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GC(39)/OR.1
9 October 1995
GENERAL Distr.
Original: ENGLISH

International Atomic Energy Agency
GENERAL CONFERENCE

THIRTY-NINTH (1995) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Monday, 18 September 1995, at 10.15 a.m.

Temporary President: Mr. BAER (Switzerland)
President: Mr. KASEMSARN (Thailand)

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[*] GC(39)/1.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(39)/INF/21/Rev.2.

95-04267 (XIV)

Abbreviations used in this record

Agreed Framework	Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
DECADES	Databases and Methodologies for Comparative Assessment of Different Energy Sources for Electricity Generation
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G-7	Group of Seven
G-24	Group of Twenty-Four
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
INES	International Nuclear Event Scale
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PHARE	Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic reconstruction
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
VIC	Vienna International Centre
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1961)
WHO	World Health Organization
World Bank (IBRD)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor (Soviet Union)

OPENING OF THE SESSION

1. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT declared the thirty-ninth regular session of the General Conference open.

2. In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, he invited the delegates to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

3. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT said that since the previous session of the Agency's General Conference, the most prominent event in nuclear non-proliferation had been the successful indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had emphasized the Agency's critical role in the application of the safeguards written into the NPT and recognized that it was important that the Agency be given the means to accomplish its task. It had called for implementation of the measures decided on by the Board of Governors to strengthen safeguards and to ensure better detection of undeclared activities. In other words, it had accorded the Agency its rightful place at the hub of nuclear non-proliferation activities.

4. Where other aspects of the Agency's work were concerned, the NPT Review and Extension Conference had specifically requested that it continue to search for reliable and predictable means to finance technical co-operation. Technical co-operation was much more than a matter of finances and, in the perspective of long-term planning, its objectives needed urgent re-examination in the light of results so far achieved. When those objectives had been clarified, finances could be discussed. For some 20 years, the gap between amounts pledged and targets to be attained had been increasing steadily. The Board of Governors should tackle that problem without delay, since the very survival of technical co-operation was at stake.

5. In New York, more than 170 non-nuclear-weapon States, almost 120 of which were Member States of the Agency, had decided that it was in their interest to renounce permanently the acquisition of nuclear weapons, in the belief that nuclear disarmament was bound to come. They had adopted a text calling upon nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the utmost restraint in that regard, in expectation of the signing of a comprehensive test ban

treaty in 1996. In so doing, they had asked nuclear-weapon States for a small encouraging sign in exchange for the major commitment that they had accepted. It was therefore regrettable that two States had rejected that request and the resumption of nuclear-weapons tests was deeply disappointing.

6. Nevertheless, the NPT Review and Extension Conference might be a turning point in the history of non-proliferation. The extension of the NPT was not an isolated occurrence, but was part of a trend towards renewed interest in a comprehensive test ban treaty and in other initiatives designed to achieve true and durable nuclear disarmament. While some still clung to ideas and attitudes that might have been acceptable some 30 years ago, but which were now rejected by the majority, others were more in touch with reality and were willing to accept change. It was they who would bring about the revolution which would open up a long period of stability. Whether the Agency wished it or not, it could not escape the effects of that revolution: although many of the items on the General Conference's agenda were the same as in the past, fundamental changes in attitude were now taking place. The climate of the discussion was different and there was a growing willingness to make progress, and a feeling that rapid improvements might, after all, be possible.

7. In conclusion, he urged participants to abandon old modes of thinking, to adopt a new approach to non-proliferation, and to be the ones to create the future rather than have others create it for them.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

8. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT invited nominations for the office of President of the Conference.

9. Mr. WALKER (Australia), speaking on behalf of the South East Asia and Pacific Group, proposed Mr. Kasemsarn (Thailand), whose extensive experience in international organizations made him eminently suitable for the office of President.

10. Mr. Kasemsarn (Thailand) was elected President by acclamation.

11. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT, on his own behalf and on behalf of all the delegates, congratulated Mr. Kasemsarn on his election and wished him every success.

Mr. Kasemsarn (Thailand) took the Chair.

12. The PRESIDENT said he appreciated the honour bestowed upon himself and his country by his election as President of the thirty-ninth session of the General Conference. He would make every effort to ensure the success of the Conference and was confident that he could count on the co-operation of all delegations to that end. He also thanked Mr. Baer, the outgoing President, for his able leadership of the previous session of the General Conference.

13. The convening of the thirty-ninth regular session of the General Conference coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of the first atomic bomb. The devastating effect of that bomb should have convinced mankind never again to allow history to repeat itself. Twenty-five years later, the NPT had come into existence, and in May 1995, the Treaty had been extended indefinitely with a view to preventing nuclear proliferation, enhancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament. The world had taken note of the commitment made by nuclear-weapon States to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and to conclude a universal and internationally effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty no later than 1996.

14. Since the previous session of the General Conference, there had been significant progress and many developments in the Agency's activities. With regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, past events had demonstrated the need for the Agency's safeguards system to provide credible assurances not only on declared nuclear activities, but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The Agency's work to strengthen further the effectiveness and improve the cost-efficiency of the safeguards system had accordingly been endorsed in a comprehensive set of measures in Programme 93+2.

15. With respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Agency had been the principal international instrument for promoting nuclear co-operation and the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries. Its areas of activity had included food irradiation, radiation protection, nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. It had also established the Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation. The continuation of such activities required a strong commitment by

Member States in terms of adequate and predictable resources and implementation support to match the Agency's efforts.

16. In the current post-Cold-War era, all should redouble their efforts to make the world a safer and better place to live in. The Agency, under the able leadership of its Director General, could play a unique role in such efforts, not only by promoting and verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but also in convincing the world at large that nuclear energy could make a positive contribution to the future of its children.

17. Turning to the appointment of the General Committee, he recalled that, under Rules 34 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference had to elect eight Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and five additional members of the General Committee. Since the Latin American Group had not yet reached agreement on its candidates to serve on the General Committee, he suggested proceeding with the election of the candidates whose names were already known and deferring the election of the other members of the Committee until the regional group in question had completed its consultations. He therefore proposed that under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the delegates of Belgium, China, Kuwait, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States of America be elected as Vice-Presidents, and Ms. Roberta Lajous Vargas of Mexico as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole; and that, under Rule 40, the delegates of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Nigeria and Qatar be elected as additional members of the General Committee.

18. The President's proposals were accepted.

19. The PRESIDENT said that, as the General Committee had not yet been fully constituted, it would be some time before the Conference would be able to adopt its agenda for the current session. He therefore proposed that the General Conference, pursuant to Rule 102 of the Rules of Procedure, waive Rule 42 until the General Committee had met and had submitted its report on the agenda, so that the General Conference could consider items 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the provisional agenda contained in document GC(39)/1 in order not to lose time.

20. The President's proposal was accepted.

APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE AGENCY (GC(39)/7 and GC(39)/8)

21. The PRESIDENT informed delegates that the General Conference had before it two applications for membership, one submitted by the Republic of Georgia (document GC(39)/7), and the other by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (document GC(39)/8). Those applications had been endorsed by the Board of Governors, which had also submitted draft resolutions dealing with each of those applications for adoption by the General Conference.

22. He assumed that the Conference wished to adopt the two draft resolutions in question by acclamation.

23. It was so decided.

24. The PRESIDENT, on behalf of the General Conference, extended a warm welcome to the two countries which had just been approved for membership.

25. Mr. HADŽIAHMETOVIĆ (Bosnia and Herzegovina) thanked delegates for their support in approving his country's application for membership of the Agency. His country considered the Agency to be one of the most important international organizations, dealing not only with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, but also acting as a forum for international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in various areas.

26. The world was now faced with new challenges and new opportunities. Peace and development were a common aspiration for all peoples. As a new Member State, his country would be seeking ways of co-operating with other Member States in the application of atomic energy in such fields as medicine, agriculture, industry and hydrology. Bosnia and Herzegovina strongly supported the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety and a reliable and effective safeguards system. Despite improvements in that system, constant vigilance was essential.

27. His country was not only in transition, it was also burdened by the impact of a war that had devastated the country, destroyed the economy and brought development to a standstill. It was in dire need of the Agency's technical assistance in the form of equipment

provision, scientific visits and research contracts. In particular, it was interested in co-operation in the fields of nuclear safety, radiation protection, application of nuclear technology and basic physical and chemical research.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

28. Mr. GIACOMELLI (Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) pointed out that 1995 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, and that during those 50 years much had been achieved. Throughout the Organization's existence, the potential for close co-operation between the various sectors of the United Nations system had been an important source of strength. Co-operation between the Agency and the rest of the United Nations system had been particularly close and productive, and that co-operation should continue to be strengthened.

29. Amidst the many uncertainties of the post-Cold-War era, international peace, security and development required that the international community should give high priority to the issues of nuclear control and nuclear safety. Although the world could take comfort from the fact that it was no longer on the brink of a nuclear precipice, the stakes remained high, and efforts should be continued. Urgent priority should be given to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, halting nuclear testing, improving verification capabilities, stopping illicit traffic in nuclear and other radioactive materials, banning the production of fissile materials for explosive devices, guaranteeing the safe disposal of radioactive waste, and ensuring the continued safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy and related technologies.

30. The NPT was the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and full adherence to it by all States was essential to international peace and security. Positive results had been achieved at the NPT Review and Extension Conference earlier that year. The indefinite extension of the Treaty had sent out a much-needed signal, and the decision to enhance the review process would help to strengthen international commitments. In addition, the agreements on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament had constituted an important step forward.

31. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had set 1996 as the target date for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The majority of the international community

viewed a complete ban on nuclear testing as a prerequisite for further progress towards non-proliferation and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Under the auspices of the United Nations, negotiations on such a treaty were currently proceeding in Geneva. All participants in those negotiations were urged to redouble their efforts and all States should voluntarily refrain from nuclear testing and demonstrate to the world their commitment to a future free of nuclear weapons.

32. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had also called for the early conclusion of an agreement to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. It was to be hoped that negotiations on such an agreement would start immediately and reach an early conclusion.

33. In a recent letter, the Security Council had expressed its continued full support for the work being done by the Agency and others to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. The Agency should examine ways in which it could further assist Member States in meeting their obligations. The international community would have to be far more vigilant if it wished to control that threat.

34. Full co-operation and mutual support between the Security Council and the Agency would continue to be essential for the promotion of international peace and security. The Agency's monitoring and verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolutions demonstrated the importance of such co-operation.

35. There had been important developments since the previous session of the General Conference in the implementation of Agency safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency had held extensive technical discussions with the DPRK on the subject.

36. He welcomed the Agency's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, including its capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Effective verification was critically important for building confidence and ensuring an effective non-proliferation regime. The United Nations would continue to provide active support for steps to strengthen the Agency's

safeguards system and all States were urged to give it their full support and provide the necessary financial resources.

37. The further development of nuclear applications in a wide variety of peaceful fields and the Agency's activities in support of Agenda 21 and other development initiatives underlined the Agency's broad mandate and its important position within the United Nations family.

38. The Agency would continue to assume important international responsibilities in the areas of nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiological protection. Member States should ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety without delay and facilitate its early entry into force and all Member States who were in a position to do so should contribute actively to the development of the proposed convention on the safe management of radioactive waste and participate in the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage.

39. The close co-operation that had characterized the relationship between the Agency and the United Nations was vital in order to address successfully the compelling challenges of global peace, security and development.

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

40. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that the machinery of the Agency had been working at full steam since the previous session of the General Conference and that considerable progress could be reported in many areas.

41. In May 1995 the NPT Review and Extension Conference had decided to extend the NPT indefinitely. That decision, inasmuch as it testified to a solid and broad commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, had been greeted with relief and enthusiasm in many capitals. It had to be recognized, however, that the decision had been received with mixed feelings in a number of other capitals, where it was a matter of concern that the extension also meant an indefinite recognition of the nuclear-weapon status of five States Party. A forward-looking interpretation of the extension decision and of the principles and objectives that had also been adopted would be that they constituted a collective commitment to bring about a world in which nuclear energy was used for positive, peaceful purposes and in which no

nation possessed any nuclear weapons: a commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire those weapons and a commitment by the five declared nuclear-weapon States to effective and accelerated nuclear disarmament.

42. The outcome of the NPT Review and Extension Conference had far-reaching implications for the future work of the Agency, which would have a continued role in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an expanded role in verification. The Agency had been expressly recognized as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements and parties to the NPT that had concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements had been instructed to direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency for it to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. That provision was an endorsement of the Agency's verification role as it had evolved in recent years. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had also called for support for the Agency's actions to strengthen safeguards and to increase its capability to detect any undeclared nuclear activities. It had further recommended that nuclear material released from military use should be placed under Agency safeguards as soon as practicable and had envisaged the universal application of safeguards once nuclear weapons had been eliminated.

43. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had set 1996 as the target date for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement - a step that was widely viewed as a vital complement to non-proliferation and a symbol of progress towards nuclear disarmament. It had further called for the early conclusion of an agreement to end the production of nuclear material for use in weapons - a cut-off agreement - and had endorsed the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones. The assumption underlying current discussions on the cut-off agreement had been that Agency safeguards would be an essential element of the verification mechanism. It could also be assumed, in the light of existing models, that the Agency would have a verification role in any new nuclear-weapon-free zone. With regard to a comprehensive test ban, it was relevant to note, as he had done in the past, that such a ban already existed in reality for all the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT and was verified under comprehensive Agency safeguards agreements. It was for the States

negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty to determine what roles might be assigned to the Agency under such a treaty.

44. As reported to the Board of Governors the previous week, he had recently received a letter from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning France's irreversible commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in 1996 and its intention to undertake a final series of nuclear tests before that date. The Minister had asked whether the Agency would be willing to conduct a scientific mission to assess the radiological impact of the tests. Such an assessment would have to be complemented by an assessment of the geological situation of the test site. In reply he had indicated that, for the Agency to take a decision on the matter, a number of preliminary questions would need to be carefully considered, including the objective and the scope of the mission, its modalities and the composition of a team. He had added that the Secretariat wished to consult with the French authorities and with others on those issues. Consultations with French experts were scheduled to take place during the week of the Conference.

45. The French request was being considered in the context of the numerous services provided by the Agency to its Member States in the field of nuclear safety and radiological protection and its establishment of radiation safety standards. For example, a mission had been sent by the Agency to Kazakhstan in 1994 to assess the radiological situation at the Semipalatinsk test site and a similar mission was being planned for the Marshall Islands. In addition, the Agency's Marine Environment Laboratory had co-ordinated two interlaboratory calibration exercises using various samples taken in 1991 and 1994 from the area of the French Pacific test sites. The Agency therefore had some firsthand experience in the field.

46. Credible Agency verification was an increasingly important factor in nuclear disarmament and global security planning. The increasing importance and scale of the safeguards effort called for the development and implementation of a strengthened and more cost-effective system.

47. Increased access to information about nuclear programmes and broader inspector access to sites within the State were fundamental prerequisites for strengthened safeguards and constituted the main thrust of Programme 93+2, which the Board of Governors was

considering. While additional authority would have to be sought for some of the desired measures, other measures could be implemented under the authority of existing comprehensive safeguards agreements.

48. By making their nuclear activities as transparent as possible to the Agency, States could help provide the basis for more effective and efficient safeguards. They would have to decide whether they were prepared to provide, as a matter of routine, greater access to information and locations than was currently required under safeguards agreements. Needless to say, the new arrangements would have to be both practical and cost-effective and make use of state-of-the-art verification techniques. Experience gained in trial arrangements with several States suggested that in practice the cost to them of, for example, granting multiple visas for inspectors and wider access within installations, was not great.

49. In 1994 he had reported that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not in full compliance with its safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT. Document GC(39)/18 summarized the many developments of the past year, in particular the Agreed Framework concluded between the DPRK and the United States of America, which provided for a freeze and the eventual dismantling of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and stated the DPRK's intention to comply fully with the safeguards agreement. On 4 November 1994, the Security Council had confirmed that the safeguards agreement remained in force and binding and had requested the Agency to take the necessary steps to monitor the freeze. With the authorization of the Board, the Agency was fulfilling that request through the continuous presence of inspectors in the DPRK.

50. To comply fully with the safeguards agreement, the DPRK would have to enable the Agency to verify effectively the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report of nuclear material subject to the agreement, a step it had as yet been unwilling to take. In the absence of the required compliance, it was essential to take all necessary measures to preserve any information of relevance to that verification.

51. In the previous few days a new round of discussions between the Agency and the DPRK had taken place at technical meetings in the DPRK. Limited progress had been made

on some issues, but a substantial paper of technical proposals transmitted by the Agency had been accepted only for study and not for discussion.

52. As he had reported to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1994, it was the Secretariat's conclusion that the essential components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme had been identified and destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. That assessment was not based on faith in Iraqi statements, but on data gathered during inspections, on information provided by suppliers and Member States and, to a great extent, on analysis of the large number of original documents obtained in Iraq by the teams of the sixth and seventh Agency inspection missions.

53. Since August 1994, Agency inspectors had been continuously present in Iraq to perform ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. Their tasks did not exclude renewed inspections for the purpose of investigations if any new information needed to be verified.

54. The Agency had recently received additional information on Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme through new statements made and numerous documents and materials transmitted to the Agency and to UNSCOM by Iraq following the departure to Jordan of General Hussein Kamel, the former Iraqi Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization. None of the new information reviewed to date suggested that a change was warranted in the Agency's earlier conclusion. It had been told that as of August or September 1990, the Iraqi authorities had intended to take the safeguarded highly enriched research reactor uranium fuel at the Tuwaitha nuclear research centre, extract the pure uranium by the spring of 1991, transform it into weapons-grade uranium metal and then use it to make a nuclear weapon. It was uncertain whether they would have been able to overcome the considerable technical difficulties involved in the plan, which had in any case been made impossible by the damage inflicted on Tuwaitha through bombing in January 1991. The new Iraqi statements and all the relevant documents and materials would have to be carefully examined for any new data. The fact that they had been withheld for so long was clearly a breach of Iraq's obligations under Security Council resolutions.

55. The affair also offered prima facie evidence of the fact that the Iraqi authorities would not have hesitated to take nuclear material under safeguards and to time the operation in such a way as to make maximum use of the period before the next scheduled Agency inspection, at which time the violation of the safeguards agreement would have become known. While taking the fuel would not have needed much time, processing and transforming it into bomb-grade material would have taken more time.

56. There were other lessons to be drawn from the affair. Firstly, the replacement of high-enriched uranium fuel by low-enriched fuel in research reactors could indeed reduce the risk of proliferation. Secondly, the change in the safeguards system introduced in the light of experience with Iraq in favour of more frequent inspections to ensure the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of safeguarded material was prudent. Thirdly, real-time remote transmission of data, when it became readily available, would provide a useful tool for achieving immediate detection of diversion.

57. Turning to developments in regional arrangements, he reported further positive developments in relation to the Tlatelolco Treaty. Since the previous session of the General Conference, two States had become parties to the Treaty, two States had ratified it and one, Cuba, had signed it. As the date of entry into force of the Treaty for the entire zone of application had therefore moved closer, it was essential to ensure that the required safeguards agreements were in force with all the States party to the Treaty.

58. As requested by the General Conference the previous year, the Agency had continued to assist the African States in their efforts to establish an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, in particular in the elaboration of the verification regime. A draft treaty text which, inter alia, entrusted the Agency with the task of verification, had been considered and endorsed by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity and the African Heads of State in Addis Ababa in June 1995 and it was expected that Africa would soon become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

59. The previous session of the General Conference had called upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and appropriate steps required to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region. The

resolution had also requested the Director General to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region and the preparation of model verification agreements as a step towards the establishment of such a zone. As he had reported to previous sessions of the General Conference, model verification agreements could not easily be prepared until the States concerned had clarified their views on the main issues of substance. That was not yet the case. Meanwhile, the Agency was participating in discussions on the issues involved in the context of the peace process. He intended to continue his visits to and consultations with States in the region.

60. With regard to the subject of illicit trafficking, he recalled that following several incidents of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials reported in 1994, Member States had invited him at the previous session of the General Conference to take a number of actions. In responding to the problems of nuclear trafficking, nuclear authorities, customs authorities and enforcement authorities of many countries and a number of international organizations were seeking to strengthen and co-ordinate their efforts to control and protect radioactive materials. The previous week, the Agency had hosted a large inter-agency meeting which had reached a number of useful joint conclusions. Within the Agency, an action programme had been approved by the Board of Governors. Training courses in the operation of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material were already being conducted. In addition, courses on physical protection methods and technology were being arranged and activities were under way to help States address the radiation hazards connected with illicit trafficking. A conference was planned for 1997 to facilitate further the exchange of information and expertise on physical protection. Meanwhile, the Agency was establishing a database of trafficking incidents to provide factual information to the Governments of Member States and the public. In July, the United Nations Security Council had expressed its full support to the Agency and other international bodies for their work in that field. A full report on the Agency's actions was contained in document GC(39)/19.

61. Turning to the Agency's technical co-operation programme and, in particular, the initiatives taken to strengthen it and to improve delivery, he said that technical co-operation with Member States should reflect their priorities for scientific, technological, economic and

social development. However, a careful study of the programmes actually requested showed that they often covered a wide range of areas, not all of them clearly related to national development goals.

62. Several initiatives had been taken to make the technical co-operation programme more effective and more relevant to the sustainable development of Member States. In that connection, he drew attention to document GOV/INF/773 describing the Agency's considerable contribution to Agenda 21 on the Environment and Sustainable Development.

63. In addition, the Secretariat, working together with Member States, had started preparing country programme frameworks, which would help focus the programmes on key areas of government priority to maximize the impact. Another initiative aimed to have fewer but better focused projects. He urged Governments to help by submitting somewhat fewer project requests and ensuring that they were in line with their development needs and had the full backing of the national authorities.

64. He was pleased to report that the technical co-operation programme delivery, as of 30 August 1995, was the highest ever in the history of the Agency. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference all participants had acknowledged the importance of the work of the Agency as the principal agent for the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries and had welcomed the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. As it had also been recognized that the success of those programmes depended on the availability of predictable resources, he appealed to all Member States to pay in full their assessed share of voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund.

65. Successive sessions of the General Conference had drawn attention to various areas of nuclear research and development of particular interest to developing countries. In response to such requests, special reports on isotope hydrology and the use of nuclear energy for potable water production had been prepared for the current session.

66. The availability of potable water was a growing problem in many Member States. Considerable progress had been made the previous year in evaluating the technical and economic feasibility of the desalination of sea water using nuclear energy. The North

African regional feasibility study had been completed, showing that the use of nuclear power plants for desalination was technically feasible and the costs competitive with those of fossil plants in the region. A similar feasibility study for Saudi Arabia was under way. Studies had also continued on practical options for nuclear desalination demonstration projects. However, the success of that programme was very much dependent on the availability of sufficient extrabudgetary contributions from interested Member States, to whom he appealed for further support.

67. In May 1995, the International Nuclear Information System had celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary. That system played a key role in providing access to nuclear information in support of activities worldwide in such diverse areas as nuclear power, safeguards and nuclear techniques in food and agriculture. The INIS database currently contained over 1.8 million nuclear literature references and was growing at the rate of about 85 000 records per year. It maintained its non-commercial character and continued to facilitate the availability of nuclear information to users in all participating countries irrespective of their levels of development.

68. As document GC(39)/INF/8 contained a comprehensive report on the various measures that had been taken by the Agency to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, he would limit his remarks to some developments of particular importance. With a view to consolidating all the Agency's safety-related activities into one organizational structure, the Department of Nuclear Energy and Safety would be divided into two separate Departments: the Department of Nuclear Energy and the Department of Nuclear Safety. The latter would cover the three major safety disciplines: nuclear safety, radiation safety and radioactive waste safety. One change connected with the division was the development of a modified and streamlined process for the preparation of all Agency safety standards in order to ensure uniformity and consistency in the preparation and review process of documents covering the three interrelated safety disciplines.

69. A major accomplishment in the nuclear safety area had been the adoption in June 1994 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. So far the Convention had been signed by

59 States and ratified or accepted by nine. A number of States were very close to ratification and it was to be hoped that the Convention would enter into force in 1996.

70. The preamble to the Convention on Nuclear Safety urged the preparation of a convention on the safe management of radioactive waste, a project on which significant progress had been made. At the end of its first meeting, in July 1995, the open-ended group of legal and technical experts had entrusted its chairman, Professor Baer from Switzerland, with the preparation of a draft of the convention for consideration in December 1995. If progress was maintained at the current pace, a final draft could perhaps be ready some time in 1996.

71. Since the previous session of the General Conference, the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had recommended, albeit with some reservations, that a diplomatic conference be convened in 1996 to revise the Vienna Convention and to adopt a system of supplementary funding. However, some fundamental issues remained to be resolved. As work on revision of the Vienna Convention was nearing completion, but could not progress further without concomitant results on the issue of supplementary funding, the Standing Committee had devoted much effort to the elaboration of an instrument on supplementary funding. He hoped that the efforts made at an informal meeting scheduled for the following week would facilitate the emergence of a broadly acceptable draft convention and thereby provide the necessary basis for a successful diplomatic conference and a viable international instrument on liability.

72. The Agency's work on the safety assessment of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union had continued and an international consensus had been reached regarding the major safety issues and their significance for each of the various reactor types. The emphasis was shifting to a review of the status of implementation of the proposed safety improvements and to the collection of up-to-date information on the upgrading situation at each of the reactors involved. The results of the Agency's work provided input for bilateral and multilateral assistance projects co-ordinated by the G-24 mechanism in Brussels. The Agency continued to rely on extrabudgetary resources for the major part of its assistance efforts in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

73. The tenth anniversary of the tragic accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, in April 1986, would provide an occasion for meetings between different authorities and international organizations to assess the various consequences of the accident. The events would culminate with an international conference in Vienna from 8 to 12 April 1996 that would seek to sum up the accumulated knowledge. The conference was jointly sponsored by WHO, the European Union and the Agency and was intended to seek a common and conclusive understanding of the nature and magnitude of the consequences of the accident.

74. In the context of measures taken by the Agency to resolve international waste management issues, the Agency had organized a seminar on international co-operation on nuclear waste management in the Russian Federation in May 1995 at the request of the Nordic Council of Ministers and with the co-operation of the Russian Federation. A comprehensive picture of existing waste management programmes, structures and problems in the Russian Federation had been provided and an overview of co-operation with the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear waste management had been obtained. A contact expert group was to be established under the auspices of the Agency for the purpose of organizing and following up co-operation activities between the Russian Federation and other States. A first meeting of the group was being organized by the Agency in Stockholm later that week.

75. One of the major future challenges in the field of energy would be to ensure sustainability. That would require both enhanced management of natural resources and a reduction of emissions that were dangerous to health and the environment. In particular, the threat of global climate change due to such emissions was a high priority of Governments. The first Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Berlin at the end of March, had shown that reaching an international consensus on those matters would take time.

76. Three years after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, the progress made, for example, in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, was extremely small. The medium-term outlook was not better and unless measures were taken soon to reduce the share of fossil fuels, especially coal, in electricity generation, the substantial growth in energy and electricity consumption in many developing

countries would lead to a serious increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon dioxide emissions would also grow in Western Europe after the turn of the century, mainly owing to the commissioning of new gas-fired or coal-fired power plants.

77. In Europe, the case of France, where more than 75% of electricity was produced by nuclear power, clearly demonstrated that nuclear power could play a major role in reducing carbon dioxide, nitrogen and sulphur oxide emissions. In that connection, it was to be welcomed that in Asia, with its rapidly expanding economies, both Japan and the Republic of Korea were pursuing dynamic nuclear power programmes, and China was in the early phase of a planned large nuclear power programme.

78. In that context, it was necessary to assess and compare all available energy supply options, taking into account their technical and economic performance as well as their potential for alleviating damaging impacts on health and environments. That was the focus of the Agency's programme on the comparative assessment of energy sources, the so-called DECADES project. Detailed studies on the emissions and residuals from nuclear, fossil and renewable energy chains showed that, under normal operation, nuclear power was one of the most environmentally friendly ways of generating electricity. Some 20 case studies had been undertaken by national institutes to assess and compare alternative electricity system expansion strategies in different countries. The preliminary results indicated that incorporating health and environmental aspects in the comparison of alternative strategies pointed, in a number of cases, to the introduction of nuclear power being the optimum strategy. Such findings must, of course, be supplemented by considerations concerning industrial infrastructure, manpower, availability of capital, acceptability, and so on.

79. The International Symposium on Electricity, Health and the Environment to be held the following month in Vienna would provide a forum for senior planners and analysts to review recent progress in the comparative assessment of different energy sources.

80. Nuclear power alone could not solve all of the problems involved in achieving a secure and sustainable energy supply worldwide but, together with renewable sources and energy conservation, it could play a very significant role in stable and sustainable energy strategies for the world. The Agency must continue to make available relevant data in that

regard and factual information about the central issues of nuclear safety, waste disposal and non-proliferation, which were at the root of many people's concern about nuclear power.

81. The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations had encouraged wide public scrutiny of the United Nations system. The identification of shortcomings and the proposal of improvements and reforms were to be welcomed. Rejecting multilateralism, however, would be a retrograde step. It had to be recognized that multilateral organizations, for a variety of purposes, were indispensable and that ever more would be expected of them in the future.

82. The expanding responsibilities of the Agency, and the legitimate demand for identification of priorities and limitation of costs, required continued close critical scrutiny of programmes and rationalization of work methods. There were a number of points to be made in that connection.

83. Firstly, the rolling medium-term perspective established by the Agency was designed to facilitate an orderly phasing-out and phasing-in of programmes in line with the changing needs of Member States. The abrupt termination of programmes was often difficult and costly. Such problems of change could be minimized through programmatic foresight.

84. Secondly, a number of senior officials from Member States had met with the Agency's senior management for two days in June 1995 to look beyond the year 2000. There had been an understanding that the Agency's roles must continue to evolve in various areas: the verification functions would grow; many activities in the area of nuclear safety and technology transfer would remain essential; and programmes in the field of nuclear waste might expand. Furthermore, although the acquisition of nuclear technologies would increasingly become commercial rather than governmental decisions, the Agency should be ready to provide impartial advice on the pros and cons of available nuclear and non-nuclear solutions to problems in both power and non-power applications. It had also been stressed at the meeting that the Secretariat must at all times be alert to the emergence of new nuclear, information and verification-related technologies.

85. Thirdly, the Secretariat was introducing some changes to rationalize the Agency's programme and organizational structure, such as the establishment of the new Department

of Nuclear Safety at the beginning of 1996 bringing together in one organizational unit the full range of Agency work related to nuclear safety.

86. Efficiencies were also being achieved through the introduction, or expanded use, of new technologies, especially in the area of communications. Many printed products were being replaced by electronic ones. As word processing and electronic mail became the norm, support staff were able to perform a wider range of duties. Those efficiencies continued to contribute to the Secretariat's ability to improve programme delivery. As the Internet became a tool for the public, the media and decision-makers, the Secretariat was ensuring that many Agency products were available on it. He expected that increasing use would be made of electronic communications for the business of the governing bodies and for the work of the Agency generally.

87. Lastly, in response to resolutions adopted by the General Conference, special efforts had been made to increase the professional representation of women and staff from developing countries in the Secretariat. However, when the number of staff was static - as had been the case - change was not easy. Furthermore, some of the Agency's activities required very specialized skills from a very limited labour market. The Secretariat was continuing to look for ways of improving the situation.

88. In spite of the constraints on resources, the Agency had managed over the past ten years to deliver an expanding programme and to respond to the needs of Member States. That certainly could not have been achieved without extrabudgetary contributions from several Governments. It was also in large measure attributable to the efficiency, skill and loyalty of staff who had responded positively and creatively to the challenges. It was to be regretted that that effort had not been matched by corresponding improvements in the conditions of employment of the Professional staff. The current remuneration scheme of the Common System was outdated and compared very unfavourably with those applied to comparable work in other intergovernmental systems, such as the OECD, the World Bank and the European Union.

89. It was a great relief that the Board of Governors had reached a consensus the previous week on a package comprising the financing of safeguards and targets for contributions to

the Technical Co-operation Fund. It remained a matter of concern, however, that a zero real growth budget was being proposed for 1996 - the twelfth consecutive year - and that it had not been possible to incorporate into the Regular Budget several activities regarded as essential. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had urged that every effort be made to ensure the Agency had the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety. He hoped that all the Governments which had given their full support to those conclusions in New York would be equally supportive in Vienna in the coming year when the Agency tackled the resource questions arising from the expanding demands being placed upon it.

90. Finally, he acknowledged the continuing support and co-operation which the Agency and the other international agencies in Vienna had received from their host, the Government of Austria, and from the city of Vienna. The facilities provided at the VIC remained among the best of their kind in the world and did much to help maintain the efficiency of the Agency's activities.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE (resumed)

91. The PRESIDENT said that agreement had been reached in the Latin American Group, on its nominations for the General Committee and accordingly he proposed that, under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the delegate of Chile be elected as a Vice-President of the General Committee.

92. It was so agreed.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION FUND FOR 1996 (GC(39)/22)

93. The PRESIDENT said that the Agency's policy-making organs had, since 1982, followed the practice of recommending indicative planning figures to be used in establishing annual targets for voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund. At its meetings the previous week, the Board of Governors had recommended a target of $64.5 million for voluntary contributions to the TCF for 1996 and had agreed that the indicative planning figures for 1997 and 1998 should provide for target increases of at least

$3.5 million in each of those years. Accordingly, in draft resolution B relating to the TCF, contained in Annex VI to document GC(39)/4, the Board was recommending a figure of $64.5 million as the target for voluntary contributions to the Fund for 1996. Document GC(39)/4/Mod.1 reflected that recommendation.

94. Owing to the late agreement by the Board on a recommendation for the 1996 target figure, document GC(39)/22 informing Member States of their individual shares for the recommended target had only been issued the previous Friday. However, the early pledging of voluntary contributions greatly helped the Secretariat in planning the Agency's technical assistance programmes and all delegations that were in a position to do so, but had not done so yet, were urged to notify the Secretariat during the current session of the voluntary contributions that their Governments would be making to the TCF in 1996. He was happy to report that one Member State - Finland - had already pledged for 1996.

95. He would report at the end of the session, under a later agenda item, on the voluntary contributions which had been pledged up to that time.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1995 (GC(39)/3, GC(39)/26 and Add.1 and 2)

96. The PRESIDENT, pointing out that a large number of delegates had inscribed their names on the speakers' list and that a draft resolution on nuclear testing, contained in document GC(39)/26, had been tabled for consideration under the item, took it that the Conference authorized him, under Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure, to limit the duration of speeches to 15 minutes.

97. It was so agreed.

98. Mr. URANO (Japan) noted that 1995 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and that it was also fifty years since atomic bombs had been dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, inflicting suffering unprecedented in human history. As the only country to have undergone such an experience, Japan was convinced that nuclear weapons should never be used again. It therefore observed the three principles of not possessing, not producing and not introducing nuclear weapons into its territory, and had been working hard to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan thus welcomed the decision taken earlier that year at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely. Japan believed it was vital that the international community strive to attain the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

99. Japan also believed that a comprehensive nuclear test ban was of paramount importance. Parties to the NPT had agreed to complete negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty no later than 1996 and the nuclear-weapon States had agreed to exercise the utmost restraint pending the entry into force of that treaty. It was most regrettable that nuclear tests were still being conducted in defiance of that agreement. Japan emphatically called for the cessation of all nuclear testing. It would do all within its power to ensure that the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty were completed as soon as possible.

100. Turning to the issue of the DPRK's suspected development of nuclear weapons, he said that Japan welcomed the Agreed Framework concluded in October 1994 between the United States and the DPRK. It strongly urged the DPRK to dispel international concerns by complying with the Agreed Framework and fully implementing its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization had been established in March 1995 to implement the Agreed Framework. Through its participation in that organization, Japan would do its utmost to help resolve the issue and looked forward to active and broad co-operation from the international community.

101. The management of nuclear materials released from dismantled nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of plutonium had also attracted international attention. Japan would continue its active participation in discussions aimed at establishing a framework to promote transparency in the management of the plutonium produced from the dismantling of nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel recycling. Japan strictly limited its development and use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. While it had recently revised its nuclear programme to construct a demonstration advanced thermal reactor, it remained convinced of the need to establish a nuclear fuel cycle. In so doing it would strictly abide by the principle of holding no surplus plutonium and make every effort to ensure the transparency of its use of plutonium under a rational and coherent plan.

102. The indefinite extension of the NPT had further increased the importance of the Agency and its safeguards system. Japan called upon all States to accede to the Treaty and to conclude, and faithfully implement, safeguards agreements with the Agency. Events in Iraq and the DPRK had brought calls to strengthen the Agency's safeguards by improving the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities and Japan fully supported Programme 93+2 that had been formulated in response to those calls. As to the former Soviet republics, Japan was providing assistance to them in establishing State systems for the accounting for and control of nuclear material and intended to continue its work in that area.

103. Turning to nuclear safety, he noted that the responsibility for nuclear safety rested primarily with the individual States using nuclear energy. International efforts were, however, necessary to complement those of individual States in the event of large-scale accidents with transboundary effects. There were high expectations of the Agency in that area. The Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted in June 1994, was an epoch-making development in that area. It was the first international agreement to ensure the safety of civil nuclear power plants and marked a significant step forward in promoting a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. Japan had deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Convention in May 1995. It hoped that other States would ratify the Convention so that it could enter into force without delay.

104. The safe management of radioactive waste was also important in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan was prepared to make positive contributions to the Agency's activities in that area, including its deliberations on a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. In that connection, the first return shipment of high-level radioactive waste from France to Japan had recently been completed successfully in accordance with all the relevant Agency and other safety standards.

105. Japan had also been contributing actively to the enhancement of nuclear safety around the world, particularly in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It welcomed the announcement by the President of Ukraine that the Chernobyl nuclear power plant would be closed by the year 2000. Together with other G-7 nations and international financial institutions, Japan would continue its co-operation in order to help make the plant's closure become a reality.

106. Following the first survey conducted in 1994, Japan had carried out - in co-operation with the Republic of Korea and Russia - a second joint survey of the radiological effects of the dumping of radioactive waste at sea by the former Soviet Union and Russia. It was grateful to the Agency for again sending a specialist from its Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco to take part in that survey.

107. Japan attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, to which it had contributed both human and financial resources. It would continue to provide as much support as possible to help develop and improve the skills of human resources involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It urged all Member States to pay their assessed contributions in full and to strengthen their efforts to meet their respective share of the target for voluntary contributions to the TCF.

108. Nuclear fusion - as a potential energy source for the future - could greatly improve the energy situation in the twenty-first century. Japan would do its utmost to make nuclear fusion a practical energy option by, for example, participating in the engineering design activities of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), which was being conducted under the auspices of the Agency.

109. Japan commended the Secretariat on its efficient management of the Agency under the current financial circumstances. Every possible effort should be made to maintain zero real growth of the Regular Budget.

110. Explosive population growth and rising living standards would probably lead to a sharp increase in the world's energy consumption in the twenty-first century. There was also concern that energy-related environmental problems, such as global warming, would become more serious. The international community therefore urgently needed to resolve energy issues. The role of nuclear power, as a stable and clean source of supply, would increase. The Agency would also have an important role to play in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan was determined to continue its active participation in the Agency's programmes and hoped that other Member States would do likewise.

111. Ms. O'LEARY (United States of America) began by reading out the following message from the President of the United States of America to the General Conference:

"This year marks an historic watershed. We have had the chance to commemorate the end of World War II and reflect on the dawn of the nuclear age. We have also taken the opportunity to look forward and demonstrate vision and resolve in the international fight against the spread of nuclear weapons. The decision of the world community to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and without conditions is a dramatic and remarkable accomplishment. It will immeasurably improve our future security and that of all generations to follow.

"In this historic year, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency is more important than ever. Combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are vital responsibilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been at the forefront of these efforts.

"Improving the Agency's ability to provide for comprehensive safeguards, detect undeclared nuclear activities, as well as strengthening safeguards on all nuclear material, are necessary for a safer and more secure future.

"The member states of the NPT have also accepted new responsibilities as a result of the NPT extension. We must all press forward in implementing the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were agreed to at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

"The United States of America stands firmly behind these goals and is demonstrating its commitment in many ways.

"My decision to pursue a zero yield comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty testifies to US seriousness in reducing the nuclear danger we all face. We will redouble our effort to conclude this treaty and sign it no later than the fall of 1996.

"The United States also demonstrated this commitment by withdrawing 200 tons of fissile material from the defence stockpile, never again to be used for nuclear explosives. International inspections of excess US fissile material have already begun and will soon be expanded. Also, the United States strongly supports the urgent negotiation and early conclusion of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards.

"I urge all other nations to join us in these efforts.

"The United States is also continuing its commitment to help improve the safety of nuclear reactors. Last year, the United States signed the International Nuclear Safety Convention. In the coming year we hope to ratify it. The assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency in improving the safety of Soviet-designed reactors has been very important.

"We also welcome the Agency's vital programmes for technical co-operation. Today nuclear technologies are employed in all geographic regions, helping children fight disease and allowing farmers to grow more abundant, healthy crops.

"As the Agency's role expands, the United States is committed to the continuing efforts to identify the resources necessary to implement its important work. We encourage other Member States to assist us with this important task.

"I look forward to a continued and growing co-operation between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency. As the 39th meeting of the annual General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency opens, I extend the best wishes of the citizens of the United States of America for a productive and successful conference."

112. With the indefinite extension of the NPT, the international community had renounced the legacy of nuclear insecurity and created the cornerstones for future safety and security. The demonstration of atomic fission fifty years previously had been a dramatic and remarkable scientific achievement. Yet while providing promise for a better human existence, it had also unleashed an explosive power that threatened the very existence of humanity. Thankfully, with the ending of the nuclear arms race and the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, many of the nuclear risks created by the Cold War had been defused. While the Agency's contribution had been essential in containing the threats of that era, the threat of nuclear proliferation and trafficking in fissile material presented serious new challenges, in many ways more difficult than those of the Cold War. The strategy for meeting those new challenges was contained in a decision of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which outlined principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

113. A key tool for the successful implementation of any strategy was the marshalling of all necessary resources, especially human resources. She was pleased to see that there had been some increase, albeit modest, in the percentage of women in Professional posts in the Agency compared to the previous year, and that steps had been taken to promote women to key positions. However, in order to meet the United Nations goal of 50% representation of women in Professional posts by the end of the century, the Agency would have to achieve by 1996 20% representation of women at the Professional level and an increased representation at Director level, with a quota of at least 10% in scientific and technical areas.

The United States considered that four points were essential to the improvement of the status of women: endorsement of the platform for action resulting from the Fourth World Conference on Women; its integration in the Agency's programme and budget; the establishment of a permanent senior-level post for gender concerns; and a progress report by the Agency to be provided at the 1996 session of the General Conference.

114. Turning to the Agency's technical assistance activities, she noted that they were essential for the promotion of human health, agriculture, and quality of life. The importance of ensuring access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had been highlighted in the principles and objectives agreed to at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. For its part, the United States supported the Agency's programme of technical assistance by contributing to the TCF and providing equipment, cost-free experts, fellowships and training courses. The United States had directly supported many Agency technical co-operation projects to improve agriculture production and human health. Her country's contribution to technical co-operation activities was in fact at least double the contribution of any other country and underscored its commitment to the provisions of the NPT. In that context, the United States welcomed the Board's agreement on the financing of technical co-operation and safeguards. In order to clarify any possible misunderstanding about her country's position she emphasized that, subject to the provision of funds by the United States Congress, it intended to pledge and pay its share of the target for the TCF as it had always done in the past.

115. While nuclear power was an essential part of the world's energy mix and for many countries a key to ensuring energy independence, its future depended totally upon its safe, economical, and reliable use. In that context, she noted that the creation of the Agency's new Department of Nuclear Safety would help the Agency to improve the management of its nuclear safety programme and to co-ordinate with other multilateral organizations. The Chernobyl accident, nearly a decade ago, had severely shaken confidence in nuclear safety and, as the tenth anniversary of that tragedy approached, the nuclear community would have to report on the progress made in improving nuclear safety. The safety of nuclear power ultimately rested with the nations operating power reactors and it was therefore crucial that they developed their own sound safety capabilities. In the past year the United States had

greatly increased its support for improving the safety of Soviet-designed reactors through bilateral programmes and multilateral assistance efforts. Nuclear power plant personnel from Russia, Ukraine, and Central and Eastern Europe had visited the United States to observe firsthand the safety practices and procedures implemented at United States plants and to participate in training courses. In addition, training centres had been established with United States assistance in Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, software provided by the United States was being used to implement emergency operating instructions at nuclear power plants in Russia and Ukraine. Eventually, the United States intended to assist with the installation of safety display systems in all of the older Soviet-designed power plants.

116. In addition to indigenous safety improvements increased multilateral co-operation was also essential for improving worldwide nuclear safety. The international nuclear safety centres to be established by the United States and Russia would promote an open exchange of information that would help in the evaluation of accidents and enhance the development of other nuclear-safety-related technologies. Furthermore, the United States, Ukraine and the G-7 were working to encourage the participation of other interested countries in the Ukrainian international nuclear safety and environmental research centre at Slavutich, near Chernobyl, in order to ensure the centre's ultimate success and safeguard its long-term financial stability.

117. As to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the United States commended Ukraine on its commitment to closing the plant by the end of 1999. It recognized the economic, social and energy-related difficulties associated with the decision and looked forward to working closely with the Ukrainian authorities and its G-7 partners in developing a programme of energy-sector reform and investment and in providing technical and financial assistance for the safe closure of Chernobyl.

118. An international nuclear safety regime was gradually being established on the basis of various multilateral agreements. One such agreement was the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Of the 59 countries that had signed the agreement, only 11 had completed the ratification process. For its part, the United States was progressing towards ratification, submission to the Senate having been made in May. Once ratification was completed, it was

essential that the national reports submitted to the peer review process be candid about both the strengths and weaknesses of individual nuclear power programmes.

119. There was also an urgent need for complementary agreements such as an umbrella liability convention to ensure the acceptable treatment of victims of civilian nuclear accidents and to provide a legal basis to facilitate the availability of goods and services needed to improve nuclear safety. The United States had hoped that a liability convention would be available for signature at the present session of the General Conference. Nevertheless, it trusted that the framework for an international liability regime would be established at a diplomatic conference in early 1996.

120. The third important element in a multilateral safety regime was a convention on the safe management of radioactive waste. The United States urged all countries to assist in the negotiation process so that a document acceptable for signature could be prepared as rapidly as possible.

121. Turning to nuclear security, she noted that new strategies in that area were more important than ever and that measures to ensure progress in the area of disarmament, the control of fissile materials and safeguards improvements were required. While the indefinite extension of the NPT had established a political foundation, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1996 was of paramount importance. The United States was aware of the leading role it played in that area and had demonstrated its commitment by declaring that it would pursue a true comprehensive nuclear test ban with zero nuclear yield.

122. At the same time, it was essential that measures be taken to improve safeguards on nuclear material. The United States had worked closely with the Agency to strengthen nuclear safeguards through Programme 93+2. Following the important recommendations recently agreed upon by the Board of Governors for strengthening safeguards and substantially enhancing the Agency's capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities, the United States urged all States to support the second set of proposals at the December Board meetings.

123. The Agreed Framework concluded between the United States and the DPRK provided for the safe storage under Agency safeguards of the spent nuclear fuel from the research reactor at Nyongbyon pending its shipment from the DPRK. The system recently installed by the United States to treat the water in the spent fuel pond would slow the corrosion of the fuel as a first step in the canning process.

124. The United States had also expanded its bilateral co-operation with States of the former Soviet Union with a view to strengthening nuclear safeguards. Its collaboration with the Russian Federation included the joint development and demonstration of a materials protection, control and accounting technology system at the Arzamas-16 nuclear-weapons laboratory; installation of materials protection, control and accounting upgrades at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow; deployment of portal monitors to detect nuclear material at high-throughput Russian installations; and completion of substantial upgrades at the fast physics assembly facility at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk. Work was also continuing in Kazakhstan following the removal of approximately 600 kg of highly enriched uranium from the Ulba fuel fabrication facility. The development by the United States of a new technology for remote monitoring of nuclear material and facilities would help to improve both international and bilateral safeguards. There were plans for the Agency to begin field trials in the United States on fissile material declared excess to defence needs, following successful demonstrations with Australia, Japan, Russia and other nations.

125. While continuing to implement a strategy for securing existing stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material, it was also necessary to move forward to limit the production and use of fissile material. The United States had concluded an agreement with Russia to end the production of weapons-grade plutonium and shut down all remaining plutonium production reactors by the year 2000. That agreement was a first step in the negotiation of an international treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes. In that connection, the declaration by the Russian Federation that it no longer produced plutonium for use in nuclear weapons was extremely gratifying. The United States strongly supported the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty and urged all States to overcome disagreements and to work towards that goal. Although the treaty would be limited to the production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes, the United States also discouraged the

use of plutonium for civil purposes and was accelerating its efforts to eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in research and test reactors. After facing numerous challenges, the United States Government was once again prepared to accept the return of spent research reactor fuel on an urgent relief basis. That decision would help to extend the research reactor conversion programme to new nations. By converting all highly enriched uranium research and test reactors, any threat that such fuel might be used to make bombs could be eliminated in future. Dangers were also posed by the excess stockpiling and use of civil plutonium. In that connection, President Clinton's decision to terminate the integral fast reactor programme demonstrated the views of the United States on civil plutonium. The United States encouraged transparency in that area and applauded Japan for its decision to publish information on its plutonium stockpiles.

126. A further aspect of nuclear security was the dismantling of existing nuclear weapons and the control and disposal of material removed from them. The agreed agenda for negotiation between the United States and the Russian Federation on the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons was a major new undertaking that supplemented the nuclear reductions in START-I and START-II and paved the way for the elimination of nuclear warheads. The United States had demonstrated its commitment in that respect by purchasing and blending down 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons. It had also undertaken an unprecedented unilateral initiative calling for the international safeguarding of fissile material declared excess to national security needs and placing more than 10 tonnes of excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium under international safeguards. It would continue to make additional facilities and materials available for Agency safeguards where possible. The United States had announced in March that some 200 tonnes of excess fissile material would be permanently withdrawn from the United States nuclear stockpile. By declassifying the composition of the excess material, which consisted of 38 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium and 165 tonnes of highly enriched uranium, and making almost 20 tonnes of it available for Agency safeguards, the United States had emphasized its commitment to irreversible nuclear disarmament. Discussions had also begun with the Agency concerning the monitoring of fissile material in a way that would protect sensitive nuclear-weapon design information. Options were also

being studied for the disposal of excess fissile material. Those options included use in reactors, as well as immobilization or vitrification and geological disposal. Materials destined for disposal would be brought under safeguards as soon as the most practical way of doing so without compromising classified information had been identified. The United States expected to complete its analysis and make decisions on highly enriched uranium disposal in early 1996 and to make decisions on the disposal of excess plutonium before the end of 1996.

127. In conclusion, she noted that good progress had been made in establishing the necessary new strategies for nuclear safety and security in the twenty-first century and that the indefinite extension of the NPT would serve as a catalyst for future progress.

128. Mr. LAFUENTE FELEZ (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union and with the support of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, noted that major events had taken place since the previous session of the General Conference in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The European Union welcomed the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. That decision unquestionably constituted a decisive landmark on the path towards the attainment of a stable legal framework to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would allow the achievement of the Treaty's three essential objectives: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to facilitate exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to continue the disarmament process with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. The decision on principles and objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament and the decision on the strengthening of the review process for the NPT would both facilitate the implementation of the Treaty's provisions and constituted valuable elements in the fight against nuclear proliferation.

129. The decision on principles and objectives deserved special attention because it referred specifically to the Agency's safeguards system and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The principles recognized that the Agency was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements with States Party to the NPT in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The principles also stated that the Agency's capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased and that every effort

should be made to ensure that the Agency had the necessary financial and human resources to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

130. Important progress had also been achieved towards greater universality of the NPT and the European Union welcomed Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as the accessions of 12 other States. Nevertheless, a small number of States continued to remain outside the Treaty and he appealed once again to those States, particularly to those which operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty. A new agreement between EURATOM and the United States on co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy had recently been concluded.

131. With respect to the DPRK, the European Union welcomed the advances made in the implementation of the Agreed Framework, although it regretted that the DPRK still did not consider itself fully bound by its safeguards agreement with the Agency and was not complying with its legal obligations under that agreement.

132. Although considerable advances had been made in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, important challenges still needed to be faced in the near future such as the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and a cut-off convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and the creation of new internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones.

133. The adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty was the greatest challenge facing the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the European Union believed that such a treaty should be universal and internationally effectively verifiable and should be concluded no later than 1996.

134. The conclusion of a cut-off convention would reinforce the legal framework of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although no substantial work had yet been done at the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the adoption of a negotiation mandate and the Conference's decision to create an ad hoc committee were positive elements. It was to be hoped that that committee would begin its work without delay.

135. The establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted one of the major achievements of the international community. The European Union was therefore satisfied with the progress achieved towards the entry into force of the Tlatelolco Treaty for the whole of Latin America, as well as Cuba's recent signature of the Treaty. The Union also appreciated the progress achieved in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and hoped that similar progress would be made in the Middle East.

136. Turning to Agency safeguards, he noted that the strengthening of the system by means of the measures outlined in Programme 93+2 was a key priority and urged Member States with comprehensive safeguards agreements to co-operate in the implementation of the measures that constituted the first phase of Programme 93+2.

137. Programme 93+2 should focus on greater co-operation between the Agency and State systems of accounting. Extensive co-operation with EURATOM had already been developed under the new partnership approach and had resulted in significant savings in the Agency's inspection effort in the European Union.

138. It was also vital that the introduction of new safeguards technologies and equipment should be conditional on their proven reliability and cost-efficiency and should take place gradually. The European Union was keen for further consultations with the Secretariat on the measures to be taken in the second phase of Programme 93+2 and hoped that following those consultations the Director General would be able to present specific proposals to the Board on the form and text of the relevant legal instrument for implementation of those measures in all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements by the end of 1995.

139. With regard to the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1994, he said that the European Union welcomed its conclusions. In the case of Iraq, the Union noted with satisfaction the results attained in dismantling its clandestine nuclear programme, as well as the implementation of the plan for ongoing control and verification of compliance with Security Council resolutions. The success of that plan depended on Iraq's full co-operation with the Agency. The Safeguards Implementation Report also noted progress with respect to the Board's decisions in 1992 and 1993 on initiatives for strengthening safeguards, such as the early provision of design information and an extended reporting scheme covering

nuclear material, non-nuclear material, nuclear-related equipment and exports/imports. Those measures, together with the recognition of the Agency's right and obligation to make use of special inspections constituted an important precursor to Programme 93+2. The reporting scheme was not yet universal and the European Union therefore urged those Member States which had not yet done so to participate in the scheme.

140. Another essential element of the non-proliferation regime were the measures for control of nuclear exports adopted voluntarily by the majority of exporting countries. The Union called on all exporting countries which had not yet done so to accept the guidelines on nuclear exports and to establish an effective mechanism for export control.

141. One matter of general concern continued to be the potential for illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Pursuant to resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/15 adopted by the previous session of the General Conference, the Director General had presented a series of proposals, which had been partially endorsed by the Board in March 1995. The European Union encouraged the Agency to proceed with the implementation of those proposals. The existence of effective national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as physical protection systems which met the provisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Agency's recommendations contained in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 were crucial elements in the fight against illicit trafficking. The European Union reiterated its appeal to all States, especially to those which possessed sensitive nuclear material, to ensure the efficiency of their national systems and, if necessary, to request the Agency's assistance.

142. Although nuclear safety in each country was a national responsibility, the European Union considered that it should also be seen as a global concern and should therefore not depend increasingly on extrabudgetary funds from only a small number of Member States. It welcomed the adoption and signature in 1994 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and hoped that it would soon enter into force.

143. In the area of radioactive waste management, the European Union noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the implementation of resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/6 and considered the approval of the safety fundamentals and of the standards on the

establishment of national systems for the disposal of radioactive waste an important step in that regard. The consensus on those two documents had paved the way for the elaboration of a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

144. The importance, variety and scope of the Agency's activities in the area of nuclear safety and radiation protection deserved general recognition, especially the activities of the extrabudgetary programme for the safety of WWER and RBMK reactors. The European Union also provided firm support for the enhancement of the safety of those reactors, as evidenced by the multiple contributions made both bilaterally and multilaterally through the PHARE and TACIS programmes. The European Union welcomed the decision taken by the President of Ukraine to close down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant by the year 2000 and was examining with Ukraine various aspects relating to the implementation of the action plan established for that purpose and looked forward to its timely implementation.

145. The discussions in the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had made important progress regarding the revision of the Vienna Convention, although some points still remained open owing to the existence of alternative texts which were difficult to reconcile. The European Union shared the general concern at that slow progress, which might prevent the finalization of an improved international system of compensation for international civil nuclear damage ten years after the Chernobyl accident. It called on all States participating in the Committee to adopt a more flexible attitude.

146. Turning to the Agency's activities in the field of technical co-operation, he pointed out that the European Union's contribution to the TCF accounted for approximately one third of the TCF resources. The report on the Agency's technical co-operation activities in 1994 indicated the magnitude of the work undertaken by the Secretariat despite its limited resources. The scarcity of resources made it necessary for the Agency to ensure that the available resources were effectively used and the European Union therefore welcomed the model project initiative. The results so far of that initiative were very positive and were permitting a reorientation of the strategy of the Department of Technical Co-operation.

147. The European Union welcomed the revised proposal for the Agency's budget for 1996, but believed that greater effort was needed to set priorities and to apply rigorous evaluation methods to all the Agency's activities. That would entail difficult decisions in order to ensure that all ineffective and low-priority programmes were eliminated so as to facilitate the financing of the necessary new programmes through the Agency's Regular Budget, instead of through voluntary contributions.

148. Looking further ahead, he said that it was time for the Agency to carry out, in consultation with Member States, the preparatory work needed to define the orientations and scope of the Agency's activities for the year 2000 and beyond. Those activities would cover the full implementation of Programme 93+2 as well as new responsibilities that might be assigned to the Agency in connection with future international treaties.

149. The European Union welcomed the Agency's improved financial situation, which had made it possible to put an end to the practice of deferred programmes, as that practice had entailed a notable loss of transparency in the presentation of the Agency's programmes and accounts. Compliance by all Member States with their financial obligations to the Agency would undoubtedly be the best solution to avoid the recurrence of such situations in the future.

150. Turning to developments in Spain and speaking on behalf of the Spanish delegation, he said that the electricity produced from Spain's nuclear power plants in 1994 had amounted to 55 300 GWh, or 34% of the country's total electricity production. With a load factor of 85.3%, the high level of technological development of the various companies which formed the management and support infrastructure of Spain's nuclear industry was beyond doubt.

151. Achievement of optimum conditions of safety and reliability in the Spanish nuclear industry was of paramount importance. Two major objectives in that area were the scheduled replacement of the steam generators at the Almaraz and Ascó plants, and the restart of the José Cabrera nuclear power plant after its closure for repairs.

152. In the area of radioactive waste management, his Government had approved the fourth general plan for radioactive waste, which took into account the new technical and economic circumstances affecting radioactive waste management in Spain. Spain would face a

significant technological challenge with the decommissioning of the Vandellós I plant, due to start in 1996. Waste declassification criteria would need to be established and agreement reached at the international level as soon as possible. With regard to high-level waste management, the strategy established in earlier plans had been maintained, involving the construction of a centralized facility for interim storage prior to deep geological disposal.

153. Turning to nuclear safety and radiological protection, he noted that Spain had ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety and was confident that the conditions would shortly be met for its early implementation. His delegation urged those countries which had not already done so to ratify the Convention at an early date. As it had stated on previous occasions, Spain hoped that a convention on radioactive waste management would be developed as a logical extension of that on nuclear safety. Spain welcomed the Board's approval in 1995 of the Principles of Radioactive Waste Management and the adoption of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. His delegation also supported the establishment of a set of advisory bodies with harmonized terms of references to assist the Secretariat in preparing and reviewing all documents and looked forward to participating actively in their work.

154. His delegation accorded high priority to the RADWASS programme and to the Agency's safety services such as OSART, ASSET and RAPAT. Spain had provided experts for such missions and had also submitted its nuclear power plants to various assessments. It was currently considering whether a new OSART mission should visit a Spanish facility in the near future. Spain also supported the Agency's analysis and assistance programmes for upgrading older power plants in close co-operation with Spanish engineering firms and institutions. The Secretariat's efforts in that area were commendable and the INSAG document on the subject was extremely useful.

155. His delegation welcomed the Agency's initiative in establishing the IRRT service to provide advice and assistance to Member States to strengthen the effectiveness of their regulatory bodies and to support the work of the ASCOT service in the assessment of safety culture. It also welcomed the expansion of INES, which promoted a climate of understanding with the media. The progress made in the work on the Agency's Regulations

for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, incorporating the ICRP's latest recommendations in line with the Basic Safety Standards, was also very gratifying.

156. Turning to non-proliferation, he welcomed the accession of Argentina and Chile to the NPT and Cuba's decision to sign the Tlatelolco Treaty, all of which constituted a valuable contribution to the international non-proliferation regime and promoted international co-operation. His delegation was confident that that Treaty would soon enter into force and consolidate Latin America as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was unfortunate, however, that the same could not be said of the Middle East, where there was still a high risk of conflict. His delegation therefore called on the States of that area, particularly those with unsafeguarded facilities, to accede to the NPT. The Agency should give priority to the resolution of that issue in order to help reduce tensions and correct the present imbalances in the Middle East.

157. The implementation of Programme 93+2 should enable important changes to be made in the safeguards system. Recent experience had demonstrated the urgent need to give priority to developing the capability to detect any undeclared nuclear activity. His delegation had always supported the view that Programme 93+2 should include a review of existing safeguards measures in addition to the introduction of new measures so as to ensure the strengthening of the safeguards system as a whole. An important element in improving efficiency should be to secure the greatest possible co-operation with existing regional systems, and especially with EURATOM. The Programme should therefore make a clearer distinction between national and regional systems and define the characteristics which the regional systems needed to enable the Agency to increase its co-operation with them.

158. The Spanish delegation hoped that the measures comprising Part 2 of Programme 93+2 would be approved at the meeting of the Board of Governors in December 1995, even though they might still require clarification, particularly with regard to the extent to which they might be applied both in respect of access to information and to facilities. A clear difference should also be established between facilities subject to safeguards and other types of activity. In that connection, it should not be forgotten that safeguards pursuant to the NPT or equivalent treaties were aimed at the nuclear material defined in Article XX of the Agency's Statute. Access to non-nuclear facilities and related

information should therefore be limited to the minimum necessary to guarantee the capability to detect clandestine nuclear activities without violating the rights of private individuals.

159. The implementation of Programme 93+2 should not be the end of the process of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards - the process should remain open so that the system could be adapted to constantly changing circumstances. To that end, following the approval of Part 2, a study should be carried out of the problems connected with the implementation of extensive environmental monitoring that would not be limited to nuclear facility sites, a measure which had been withdrawn somewhat hurriedly from the Programme 93+2 that had been originally proposed.

160. His delegation was aware that strengthening the safeguards system would initially entail an increase in cost, even though, as the Director General had stated on several occasions, the additional requirements would be offset in the medium-term by the effects of the methods to strengthen the system as a whole. In that connection, he reiterated that safeguards activities were one of the Agency's statutory obligations and consequently there was no reason why they should be financed any differently from any other Agency activity under the Regular Budget. In a spirit of compromise, his delegation had accepted the formula for the financing of safeguards for the next five years, although it had reservations about the advisability of including a new freeze mechanism. Nevertheless, his delegation was confident that the formula presented to the Conference for approval would be accepted as an intermediate stage in the process of incorporating safeguards into the Regular Budget without making any kind of distinction.

161. With regard to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, his delegation welcomed the compromise reached at the recent Board meeting on the target figure for the next biennium. However, as indicated at the time, his delegation did not agree that the approval of that figure should be accompanied by a recommendation establishing, de facto, a system of sanctions for countries whose voluntary contributions to the TCF did not correspond to their assessed share of the targets.

162. Spain contributed to the Agency's technical assistance activities in a variety of ways. In addition to its contribution to the TCF, which would be increased by $200 000 in 1996,

it also financed footnote-a/ projects, offered fellowships at Spanish nuclear firms or institutions, and hosted several Agency training courses each year, bearing all local costs. Those additional contributions had amounted to $764 000 in 1994, slightly higher than in 1993 despite budgetary restrictions. Co-operation could be further increased if the Secretariat made greater use of the potential of Spain's nuclear sector, both public and private.

APPLICATIONS FOR RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS

163. The PRESIDENT drew attention to document GC(39)/INF/20 entitled "Statement of Financial Contributions to the Agency as at 15 September 1995". Included in that document was a table indicating those Member States which had lost their voting rights by virtue of the application of Article XIX.A of the Statute. Since that document had been issued, Mongolia had paid the necessary amount and its name would therefore be deleted from the table in that document. Communications had been received from Iraq and from Belarus, which were among those Member States to which Article XIX.A of the Statute applied, requesting that their voting rights be restored. Those requests were contained in documents GC(39)/INF/7 and 17. He took it that, following past practice, those requests would be referred to the General Committee for consideration.

164. It was so agreed.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.