


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THIRTY-NINTH (1995) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Monday, 18 September 1995, at 3.50 p.m.

President: Mr. KASEMSARN (Thailand)

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95-04375 (XV)

Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
Agreed Framework	Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
CANDU	Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor]
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
G-7	Group of Seven
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KSNP	Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant
NPP	nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
R&D	Research and development
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1994 (GC(39)/3, GC(39)/26 and Add.1 and 2) (continued)

1. Mr. JIANG (China) said that the Agency, as an important special organization within the United Nations system, was playing a central role in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. The Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had, thanks to the unremitting efforts of the States Parties, adopted without a vote the decision on an indefinite extension of the NPT, the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process of the Treaty". Those positive and historic decisions would undoubtedly have far-reaching effects on future international security. During the NPT Review and Extension Conference, delegations had affirmed the positive contributions of the Agency in maintaining the effectiveness of the NPT and expressed high expectations regarding the future role of the Agency.

2. The objectives of the Agency were clearly set out in the Statute: the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. During the past 39 years, in accordance with its Statute, the Agency had done a great deal of useful work in applying safeguards, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international co-operation in that respect, and developing technical assistance and co-operation. With the changing international situation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Member States, the Agency would be facing new tasks. In that connection, his delegation believed that the Agency should continue firmly to pursue the objectives set out in its Statute and play a greater role in preventing nuclear proliferation, maintaining world peace and security, strengthening international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and promoting nuclear technology in countries throughout the world - and especially the developing countries.

3. As the prevention of nuclear proliferation was an issue with a bearing on international peace and security, all Member States were concerned about how the Agency would adapt to the development of the international situation, fulfil its obligations under the Statute and other international agreements and deal with safeguards in a more equitable and effective

manner. China attached great importance to the Agency's safeguards system and would like the Agency to enhance safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through appropriate measures. His delegation appreciated the efforts being made by the Agency in implementing Programme 93+2 and had taken note of the set of measures proposed by the Secretariat for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. It believed that, on the basis of thorough discussion and consensus and with the legal issues resolved, step-by-step implementation of those measures would help strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. It also believed that the improved safeguards system should be fair, objective, rational, transparent and feasible. The new safeguards system would have to be implemented strictly within the framework of the Statute and of the relevant international agreements and on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and legitimate rights of the countries concerned. His delegation would like the Secretariat to pay more attention to the legal issues and take those measures which were within the existing legal framework and would result in cost-saving. As for the measures not within the existing legal framework, extensive consultations with Member States were necessary in order to reach consensus. His delegation had repeatedly emphasized that strengthening of the safeguards system should impede neither the development of nuclear science and technology and of the nuclear industry in Member States nor international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was of the view that, in the strengthening of safeguards, discrimination and the abuse of safeguards information and verification activities should be avoided. It was concerned about the financial impact of the new safeguards measures and hoped their application would not increase the burden on Member States or affect the allocation of resources to other Agency activities. Although, according to the Statute and other relevant international instruments, safeguards implementation was one of the Agency's major tasks, other major tasks of the Agency should not be forgotten.

4. Promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international co-operation in that regard was one of the main objectives set out in the Statute of the Agency, which was playing a very important role in promoting economic prosperity and social development in Member States - and especially those which were developing countries. In accordance with

"Agenda 21" adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the Agency, while continuing its existing technical co-operation activities, was gradually shifting the focus of its technical co-operation to technology transfer helpful in increasing food supplies and in promoting health, sustainable development and environmental protection. China fully supported that trend and was very satisfied with the Agency's achievements of recent years in the fields of pest control, nuclear medicine and environmental protection. It sincerely hoped that the Agency would be able to help least developed countries to resolve their basic problems, those of food supplies and health, and that the international community - especially the advanced countries - would provide them with assistance of a more practical kind.

5. His delegation was pleased that in recent years the Agency had taken some tentative reform measures in the field of technical assistance and co-operation. As the Model Projects proposed and being implemented by the Secretariat took fully into account the economic development priorities of the recipient countries, they had received strong support from the governments of those countries and promised substantial economic and social benefits. China attached great importance to the Agency's Model Projects and had provided financial support in that connection. The previous year, at the Conference's 38th session, he had announced the Chinese Government's decision to make an extra donation of US \$1 million in support of the Agency's technical assistance activities - or more specifically, in support of two Model Projects in Africa, one relating to tsetse fly eradication in Tanzania and the other to a national radiotherapy and nuclear medicine network in Ghana. His delegation had been pleased to learn that those two projects had made good progress in the past year, thanks to the efforts of the recipient countries, the Secretariat and the donor countries.

6. In recent years, on the initiative of many developing countries, the General Conference and the Board of Governors had adopted a series of resolutions on enhancing the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities. It was encouraging that the Secretariat, and the Department of Technical Co-operation in particular, had done a great deal to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology in developing countries. On the other hand, as the demand of developing countries for Agency technical assistance grew and the number of recipient Member States increased, it would be necessary

to think about how the Agency's technical assistance activities might be adapted to the new situation and further improved. His delegation believed that, given the new situation, the Secretariat should take practical steps to study the strategic policies and principles governing technical co-operation activities and carry out extensive consultations with Member States. It was for that reason that China, together with other developing countries, had proposed the establishment of a Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation (SAGTAC) devoted to the consideration of strategic issues such as the Agency's technical co-operation policy and ways of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. Experts from Member States would be able to offer ideas and make proposals to the Director General, and his delegation was pleased that the Director General had responded positively to the proposal and arranged for the Group to hold its first session before the end of the year. It was well known that the contributions to the TCF could barely meet the real needs of the developing countries in 1994; pledges of TCF contributions had fallen to 72.5% of the target. Without guaranteed funding, the technical co-operation of the Agency could only be a "mirage". China would therefore like all Member States to pledge and pay their contributions in full. The Chinese Government intended to make an extra donation of \$200,000 in 1996 in support of Agency Model Projects, and his country would continue to work with other countries in developing Agency activities in the field of technical assistance and co-operation.

7. The Chinese Government had consistently attached great importance to nuclear safety and the safe management of radioactive wastes. It was of the view that a high level of nuclear safety and the appropriate disposal of radioactive wastes would pave the way for the sustainable development of nuclear power production and the public acceptance of nuclear power. It greatly appreciated the measures taken by the Agency for the purpose of enhancing international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management and would continue to actively support the safety service activities of the Agency. In recent years, the international community had made great efforts to improve nuclear safety and the management of nuclear wastes. China, which had been one of the initiators of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and one of the first countries to sign it, would formally submit its instrument of ratification once the necessary national legislative procedures had been

completed. A major achievement of the Agency in the field of radiological protection had been the completion of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, which had been reviewed and approved by the Board of Governors. Following the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the international community had set about preparing a convention on the safe management of radioactive wastes. China would participate actively, for it considered the safe management of radioactive wastes to be a very important issue relating to the protection of the global environment and hence affecting future generations.

8. The Chinese Government attached great importance to the development of the power sector. At present, China had three nuclear power units in operation. The 300 MW(e) Qinshan NPP, which was of Chinese design and construction and had been connected to the grid in December 1991, was operating well. After its first refuelling and scheduled maintenance, in October 1994, it had been reconnected to the grid and was now operating at its rated power level. That confirmed the reliability of the components and fuel designed and produced in China. The two 900 MW(e) units of the Daya Bay NPP had been operating smoothly since their entry into commercial operation in 1994. The average availability factor of the two units had reached 88.7%. Since their first refuelling and overhaul, at the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995, the two units had been reconnected to the grid and had started generating power. With the rapid development of China's economy, the demand for energy was constantly increasing, which pointed to a substantial development of nuclear power production in China. Four further NPPs were under construction or to be constructed in China, among them one with two 600 MW(e) units at Qinshan within the framework of a major project started in 1994 and due to be completed at the beginning of the next century. In January 1995, the Governments of China and France had signed a memorandum of understanding on the joint construction of two 900 MW(e) units. It was expected that construction of the NPP would be completed at the beginning of the next century. At the end of 1992, a Sino-Russian agreement for the joint construction of two 100 MW(e) units in Liao Nin province had been concluded. The Chinese and Russian experts had completed a joint technical and economic evaluation of the project. Furthermore, in December 1994 Canada and China had signed a bilateral agreement on co-operation in the nuclear energy field and

discussed the export of two 700 MW(e) CANDU units to China and the provision of a favourable loan by the Canadian Government. It was envisaged that the plant would be close to the Qinshan NPP. Besides the afore-mentioned four plants, plans for the construction of plants were being worked on in the provinces of Shandong, Fujian, Jiangsu and Hainan. It was expected that in China there would be a great leap forward in the nuclear power production sector during the first years of the next century.

9. The year 1995 marked the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism. Pondering over the past, people everywhere yearned for peace, development and a better world. China, which hoped that the Agency would continue its efforts to achieve the objectives set out in the Statute, would - as in the past - make its due contribution to that end.

10. Mr. CHUNG (Republic of Korea), having congratulated Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on being approved for Agency membership, said that the current session of the Conference had a particular meaning in the sense that it was being held in a new international context brought about by the indefinite extension of the NPT. The extension of the NPT would have far-reaching implications for the Agency's future role and responsibilities. Now that its mandate under the NPT had been put on a permanent footing, the challenge facing the Agency was to provide credible assurances of States Parties' compliance with their non-proliferation commitments in an increasingly volatile international security environment. The Republic of Korea was convinced that global non-proliferation objectives could be attained only when all States engaging in nuclear activities had acceded to the NPT and all peaceful nuclear facilities and activities had been placed under full-scope Agency safeguards.

11. His Government deplored the resumption of nuclear testing by two of the nuclear-weapon States in violation of the spirit of mutual trust and confidence between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States which had enabled the NPT to be extended indefinitely. Those States which had active nuclear testing programmes should desist from testing and join the other nuclear-weapon States in observing test moratoria until a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) entered into force.

12. His Government supported the strengthening of Agency safeguards in general and Programme 93+2 in particular, and it was pleased that Part I of Programme 93+2 had been endorsed by the Board in June. The Secretariat and SAGSI were to be commended on the excellent job they had done, and his Government looked forward to the early endorsement of Part II by the Board. His country attached particular importance to measures such as environmental monitoring and no-notice inspection, designed to strengthen the Agency's capability for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. Also, a comprehensive real-time safeguards monitoring system was undoubtedly within the reach of present information technologies, and it was likely that costs could be reduced without safeguards effectiveness being impaired. For example, a trade-off between the intrusiveness and frequency of inspections would respond to concerns regarding budgetary constraints without detracting from the effectiveness of the strengthened safeguards system. Another idea worth serious consideration was the reallocation of resources on the basis of the proliferation risks associated with different nuclear facilities and activities. The co-ordination of safeguards activities between, on one hand, SSACs and, on the other, the Agency inspectorate was another way of saving costs, through the avoidance of duplication of effort to the extent possible. The Republic of Korea, which was establishing its own independent national safeguards system, would continue to consult with the Secretariat on how to improve the system's effectiveness.

13. The Republic of Korea had ten nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation and six units under construction. On the basis of the technical capabilities and experience acquired by it, his country had been engaged in an NPP design standardization project since 1984. The Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP) design which had been developed would best serve his country in meeting its increasing energy demands. Through sustained technical modifications aimed at enhancing safety, reliability and availability and capacity factors, the performance characteristics of the KSNP had been substantially upgraded, and there had been significant simplification of the operating procedures.

14. The Republic of Korea, which intended to expand its R&D activities in the field of small and medium power reactors for co-generation or desalination, planned to conduct such activities in co-ordination with the Agency. In the field of research reactors, a 30 MW

reactor called HANARO had gone into operation in April. It was expected that the production of radioisotopes for industrial and medical applications would be expanded to meet the increasing demand and that various R&D activities, such as the development of new materials, would be stepped up. A plasma heating and confinement device called HANBIT had been installed in June in the Republic of Korea, which had launched a nuclear fusion research project and hoped that its research team would soon be participating in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project.

15. Nuclear technology served people in many areas besides power generation - for example, nuclear medicine, agriculture and non-destructive testing. Under the umbrella of the Agency's technical co-operation programme, his country was willing to share its experience and technology with other Member States. In particular, it wished to share with interested Member States the technical expertise accumulated in the development of the KSNP. Also, it intended to develop, through the Agency, joint research programmes for utilizing the HANARO research reactor as part of its continuing effort to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Lastly, the Republic of Korea was participating actively in a seawater desalination demonstration project within the framework of the options identification programme approved by the General Conference at its 38th session, and his Government had made an extrabudgetary contribution already.

16. Nuclear safety was undoubtedly the most important factor in any activities connected with the utilization of nuclear energy. His country looked forward to the early completion of the process of ratifying the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and he himself would be depositing his Government's instrument of ratification during the current session of the General Conference. On 10 September, his Government had issued a nuclear safety policy statement assigning top priority to nuclear safety. The Korean nuclear community had designated 10 September as "Nuclear Safety Day", and the first annual celebration of that day had just taken place. Such concentration on nuclear safety in the Republic of Korea derived from the safety culture programme initiated by the Agency in 1993.

17. In that context, his country had welcomed the final adoption of the Safety Fundamentals document entitled "The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management", and

his delegation hoped that a convention on the safe management of radioactive wastes would be concluded at an early date.

18. His Government attached great importance to the question of amending Article VI of the Agency's Statute. The international nuclear community had undergone fundamental changes since the last amendment of Article VI, more than 20 years before. The Board needed to be restructured in such a way as to reflect in its composition the dynamic features of underlying international realities if it was to maintain its representativeness and if its decisions were to continue being relevant.

19. A question related to that of amending Article VI was "How can the transparency of the process of designating Board members be ensured?". His country believed that the representativeness of the Board would be enhanced if the designations were guided by objective criteria and conducted in full compliance with the relevant provisions of the Statute. In that regard, his delegation had noted the decision of the Board in June to establish an open-ended expert group to consider designation criteria and looked forward to actively participating in the work of the group.

20. The Agreed Framework signed by the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 21 October 1994 had represented a turning point in the international efforts to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue. His Government had welcomed the Agreed Framework as a step towards ultimate resolution of that issue and a contribution to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. It had welcomed in particular the DPRK's decision to remain a party to the NPT and implement in full its safeguards agreement with the Agency. Clearly, however, a bilateral agreement could not replace or detract from the safeguards agreement, which remained binding and in force. The Agreed Framework was a supplementary way of bringing the DPRK into full compliance with that agreement.

21. From the wider perspective of the Agency and the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, the question of the transparency of the DPRK's past nuclear activities and of the DPRK's non-compliance had still to be resolved. His Government was concerned about the continuing non-compliance of the DPRK with its safeguards agreement with the Agency and once again called on the DPRK to come promptly into full compliance with its safeguards

obligations and also to fulfil its obligations under the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In that connection, the Director General and his staff were to be commended for the fair and impartial way in which they were discharging their responsibilities under the safeguards agreement with the DPRK while carrying out the additional tasks assigned to them by the Security Council in connection with the implementation of the Agreed Framework. His country hoped very much that all outstanding issues relating to safeguards in the DPRK and to the monitoring of the "freeze" would be resolved soon, once and for all. It strongly endorsed the Secretariat's approach to preserving intact all information relevant to the verification of the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial declarations. The DPRK should demonstrate its good faith and co-operate fully with the Agency, so that the latter could fulfil its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement and the mandate given to it by the Security Council.

22. In conclusion, he said that the meeting entitled "Beyond the year 2000" which had been organized by the Secretariat should lead to a strengthening of the Agency's role in the face of the global challenges lying ahead. The Republic of Korea would participate with enthusiasm and compassion in future efforts to promote the application of nuclear energy for economic development and the improvement of living standards.

23. Ms. LAJOUS VARGAS (Mexico), thanking delegations for the confidence which they had placed in her in electing her to the chairmanship of the Committee of the Whole, said she would spare no effort to ensure that the Committee reached consensus on all the matters referred to it.

24. Mexico was pleased that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia had been approved for Agency membership. The steady growth in the number of Agency Member States underlined the importance of the role which the Agency was playing in the modern world in enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity while helping to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

25. The very positive results of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, held in May 1995, would have a direct impact on the Agency's activities. As regards non-proliferation, 1995 had been a remarkable year: the NPT had been extended indefinitely;

a commitment had been made to conclude a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996; the intention to draw up a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices had been confirmed; and the ultimate goals of complete nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons had been reaffirmed - all developments which helped to strengthen the framework essential for enhanced international co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy at the bilateral and the international level. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had strengthened the foundations for a continuing increase in the role of nuclear energy and radioisotopes in the areas of health and food, in industry and in sustainable development.

26. The States party to the NPT and the Agency should commit themselves to achieving the noble objectives which had been set. As regards non-proliferation, the Agency's Member States had embarked on an unprecedented exercise aimed at strengthening the safeguards system through Programme 93+2. The Board, of which Mexico was a member, had requested the Secretariat to implement those measures for which there already existed legal authority in INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements. Programme 93+2 foresaw certain innovations which should be faced with an open mind in order that the Agency might respond to new challenges and adapt to the new needs of the international community. All would benefit from Programme 93+2, which would ensure greater transparency and credibility as regards the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Mexico was currently analysing the second set of measures proposed under Programme 93+2. As those measures would involve commitments which went beyond the present legal framework, her country would endeavour to define an appropriate framework for the new measures as a whole, which should accord with the principles of universality and non-discrimination.

27. Referring to Part 2 of document GOV/2807, which dealt with the proposed Programme 93+2 measures for which the Agency would require additional authority, she said that Mexico was prepared to participate in field trials. Those could take place as soon as the necessary internal arrangements had been made and the National Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Commission (CNSNS) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had negotiated the necessary agreement with the Agency.

28. Approval of those measures and participation in field trials presupposed considerable effort and great flexibility on the part of States. The effort would be fully justified if it resulted in assurance that there would be no horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; but it would be wasted unless everything was done to put an end to vertical proliferation, accelerate disarmament and guarantee for future generations a world free of nuclear weapons. That was why Mexico was very concerned about the resumption of nuclear testing by certain Powers and deplored the test explosions which had taken place recently; also, her country was worried about the harmful effects of the tests on health, radiological safety and the environment, and on the negotiations for a future CTBT. Mexico had made its position in the matter known: pending the entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should, on the basis of unilateral moratoria, abstain from carrying out any nuclear tests. The negotiation of a CTBT remained an absolute priority in the field of nuclear disarmament, as the treaty in question should be adopted at the beginning of the 51st session of the United Nations General Assembly.

29. Mexico was very pleased with the results achieved in technical co-operation and nuclear technology transfer. Special mention should be made of the implementation of the recommendations of the third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar, the closer interaction with Member States during project implementation, the particular attention being paid to projects connected with nuclear safety, the marked improvement in project implementation rates and the improved co-ordination among the Agency's technical Divisions. Her delegation would continue to support Model Projects, which it regarded as the main instrument for the establishment of a "partnership in development" between Member States and the Agency. She had been pleased to note that such projects were becoming more and more numerous and that one was being implemented in Mexico.

30. Mexico had supported China's proposal regarding the creation of SAGTAC, whose first session would take place in November 1995. Given the importance which the work of SAGTAC would have, its recommendations should be communicated to all Member States and be implemented in due course.

31. Only sincere efforts on the part of all Member States would lead to a strengthening of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. Everything should be done to stop the

decline in contributions to the TCF. If it lacked the financial resources, the Agency would be unable to execute technically sound projects capable of meeting the basic needs and promoting the sustainable development of many countries. That was why, despite the financial difficulties which it was experiencing, Mexico was endeavouring to pay its share of the TCF target. It would pay its TCF contribution for the current years in a few days' time.

32. In the same spirit, Mexico had endorsed the new safeguards financing formula even though it would lead to an appreciable increase in Mexico's contributions. Mexico was one of the "shielded" countries whose base rates of assessment were increasing most in nominal terms, but it considered that, as in the case of technical co-operation activities, all Member States should fulfil their financial obligations in respect of safeguards, which were essential for international security and non-proliferation. In that connection, she said that Mexico had been calling for a Regular Budget and a TCF which would promote a financial equilibrium among the principal activities of the Agency.

33. In nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management, considerable progress had been made during the past year. Particular mention should be made of the drafting and approval of documents on "The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management" and "Establishing a National System for Radioactive Waste Management". In addition, assistance packages for improving different components of radiation protection and radioactive waste management infrastructures had been prepared, as had national radiation protection and radioactive waste management infrastructure profiles, and a system of peer review, consultation and assessment had been established. Mexico, which attached great importance to safety, had noted with interest the decision to create a Department of Nuclear Safety with effect from January 1996; the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities in that area should increase as a result.

34. The use of nuclear technology, be it in electric power production or in other areas, continued to be important for Mexico's economic life. The second unit of the Laguna Verde NPP had been connected to the grid in November 1994 and had gone into commercial operation on 7 April 1995. Mexico's nuclear electricity production capacity was now therefore 1308 MW(e) - the highest in Latin America. The Laguna Verde units had been

operating very satisfactorily - the first one for five years and the second one for five months. The previous year, 3.8% of the electricity produced within the country had been of nuclear origin, and that percentage would be decidedly higher in 1995. As regards fuel cycle activities, the National Nuclear Research Institute (ININ) had recently produced its first fuel assembly. That assembly, together with three still undergoing fabrication, would be used in refuelling the second Laguna Verde unit, probably in April 1996.

35. Mexico attached great importance to the management of radioactive wastes. The Federal Electricity Commission was continuing with preparations for the construction of a final storage facility for low- and medium-level wastes at Laguna Verde. For its part, ININ had substantially improved its infrastructure for the collection, treatment and storage of low- and medium-level wastes from the utilization of radioisotopes, which in Mexico was very widespread in medicine, industry and research.

36. As regards applications of nuclear energy other than in electricity generation, Mexico was a leader in applying the sterile-insect technique. ININ's irradiation facility, with a design capacity of 1 million Ci, had been operating without interruption for over ten years. In the light of the good results obtained, several private companies had expressed interest in constructing further irradiation facilities in Mexico in collaboration with ININ.

37. Technical co-operation projects relating to reactor technology, human health, agriculture, animal husbandry, hydrology, geothermal energy, radioisotope production and radioactive waste management were under way in Mexico.

38. Her country attached great importance to safety in all activities connected with nuclear energy and its applications. That was why it had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety in November 1994 and would soon take steps to ratify it. Mexico would like the scope of the Convention to be extended to include all reactor types. Also, it looked forward to an early conclusion of the discussions on implementation of the Convention, and especially on the arrangements for meetings of the Contracting Parties, the financial rules, the contents of country reports and the procedures for examining those reports. Mexico had participated actively in the meeting held for that purpose during the first half of 1995 and would do so in future meetings.

39. Similarly, Mexico unreservedly supported the preparatory work for a convention on the safe management of radioactive wastes, in which Mexican experts were taking an active part. The entry into force of that convention would help to strengthen the confidence of governments and of the general public. The general thrust and the contents of the convention should be such as to encourage countries to accede to and implement it; it should refer to the general safety principles on which there was an international consensus, apply to all types of radioactive waste regardless of origin and ensure the protection of human health and the environment.

40. It was regrettable that the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had not yet finished revising the text of the Vienna Convention, of which Mexico was a signatory. A number of basic questions had still to be resolved - for example, those relating to geographic scope, actual figures for compensation limits, the definition of "nuclear damage", and the final clauses. Moreover, the Standing Committee had still not agreed on a single instrument relating to supplementary funding. Consequently, in her delegation's view it would be a good idea if the Standing Committee held two further sessions before the envisaged diplomatic conference in order to resolve the outstanding problems. She hoped that the countries participating in the work of the Standing Committee would demonstrate the political will necessary if it was to complete its work.

41. Mexico was convinced that the Agency was capable of assuming the vital new functions which the international community wished to entrust to it in the new era of détente and co-operation among States. Much had been achieved under the skilful guidance of the Director General; what was now needed was stronger support from Member States in order that the Agency might take up the challenge awaiting it. Mexico had confidence in the Agency and would unreservedly support the strengthening of the Agency and its adaptation to new realities.

42. Mr. MIKHAILOV (Russian Federation), having congratulated Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on being approved for membership of the Agency, said that the year 1995 was rich in anniversaries. Fifty years had passed since the end of the Second World War, during which nuclear weapons had been used for the first and - it was to be hoped - last time. Also, the United Nations Organization, with which all peoples linked their

desire for a stable world free of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war, was celebrating its 50th anniversary.

43. The General Conference's 39th session was following on the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The Russian Federation was very pleased that the States which had taken part in that important international gathering had reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT and taken by consensus the historic decision to extend the NPT for an indefinite period. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had underlined the importance of the role played by the Agency in ensuring the NPT's effectiveness and of the efforts it was making to strengthen its safeguards system, which was a unique instrument for verifying compliance with the provisions of the NPT. The Conference had devoted a great deal of attention to the most urgent current questions connected with ending the nuclear arms race. One could now say that the race had been stopped. The substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States constituted a remarkable achievement of the 20th century which benefited all peoples.

44. Another aspect of nuclear disarmament consisted in stopping the qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons. Russia persistently advocated that a non-discriminatory and effectively and internationally verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) be drawn up as soon as possible - and not later than 1996. It should be also underlined that since October 1990 Russia had been observing a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

45. Russia was still committed to the preparation of a multilateral agreement on the verifiable prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In his country's view, it would be important to draw upon the Agency's vast expertise for verification of its implementation as well as for verification of the implementation of a CTBT. In that connection, he said that 500 t of weapons-grade uranium had, in accordance with commitments entered into by Russia, not only been submitted to Agency safeguards but also used as fuel in nuclear power plants. Also, Russia had reduced the use of plutonium for weapons purposes and, together with several other countries, was conducting a range of activities directed towards the use of weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in nuclear power plants (NPPs) as from the beginning of the next century.

46. The Russian Federation greatly appreciated the activities carried out by the Agency during the past year. Basically, the Agency had achieved its goals relating to the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. His country would continue to provide the Agency, an important and authoritative international organization, with the assistance and support necessary in all its areas of activity.

47. The Russian Federation was convinced that the role of nuclear power in meeting the energy needs of mankind would inevitably grow, particularly in countries which suffered from serious energy shortages. In that connection, he said that it was wrong to apply double standards. The problems which existed could not be resolved through decisions imposed by force - only through recourse to international authorities. The implementation of programmes for the development and promotion of novel nuclear technologies and new-generation reactors offering better prospects from the point of view of safety, ecology, economics and non-proliferation should be among the most important objectives of the Agency's activities.

48. The Russian Federation believed that it was reasonable to begin formulating a comprehensive programme for the development of nuclear power as a basis for the solution of energy, environmental and economic problems. It was necessary to strengthen the assistance which the advanced countries were rendering in that field to countries with rapidly growing economies and populations. The Agency, which had played an outstanding role during the early stages in the development of nuclear power, could make a further significant contribution in helping to meet the most acute and urgent challenges of the present and future.

49. Recalling that in 1994 his country had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, an important international legal instrument, he said that Russia was conscious of the need to comply with all of the provisions and principles set out in the Convention.

50. The Russian Federation also supported the Agency's activities directed towards strengthening the safety of existing NPPs in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the CIS.

51. The Russian Federation had its own programme for the modernization of existing NPP units, and much had already been done in implementing it. However, economic difficulties were slowing down its implementation. In that regard, he noted that help was being provided by Agency Member States on a bilateral and a multilateral basis and by the European Union.

52. In his country's view, the Agency's extrabudgetary programme on the safety of NPPs with WWER and RBMK units, which had demonstrated its effectiveness in practice, could continue to play an important role, above all in the appraisal of reactor modernization projects and in the co-ordination of technical support. The implementation of that useful and effective Agency programme should continue.

53. President Yeltsin's initiative regarding the holding of a summit meeting early in 1996 had evoked a wide international response. The meeting would be devoted to issues of nuclear safety in their global perspective, and the aim would be to review the vital problems in that area and determine ways of arriving at short- and long-term solutions. The problems related to - inter alia - the safe development of nuclear power throughout the world, the suppression of illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, the safe disposal of radioactive wastes, international safeguards and the disposal of nuclear materials released in the destruction of nuclear weapons. In his delegation's view, the Agency could make a substantial contribution to the preparations for such a meeting thanks to its extensive experience in the areas which he had mentioned.

54. The programme relating to the safe management of radioactive wastes was an important aspect of the Agency's activities. The waste management seminar organized in May by the Agency in response to an initiative of the Nordic countries had been a good example of effective co-operation under the Agency's auspices. His country hoped that implementation of the recommendations made at the seminar would help to raise the overall level of safety. In that connection he said that in 1994 and 1995 Russian nuclear facilities had been visited by over a thousand foreign experts, mainly from Nordic countries and Western Europe. It was important to be well informed about Russia's nuclear industry and the safety of Russia's nuclear facilities, but one should not necessarily give credence to all the criticisms directed against them. Russia's nuclear industry was open for inspection and

visits by experts and specialists in order that they might form a clear, objective impression of its present state.

55. The Russian Federation, which attached great importance to the Agency's activities in the field of technical assistance to developing countries, was in favour of the TCF target for 1996 being set at \$64.5 million. At the same time, his delegation assumed that the principle that contributions to the TCF were voluntary and might be made in national currencies would be maintained. Despite the economic difficulties which it was encountering at present, the Government of the Russian Federation had managed to arrange for 5.7 billion roubles (equivalent to about \$1.5 million) to be paid into the TCF for 1995. The money would be used in supplying Russian equipment, instruments and installations to developing Member States and in the organization of training courses and other activities in Russia.

56. His country had always attached high priority to one of the major statutory aspects of the Agency's work - namely, verification and control of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the continuous improvement of the Agency's safeguards. Together with other States, the Russian Federation would step up efforts to facilitate the implementation of recommendations for further increasing the effectiveness of Agency safeguards.

57. The Russian Federation was taking an active part in many safeguards-related scientific and technical programmes and successfully implementing its national safeguards support programme. In the year under review, within the framework of that programme work had been done on 15 tasks, five of which had already been successfully completed. For example, extensive research was being done in order to determine whether environmental monitoring could be used for the detection of signatures of undeclared nuclear activities. The Russian Federation fully supported that aspect of the Agency's activities and was prepared to make its scientific potential available for the development of appropriate verification procedures and methods.

58. Fifty years before, right after the end of the Second World War when his country had been in a very difficult situation, intensive efforts on the part of its engineers, scientists and statesmen had resulted in the creation of a new industry which had placed atomic energy in the service of the population. Since that time, the nuclear sector had grown into a major

industry with a highly developed scientific research base which was playing a leading role in maintaining the country's defence capability, in nuclear power generation and in the building of nuclear-powered ships. Russian nuclear-powered ships were plying the world's seas, and Conference participants should not miss any opportunity to visit the arctic regions on board a Russian ice-breaker.

59. As a major nuclear Power, his country had always pursued a policy in support of a comprehensive nuclear arms ban while advocating the widespread international exchange of experience and results in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. In 1994, it had established, near Moscow, a joint research centre as an open window onto the world of science, and Russia was now co-operating with over 30 countries worldwide through more than a hundred treaties and other agreements.

60. The most important challenge facing Russia's nuclear sector at present was the elimination of nuclear weapons. Through its efforts in that connection, the Russian Federation was, despite its financial and economic difficulties, making a tremendous contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had undertaken to carry out the dismantling within its own territory of the nuclear arsenals of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and for that purpose it was spending some \$500 million a year. The dismantling operations involved were absolutely colossal - and much more extensive than those under way in other countries. For example, during the next three years some 90% of Russia's nuclear arsenal would have to be dismantled.

61. Intensification of the nuclear weapons elimination process had inevitably required the switching of a substantial part of the scientific and technological capacity in the defence sector to peaceful activities. The establishment of the International Scientific and Technological Center in Moscow - through the efforts of Russia, the United States, Japan and the European Community - had been important for providing defence establishments with work and converting them and for the retraining of their specialist personnel.

62. In Russia, great importance was also attached to research concerning power generation in the future. In that connection, mention should be made of a study carried out within the framework of the US-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological

Co-operation (the "Chernomyrdin Commission"). The results of that joint study had confirmed that nuclear power would continue to account for a substantial part of the electricity produced in Russia. Nuclear power development programmes had been drawn up for the next 25 years, the intention being that nuclear electricity production should double during that period. Also, the joint study had shown that investment in enhancing the safety of existing NPPs was competitive with investment in alternative energy sources. Whether one liked it or not, nuclear power would be needed also by the next generation. In fact, he believed that nuclear power would be the main energy source in the 21st century and that thermonuclear fusion, once operational, would play the same role in the 22nd century. Nuclear reactors were indispensable; they were not only a source of energy, but also a means of developing new materials for use in - for example - medicine and various technological areas, including thermonuclear fusion.

63. In conclusion, the Russian delegation would like to join other delegations which had already voiced their approval of the Agency's annual report for 1994 and to express its gratitude to the Secretariat staff and the Director General. It very much hoped to contribute to the success of the General Conference's current session and would co-operate in a constructive and business-like manner with all others in seeking ways to meet the challenges facing the Agency.

64. Ms. YZER (Germany), having associated herself fully with the statement made by the delegate of Spain on behalf of the European Union, said that since the previous session of the General Conference new momentum had been imparted to nuclear non-proliferation by the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York. Her Government welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT, which was the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation system. That decision would provide a stable basis for further Agency work relating to the implementation of articles III and IV of the NPT. The consensus built during the Conference and the principles enshrined in the documents adopted by the participating States were a clear demonstration of the broad agreement in the international community regarding non-proliferation norms.

65. Her Government attached the utmost importance to the conclusion of a sufficiently verifiable and universally applicable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the

autumn of 1996 at the latest. It regarded the proposal of France and the United States that the CTBT be based on a zero threshold as a decisive step towards that goal and hoped that the proposal would be supported by all nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices had been a long-standing goal. Now that the mandate for negotiations in Geneva had been agreed upon, the Ad Hoc Committee should start its work without further delay.

66. With regard to the application of Agency safeguards in the DPRK, her country deplored the fact that the DPRK was still not in compliance with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the Agency. However, the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the DPRK was an important step towards a political solution. If implemented in full, it would contribute to regional détente and global security and should lead to a satisfactory solution of the DPRK nuclear problem. Her Government appreciated the Agency's willingness to undertake additional, non-obligatory verification activities in the DPRK as provided for in the Agreed Framework. The overall objective should, however, remain that of ensuring the DPRK's return to full compliance with its legal obligations as soon as possible.

67. As regards the nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the Agency could look back on positive results. Her Government was pleased that the monitoring and verification activities being conducted by the Agency in accordance with Security Council resolution 687(1991) had led to the discovery of further aspects and to a better knowledge of the programme. Also, it welcomed the further steps taken by the Agency's Action Team in implementing the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in accordance with Security Council resolution 715(1991), in close co-operation with the UN Special Commission and with support from UN Member States. The establishment and operational startup of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre represented a major development in that respect. The new export and import control mechanism would be an additional important element of the long-term monitoring regime in Iraq. Recent developments had created a new situation, however, and it would be necessary to thoroughly examine the new documentation and information regarding Iraq's nuclear weapons programme; that might lead to a reassessment of the extent

of Iraqi non-compliance, especially with the NPT and Iraq's safeguards agreement with the Agency.

68. Her Government welcomed the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation system in the States of the former Soviet Union, and particularly the accession of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. All the newly independent States were now parties to the NPT and subscribed to the objectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The very positive role played by those countries during the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York had been highly commendable. The indefinite extension of the NPT had been achieved with their active and constructive support.

69. Her Government would like to emphasize once again that, as stated by the NPT and Review and Extension Conference, universal adherence to the NPT was an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the NPT should accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those which were operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Conference had reaffirmed the conviction that full-scope Agency safeguards provided assurance that States were complying with their undertakings. So far, the safeguards regime of the Agency had not been designed to detect undeclared nuclear activities or an undeclared nuclear programme like the one developed in Iraq. In that connection, the NPT Review and Extension Conference had encouraged continued work by the Agency in developing a range of measures for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system in order to increase the Agency's capability for detecting undeclared nuclear activities.

70. At present, the principal way for the Agency to detect undeclared activities was to exercise its authority to conduct special inspections if it considered that the information made available by the State concerned was inadequate and therefore did not enable the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities. That authority included a right of access to information or locations over and above that specified in safeguards agreements. The Agency had the right - and even the duty - to conduct such inspections whenever it considered the information made available to be inadequate. Decisions regarding complementary authority would have to be based on a thorough examination of all the aspects involved, providing a convincing rationale for the proposed measures, particularly where access to privately owned information or property would be involved. It would be important that the complementary authority derive

from legal instruments equivalent to the existing ones and that any decisions in that regard be adopted by a consensus of all interested parties.

71. Although the problem of undeclared nuclear activities related specifically to States having full-scope safeguards agreements, it was essential - as had been shown by the events in Iraq - to build international confidence that no countries anywhere were engaging in clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. Any weakening of such confidence would be detrimental to the non-proliferation regime and to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Her Government therefore strongly supported the intention of the Agency, endorsed by Main Committee II of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, to consider how and to what extent measures proposed for strengthening comprehensive safeguards agreements might also be applied to item-specific agreements and to voluntary-offer agreements with nuclear-weapon States.

72. Her Government greatly appreciated the measures taken or planned by the Agency to address the problem of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Those measures included the establishment of a database and the provision to Member States of advice on standards for physical protection and for material accountancy and control. Her Government continued to give high priority to the problem and would continue to strongly support the efforts of the international community to counter the serious dangers involved in illicit trafficking.

73. Her Government continued to attach very great importance to ensuring the highest possible standards in nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, and it therefore welcomed the wide acceptance which the Convention on Nuclear Safety had found in the international community - demonstrated by the large number of countries which had signed or even already ratified the Convention. The German Parliament was expected to ratify the Convention early in 1996. Her Government welcomed the activities initiated by the Agency with a view to facilitating early implementation of the Convention, whose success would depend largely on the establishment of an effective peer review mechanism based on full and comprehensive country reports to be prepared by governments. Germany would continue its active support of the process.

74. Since the General Conference's previous session, Germany had continued and enhanced its nuclear safety assistance to newly independent States of the former Soviet Union and to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. That assistance had started five years before on a bilateral basis with studies and safety assessments, the establishment and strengthening of regulatory authorities and the training of plant operating personnel. It included support for the improvement of nuclear power plant (NPP) hardware and had been integrated into the multilateral programme of action adopted by the G-7 countries in 1992. Germany was also participating in the multilateral activities provided for in an action plan for Ukraine's energy sector which had been submitted to the Ukrainian Government by the G-7 at the Naples Summit in 1994 and reaffirmed at the Halifax Summit in the current year. Her Government welcomed the decision of President Kuchma to close down the Chernobyl NPP by the year 2000. It was prepared to continue working together with its Western and Eastern partners, on the basis of the action plan, in mobilizing international support for Ukraine's energy sector. The action plan included proposals concerning the construction of a safe enclosure for the existing shelter of Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP and the establishment of an international nuclear research centre near Chernobyl. Her Government was looking forward to further progress in improving the safety of reactors of Soviet design and on related issues during the nuclear safety conference which was to be held in Moscow early in 1996 pursuant to the suggestion made by President Yeltsin at the Halifax Summit.

75. Her Government welcomed the activities which had been initiated under the Agency's auspices with a view to preparing a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. It would actively support all efforts which might contribute to the smooth and speedy progress of work on that very important project.

76. On the other hand, the negotiations on liability for nuclear damage had still not reached a successful conclusion. Despite the untiring and intensive efforts of many interested parties, there was still no agreement, especially on the principles and rules for supplementary funding in the event of nuclear damage. It remained essential to ensure that any new liability regime gained broad international acceptance and the support of the main nuclear power producing countries. Efforts to reach consensus on the issue of supplementary funding would

therefore have to continue, but there must be no delay in finalizing the work on revising the Vienna Convention.

77. The Agency was to be commended for the way in which it had coped with the problems caused by considerable shortfalls and late payments of contributions to the Regular Budget. Her Government appreciated the efforts made to ensure that the Agency's activities were not jeopardized by the financial constraints. Those efforts would have to continue in the coming years. Given the severe budgetary problems faced by many Member States, it would not be realistic to expect that the policy of zero real growth could be abandoned in the near future. Her Government therefore appealed once again to all Member States to pay their contributions in full and on time in order to enable the Agency to return to normal budget and programme procedures and to meet the challenges which lay ahead.

78. Mr. KASENALLY (Mauritius) said that his country, like most small States, could afford to make only limited use of nuclear energy and therefore did not have much experience in that field. However, given the beneficial economic and environmental effects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, his country could not remain insensitive to the Agency's activities.

79. The end of the Cold War had brought with it more positive attitudes and new ways of peaceful conflict resolution in international relations, but in some parts of the world the monster of war was still rearing its ugly head. The ideological vacuum left by the end of the Cold War had been filled by a multitude of pseudo-ideologies which were more dangerous than previous ones and called for urgent countermeasures. More than ever, the Agency had a challenging role to play in controlling the potential use of nuclear weapons, which the phenomenon he had just mentioned might encourage.

80. Taking stock of the progress achieved in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, the region to which Mauritius belonged, he said that the emergence of a democratic South Africa augured well for the achievement of that goal. Success in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with South Africa would facilitate the establishment of such a zone. He hoped that the General Conference would spend some time

on that crucial issue. In addition, South Africa might now become the springboard for the more effective utilization of nuclear techniques on the African continent.

81. For a number of years, his country had been following with satisfaction the Agency's efforts to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection. Since the Chernobyl accident, the world had become very conscious of that important aspect of the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. His country had benefited considerably from the assistance of the Agency in establishing a legal framework for effective radiological protection and acquiring the necessary equipment. In that area, the Government of Mauritius was sparing no effort to attain the standard expected by the Agency.

82. He was pleased to note that once again the question of radioactive waste management was the subject of an agenda item. It was of paramount importance that ecological balances not be endangered by the use of unsafe methods of waste management. The question of how to deal with the substantial volumes of high-level wastes emanating from reactors was one of great current concern. Even in developed countries, public opinion was already opposed to the storage of such wastes. Leaks, accidents and near-accidents had prompted people to decide that they wanted no more radioactive wastes in their vicinity, and governments were unclear about what to do with such wastes.

83. Site selection was only part of the problem. Transport, both inter- and intra-continental, was another big stumbling-block. The campaigns of pressure groups against waste disposal were giving food for thought. The trickiest problem was that of public confidence, and the Agency should therefore intensify the dissemination of its safety standards and push harder for their application. In addition, the general public should be kept informed about the Agency's monitoring mechanisms so that trust might develop.

84. During its current session, the General Conference would continue to discuss two very important issues: the economical production of potable water and the extensive use of isotope hydrology for water resources management. The management of water resources would probably be the single factor with the greatest impact on the quality of life during the rest of the century. The complexity of economic activities would exacerbate shortages of water, a substantial proportion of which would be needed for domestic purposes. It was

therefore important to find ways of helping countries in dire need of that precious commodity.

85. As he had said in his capacity as Minister of External Affairs at the Non-Aligned Movement's ministerial co-ordinating bureau meeting held in New York in 1993, his country was deeply committed to the achievement of the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Mauritius welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT. As the NPT was the world's chief bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, its indefinite extension by consensus and its near-universality augured well for the cause of non-proliferation. The world community, with the assistance of the Agency, should leave no stone unturned in trying to persuade States not party to the NPT, in particular those capable of developing nuclear weapons, to accede to it.

86. Mauritius, like most Member States, deplored the decision of certain nuclear-weapon States to resume nuclear testing, particularly since at the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference the nuclear-weapon States had given various assurances and entered into various commitments regarding the exercise of restraint pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). France and China had stated that they would abide by the CTBT, but his country feared that a continuation of nuclear testing would jeopardize its conclusion. Mauritius hoped that trust could continue to be placed in the wisdom and judgement of the nuclear-weapon States in preserving peace, but in view of the French and Chinese decisions it felt compelled to ask what would happen if the five permanent members of the Security Council changed their minds and reneged on their commitments.

87. Mauritius appreciated the efforts being made by the Agency to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. Also, it welcomed the decision of the United States Government to accept nuclear wastes from States of the former Soviet Union; that augured well for the cause of non-proliferation, and he hoped that other States with nuclear programmes would follow suit.

88. Energy demand was growing fast in some parts of the world, and it was expected to grow by over 90% during the next 25 years' in certain regions. Nuclear power would

inevitably be one of the options considered by the countries in question. Rightly or wrongly, however, the general public believed that nuclear power was unsafe and expensive. The economics of nuclear electricity production varied from country to country. Mauritius, by virtue of its size, had a modest power demand. Also, nuclear power called for huge capital investments, in which some lending institutions were always unwilling to participate as they believed that it was both uncompetitive and potentially unsafe. For Mauritius, therefore, nuclear power did not appear to be an option. The situation might be different for other energy-hungry economies, however, for which nuclear power might in addition be a protection against future oil shocks.

89. Mauritius had always been pragmatic in development matters, and its requests for Agency technical assistance had always been in line with its national objectives. In that regard, it was focusing on three areas: radiation protection, which had initially been limited to the health sector but was now being extended to other sectors where nuclear techniques were applied; nuclear medicine, which was to be applied more widely for the benefit of the country's population; and agriculture (still the backbone of the country's economy), where extensive use of the sterile-insect technique was envisaged and efforts were being made to improve cattle productivity. Also, Mauritius was participating in AFRA activities and in the Agency's regional projects for Africa.

90. The future of the world might reside in the peaceful application of nuclear techniques. Every effort should therefore be made to strengthen the Agency, so that it might facilitate the further dissemination of such techniques, especially to the developing countries.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION

91. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended that the agenda for the current session consist of all the items on the provisional agenda set forth in document GC(39)/1.

92. As regards the allocation of items for initial discussion, the General Committee recommended that - with the exception of item 28 ("Appointment of the External Auditor") -

all the items listed in document GC(39)/1 be taken up for discussion as indicated in that document. With regard to item 28, given the nature of the subject-matter and the documentation on it the Committee recommended that it be allocated for initial discussion to the Committee of the Whole. As regards the order of items, the Committee recommended the order appearing in document GC(39)/1, with item 28 ("Appointment of the External Auditor") moved up to the group of items proposed for initial discussion in the Committee of the Whole and placed immediately after item 22 ("Amendment of Article VI of the Statute") and with the consequential renumbering of some items. It was understood that, depending on progress of the Conference's work, changes in the order might be necessary; they would be made after due notice had been given.

93. All of the General Committee's recommendations regarding the agenda for the current session were accepted.

94. The agenda was adopted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

95. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended that the Conference set Friday, 22 September, as the closing date of the current session and Monday, 16 September 1996 as the opening date of the 40th regular session, which would be held in Vienna.

96. The recommendations of the General Committee were accepted.

REQUESTS FOR THE RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS

97. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had had before it requests from Iraq and Belarus that the last sentence in Article XIX.A of the Statute be invoked in order that they might be permitted to vote during the current session of the General Conference. The Committee recommended that the Conference permit Belarus to vote but not Iraq.

98. The Committee's recommendation was accepted.

The meeting rose at 5.57 p.m.