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### RECORD OF THE THIRD PLENARY MEETING

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President: Mr. KASEMSARN (Thailand)  
Later: Mr. ROUX (South Africa)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(39)/INF/21/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

A&B Committee	Administrative and Budgetary Committee
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EU	European Union
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
IPF	Indicative Planning Figure
MOX	Mixed oxide
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
Paris Convention	Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (July 1960)
RADWASS	Radioactive Waste Safety Standards
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)
WAMAP	Waste Management Advisory Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1994 (GC(39)/3) (resumed)

1. Mr. MEADWAY (United Kingdom) said that the decision taken in May to extend the NPT indefinitely had been a major success for the world community as a whole. That key event had confirmed the importance of the Agency's main functions and had fundamental implications for their future development.

2. With regard to the United Kingdom, the results of a nuclear review carried out there had been announced earlier that year. The review, in which key aspects of nuclear power generation had been examined in the light of the major changes which had taken place since 1989, had confirmed his Government's continuing commitment to nuclear power provided it remained competitive and rigorous standards of safety and environmental protection were maintained. One of its conclusions had been the decision to privatize the country's advanced gas-cooled reactors and the pressurized water reactors at Sizewell in 1996. Privatization of the Magnox reactors, however, had been considered impracticable. In addition, it had been concluded that public sector support for a new nuclear power station would constitute an unjustified intervention in the electricity market.

3. Nuclear power was continuing to play an important role in the diverse energy market of the United Kingdom; in 1994 it had met 27% of the country's electricity needs - a record figure. Implementation of the nuclear review's recommendations would make the nuclear power sector more competitive by providing incentives for further improvements in operational and financial performance.

4. With regard to radioactive waste management, the United Kingdom's policy was clear: to ensure that radioactive waste, irrespective of whether it was produced in the public or the private sector, was properly managed and that people and the environment were not exposed to unacceptable risks, either now or in the future. Radioactive waste management policies should respond to present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs within the framework of sustainable development.

5. On the international scene, the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely and the decisions to strengthen the review process and to adopt a set of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which had been taken without a vote, would

greatly help to discourage proliferation and encourage the accession to the NPT of the small number of countries not yet party to it. Indefinite extension of the NPT had consolidated the framework which was essential to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of which the Agency's promotional activities were an important component.

6. The United Kingdom was particularly pleased with the continuing progress in the introduction of major reforms aimed at making the Agency's development assistance more relevant. It continued to support the introduction of Model Projects and regional projects and of evaluation methods designed to ensure that projects met specific objectives and had an early and measurable impact.

7. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had also highlighted the important role which the Agency was continuing to play in nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. The Agency should pursue its efforts in those areas and draw on its experience in continuing to encourage the responsible use of nuclear energy by all Member States.

8. The Convention on Nuclear Safety would have an important role to play in promoting the safe production and use of nuclear energy. The number of States which had signed the Convention and the growing number of ratifications were encouraging; in that connection, he was happy to announce that his country would be ratifying the Convention shortly.

9. With regard to radioactive waste management, he reaffirmed the support of the United Kingdom for the RADWASS programme and the importance which it attached to the development of an international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

10. Nevertheless, it was the NPT and the associated comprehensive safeguards agreements which constituted the primary assurance against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Agency's full-scope safeguards were of universal benefit and would remain the key element in encouraging the widespread acceptance of nuclear energy within a coherent and stable framework. Safeguards should therefore continue to have the highest priority when budgetary decisions were being taken and nothing should be done to impair their efficiency. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the many initiatives which had been launched to improve the cost-effectiveness of what was an essential activity. The Agency had an obligation to apply safeguards and deserved the full support of all Member States in carrying

out the action considered necessary for ensuring that countries honoured their obligations. That was essential in order to ensure that a climate of mutual suspicion did not evolve and that nuclear weapons were not developed in secret. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had also shown that the international community fully appreciated the need to strengthen the safeguards system, and particularly to increase the Agency's capability for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. Work on developing measures to strengthen the safeguards system was advancing satisfactorily, and excellent progress had been made at the June meetings of the Board of Governors. His delegation looked forward to considering the Secretariat's new proposals relating to Part 2 of Programme 93+2.

11. In conclusion, he commended the Agency on having adapted to a series of new challenges and expressed confidence that it would continue to carry out its functions effectively.

12. Mr. EL FADHEL KHALIL (Tunisia) welcomed the approval of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia for membership of the Agency and thanked the Director General and the Agency's staff for the efforts which they were making in the discharge of their responsibilities, particularly with regard to technical assistance and co-operation.

13. Tunisia was endeavouring to make progress in the peaceful utilization of nuclear science and nuclear techniques and to apply them in its development efforts. As the host country of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, it was also endeavouring to put new life into that regional body in order to strengthen collaboration between Arab countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear techniques. It had been the first African country to join the African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), and in 1994 had been the first to request an extension of the Agreement for a further period. He took the opportunity to thank all the States which had supported the AFRA programme and hoped that it would receive greater world support, so that the people of Africa might enjoy a better life in the 21st century.

14. Developing countries, including Tunisia, were placing great hopes in the strengthening of technical co-operation with the Agency, which was the ideal framework for sound and balanced international co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear science and

technology. In order that developing countries might make effective use of nuclear energy in their development, the Agency should maintain the essential balance between those of its activities which aimed at promoting the use of atomic energy through technical co-operation and those which aimed at protecting the international community from the dangers of nuclear energy - particularly through safeguards.

15. With regard to resources, the Agency needed to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards system while limiting the costs. At the same time, his delegation hoped that the Agency would succeed in implementing resolution GC(XXV)/RES/388 on the financing of technical co-operation through the Regular Budget.

16. The energy needs of developing countries were still increasing, and nuclear energy would be essential in the centuries to come. Small and medium power reactors would play an important role in electricity production. Tunisia therefore welcomed the efforts being made by the Agency in that regard and would like it to continue with them.

17. The Agency had been examining the question of seawater desalination and, for four years, supporting the North African regional project on the use of nuclear energy for that purpose. It had also supported work aimed at establishing conceivable options. Tunisia welcomed those efforts and hoped that the Agency would continue to provide support, so that the study of the technical and economic feasibility of nuclear desalination might be completed. In addition, it hoped that the Agency would increase its efforts to assist States in improving water resources management through the use of radioisotopes.

18. With regard to the question of amending Article VI of the Agency's Statute, Tunisia was convinced that a broader representation of developing countries on the Board of Governors would increase the latter's effectiveness and encourage States to abide more closely by its decisions. It was therefore in favour of a revision of Article VI so as to achieve a more equitable representation of Africa and Middle East and South Asia on the Board.

19. The Agency was still endeavouring to make nuclear science and nuclear techniques serve mankind in all fields where they could be of benefit. At the same time, it was also endeavouring to limit the dangers associated with them. In that context, the members of the

international community had agreed to extend the NPT, thereby demonstrating their awareness of the need to limit the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and their desire to achieve nuclear disarmament. Some States had still not acceded to the NPT, but his delegation hoped that they would become parties to it before long. All Member States without exception should accept the Agency's safeguards system and also accede to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. There was a general need for international collaboration in all aspects of nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management.

20. Fearing the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation and wishing to contribute to world peace, the countries of Africa had undertaken to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. His delegation hoped that the Agency would strongly support that initiative.

21. In view of Africa's geographical proximity to the Middle East, the African commitment in that regard would not have the desired effect unless the threat of nuclear weapons was removed from the Middle East. Efforts to establish peace in that region were certainly helping to strengthen peace in the world. The problems associated with non-proliferation should therefore be resolved on a global scale through a new approach based on the need to apply comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, thereby creating support for efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Agency would no doubt have an important role to play in that regard, as foreseen in the relevant draft resolution.

22. Mr. YANEV (Bulgaria), welcoming the decision of the NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely, said his Government was convinced not only that the NPT had become a fundamental instrument for maintaining international stability but also that it was the basis for a verifiable mechanism for peaceful nuclear co-operation between Member States. Also, it recognized the outstanding role which the Agency was playing in the implementation of the NPT's basic provisions.

23. Since the conclusion of the NPT, the Agency's safeguards system, which underpinned a major part of the non-proliferation regime, had fulfilled its functions. The Agency was to be commended for that. With the NPT extended indefinitely, it was now even more important to verify that non-proliferation commitments were really being complied with.

Henceforth, safeguards should be based not only on trust in States which had concluded safeguards agreements but also on an improved capability for detecting possible clandestine activities. For that reason, Bulgaria was unreservedly supporting Programme 93+2, which aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. In addition, it believed that steps should be taken to make the system universal. Bulgaria therefore strongly advocated the principle that full-scope safeguards should be a precondition for supply - a principle which it applied to its own foreign trade policy.

24. Illicit trafficking in nuclear material - a problem which had come to the fore recently - constituted a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation system and also a safety and environmental hazard. It was the responsibility of Member States to ensure adequate physical protection of nuclear material and to establish reliable national systems of accountancy and control, but the Agency could facilitate international co-operation, in particular by providing technical assistance to the countries concerned in areas not related to law enforcement or by helping to establish an international register of fissile material.

25. Over the years, the NPT had not only become the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation but also contributed significantly to international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, as was stipulated in Article IV of the NPT. The wide range of the Agency's activities and the large number of beneficiaries of its technical co-operation programme, including Bulgaria, testified to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the value of the Agency as a framework within which nuclear expertise could be brought together and shared.

26. In 1994, Bulgaria had continued to comply strictly with its obligations under the safeguards agreement which it had concluded with the Agency. The number of Bulgarian nuclear facilities had remained unchanged at eight - six operating power reactors, one spent fuel repository and a research reactor. The Agency had carried out eight inspections and made two technical visits in order to verify the nuclear material inventory and accountancy. The Agency reports on the results of the inspections had shown that Bulgaria had been complying strictly with its NPT commitments. As it had nuclear facilities of various types, Bulgaria had officially proposed to the Agency that they be used, where appropriate, for the training of inspectors.



27. His delegation had been pleased to read in the annual report for 1994 that the Agency "did not find any indication of the diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or for any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device or for purposes unknown." The previous year had also been notable for the adoption and opening for signature of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which would constitute an essential element in the international regime for the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Also, technical co-operation had been very fruitful. The implementation rate for the technical co-operation programme had been the highest in recent years and project assessment procedures had been further improved. The Bulgarian delegation endorsed the annual report for 1994.

28. Bulgaria also endorsed the proposed budget for 1996; in its view, the envisaged resources would constitute a solid financial basis for implementation of the Agency's programmes. However, it was essential for the proper functioning of the Agency that Member States pay their contributions in a timely manner. For its part, Bulgaria had paid its contributions for 1994 and 1995 in full.

29. With regard to the financing of technical assistance, his delegation supported continued application of the current mechanism of voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund (TCF) in national currencies on the basis of Indicative Planning Figures. In 1996, Bulgaria would be paying into the TCF a contribution in national currency equivalent to US \$10 000.

30. With regard to the financing of safeguards, the present mechanism was a good one, enabling the Agency to fulfil its non-proliferation verification obligations effectively. That mechanism should be retained, but consultations should be held with a view to finding a solution which was acceptable to all Member States.

31. Enhancement of the operational safety of nuclear facilities was a matter of interest to all Member States, and the Agency activities designed to promote and strengthen the international regime relating to operational safety were of great importance. Bulgaria had played an active part in the drawing up of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and its experts

would be participating in the elaboration of a draft convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

32. With regard to the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, agreement on some major issues raised by the revision of the Vienna Convention and the elaboration of a convention on supplementary funding was necessary in order to ensure the broadest possible accession of countries to those two conventions. The revised Vienna Convention and the convention on supplementary funding should be adopted at a diplomatic conference, which should be organized with great care.

33. With regard to the question of amending Article VI of the Agency's Statute, the Board of Governors was an efficient body and should remain so; accordingly, Article VI should be modified only if there was a consensus which took into account the interests of certain areas - including Eastern Europe.

34. Bulgaria's transition from a planned economy to a free-market economy and the socio-economic changes which his country had gone through had prompted it to make changes to its nuclear legislation: new financial responsibilities had been placed on commercial organizations which used ionizing radiation sources; special funds, the resources for which were to be raised through users' contributions, had been set up to finance the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the storage of radioactive waste; the functions and activities of Bulgaria's regulatory body - the Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes - had been clearly separated from those of the electricity utilities; and provision had been made for the establishment of areas with special status around nuclear facilities. Work was in progress on harmonizing the regulatory texts on civil liability for nuclear damage with the requirements of the Vienna Convention. In 1994, Bulgaria had acceded to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, both of which had entered into force for Bulgaria in November. In addition, it had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Council of Ministers had tabled in the National Assembly a draft law concerning ratification of the Convention. The draft law, after being reviewed and approved by the relevant parliamentary commissions, had been adopted on 14 September. Moreover, the Bulgarian

Government had adopted rules for harmonization of the country's nuclear regulatory standards with the legislation of the European Union.

35. The Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes had drawn up a programme for the preparation, during the next few years, of around 50 regulatory texts which would be in harmony with the legislation of the European Union, the aim being to implement the country's Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Act and international agreements to which Bulgaria was a party.

36. Nuclear power played a significant role in meeting the electricity needs of Bulgaria. For example, in 1994 the six units of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant had accounted for 15.3 TW · h (i.e. 45.6%) of the country's total electricity output.

37. Bulgaria had been among the first countries to sign and ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and for good reason: its nuclear safety problems were structural in nature and related very largely to its economic difficulties and to management shortcomings.

38. The 1991 period of "health failures" and "life-saving measures" - during which the Agency had played an important role - was long past, and Bulgaria was now endeavouring, through long-term measures, to achieve "sustainable safety" and thereby satisfy present energy requirements without harming future generations. It was already four years since Bulgaria had embarked on the path of social, institutional and economic reforms, and it would need at least another six years to complete them. The economic situation of the country and the external financial aid received by it would be decisive factors.

39. Nuclear safety could not be dependent on the policy of one government or another, nor on external support or technical assistance. Every nation using nuclear power for electricity production had to be ready to take the measures necessary for establishing and maintaining the key elements of "safety culture" so as to ensure that the population and the environment were protected from the consequences of an accident throughout the period of use of the technology in question. Bulgaria had made great progress in that regard during the preceding four years and could now say that it had a level of "safety culture" which was worth maintaining. Currently, the main problem in the nuclear power sector was not to construct, put on line and operate a nuclear power plant, but rather to establish sound

institutions and ensure that the necessary resources were available for operation, maintenance, repair and upgrading.

40. In all the efforts which Bulgaria had made during the past several years - and particularly in 1994 - to enhance nuclear safety, it had benefited from the support of the Agency. That support had been invaluable for the establishment of a stable regulatory body, the improvement of "safety culture" and the enhancement of engineering and operational safety at Kozloduy. Once again, the Agency had shown that it had a unique role to play in the solution of problems related to the safe utilization of nuclear energy, and his country was grateful to it. In that connection, he would like to see the Agency helping to resolve the problems of nuclear projects which had been frozen, delayed or suspended.

41. Bulgaria was actively participating in regional projects relating to the safety of WWERs, spent fuel storage, radioactive waste management and the strengthening of regulatory bodies in countries of Eastern Europe. Bulgarian specialists had received training at leading establishments in developed countries under the Agency's fellowship programme and had improved their expertise through Agency-organized courses. Thanks to the financial support of the Agency, Bulgarian scientists and specialists had been able to participate in international conferences, symposia, workshops and meetings organized by the Agency and exchange experience and knowledge with colleagues from other countries. Moreover, Bulgarian institutes and laboratories had taken part in research programmes co-ordinated by the Agency. Lastly, Bulgaria was now an active participant in INIS and the Incident Reporting System.

42. His country, which appreciated and supported the Agency's activities aimed at promoting international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, wished the Director General and the Agency's staff further success in their work.

43. Mr. ROUX (South Africa) took the Chair.

44. Mr. KRAMBERGER (Croatia), after welcoming the approval of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for Agency membership, recalled that 1995 marked the 50th anniversary of the United Nations and the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, recently extended indefinitely. While recognizing that the United Nations and its

specialized agencies had improved matters in many fields, his country believed that there was an urgent need to review their role and performance in the light of the new international situation, so as to enable them to tackle more effectively the new and multiple challenges facing them. With that in mind, the Agency's Secretariat, the Director General and his colleagues were to be commended for their continuous efforts in pursuing innovation and cost-effectiveness and adapting the Agency to a changing world.

45. Croatia attached great importance to the Agency's role in sustaining and enhancing the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in verifying its application reliably. Believing the NPT to be an essential instrument for preventing proliferation and securing a world free of nuclear weapons, Croatia welcomed the fact that the NPT Review and Extension Conference had decided to extend the NPT indefinitely. However, that decision would help to achieve a safer world only when the commitment to non-proliferation demonstrated by the vast majority of countries was fully matched by a genuine commitment to universality, full compliance, transparency and - in particular - nuclear disarmament. In that regard, Croatia too regretted deeply the latest nuclear tests and the lack of restraint on the part of the nuclear-weapon States conducting them. It associated itself with other countries in urging the nuclear-weapon States to respect the worldwide moratorium and simultaneously to intensify the ongoing negotiations in Geneva on the elaboration of a universal, multilateral and verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) and in emphasizing the urgent need for those negotiations to be concluded by the end of 1996, since a CTBT was the keystone of the nuclear disarmament process. Also, Croatia considered that prohibition of the production of fissile materials for use in manufacturing nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would constitute a further decisive step towards global nuclear disarmament.

46. Still within the context of nuclear non-proliferation, he emphasized the importance which Croatia attached to the safeguards development programme. Believing that a more effective and efficient safeguards system would make a significant contribution to international security and to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it supported the early implementation of such a system and the further strengthening of the Agency's capabilities in the safeguards area.

47. Like other countries, Croatia was concerned about illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. It welcomed the Agency's support of Member States' efforts to prevent such dangerous activities. It also welcomed the adoption of the new Basic Safety Standards and the progress made in the consultations on a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. By contrast, it regretted the lack of progress in the negotiations regarding liability for nuclear damage; political resolve would be required in order to break the present deadlock.

48. Croatia had ratified its safeguards agreement with the Agency in April and was close to ratifying the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Also, it had begun participating in INIS and hoped to establish a national INIS Centre before long.

49. His Government, which attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, was pleased with the way in which the Department of Technical Co-operation was implementing its programmes and particularly with its dynamic approach in adapting to changing conditions. Croatia welcomed in particular the Model Project concept, the use of Country Programme Frameworks and the twinning of institutions in the context of TCDC. Croatia was aware of the heavy demands being placed on the Agency's technical co-operation programme managers as a result of changing circumstances. However, it considered that the difficulties to be overcome represented a force for change also in the recipient countries, which were being forced to concentrate more closely on their real needs and on the benefits which they could and should derive from the Agency's activities. Croatia hoped not only to remain a traditional recipient of Agency technical assistance but also to contribute to new types of technical co-operation activity in areas where - with Agency assistance - it had achieved high standards and acquired extensive experience. Croatia took a keen interest in regional co-operation, which it hoped would continue and become more extensive.

50. Croatia welcomed the tailoring of Agency technical co-operation programmes to the overall development objectives of recipient countries in accordance with the "partnership in development" philosophy. The most recent development activities in Croatia had been influenced to a considerable extent by the dictates of post-war reconstruction, to which his country's technical co-operation activities in 1995 and 1996 had been adapted.

51. His delegation hoped that, in preparing the 1997-98 programme, the Agency would become actively involved in the efforts to find the most effective ways of upgrading Croatia's waste management infrastructure and training its radiation protection personnel. Croatia continued to attach high priority to the application of nuclear techniques in human health and to take an interest in the development of nuclear analytical techniques for environmental and health studies and industrial applications.

52. Although nuclear techniques were unequalled in the contribution they could make to the development process, the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes were suffering increasingly from the dearth of resources available for promotional activities. Aware of the constraints imposed by zero real growth, Croatia would like all Member States to meet their financial obligations in a timely manner and thus ensure a balance between the Agency's promotional and safeguards activities. Croatia itself was endeavouring to meet its financial obligations in a timely manner despite the severe economic strain brought about by war and destruction.

53. Croatia welcomed the Agency's efforts to find new multi- and bilateral sources of funding and hoped that donor countries would respond to the Agency's requests. It should not be forgotten that the Agency had been established almost 40 years previously in order to extend the many benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all countries and that assisting the Agency meant helping it to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world".

54. Mr. MARSCHIK (Austria) said that, since the position of the EU Member States - which Austria fully endorsed - had already been presented in detail by the representative of Spain, his comments would be confined to issues of direct concern to Austria.

55. The extraordinary importance of the NPT Review and Extension Conference had been emphasized by previous speakers. Austria had actively supported the principle of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, on the understanding that the nuclear-weapon States would continue and intensify their nuclear disarmament efforts and that indefinite extension

would expedite the negotiations on a CTBT with a view to their successful conclusion in 1996.

56. On several occasions Austria had expressed in unequivocal terms its regret at the decision of two nuclear-weapon States to conduct additional nuclear tests. It hoped that the decision would in no way delay the negotiations on the conclusion of a CTBT and that, before the end of 1996, negotiations on the establishment of an organization responsible for the future application of a CTBT would be well in hand. In that connection, he recalled his Government's proposal that the envisaged organization be established in Vienna and expressed its gratitude for the widespread support which that proposal had received. His Government had no doubt that the organization would be able to operate very efficiently in Vienna and would benefit from the Agency's co-operation and experience.

57. His delegation had noted with great satisfaction the very positive appraisal of the Agency's work given by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. In particular, the Conference had emphasized the vital contribution made by Agency safeguards to the creation of a climate conducive to peaceful nuclear development and had commended the Agency on the manner in which it was implementing NPT safeguards agreements and on its work in the context of Programme 93+2. The Conference had endorsed the general direction being followed by the Agency in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and had recognized the Agency as the sole body responsible for verifying compliance with NPT safeguards agreements.

58. Austria had been among those countries which, at the 1992 session of the General Conference, had submitted detailed proposals for improving the safeguards system and extending its scope. His delegation was pleased that the Agency had taken up a number of those proposals and that significant progress had been achieved; nevertheless, much remained to be done, in particular if Member States were to accept the envisaged new measures on a non-voluntary basis. Moreover, certain matters - such as the further strengthening of SSACs and mechanisms for co-operation between SSACs and the Department of Safeguards - had still to be considered.



59. Nuclear safety remained a high-priority concern for Austria. The procedures for ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety were well in hand, and it was hoped that the matter would be referred to Parliament before the end of the year. Also, his delegation hoped that rapid progress would be made in the elaboration of a convention on radioactive waste management and that its scope would ultimately extend to all sources of nuclear waste.

60. His delegation, like many other delegations, hoped that the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage would soon resolve its outstanding problems and that it would be possible to hold a diplomatic conference at an early date. It was very important, however, that the Committee's work lead to improvements in the area of compensation for transboundary damage.

61. In conclusion, as representative of the host country, he welcomed all delegates to Vienna. He assured the Director General of Austria's continued support for the Agency's work.

62. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran), having welcomed the approval of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for membership of the Agency, commended the Director General both on his comprehensive, informative and carefully worded introductory statement and on his constant endeavours to fulfil the Agency's objectives.

63. The 39th session of the General Conference, which coincided with the 50th anniversary of the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was an occasion to remember that great tragedy, which had led to eternal condemnation of the military applications of nuclear technology. His delegation hoped that the condemnation of those applications would guide those who still blindly sought power and influence by means of nuclear weapons to the path of peace, compassion and solidarity with the victims of weapons of mass destruction.

64. Mindful of the need to defend the inalienable right of every State to the non-discriminatory use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and convinced of the need for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world, the Islamic Republic of Iran had joined the consensus in favour of an indefinite extension of the NPT, despite the reservations which it had had, the clear violations of the NPT which had taken place and the

incompatibility between the objectives of the NPT and the implementation process. Responsible implementation of the decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference could guarantee the credibility and coherence of the NPT in the years to come. It was clear that the nuclear-weapon States, which had been the chief proponents of maintaining the NPT in its present form, bore greater responsibility in that respect.

65. One of the most important aspects of the NPT and of the decision on Principles and Objectives was the necessity for nuclear-weapon States to take effective measures with a view to complete disarmament. The nuclear test race between certain of those States, which had regrettably led to tensions in the international community just when it was expected that a CTBT would be concluded in 1996, was clear proof that the nuclear-weapon States were determined to maintain and strengthen their nuclear arsenals.

66. Quoting from Article I of the NPT, he said it was regrettable that certain régimes - and particularly the Israeli régime - were continuing to expand their nuclear arsenals and develop non-peaceful applications of nuclear energy, with the support of States which had the presumptuousness to consider themselves the main defenders of the non-proliferation regime and of the NPT.

67. While turning a blind eye to - or even supporting - the nuclearization of Israel, those States stopped at nothing to deprive developing countries of their legitimate right to use nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes. Thus, the efforts made and the expense incurred over the past 17 years by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran with a view to completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant had remained fruitless, despite the fact that the Agency had repeatedly testified to the peaceful nature of the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and despite the prediction that by the year 2010 all the oil produced in Iran would be consumed internally.

68. Proper implementation of the NPT and prevention of the gradual erosion of its foundations could not be ensured without mandatory and unbiased mechanisms for complete control over the nuclear activities of all States. Paragraph 1 of the decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament provided the international

community with the political tools for putting pressure on the States not yet party to the NPT, particularly on those which had not accepted Agency safeguards, and inducing them to accede to the NPT. Thus, the competent international organizations should see to it that States not party to the NPT, particularly Israel, felt that pressure in practice and really paid the price for their reservations or insubordination. His delegation proposed that the Director General make efforts to that end within the framework of his endeavours to strengthen the safeguards system and report thereon regularly to the General Conference.

69. World population growth would create new demands that could not be met from the Earth's resources as in the past. For example, it was evident that fossil fuels could never meet the future demand for energy, particularly in view of environmental constraints, and that nuclear technology, which the Agency should more than ever promote worldwide, would be needed. In that regard, it was essential that the necessary means be provided for promoting nuclear fusion also in developing countries.

70. Notwithstanding the Agency's efforts to respond to the needs of Member States as regards peaceful applications of nuclear energy and despite the fact that those applications were no less important than non-proliferation, there was an imbalance between the regulatory and promotional activities of the Agency. Strengthening of the non-proliferation regime should not be allowed to undermine the legitimate right of States party to the NPT - and particularly those which were developing countries - to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Equal weight should be given to the strengthening of safeguards on one hand and to the intensification of technical assistance and nuclear technology transfer on the other.

71. Israel's blatant and persistent refusal to sign the NPT and accept international verification had so far been a major obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and Israel's possession of nuclear weapons had become a serious threat to peace and stability in the region and the world at large. The United States should stop supporting Israel and its nuclear policy and refrain from creating more obstacles to the establishment of such a zone. If one accepted the argument put forward by Israel (as some of its supporters unfortunately did) that the continuation of its threatening activities was justified because they were of a defensive nature and essential in the face of regional animosities, it was hardly logical to expect other States, which could put forward similar

arguments, to honour international norms or treaties. The persistence of such biased policies boded ill for the future of the NPT.

72. Having thanked the Director General for helping the African States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone, he expressed the hope that with Agency assistance a nuclear-weapon-free zone would - as Iran had proposed already in 1974 - be created in the Middle East, as soon as the obstacles attributable to Israel's expansionist and unjustifiable policies had been removed. In addition, he commended the initiative taken by South Africa in terminating its nuclear weapons programme, thereby helping to strengthen the NPT and facilitating the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

73. His delegation still firmly believed in the need to strengthen the Agency's safeguards and to prevent violations. Transparency had always been one of the pillars of the nuclear policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

74. With regard to the disquieting problem of illicit trafficking, the nuclear-weapon States should strengthen their systems for controlling and protecting nuclear materials. The Agency was playing a vital role in co-ordinating physical protection guidelines and helping States to improve their control and surveillance systems. However, illicit trafficking should not be used as a pretext for violating the sovereignty of States or depriving them of the right to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. In that connection, his delegation was opposed to malicious propaganda and intrigues which were motivated by political considerations and by competition among the nuclear-weapon States and which might alarm the world community and hamper peaceful international co-operation. Unfortunately, the exaggerations and unfounded controversies regarding illicit trafficking in nuclear materials mainly served the interests of States which preferred to see international norms and treaties subordinated to their biased political aims and which wanted to be the only suppliers on the international nuclear market. The international media should not allow themselves to be lured into accusing States on the basis of false information and concealed political motives.

75. Referring to paragraph 16 of the decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, he said his country was strongly opposed to the resumption of technical assistance to Israel; the reasons for which the Agency had refrained

from providing technical assistance to Israel for many years were still valid. There was absolutely no logical or legal justification for limited Agency funds to be used in helping a régime which, by refusing to accede to the NPT and to heed the wish for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, had become a real threat to peace and security in the region and the world thanks to several decades of financial and technical assistance provided by certain States. The provisions of paragraph 16 of the aforementioned decision should be applied to the relationship between the Agency and Israel.

76. With regard to the question of amending Article VI of the Agency's Statute, his delegation was in favour of an increase in the number of seats - including floating seats - on the Board to the extent that the Board's efficiency was not impaired. Given the sensitivity of the nuclear industry and the need to promote peaceful co-operation in the nuclear field, the candidates for election to the Board should, as in the past, be presented to the General Conference with the agreement of the States in the relevant regions.

77. In conclusion, he drew attention to the new obligations facing the international community now that the Cold War was over. Implementing international treaties in a spirit of trust and fairness was one such obligation. Given the absence of secure borders, particularly on account of the birth of new States and the expansion of "micronationalism" and even "ultranationalism", it would be impossible to guarantee the continuation of peace in the future if international relations were not imbued with such a spirit of trust and fairness and if access to development and welfare - presented as one of the principal objectives of the so-called New World Order - remained the exclusive privilege of the wealthy States. He hoped that the Agency - aware of the importance of adapting international institutions to the new needs of the human community, preventing erosion of the element of trust in international relations and reducing the gap between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States - would encourage and co-ordinate co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly by ensuring that implementation of the NPT was fair and non-discriminatory.

78. Mr. SOYSA (Sri Lanka) said that the Agency's General Conference resembled many conferences meeting within and outside the United Nations context. Invariably its sessions brought together rich and poor. In the course of its meetings there were bound to be references - sometimes violent ones - to the lack of resources and to the further

impoverishment of those who were already poor and demands for additional resources to promote development. The present session of the General Conference was no exception.

79. Sri Lanka too needed additional resources. Thanks to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, it had completed a number of successful projects, in particular one relating to the establishment of a tissue bank. Also, it had benefited from assistance in the areas of agriculture, industry and medicine and with monitoring the use of nuclear materials - particularly radioisotopes. None the less, it still required more aid, not of the kind which had been cynically described as "a transfer of resources from the poor people of rich countries to the rich people of poor countries" but of the kind which would permit it to reap the benefits of projects sponsored by the Agency. At the present session of the General Conference, however, the Director General had in his introductory statement pre-empted all requests for assistance by deploring the lack of resources and urging Member States to pay their voluntary contributions.

80. The Agency had to face numerous challenges, one of the biggest being the increasing misery of Third World countries. The people of those countries were suffering from disease, ignorance and all the other evils associated with poverty despite all the efforts being made to remedy matters. He had drawn attention to that situation because technical assistance with applications of nuclear technology could have a very beneficial effect in developing countries. But it had to be recognized that the North-South dialogue had failed, and billions of dollars were being drained every year from the South to the North. That was an intolerable situation, which the Agency should seek to remedy through its technical assistance programme.

81. The Agency was to be congratulated on the work it had done and the role it had played in keeping with its Statute, particularly as regards implementation of the NPT. In that connection, 1995 could be considered a watershed; the NPT Review and Extension Conference, presided over by a Sri Lankan, had decided upon indefinite extension of the NPT.

82. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was to be concluded in 1996, but certain countries were attempting to beat the ban. Sri Lanka associated itself with those who,

condemning such attempts, had submitted a draft resolution on the subject. Moreover, it was no accident that the recent French nuclear test had taken place in the Pacific, in the heart of the Third World. The same situation had long prevailed with regard to nuclear waste, which numerous countries had regularly dumped in other, disadvantaged countries. Much had been done in recent times to eliminate that practice, but - as far as he was aware - without complete success.

83. Reference had been made during the session to illicit trafficking in nuclear material. The Director General had highlighted the steps taken by the Agency in that regard. Unhappily, the purchasers of illegally traded nuclear material included not only criminal elements and terrorists but also commercial concerns and governmental agencies.

84. It was time to bring international public opinion to bear on the subject. It should be remembered that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima had been followed by a frenetic race for nuclear weapons. That period had coincided with the start of the Cold War, and many people - whatever their political opinions - had used the Cold War as an excuse for the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Various horrible weapons, many of them based on nuclear technology, had been developed. Since then, humanity had been travelling a road that led to destruction. There were many who viewed that prospect with completely unjustified complacency. The threat to all humanity and to the entire planet could no longer be ignored. It was not enough to pass resolutions on non-proliferation or to utter public condemnations of proliferation; the time had come for people to live up to the principles which they professed.

85. Without calling the Agency into question, he wished to point out that certain countries, while publicly preaching the elimination of nuclear weapons and of the threat of nuclear war, were busy manufacturing weapons even more terrible than before. For a long time, under the pretext of deterrence, countries had engaged in the production of poison gas and bacteriological weapons, the terrible effects of which were known, and ultimately certain countries at war with their neighbours had begun to use them. One could not invoke the deterrence argument to justify the production of nuclear weapons, but certain countries, while undertaking publicly to eliminate nuclear weapons, were continuing to produce them and building up huge arsenals. That was blatant hypocrisy.

86. Delegates representing countries where the people could influence government policy and decisions should join together in mobilizing international public opinion and developing an international conscience in those matters. In that connection, new methods of communication such as the Internet could prove useful for transmitting relevant information. Urging delegates to take his appeal seriously, he called on them to commence by co-operating with the Agency in the application of the NPT and then to take all measures necessary to alert international public opinion and prevent certain countries from continuing with their destructive practices. He was not condemning peoples, but some of their leaders, who - now as in the past - were blinded to the real issues facing humanity. The whole world was involved. What would happen if, for political or other reasons, the régime changed rapidly in a country which had amassed nuclear weapons? Who would take control of those weapons, who would decide their fate? Those were questions which concerned not only the people of that country but the whole of humanity. That was why he was appealing to all, whatever their political or other differences, to tackle the issue together, since it was now a matter of life or death.

87. Mr. CEYSSENS (Belgium) said that his country fully supported the views expressed on various agenda items by the delegate of Spain on behalf of the European Union.

88. The importance of safeguards had been clearly emphasized in the European Union statement. Also, Belgium welcomed the fact that the United States had submitted significant quantities of nuclear material from its military surpluses to Agency safeguards; that had been an important step towards the application of safeguards to the surpluses in nuclear-weapon States.

89. His Government continued to give special attention to nuclear energy. In a declaration made in June 1995, it had stated that in 1998 it would submit to Parliament a new global analysis of the situation taking into account - inter alia - non-proliferation, waste management, safety, the protection of workers, the general public and the environment, and economic aspects. That analysis would be the basis for a decision on whether to continue reprocessing irradiated Belgian fuel after the year 2000.



90. The Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, one of whose main objectives would be to strengthen the control of the authorities over the various operators in the nuclear sector, would become operational at the beginning of 1996 at the latest. That was one of the priorities established by the present Government. In April 1994, a number of new measures had been adopted in the area of nuclear power plant safety and radiation protection as part of the process of implementing the European directive relating to environmental impact and the general philosophy of the Espoo Convention on environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context. Also, they were in keeping with a recent law on the publication of administrative decisions and on public access to relevant administrative documents.

91. The former General Regulations for Protection of the Population and Workers against the Hazards of Ionizing Radiation had been reviewed in depth and were now entitled "Regulations for the Protection of the Population, the Environment and Workers against the Hazards of Ionizing Radiation". Also, in order to promote the public interest, to make licensing procedures more transparent and to clarify the legal position of operators, the procedure for the licensing of establishments using substances or devices which could emit ionizing radiation had been modified. Henceforth, the Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control would be responsible for supervising the application of the regulations in the various establishments; it could, however, continue to entrust the practical execution of that task to approved organizations. Finally, as some facilities were reaching the end of their operating lives, it had seemed wise to draw up an authorization procedure prior to their closure and dismantlement, although ultimately it would be necessary to comply with the requirements of a European directive currently being prepared.

92. Belgium was continuing intensive development work in the area of medical applications of ionizing radiation; the Fleurus Radioisotope Institute remained one of the largest producers of isotopes for medical use in Europe, and its products were exported directly or indirectly to countries within Europe and throughout the rest of the world. Wishing to ensure compliance with European directives, and in particular with the one relating to the radiological protection of patients, his Government had already strengthened the regulatory provisions for the training of doctors who used ionizing radiation for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, requiring that they attend a certain number of lectures and

participate in a certain number of practical exercises depending on the type of source used and the activities involved. The formulation of safety criteria for therapy involving the use of unsealed radioactive sources was continuing, with the participation of the Supreme Health Council; it was expected that the criteria would be published towards the end of 1995.

93. In 1994, net electricity consumption in Belgium had increased by 4.5% and net electricity production by 2.2%. With 56.4%, nuclear power had continued to account for a major share of electricity production.

94. The fabrication of MOX fuel by the firm Belgonucléaire had increased to 32 tonnes, for nuclear power plants in France, Germany and Belgium. In addition, the firm FBFC International had assembled 60 tonnes of MOX fuel and 310 tonnes of UO<sub>2</sub> fuel - a total of 740 assemblies. Other items had been supplied to Sweden and South Africa.

95. With regard to radioactive waste management, the irradiated fuel from Belgium's three oldest units had so far been reprocessed; the irradiated fuel from the other units was being stored on-site. For economic and political reasons, a decision had been taken to conduct studies on the choice of procedures for the final storage of irradiated fuel. As the existing pools were reaching saturation point, other solutions for the interim on-site storage problem had to be found.

96. His country's new low-level waste treatment facility had been opened in May 1994, the first part of the storage building for high-level waste from the reprocessing of irradiated fuel from Belgian reactors was ready to go into service and the capacity of the low-level waste storage building had been increased to 14 000 m<sup>3</sup>.

97. As regards the disposal of waste with low activity and a short half-life, a final choice would be based on an analysis of the various options, account being taken of safety and costs. Finally, investigations of the Boom clay beneath the site of the Mol Nuclear Research Centre were continuing, their aim being to verify whether the clay stratum could be used for the disposal of high-level wastes; they would be the subject of a preliminary safety report, on which the authorities would base their decision.

98. With regard to research and development, detailed studies and analyses of different components of the BR2 research reactor at Mol had indicated the need to carry out a major

overhaul, to determine its cost and to select operating regime options for the period after the overhaul (in principle until 2010). Work on demonstrating the feasibility of dismantling a pressurized water reactor had continued at the Mol Centre's BR3 reactor. As a result of participation in an international programme on the safe use of MOX fuel in pressurized water reactors, the Mol Centre had established a databank for validating core computation codes used in the case of reactor cores consisting of MOX assemblies. The research and development programme relating to waste disposal in geological formations was continuing. It was based - inter alia - on the decision to construct the PRACLAY underground demonstration unit, which could be used for a full-scale study of the consequences of introducing highly radioactive containers into a clay stratum.

99. The LABORELEC Institute was conducting research in support of nuclear power plant operations. In 1994, the research had been mainly concentrated on the inspection, maintenance and replacement of steam generator tubes. It had led to the validation of new inspection techniques for steam generators.

100. Recalling that one of the main topics of the special scientific programme organized in conjunction with the General Conference session had been "Application of Accelerators: A Rapidly Growing Nuclear Technology", he said that Belgian industry had recently entered the electron beam accelerator market thanks to the Rhodotron. That accelerator, which was simple and very effective, was one of the most powerful on the market and could be used in a very wide range of applications.

101. In a country as densely populated as Belgium, such activities would not be possible without a good public information service. Besides the regulatory measures already referred to, the public information centres set up at the Doel and Tihange reactor sites each received over 20 000 visitors a year. Also, the Isotopolis information centre set up by ONDRAF at the Belgoprocess site near Dessel had been operational since the end of January 1994 and had already received over 8000 visitors. Moreover, a visitors' gallery had been installed outside the low-level waste storage building.

102. In addition, as part of an information campaign relating to the final disposal of low-level radioactive waste which was being conducted by ONDRAF, all local authorities in

Belgium had been informed of the nature and objectives of the investigations in question. Also, seminars on specific subjects were being organized by nuclear power plant operators for the Belgian press, while the Belgian Nuclear Society was developing a programme for informing specialists about topical issues at monthly meetings. Finally, Belgium continued to be firmly committed to the multilateral non-proliferation regime, in which the Agency was playing a role of worldwide importance and without which any development of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy would be impossible.

103. Mr. PALADE (Romania) said that his Government, which had always maintained that the Agency made a decisive contribution to the promotion of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy for the benefit of all States and to the prevention and halting of nuclear weapons proliferation, was sure that the Agency would continue fulfilling the tasks in question and would find solutions to the complex problems which were arising in the nuclear field. The events of recent years had highlighted once more the links that existed between the Agency and the United Nations Security Council. Romania fully supported the measures taken by the Agency's administration and the Board of Governors.

104. The annual report reflected a year of positive results, and it was worth noting that the Director General and the Secretariat had achieved those results under difficult conditions, constantly endeavouring - in collaboration in Member States - to fulfil the Agency's main tasks in the areas of technical assistance and co-operation, nuclear safety and safeguards and in the development of new legal instruments for regulating nuclear activities as a whole. Romania, which was very satisfied with the professionalism and sense of responsibility shown by the Agency's administration in managing funds and dealing with financial problems, liked the annual report - and particularly its presentation.

105. Over the past year Romania had continued research and development activities relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy; the areas of activity had included nuclear physics, reactor physics, the interaction of radiation with matter, the physics of materials, cryogenics, radioecology and the utilization of isotopes and radiation in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. It gave high priority to its nuclear power programme, the objective of which was to improve the quality of life of the population. In that regard, he noted that the first unit of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant would go into service at the

end of 1995. His Government was grateful to the Agency for its help in establishing a nuclear safety and radiation protection infrastructure. It hoped to continue receiving Agency support, so that ultimately its nuclear projects would be completed.

106. As a means of co-ordinating its nuclear activities, his Government had in 1994 established the National Atomic Energy Agency (NAEA), which was also responsible for contacts with the Agency. A national nuclear strategy had been developed, and research and development programmes were being finalized. The four units of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant would benefit from the programmes for the fabrication of fuel based on natural uranium, the production of heavy water and the integration of Romania's industry.

107. His Government supported the zero-real-growth budget proposed for 1996. It understood the reasons why not all requests and priorities of Member States could be taken into account and satisfied, and it considered that the Board of Governors and the Administrative and Budgetary Committee had arrived at a balanced solution. The Secretariat had made remarkable efforts to obtain supplementary funding for high-priority programmes. His delegation commended the Board of Governors on having succeeded, at its last meeting, in arriving at a compromise on the financing of technical assistance and in agreeing on a new formula for safeguards financing.

108. Romania attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, which it considered to be an effective means of transferring nuclear technology and know-how. Romania was currently involved in 24 technical co-operation projects, which should enhance its capabilities in the areas of nuclear power and safety and in applying nuclear science and technology in vital sectors such as industry, agriculture, medicine, environmental protection, hydrology and higher education. He thanked the Agency and those Member States - especially Canada, the United States, Spain, France, Germany and Italy - which had contributed to Romania's nuclear development. His country strongly supported the measures being taken by the Department of Technical Co-operation to increase the number of Model Projects, which had proved effective in enhancing the socio-economic impact of Agency technical assistance.

109. Romania, which had scientific, human and technical resources of international calibre, was ready to make its expertise available to specialists from other States and assist them in areas such as the application of isotopes in agriculture and the physics of particle accelerators. Also, it could offer the Agency the services of highly skilled experts. It greatly appreciated the Agency's initiative in establishing an international working group on heavy water reactors for the purpose of promoting the exchange of information in that field. As a recipient country, Romania, although going through a period of budgetary constraint, was determined to comply with its obligations and contribute to the funding of Agency technical assistance.

110. Romania considered nuclear safety to be one of the most important of its national programmes. Thanks to Agency assistance, it now had a clear idea of the relevant requirements and necessary legal framework. It had participated actively in the negotiations on the Convention on Nuclear Safety and was one of the very few countries to have ratified the Convention. Also, it was taking part in the negotiations relating to a convention on civil liability for nuclear damage and to an international radioactive waste management convention.

111. In the area of safeguards, his Government associated itself with the efforts being made to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and endorsed the measures being proposed at the international level. The principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, which were winning ever-greater acceptance, had persuaded a very large number of countries to accede to the NPT and support its indefinite extension - something which Romania had supported unreservedly from the outset.

112. In order to ensure that the spirit and letter of safeguards agreements were observed, the Agency had been engaging in highly complex and important activities. Romania greatly appreciated the way in which it had fulfilled the mandate entrusted to it by the United Nations Security Council, particularly in the case of the DPRK. Implementation of the NPT had revealed certain shortcomings, notably in respect of safeguards and verification. As soon as the international community had learned of cases of non-compliance, steps had been taken within the Agency framework to strengthen the safeguards system. Romania strongly supported the measures already taken and endorsed those proposed by SAGSI.

113. In keeping with its belief in non-proliferation, Romania also endorsed the measures proposed for strengthening the Agency's existing system of accounting for and control of nuclear material through the rapid provision of relevant information. Also, Romania supported the measures envisaged in Programme 93+2.

114. In the interest of transparency and wishing to facilitate the Agency's task, his Government had decided some time previously to grant multiple-entry visas to Agency inspectors so that they might carry out no-notice inspections. Furthermore, the owners of nuclear installations had been requested to simplify the procedure for gaining access to sites containing nuclear material.

115. Finally, Romania appreciated the services offered by the Agency in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection through its OSART, ASSET, RAPAT and WAMAP programmes; Romania had benefited greatly from the high-quality assessments which had been carried out during construction of its nuclear power plant and the commissioning preparations.

116. Mr. HASHIM (Malaysia), having thanked the Director General for his introductory statement and congratulated the Agency on the 25th anniversary of the International Nuclear Information System (INIS), commended the Secretariat on the clarity and comprehensiveness of document GC(39)/13, which described the initiatives and measures taken to strengthen the Agency's technical co-operation activities. He supported the idea of a partnership in development through Model Projects and other mechanisms described in that document.

117. The work on radiation protection and radioactive waste management and on Country Programme Frameworks done as a follow-up to the third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar was ambitious but necessary. While endorsing the Secretariat's general approach, his delegation agreed with others that the activities in question should not become goals in themselves but should be seen as means of ensuring efficient technical assistance delivery and utilization. Also, his delegation considered that the Department of Technical Co-operation should remain aware of its expanded implementation responsibilities. Stricter control and discipline would be required during planning, organization and implementation.

118. His delegation commended the Director General on the speed with which he had established the Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation (SAGTAC) and noted that the Group would be meeting for the first time during the period 27 November-1 December 1995.

119. Malaysia's nuclear science and technology programme was concerned with non-power applications of nuclear energy. It included sustainable and end-user oriented projects which had an impact on national socio-economic development and for which the necessary infrastructure was available. His delegation was grateful to the Agency, and particularly the Department of Technical Co-operation, for having supported a large number of those projects. Many of Malaysia's projects were also receiving support from national development funding programmes and bilateral co-operation programmes.

120. Malaysia considered that technical co-operation was important for the implementation of Article IV of the NPT. Recalling the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference, he said that every effort should be made to ensure that the Agency had the financial and human resources necessary for meeting its responsibilities in the areas of technical co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety. In particular, the Agency should intensify its efforts directed towards the financing of technical assistance from predictable and assured resources. He noted with regret that pledges and payments to the TCF were declining and expressed surprise that some industrialized Member States had made no pledge whatsoever in the past.

121. Malaysia had always pledged and paid its share of the TCF in full and in a timely manner but, as the 1996 TCF target had been agreed upon so late, his delegation had not received formal authorization to pledge a TCF contribution for 1996 at the present session. However, his country would continue to pledge its share of the target and hoped that other Member States would honour their commitments promptly.

122. With regard to nuclear testing, it was his delegation's view that - as the nuclear-weapon States had shown a lack of serious commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons - all nuclear tests, whether real or simulated, should be condemned as they were



an additional obstacle to the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). The nuclear-weapon States were responsible also for the delay in the negotiations on the principal features of the envisaged CTBT - namely, its scope and the verification and financial requirements - and they should undertake to ensure the conclusion of those negotiations by the middle of 1996. Their present attitude vindicated the position of countries which had spoken against an indefinite extension of the NPT at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. His delegation, which was very concerned about the nuclear testing issue, had co-sponsored the draft resolution on nuclear testing because it felt that anything which prevented the Agency from promoting non-proliferation and nuclear safety in line with its mandate was a matter of concern to the General Conference.

123. Malaysia endorsed the annual report and the accounts for 1994. With regard to the 1996 budget, it would continue to call for prudent spending and had noted the positive attitude displayed in reviewing programme priorities and needs.

124. The financing of technical assistance had been examined together with the financing of safeguards for obvious reasons. While convinced of the importance of safeguards, his delegation had noted that the new formula envisaged for the financing of safeguards would require financial sacrifices on the part of developing countries, including those which - like Malaysia - had no nuclear power programmes. Thus, Malaysia's contribution to the safeguards element of the Agency's Regular Budget for 1996 would be approximately four times as high as its 1995 contribution, and its safeguards contribution would have increased by a further factor of four by the year 2000. Although the increase would be gradual, it would be very substantial. His delegation would also like to see an equivalent increase in the contributions of the nuclear-weapon States - a fair price to pay for their monopoly.

125. Malaysia was pleased that Moldova and Ukraine would soon be concluding NPT safeguards agreements. Also, it welcomed the fact that Cuba had signed the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty and that safeguards agreements had been concluded with Barbados and Chile.

126. His delegation had studied with interest the report on the first meeting of an open-ended group of experts for the preparation of a convention on the safe management of

radioactive waste (GOV/INF/762/Add.1). It was gratifying to note that the question of waste from non-nuclear activities had been broached; for example, petroleum industry waste and tailings from tin and gold mining could contain substantial levels of uranium and other natural radionuclides. Malaysia, which continued to view such materials with considerable concern, considered that they should be addressed in the preparatory work on the envisaged convention, although it understood that certain Member States were not of the same opinion. His delegation would continue to participate in the meetings of the open-ended group.

127. The Permanent Mission of Malaysia in Vienna and ten other Permanent Missions had recently been participating in a six-month pilot project whose objective was, inter alia, to evaluate the technical, economic and organizational feasibility of the use of the Secretariat's computing services by Vienna-based Missions. Access to those services had already led to improved communications between his country's Mission and the Secretariat and between the Mission and Kuala Lumpur. Although the transmitted information was generally informal, it was helpful in the reaching of early decisions on vital issues requiring an urgent reply. His delegation was grateful to the Secretariat for having included it in the project, which it hoped would be expanded to include a larger number of Vienna-based Missions.

128. Finally, his delegation welcomed the fact that the Conference had approved Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia for membership of the Agency.

129. Mr. KENIK (Belarus) recalled that his country had decided to become a non-nuclear-weapon State shortly after attaining its independence, the fifth anniversary of which it had just celebrated; the decision had been enshrined in its Declaration of Sovereignty and then in its Constitution. By the beginning of April 1992, Belarus had removed all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory and drawn up a plan for the removal of the strategic nuclear weapons, thereby significantly anticipating the dates fixed in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). After ratifying START and at the same time acceding to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, Belarus had taken the lead in the move to denuclearize the Republics of the former Soviet Union and had been among the first to renounce the ownership of nuclear weapons. On 14 April 1995, his country had signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency which had entered into force on 31 July 1995.

130. All States which had not yet acceded to the NPT and not yet concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency should follow his country's example; that would contribute greatly to nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of international security. In that connection, his country was particularly grateful to Japan, Sweden and the United States for helping it to set up a national system for nuclear materials accountancy, control and physical protection. As to the Agency, it had played a useful co-ordinating role in the strengthening of nuclear and radiation safety infrastructures in Newly Independent States.

131. The Agency should focus on strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in line with the decisions taken in May 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

132. Having already been faced with the problem, the Agency should take measures to ensure that clandestine nuclear activities were detected more rapidly. The measures taken by the Agency's Secretariat, in collaboration with Member States, within the framework of Programme 93+2 to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system constituted a major step in the right direction. Illicit trafficking in nuclear material could pose a serious threat to the security of States, and Belarus was endeavouring to abide scrupulously by the obligations it had assumed under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

133. In 1996, it would be ten years since the Chernobyl accident, the most serious radiological disaster in history. In May 1986, the whole of Belarus had been contaminated by short-lived radioisotopes. On 10 May 1986, the iodine-133 contamination level in certain regions had been 1500 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or more. Currently, the contamination was due mainly to long-lived radionuclides such as caesium-137, strontium-90 and plutonium-239 and -240; some 23% of the territory of Belarus had been severely contaminated by those radionuclides. Some 22% (18 000 km<sup>2</sup>) of the country's agricultural land had been affected, all forms of agriculture being prohibited on 3.2% (2600 km<sup>2</sup>).

134. Public health in Belarus was a matter for particular concern. The number of thyroid cancer cases had increased by a factor of 50 among children and a factor of 1.8 among adults. The increase was a direct consequence of the Chernobyl accident. Unfortunately,

Belarus was having to rely largely on its own resources in dealing with the consequences of the accident. Until 1992, the Soviet Union had met the costs of cleaning up after the accident; following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, Belarus had been left to face its problems alone. The direct and indirect annual expenditures attributable to the accident accounted for 20% of the national budget. The total damage suffered by the country had been put at a value 32 times the pre-accident annual budget.

135. In March 1996, the First International Conference of the European Union, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident would be held in Minsk. Belarus hoped that Member States and the Secretariat of the Agency would be well represented.

136. Belarus intended to play an active part in the WHO International Conference on the Health Consequences of the Chernobyl and other Radiological Accidents to be held in Geneva in November 1995 and in the international conference entitled "One Decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the Consequences of the Accident" to be held in April 1996 in Vienna by WHO, the European Commission and the Agency. It attached particular importance to the Decision Makers' Forum to be held during the latter conference and hoped that very senior officials would take part, thereby clearly demonstrating that the international community was paying due attention to the problems caused by the Chernobyl accident.

137. Technical co-operation was one of the Agency's main activities. Belarus supported the recommendations formulated during the third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar, and particularly the recommendations that Country Programme Frameworks be drawn up for recipient countries. In June, Belarus had received an Agency technical co-operation mission which had prepared a draft country programme for Belarus in collaboration with representatives of ministries and other governmental departments. His delegation hoped that the programme would be accepted by the Agency. Noting with satisfaction that technical co-operation between the Agency and Belarus had expanded considerably during recent years, he said that Belarus accorded high priority to projects for mitigating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. For its part, his Government was doing a great deal, but Belarus was entitled to expect the Agency - whose role it was to contribute to the development and practical utilization of atomic energy for peaceful

purposes - to provide substantial assistance, for its population had become the victim of a catastrophic accident which had occurred in a nuclear power plant belonging to another State.

138. Another priority of Belarus was the strengthening of its national nuclear and radiation safety infrastructure. Following the "Forum for Information Exchange" held in Vienna in May 1993 as the first step of an initiative launched for the purpose of strengthening the nuclear and radiation safety infrastructures in countries of the former Soviet Union, a UNDP/Agency team had visited Belarus in order to draw up a programme for strengthening its infrastructure. The donor countries had not made available the resources necessary for implementation of the programme, however, and it was clear that Belarus, which was going through a serious economic crisis, had only very limited resources for that purpose. It therefore had great hopes of the sub-regional co-ordination meeting for the Baltic countries and Belarus which the Agency was convening for December 1995 at the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute and to which it was planned to invite representatives of donor countries.

139. The delegation of Belarus shared the general concern regarding the Agency's difficult financial situation. In addition, it felt that the financial problems of international organizations could be solved only by fixing the contributions of each Member in an equitable manner on the basis of its true ability to pay. Unfortunately, for several years Belarus's contributions to the budgets of the Agency, the United Nations and other international organizations had not been in line with its ability to pay. In document GC(39)/INF/17, issued shortly before the General Conference's current session had begun, the Government of Belarus had stated the reasons - beyond its control - why it was in arrears with its contributions and had requested that it be allowed to vote during the current session of the Conference. Belarus was grateful for the understanding it had been shown and would do its utmost to meet its financial obligations vis-à-vis the Agency in full.

140. In conclusion, the delegation of Belarus endorsed the annual report of the Agency and the programme and budget for 1996.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

