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President: Mr. KASEMSARN (Thailand)

Later: Mr. ROUX (South Africa)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(39)/INF/21/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BWR	Boiling-water reactor
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CTBT	Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G-7	Group of Seven
HWR	Heavy-water reactor
Joint Protocol	Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LWR	Light-water reactor
MOX	Mixed oxide
NPP	Nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAS	Organization of American States
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
PHWR	Pressurized heavy water reactor
Quadripartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
R&D	Research and development
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1994 (GC(39)/3, GC(39)/26, GC(39)/26/Add.1 and 2) (continued)

1. Mr. BØJER (Denmark), having welcomed the fact that the Conference had approved the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for membership of the Agency and having associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the European Union, said that for Denmark the NPT was the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. His country was therefore pleased that the NPT Review and Extension Conference had decided without a vote on an indefinite extension of the NPT.
2. Denmark strongly deplored the recent nuclear tests, which represented a setback for international non-proliferation efforts and might well complicate the ongoing negotiations in Geneva on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In the light of the commitment undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to exercise utmost restraint as regards future nuclear testing, Denmark urged the States concerned not to carry out any further nuclear tests.
3. Besides deciding to extend the NPT, the Conference had adopted a number of principles and objectives which were very important for implementation of the policy of non-proliferation and directly relevant to the work of the Agency. It had expressly recognized the Agency as the competent authority responsible for verifying and ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements. Also, the reports of Main Committees II and III - although not formally adopted - contained elements which had been generally accepted. For example, the importance of the concept of sustainable development had been recognized as a guiding principle for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. In addition, the Conference had endorsed the role of the Agency in helping Member States to formulate projects which met the objective of protecting the global environment through sustainable development approaches. As a whole, the Conference had paid great attention to the importance of ensuring that nuclear energy was used in such a way as to minimize the possible negative effects on human health and the environment.
4. Safeguards were an important part of the international non-proliferation regime and played an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. That was why the

strengthening of safeguards had to be a top priority for the Agency. Denmark welcomed the fact that the Board of Governors had approved the measures constituting the first phase of Programme 93+2 and hoped that the Board would soon take the necessary decisions regarding the second phase.

5. Safeguards had to be regularly evaluated in order to make sure that the Agency was capable of detecting undeclared nuclear activities at all times. Only so could safeguards promote the necessary confidence among States. The two cases of violation of safeguards agreements were undoubtedly matters for concern, and it was also a matter for concern that more than 50 of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet concluded safeguards agreements pursuant to their treaty obligations. Although the States in question had no significant nuclear activities, it was still important for the credibility of the NPT and the safeguards system that all States comply with their obligations under Article III.

6. Denmark attached the utmost importance to the question of nuclear safety. When Denmark had decided, already in 1985, that nuclear power should not be used in its electricity production, the decision had been based on safety concerns. Unfortunately, many nuclear safety and radioactive waste storage problems were still unsolved. It was particularly regrettable that many nuclear power plants (NPPs) were operating at critically low levels of safety. However, Denmark greatly appreciated the fact that the Agency had intensified its efforts with regard to the assessment of the safety of NPPs built to earlier standards. Agency review missions had played an important role within the framework of the nuclear safety assistance rendered to States of Central and Eastern Europe and to Newly Independent States. Denmark strongly supported that assistance and had assumed its share by contributing to the programmes of the European Union, by making voluntary contributions to the EBRD Nuclear Safety Account and by allocating money to bilateral assistance programmes.

7. With regard to certain reactors operating in Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States, his country remained of the opinion that the only responsible solution was to shut them down as soon as possible. In that connection, it was very worried about plans for the recommissioning of one shut-down reactor despite the fact that the safety risks - including the safety risks associated with seismic activity - had not been properly addressed. In the countries concerned there was a very considerable potential for energy savings, which

should be exploited. Also, the development of alternative energy supply solutions might make it easier to shut down the unsafe reactors.

8. The conclusion of the Convention on Nuclear Safety had been a major step towards the creation of a comprehensive and legally binding safety regime. It was to be hoped that the Convention would enter into force soon. The Convention would have to be complemented by other legally binding agreements - for instance, in the field of radioactive waste management. Denmark supported the preparatory work being done for a convention on the safe management of radioactive wastes, and it appreciated other Agency initiatives aimed at resolving international radioactive waste management issues. The seminar on nuclear waste management in the Russian Federation which the Agency had organized in response to a request of the Joint Council of the Nordic Countries and with the approval of the Russian authorities had laid the groundwork for strengthening global co-operation with the Russian Federation in radioactive waste management and environmental restoration.

9. The need to strengthen the nuclear liability regime was perceived with a growing sense of urgency. In that regard, it was crucial to find a solution to the question of supplementary funding. Denmark strongly supported the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, but it was disappointed that the Committee had made such little progress towards agreement on common solutions to the outstanding questions. If substantial progress was not made at the Committee's next session, it would be difficult to convene a diplomatic conference at an early date. It should be borne in mind that broad participation in the third-party liability regime would have an important positive impact on international co-operation in upgrading nuclear safety.

10. Denmark attached great importance to the Agency's technical assistance activities, which were continuing to show considerable growth. It could accept a figure of US \$64.5 million as the target for TCF contributions for 1996 and had already pledged its full share of that target.

11. Mr. KAYONGO (Zambia), having welcomed the approval of the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for membership of the Agency, said that in the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations it had been gratifying to

witness the consensus in favour of peace represented by the decision - taken without a vote - to extend the NPT for an indefinite period. That had been a significant step towards everlasting peace. It was to be hoped that all the countries which had participated in the NPT Review and Extension Conference would respect the Conference's decisions.

12. His Government recognized the critical role being played by Agency technical co-operation in the development of Zambia. During the current biennial technical co-operation cycle, Zambia was benefiting from a Model Project in the field of radiotherapy. The unit to be established would be a good example of how nuclear energy applications could benefit a wide spectrum of the population, including the poor and underprivileged. The first phase of the project was well under way, and the necessary manpower had been found and trained. Also, a footnote-a/ project with potential social impact - in the field of nuclear medicine - had been made operational.

13. Those two projects would soon join a group of completed projects which had previously been supported by the Agency and were now having a socio-economic impact. The completed projects included one - mentioned by way of example - for the establishment of a tissue culture laboratory which was being used to produce potato seeds for a private company and preserve suitable varieties of cassava. Facilities established through other projects were being used in assessing the quality of cattle dips, in carrying out livestock disease diagnoses and in performing nitrogen fixation studies with the aim of improving performance in the agricultural sector. For the future, he expected that nuclear techniques would play a greater role in the improvement of soil fertility, in the efficient utilization of water resources and in the management of agricultural inputs such as agrochemicals.

14. Within the technical co-operation framework, Zambia would continue to participate in Agency-supported interregional and regional activities. The AFRA programme, now in its second five-year phase, would help very much to enhance Africa's regional capacity in the field of nuclear applications. The AFRA activities which had taken place so far had shown that the existing capacity could be used in achieving improvements in the nuclear science and technology sector which would contribute to sustainable development. In that regard, Zambia was looking forward to participating in the second seminar on the role of

nuclear science and technology in the development of Africa, which was scheduled to take place in 1996.

15. The delivery of technical assistance had been higher in 1994 than in any previous year, and the Agency was to be congratulated on that. The achievement reflected the measures which the Agency and Member States had been taking to enhance technical co-operation implementation, which would be further enhanced by the measures which the Secretariat was proposing in order to strengthen the Agency's technical co-operation activities.

16. Zambia supported the efforts being made by the Agency to increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system through Programme 93+2. His delegation was encouraged by the early implementation of the first part of Programme 93+2 within the existing legal framework and hoped that it would be possible to implement the whole programme soon, after the remaining issues had been resolved.

17. His country had noted the role played by the Agency in improving nuclear safety, especially its activities relating to the safety of nuclear reactors in Eastern Europe and CIS countries. The fact that 29 Member States had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety and nine had ratified it gave grounds for hope that the Convention would enter into force before the next General Conference session.

18. Resolution of the radioactive waste issue was essential if public confidence in nuclear science and technology was to be boosted. In that regard, his Government appreciated the progress made by the Agency and Member States in drafting a convention on radioactive waste safety and other relevant safety documents. The creation of a Department of Nuclear Safety was also a positive step.

19. In conclusion, his delegation was confident that, with the approval of a draft treaty text by the Council of Ministers and Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity in June 1995, the steps taken to establish an African nuclear-weapon-free zone would soon bear fruit.

20. Mr. CHIDAMBARAM (India), having welcomed the fact that the General Conference had approved the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of

Georgia for Agency membership, said that atomic energy was clearly establishing itself not only as an environmentally benign but also as the inevitable option for satisfying the future energy needs of the world, particularly in developing countries. The possibility of global warming, the problem of acid rain caused by fossil-fuel power plants, the declining world supplies of fossil fuels, the ecological and social problems caused by giant hydroelectric projects and the unlikelihood of the emergence - in the foreseeable future - of economically viable large-scale power plants based on solar energy, wind power or other non-conventional energy sources highlighted the importance of atomic energy. Nuclear power had, of course, to be incorporated in each country into an appropriate mix with other forms of power generation.

21. That being so, the most important activities of the Agency under its Statute should be to assist Member States in developing nuclear power technology and to facilitate the exchange of the related technical know-how and information in a manner dictated solely by technical considerations. Basically, the Agency should be an advanced technical body and play a catalytic role in the field of atomic energy, acting as a storehouse and a dissemination centre for technical information on operational experience with existing reactors and on the design of advanced reactor systems. That would benefit both developing and developed countries and would help in advancing the cause of nuclear safety. It was high time the Agency co-operated with developing countries in facing issues involved in actually setting up NPPs rather than limiting its activities to comparative studies and the development of databases. Also, technology control regimes must not be a barrier to the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

22. The world's resources of natural uranium and of thorium must be used effectively. India had adopted a scheme - involving closed and combined fuel cycles and utilizing natural uranium, plutonium and thorium - which it considered to be an effective form of sustainable development in the nuclear field. In his country's view, disposing of spent fuel as waste was not a prudent option. Spent fuel had a useful energy content which should be recovered by reprocessing. Also, from the waste management point of view the closed fuel cycle was a much safer option. Countries with reprocessing capabilities, including India, would no



doubt be happy to offer reprocessing services to other countries so that the plutonium in spent fuel might be recovered for use in MOX and other kinds of fuel.

23. In India, besides the two BWRs at Tarapur, there were eight 220 MW(e) PHWRs in operation and four PHWRs under construction. The construction of two 500 MW(e) PHWRs would start soon at Tarapur. In a recent study, Indian nuclear experts had concluded that the creation during the next 25 years of an installed capacity of 20 000 MW(e) with a reactor mix including fast breeders would provide India with a solid base from which it could expand its nuclear power programme in subsequent decades, with the inclusion of LWRs and advanced HWRs.

24. Over the years, India had developed the capability necessary for fabricating a variety of nuclear fuels: metallic, mixed-carbide and alloy fuels using natural uranium, plutonium and uranium-233. A project for increasing the loading of MOX fuel in the BWRs at Tarapur in a phased manner was under way.

25. The second objective of the Agency was to "ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it ... is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." Experience had shown that the Agency had done that very successfully. In addition, however, one of the functions assigned to the Agency in its Statute was "to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy". It would appear that, over the years, that function had supplanted the second objective. Be it as it might, the function was an important one and needed to be performed well, in the tradition of the Agency. In the past year, during his term as Chairman of the Board, considerable time and effort had been devoted under Programme 93+2 to the strengthening of safeguards applied on the basis of comprehensive safeguards agreements. India recognized the purpose of the exercise but believed that the approach should be a balanced one. Prudence was essential, for any agreed additional safeguards measures should be cost-effective and legally valid, equitable and politically acceptable - and they should respect the sovereignty of Member States. Applying excessive pressure might simply lead to a breakdown of the system. Distorting the perspective by the excessive use of clichés like "transparency" and "voluntary submission" might lead to a situation where the Agency found it difficult to give a comprehensive "clean

bill of health" to a Member State, even after subjecting it to intrusive measures. Anything which compromised the credibility of the Agency as a neutral, objective body must be meticulously avoided. In fact, it should be emphasized in that context that the Agency must strive to achieve the right balance in its main activities and accord to its promotional activities at least as much attention as it did to its safeguards activities.

26. Illicit trafficking in nuclear materials constituted a grave threat, particularly when associated with clandestine nuclear programmes. India had noted the proposals made the previous year at a meeting of experts convened to improve national systems of accounting and control and had supported the Agency's intention to develop a reliable database on illicit trafficking incidents. While the prevention of illicit trafficking was entirely a national responsibility, the Agency could help by conducting training programmes.

27. The nuclear tests carried out recently by certain States party to the NPT, soon after its indefinite extension, highlighted the NPT's inherent defects and would have repercussions as regards the envisaged Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India saw a CTBT as a step towards nuclear disarmament, but it would be meaningful only if firmly linked to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a well-defined timeframe - within, say, the next ten years. In his country's view, there was a pressing need for a disarmament regime which was universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory. A sincere effort to reach that goal was conspicuous by its absence.

28. India, which was fully committed to nuclear safety, had an effective regulatory mechanism and a very good safety record. A signatory of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, it was actively participating in the discussions on a nuclear waste safety convention and looked forward to its finalization soon. Safety was basically a technical issue, but commercial interests were often invoked in order to prevent the diffusion of information through the Agency in the field of nuclear power technology. Every nuclear facility in India had a radiation protection unit and an environmental surveillance unit operating on a permanent basis.

29. The applications of atomic energy in agriculture, medicine and industry were numerous. In agriculture, India had produced new varieties of groundnut, mustard and black

gram through radiation-induced mutation breeding, which was helping to preserve biodiversity in agriculture and should be actively encouraged by the Agency. Also, tissue culture techniques had been developed in India in order to improve the productivity and quality of bananas. A demonstration plant for the commercial irradiation preservation of spices was being set up in Bombay. Efforts were under way to manufacture irradiators, including portable ones. In that connection, the Agency was to be commended on its efforts in the field of food irradiation in response to the relevant General Conference resolution. Similarly, the Agency's efforts in the area of isotope hydrology for water resources management were progressing well. The production of radioisotopes and their application in industry, medicine and agriculture were an important part of India's nuclear programme, and the demand for the radiation sterilization of medical products had increased substantially in his country.

30. India had always been a staunch supporter of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. During the past year or so, important steps had been taken to strengthen those activities, through - inter alia - the Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar and the development of Model Projects, but India was dismayed to see how reluctant some countries were to back with adequate financial support the consensus decisions which had been arrived at. There had been a long and arduous debate over relatively small increases in the Indicative Planning Figures for technical co-operation, and there was continuing uncertainty about the payment of contributions. As in the past, India had pledged its full share of the TCF target for 1996 and would meet its pledge in full.

31. The development of nuclear technology had a multiplier effect on the growth of other technologies, especially in developing countries. For example, the high-technology sub-system integration capabilities needed for building reactors was also needed for building accelerators and laser systems, which were used in fields as diverse as elemental analysis, surgery, food irradiation, materials processing, waste management and nuclear fusion. India was interested in all those fields. The Agency must retain an active interest in many of those fields if its scientific-technological fibre was not to become atrophied.

32. Electronics and instrumentation were also important. The self-reliance achieved in the Indian nuclear programme was due in no small part to a broad-based R&D and

manufacturing capability established in India in support of that programme. Recently, India had provided the Agency's laboratories at Seibersdorf with nuclear instrumentation consisting - with the related software - of iodine, air particulate and argon-41 monitors, which together formed a system for monitoring releases of activity into the environment. The instrumentation would be used at the laboratories for the training of scientists and technicians.

33. The Agency had developed some useful mechanisms for increasing the interaction between Member States. In addition to its training programmes, its co-ordinated research programmes were particularly useful. Similarly, in order to exploit changing realities more effectively the Agency should increase the participation of developing countries in its research contracts programmes, for the simple reason that the capability of many developing countries had increased substantially over the years.

34. India believed that it was time for a larger fraction of the Agency's training programmes, technical meetings and co-ordinated research programmes to address more advanced areas. Many developing countries had reached the stage where they would benefit from more advanced nuclear technologies. That did not mean that the needs of the least developed countries should be overlooked. Those needs should be met more through TCDC and similar mechanisms which had many proven advantages. India would continue to render active support to the Agency in its efforts to promote and enlarge the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of health, peace and prosperity throughout the world.

35. Mr. DJITEDJIAN (Armenia), having welcomed the fact that the Conference had approved the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for Agency membership, said that Armenia set high store by the Agency activities relating to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the enhancement of NPP safety. For the past two years, Armenia, as an Agency Member State, had been fulfilling its commitments and making its contribution to those activities. During that time, Armenia had acted in strict accordance with international law as it related to the utilization of nuclear energy. Since gaining independence, it had embarked on far-reaching reforms in order to make the transition to a free-market economy. However, the transition was being slowed down by a severe energy crisis.

36. In 1981 Armenia's total installed electricity-generating capacity had been 3500 MW (1750 MW accounted for by fossil-fuelled power stations, 800 MW by NPPs and 950 MW by hydroelectric power stations), but the situation had deteriorated seriously by the beginning of the 1990s. Power generation using fossil fuels had been seriously affected by the 1988 earthquake; the Hrazdan power station, with a capacity of 1200 MW, was still being repaired. As for the Erevan power station (520 MW), it was old and had been overworked. Because of shutdowns due to fuel supply interruptions resulting from 35 cases of sabotage of the pipeline feeding Armenia and ten of the railway lines used in the transport of heating oil, a great deal of equipment was no longer serviceable. From the 1750 MW of installed capacity accounted for by fossil-fuelled power stations, Armenia was now obtaining only 300-600 MW of power.

37. The situation regarding hydroelectric power stations was no better. Of the 950 MW of installed capacity, 550 MW were accounted for by the Sevan-Hrazdan hydroelectric power stations, built in the 1950s, which used the waters of Lake Sevan, the only source of fresh water in the region. It had been necessary to operate those stations at full capacity in order to ensure a minimum coverage of energy needs. As a result, in the course of five years the level of the lake had fallen to within only 27 cm of the level below which the ecological consequences would be irreversible. The state of the equipment at those stations was also critical. For all those reasons, Armenia now had a hydroelectric power generation capacity of no more than 400 MW.

38. As to Armenia's NPP, it had been built in the 1970s near to the town of Medzamor, in the Arart plain, and had played a very important role in meeting the country's electricity needs. It consisted of two WWER-440/270 units, which were intermediate between WWER-440/230 units (first generation) and WWER-440/213 units (second generation). The NPP had withstood the 1988 earthquake. Thanks to the site selection which had been made, it had not suffered any damage, being shut down by the operator soon after the earthquake purely as a precaution. In spite of that, the psychological shock caused by the earthquake had triggered a "Chernobyl syndrome". The optimistic programmes and political tensions of the period of perestroika had induced the last communist government to opt for a shutdown of the NPP at the beginning of 1989.

39. Of the 3500 MW of installed capacity which Armenia had had at the beginning of the 1980s, only 650-1000 MW remained. That had forced the Government to reduce the supply of electricity to the population to two-three hours daily and to stop the district heating of apartment blocks despite extremely cold winter conditions. In 1988, per capita energy consumption in Armenia had been 3600 kg of coal equivalent - the same level as in France in the 1960s. By 1993 it had dropped to 1200 kg. A whole succession of expert groups had endeavoured to find solutions to those problems. They had been unanimous in their conclusion: only by restarting the NPP would it be possible to overcome the profound energy crisis in the short term. Many experts had made a gradual raising of the safety level a condition for a restart of the WWER-440 units. It was on that basis that, in April 1993, the Armenian Government had decided to begin preparing for a restart of the second unit. Aware of the importance of everything to do with operational safety for Armenia and its neighbours, during the past year it had devoted enormous efforts to improving the safety of the NPP. It had had additional studies carried out regarding the seismicity at the site and the behaviour of the buildings and equipment during earthquakes. Geophysical and seismological analyses performed under the supervision of Agency experts had shown that the basic data used in the design of the NPP had not changed. It had been clearly established that there was no geological fault at or near the site and that the NPP rested on a "monoblock".

40. In addition, a set of 19 measures had been taken in order to raise the safety level of the NPP. They included the installation of a high-pressure emergency cooling system, a sprinkler system and a system for locating damage and detecting leaks from the primary into the secondary circuit. Steps had been taken to enhance the seismic resistance of the NPP, the reliability of the electricity supply, the protection of the site and the level of personnel training. Also, a number of fire precaution measures had been taken. The work in question was in its final phase, and the NPP was to be restarted in two months. The determination of the Armenian Government to continue with its economic reforms confirmed the correctness of the decision: a collapse of the energy system and of the entire economy would have meant the failure of the reforms.

41. The objective difficulties of the transition period - the severing of commercial ties, the collapse of payment mechanisms, the blocking of transport routes and disasters (like the

earthquake) producing tens of thousands of refugees - had not prevented his Government from making some progress towards a free-market economy. It was absolutely convinced that the NPP's re-entry into service would extricate Armenia from the crisis and consolidate the changes now under way.

42. The totality of the work done during the initial stage had been financed by Armenia. No less important measures needed to be taken during the second stage, and for them substantial technical and financial assistance would be necessary. It was to be hoped that Armenia would receive from Western countries assistance like that still being provided to the countries where reactors similar to those of the Medzamor NPP were in operation. The assistance provided to Armenia in order to ensure the safe operation of that NPP would constitute not only support for a country which had chosen the path of economic reform but also a contribution to solving common safety problems and maintaining the prestige of nuclear power.

43. The people and Government of Armenia were grateful to the Russian Federation's specialists for their help. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy and the nuclear safety organization Gosatomnadzor deserved particular mention. There could be no doubt that the fruitful technical co-operation between the Russian Federation and Armenia would develop further. Also, Armenia was grateful to the Agency and to the specialists of many countries who had visited the NPP and provided valuable advice. It was ready to co-operate constructively with Member States of the Agency and was resolved to abide by the principles upheld by the Agency.

44. Mr. CORDONIÚ PUJALS (Cuba), having expressed pleasure at the fact that the Conference had approved the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for Agency membership, said that during the past year the structure of nuclear activities in Cuba had undergone profound changes as a result of the reforms carried out in order to improve the State apparatus. At the end of 1994, statutory order 147 had led to the establishment of a Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment, to which had been entrusted - inter alia - the functions previously performed by the Cuban Atomic Energy Commission and the Executive Secretariat for Nuclear Affairs. The Ministry had thus become the national authority for everything to do with the peaceful utilization and the

promotion of nuclear energy and for co-ordination, regulation and control activities. In performing its functions, the Ministry would rely heavily on two specialist organizations. The first was the Nuclear Energy Agency (AEN), whose main tasks were to promote, co-ordinate and supervise the applications of nuclear energy in all sectors of the economy, R&D activities, special production operations, the training of specialists, public information activities and scientific-technical services. Also, the AEN had been made responsible for co-ordination with the Agency and other outside bodies involved in technical assistance and co-operation in the nuclear field. For the performance of its tasks, the AEN had four scientific establishments (which, in addition, offered specialized services and engaged in production operations), an advanced training centre and an information centre. The second specialist organization was the National Centre for Nuclear Safety, which reported directly to the Minister. It was responsible for the enforcement of nuclear and radiological safety regulations and for nuclear material accountancy and control. The construction and future operation of Cuba's NPP, on the other hand, were the responsibility of the Ministry for Basic Industries, which was responsible for all electricity production in Cuba.

45. The new structure, set in place in January 1995, would permit a clearer separation between promotional and regulatory activities and facilitate the interaction between, on one hand, nuclear activities and, on the other, the country's major scientific and technical development programmes and efforts in the area of environmental protection. Despite the economic difficulties which it was experiencing, Cuba - the victim of an unjust, criminal blockade which had now been going on for more than 30 years - was still making a great effort to move ahead with its nuclear programme. In the first place, upkeep operations at the Juragua NPP had continued, and progress had been made in seeking ways of achieving completion of the construction work. A technical-economic feasibility study relating to the first unit was at a very advanced stage, and the results were to be published soon. Then negotiations would begin with firms interested in joining an international consortium which would assume responsibility for completing the construction work and operating the reactor.

46. At the same time, work relating to the safety of the facility had continued. The international studies on the safety of reactors of Soviet design had been followed closely, the results being examined in the light of the characteristics of the Juragua reactors, which were



of the WWER-440/318 type - i.e. more modern than WWER-440/230 and 213 units and incorporating from the outset many of the solutions now being proposed for such units. Various measures had been considered when that was necessary, and some had already been taken. In addition, the regulatory organization was working hard to improve the legal and regulatory regime and was training its staff to perform an accurate overall assessment of the safety of the NPP at the different licensing stages.

47. The Agency's Secretariat had supported Cuba in its efforts to complete the NPP and ensure that its nuclear safety system was operational at all times; thanks to it, Cuba had benefited from the services of experts and from the support of other countries. On the other hand, in recent months Cuba had been the target of a campaign in various foreign media which were intent on denigrating its NPP and were disseminating tendentious information which cast doubt on the safety of the NPP, the qualifications of its personnel and the competence of the relevant specialized Cuban organizations. Most of that information was devoid of all technical substance, representing no more than an attempt to undermine the legitimate efforts being made by the Cuban people to resolve its energy problems. The reality was that Cuba had acquired an excellent reputation thanks to the serious manner in which it had always conducted its nuclear programme. The campaign was nevertheless helping to confuse international public opinion by arousing distrust towards and fear of nuclear power. The Agency should condemn such manipulation of public opinion and such peddling of damaging untruths about countries' nuclear programmes; as to governments, they should make sure that such machinations did not occur within their territories.

48. Cuba had always been ready to exchange information and collaborate with all its neighbours, including those countries which might be worried about the nuclear safety measures which it had taken - provided, of course, that such exchanges were based on transparency and reciprocity. It certainly was not Cuba which had hindered technical collaboration between its scientists and those of its neighbours, but its efforts had not always been reciprocated. However, he hoped that everyone would soon appreciate the necessity and usefulness of such exchanges.

49. Cuba had remained very active in other areas of nuclear applications. Following the completion of construction and installation work, the isotope centre was at the final startup

and licensing stage. At the same time, Cuban specialists had continued to produce - at temporary facilities - various types of radiopharmaceuticals and labelled compounds for general use in the country; production would be gradually shifted to the new facility during the rest of the year. Also, the new laboratories of the Centre for Radiological Protection and Health were now in operation. The Centre had - inter alia - a secondary standard dosimetry laboratory and a variety of equipment provided through Agency technical assistance projects. Thus, Cuba was continuing to strengthen its infrastructure for radiation protection - an area where it had had occasion to share its experience with other countries in the region; in fact, it was ready to place its expertise and infrastructure at the disposal of other Member States. Also, the programmes for the radiobiological monitoring and assessment of children from regions affected by the Chernobyl accident had continued; a workshop would be held at the end of 1995 with a view to comparing the results obtained by Cuba and those obtained in other countries. Moreover, during the past year important work had been done within the framework of Agency technical co-operation projects relating to the use of radioisotopes in the assessment of biological fertilizers, to the development of new crop varieties adapted to tropical environments, and to the use of nuclear instrumentation in industry to increase efficiency, reduce contamination and improve quality control. Satisfactory results had also been obtained in the development of monoclonal antibody kits for use in radioimmuno-scintigraphy.

50. In that connection he recalled the importance which his country attached to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities. In the present complex world economic situation, many developing countries were experiencing serious difficulties, and technical co-operation programmes were often the only thing enabling them to continue their efforts in areas as important for their populations as health, agriculture and environmental protection. Those essential Agency activities - far from declining - would have to expand if nuclear energy was really to be placed at the service of mankind. In that regard, his delegation was very conscious of the decisive contribution of the donor countries. Also, it was grateful to the Department of Technical Co-operation for the efforts made by it in improving its programmes and executing economically and socially effective projects. It would like all Member States to contribute to the TCF their shares of the TCF targets. At

the same time, Cuba had already made it known in the Board of Governors that it considered the minimum annual TCF target increases agreed upon for 1996-98 to be completely inadequate.

51. In Latin America and the Caribbean, over the previous decade technical co-operation had benefited greatly from ARCAL, thanks to which thousands of specialists had received training, information, maintenance and radiation protection infrastructures had been strengthened, technology transfer from more to less developed countries had been achieved and - above all - there had been an increase in the co-operation between nuclear institutions in the region. Admittedly, the ARCAL programme, whose possibilities had not been fully explored, could be improved, but it was nevertheless of crucial importance for the region; efforts should be made to strengthen it and to develop new approaches which would result in projects with greater impact and more tangible results.

52. His delegation welcomed the measures being taken by the Secretariat to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management. With regard to the question of amending Article VI of the Statute, the Article as a whole should be revised in the interests of greater democracy in the Agency's operations. The designation of members of the Board of Governors should become a more transparent exercise, and the number of Board members should be increased - albeit with respect for the principle of equitable geographical representation and without detriment to the participation of developing countries.

53. As to the proposed measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Secretariat was to be commended for trying to take into account most of the comments made by Member States. With regard to the measures approved by the Board of Governors in June 1995, the need - recognized by the Board - for appropriate consultations between the Secretariat and Member States regarding their implementation should not be forgotten. As regards the measures for which the Agency would require additional legal authority, his delegation hoped that the Secretariat would produce a detailed report going into the technical, legal and financial aspects of the proposed measures, so that a complete picture would be available before decisions were taken. His delegation had already stated that, in its view, some of the information which it was proposed

should be requested of Member States was unnecessary. It had already emphasized the need to take into account considerations of cost efficiency in accordance with the relevant resolution adopted by the General Conference in 1992. Implementation of the new measures must not entail any increase in Member States' contributions or negatively affect other important activities of the Agency. Developments did not warrant any significant changes in the present safeguards financing arrangements, especially as the formula which had been under consideration since the beginning of the year would lead to appreciable increases in the contributions of many "shielded" countries to the safeguards budget. During a recent session of the Board of Governors, Cuba had expressed reservations about the tendency to tackle the question from a political point of view without bearing in mind the economic implications of the proposed measures for the "shielded" countries. Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the Agency's safeguards system should be applied in the same fashion to all States and should not involve discriminatory conditions or other elements.

54. In March 1995 Cuba had signed the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the internal measures necessary for ratification were currently being taken. That demonstrated Cuba's wish to contribute to regional integration and to the creation of a zone truly free of nuclear weapons. However, as stated by the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time of signing, the obstacles which had been in the way of Cuba's signing the Treaty still existed and continued to pose a serious threat to its security. The only nuclear Power in the region was pursuing a policy of hostility towards Cuba, was intensifying its economic, commercial and financial blockade, stepping up its campaign of defamation and continuing to occupy by force - illegally and against the wishes of the Cuban people - a part of Cuba's national territory, through which even nuclear-armed ships belonging to it passed. It was for the sake of Latin American unity that Cuba had nevertheless signed the Treaty. Moreover, the Minister had recalled that Cuba was in favour of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the only way of bringing about lasting peace and ensuring the security of all on an equal footing.

55. February 1996 would mark the centenary of the announcement by Henri Becquerel of the discovery of natural radioactivity - an event which had heralded in the nuclear age. The anniversary should be properly commemorated, for it would offer the Agency a unique opportunity for launching an information campaign on the benefits of radioactivity for

mankind and the prospects for the future. The importance of the role of public opinion in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been adequately demonstrated, and there was no secret about the difficulties of implementing projects or programmes even of incontestable value when their potential beneficiaries were poorly informed.

56. Mr. KOSTENKO (Ukraine), having welcomed the approval of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for membership of the Agency, said that one of the most important events since the previous session of the General Conference had been the decision of the NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely. In keeping with its denuclearization policy and deeply conscious of the NPT's importance for future generations, Ukraine had acceded to the NPT on 5 December 1994 as a non-nuclear-weapon State and was taking all necessary measures to eliminate the nuclear arsenals inherited by it after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In taking the decision to accede to the NPT and supporting its indefinite extension, Ukraine had wanted to help strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, hoping that all States - including those with nuclear weapons - would contribute to the attainment of that goal. That was why Ukraine could not but express its concern about the continuation of nuclear testing, which ran counter to the decisions taken by the NPT Review and Extension Conference, once again urge all the nuclear-weapon States to abide by the principle of "utmost restraint" and call for the earliest possible conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

57. It was hardly possible to overestimate the role of the Agency in the implementation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the principal element of which was the safeguards system. Wishing to help in strengthening the safeguards regime, Ukraine had declared its readiness to sign the relevant agreement with the Agency during the current General Conference session. Moreover, despite an extremely complicated economic situation Ukraine had since January 1995 been complying with the agreement between it and the Agency on the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities in Ukraine. Thanks to the direct involvement of - and to assistance from - staff of the Agency's Department of Safeguards, a great deal had been done to implement the provisions of that agreement, including the establishment of an SSAC, the conduct of inspections, the training of personnel and the installation of necessary technical means.

Ukraine was grateful to the Agency and also to Sweden, Finland, the United States, Japan and the other States that were still assisting Ukraine with the implementation of the safeguards agreement.

58. The issues of nuclear safety and radiation protection were of vital importance for Ukraine and the international community, and his delegation was pleased that the Agency was devoting more and more attention to those issues. The Secretariat had spared no efforts in assessing the safety of NPPs in Central and Eastern Europe, including CIS countries. An international consensus was emerging with regard to the safety of NPPs of Soviet design, and international co-operation in the nuclear safety area between East and West had commenced. Obviously, solving the NPP safety problems would take time and a great deal of effort, and legislative, economic and administrative reforms would be necessary. For its part, Ukraine had in 1994 - with Agency support - reorganized its regulatory system for nuclear safety and radiation protection, integrating the nuclear regulatory authority into the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety and thereby separating regulatory from operational functions. Moreover, at the beginning of 1995 the Ukrainian Parliament had adopted a law on nuclear energy utilization and radiation protection whose provisions were fully consistent with the relevant international norms and with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Since then, Ukraine had been updating its safety rules and regulations.

59. Nuclear power was still playing an important role in Ukraine's economy. NPPs had accounted for 33.5% of the electricity produced in Ukraine in 1995, and the share of nuclear power in the country's electricity supply was continuing to grow. Despite the general economic difficulties in Ukraine, the resources necessary for the commissioning of Unit 6 of the Zaporozhe NPP had been made available.

60. Welcoming the Agency's initiative in convening for the spring of 1996 an international conference entitled "One decade after Chernobyl", he said that the negotiations which had started as a follow-up to proposals as to possible ways of decommissioning the Chernobyl NPP made at the G-7 meeting held in Naples in 1994 had not yet finished. The President of Ukraine had announced that his country intended to decommission the Chernobyl NPP by the year 2000 provided that it received sufficient assistance in support of its energy sector and the nuclear safety issues were resolved. In a letter dated 8 August 1995

to the G-7 members, the President had affirmed the Ukrainian position in the matter, at the same time pointing out that, if the West continue to delay in providing the assistance which it said it wished to provide, Ukraine would be obliged to act in accordance with its national priorities and economic and technical capabilities. As Ukraine was in the midst of a complicated economic and financial transition, the assistance of other States in resolving the problems connected with the Chernobyl NPP was of decisive importance.

61. Moreover, one should not speculate about shutting down the Chernobyl NPP without bearing in mind the safety-related problems of the "sarcophagus" and the need to rehabilitate the contaminated zone as a whole. In that connection it might be mentioned that all activities relating to the Chernobyl units in operation and to the "sarcophagus", and also to the rehabilitation of contaminated areas, which cost over \$100 million a year, were being carried out by Ukraine alone, without any support from the international community.

62. One way of analysing and resolving the whole complex of scientific, social, environmental and medical issues arising from the Chernobyl disaster was to establish an international R&D centre where experts from all over the world could study the problems of eliminating the consequences of nuclear and radiation accidents. Such a centre, the only one of its kind in the world, would provide an opportunity to study the experience acquired in overcoming the consequences of major ecological accidents in the light of the Chernobyl experience, thereby fostering a close partnership between Ukrainian scientists and the world's leading R&D centres and laboratories. In that connection, Ukraine was grateful to the Government of the United States for responding promptly to its proposal and taking practical steps to help it establish the centre. It hoped that the Agency and the governments of all interested States would support the initiative and participate in the establishment and building-up of the centre.

63. Ukraine - like many other States - had in 1994 signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and it was now preparing to ratify it. His country was very conscious of its responsibilities as regards the safety of the NPPs under its jurisdiction and recognized the complexity of the efforts which would have to be made and how long those efforts would take before it was able to fulfil in their entirety the requirements of the Convention.

64. Ukraine appreciated what the Agency was doing in order to establish a comprehensive regime of civil liability for nuclear damage. It approved of the basic principles of the regime and planned to take appropriate steps aimed at the adoption - as soon as possible - of the international standards existing in that area.

65. His delegation welcomed the progress made in implementing the programme for the setting of standards for radioactive waste management, an issue about which world public opinion was very sensitive. The international consensus which had emerged regarding that issue was extremely important. It was to be hoped that the work of the group of experts charged with drawing up a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management would bear fruit.

66. Ukraine was pleased with the way in which its technical co-operation with the Agency in basic areas like nuclear safety, radiation protection and NPP operational safety was developing. At present, the Agency and Ukraine were implementing nine projects of great practical importance relating to nuclear power production.

67. Ukraine endorsed the Agency's draft budget for 1996. Regrettably, the economic difficulties which it was experiencing had prevented it from entirely meeting its Regular Budget obligations. Being very conscious of the Agency's own financial difficulties, it was doing its best to fulfil the financial commitments associated with membership of the Agency; thus, early in 1995 it had made a payment of more than \$4 million towards the Regular Budget. However, it considered its Regular Budget assessment not to be fully in line with its capacities. In that connection, it had welcomed resolution 49/19B adopted at the 49th session of the United Nations General Assembly and providing for a reasonable, gradual reduction in Ukraine's rate of assessment during the period 1995-97. Ukraine continued to support the principle of zero real growth and believed that the main activities of the Agency should be financed from the Regular Budget.

68. In conclusion, Ukraine endorsed the annual report for 1994 and greatly appreciated the efforts being made by the Agency to strengthen international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and the international non-proliferation regime.



69. Mr. ZAIDE (Philippines), having welcomed the approval of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for Agency membership, thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for the simplified and improved format of the annual report, which had greatly facilitated the task of reviewing it.

70. The President had drawn attention to the fact that the General Conference's 39th session was taking place 50 years after the first atomic explosion. At the same time, the Director General had looked forward to a world where nuclear energy would be used only for positive, peaceful purposes and had expressed the hope that accession to the NPT would constitute a firm commitment on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons and on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate nuclear disarmament.

71. The Agency had an increasingly important role to play in ensuring that nuclear energy was used exclusively for peaceful purposes and in monitoring, through its safeguards system, the compliance of States with their commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons, particularly at a time when the nuclear-weapon States had declared their commitment to nuclear disarmament. The major issue facing the Conference was the credibility of commitments entered into by States. Were States complying with their international undertakings? Were they acting in the nuclear field in accordance with the letter and spirit of the treaties and other agreements which they had freely entered into?

72. In May 1995, at a time of international détente, the States party to the NPT had taken the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. The Philippines was among the countries which had supported an indefinite extension, convinced that nuclear weapons were a non-option and that the NPT was helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. All States party to the NPT, and particularly those with nuclear weapons, had committed themselves to abide by the principles and objectives adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference: universality, non-proliferation, a programme of action for nuclear disarmament, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards and the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

73. Subsequent events had been disappointing: two nuclear-weapon States had resumed nuclear testing in violation of commitments accepted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. They had dealt a serious blow to the cause of nuclear disarmament and severely damaged the credibility of the NPT. The fragile trust which had been created among States and on which the NPT's indefinite extension rested had been undermined. The Philippines had noted the Director General's remarks concerning a request by France that the Agency organize a scientific mission to assess the radiological impact of its nuclear tests. The request denoted recognition of the fact that the Agency possessed the authority and moral integrity necessary in order to pronounce on the results of those tests. The Philippines had expressed its indignation regarding the nuclear tests by, inter alia, co-sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document GC(39)/26, which it would like all Member States participating in the current Conference session to support.

74. On the other hand, the Philippines was happy about the progress made towards the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, and it hoped that the African example would be followed in the Middle East. Also, the Philippines welcomed the fact that all countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region had now become parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty. In addition, it would like those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so to sign the relevant Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. For its part, ASEAN was making good progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. The ASEAN countries attached great importance to the establishment of additional internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones by the year 2000.

75. The strong commitment of the non-nuclear-weapon States to the principles and objectives adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference was manifest in their support for the strengthening of safeguards and the new safeguards financing scheme. Those States were in favour of stricter measures to prevent horizontal non-proliferation. The Philippines had consistently supported Programme 93+2 for strengthening safeguards and believed that, in order to underpin the non-proliferation regime, Programme 93+2 should apply also to item-specific and voluntary-offer safeguards agreements. That had become imperative with the increase in the number of cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

76. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had called for the co-operation of States in providing the Agency with the financial and human resources necessary to enable it to fulfil its mandate as regards technical co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety. To that end, it had encouraged the Agency to intensify its efforts directed towards the funding of technical assistance from predictable and assured resources. His country had therefore been very disappointed by the compromise - arrived at only with great difficulty - on the target for contributions to the TCF for 1996 and on Indicative Planning Figures for 1997 and 1998 (a compromise which had provided only for a \$3 million target increase in 1996 and \$3.5 million target increases in 1997 and 1998), particularly in view of the fact that every nuclear test cost at least \$20 million. Despite the fact that it possessed only very meagre resources, the Philippines had pledged and paid in full its share of the TCF target. It would like other Member States, and particularly the major donor countries, to do everything possible to make more footnote-a/ projects operational.

77. His country was grateful to the Secretariat, and particularly the Department of Technical Co-operation, for the efforts being made to improve the technical co-operation system. It had been among the first to receive - in March 1995 - a country programme framework mission. The Agency's technical co-operation activities were being integrated with his country's national or sectoral development objectives. The mission team had identified areas for future co-operation between the Philippines and the Agency. The current programme encompassed activities in agriculture, medicine and industrial development. Also, in May 1995 the Philippines had set up a nuclear power steering committee to review the viability of the nuclear power programme, and the policies which would be adopted in that area would influence his country's technical co-operation requirements.

78. The Conference on the Nuclear Power Option, held in September 1994, had projected a positive future for nuclear power. Talking about the Agency beyond the year 2000, the Director General had forecast enhanced Agency roles in safeguards verification, nuclear safety and technology transfer. He had also forecast that the Agency would play a pivotal role in the implementation of a CTBT and a cut-off agreement, which could lead to safeguarded worldwide disarmament.

79. The Philippines believed that, in anticipation of such enhanced roles, there was a need for democratization of the Board, with greater regional representation. It was in favour of amending Article VI of the Statute so as to achieve an expansion of the Board. It would welcome the early convening of an expert group to study specific criteria for designating Board members. The successful resolution of that issue would determine the Agency's effectiveness.

80. Mr. AKWA (Yemen), having welcomed the fact that the General Conference had approved the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for Agency membership, said that the Conference's current session was of particular importance for Yemen, which had not long previously become an Agency Member State. That had been a crucial step, which should enable his country to benefit from the many possibilities offered by the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques in the development area.

81. Being in favour of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, Yemen had welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT. His country supported the efforts of the Agency to make Africa and the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zones, and it believed that all States in those regions should place their nuclear facilities under safeguards and open them to Agency inspection teams.

82. The Government of Yemen was endeavouring to meet its responsibilities and fulfil its financial, moral and legal commitments vis-à-vis the Agency. His delegation was very appreciative of the visit which the Director General had paid to Yemen in the middle of December 1993 and of the February 1994 mission undertaken in order to examine the possibilities of co-operation between Yemen and the Agency and to provide initial advice and assistance. They had led to the formulation of a number of tasks relating to practical and legal matters whose implementation had already started.

83. In conclusion, his delegation hoped that the Conference would achieve positive results and that it would take the appropriate decisions with regard to the various important items on its agenda, thereby strengthening the positive role being played by the Agency, especially in nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, the prevention of illicit

trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances, the economic production of potable water and the financing of technical assistance.

84. Mr. ARAMRATTANA (Thailand), having welcomed the fact that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia had been approved for Agency membership, said that there were grounds to be pleased that during the current year, 50 years after Hiroshima, the international community had agreed on an indefinite extension of the NPT, which was now a permanent part of the global security structure and provided a framework for achieving complete disarmament and ensuring the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. His delegation would like to urge all States which had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so and to conclude the requisite comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. It looked forward to the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. In that connection, his delegation wished to underscore the statement made by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Brunei Darussalam in July deploring the resumption or planned resumption of nuclear tests in the Asian-Pacific region in view of the commitment of all States party to the NPT to exert utmost restraint as regards nuclear weapons testing and to conclude a CTBT in 1996. All nuclear-weapon States should desist from testing nuclear devices. In that connection, Thailand was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution on nuclear testing which had been submitted to the Conference.

85. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers had also taken note of the planned establishment of a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, which would be the subject of a draft treaty expected to be presented at the ASEAN Summit in December, in Thailand. His delegation welcomed the draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific; they would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. His delegation hoped that all the nuclear-weapon States would adhere to the relevant Protocols.

86. Thailand attached high priority to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, which had made significant contributions to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy in developing countries. Those activities should continue, and comprehensive projects in line with Member States' national development plans for the period 1997-98 should be supported by the Agency. In Thailand, peaceful applications of nuclear energy had become an integral

part of economic development in sectors such as agriculture, food production and preservation, medical health care, radiation protection and industry. The Agency's regular programme of technical co-operation for the years 1995-96 included projects for Thailand concerned with the establishment of a nuclear research centre, a nuclear power plant pre-feasibility study, the development of a nuclear regulatory organization, the integrated control of fruit flies, the extension of neonatal screening to rural areas, the improvement of sugar cane production using nuclear techniques, the improvement of fertilizer use efficiency, an isotope-aided study of groundwater resources and the strengthening of radiation protection. His delegation looked forward to Thailand's continuing co-operation with the Agency in all the areas in question.

87. The Thai delegation welcomed the establishment of the Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation (SAGTAC), whose work should be of benefit to the developing countries. Also, it would like to commend the Secretariat for having achieved a technical co-operation implementation rate of 69.7% in 1994 despite financial constraints. Noting that the value of TCF contributions for 1995 paid as at 31 August 1995 had been equal to 66% of the 1995 target, he urged Member States to fulfil their obligations in order that the target might be met. For its part, Thailand had pledged and paid an amount equal to its share of the TCF target and had also paid its Regular Budget contribution. A balanced approach should be adopted in strengthening the Agency's technical assistance activities and its safeguards programme.

88. The role of the Agency in verifying peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been reaffirmed by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Its efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system were aimed at creating international confidence. His Government welcomed and supported the Agency measures proposed for ensuring the correctness and completeness of information on Member States' nuclear activities provided under comprehensive safeguards agreements. In that connection, Thailand would like to see the Agency's verification capacities employed in the implementation of nuclear disarmament agreements and a CTBT.

89. Thailand had consistently supported the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and had therefore welcomed the outcome of the talks between the United States and the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); an important role was to be played by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in helping to implement the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994. In that connection, his Government had pledged an amount of \$300 000 as its contribution to KEDO.

90. In conclusion, his delegation wished to endorse the Agency's annual report and to congratulate the Agency on its excellent performance in spite of the financial and other constraints of recent years. Thailand would continue to support the Agency's work.

91. Mr. PESCI BOUREL (Argentina), having welcomed the approval of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for Agency membership, said that since the General Conference's 38th session Argentina had made significant new contributions to the international non-proliferation regime. In particular, on 10 February 1995 it had deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. That step had been further evidence of his Government's commitment to non-proliferation, which had already been demonstrated by Argentina's agreement with Brazil on the exclusively peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, the quadripartite full-scope safeguards agreement concluded with the Agency (the Quadripartite Agreement), Argentina's ratification - with waiver - of the Tlatelolco Treaty and its formal accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to the "dual-use regime".

92. Moreover, Argentina had taken an active part in the NPT Review and Extension Conference and was pleased with the consensus which had emerged there. Convinced that States must fulfil their obligations pursuant to Article IV of the NPT, Argentina had established a national system for the control of sensitive nuclear exports. In that connection, it was perhaps worth noting that the Common Argentine-Brazilian System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials was functioning well and that implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement was proceeding to everyone's satisfaction. The mechanisms for co-ordination between the Agency and ABACC should now be agreed on and put in place as soon as possible, in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement. That would bring operational and economic benefits for both organizations and also for Argentina and Brazil. In addition, wishing to support the Agency's efforts to strengthen the safeguards system, Argentina had advocated the immediate application of the measures envisaged in Part 1 of

Programme 93+2 and had continued to co-operate with the Secretariat in carrying out environmental monitoring trials with a view to the use of environmental monitoring in the detection of undeclared nuclear activities.

93. Argentina was convinced that nuclear energy was essential to economic and social development, as attested by the 45 years during which the National Atomic Energy Commission had been devoting itself to nuclear science and technology. The fruits of its efforts were well known, and a growing number of countries besides Argentina were benefiting from them. Argentina was now employing advanced techniques which had previously been the exclusive preserve of the highly developed countries. Still following the peaceful path for which it had opted, his country was continuing to pursue national development policies involving the use of nuclear power to produce electricity and other applications of nuclear energy.

94. The National Atomic Energy Commission had helped, on one hand, to highlight - through new projects - the importance of technology in economic transformation and, on the other, to provide the answers called for by the present international situation by emphasizing the high-priority nature of both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. For example, it was assigning priority to its technology development projects as it had already mastered the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the production of fissionable material and the industrial-scale production of heavy water, some of which was now - for the first time - to be exported. Moreover, investment projects relating to the construction of an intermediate-level waste repository and to a siting study for a high-level waste repository were being considered.

95. In the field of research reactors and radioisotope production, construction work was well advanced on the third reactor for export - an indication of Argentina's technological capacity and of the importance which his country attached to bilateral co-operation in enhancing international security. As regards electricity production, the design of a low-power reactor possessing a high degree of intrinsic safety was near completion. Argentina intended to make available the technology of that reactor, which could be used for seawater desalination. With regard to applications of ionizing radiation, a facility for the production



of molybdenum-99 from uranium fission products had recently been inaugurated and the establishment of a nuclear medicine centre in the town of Trelew was planned.

96. Furthermore, progress had been made in establishing a legal framework for all nuclear activities being conducted in Argentina. The Government had submitted to Congress the draft of a nuclear law which would govern all nuclear activities, the State being responsible for R&D and for regulatory and supervisory functions. Also, Congress had before it a draft law regarding radioactive wastes. The process of restructuring the nuclear sector which had been initiated a year before was thus well under way. The Government intended to support the nuclear sector by strengthening the R&D activities of the National Atomic Energy Commission. A load factor of 98.3% had been achieved in the generation of nuclear power, which had accounted for 14.4% of the electricity supplied to the national grid. The country's nuclear regulatory organization (Ente Nacional Regulator Nuclear) had completed its first year as the body responsible for regulatory activities in the fields of radiological protection, nuclear safety, non-proliferation and physical protection. Earlier, it had performed the functions in question as a unit within the National Atomic Energy Commission.

97. Argentina had noted with satisfaction an increase in international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy since the 38th session of the General Conference. At the multilateral level, it had participated actively in the Agency's technical co-operation programme and in ARCAL. In that connection, it had hosted numerous courses and workshops and made available to the Agency numerous experts and lecturers. Thanks were due to the Secretariat and the Department of Technical Co-operation for their efforts in making good use of the resources provided, and Argentina would continue contributing to the TCF as in the past.

98. Argentina was continuing to support Programme 93+2, the purpose of which was to create a strengthened safeguards system applicable to all nuclear materials and all nuclear activities in all States with full-scope safeguards agreements. One of the Secretariat's most important tasks in that connection was to work out criteria and modalities for the application and evaluation of safeguards. That task should be performed in close consultation with Member States, and Argentina was looking forward to co-operating with the Secretariat in

that important area. Also, it was essential for the international non-proliferation regime that the Agency's safeguards system be capable of detecting any undeclared nuclear activities in countries with full-scope safeguards agreements.

99. Argentina had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety in October 1994, and it was now following with great interest the efforts to develop a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. At the same time, it hoped that the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, would soon reach a successful conclusion. While appreciating the progress already made in various areas, particularly with regard to the question of amending the Vienna Convention, his delegation regretted the fact that certain questions, especially that of a possible convention on supplementary funding, had not yet been resolved; it would like all interested parties to be flexible and demonstrate a real will to negotiate. Together, the conventions in question would constitute the basis for the future development of nuclear energy, particularly as far as its public acceptance was concerned.

100. His delegation welcomed the Agency's decision to establish an independent Department of Nuclear Safety and to make it responsible for all questions relating to radioactive waste management. Also, it had been very interested in the comprehensive review - carried out in July by a senior expert group - of the content and management of the Agency's radiation protection and nuclear safety programme and would like the Secretariat to implement the group's recommendations without delay, keeping the Board of Governors and the General Conference informed about the progress made.

101. In conclusion, he paid tribute to the Director General and his colleagues for the professionalism which they had shown in conducting the Agency's business and which was reflected in the excellent results achieved in all areas of Agency activity.

102. Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan), having welcomed the fact that the Conference had approved the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for membership of the Agency, said his country deplored the fact that, despite the consensus against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, no agreement had yet been reached on complete nuclear disarmament. At the same time, his country welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT, which would preserve a measure of stability. However, non-proliferation could

be achieved globally only if it was accompanied by a genuine process of nuclear disarmament. The commitments entered into by the nuclear-weapon States under Article VI of the NPT remained unfulfilled.

103. Pakistan had steadfastly supported the goals of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, as attested by the various initiatives which it had taken at the global and the regional level. It attached considerable importance to the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and was participating actively in the elaboration of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off convention. The progress made in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East was encouraging. Pakistan had been advocating the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia since 1972. In addition, it had put forward several proposals for an equitable and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime in the region, and it was ready to work with other countries in considering any realistic suggestion for achieving that goal.

104. The Agency's commendable efforts to harness the atom for the good of mankind found their most tangible expression in the contribution which nuclear technology could make to the energy security of fossil-fuel-deficient developing countries. The conventional means of generating electricity not only imposed a heavy import burden on such countries, but also raised serious environmental problems. Nuclear power was a technologically proven resource-conserving solution, environmentally benign and for many countries economically rational. His country was deeply appreciative of the Director General's support for nuclear power, and welcomed the strengthened programme on the comparative assessment of energy sources for electricity generation. The Agency could nevertheless pursue more vigorously the sharing of safety-related experience and the transfer of safety-related information. Also, South-South co-operation should be encouraged, as some developing countries now had experience in the design, construction and safe operation of NPPs.

105. Pakistan appreciated the efforts being made by the Agency to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of its safeguards system. While recognizing the importance of being able to detect cases of non-compliance, it was of the view that any changes to the present system should be made within the bounds set by the existing legal instruments. It appreciated the work done by SAGSI and the Secretariat under Programme 93+2, but was concerned

that many of the proposals made lacked legal authority, were based on unproven technology, were doubtful from the cost-effectiveness point of view and impinged in many ways upon countries' sovereignty. That delicate issue should not be dealt with too hastily; it should continue to be discussed with Member States until a consensus was achieved regarding the legal, technical and economic aspects.

106. Illicit trafficking in nuclear materials had been on the Agency's agenda since the previous year. A careful assessment of events showed that the fears and apprehensions were based largely on exaggerated reports. Nevertheless, the Agency was to be commended for its timely recognition of the issue, which was a serious one and which his country would like the Agency and Member States to address in an appropriate manner.

107. Turning to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, he said it was heartening to note that delivery up to August 1995 had been the highest ever. He commended the Department of Technical Co-operation for the dedicated work and innovative approaches which had resulted in that signal achievement. The establishment of SAGTAC would help to further strengthen technical co-operation programming and implementation. Also, his delegation was grateful to the major donor countries for their generous contributions to the TCF. At the same time, it had noted with regret that many Member States were contributing much less than their target shares or were not contributing anything at all. Although the contributions to the TCF were voluntary, they supported an activity which was the primary statutory responsibility of the Agency. Pakistan had always paid its contribution fully and in time, and it would do so again in 1996. All Member States should follow suit.

108. His country had been an efficient beneficiary of the Agency's technical co-operation programme. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission now had the scientific and technological infrastructures and the human resources necessary for undertaking projects of national importance. Pakistan was willing to share its experience with other countries. Within the framework of the Agency's technical co-operation programme, it was already providing, free of charge, training for personnel from developing countries in agriculture, medicine, isotope applications and basic R&D activities. The facilities at the Centre for Nuclear Studies, in Islamabad, at Pakistan's medical and agricultural research centres and

at the Centre for Non-destructive Testing were open to professionals and technicians from other developing Member States.

109. Turning to Pakistan's main activities connected with peaceful applications of nuclear technology, he said that the nuclear power project at Chashma, being undertaken in collaboration with China, was progressing on schedule. Pakistan was giving top priority to the safety of the plant and was grateful to the Agency for its help in that connection. In 1994 the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) had achieved its best ever results as regards uninterrupted operation and electricity generation. Life extension and operational safety enhancement efforts were continuing, and his delegation was confident that with help from the Agency and from vendors it would be possible to operate KANUPP safely for at least ten years beyond the end of its design life.

110. Pakistan had demonstrated the importance which it attached to nuclear safety by being among the first signatories of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it would ratify as soon as the requisite national legislative and administrative processes were completed. Also, it appreciated the Agency's efforts in connection with the preparation of a similar convention on radioactive waste management. In line with international practice, Pakistan was gradually separating regulatory functions from executive authority in the field of nuclear safety. An autonomous board with a majority of members drawn from institutions other than the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had recently been established. The board would supervise the Directorate of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, which was charged with implementing nuclear safety policies. The ultimate aim was to make the Directorate independent of the Commission.

111. With regard to applications of nuclear technology in agriculture, Pakistan's policy was to consolidate the gains made through the efforts of its scientists in addressing plant disease, soil infertility, soil water-logging, soil salinity and other problems.

112. In 1994, Pakistan's medical centres had provided diagnostic and radiotherapy services to approximately 200 000 patients. In order to meet the growing demand for such services, the construction of two more centres had started and that of a further two was planned.

113. R&D activities were essential for the progress of science and technology in any country. The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology had been supporting other institutions in the field of isotope production and in various areas of R&D. Quality control and quality assurance were not being overlooked either, and a national centre for non-destructive testing had started functioning that year.

114. The question of revising Article VI of the Agency's Statute had been under consideration for a long time, and the continued interest in that question and the quality of Member States' inputs were very revealing. There was a real need to increase the representation of Member States in the Board. Also, it was important to formulate clear criteria for determining which countries were the most advanced in nuclear science and technology in different geographic areas. Acknowledgement of the greatly changed technical and political realities would increase the transparency and efficiency of the Board.

115. At the 38th session of the General Conference, his delegation, recalling Conference resolutions GC(XXXVII)/RES/621 and 622, had stressed the need for enhanced representation of professionals from developing Member States and of women on the staff of the Secretariat. The matter was an important one and, while appreciating the positive efforts already made, he hoped that more would be done to improve the situation.

Mr. Roux (South Africa) took the Chair.

116. Mr. van EBBENHORST TENGBERGEN (Netherlands), having welcomed the fact that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia had been approved for Agency membership, associated himself fully with the statement made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the European Union.

117. The indefinite extension of the NPT in May 1995 had been a major event and a significant step towards world peace and security. The Agency had contributed substantial background material in support of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, particularly material concerning safeguards implementation and the transfer of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and had played a significant role in the success of the Conference. The indefinite extension of the NPT would further strengthen the Agency's role in the areas of non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear co-operation. Also, the accession

of 13 further States to the NPT was testimony to the faith which the international community had in the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and it was to be hoped that the small number of States still not party to the NPT would accede to it soon.

118. The Netherlands unreservedly supported the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and would strive vigorously for their full implementation. His Government would regret any development which ran counter to their letter and spirit, and continued or resumed nuclear testing by nuclear-weapon States was in fact a development which his Government regretted. Recent developments underscored the urgent need for the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible, and certainly no later than the end of 1996. The Netherlands would do everything in its power to help in attaining that very important goal.

119. The principles and objectives adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference confirmed the leading role which the Agency, with its extensive experience of safeguards verification, had to play in developing and implementing credible measures to ensure compliance with safeguards agreements. His delegation welcomed the report by the Director General on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, which reflected recommendations made by SAGSI. It was necessary to develop and implement further measures for ensuring that nuclear material was not diverted for non-peaceful purposes, and the task was one to which the Director General had very rightly assigned high priority.

120. In June 1995 the Board of Governors had accepted the recommendations of the Director General regarding the measures described in Part 1 of document GOV/2807. Although some Member States felt the need for further elaboration and clarification of the proposed measures, which would require consultations with the Secretariat, his country looked forward to their being implemented without delay. However, a safeguards system based on the Agency's present safeguards and on the implementation of Part 1 measures would probably not provide sufficient information for conclusions to be drawn regarding the absence of undeclared activities. His delegation was convinced that implementation of the

Part 1 and the Part 2 measures would be necessary in order to provide the necessary assurances. The Director General should consult further with Member States in order to clarify the justification for certain specific measures to which some opposition existed. As regards implementation of the Part 2 measures, concrete proposals, including proposals regarding the relevant legal instruments, should be submitted to and discussed with Member States as soon as possible. Events in Iraq had once more shown that it was necessary to enhance the capacity of the Agency's safeguards system for detecting undeclared nuclear activities as well as activities within a country's civil nuclear fuel cycle. His delegation looked forward to examining the results of the Agency inspection mission currently under way in Iraq and hoped that a full picture would emerge of Iraq's activities in developing nuclear weapons.

121. His Government believed that the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency was still in force and binding and that it should be fully implemented. However, the Agreed Framework concluded by the DPRK and the United States provided the best way for the DPRK to return to full compliance with its safeguards agreement. In that connection, he wished to pay tribute to the Governments of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States for having established the international consortium known as KEDO, which was to implement very important aspects of the Agreed Framework and had the full support of the Government of the Netherlands. The report of the Director General on the monitoring of the "freeze" on specified nuclear-related facilities in the DPRK was encouraging. On the other hand, the Agency's activities with regard to the verification of the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report were progressing slowly. It was to be hoped that the DPRK would continue to co-operate in that area so that the Agency might complete its task. Prompt co-operation was in the interest both of the DPRK and of the international community.

122. With regard to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, his country welcomed the final steps taken towards the full entry into force of the Tlatelolco Treaty. It also welcomed the adoption by the OAU Heads of State in June of a draft treaty establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone and looked forward to its presentation to the United Nations General Assembly. As to the peace process in the Middle East, it was to be hoped



that it would open the way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the application of international safeguards was essential to the existence of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

123. Creating the conditions for an affordable, reliable and clean energy supply both in the present and in the future was the key objective of Dutch energy policy. The Netherlands Government was preparing a "White Paper" on energy which would be presented to Parliament at the end of the year. Trends and the future roles of all of the country's energy supply options were being considered. In general, there was no need for the creation of additional electricity-producing capacity in the Netherlands in the coming years, so that no decisions on new nuclear power capacity would be taken by the present Government. As far as the country's existing NPPs were concerned, a major safety upgrading programme was under way.

124. Nuclear safety was a matter of top priority for all Members of the Agency. The growing awareness of that fact was reflected in the proposal by the Director General to create a separate Department of Nuclear Safety. In that connection, his country welcomed the initiative of the advisory group which had carried out a peer review of the Agency's safety-related activities regarding the establishment of SAGTAC. After the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, work had commenced on the drafting of a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. The approval of Safety Fundamentals and a Safety Standard relating to radioactive waste management could be considered a step towards a convention on nuclear waste management. He hoped that the expert group which had started drafting the convention would make rapid progress.

125. The Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had made some progress since the previous General Conference session with regard to the revision of the Vienna Convention. However, the difficulties regarding the draft convention on supplementary funding had not yet been resolved. The existence of two alternative texts might delay the holding of the envisaged diplomatic conference, but it was important to continue preparing for it to be held in 1996.

126. The resolution on the strengthening of the Agency's technical co-operation activities which the General Conference had adopted the previous year had resulted in a number of commendable Secretariat initiatives. Of special interest were the initiatives relating to Country Programme Frameworks and Model Projects, which were broadening the perspective of Agency technical co-operation to include the achievement of social and economic goals. The Special Training Programme aimed at supplementing existing short-term on-the-job training and enabled candidates from developing countries to receive part of their training in advanced countries through co-operation between institutions in developing and advanced countries. Such initiatives deserved encouragement and financial support, and it was therefore important that Member States - developing and developed alike - pay their pledged TCF contributions in full.

127. The Agency's financial situation had improved, thanks to improvements in the payment of contributions by Member States. For its part, the Secretariat was paying increased attention to the possibilities for reallocating resources to new priority areas. That was important as Member States, faced with growing financial constraints, might well become less willing and able to pay their contributions. In order to justify to public opinion the contributions paid to the Agency, governments had to be able to point to the Agency's priorities. The Netherlands, for its part, intended to co-operate fully with the Agency and its other Member States.

128. Mr. HÖGBERG (Sweden), having welcomed the Conference's approval of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for Agency membership and associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the European Union, said that in 1995 the most important event relating to non-proliferation had been the success of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The NPT had been extended indefinitely, the NPT review process had been strengthened and the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the Conference would be of crucial importance in the efforts to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. The NPT was a key both to nuclear non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament. In Sweden's view, non-proliferation efforts alone could not guarantee international peace and security; they had to be supplemented by verifiable disarmament measures involving all nuclear-weapon States.

Sweden welcomed the recent accessions to the NPT and would like to see all States which had not yet done so acceding to the NPT so as to make it truly universal.

129. Sweden nevertheless remained concerned about the fact that certain States party to the NPT were not complying with their safeguards obligations. It supported all efforts which would help to achieve full transparency of the DPRK's nuclear programme, and it was pleased with the manner in which the Agency was working, in close co-operation with UNSCOM, to trace and eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons potential and welcomed the steps taken to ensure long-term monitoring and verification.

130. Sweden was taking an active part in the negotiations being conducted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a CTBT and would like all States involved in those negotiations to help ensure the early conclusion of such a treaty. It was of vital importance to reach agreement on a zero-yield CTBT in 1996, and Sweden was convinced that the Agency could make a valuable contribution to the verification of its implementation. In that connection, Sweden strongly deplored the continuation of nuclear testing, which represented a setback for international non-proliferation efforts and could complicate the negotiations on a CTBT. Furthermore, nuclear tests constituted a potential risk to human health and the environment in the areas affected. In the light of the commitments made at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, he urged those States which were still conducting nuclear explosions to declare moratoria and refrain from further testing.

131. For many years, Sweden and a number of other countries had been working for a cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. In Sweden's view, the Agency had an important role to play in the verification of a cut-off treaty. Despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had decided in the spring to establish an ad hoc committee for negotiations on such a treaty, the committee had not yet been able to start its work. All States concerned should do their utmost to remove, as soon as possible, the obstacles causing the deadlock.

132. Verification of the nuclear non-proliferation regime was to a very large extent based on the Agency's safeguards system. Sweden welcomed the confirmation by the NPT Review and Extension Conference that the Agency was the competent authority for verifying and

ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements. It was important that the Agency continue to increase its capabilities for detecting undeclared nuclear activities.

133. Sweden was looking forward to early implementation of the measures which constituted phase 1 of Programme 93+2 and which had been approved by the Board of Governors in June. It would do its part to facilitate the implementation of phase 1 and hoped that other States which had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements would co-operate with the Agency in that regard. The early finalization by the Agency of phase 2 of Programme 93+2 was also important, since the viability of the idea behind the programme depended on the totality of the measures comprising phases 1 and 2 and on the synergistic functioning of the system as a whole. Sweden sincerely hoped that Member States would co-operate with the Agency in carrying out the consultations necessary for the development of the details of the phase 2 measures and looked forward to examining the Director General's concrete proposals at the December meetings of the Board of Governors. With regard to the financing of safeguards, Sweden welcomed the agreement reached the previous week in the Board of Governors.

134. It had been a matter of great satisfaction for Sweden when the Convention on Nuclear Safety had been opened for signature on 20 September 1994. It was now essential that the signatories ratify the Convention as soon as possible, so that it might enter into force and its provisions might be applied without further delay. Sweden's instruments of ratification had been deposited on 11 September 1995.

135. Sweden welcomed the fact that preparations for a similar convention on the safety of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management had begun. Nuclear safety in all its aspects was basically a national responsibility, but there could be no doubt that internationally agreed safety principles and objectives constituting part of a globally binding institutional regime would strengthen national efforts to manage and dispose of radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel safely. The scope of the convention should cover all phases of radioactive waste management, including the management of spent nuclear fuel no longer stored at NPPs and of high-level wastes from spent fuel reprocessing, regardless of whether the wastes derived from civil or from military activities. Furthermore, the convention should include

financial arrangements for meeting future costs of disposing of spent fuel and other radioactive wastes.

136. For about four years, Sweden had been taking part in the ongoing international efforts to support East European and CIS countries with nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management and the control of nuclear materials. In that context, it was grateful to the Director General for having organized a seminar on the management of radioactive wastes in May 1995. Also, Sweden greatly appreciated the Agency's assistance to Newly Independent States in identifying their needs as regards improved nuclear material control, physical protection and export-import control systems.

137. A prerequisite for successful co-operation in the field of nuclear safety was that all CIS and East European countries accede to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol. Also, Sweden attached great importance to the current work on revising the Vienna Convention and drafting a convention on supplementary funding. A determined effort was now needed in order to complete that work, so that the envisaged diplomatic conference might be held as planned in 1996.

138. The Agency's technical co-operation activities were of great importance, and Sweden had a high regard for the competence of the Secretariat in that field. It was particularly encouraged by the positive results achieved in recent years in implementing several innovative ideas, such as those relating to Model Projects and the subcontracting of technical co-operation project execution to institutions in certain developing countries. Activities of the kind in question should be further developed and expanded. Sweden had always claimed that the Agency's technical co-operation activities should be financed on an assured and predictable basis, and it therefore welcomed the agreement on technical assistance financing reached in the Board of Governors the previous week.

139. Ms. MÄKELÄINEN (Finland), having welcomed the Conference's approval of the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for membership of the Agency and associated herself with the statement made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the European Union, said that despite a very good record of nuclear electricity production in many countries the Chernobyl tragedy of 1986, the slowness of progress in

nuclear waste management and doubts about a possible proliferation of nuclear material were casting a long shadow. The Agency and other international organizations faced the challenge of trying to create public and political understanding of the benefits of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Acceptance was best achieved through streamlined programmes and a focus on the Agency's main tasks - nuclear safety and safeguards. Those constituted the basis on which the future of the utilization of nuclear energy rested. If that basis was not strengthened, the future role of nuclear energy - and to some extent also of the Agency - would be jeopardized.

140. Finland welcomed the decision to split the Department of Nuclear Energy and Safety into two Departments. Advantage should be taken of the reorganization in question to streamline the Agency's activities in the nuclear safety field. The Secretariat had recently arranged for the Agency's safety-related activities to be reviewed, and the peer review carried out in Vienna in July warranted comment. It was important that the suggestions made by the advisory group be taken fully into account in planning the work of the new Divisions. Project evaluation should allow for prioritization and for the gradual elimination of redundant or obsolete programmes. Safety project planning needed to be organized in such a manner that Member States could influence the planning cycle at an early stage and at the level of individual programmes. One way of achieving that would be to establish an independent technical body to advise on the general directions of the programme of the Department of Nuclear Safety. Also, that advisory body should support the Agency in ensuring closer co-operation with regional organizations dealing with nuclear safety issues.

141. Finland welcomed the progress made in the preparations for an international convention on the safe management of radioactive wastes. It hoped for an early completion of those preparations so that a diplomatic conference might be held in the summer of 1997 and the convention opened for signature during the 41st session of the General Conference. The convention should be of broad scope and cover all radioactive wastes, including wastes of military origin. It should be similar to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in providing for periodic review conferences, a detailed reporting system and peer reviews.

142. Finland, which was naturally very interested in the management of nuclear wastes in areas adjacent to its borders, welcomed the decision of the Agency and the Russian

Federation to set up a contact group on such issues pursuant to a joint initiative taken the previous year by the Nordic ministers responsible for nuclear safety. It was expected that the mandate of the contact group would be confirmed that week in Stockholm.

143. With regard to questions of safeguards and non-proliferation, Finland had contributed to Programme 93+2 through its safeguards support programme. It would continue its support during the next phase of the programme. Its support activities included bilateral programmes designed to assist in the establishment of effective SSACs in Ukraine and Latvia.

144. The question of controlling nuclear exports also called for comment. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. The Member States belonging to the Nuclear Suppliers Group had been applying that principle since 1992. Finland, as current Chairman of the Group, was urging all nuclear supplier States to abide by the Group's guidelines.

145. During the NPT Review and Extension Conference, all nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to exercise utmost restraint with regard to nuclear tests. Finland therefore deeply regretted the continuation of nuclear testing. The existing moratoria were important, and Finland would like all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further testing.

146. Mr. KIENER (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of the delegation of the Principality of Liechtenstein, having welcomed the Conference's approval of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Georgia for Agency membership, commended the work done by the Director General and the Secretariat during the past year under unfavourable financial conditions.

147. The NPT Review and Extension Conference, meeting recently in New York, had provided an opportunity for the States party to the NPT to reaffirm the importance of the role played, with regard to non-proliferation and disarmament, by the safeguards of the Agency and its other activities relating to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. During the Conference, Switzerland had been among those States - the majority - which wanted the NPT to be extended for an indefinite period in order to maintain a strong non-proliferation regime, expecting that the nuclear Powers would fully honour all the disarmament promises made by

them pursuant to Article VI of the NPT. It therefore regretted the recent resumption of nuclear testing by two of the nuclear Powers; that was a disappointment for all the non-nuclear-weapon States which had agreed to an indefinite extension of the NPT. Accordingly, he hoped very much that the Conference on Disarmament would conclude its negotiations on a future CTBT during the early months of 1996, so that there might be an effective prohibition of all nuclear explosions, whatever their yield. Meanwhile, all the nuclear Powers should abide by a nuclear test moratorium. Given its experience, the Agency would undoubtedly play a role in the verification system created by the CTBT.

148. Since the beginning of 1995, the Conference on Disarmament had been very actively considering the question of a cut-off of the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes; it had decided to establish an ad hoc committee with the task of negotiating a non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable multilateral cut-off treaty. There also, the Agency's safeguards and expertise would play an important role.

149. Switzerland was counting on the DPRK to allow the Agency to perform without delay all necessary inspections, in compliance with the obligations which it had assumed under its safeguards agreement with the Agency; that would be in the interest both of the international community and of the DPRK itself.

150. His delegation was pleased that the Board of Governors had approved the implementation of a first set of measures under Programme 93+2. The Secretariat had done a great deal of work in putting the programme together, and he was sure that it would prove equally effective in implementing those measures. However, it was only when the entire new system was running that one would know whether it was going to fulfil the hopes placed in it. In the Board, the Governor from Switzerland had expressed certain reservations regarding Programme 93+2, not wanting a system which - whatever its political merits - would not be applicable in practice. The emphasis should be on effectiveness.

151. For similar reasons, the financing of safeguards continued to be a matter for concern. Admittedly - and fortunately - some progress had been made in 1995, but Switzerland continued to consider it necessary to escape from the system within which everyone was trapped, trying to maintain an illusory balance between the financing of technical assistance



and that of safeguards. Everyone knew that the present arrangements were only a temporary makeshift and that every effort needed to be made in order to place the two programmes in question on a more durable and stable financial footing.

152. Switzerland had already emphasized the need for rapid progress towards the adoption of a convention on the safety of radioactive wastes. It was therefore pleased that the expert group charged with drafting such a convention had finally begun its work and that progress had apparently been made. The goal was still a long way off, however, and the Agency's Member States should do everything in their power to ensure that it was attained rapidly. For its part, Switzerland would do everything it could to contribute to the success of the enterprise.

153. The question of the Board's composition and structure was still on the agenda, and the Conference had before it a report concerning Article VI of the Statute. While some believed that an expansion of the Board was inevitable, others - including Switzerland - had consistently opposed an expansion, but not in order to prevent certain countries from becoming Board members. Admittedly, the present formula was not ideal, but the Board had to be effective and flexible, and an increase in the number of Board members would run counter to that. Some even agreed - and he was of their opinion - that, far from an increase in the number of Board seats, there should be a reduction and the Board should be restructured, a number of standing working committees dealing with certain technical aspects of the Board's duties. The Board would then become a true governing body, responsible for policy and better able to guide the Agency through difficult times. If Article VI of the Statute was to be amended, it should be thoroughly re-cast.

154. During the past year, Switzerland's NPPs had operated satisfactorily. In the case of one NPP, the time between refuelling shutdowns - which from the outset had been 12 months for all the NPPs - had been increased to 18 months. At two NPPs, the low-pressure turbines had been replaced by new, more efficient ones, which had considerably increased their rated capacity. Also, an NPP which had been authorized to increase its thermal power by 10% had completed its first year of operation in accordance with the expectations of the operator and the safety authorities.

155. As regards nuclear waste management, preliminary investigations with a view to the construction of a low- and intermediate-level waste storage facility at the Wellenberg site had encountered a serious obstacle in June 1995. The citizens of the canton in question had voted against a continuation of those investigations, so that the prospects of a final repository going into service had receded once again. That decision had illustrated how radioactive waste management was above all a political issue, for the studies carried out at the site had shown with a high degree of probability that the site was suitable. At the time of the referendum, however, the objective scientific and technical arguments put forward by the promoters of the project had failed against the emotional arguments of the opponents of nuclear power, who were demanding that a waste management solution be found for Switzerland but wanted the country first to renounce nuclear power permanently - hence their opposition to all storage site proposals, which meant a succession of temporary storage arrangements.

156. In 1990, against the advice of the Government and of Parliament, a ten-year moratorium on the construction of NPPs had been adopted by the Swiss population. It was to be hoped that during the period in question agreement would be reached on a truce in the political battles relating to nuclear power. However, certain decisions - such as the decisions to renew the operating licences of two NPPs and a decision to license a waste storage facility- had given rise to strong political reactions. The opposition to nuclear power was so deep-seated that a meeting of minds was most unlikely despite the concern about climate change. The environmental protection organizations were demanding the abandonment of nuclear power and a reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions simultaneously, refusing to see that with all realistic scenarios the abandonment of nuclear power would cause an increase in such emissions - which meant not that nuclear power was the only solution to the problem of a possible greenhouse effect but that it represented one of the responses to the threat.

157. In the forthcoming years, the nuclear policy debate would become even more bitter in Switzerland, where a new law on nuclear policy was to be adopted by Parliament before the end of the century. Besides the basic issues of the future utilization of nuclear energy, issues like reprocessing or storage would arouse strong opposition, and it was expected that a referendum concerning the future law would be called for, so that the decision would rest with the country's citizens. The Swiss Government had always spoken out for maintaining

the nuclear option, even when no new NPP construction was planned, for it appreciated the political, economic and environmental importance of nuclear power. To lose an energy source which accounted for about 40% of the electricity produced in Switzerland would be a disaster.

158. Mr. MIELNICKI (Trade Unions International of Workers in Energy - TUIWE) said that the TUIWE attached great importance to the activities of the Agency, and especially to its efforts in support of non-proliferation and the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. By its very nature, the TUIWE took a great interest in the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology and in safety and working conditions at NPPs. In those areas, the world situation was very worrying: the preponderance of certain countries in the nuclear field was as great as ever, and further nuclear weapons tests were being planned despite public opposition. The management and transport of radioactive wastes continued to involve hazards for mankind and the environment, while the safety of NPPs in countries of Central and Eastern Europe was still a matter of concern to the people living in those regions.

159. Fifty years after the terrible tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were still States carrying out nuclear tests, thereby expressing their desire to dominate. Coinciding with what was a very sad anniversary, those tests were taking place in disregard of world public opinion - a sure sign that the victims were going unheeded. The TUIWE condemned the nuclear tests being carried out by the French Government, regarding them as an act of selfishness and of defiance of the entire world. The Agency, the principal international organization concerned with co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, was playing a prominent role in the fight against nuclear weapons proliferation. Thanks to its expertise and experience, it was applying effective safeguards at nuclear facilities. It should also be in a position, however, to monitor and regulate nuclear weapons tests at the international level. Not only should it be looking out for illegal diversion for weapons production purposes - its controls should extend also to official nuclear weapons tests. In the TUIWE's view, it was important to establish clearly what nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions represented, to determine their purpose and to inform the public about them.

160. As regards NPPs, it was necessary to ensure - in the light of technological developments - that the level of safety culture was sufficiently high, that the personnel received proper training, that safety at the workplace was adequate and that the social and economic conditions of work were satisfactory. With regard to older NPPs, it was necessary to work out plans for modernizing them over time or shutting them down; economic problems were undoubtedly important, but the safety of the world was absolutely crucial. Lastly, it was necessary to put in place reliable mechanisms for the utilization, control and transport of nuclear wastes. The TUIWE would spare no effort in contributing to the peaceful development of nuclear energy and would continue to support the Agency, especially with regard to information exchange, training and safety at the workplace in NPPs.

161. Mr. ALVIM (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC) recalled that, on the basis of the bilateral agreement of December 1991 between Brazil and Argentina for the exclusively peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, ABACC had started up activities in June 1992. Until March 1994, it had devoted special attention to installations not subject to Agency safeguards. Then the Quadripartite Agreement, providing for the application of full-scope safeguards, had entered into force. Argentina and Brazil had subsequently acceded fully to the Tlatelolco Treaty, and in February 1995 Argentina had acceded to the NPT. The Quadripartite Agreement was considered by the Council of OPANAL and by the Agency to be a valid legal basis for verification in accordance with the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT. The commitments thus entered into by the two countries, including the commitment regarding a ban on all nuclear explosive devices, had demonstrated clearly that Brazil and Argentina intended to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

162. Joint Agency-ABACC inspection activities had started in June 1994, and it was already possible to make some preliminary comments regarding them. ABACC was applying safeguards based on the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) established by the aforementioned bilateral agreement. The procedures took into account the effects of the application of Agency safeguards once the Quadripartite Agreement had entered into force. The SCCC was consistent with the Agency's safeguards system, which was significant for the relationship between the two organizations.

163. ABACC had a technical Secretariat consisting of ten professionals, including a Secretary, a Deputy Secretary and two administrative officers. The technical Secretariat was responsible for the administration of the system, which drew whenever necessary on the services of 70 inspectors selected from nuclear-related institutions in Brazil and Argentina. From June 1994 to May 1995, ABACC had performed 1801 inspector-days of inspection work, 51% of it in the field. The inventories of nuclear material at all 70 nuclear facilities in Argentina and Brazil had been verified either jointly with the Agency or as a follow-up to earlier verifications. That had accounted for 48% of the inspector-days spent in the field, the remaining 52% being accounted for by ad hoc inspections and design information verifications. For 97% of the facilities there had been initial verifications of design information.

164. Special attention had been paid to the training and qualification of ABACC inspectors. So far, 4200 inspector-hours of inspection training had been given to experts actively working in the nuclear field and/or in safeguards. The training had gone very smoothly, ABACC being supported by lecturers from the Agency, EURATOM, the United States, France and Japan.

165. Some \$500 000 had been absorbed by the acquisition of portable inspection equipment, the functioning and calibration of which were ensured by ABACC's technical Secretariat. Through an intercomparison programme involving the laboratories of ABACC it had been possible to evaluate the performance of those laboratories in both countries. The samples of nuclear material taken in one country were always analysed at laboratories in the other country. Thanks to support from countries such as the United States and France and also from the Agency, ABACC had acquired a high degree of technical expertise in that area. The technical Secretariat kept its nuclear accounting up to date, and about 98% accuracy was being achieved in the information sent to the Agency.

166. The objective of regional safeguards was greater efficiency and effectiveness. The system established by ABACC had some features which made it different from the system of the other organization applying regional safeguards jointly with the Agency - namely, EURATOM. Whereas EURATOM represented its member countries in their relations with the Agency, in the case of ABACC such representation was effected either through it or

directly by Argentina and Brazil. Another important distinguishing feature was that the ABACC safeguards system was designed to parallel the Agency system, it being understood that both should be able to reach independent conclusions. The Quadripartite Agreement established two conditions - that the Agency and ABACC should be able to come to independent conclusions and that they must avoid unnecessary duplication - which were only apparently contradictory; it should be perfectly possible for the Agency - by applying current quality assurance techniques and auditing methods - to reach independent conclusions using results obtained by ABACC. The challenge for experts and decision-makers of the Agency and ABACC was to establish the principles and practices that would ultimately make safeguards based on regional systems more effective and efficient. Although more slowly than desired, the Agency and ABACC had made progress in applying safeguards jointly. Good co-ordination of the inspection programme already existed, and the relationship between the inspectors of ABACC and those of the Agency in the field could also be considered satisfactory. However, the matter of procedures for sharing equipment - especially surveillance devices - had not yet been resolved. Guidelines regarding that matter would have to be worked out in order to arrive at agreement on the procedures to be provided for in the first Facility Attachments, which were currently being negotiated.

167. In the relationship between the Agency and ABACC, progress needed to be made in respect of two main points. Firstly, the division of activities between the inspectors of the Agency and those of ABACC should be such as to preserve the independence of results. In many cases, inspection teams consisting of four inspectors - two from each organization - could be reduced to two, which would represent considerable savings for both sides. Secondly, the Agency should take into account the results of ABACC. In terms of quality assurance, that meant assessment by the Agency not only of ABACC's inspection and measurement results, but also of its methods and procedures. ABACC was perfectly willing to disclose its results and methods so that senior Agency experts might verify them. Such initiatives would not jeopardize the independence of Agency results, and they would greatly help to rationalize activities and reduce costs for both the Agency and ABACC.

168. ABACC had been established for the purpose of ensuring that Brazil and Argentina used nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. The experience acquired during the

past few years indicated that it had generated greater trust between the two countries and increased the confidence of the international community with regard to their peaceful intentions. Thanks to ease of access, a similarity of languages and considerable reciprocal knowledge, regional safeguards were increasing the system's efficiency. The elimination of regional suspicions was promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a context where there would otherwise be grounds for fearing nuclear proliferation.

169. The establishment of ABACC had attracted the attention of many countries and might well serve as a pilot experiment and as an example for other regions of the world. In that sense, ABACC was ready to share the results obtained to date and to discuss improvements in its safeguards system with all interested organizations and Agency Member States, in the interests of world peace as envisaged by the countries which established it.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.

