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President: Mr. KASEMSARN (Thailand)
Later: Mr. CEYSSENS (Belgium)

CONTENTS

Item of the
agenda*

Paragraphs

7	General debate and annual report for 1994 (continued)	1 - 162
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	Zimbabwe	1 - 13
	France	14 - 41
	Canada	42 - 57
	Syrian Arab Republic	58 - 67
	Israel	68 - 80
	European Commission	81 - 99
	Turkey	100 - 120
	Sudan	121 - 128
	Poland	129 - 147
	Morocco	148 - 162

[*] GC(39)/27.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(39)/INF/21/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ANDRA	(French) National Agency for Radioactive Waste
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
Chemical Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DECADES	Databases and Methodologies for Comparative Assessment of Different Energy Sources for Electricity Generation
DPRK	Democratic People's République of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
ECU	European currency unit
EDF	Electricité de France
ENPEP	Energy and Power Evaluation Program
EPR	European Pressurized Water Reactor
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G-7	Group of Seven
INES	International Nuclear Event Scale
MOX	Mixed oxide
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PHARE	Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic reconstruction
PPAS	Programme Performance Assessment System
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
World Bank	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1994 (GC(39)/3, 26 and Add.1-5)
(continued)

1. Mr. MOYO (Zimbabwe) paid tribute to the Agency's contribution to project implementation in the areas of the nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste management, food and agriculture, human health, industry and earth sciences, and the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. He also commended its careful publicity efforts on behalf of nuclear technology.
2. At a time when the Agency's role was being enhanced by such effort as the strengthening of the safeguards system, it was important to highlight some of the implications of reducing the budget by 9.3% in 1994. That reduction might have negative repercussions on technical co-operation activities which were among the most important of the Agency's activities, and on the transfer of advanced technologies to the developing countries by means of expert services, training and equipment provided by the Agency.
3. With regard to Member States' contributions to the Regular Budget, he noted that the majority of the developing countries, particularly in southern Africa, were undergoing a period of economic reforms and had been devastated by persistent droughts. Most of Africa was experiencing water and food shortages due to erratic rainfall. His delegation thanked the Agency for its efforts in that respect and for the determination with which it was endeavouring to help resolve those problems through co-ordinated research programmes aimed at improvements in the areas of food, water resources management and agriculture.
4. It was to be hoped that the use of isotope hydrology combined with conventional water resources management techniques would improve water supply, which was directly linked to human health and the economy. Zimbabwe was pleased to note that, following the recommendations made at the third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar, the Agency had adopted country programme frameworks as a programming and management tool for the technical assistance programme.
5. His Government reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening the radiation safety control authority, not only in order to meet the requirements of the Agency's International Basic Safety Standards but also to bring it in line with Zimbabwe's level of industrialization.

His country had benefited from the services of experts, in particular with respect to regulations for the handling, use and disposal of spent sources, in the setting up of a radiation protection service, the introduction of the sterile insect technique to eradicate the tsetse fly, and in the field of human and animal health. Zimbabwe also thanked the Agency for the assistance it had given to regional and national workshops held in the country. In addition, it commended the Agency on its training activities aimed at developing the use of nuclear techniques in Zimbabwe and other African countries.

6. He was optimistic that Zimbabwe, which could contribute to the use of nuclear techniques in the region, would join AFRA by the end of the year. In that context, there was an urgent need for the Agency to organize a massive education campaign on the use of nuclear technology for the purposes of peace and development. That campaign could be co-opted into other United Nations education programmes.

7. Zimbabwe was in favour of a drastic reduction of the nuclear arsenals in nuclear-weapon countries and of all non-nuclear countries acceding to the NPT. It advocated strengthening the Agency's inspection system and trusted that in the near future the Agency would include trained staff from developing countries in its inspection teams.

8. It was important to stress that despite the application of advanced and prudent nuclear safety principles, incidents and accidents could not be ruled out - as was the case in any human activity. Lessons and experience drawn from previous incidents should be made widely known in order to prevent any recurrence and thus to enhance nuclear safety.

9. The developing countries welcomed the continuing commitment of some major powers to the destruction, reduction or banning of certain categories of nuclear weapon and urged them not to slacken in their efforts.

10. In southern Africa, the outcome of the negotiations which had brought about an end to the prolonged armed conflict in Angola had been met with great relief. Zimbabwe hoped for a durable peace in the region which would allow meaningful development in an atmosphere of confidence and tranquillity.

11. His delegation looked forward to the election of a new Board of Governors, on which there would be two elective seats for Africa. He urged the members who would be elected to work in the same spirit which had reigned at the time of the Agency's creation.

12. His country advocated continued vigilance against the dumping of toxic waste and further nuclear testing. Scientific and technological progress, despite enabling people worldwide to attain an unprecedented standard of living and life expectancy, had environmental effects which brought about undesirable ecological changes. As the world's population continued to grow the need to manage the environment in an intelligent and responsible way was becoming ever more critical.

13. In conclusion, his delegation thanked the Director General and his staff for their efficient handling of the Agency's business and looked forward to many years of co-operation with the Agency.

14. Mr. d'ESCATHA (France) took pleasure in welcoming the delegations of Georgia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the General Conference following their recent admission to the Agency. He fully associated himself with the statement made by the delegate of Spain on behalf of the European Union.

15. 1995 would go down in history as the year in which the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been extended indefinitely by its 178 States Parties. His delegation warmly welcomed that decision. While gratified to note that the Treaty now applied to almost all States, his delegation hoped that it would soon become truly universal.

16. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had also adopted principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as a guideline for future action. That document underscored in particular the pre-eminent role played by the Agency in verifying compliance with commitments undertaken within the framework of the NPT and the need to strengthen its capability for better detecting signs of possible clandestine activities. The Director General had proposed, under Programme 93+2, a range of measures for enhancing the Agency's capability in that area. The Board of Governors had approved the basic elements of that programme and had also given the Director General the

authority to implement a first set of measures without delay. His delegation fully supported that action and hoped that the entire programme could be adopted and implemented soon.

17. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had also called on the international community to enter into and bring to a successful conclusion negotiations on two major issues aimed at consolidating the international non-proliferation regime and making progress towards disarmament: one was the conclusion, by 1996 at the latest, of a nuclear test ban treaty; the other was the signing of a "cut-off" convention banning the production of fissile material for the manufacture of explosive devices.

18. France unreservedly supported both objectives. In particular, it was irrevocably committed to signing the future test ban treaty. It was participating actively in the current negotiations in Geneva and had just unequivocally demonstrated its willingness to bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion by supporting a complete ban, without any reservation, on all testing of nuclear weapons or on any other nuclear explosion of whatever yield.

19. In view of the forthcoming final phase of the negotiations, the President of the Republic had decided to go ahead with a last series of tests involving a maximum of eight underground shots. France had never made a secret of the fact that it reserved the right to take such a decision. Accordingly, it had never made any commitment compelling it to perpetuate the unilateral suspension decided upon in 1992. The small number of tests envisaged and the limited duration of the series bore witness to its willingness to take notice of the conclusions of the Conference held in New York in May 1995.

20. Needless to say, all the necessary precautions had been taken to ensure that those tests had no damaging consequences for the environment. Indeed, France had requested the Agency to conduct an international scientific mission to confirm that the tests had no harmful effect on the environment. The possible conditions for implementing that project were currently the subject of consultations with the Director General.

21. The tests were therefore being carried out in full conformity with France's international commitments. As to their impact on the environment, international experts of

unquestionable scientific repute would be called upon to check that there were no harmful consequences.

22. Over the past year other events had also contributed to strengthening the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. Thus, his delegation had taken note with satisfaction of further ratifications of the Tlatelolco Treaty enabling its relatively early application to the entire zone to which it pertained and his delegation was particularly pleased to note that agreement had been reached during the year on the draft treaty for the denuclearization of Africa.

23. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could not but reinforce the measures instituted under the NPT; likewise the involvement of regional verification systems could only strengthen the effectiveness of the arrangements implemented by the Agency. His delegation sincerely hoped that the Agency would develop its co-operation with those regional systems as much as possible.

24. The principles adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference related to all aspects of nuclear energy application. In particular they reaffirmed the commitment to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses provided that the recipient country accepted Agency safeguards on all its activities.

25. Nuclear safety was another vital area. The responsibility of States with nuclear activities could not be stressed enough. Of paramount importance was the safety of reactors and other industrial nuclear installations, but it should also be remembered that several accidents with very serious human consequences had been caused by negligence in operating radioactive sources, which - as was well known - were numerous and widely distributed.

26. The Agency played a fundamental role in the crucial area of safety as, in addition to the necessary regulations, it could provide States with vital information and assistance if they requested it.

27. France was particularly appreciative of efforts made to assist Eastern European countries. Those efforts should continue in order to find solutions which, while ensuring that

those countries obtained the power they required, would bring about significant improvements in the overall safety level.

28. On the international scene, an important step had been taken the previous year in Vienna when the international Convention on Nuclear Safety had been opened for signature. Numerous States had already signed, and several of them had ratified, that Convention. He was pleased to announce that the French Parliament had approved the terms of the Convention on 26 July 1995. On behalf of his delegation, he urged all signatory countries which had not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay in order to achieve an early entry into force. He also paid special thanks to the Agency for the assistance it was currently providing in preparing for the first meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention.

29. That was, however, merely the first stage. Work had been under way for several months to draw up a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management and a group of international experts responsible for preparing the basis for that convention had held its first meeting. That decisive step should not obscure the reality, though; there remained many difficulties to overcome, at both the technical and the legal and political levels, which should provide even more impetus to all the participating countries to persevere with their efforts.

30. France unreservedly supported the assistance organized by the Agency, particularly within the framework of the Waste Management Assessment and Technical Review Programme. Such a mission was due to be carried out shortly at the Aube disposal centre operated by the National Agency for Radioactive Waste (ANDRA).

31. Rational management of the waste produced by nuclear activities was of utmost importance for their future development. For that reason the French law of 30 December 1991 on the management of high-level long-lived radioactive waste had foreseen three chief avenues of research: separation and transmutation of waste; disposal, retrievable or non-retrievable, in deep geological formations including the creation of underground laboratories; and conditioning with long-term surface storage. Furthermore, France had planned the establishment by ANDRA of a national radioactive waste inventory and once again urged all Member States to draw up a similar inventory, which would have

the added advantage, thanks to the information thereby released, of improving communication and transparency vis-à-vis public opinion.

32. Turning to the outstanding events which had taken place in France during the past year, he said that his country had 54 pressurized water reactors, representing a total net power of 57 GW(e), and two fast reactors, representing 1.4 GW(e) net. In 1994 electricity production from nuclear sources had amounted to 342 TW·h, or more than 75% of total electricity production. Exports to neighbouring countries had totalled 63 TW·h, worth some 15 billion francs in revenues.

33. The good results achieved in 1994 in operating the EdF reactors confirmed progress in all areas: safety was being maintained at a satisfactory level: there had been 65 incidents classified at level 1, and only 2 at level 2, on the INES scale. The dose reduction recorded in 1993 had continued in 1994 with a drop in the average collective dose of approximately 15%. The availability of the pressurized water power plants as a whole had been more than 81%, thereby confirming the progress made in 1993. Finally, operating expenses, including exceptional operations, were under control and were down by 1.9% as compared with 1993.

34. The Superphénix fast reactor prototype had received authorization on 24 August 1995 from the Directorate for Nuclear Installation Safety to continue its gradual re-startup programme which had been interrupted on 25 December 1994 following an argon leak in one of its eight intermediate exchangers. That shutdown had occurred when the reactor had reached 20% of its nominal power and had just been reconnected to the grid for the first time since 1990. Finally, in accordance with the decision taken by the Government on 22 February 1994, Superphénix would no longer operate as a nuclear power plant but as a research and demonstration reactor, in particular for the CAPRA (Increased Plutonium Consumption in Fast Reactors) and SPIN (Separation-Incineration of Minor Actinides and Long-lived Fission Products) programmes.

35. France's nuclear power programme was proceeding with the construction of four 1450 MW(e) units of the N4 series at Chooz and Civaux. The first unit, Chooz B1, would be connected to the grid in the coming months, and the last, Civaux 2, should be connected in 1998. In addition, France - in collaboration with Germany - was continuing to develop

the new EPR model which was to replace existing reactors when they reached the end of their lifetime.

36. As for the fuel cycle, the Melox plant for the fabrication of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel was being brought into operation and should gradually achieve its nominal capacity of 120 tonnes per year. That capacity could be increased to meet demand.

37. At the present time, seven 900 MW(e) pressurized water reactors were using MOX fuel. That type of fuel would be introduced first of all in the sixteen 900 MW(e) reactors which already had the necessary authorization, but 28 reactors in all would be able to use it eventually.

38. Where reprocessing was concerned, the second half of 1994 had been notable for the increase in the capacity, under excellent conditions, of the UP₂ plant at La Hague from 400 to 800 t per year. In addition, 1994 had seen continued good operation of the La Hague UP₃ plant, which had reprocessed 700 tonnes of irradiated fuel in the course of the year. In total, more than 7000 tonnes of light water reactor fuel had been reprocessed at the La Hague site since 1976.

39. Regarding the management of low- and medium-level waste both from the nuclear power industry and from other industries, hospitals and laboratories, the La Manche disposal centre had taken receipt of its final batches in July 1994. Since its commissioning on 1 January 1969, 525 000 m³ of waste had been accumulated at that centre. Henceforth, and for the next 50 years, all low- and medium-level waste would be stored at the new Soulaines-sur-Aube centre. As a result of efforts on the part of producers, management of that waste had been facilitated by a significant reduction in volume.

40. With respect to high-level and long-lived waste management, pre-siting studies for two geological laboratories in the four Departments which had submitted applications had continued in 1994 in accordance with the requirements of the law of 30 December 1991.

41. In conclusion, his delegation was convinced that nuclear energy would, in the decades to come, have a vital role to play in meeting the energy needs of the world's population. If well managed, nuclear power was unrivalled in meeting the requirements for safety, capacity, cost-effectiveness and environment-friendliness, all objectives which France intended to

pursue in co-operation with its foreign partners. France's contribution to the Agency's activities met the same concerns and his country was firmly resolved to collaborate as closely as possible with the Agency.

42. Mr. WALKER (Canada), after welcoming Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, reaffirmed his country's full support for the NPT and for the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The indefinite extension of the NPT had established a firm and lasting framework for nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference had also recognized the Agency's permanent role as a vital instrument in the implementation of the NPT and, in particular, its statutory duty to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and help prevent its military use. However, the main challenge still lay ahead, namely to give real meaning to the commitments entered into in New York when adopting the decisions concerning principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty. The key consideration was to achieve early progress on both arms limitation and disarmament by concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty and initiating negotiations on a cut-off convention. Those two agreements would have important implications for the Agency. One of the lessons learned from the NPT Review and Extension Conference had been that security issues transcended the traditional East-West and North-South divides and that it was possible to build a consensus whenever States were prepared to consider their long-term common security interests.

43. All States Party to the NPT should now commit themselves to its full implementation. For the Agency, that would mean the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, increased safeguards application at civilian facilities in nuclear-weapon States, and the continuation of technical co-operation activities for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with increased attention being given to safety and waste management. Canada would support the Agency fully in the accomplishment of those tasks, which were all consistent with the objectives of the Agency and its Member States.

44. Canada deplored the decision of two nuclear-weapon States to test nuclear weapons and wished to reiterate its long-standing concern in that regard. It was determined not to

relax its efforts in pursuing the fundamental objective of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty. His delegation considered that that objective could be achieved in 1996 and noted with satisfaction that two nuclear-weapon States had recently committed themselves to supporting a zero threshold for testing. It hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would do likewise and called upon countries to negotiate in good faith in order to bring the deliberations on the treaty to a speedy conclusion.

45. Turning to the Agency's main activities, he noted that the world had changed considerably and that the number of nuclear power plants had increased in spectacular fashion since the establishment of the IAEA. The natural and welcome consequence had been the strengthening of nuclear safety, which was the third pillar of the Agency's mandate alongside technical co-operation and safeguards. Those three areas were interdependent in the sense that a loss of confidence in one led to a loss of confidence in all of them.

46. Programme 93+2 on strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system had become, in two years, a system which would help the international community detect infringements of its security by States determined to acquire nuclear weapons. In so doing, the strengthened safeguards system would make it possible to establish a climate of confidence and allay the fears of neighbouring countries while also assuring transparency. In the light of the Canadian experience with field trials of improved access to information and sites, his delegation considered that implementation of the system was worth the short-term cost increases, as Member States' confidence would be enhanced.

47. With regard to the financing of the strengthened safeguards system, Canada believed that administrative efficiencies and savings resulting from better management could partly offset those measures' increased costs - which, according to the Secretariat, would in any case only be temporary.

48. Emphasizing the importance Canada attached to comprehensive safeguards agreements, he recalled that the Agency's safeguards system was designed to assure States that nuclear material was being used for non-explosive purposes, and thus to facilitate nuclear trade. Canada therefore encouraged all States Party to the NPT which had not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency as soon as possible in order

to fulfil their legal obligations under the Treaty and thereby participate in the establishment of a global confidence-based regime. That would also provide the necessary framework for increased technical co-operation activities in the future.

49. Canada supported the new direction in the Agency's strategy for its technical co-operation programme. The Model Project approach combined with the recommendations of the 1994 Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar had established sound guidelines for future activities. The Canadian Government contributed regularly to the TCF, and its private sector was becoming increasingly involved in technical co-operation projects and consultations. Work on sea water desalination and food irradiation was progressing well, and the Canadian private sector was eager to apply some of those technologies. His delegation welcomed the establishment of SAGTAC and noted with satisfaction that a member of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had been chosen to participate in the Committee's work.

50. Canada supported the Agency's role as the international institution for fostering the open exchange of information and experience on matters related to nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle. Canadian experts would continue to participate actively in the Agency's technical meetings. His delegation was particularly interested in the meetings on heavy water reactors and their fuel cycle and looked forward to the technical committee meeting on advances in heavy water reactors due to be held in 1996. Exchanges of information were also being achieved through the Agency's programme of technical training courses, which Canada would continue to host.

51. Nuclear safety issues were also a priority for his country. During the negotiation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Canada's objective had been simple - to develop a convention which could be adhered to by all States with nuclear power programmes and to encourage the establishment of a stringent safety culture. Canada intended to ratify the Convention in the near future and urged other States to begin the ratification procedure and bring the Convention into force as soon as possible. In so doing they would demonstrate to the public their governments' fundamental commitment to the safe and peaceful application of nuclear energy for the common good. His delegation also welcomed the work to prepare

a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management and was encouraged by the progress made so far.

52. The commitment of resources to the funding of several major safety-related projects was notable. The safety improvements made to nuclear power plants in the countries of Eastern Europe with multilateral assistance offered a specific example of how co-ordinated action could achieve positive results. Canada, as current holder of the Presidency of the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group, thanked the Agency for its valuable reports and assessments and the various missions it had undertaken to nuclear power plants to assess their overall nuclear safety.

53. Turning to the Agency's financial situation, he said that the Canadian authorities were applying a policy of zero nominal growth in all multilateral institutions for the simple reason that Canada could no longer afford zero real growth. Nevertheless, over the last decade of zero real growth Canada's contribution had increased by 300%, only a small proportion of which could be attributed to exchange rate fluctuations. His delegation considered that great progress had been made in modernizing the fiscal management of the Agency. However, there remained room for improvement, and he trusted that all Member States would continue to co-operate with the Secretariat in making better use of management tools, particularly those associated with planning and the setting of priorities.

54. In that context the PPAS would be a fundamental tool. Only through prioritization could the Agency achieve its main objectives. Projects of lesser importance should be delayed or cancelled to allow important activities to continue. Constant performance analysis and appraisals were essential to tell the Agency's staff which projects were satisfactory and which should be discontinued. His delegation hoped that the Agency's efforts in that direction would be rewarded by greater savings which could be spent on priority projects. In particular, his delegation noted with satisfaction the Secretariat's intention to hold early consultations with Member States on the 1997-98 programme and to circulate working documents for that purpose. Through that mechanism Canada would be able to co-operate with the Secretariat and other Member States in achieving a realistic and balanced programme which took into account the financial constraints of all Member States.

55. Canada was opposed to across-the-board cuts. It was true that the Agency's resources were reduced, but through careful application of the PPAS and a good deal of common sense it would be possible to determine priorities in such a way that high-priority programmes did not sustain the same percentage cuts as low-priority programmes.

56. Canada's nuclear sector had progressed steadily for several years and the future outlook was good. Reactor performance was satisfactory, safety levels were high and the nuclear industry played a dominating role in the formulation and application of extensive measures relating to radioactive waste management and nuclear safety. At the international level, in 1994 Canada had signed nuclear co-operation agreements with the Czech Republic, China, Mexico, Argentina, Ukraine, Slovenia and Lithuania which would bring about a welcome expansion of nuclear trade between Canada and those countries.

57. In conclusion, Canada reaffirmed its commitment to the Agency and to its objectives and looked forward to collaborating with all Member States and the Secretariat in order to help achieve them.

58. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic), welcoming the admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Georgia to the Agency, commended the Secretariat on its efforts to implement the resolutions adopted by previous sessions of the General Conference and ensure that the Agency was able to fulfil its important role in the development of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

59. In several regions of the world, commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the dropping of the first atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had taken place during the year: to remind the international community of the terrible effects of nuclear weapons and encourage the nuclear-weapon States to strive for disarmament.

60. The year had also been notable for the holding of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The international community ought to have seized such a unique opportunity to remedy the shortcomings and omissions in the Treaty, which should apply to all States without exception. Unfortunately, the Conference had not succeeded in persuading the nuclear-weapon States to honour their obligations under the NPT. Neither had it been able to ensure that assistance enabling non-nuclear-weapon States to use nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes was distributed on an equitable basis. States had not hesitated to supply all kinds of modern technology to Israel, which still refused to accede to the NPT although it possessed a military nuclear capability. Syria believed that Israel should have had to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear installations under international surveillance and inspection before the NPT was extended. The objectives of the Treaty would thus have been upheld and regional security and stability assured. It was unacceptable that Israel should be the only country in possession of a nuclear arsenal threatening the security of the region and the future of its peoples while continuing to occupy certain territories in the region.

61. Israel's accession to the NPT was essential to the establishment of an area free of nuclear armaments and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The issue had become extremely important, especially in view of the ongoing peace process in the Middle East, as it was unacceptable for one party to enjoy privileged or exceptional conditions at the expense of another party when delicate and fundamental matters relating to regional security were at stake. His delegation considered that the decisions and measures needed for applying Agency safeguards in Israel should be taken and urged the Director General to step up his efforts before the next session of the General Conference to bring Israel's installations under international inspection.

62. The amendment of Article VI of the Agency's Statute had been the topic of many discussions and consultations, but not enough of the required elements were yet in place to allow a decision to be taken. Further consultations should be undertaken to obtain the agreement of all interested countries in each region on the changes to be made.

63. Turning to the subject of radioactive waste management, he said that due attention should be paid to the measures currently foreseen so as to ensure safe disposal of the various types of radioactive waste and to protect populations against radiation hazards, promote sustainable development and conserve the environment. His delegation commended and supported the considerable efforts currently being made to draw up a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

64. Syria also supported the measures to combat the illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radiation sources.

65. With regard to more extensive use of isotopes for water resources management, Syria was in favour of co-operation between the Agency and other competent United Nations bodies, as it was convinced that the Agency had much to contribute in helping to solve problems relating to water, particularly in the developing countries. By supporting programmes on radiation protection and nuclear safety, the Agency enhanced its role in the eyes of those who regarded it as the international body which possessed the means to help protect them against danger. Moreover, in helping to strengthen radiation protection and nuclear safety and improving staff training in those areas, it promoted the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the developing countries.

66. The assistance the Agency supplied to developing countries made it possible to introduce new techniques there which were conducive to raising the standard of living of their populations and securing sustainable development. Technical assistance should therefore be allocated appropriate funding from the Agency's budget, as was the case with other programmes such as safeguards.

67. In conclusion, his delegation reiterated the need to support the Agency's activities in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the purposes of achieving peace and prosperity and commended the efforts it had made to transfer know-how and encourage research in the developing countries so as to help them achieve social and economic well-being and open up individual and scientific development.

68. Mr. FRANK (Israel) said that although political matters did not fall within the Agency's mandate, the Conference might be interested to note the recent developments which had occurred in the context of the Middle East peace process. It was gratifying to observe that since the previous session of the General Conference remarkable progress had been achieved towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Firstly, a peace treaty had been signed between Israel and Jordan and strengthened by the addition of co-operation agreements in a number of areas such as the economy, energy and tourism. Secondly, the arduous negotiations on an interim agreement with the Palestinian Authority had made considerable progress towards settling a large number of difficulties and had paved the way for a final and lasting agreement which should be concluded in the not too distant future. Progress had also been made in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations, and further positive

developments were hoped for in the coming year. At the same time, advances had been made by the five multilateral working groups established in the context of the Madrid peace process in the areas of environment, water, refugees, economic co-operation, and arms control and regional security (ACRS), where important confidence- and security-building measures were being worked out. It was to be hoped that those achievements would hasten the process of re-establishing peace in the region after many decades of conflict. For its part, Israel hoped that the positive developments signalled a new era of understanding, reconciliation, security, co-operation and economic growth in the region.

69. However, it should not be forgotten that that was only the start of a long process. Determination, goodwill, patience and restraint were required of all parties involved in order to create a climate conducive to building confidence. Moreover, certain States of the region still denied Israel's right to exist, refused to forsake war as a means of settling differences, and not only held themselves aloof from the peace process but attempted to impede it by terror and violence, either directly or through proxies.

70. In the context of the peace process, it was interesting to note how negotiations were progressing in the Working Group on ACRS, which currently involved 15 regional parties. The establishment of an infrastructure for multilateral dialogue on co-operation in Middle East security matters and the dissemination of expertise in arms control, complemented by a process of mutual familiarization and demystification, were among the more notable of the Working Group's achievements. Its promising start showed clearly why the Working Group on ACRS was the only body capable of negotiating and promoting co-operative arrangements on security and arms control in the region. It was important to acknowledge the impetus given to the Working Group's activities by the United States and the Russian Federation, co-sponsors of the peace process, and also the guidance and expertise they had contributed. Moreover, participants from outside the region, including Canada, France, the Netherlands and Turkey, had supported the process by giving the Group the benefit of their expertise in certain areas. The Working Group had also succeeded in negotiating and agreeing on a promising first set of confidence- and security-building measures.

71. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, agreement had been reached on a joint statement on arms control and regional security, of which only the final paragraph had yet

to be approved. It was an ambitious document which set out fundamental principles to govern security relations between participants in the process and provided guidelines for arms control and regional security in the Middle East. It contained detailed declarations of intent regarding the objectives of ACRS, which ranged from preventing conflicts to curbing military spending, reducing stocks of conventional weapons, preventing a conventional arms race, and establishing in the Middle East a mutually verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Israel trusted that it would be possible to overcome the last remaining obstacle to the document's final adoption.

72. The significant progress achieved so far was encouraging, and had been possible because basic rules for ensuring the freedom to exchange views and enabling real progress to be made had been agreed on by common consent. Nevertheless, owing to the complexity of the situation in the Middle East, much remained to be done. A major obstacle to the multilateral process was the absence of some of the leading States of the region, which held up progress in certain important areas. While the difficult and complex regional negotiations continued to advance peace in the Middle East, it would be advisable not to disturb their delicate balance by initiating activities or adopting resolutions in international organizations that might undermine their comprehensive and inseparable nature. Israel urged the Agency's governing bodies above all to acknowledge and support the primacy of the peace talks and the principle of free and direct negotiations between the parties on all outstanding issues, without isolating or separately discussing any one of them. In that context he recalled an August 1993 report in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations had pointed out that a nuclear-weapon-free zone on a region-wide basis could not be dictated to States from outside, but must be worked out by them. Israel concurred wholeheartedly with that position.

73. The General Conference had taken note of the peace process at its previous session, and the important and irreversible steps being taken by Israel towards peace were well known. He invited the General Conference to consider carefully its approach to the resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. Resolutions on the matter had been adopted by consensus at the General Conference since 1991, the year in

which it had first appeared as an agenda item. It was because a nuclear-weapon-free zone was an important element of its overall policy on peace and security that Israel had in the past joined the consensus on that resolution, despite its inherent deficiencies, while also stating clearly its fundamental reservations concerning the wording and relevance of the resolution and distancing itself from its modalities. For Israel, the establishment of a credible nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was the best means of assuring non-proliferation. Such a zone should be negotiated directly among the States of the region and should be based on mutual verification arrangements more stringent than other arrangements. Its establishment should be negotiated, when the time came, within the framework of the Middle East peace process. At present, when several important States of the region were not participating in the Working Group on ACRS and others did not even recognize Israel's right to exist, it was inconceivable that measures which infringed upon Israel's security should precede the establishment of peace in the negotiating agenda. Recent revelations concerning Iraq's plans and capabilities with regard to weapons of mass destruction, in particular biological weapons, demonstrated once more how complex and all-embracing the issue of the region's security had become. Nothing should therefore be done to lift the nuclear question out of the comprehensive framework of peace and security in the region. The primacy of the peace negotiations as the principal forum in the search for peace must in no way be eroded.

74. Israel could not support any modification of the draft resolution which attempted to introduce divisive issues and to detract from the sovereignty of the peace negotiations. Such modifications would be detrimental to the peace process in that they would give rise, in certain States of the region, to false hopes that the peace process could be circumvented by recourse to international bodies. Instead, Israel called upon all the participants in the multilateral Working Group, including States outside the region, to support the peace process, and specifically the Working Group on ACRS as the only appropriate forum for discussing and eventually negotiating a comprehensive agenda for arms control and regional security. In view of the primacy and fragility of the peace process, Israel urged the General Conference to join it in opposing any attempt to create instability and, in particular, any

amendment to the draft resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East which might prevent Israel from joining a consensus.

75. Israel's bold decisions in the context of the peace process, and the actions it had taken during the ACRS negotiations and with regard to non-proliferation in general - it had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, was an active participant in the CTBT negotiations and was preparing to adhere to all the supplier regimes (such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group) - demonstrated its positive approach and its substantial contribution to the peace process and towards the objective of achieving non-proliferation.

76. Old hostilities were still evident when it came to Israel's right to sit on the Board of Governors. As a founding member of the IAEA, Israel had been in the Agency since 1957, but it had never been elected to the Board owing to political discrimination. The geographical group to which Israel belonged, the Middle East and South Asia Group, had refused to recognize Israel as a member, thus effectively excluding it from the Board. In accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States established in the Agency's Statute, that situation had to be remedied. Israel proposed taking a modest step in that direction. Article VI of the Statute determined the membership of the Board of Governors on the basis of a geographical distribution with eight areas, one of them the Middle East and South Asia, but without listing the Member States which belonged to each area. As a result, the spirit of the Statute could not prevail to ensure equitable geographical distribution within the Board. Israel belonged to the Middle East region, no matter how that region was defined. That much was unquestionably clear from the Note by the Director General of 29 August 1989 entitled "Modalities of application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East"¹. It was well known that an attempt to attach such a list to an official report by one of the Agency's working groups had been blocked by several Arab States during the Board's June 1995 meetings. Israel urged the General Conference to support publication of such a list when it discussed the agenda item on "Amendment of Article VI of the Statute". How was it possible to ignore obvious geographical facts and at the same time support

¹ GC(XXXIII)/887.

resolutions which concerned the entire region, such as that on "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East"?

77. In recent years Israel had contributed to the drafting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it had signed during the previous session of the General Conference. Work on the Convention was by no means complete - a preparatory committee still had to be convened in order to finalize and approve the reporting and review processes. The Secretariat had done well to initiate informal consultations on those subjects without awaiting the Convention's entry into force, and it should be commended for doing so. The Convention was of an incentive nature and was based on the principle that a State on whose territory a nuclear installation was located bore full responsibility for its nuclear safety, and that such responsibility was indivisible. Israel was in favour of a review process that was carried out with professional efficiency and was also affordable. The review meetings should be regarded as opportunities for exchanging information on safety and discussing, or holding consultations on, issues raised by States party. It would be contrary to the principles set out in the Convention to attribute powers of decision-making to such meetings.

78. Israel also commended the Agency for the initiatives it had taken in the preparation of a convention on the safety of nuclear waste management. That convention should not emulate the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The hazards, both local and long-range, which were associated with large power reactors far exceeded those presented by radioactive waste. The energy contained in an operating power reactor represented an inherent risk of dispersal of radioactive material. No such driving force was present in the case of radioactive waste. On the other hand, improper treatment of waste carried a risk of excessive and avoidable exposures of populations, especially in the vicinity of sites. Israel therefore supported an incentive-type convention which was based on internationally accepted standards, incorporated the principle of exclusive responsibility of national regulatory bodies, and provided a mechanism for international co-operation and voluntary information exchange.

79. Israel also attached importance to the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage and noted the progress it had made in the past year. In Israel's view, the nuclear liability convention should also focus mainly on power reactors, as the dispersal hazard associated with such reactors was far greater than with any other component of the

nuclear fuel cycle, including research facilities. For those reasons, Israel supported the proposal submitted to the negotiating group by the United States. Concentrating on the main sources of hazard could simplify the negotiating process and render the world a service through the timely provision of an effective accident liability response.

80. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that in the coming months the peace process in the Middle East would make further advances, and that in the future confidence and reconciliation among the States of the region would banish old suspicions and hostility.

Mr. Ceysens (Belgium) took the Chair.

81. Mr. CACCIA DOMINIONI (European Commission) said that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT for an indefinite period not only guaranteed continuation of non-proliferation efforts and the disarmament process, but also provided the essential basis for continued access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The European Commission, which had actively contributed towards that objective, therefore welcomed it warmly.

82. For the European Commission itself, the most significant event had been the expansion of the European Union from 12 to 15 members: on 1 January 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden had become full members of the Union. The Commission was convinced that the positive consequences of that expansion would not be limited to the European Union but would bring benefits to the international nuclear community as a whole. Indeed, all the new Member States, whatever their individual approach to the use of nuclear energy, were strongly committed to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

83. With the accession of those new members, the European Union confirmed its position as a world leader in the civil use of nuclear energy. Nuclear issues would continue to be reviewed at Community level in the light of the fundamental criteria for a Union-wide energy strategy, which naturally had to be based on recognition of the state of development of that form of energy and on respect for the political choices on nuclear programmes made by each Member State at national level.

84. An essential condition for the peaceful use of nuclear energy was that nuclear materials be submitted to effective non-proliferation and safeguards regimes. In the

European Union, under the EURATOM Treaty, all civil nuclear material on the territory of Member States was subject to EURATOM safeguards. Furthermore, IAEA safeguards were applied under the three safeguards agreements to which EURATOM was party, concluded by the IAEA with the non-nuclear-weapon EURATOM Member States, with the United Kingdom and with France. In implementing the agreement concerning non-nuclear-weapon States, the Commission and the IAEA had in April 1992 adopted a new partnership approach aimed at improving co-operation during the planning and carrying out of inspections and at taking due account of the EURATOM regional safeguards system, thus enabling the IAEA to achieve savings while continuing to draw its own independent conclusions. That partnership approach was also relevant to the efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards under Programme 93+2. Indeed, several of the actions proposed in that Programme could be said to reflect experience acquired under the partnership.

85. The nuclear suppliers' guidelines were of course also relevant to preventing misuse of nuclear materials. The General Conference would certainly remember that the States party to those guidelines had in 1992 adopted an export control regime covering dual-use equipment, material and technology in the nuclear field. In November 1994, the Council of the European Union had for its part adopted a system of export controls on dual-use goods which had entered into force on 1 July 1995.

86. With reference to the problem of illicit trafficking in radioactive substances and nuclear materials, the European Union appreciated the work already done by the Agency. The European Council summit meeting held in Essen in 1994 had designated illicit trafficking and co-operation with the successor States of the former Soviet Union to prevent it as a European Union priority. The European Commission had launched several initiatives. Analysis of seized material was carried out at the Institute for Transuranium Elements at Karlsruhe. From the information obtained and comparison with the Institute's data, it was generally possible to determine the origin of the material, the type of reactor for which it had been prepared and the installation in which it had been treated. That information, made available to the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and to competent national authorities, was extremely valuable for judicial inquiries and, more generally, for any organized action to combat trafficking.

87. In addition, EURATOM had developed projects to help establish more reliable safeguards systems. They mainly concerned the Russian Federation. A complete and consistent scheme of integrated projects had been presented to the European Council at Essen underlining the importance of such assistance.

88. All nuclear activities required a strong safety and radiological protection regime. The European Commission welcomed the publication by the IAEA in December 1994 of the English interim edition of the new International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. The revision of the Community directive on basic safety standards proposed by the Commission in 1993 pursuant to Chapter III of the EURATOM Treaty, which dealt with health and safety, had thus received new impetus, and its progress was being facilitated by constant reference to the International Basic Safety Standards. Also in connection with Chapter III of the EURATOM Treaty, a team of European Commission officials had very recently been sent to French Polynesia, in consultation with the French Government, to exercise the Commission's competences under the Treaty. A report on the mission would of course be made to European Commissioners on the team's return.

89. With regard to technological safety, the Commission had continued to promote recognition of the best nuclear safety practice within the European Union. It had also continued its efforts to ensure coherence in the nuclear assistance the Union provided to non-Member States, notably to Central and Eastern European States. Through co-operation programmes the Commission sought to promote a long-term partnership, whereas the assistance programmes aimed to improve safety in the short term. The link between those complementary activities was being established through networks of organizations which contributed to co-ordinated project conception and assessment.

90. The TACIS and PHARE programmes provided Central and Eastern European States and countries of the former Soviet Union with assistance aimed at improving nuclear safety. Those programmes, to which more than ECU 430 million had been allocated, had now entered their fifth year. Their scope was rather broad, including design safety, on-site assistance and assistance to the responsible safety authorities, and they also aimed to promote regional co-operation on emergency preparedness and planning. The Commission also

chaired the Group of 24's co-ordination mechanism, which continued to receive valuable technical advice from the Agency.

91. One of the major problems with the long-term improvement of the safety of nuclear installations in the Eastern European countries was the financing of such projects. That problem would become increasingly important once the short-term activities, based on grants, had reached a successful conclusion. Such grants were provided by the European Union and other institutions or countries to enable older-generation installations to be operated under safer conditions. Those installations would have to be replaced by other plants currently under construction or recently completed. Improvements to the new-generation power plants would have to be financed mostly by loans or through industrial co-operation, which was different from technical assistance. The EURATOM loan system for the European Union member countries had been extended and the Commission could now grant such loans to Central and Eastern European countries and to the Commonwealth of Independent States.

92. The question of civil liability for damage caused by nuclear accidents had become critical, particularly in the context of assistance. An agreement on liability for damage resulting from assistance provided under the TACIS programme had been concluded between the European Commission and the Russian authorities. The Commission was expecting to conclude a similar agreement with Ukraine in the near future. Those solutions were, however, only interim, and related to specific projects. The European Commission hoped that much broader adherence to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage would soon resolve that problem once and for all on a world-wide scale. Early completion of the ongoing negotiations on the nuclear liability issue in the Standing Committee was highly desirable. The European Commission would therefore welcome the scheduling of a diplomatic conference in the spring of 1996.

93. The European Commission also commended the initiative taken by President Yeltsin at the Halifax summit in June 1995 in suggesting that a high-level meeting be held in the spring of 1996 to discuss the entire complex of questions pertaining to nuclear safety.

94. With regard to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the European Commission welcomed the success of that instrument, as evidenced by the number of signatories. It had

also participated actively in the two meetings held with a view to drawing up a complementary convention on radioactive waste management and commended that Agency initiative. Indeed, at a time when the international nuclear community was being unduly criticized for having given priority to the production side of the nuclear fuel cycle while neglecting - or deferring - consideration of a comprehensive approach to radioactive waste management, such a convention could play a key role in boosting public acceptance of nuclear energy.

95. The European Union's constant and strong commitment to research in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion had been confirmed by the European Council's adoption, in December 1994, of a specific programme for the period until 1998. The long-term objective of that programme was the creation of safe and environmentally sound reactor prototypes. Its chief medium-term objective was to establish the engineering design for the first thermonuclear experimental reactor within the framework of the quadripartite agreement between EURATOM, Japan, Russia and the United States.

96. Implementation of the Energy Charter Treaty, which had been opened for signature in December 1994 and had been signed by 49 States and the European Community, should lead to improved trade and investment in energy between the countries of Europe and some of their major non-European partners.

97. The uranium market, although improving, remained rather fragile, and the European Commission and the EURATOM supply agency needed to continue monitoring it closely. Nuclear trade agreements were envisaged between EURATOM and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; indeed, even broader co-operation in the nuclear field with those Republics was envisaged: the Council of the European Union had recently approved directives for the European Commission to negotiate agreements on nuclear safety research and thermonuclear fusion with Ukraine and Kazakhstan and similar agreements had already been negotiated with the Russian Federation.

98. Negotiations between the European Commission and the Government of the United States on the conclusion of a new agreement between EURATOM and the United States on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would replace the agreement due

to expire at the end of 1995, had been completed. The text of the new agreement had been approved by the European Council in August 1995. The Council was also currently considering the draft mandate submitted to it by the Commission in June 1995 for the negotiation of an agreement with Argentina on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

99. EURATOM also had a role to play in preparing for the future, which linked its activities closely with those of the IAEA. The European Commission looked forward to close co-operation with the Agency, particularly in such areas as radiation protection, safety assistance and safeguards.

100. Ms. OK (Turkey), after welcoming the approval of the applications for membership of the Agency from Georgia and from Bosnia and Herzegovina, said that, although the pursuit of peace and development had experienced serious setbacks since the last session of the General Conference, there was reasonable cause for optimism: owing to the general atmosphere of détente, Member States had less incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. Since the risk of a generalized nuclear conflagration had practically disappeared and nuclear disarmament was accelerating, non-nuclear-weapon States had no security-related incentive to abandon their non-nuclear status, even though proliferation problems remained in the Middle East, Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In 1995, the United Nations had celebrated the International Year of Tolerance. The promotion of a culture of tolerance was vital in order to consolidate democracy and prevent ethnic conflicts, and her country would wish the world to be more aware of the close link which existed between development, peace and democracy. Human-centred development aimed at ensuring universal security was an imperative of the times and a prerequisite of sustainable development.

101. With the extension of the NPT for an indefinite period, the world had come closer to nuclear disarmament and demilitarization, for most non-nuclear-weapon States had committed themselves to not acquiring such weapons and the nuclear-weapon States had pledged to promote the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies.

102. Turkey had always maintained that there was an urgent need to reinforce the effectiveness of the safeguards system. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had

provided an opportunity for reviewing the shortcomings of the existing verification and safeguards regimes. She noted with satisfaction that the Conference had accorded an important role to the Agency in the implementation of, and verification of compliance with, the NPT. The Agency had been expressly recognized as the competent authority responsible for verifying the implementation of safeguards agreements and assuring compliance therewith. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had also called for an increase in the Agency's capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activities and had recommended that nuclear material released from military use should be placed under Agency safeguards as soon as possible.

103. Generally speaking, her delegation was pleased with the interest shown during the Conference in expanding the Agency's responsibilities in order to reinforce the credibility and cost-effectiveness of the safeguards system. The Director General should be congratulated on his efforts in launching a cautious but effective new safeguards programme, Programme 93+2. The package of measures outlined by the Director General in his report to the General Conference (document GC(39)/17) was a fitting response to the expectations of delegations. Turkey fully supported the measures aimed at achieving broader access to information, those relating to physical access to sites, including no-notice inspections, the measures to optimize the use of the present system, and the use of environmental sampling. It also thought that those measures should be applied to item-specific safeguards agreements and voluntary-offer agreements with nuclear-weapon States. Additional measures such as the use of new technologies and increased access to safeguarded facilities, expanded access to information relating to possible undeclared nuclear activities, and universal reporting systems on the import and export of nuclear material and equipment could only be complete and effective if they were applied to all States and were universally accepted.

104. The past year had also seen major events at regional level in the area of non-proliferation. Her delegation welcomed the developments which had taken place with regard to the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in particular the freeze on graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities under the Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK. Turkey was very committed to the principle of non-proliferation and accordingly hoped that the DPRK would supply the Agency

with satisfactory information as to the accuracy and completeness of its initial declaration and that it would comply with the provisions of its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

105. For Turkey, the Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the ensuing Israeli-Jordanian agreement constituted a historic turning-point in the development of attitudes in the Middle East. Despite the attempts of extremists to block the peace process, there was room to hope that co-operation would replace confrontation. In that context, she welcomed the recent agreement on the transfer of civil powers to the Palestinian Authority.

106. It was essential that the countries of the Middle East co-operate with the Agency in the nuclear field. All parties to the peace process in the Middle East should contribute more productively to the creation of a new environment in the region. It was to be hoped that the successful consummation of the peace process would coincide with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The regional developments just mentioned confirmed the view of the Turkish Government that non-proliferation objectives should be realized through regional approaches, while keeping in mind the international nature of the safeguards regime.

107. Turkey was following closely the Agency's activities to prevent diversion of nuclear material in Iraq. The instability of the political situation in Iraq had shown that detection efforts should continue; thus, thousands of pages of documentation and several tonnes of metals in various forms had been found which would require considerable time to analyse. It was to be hoped that Iraq would continue to co-operate with the Security Council and the Agency so that the sanctions which were affecting the lives of the Iraqi population could be lifted and Iraq could resume its place within the international community.

108. It was gratifying that work on drawing up a text for a comprehensive test ban treaty was nearing its conclusion and that a consensus seemed to be emerging that the body which would be responsible for verifying the implementation of that treaty should be based in Vienna and should have some form of collaborative relationship with the Agency. Since the Agency would also be playing an essential role in the verification of the proposed "cut-off" agreement prohibiting production of fissile material for the manufacture of weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the Agency's verification functions could be expected to expand.

109. The Convention on Nuclear Safety had not yet entered into force, but it was to be hoped that all the members of the Agency would adhere to it. During the 38th regular session of the General Conference, her delegation had stated that the Turkish Government would be following very closely the Agency's safety evaluation and upgrading activities at RBMK and WWER reactors in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries, and it had expressed the hope that everything possible would be done to improve the safety level of those dangerous reactors. Since that time, the Agency had helped a substantial number of countries in those regions to improve any reactors they had of that type. Nevertheless, the reactors remained dangerous, and the one which was situated very close to the eastern border of Turkey, the Medzamor reactor, was seriously in need of safety upgrading. In particular, it was necessary to reinforce the earthquake-resistance of the plant structures and equipment, anneal the pressure vessel, complete the safety modifications planned by the regulatory body, prepare emergency plans in collaboration with neighbouring countries, and recruit highly-qualified and well-trained operating staff. Unfortunately, none of those measures had as yet been implemented, and Turkey was of the understanding that the Armenian Government intended to take those measures only after the plant had been restarted.

110. In that context, one paragraph which had appeared in the text of the Director General's statement as circulated to the General Conference but which the Director General had not read out was worth quoting:

“Following the decision by the Armenian Government to restart Medzamor Unit 2 reactor, an Agency mission visited Armenia in April 1995. Its report pointed to a difficult safety situation, including a number of unresolved technical issues. I conveyed these results to the Armenian Government and stressed the need to solve the safety issues before plant restart. I also stressed the need for highly competent and well trained operating staff. Armenia has had considerable co-operation from Russia and the Agency has responded to requests for assistance on several safety-related issues, e.g. evaluation of the seismic situation and of the condition of the pressure vessel as well as on emergency planning. Responsibility for all steps which are needed before startup and for safety upgrades thereafter rests, of course, with the Government.”

With those comments, Turkey strongly urged the Armenian Government to complete the upgrading of the safety standards of the Medzamor nuclear power plant before bringing it

back into service. She assumed the Director General would monitor the upgrading activities closely and would keep the Board of Governors regularly informed as to their status.

111. Turkey also noted with pleasure that considerable progress had been made with the preparation of a convention on liability for nuclear damage. She hoped that a compromise could be negotiated to reconcile the two different views on funding at the meeting which was to be held in October and that the convention could be concluded in 1996. Once the convention had been adopted, after the Convention on Nuclear Safety, all nuclear States would assume full responsibility for the safety of their reactors and would also commit themselves to providing compensation for any damage which accidents might cause to non-nuclear States. The Agency would be responsible for verifying that States honoured their commitments in that regard.

112. Turning to the amendment of Article VI of the Agency's Statute, she noted that, following the informal consultations on that subject which she had chaired in 1994, she had arrived at certain personal conclusions: an international organization which required the co-operation of its Member States to prevent nuclear proliferation should not be largely monopolized by some of those States. The membership of the Agency's Board of Governors was determined according to a highly complex and inequitable system. Certain members had criticized that there was no transparency concerning the way in which designation criteria were applied. Moreover, there was serious conflict among the members of each regional group on that issue. After the consultations, it had seemed to her that a moderate enlargement of the membership of the Board of Governors was necessary and that it should be implemented by consensus. She accordingly hoped that a consensus would be reached to make the Board more representative.

113. As to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, the TCF, which was fed from the voluntary contributions of Member States, should be used effectively to improve nuclear applications in Member States. For a beneficiary country, the establishment of the necessary infrastructure, training of staff, improvement of the scientific level and achievement of project goals were important steps in the technical co-operation project cycle. Once that technical progress had been achieved, countries should transfer the knowledge they had acquired in a specific field to other Member States through the Agency. Thus, a beneficiary

country would attain the status of a donor country in the area concerned. Her delegation hoped the Agency would continue its efforts to utilize such potential in Member States within the framework of regional co-operation.

114. Turkey lay at a crossroads of continents and cultures. The post-Cold War political situation in Eurasia had given it a pivotal role in the harmonization of civilizations. It had endeavoured to develop creative initiatives and to promote regional co-operation. It had implemented an economic assistance package covering technical assistance, project financing, training grants and soft loans for over 30 countries on four continents. In the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, its public authorities had opened their facilities to other developing countries. It was gratifying that the Agency's Department of Technical Co-operation had also made use of those opportunities. However, further regional co-operation projects should be programmed with the same goal in mind.

115. In that context, Turkey had already initiated training programmes in the field of radioactive waste management which would be run in facilities on its territory. The Agency had been invited to make use of the radioactive waste treatment plant in Istanbul. Such activities would enable experts and scientists from Member States in the region to acquire practical experience of waste treatment and to develop national programmes.

116. She commended the Department of Technical Co-operation on the efforts it had made to strengthen co-operation with other international organizations. She also thanked the Secretariat for its co-operation with UNESCO, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, UNEP, WMO, UNDP and the World Bank on the project entitled "Environmental restoration of the Black Sea", in which marine environmental assessment played an important part. That project was highly important for Member States in the region and could serve as a model for other regions.

117. The procurement of sophisticated equipment for technical co-operation projects constituted an important component of assistance to developing countries. However, there seemed to be constant problems with procurement. The type of equipment should be chosen by the Secretariat in the light of the infrastructure and technological level of the States in question, as well as the quality, serviceability and reliability of the equipment and the

availability of spare parts. The purchase should be finalized in consultation with, and subject to, the approval of the Member States concerned. Moreover, in order to prevent disputes between the recipient States and the Agency, a new mechanism for equipment procurement should be instituted providing for thorough evaluation on the basis of the specifications submitted by the Member States in question. Otherwise, technical co-operation projects would not yield satisfactory results either for the Agency or for the recipient countries.

118. One serious problem which was causing increasing concern to certain Member States was that of the unauthorized and uncontrolled movement of nuclear material. That new type of illicit trafficking involved risks of radiation exposure or proliferation, depending on the quantity and type of material involved. Turkey, together with other countries which faced such risks, had submitted proposals which would give the Agency certain responsibilities in that area. She noted with satisfaction that the Agency had prepared some technical assistance programmes which provided for the establishment of a database and the provision of advice on State systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. Collaboration between the States concerned and the Agency should continue in order to strengthen police and customs surveillance, to equip the enforcement authorities with the necessary means of detecting nuclear material, and to train them in its identification. She hoped that the planned programmes in those areas could be expanded to cover all those issues.

119. Turkey attached great importance to the representation of developing countries and women. Though it could not be denied that the Secretariat found it difficult to recruit qualified people from developing countries and suitably qualified women in the nuclear area, it should do more to promote women and developing country nationals who were already working in the Secretariat. In that context, the United Nations had adopted a new human resources management system which provided for close dialogue between managers and staff, greater transparency in assessments, and more consultation. Her delegation would like the Agency to find ways of benefiting from that system by sending staff to the managerial training courses which were being organized in New York. That system, if it were adopted by the Agency, would result in a more representative Secretariat; it should not be forgotten that the Secretariat was financed by 124 countries.

120. The Agency had accomplished major tasks, but it should try to be more responsive to the concerns of Member States over safety and safeguards, and to be more imaginative in the implementation of regional technical assistance projects by making use of existing potential in certain more highly developed countries for the benefit of the less developed ones. Member States would like the organization to be more representative both in its Board of Governors and in its Secretariat, and would like to see at least 33% of the posts in the Secretariat staffed by women: that goal, which had been set by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, was already being realized at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

121. Mr. OMER (Sudan), after welcoming approval of the applications of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia for membership of the Agency, said that his country, conscious of the rapid development of science and technology as well as of the importance of nuclear energy and its applications, highly appreciated the role played in that regard by the international organizations and notably by the Agency. He believed that in such areas it was desirable to collaborate within the framework of those organizations and to accord precedence to development over regulatory activities.

122. In the area of nuclear technology the Sudanese delegation wished to thank the Agency for the technical assistance provided to its country. The Agency had executed numerous projects in the fields of human health, food and agriculture, zootechnics and animal reproduction. It had also collaborated with Sudan in the search for groundwater resources, monitoring of the environment and foodstuffs, maintenance of equipment and training of personnel both in Sudan and at the regional level. The assistance which had been supplied, whilst not considerable in volume or financial terms, was highly appreciated.

123. The Agency had also lent assistance in elaborating an agreement aimed at making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The text of the agreement had been adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, and the Sudanese delegation hoped that that agreement would be implemented in the near future with the co-operation of the world community and of international institutions.

124. On the regional scale, AFRA offered an excellent basis for intra-African co-operation and co-operation between Africa and other regions in the areas of research and training. All

the scientific activities undertaken during the past year under the AFRA programme with the support of the Agency were to be commended. Conscious of the ever increasing role of that agreement in enhancing co-operation between States party to it, the Sudanese Government had approved its extension for a new period of five years. In that connection, he wished to thank the donor countries which had helped to identify new objectives and establish the strategy of AFRA for the five years to come, as well as drawing up development plans in the fields of nuclear science and technology to meet the urgent needs of the States parties.

125. The support provided by the Agency to developing countries could not bear fruit in the absence of assured and predictable resources for the Technical Co-operation Fund. It was time to apply resolution GC(XXV)/RES/388 adopted by the General Conference in 1981 which called for measures to have technical assistance funded through the Agency's Regular Budget or through other comparably predictable and assured resources.

126. Since the creation of the Agency the number of members had increased appreciably due in particular to the accession of developing countries. The Agency should therefore adapt to that development and enlarge the size of the Board, so that those countries could participate more in decision-making and the formulation of policy, particularly such as satisfied their desire to develop their technical capacities. In that connection the Sudanese delegation supported the position of the African Group set forth in Annex 5 of document GOV/2814/Rev.1, considering that particular importance should be accorded to the representation of the least developed Member States on the Board of Governors, in order to reduce the gulf and re-establish equilibrium between the richest and the poorest countries of the planet.

127. Sudan, which had always supported the idea of making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, likewise urged that one be created in the Middle East. To that effect it would be necessary for the international community to prevail upon Israel to accede to the NPT and submit its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards. The faith of the Sudanese had been shaken by the attitude of certain major powers which maintained one law for the rich and one for the poor and were creating obstacles to peace and co-operation in the world.

128. Sudan endorsed efforts being made to strengthen technical co-operation and supported the idea of proposing projects from which wider sections of society would benefit. It also approved the Agency's work concerned with producing potable water economically and using radioisotopes to identify groundwater resources. It also welcomed efforts being made to eliminate endemic diseases. In that connection Sudan associated itself with the views of the Group of 77 with regard to the various issues facing the Agency.

129. Mr. NIEWODNICZANSKI (Poland) said his delegation was pleased that the General Conference had approved the applications for Agency membership submitted by the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the admission of those two countries would significantly strengthen the Agency's influence in two politically crucial regions.

130. His delegation strongly endorsed the views expressed by the delegate of Spain on behalf of the European Union and of the States associated with it, so that he would confine himself to questions of direct concern to Poland.

131. As the first victim of the Second World War, Poland attached special importance to the efforts being made to strengthen global peace and security. The 1995 decision to extend the NPT indefinitely had been a major success, and there were real prospects that it would be complemented by the conclusion in 1996 of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

132. The historic decisions taken at the NPT Review and Extension Conference had confirmed once again the importance of the Agency's operational functions for implementation of the safeguards regime. The results of the Agency's activities in Iraq and the DPRK illustrated their importance. The measures being considered within the framework of Programme 93+2 were essential for further strengthening the safeguards system.

133. In that context, his delegation wished to congratulate the Governments of Ukraine and Moldova and also the Agency's Secretariat for having completed the negotiation of safeguards agreements. The congratulations were particularly justified in the case of Ukraine in that the envisaged safeguards system was complex and was being developed in parallel with the dismantling of nuclear weapons legally situated on the territory of Ukraine.

134. Poland greatly appreciated the activities being undertaken by the Secretariat in order to strengthen technical co-operation between the Agency and Member States. It welcomed the initiatives for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of technical co-operation programmes which had been launched as a follow-up to the third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar - for example, the preparation of Country Programme Frameworks.

135. Two years previously, Poland had been one of the first countries to receive major financial support for a Model Project. Owing to its scope and to the direct involvement of the industrial sector, the Model Project in question - entitled "Industrial-scale demonstration plant for the electron beam purification of flue gases" - had run into unexpected difficulties which had caused delays in implementation. His Government was grateful to the Director General and the Department of Technical Co-operation and also to the Government of Japan for their understanding, their patience and their help in finding the best solution to the various problems which had arisen during the initial project implementation phases. Recent information suggested that the principal internal difficulties had now been overcome, so that there was reason to hope that the delays would be made good.

136. Poland considered very useful the Secretariat initiative aimed at increasing the number and scale of the regional programmes being implemented in Eastern Europe. A regional workshop for determining the needs and expectations of East European countries had been held in Athens in May, and one was due to take place in Poland in October. The two workshops would undoubtedly lead to a better understanding of the common interests of the countries in the region, ensuring optimum utilization of the financial resources for technical co-operation programmes in Eastern Europe.

137. In that context, it was important to ensure adequate funding for the implementation of the planned technical co-operation programmes. Poland would pay its full share of the TCF target for 1996 and would like to see all Member States acting likewise, in order that the Agency might make further valuable contributions to the worldwide development of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

138. Poland had been operating two research reactors and a critical assembly for many years. The operation of its oldest research reactor (EWA) had been terminated at the end

of February, after 37 years of fruitful work. Its decommissioning, scheduled for the period 1995-2000, would be a new and very important technical undertaking for Poland, with major implications for public acceptance of the nuclear power option. All international assistance with decommissioning procedures and with management of the spent fuel elements would be welcome. The Agency's technical co-operation programme should place major emphasis on such questions in the years to come.

139. In his statement, the Director General had referred to a number of new projects executed since the previous session of the General Conference and to changes which should be made in the Agency's long-term programme. In that context, account would have to be taken of the growing tendency in Member States to subject new techniques - including those related to nuclear power and the application of nuclear methods and techniques - to a more strict assessment of their economic competitiveness and environmental impact. The increasing attention which the Agency was paying to those two issues was thoroughly justified.

140. His delegation believed that the Agency should in particular step up its efforts to promote the methods and mathematical models used in assessing energy and electricity demand and the cost competitiveness of various electricity-generating options. Application of the models forming part of ENPEP and of the DECADES programs required the establishment of new databanks and the expansion of existing ones and also the mastering of ways of operating more sophisticated computational and modelling systems. The help being given in that area by the Agency, in collaboration with other international organizations, was greatly appreciated. Similarly, the Agency's impartial expert advice regarding the pros and cons of available nuclear and non-nuclear solutions to problems connected with non-power applications of nuclear energy was becoming increasingly essential. His country was very interested in co-operation in the application of an objective and internationally tested methodology for the evaluation of national development strategies.

141. Among the Agency's other activities, the intensification of measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources deserved special mention. His Government attached great importance to the strengthening of national infrastructures, the accent being on the physical protection of nuclear materials, on nuclear material accounting

and control systems and on the prevention of illegal cross-border movements of radioactive sources. Poland had 116 border crossings, of which 47 - those most frequently used - were equipped with automatic radiation control gates produced in Poland. In 1994, the gate alarms had been triggered 1684 times, mainly at the country's eastern border; 867 consignments had been considered not to conform to Polish customs requirements and had been turned back. During the same period, no radioactive materials of unknown origin had been detected within Polish territory. An international database on all cases of unlawful use and attempted illegal transfer of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources would undoubtedly be a powerful instrument of prevention. His delegation therefore welcomed the Agency's efforts in that direction.

142. The jolt given to the nuclear community by the Chernobyl catastrophe had been channelled by the Agency into the development of important international instruments such as the Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Convention and the Convention on Nuclear Safety. His delegation had been pleased to learn that the last-mentioned convention, which had already obtained 59 signatures and 8 ratifications, would probably enter into force the following year. For its part, Poland had ratified it on 14 June 1995.

143. Being without nuclear power plants of its own but surrounded by the nuclear power plants of neighbouring countries, Poland had made a point also of acceding to the complete system of bilateral agreements on the early notification of nuclear accidents and on co-operation in the fields of nuclear safety and radiological protection. Following the conclusion of such agreements with Denmark, Austria and Norway, agreements had been concluded with the Governments of Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Lithuania. The agreements with the Governments of the three last-mentioned countries had been concluded after the 38th session of the General Conference. Negotiations with Slovakia were well advanced and would - he hoped - be finalized before the end of the year. Also, Poland was planning to start negotiations with Germany. At the same time, it was broadening its co-operation within the framework of existing agreements, especially with regard to radiation monitoring and radiological protection. The technical co-operation with Denmark initiated in 1994 was a good example of what was happening in those areas.

144. His delegation was pleased with the progress made in the preparation of a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. A number of important issues remained, however, and they would have to be tackled with great prudence as the time-scales involved were extremely long.

145. Another important problem closely related to the further development of nuclear power and to environmental protection was that of liability for nuclear damage. The extent of the damage caused by the Chernobyl accident, including its transboundary effects, had shown that the problem was a serious international one. The international liability system existing at the time of the Chernobyl accident had proved to be incapable of ensuring prompt and adequate compensation. The General Conference had taken up the problem in 1988, and in 1990 the Board of Governors had established the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, giving it two main tasks: firstly, to consider the question of international liability for nuclear damage, including international civil liability, international State liability and the relationship between them; and, secondly, to keep under review problems relating to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.

146. By adding the concept of State liability to the civil liability system which had been in existence since the early 1960s, the Board of Governors had introduced a source of supplementary funding to be drawn on in compensating for the consequences of nuclear accidents - including transboundary consequences. It was the issue of supplementary funding which had given rise to controversy in the Standing Committee - and to several proposals on which no consensus had yet been reached. A full and broadly accepted text concerning a new liability system was essential to the success of the envisaged diplomatic conference and to the viability of the system. It was very important to arrive at a consensus on such a text establishing a global nuclear liability regime which ensured well-defined and reasonable compensation for transboundary victims.

147. His delegation believed very strongly that the Agency owed the nuclear community an agreement on that important topical issue during the year which would mark the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. It therefore hoped that the Governments of Member States would soon provide the political guidance necessary for consensus on the new liability regime.

157. Convinced of the importance of international co-operation within the Agency framework for the attainment of a world order where justice, collaboration and prosperity reigned, his delegation was looking forward to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and of a convention on nuclear waste management, where it was sure the Agency would have a crucial role to play. In that regard, Morocco, which was taking all measures necessary for closer collaboration with the Agency, had finalized its radiation protection regulations and established a national nuclear energy council, a national centre for nuclear energy, science and technology and a national radiation protection centre.

158. Despite financial difficulties, caused in part by drought, Morocco had paid its Regular Budget and TCF contributions in order to help the Agency accomplish its tasks, which were continuing to expand. Clearly, the Agency would need more financial resources in the future, and the time had already come to consider how to remedy the situation before it was too late.

159. In support of the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards, Morocco had proposed the establishment of a regional organization for nuclear co-operation; the organization might be called MENATOM (by analogy with EURATOM) and could encompass the countries of North Africa and - given the progress made in the peace process in that region - the Middle East.

160. The problem of world water resources was becoming increasingly serious and might lead, early in the next century, to social crises or even to all-out wars. The reserves were declining, while needs were increasing. Strenuous efforts would therefore have to be made in support of the use of techniques such as seawater desalination and waste water purification, which would have to be adapted to the conditions in different regions. His delegation had already proposed the regular assignment of fixed amounts of TCF resources to such efforts. Also, cost-sharing might perhaps be adopted as a means of financing projects concerned with water resources.

161. With a view to the achievement of a consensus on the question of amending Article VI of the Agency's Statute, his country had submitted a proposal which was based on the principles expounded - inter alia - in resolution GC(XXV)/RES/389 in that it took into

account levels of technological development, provided for equitable geographical distribution, did not affect acquired rights, maintained the Board's effectiveness and did not change the balance between the number of seats filled through designations and that of elective seats. He hoped that a solution would be arrived at early in the following year, on the occasion of the Agency's 40th anniversary.

162. The human race was facing a crucial choice regarding its future. Either it could opt for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and thereby for its continued existence, or it could decide to use nuclear energy for military purposes and thereby trigger its own annihilation. The Agency had an important role to play, pursuant to Article II of its Statute, in the utilization of nuclear energy to open the way towards a new era of hope, harmony and prosperity.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

