as soon as possible, the cessation of nuclear weapons manufacture, the destruction of stocks of such weapons and their removal from national arsenals.

139. Chile fully supported the safeguards objectives of the Agency and its Member States, though their achievement should not hinder countries' legitimate economic or technological development or international co-operation in the area of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. It was essential for the safeguards system to be objective, transparent and capable of inspiring real confidence regarding the non-existence of clandestine nuclear-weapons programmes. The credibility of the safeguards system was a crucial element in advancing disarmament. In that regard, he expressed his country's appreciation of the Secretariat's

valuable efforts to strengthen the system, and its support for the measures which had been approved for that purpose. As to the measures over which concerns remained, Chile was confident that consultations between the Secretariat and Member States would soon lead to solutions for overcoming those concerns.

140. His country welcomed the extension of the NPT and the approval of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. It should now be possible to leave behind the nuclear threat and offer future generations a safer and cleaner world less threatening to human health and the environment. However, some recent developments had been cause for concern, in particular the numerous cases of illegal trafficking in nuclear material and the testing of nuclear weapons despite worldwide opposition.

141. In view of the significant progress made since the end of the Cold War in the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and in non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, including the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing on the part of the majority of nuclear powers, his country deplored the implicit significance and legitimacy which some States apparently attributed to nuclear weapons. The views of the overwhelming majority of countries on the matter were clear. Chile, for its part, objected strongly to the recent tests carried out by China and France and urged those countries to take into consideration the international community's virtually unanimous opposition to the tests.

142. With regard to technical co-operation, Chile intended to settle its outstanding financial obligations immediately and had pledged its share of the TCF target for 1996. His Government urged other Member States to do likewise, not only because it considered that technical co-operation should be given high priority, but also out of concern that in future it might decline to a level below zero real growth, as suggested in the statements made by certain major donor countries. Such a development would create an undesirable imbalance in the Agency's activities. Chile endorsed the position adopted by the Group of 77 in connection with the strengthening of the Agency's technical co-operation activities and welcomed the establishment of SAGTAC,¹ to which it intended to extend its full co-operation..

143. His Government had now approved Chile's National Nuclear Development Plan, one of whose functions, in line with the recommendations of the Agency's Department of Technical Co-operation, was to provide a national framework for technical co-operation activities to be concentrated more effectively. The Plan would also act as the basis for carrying out Chile's future policy on strengthening the applications of nuclear technology.

144. In that context, he emphasized that peaceful nuclear technology was a tool for solving problems, to be used alongside other complementary technologies. An approach which failed to recognize that important factor would make it inordinately difficult to identify the most viable and relevant projects and introduce unnecessary rigidity for countries attempting to further their technological development. Chile therefore considered that the Agency's technical co-operation policies should be revised with a view to improving the support for and utilization of nuclear applications and facilitating their transfer to the different national sectors.

145. With regard to regional co-operation, Chile fully endorsed the support for the ARCAL programme expressed by GRULAC.

146. In conclusion, he commended the Director General and the Secretariat for the quality and effectiveness of their work, which rightly entitled the Agency to a position of prominence within the United Nations family.

147. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar), having welcomed the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia as new members of the Agency, noted that the NPT Review and Extension Conference, at which the Treaty had been indefinitely extended, had been one of the most important events that had taken place since the previous session of the General Conference. Universal adherence to the NPT was the basis for international peace and security and he therefore urged all Member States to accede to the Treaty. Within the non-proliferation regime, the Agency's safeguards system played a vital role in guaranteeing the effectiveness of the NPT.

148. The establishment of peace and stability in the Middle East required the dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction in order to create a zone free of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The continuation by Israel of its nuclear programme outside the

non-proliferation system and its refusal to accede to the NPT and to submit its nuclear facilities to the safeguards system threatened peace in the region and undermined the credibility and universality of the NPT. Qatar strongly supported the Director General's efforts to intensify negotiations between the Agency and the countries of the Middle East aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

149. Turning to the Agency's technical assistance activities, he said it was important to strengthen those activities in order to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in areas such as agriculture, environmental protection, human and animal health and food preservation. As to water resources, he noted that water shortages might very well become a cause of conflict in the world and that the application of nuclear techniques for the desalination of sea water and the exploration of water availability was therefore of crucial importance. In order to enable the Agency to implement its technical co-operation projects, it was necessary for all Member States, particularly the industrialized countries, to take the necessary measures to ensure that assured and stable financial resources were available, either through the Regular Budget or through funds earmarked for that purpose.

150. With regard to the allocation of technical co-operation resources, he noted the Arab region's modest share and called upon the Agency to show more interest in technical co-operation projects in Arab States, to adapt its programmes to the region's development requirements and to provide training and fellowships in order to establish teams of qualified Arab experts able to apply nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes and to enhance the standard of living of the peoples of the region.

151. With the many political and regional changes of the last two decades, it was time for the Agency to amend its Statute in order to allow a greater number of States to participate in its decision-making bodies and to ensure a fairer distribution of safeguards costs among Member States.

152. Mr. EL-FEKI (Egypt) joined other speakers in welcoming the new members and in highlighting the importance of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. His country strongly supported the NPT, which it considered to be essential in order to ensure international peace and security, and welcomed the fact that the Review and Extension

Conference had called upon all States in the Middle East to accede to the Treaty and to take practical steps to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, his country was concerned at the NPT's lack of universality and its slowness in bringing about nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI. Furthermore, it was to be regretted that the Treaty did not provide comprehensive and effective security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby creating an imbalance in the responsibilities and rights of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

153. Egypt was a strong advocate of disarmament in the Middle East and had launched an initiative in 1990 to make the region a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by consensus at the Review and Extension Conference highlighted the importance of nuclear disarmament efforts in the region. The positive developments that were occurring in the Middle East made it even more necessary than ever before to strengthen regional security and take advantage of the existing opportunities for peace. Peace and security in the region had to be based on the principle of equal rights and obligations at a minimum level of armaments.

154. Egypt's position was based not on opposition to any one State, but on a conviction that the elimination of weapons of mass destruction was in the interest of all peoples in the region. The presence of an unsafeguarded nuclear programme on its eastern borders posed a serious threat to Egypt, which had therefore held extensive consultations with regional and international partners aimed at developing international or regional arrangements to protect the Middle East from the dangers of nuclear weapons. It was essential that all countries of the region should accede to the NPT and submit all their nuclear installations to comprehensive Agency safeguards. Egypt was ready to respond to the preliminary steps taken by Israel if those steps paved the way for Israel's accession to the NPT and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Egypt had proposed the initiation of formal negotiations on a multilateral approach towards the establishment of the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and had further proposed that all States in the region should adhere to international agreements in the field of the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons within a specific time frame

in line with the peace agreements between Israel and the parties to the peace process in the Middle East. Egypt had made those proposals in a positive spirit with the understanding that Israel should take immediate practical steps to initiate negotiations on the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction from the region and that Israel should find a compromise between its security considerations and its legal commitments in the field of non-proliferation. Constant doubts about the Israeli nuclear programme would only lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region and the danger of a regional arms race.

155. His delegation noted with interest the positive role played by the Agency in the multilateral working group on arms control and regional security and had read with interest the Director General's report on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. The Director General should continue his consultations with the countries of the region to facilitate the comprehensive application of safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region and the preparation of model verification agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with General Conference resolutions. The Director General should also consider the convening of a seminar of experts from the region to prepare a draft treaty.

156. Turning to developments in the African region, he said Egypt was very pleased to see that the objective announced in the Declaration made at the first session of the OAU held in Cairo in 1964 would soon be achieved and that Africa was about to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The endorsement of the draft text of a treaty establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone by the OAU Council of Ministers and the African Heads of State in June was a historic achievement for Africa and a great incentive for countries in the Middle East, particularly in view of the political and geographical links between the two regions.

157. The swift conclusion and entry into force of a CTBT would enhance the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the Agency would be a suitable body for the verification of such a treaty. However, progress in that area was rather slow, especially with regard to the main issues requiring political will and decisions. That was particularly regrettable as it had been expected that the extension of the NPT would serve as an incentive for the achievement of that goal. Moreover, the nuclear tests that were currently being conducted were at

variance with the objective of comprehensive nuclear disarmament sought by the international community and the parties to the NPT.

158. The Agency's promotional activities were just as important as its verification activities and it was essential to maintain a balance between the two areas and to guarantee assured resources for the Agency's technical co-operation programme. For its part, Egypt was convinced of the great potential of nuclear energy and was making increasing use of it for peaceful purposes. Nuclear power was one of the most important options as a future source of electricity and Egypt was currently following world developments in the various new designs of power reactors, including small- and medium-size reactors, while giving special priority to safety and environmental issues and building the necessary infrastructure to meet future electricity requirements. The centre at El-Daba was being equipped with the necessary facilities for training and a project to construct a second multipurpose 22 MW research reactor at Inshas was under way.

159. Egypt was also continuing to prospect for nuclear raw materials and had started to evaluate reserves at some promising sites in the Eastern Desert and the Sinai Peninsula. It was also very interested in uranium ores from non-traditional sources, such as black sand and phosphate rocks, and had established a semi-industrial unit to extract uranium from phosphoric acid. Egypt attached particular importance to radiation protection and safe radioactive waste management and was studying suitable sites for repositories for low- and medium-level wastes. His country had gained experience in the sterilization of medical products and instruments and an electron accelerator had started operation for industrial purposes. Egypt's radioisotope production plants had been upgraded and the radioisotopes were being used for diagnosis, treatment and other purposes. In addition, with Agency assistance, Egypt had installed a cyclotron for isotope production.

160. Egypt was very interested in the use of nuclear techniques to increase agricultural production and to improve water and insecticide utilization in desert areas. The use of nuclear technology to evaluate groundwater resources in Africa and in Egypt and for the desalination of sea water was very important and his country was grateful to the Agency for its work in those areas. Mention should also be made of co-operation with Germany in

operating a tokamak research reactor at Inshas and the co-operation programme with Canada to establish an experimental heavy water production unit with an annual capacity of 20 kg.

161. In conclusion, he noted that Egypt paid great attention to training and had organized several training programmes for African countries under the AFRA programme and for Arab countries through the Arab Atomic Energy Agency and the regional centre for radioisotopes in various fields, including the use of radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture and industry.

162. Mr. GODWYLL (Ghana), welcoming Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia as members of the Agency, said that at a time when public expectations for a world devoid of weapons of mass destruction had been boosted by increasing support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the significance of institutions like the Agency, which had been charged with the responsibility of enforcing non-proliferation, could not be overemphasized.

163. The Government of Ghana, as a signatory of the NPT, maintained close co-operation with the Agency and accorded it its fullest support in carrying out its obligations. It also recognized the Agency's role in curtailing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but as a non-nuclear-weapon State it was of the view that attention should not only be focused on the horizontal spread of nuclear arsenals, but equally on the vertical proliferation and non-reduction of nuclear stockpiles by nuclear-weapon States.

164. At the recently concluded NPT Review and Extension Conference, there had been general agreement on the major contribution which the Treaty could make towards creating a safer environment now and in the future. His delegation therefore urged signatories of the Treaty to honour the spirit and principle of ultimate compromise that had made it possible to secure an indefinite extension of that Treaty.

165. His Government hoped that deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament would lead to the conclusion of a CTBT by 1996. The conclusion of that treaty was one of the prerequisites for ensuring greater rapport between States on disarmament and an effective mechanism for the promotion of confidence between States.

166. His delegation noted with extreme satisfaction the steady advancement towards the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone and was highly appreciative of the

Agency's continued assistance in that most crucial development for the region. It endorsed the proposal in the draft treaty to entrust verification responsibilities to the Agency and it was optimistic that, given the support for the treaty demonstrated by OAU Member States at the recent summit of African Heads of State, Africa would soon be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

167. Ghana had over the years enjoyed fruitful co-operation with the Agency and was grateful for the technical assistance which it received. A mark of that co-operation had been the commissioning of a nuclear research reactor and a gamma irradiation facility. The former, constructed in accordance with the appropriate Agency regulations, would be solely for health, agricultural and industrial purposes and in particular would serve the needs of the nuclear medicine and radiotherapy centre to be established for the improvement of diagnostic and therapeutic management of cancer and related diseases.

168. The full operation of the gamma irradiation facility would involve the commercial irradiation of medical items as well as agricultural products such as maize, cowpeas, yams and onions. Bearing in mind the significance of agriculture in the nation's economy, the Agency's assistance and support in that sector, and particularly its co-operation with Ghana's Institute of Biotechnology and Nuclear Agriculture, had been most beneficial.

169. In industry, the nuclear analytical techniques laboratories for non-destructive testing would help industrial establishments upgrade the quality of their products. A centre for advanced digital nuclear electronics which would cater for training in nuclear instruments and computer interfacing was to be established in the near future.

170. His Government's continued high interest in the Agency's activities, and especially technical programmes, had been demonstrated by the visit to the Agency in November 1994 of Ghana's First Lady, during which she had declared her full support for the establishment of the model radiotherapy centre in Ghana to help cancer patients not only in Ghana, but possibly in the subregion as well. She had also applauded the Agency's activities in promoting the practical application of nuclear energy.

171. His delegation recognized that the Agency's technical assistance programme required the commitment and support of all Member States and accordingly enjoined members to

continue to offer the Agency the necessary assistance to enable it to implement its programmes. The international community also needed to make a conscious effort to diminish the threat of self-destruction. The greatest danger lay in complacency and the delusion that the problems which had confronted the world in the 1980s no longer existed. While they might no longer exist in their previous form, the continued conflicts, civil wars and ethnic cleansing were indications that the attainment of world peace and security was still a long way off. Ghana nevertheless remained optimistic that despite the world's difficulties, the Agency, given the requisite support, would be able to carry out the tasks assigned to it and make its contribution towards the desired objective of world peace and stability.

172. Mr. COOK (New Zealand), welcoming the new members, said that while there had recently been unprecedented progress towards checking nuclear proliferation, new challenges had emerged and some old business remained unfinished. Earlier in the year, 178 Member States had agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely and thereby substantially to strengthen the global non-proliferation system, in which the Agency had a key role. The NPT was now clearly established as the cornerstone of international co-operation against nuclear proliferation. The few countries remaining outside the Treaty should reconsider their isolated position and accede to the Treaty, in their own best interests as well as to bring the goal of universal membership nearer.

173. One welcome aspect of the NPT Review and Extension Conference had been the confirmation that delegations unanimously held the Agency in high esteem for making an essential contribution through its safeguards and technical co-operation activities. Along with other members of the so-called "Vienna group", his country had asked for the consensus reached in New York on Articles III and IV of the Treaty to be circulated for information. The text contained many important observations on all aspects of the work of the Agency and his delegation commended it to the attention of all Member States.

174. As well as the extension decision, the NPT Conference had also adopted decisions on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a number of which had direct relevance to the work of the Agency. New Zealand was strongly committed to implementing the follow-up programme of that Conference, particularly in such areas as

wider support for nuclear-weapon-free zones, the achievement of a cut-off convention and the early completion of a CTBT.

175. In that connection, it was a matter of the utmost concern to New Zealand that, despite the clear outcome of the NPT Conference, two countries had since conducted nuclear tests. Those tests could in no way be considered to fall within the meaning of the agreement reached at the NPT Conference that the nuclear-weapon States would exercise "utmost restraint" on nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996. His Government had always been a strong opponent of nuclear testing wherever it occurred and believed that it was even more unacceptable in current circumstances. It had therefore vigorously condemned the recent tests by both France and China.

176. New Zealand fully supported the draft resolution on nuclear testing introduced by the Philippines on behalf of a large number of countries, including his own. The resolution was balanced and well focused, and specifically addressed two areas in which the Agency clearly had a particular interest and on which the international community would expect the General Conference to express its views. First of all, the resolution fell clearly within the Agency's responsibilities for the implementation of a global nuclear non-proliferation system and the promotion of international disarmament. The Agency's role in that area was expanding rapidly, particularly after the NPT extension decision, and it was entirely appropriate to address the issue of nuclear testing in that context. Secondly, the resolution dealt with nuclear safety, which was again a central part of the Agency's mandate. Many countries had serious concerns about the impact of nuclear testing on health, safety and the environment, and indeed such concerns had been the motivation for New Zealand's own recent submission to the International Court of Justice.

177. With such widespread international misgivings about the implications of testing for non-proliferation and nuclear safety, it was clearly not possible for the Agency to remain silent. The draft resolution constituted an appropriate response which should attract the broadest support of the General Conference and he accordingly commended it to all delegations.

178. Nuclear testing was but one challenge to the non-proliferation system. Other challenges, despite progress, had not yet been satisfactorily resolved. His delegation shared the concerns expressed by many at the recent revelations about how far Iraq had been prepared to violate its safeguards commitments in seeking to develop nuclear weapons. New Zealand supported the Agency's continued efforts to uncover the full details of Iraq's past nuclear-weapon programmes.

179. The Agreed Framework with the DPRK represented a major step forward in the problems surrounding that country. As a contributor to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, New Zealand welcomed the efforts of the United States in particular to stabilize a threatening situation and endorsed the Agency's activities in monitoring the freeze and implementing safeguards in the DPRK. His country looked forward to the DPRK's eventual return to full conformity with its safeguards agreement, which remained in force.

180. The ongoing work on strengthening safeguards was the result of the experience learned from problems such as those he had mentioned. New Zealand fully supported the proposals contained in Programme 93+2 for strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. It was pleased that Part 1 of that Programme had been adopted by the Board and looked forward to an early agreement on the remaining elements of the Programme.

181. New Zealand saw the Programme 93+2 measures, including those which might require additional legal authority, as an integral package. The additional Part 2 measures, such as expanded declarations and access for routine inspections to all relevant sites, were needed to produce complete results. Safeguards should be able to supply credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities and programmes and therefore, to remain effective, the safeguards system needed the support of all Member States in the full implementation of Programme 93+2.

182. His delegation welcomed the agreement reached at the recent meeting of the Board of Governors on the financing of safeguards and of technical co-operation. New Zealand had long been concerned that the present system of safeguards funding was less than fair. All countries, including his own, benefited equally from the international confidence and stability

created by an effective safeguards system. Although his country had no nuclear industry of its own, it had always been ready to shoulder its share of the costs of applying safeguards. It therefore appreciated the emerging greater readiness to move to a more equitable system of financing. The agreement reached was not ideal from New Zealand's point of view, but it was an acceptable compromise which represented a significant step forward.

183. Another issue of interest to his country was the current negotiating process to produce a convention on the safe management of nuclear waste. He was pleased that negotiations had started well and hoped, ultimately, to see a convention which attracted wide international support and built on established principles such as those contained in the Rio Declaration.

184. New Zealand had more concerns, however, about the negotiations on liability for nuclear damage. Time was running out for those negotiations, and it was important to inject a sense of political urgency into the process. An effective system of compensation, taking account of the concerns of non-nuclear countries about possible damage during, for example, the transport of nuclear material, was essential. The next meeting of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage would be critical in that it would have to produce results which could be presented to a diplomatic conference in 1996.

185. Earlier in the year, New Zealand had hosted the RCA mid-term review meeting. As a recent member and contributor to the RCA/IAEA/UNDP project, New Zealand placed particular value on the scientific links which it promoted among experts within the region. The RCA had proved itself a most effective mechanism for regional co-operation in the nuclear field.

186. Ms. NGUYEN THI HOI (Viet Nam), after welcoming the new members, said that since the previous session of the General Conference significant progress had been made in international co-operation to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and prevent nuclear proliferation. Her country welcomed in particular the indefinite extension of the NPT, which was a remarkable event signifying a healthy commitment to non-proliferation on the part of the international community.

187. Viet Nam shared the deep concerns expressed by other countries in the region of Asia and the Pacific with regard to nuclear testing and hoped that all States, particularly those with

nuclear weapons programmes, would actively contribute to the early conclusion of a CTBT. Moreover, Viet Nam strongly supported every initiative aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in its region.

188. In the year marking the 50th anniversary of its foundation as a Republic, Viet Nam had begun to create the necessary conditions for transforming itself into a modern industrialized nation. In particular, by joining ASEAN, normalizing relations with the United States and concluding a co-operation agreement with the European Union, it now enjoyed the most favourable opportunities in its history for achieving economic development and integration with its region and the rest of the world.

189. As a developing Member State, Viet Nam attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities and was pleased to note that the implementation rate had reached its highest-ever level in 1995. It welcomed the establishment of SAGTAC but noted with great concern the decrease in the level of funds available for technical co-operation. The financing of those activities should be given priority as they represented one of the Agency's main functions.

190. There was a growing demand for nuclear techniques in her country, particularly in industry, agriculture, human health and environmental protection. The National Atomic Energy Commission (VINATOM) continued to act as the focus for the transfer of technology from the Agency to meet the industrial sector's needs with regard to guidance, manpower training and the development of nuclear techniques. Groundwater and sedimentation studies using tracers, carried out with assistance from UNDP and the Agency, had yielded promising results. The level of public acceptance achieved after four years' operation of the Hanoi Irradiation Centre had persuaded the Government to promote and partly finance the establishment of another centre in Ho Chi Minh City for the sterilization of medical products.

191. The development programmes that Viet Nam was undertaking would entail a rapid growth in energy demand which conventional sources would be unable to meet. VINATOM, together with other national bodies, had been given the task of studying the nuclear power option with a view to its inclusion in the long-term development plan. Viet Nam hoped that assistance would be forthcoming from the Agency and from other Member States.

192. In conclusion, she thanked the Director General and his colleagues for their effective support for Viet Nam and wished them further success in their efforts to promote development and prosperity through the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques.

193. Mr. YIMER (Ethiopia), having welcomed the new Member States of the Agency, said that the Annual Report for 1994 in document GC(39)/3 showed that the Agency had exerted every possible effort to achieve a balance between its technical assistance and safeguards activities.

194. With regard to the former, it had done commendable work in the areas of food and agriculture, human health, and development of water resources, which were of particular interest to developing countries.

195. The technical co-operation programme had continued to pursue the Model Project approach, and eleven new Model Projects had been added to the twelve approved for 1994. The new ones were based more clearly than the first set on proposals from Member States, and the Agency had also made an encouraging effort to co-operate on them with other international organizations such as FAO, WHO and UNIDO.

196. The Agency's efforts to help increase food supplies were of particular interest for Africa, and the programme on rinderpest control in the continent for example had made welcome progress.

197. Other welcome highlights included the highest financial implementation rate ever achieved, the Third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar, held in September 1994, and the missions to other international and bilateral development organizations.

198. On the other hand, some developments were a serious cause of concern to his country, notably the fact that pledges to the TCF had reached only 72.5% of the target, the second worst result on record. Turning to the report on the Agency's technical co-operation activities in 1994 contained in document GC(39)/INF/3, he welcomed the fact that the strategy that had evolved in 1994 had been outlined at the TACC meeting and discussed in informal meetings with the G-77 and the Geneva Group. He hoped that approach would continue.

199. He was also pleased to learn that the recommendations which had followed the special evaluation of technical co-operation with LDCs in 1993 and the 1992 evaluation of manpower development in Africa had led to an agreement with the ICTP in Trieste on the training of young scientists from those countries.

200. He noted that in 1994 Africa had achieved the highest volume of programme resources delivered of all four regions, with a financial implementation rate of 68.9%, despite the often unfavourable social and economic conditions in most African countries. Substantial efforts had been made in 1994 to strengthen co-operation with FAO in sub-Saharan Africa and he looked forward to the availability of the "technology packages" designed for Ethiopia and other countries in that region. Particular attention had been paid to the needs of LDCs, and in that connection the regional workshop on the design, management and evaluation of Agency technical co-operation projects held in Addis Ababa had been an immensely valuable exercise. Finally, the use of isotopes for the assessment of water resources, especially in arid and semi-arid zones of the region, had been a major category of technical co-operation with Africa in 1994, and his country looked forward with keen interest to the implementation of the multi-year regional Model Project on aquifer recharge rates approved by the Board; the importance of that project could hardly be over-emphasized.

201. In the area of human health, projects relating to nuclear medicine services for in vivo diagnostics had been operational in six African countries in 1994. The assistance provided to Ethiopia to develop basic infrastructure for the in-house small-scale manufacture of kits used in the formulation of certain radiopharmaceuticals had been particularly appreciated. In line with the increased emphasis being placed on the establishment of adequate radiation safety infrastructure, Ethiopia had been operating a National Radiation Protection Authority for some time already.

202. With regard to regional co-operation, 1994 was rightly described in document GC(39)/INF/3 as a pivotal year for the AFRA Programme, and he fully shared the view expressed in paragraph 63 that the unanimous extension of the AFRA Agreement illustrated the commitment of AFRA Member States to regional co-operation.

203. In conclusion, he pointed out that despite encouraging achievements in the technical co-operation area, very little could ultimately be accomplished by the Agency without adequate and reliable resources. Given that the resources for technical co-operation depended exclusively on voluntary contributions, he called upon donor governments to do everything in their power to reverse the downward trend in payments to the TCF. That was the only way to ensure the viability of one of the two major activities of the Agency - the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

204. Finally, he reaffirmed Ethiopia's abiding commitment to the purposes and objectives of the Agency as set forth in its Statute and to close co-operation with the Agency in the discharge of its functions.

The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.