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THIRTY-NINTH (1995) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Friday, 22 September 1995, at 3.15 p.m.

President: Mr. KASEMSARN (Thailand)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda*</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
30	Report on voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund for 1996	1 - 3
7	General debate and annual report for 1994 (resumed)	4 - 36
27	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East (resumed)	37 - 77
-	Closing of the session	78 - 86

[*] GC(39)/27.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(39)/INF/21/Rev.2.

95-04448 (XV)

Abbreviations used in this record

Biological Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction
Chemical Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	Nuclear-weapon-free zone

REPORT ON VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION FUND FOR 1996 (GC(39)/25/Rev.4)

1. The PRESIDENT, drawing attention to document GC(39)/25/Rev.4, said that by 5.30 p.m. on 21 September 1995 the voluntary contributions pledged by Member States to the Technical Co-operation Fund for 1996 had reached a total of only US \$8 010 920. Since then \$310 000 had been pledged by Argentina, \$51 600 by Chile and \$60 000 by Colombia, bringing the total amount pledged to \$8 432 520.

2. Member States had been informed late of their shares of the recommended target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund for 1996 because that target and the Indicative Planning Figures for 1997 and 1998 had been agreed on by the Board only the previous week, and that probably accounted for the low level of pledges received so far.

3. He urged all delegations which had not yet done so to make their 1996 pledges and also to pay their contributions in full at the earliest opportunity so that the Secretariat might propose to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee a 1996 technical co-operation programme based on reasonably assured resources and subsequently implement the approved programme without hindrance or uncertainty.

The meeting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 4.50 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1994 (GC(39)/26/Rev.1 and GC(39)/26/Rev.1/Mod.1) (resumed)

4. The PRESIDENT said that since the delegate of the Philippines had introduced the draft resolution contained in document GC(39)/26/Rev.1 there had been extensive consultations, as a result of which document GC(39)/26/Rev.1/Mod.1 had been issued.

5. Mr. ZAIDE (Philippines) said that, in addition to the modifications set out in document GC(39)/26/Rev.1/Mod.1, it had been proposed that the word "immediate" be deleted from operative paragraph 4.

6. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution in document GC(39)/26/Rev.1 as modified.

7. The draft resolution in document GC(39)/26/Rev.1 was adopted as modified.

8. Mr. ARGÜELLO HURTADO (Nicaragua) said that, as a country of the Pacific Basin, Nicaragua was dismayed at the recent resumption of nuclear testing.

9. With regard to the resolution just adopted, his delegation was pleased that the weight of censure had been apportioned equally among the countries involved, despite the fact that some were more susceptible than others to public opinion and international pressure. That put paid to speculation, particularly in the media, that any one country was being singled out for particular criticism.

10. Mr. DOSHI (India), noting that his delegation had not participated in the informal consultations relating to the resolution just adopted, said that India was in favour of all genuine non-proliferation measures. To be genuine, however, non-proliferation had to have total nuclear disarmament as its ultimate aim.

11. The problem was not that some countries were testing their nuclear weaponry, but that there was altogether too much nuclear weaponry in the world. Non-proliferation had been useful as long as there had been few nuclear weapons in the world, but, with the tens of thousands of weapons now available in the nuclear-weapon States, nuclear disarmament was the only concept that could lead to world peace.

12. The resolution just adopted did speak of the need for total nuclear disarmament, but in a purely routine manner, by way of lip-service.

13. What his country would have liked to see in the resolution was an appeal to all States to take all steps necessary for achieving total and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament by a specific date, say the end of the year 2005. Unless the international community banished nuclear weapons as it had banished chemical weapons, the 21st century was going to be a difficult time for everyone.

14. He hoped, nevertheless, that the resolution just adopted would prove to be a step - however small - towards total nuclear disarmament.

15. Mr. MEADWAY (United Kingdom) said that the General Conference of the Agency, fundamentally a technical organization, was not the correct forum for consideration of the nuclear testing issue. There were other bodies where the issue was already receiving

active consideration, and it was for those bodies to pronounce on what was essentially a political question.

16. His delegation did not wish to see the Agency become a vehicle for ad hoc national or regional protests on political issues; that was incompatible with the responsibilities and activities of the Agency as provided for in its Statute. In a spirit of compromise and in keeping with the Agency's tradition of non-confrontation and consensus, however, his delegation had joined in the quest for a text which would not be divisive, its overriding aim being to ensure that the negotiations on a CTBT would not be jeopardized.

17. The resolution just adopted ran counter to his Government's position in several respects, but his delegation had decided not to block its adoption - a decision that should not be interpreted as an indication of agreement with all its provisions.

18. Mr. LI (China) said that the issue of nuclear testing did not lie within the competence of the Agency. It was being considered in the United Nations General Assembly and its First Committee, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in the Conference on Disarmament. Raising the issue in the General Conference could interfere with the normal functioning of the Agency, and it was certainly not conducive to progress in the negotiations on a CTBT. The Agency, which already had a heavy workload, should focus its attention and resources on tackling the issues which lay within its competence as effectively as possible.

19. The cessation of nuclear tests was not an isolated issue, but part of a process directed towards the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and hence the elimination once and for all of the threat of nuclear war. There were other, equally important issues. For example, there was the need for substantial reductions at an early date in the nuclear arsenals of the countries with most nuclear weapons so that the physical basis for the threat of nuclear war was eliminated; there was the need for the nuclear-weapon States concerned to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons; and there was the need for the nuclear-weapon States to conclude among themselves an agreement outlawing the use of and the threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). Once those issues had

been resolved, an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be concluded with the participation of all countries.

20. On the very first day of its possession of nuclear weapons, China had declared that it would under no circumstances be the first to use such weapons. Moreover, China unilaterally undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear-weapon States and NWFZs. On many occasions it had appealed for the conclusion of an international treaty the parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and NWFZs. At the previous session of the United Nations General Assembly, China had proposed the negotiation of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons similar to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Unfortunately its proposal had so far not met with a positive response.

21. Given China's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and NWFZs, it was evident that the small number of nuclear weapons possessed by China was intended entirely for self-defence and did not constitute a threat to any country. As an independent sovereign State not belonging to any military alliance and not enjoying the protection of any nuclear umbrella, China was obliged to maintain a small number of nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defence and consequently to conduct a very limited number of nuclear tests. Nevertheless, it appreciated the concerns expressed by a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States and recognized the importance of the early conclusion of a CTBT within the framework of a complete prohibition - and the complete destruction - of nuclear weapons. It was participating seriously in the negotiations on such a treaty and hoped that a truly comprehensive treaty which banned nuclear weapon test explosions, which provided for effective international verification and which enjoyed universal adherence would be concluded before the end of 1996. With the treaty's entry into force China would cease all nuclear tests.

22. All unbiased countries, and particularly those which in the past had suffered like China, could no doubt appreciate China's position. Although China was a nuclear-weapon

State, it was also a developing country, and it would prefer to devote its limited financial and material resources to economic development. It had always opposed the nuclear arms race and had neither the intention nor the ability to participate in such a race. More than any other country, it longed for general and complete nuclear disarmament leading to a world free of nuclear weapons.

23. China had never shirked its responsibilities in the field of nuclear disarmament, nor did it intend to renege on the commitments undertaken by it in the current nuclear disarmament negotiations. It welcomed all progress made in the CTBT negotiations and was convinced that the Conference on Disarmament - which had succeeded in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention - was capable of concluding a CTBT. If all those involved displayed the necessary political will, the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996 was possible. China would like to see all countries and international organizations helping to create the right political environment, so that the negotiators could perform their task without unnecessary interference.

24. In the light of what he had just said, his delegation had reservations about certain aspects of the resolution just adopted by the Conference. The fact that it had not prevented adoption of the resolution without a vote should not be taken to mean that it endorsed the contents in their entirety.

25. Mr. SNYDER (United States of America), noting that his delegation appreciated the concerns expressed by the co-sponsors of the resolution just adopted, said that his country had gone along with its adoption without a vote despite a strong conviction that political issues such as nuclear testing should be addressed in more appropriate international fora. Although his Government had expressed regret at the recent decisions to proceed with nuclear testing, it considered that raising the issue of nuclear testing in an organization concerned with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was unnecessary and even inappropriate.

26. Emphasizing his country's strong support for the current negotiations on a CTBT, he said that all nuclear-weapon States should adhere to a moratorium on testing pending the successful outcome of those negotiations.

27. President Clinton had recently committed the United States to the conclusion of a truly zero-yield CTBT in 1996 and was urging that the negotiations proceed as rapidly as possible. It was to be hoped that the action just taken by the General Conference would not slow down discussion of the complex issues relating to nuclear testing.

28. In conclusion, he commended the spirit of co-operation displayed by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution which the Conference had just adopted.

29. Mr. PRETTRE (France) said that in the interests of openness and transparency his delegation had refrained from entering into a procedural discussion about the competence of the General Conference to deal with the matter under consideration. It was grateful to all those delegations which had displayed a spirit of conciliation.

30. The resolution, which reflected the concerns of certain delegations, had been adopted without a vote and hence without the calmness of the Conference's deliberations being disturbed. At the same time, however, his delegation, while appreciating some of the concerns which had been expressed, could not associate itself with some of the assertions made and judgements passed in the text.

31. Many delegations had claimed that the resumption of nuclear testing by France was not in conformity with the decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" taken on 11 May 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference, pursuant to which the nuclear-weapon States were required to exercise utmost restraint with regard to nuclear testing. By conducting a final series of - at the most - eight tests due to be completed in May 1996 at the latest, France was not in any way repudiating the commitment into which it had entered in New York. It was firmly committed to the NPT and had, like the vast majority of the States parties, supported its indefinite and unconditional extension. It agreed fully with the principles and objectives of the NPT, including those of Article VI, which placed a special responsibility on it. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control was a goal to which France subscribed.

32. He wished to correct the impression that the final series of tests was contrary to France's firm commitment to a CTBT. The purpose of the decision taken by the President

of the French Republic was precisely to be able to sign the CTBT in 1996 and hence to put an end to nuclear testing, which had been only suspended in 1992.

33. France needed to master the simulation techniques necessary for ensuring the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal in the future; it had no intention of increasing the number or the power of its nuclear weapons or creating new nuclear weapon types. It was irrevocably committed to signing a CTBT in 1996, and it had in fact been the first nuclear-weapon State to accept prohibition by the envisaged CTBT of the testing of all nuclear weapons and all other nuclear explosive devices whatever their strength.

34. France appreciated the concerns of numerous States about the effects of nuclear tests on the environment, and in the interests of complete transparency foreign journalists and scientists (and the Agency) had been invited to verify how innocuous its tests were. In particular, it would do everything to ensure that the international scientific team which it had requested the Agency to organize was able to carry out its mission under optimum conditions of transparency and objectivity, with the participation of experts from the Pacific region. An arrangement to that end would be negotiated between France and the Agency.

35. Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan) said that Pakistan was fully committed to nuclear non-proliferation and had put forward several proposals in that connection, including one for the creation of an NWFZ in South Asia. Also, it had been participating constructively in the discussions of the Conference on Disarmament, which it felt was the appropriate forum for discussions on a CTBT. As the Agency was a technical body with an extensive agenda of its own, it should not be burdened with matters which were outside the mainstream of its activities.

36. Ms. TAMAYO de ARNAL (Bolivia), welcoming the adoption of the resolution, said that her country was very concerned about the negative impact which nuclear testing could have on the environment and human health, not to mention the effect it might have on the current CTBT negotiations.

APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (GC(39)/20,
GC(39)/34/Rev.1, GC(39)/41) (resumed)

37. The PRESIDENT said that informal consultations had been under way for some time regarding the draft resolutions contained in documents GC(39)/34/Rev.1 and GC(39)/41 and asked what stage they had reached.

38. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) said that they were continuing.

The meeting was suspended at 5.30 p.m. and resumed at 6.45 p.m.

39. Mr. EL FADHEL KHALIL (Tunisia), replying to the PRESIDENT, said that the informal consultations were still continuing.

The meeting was suspended at 6.50 p.m. and resumed at 7.35 p.m.

40. Mr. EL-FEKI (Egypt), replying to the PRESIDENT, said that those involved in the informal consultations had agreed that the Conference should adopt - with necessary minor changes - resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 adopted in 1994. He hoped that the Conference would adopt it without a vote.

41. Mr. ALTER (Israel) said that, in keeping with the peace process under way in the Middle East region, his delegation would go along with the adoption of that resolution.

42. The PRESIDENT, noting that it was his understanding that the draft resolutions contained in documents GC(39)/34/Rev.1 and GC(39)/41 had been withdrawn, said he assumed that the Conference wished to adopt resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 (with one resolution number, one document number and the Conference session number changed) without a vote.

43. It was so agreed.

44. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) said that in the resolution just adopted the Conference affirmed "the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities". However, the only State in the Middle East with nuclear weapons which had not acceded to the NPT was Israel.

45. Noting that the resolution referred to "the activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East", he said that the group's activities were being hampered by Israel's refusal to withdraw from occupied Arab territories.

46. Each year the Conference adopted a resolution in which it requested the Director General "to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region". The only State impeding "the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region" was Israel, but no reference was ever made to it in the resolutions adopted. For the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, it was essential that Israel first subject all its nuclear facilities to comprehensive Agency safeguards.

47. Mr. HOBEICA (Lebanon) said that, while it had not wished to prevent adoption of the resolution without a vote, his delegation had reservations about operative paragraph 4, which referred to the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security. It considered that the group would not produce positive results until progress had been made in all directions.

48. For Lebanon the road to peace in the Middle East was blocked by the intransigence of Israel in refusing to comply with United Nations resolutions, and especially with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), in which the Council called upon Israel to "withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory".

49. Moreover, Israel, with its nuclear weapons, was a threat to Lebanon and the entire Middle East region, and the international community should therefore insist that Israel accede to the NPT.

50. Mr. de YTURRIAGA (Spain) said that the European Union (EU) was perplexed and frustrated by the result of the consultations regarding the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, which was reminiscent of "the mountain in labour which had brought forth a mouse". Nevertheless, it had joined in the consensus - albeit without enthusiasm.

51. Behaving like an ostrich was not very clever; however much one buried one's head in the sand, one could not ignore the fact that in May the NPT had been extended indefinitely by acclamation. Consequently, the EU would like all States in all regions to accede to the NPT for the benefit of all mankind.

52. Mr. WALKER (Australia) associated himself with the statement made by the delegate of Spain.

53. Mr. OWN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his delegation had joined in the consensus although it did not accept everything in the resolution just adopted. It had its own views regarding the Middle East peace process and reservations about the peace negotiations referred to in the resolution. It also had reservations about the fact that there was no explicit reference to Israel in the resolution.

54. Mr. EL-FEKI (Egypt) said that his country, which was well aware of the importance of ridding the Middle East of weapons, would like the Agency to support efforts to that end through the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region.

55. His delegation would have liked the resolution just adopted to invite the Director General to prepare, with the help of experts, a model treaty concerning the application of safeguards in the Middle East, and it hoped that such an invitation would be forthcoming in the not-too-distant future.

56. Mr. ASWAD (Iraq) said that his delegation had joined in the consensus despite the fact that the resolution made no specific reference to Israel and the fact that it had reservations about operative paragraph 4 of the resolution.

57. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation approved of those parts of the draft resolution just adopted which reflected a genuine desire for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, but that it was unhappy about certain other parts.

58. The reference in operative paragraph 2 to "the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities" played down the hazardous non-peaceful nuclear activities of Israel. The

generalization of the Middle East safeguards issue was rather like the generalization of the issue of accession to the NPT, to which Israel was blatantly refusing to accede.

59. As regards operative paragraph 4, his delegation considered the linkage made between bilateral peace negotiations on one hand and multilateral arms control and regional security measures on the other to be irrational; there would be no just and lasting peace in the Middle East until Israel and its supporters appreciated the peaceful aspirations of the peoples of the region and deigned to abide by international commitments.

60. Accession to the NPT was the primary evidence of the sincerity of any State advocating the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. It was illogical to ignore Israel's rejection of the NPT and at the same time to expect the Middle East States which were parties to the NPT to promote mutual confidence and security in the Middle East through, inter alia, the establishment of an NWFZ - and it played into the hands of Israel.

61. A few decades previously, his country had been a pioneer in proposing the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. Since then, substantial progress towards the establishment of NWFZs had been made elsewhere, but in the Middle East there had been nothing but failure, due to Israel's refusal to enter into international denuclearization commitments.

62. No country was justified in refusing to join in establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East on the grounds that it was involved in a bilateral or multilateral conflict, and the difficulties of the Middle East would remain until Israel had been pressured into accepting international demands for denuclearization of the region.

63. His country deplored the fact that, although the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a major international issue and the international community had made significant non-proliferation efforts, no effective measure had yet been taken against the non-peaceful nuclear activities of the Israeli régime.

64. Mr. OMER (Sudan), recalling that in 1994 his country had withdrawn from the list of co-sponsors of the draft resolution which (with one amendment) had been adopted

by the General Conference as resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21¹, said that his country had done so because of the intransigence of one State. A year later, his delegation still believed that resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 was unsatisfactory, but it had not wished to block its re-adoption without a vote at the current session of the Conference.

65. The resolution just adopted was far too weak as regards pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT, and it did not provide for an acceleration of the process of establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East.

66. His delegation therefore had reservations about the resolution just adopted, particularly as it contained no reference to Israel - the only State in the Middle East which had not subjected all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards.

67. Mr. SIEVERING (United States of America) said that his delegation had joined in the consensus regarding the resolution just adopted although, by definition, a consensus did not satisfy anyone completely.

68. His delegation believed that the resolution should have stated that the General Conference welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT in May 1995, as the overwhelming majority of the Agency's Member States were parties to the NPT and had worked hard to achieve that positive outcome of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The omission of a reference to the indefinite extension of the NPT was regrettable but, in keeping with his country's support for the Middle East peace process, his delegation had deferred to the countries which had been most closely involved in the consultations leading to the consensus.

69. Mr. WALKER (Canada) said that his delegation also was disappointed that the resolution just adopted contained no reference to the indefinite extension of the NPT.

70. Mr. ALTER (Israel) said that Israel had joined in the consensus because it was in favour of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East in due course. However, the resolution just adopted contained elements which ran counter to policies of his Government, which disassociated itself from those elements.

¹ See para. 54 of GC(XXXVIII)/OR.10.

71. For the sake of clarity, he proposed to reiterate his Government's policy on the nuclear issue, which was based on four principles.

72. The first principle related to comprehensiveness: the nuclear issue should be dealt with in the context of the peace process and of all the regional security problems, both conventional and non-conventional.

73. The second principle related to the regional framework: nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East would be achieved and be seen to be achieved only by making the Middle East a mutually verifiable NWFZ in due course.

74. The third principle related to the need for a step-by-step approach: for reasons of practicality, it was necessary to begin the process with confidence- and security-building measures, with the establishment of peace relations and with reconciliation, dealing in due course with conventional and non-conventional arms control, priority being given to systems which experience had shown to be destructive and destabilizing.

75. The fourth principle related to the primacy of the peace process: negotiations on all the issues concerned with the security of the region had to be free and direct - as they in fact were in the bilateral and multilateral talks taking place within the framework of the peace process.

76. Israel invited all Member States to respect the inviolability of the current negotiations, in which all issues pertaining to peace in all its aspects had been or would ultimately be taken up and which were beginning to yield manifest results. In those negotiations, it was - as the General Conference knew - Israel which, in return for being allowed to live in peace, was expected to make concessions of substance, and in that connection it was worth recalling the statement made by the delegate of the United Kingdom during the Conference's consideration of the nuclear testing issue: in that statement he had said that the General Conference of the Agency, fundamentally a technical organization, was not the correct forum for consideration of that issue, that there were other bodies where the issue was already receiving active consideration, that it was for those bodies to pronounce on what was essentially a political question and that his delegation did not wish to see the Agency become a vehicle for ad hoc

national or regional protests on political issues. His delegation agreed wholeheartedly with those remarks, which applied equally to the issue under consideration now.

77. In conclusion, he wished to finish with an expression of hope for peace and reconciliation in the Middle East in a better future.

CLOSING OF SESSION

78. Mr. HODEL (Switzerland), speaking on behalf of Professor Baer, the President of the General Conference at its previous session, and on behalf of all delegations, congratulated the President on the efficient and diplomatic manner in which he had presided over the Conference at its thirty-ninth session. The Governor from Switzerland had had the good fortune to be Mr. Kasemsarn's neighbour in the Board of Governors during the past year and was sure that the Board would continue to benefit from his wisdom during the coming year.

79. The PRESIDENT, having thanked the representative of Switzerland for his kind words, said that the current session of the General Conference was the first in which he had participated and that he understood from colleagues that it had been a particularly harmonious session. There had of course been some awkward issues, but they had ultimately been resolved in a spirit of compromise, reflecting the general desire to put the Agency's interests first.

80. Two long-standing issues which had been dealt with were the financing of safeguards and Article VI of the Statute. Financing arrangements for safeguards had been approved and, although they were not to everyone's liking, that had effectively defused the safeguards financing issue for a few years. With regard to Article VI of the Statute, some tentative movement had been made after a period of almost complete immobility.

81. The Director General and the Secretariat had been set a number of tasks, and Member States were now looking forward to seeing - at the next session of the General Conference - how those tasks had been tackled.

82. Presiding over the session had been an interesting - almost an enjoyable - experience. It had been a privilege to work so closely with the Director General on so many issues, and

he greatly appreciated the support which he had received from all delegations. That co-operation had greatly facilitated his task and augured well for the future of the Agency.

83. He was grateful to the Director General and his staff - including the interpreters, the translators, the précis-writers, the printers and the officers in charge of documents control - for their valuable support and particularly grateful for the assistance which he had received from the Secretariat of the Policy-making Organs, the Head of which, Mr. Sanmuganathan, had, with his most valuable advice, contributed greatly to the success of the Conference session.

84. On behalf of the Conference, he thanked the Austrian authorities and the city of Vienna for the traditional hospitality which had been enjoyed by all during the week.

85. In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure, he invited all delegations to observe a minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

86. The PRESIDENT declared the thirty-ninth regular session of the General Conference closed.

The meeting rose at 8.10 p.m.

