MEASURES AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN
NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

From 13 to 15 September 1995 the Secretariat hosted an interagency meeting on Illicit Cross-Border Movement of Nuclear Material and Other Radioactive Sources held to assess how international organizations can support States in combatting illicit trafficking. As mentioned in the Director General's statement to the General Conference, a number of useful conclusions were reached at the meeting. These conclusions are being circulated in the Attachment to this document for the information of Member States.
INTERAGENCY MEETING ON THE ILLICIT CROSS-BORDER
MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
13-15 SEPTEMBER 1995 - VIENNA, AUSTRIA

Recent news stories have created considerable interest in the illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive sources. Although overstated, there have been a number of incidents involving both nuclear materials and other radioactive sources which indicate a real problem which has generated a number of actions at the international level. As a result of contacts with other international organizations on this matter, the IAEA determined that it would be timely to convene a meeting of a number of international organizations to discuss these activities and determine if further co-ordination and cooperation would be useful.

Such a meeting was convened in Vienna from 13 to 15 September 1995. It was attended by representatives of the following organizations:
United Nations, New York
World Customs Organizations
International Atomic Energy Agency
Economic Commission for Europe
European Commission
EURATOM
INTERPOL
EUROPOL
International Air Transport Association
International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations
Universal Postal Union

The International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization were also invited, but because of other commitments could not attend. Representatives of both organizations indicated that they supported this meeting and would co-operate in any further activities of this group.

At the meeting, there were wide ranging discussions about illicit trafficking. A number of ideas and suggestions were made. This paper, reviewed by all participants, provides a synopsis of the more important conclusions from that meeting.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Secure handling of radioactive materials, physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear material accounting and control are State responsibilities. International organizations must play a key role in reminding and assisting States to increase their competence in these areas and increase their vigilance in combatting illicit trafficking. Adequate preventive and responsive measures within a State for the protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources should make unlikely their availability for international illicit transfer.
2. In the past, the carriage of radioactive and nuclear materials has been mainly a radiation protection issue. However, a broad shift of concerns created by illicit transportation places the subject well into the area of security as well as being a "dangerous goods" matter. An emphasis on "safety and security culture" should be introduced in State and industrial commercial programmes concerned with the movement of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. All groups involved should strive to raise the security awareness of their members.

3. An international regime and the attendant legal instruments is generally in place and provides a good basis for supporting States in their efforts to combat illicit trafficking. At the national level, further implementation is needed. Some particular suggestions discussed were:
   - The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials should be adopted by more States. At present, only 53 States have ratified the Convention.
   - All nuclear materials under a State's jurisdiction should be covered by measures specified in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, as appropriate.
   - All radioactive sources should be regulated in a manner consistent and compatible with the IAEA Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation (IAEA Safety Series No. 115).

4. Although the Convention on Physical Protection obligates each state to establish certain legislation, it is not clear whether these have been appropriately implemented by the States. The IAEA, in cooperation with relevant international organizations, as appropriate, should consider a study to determine the extent of compliance with this convention.

5. As recommended by the Technical Committee Meeting on the Competent Authority Actions for Compliance with Regulations in Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 12-16 June 1995, the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Safety Series No. 6, should be revised to explicitly consider, where appropriate, cases of illicit trafficking.

RESPONSE

6. At the national level, a focal point should be designated to coordinate matters dealing with illegal trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive sources.

7. At least for nuclear materials of a sensitive nature (e.g. highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium), the State Authorities should immediately upon discovery inform other relevant States, international law enforcement organizations and customs authorities of the theft or disappearance of such materials. Under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, there is an obligation for States to notify concerned States where there is theft of nuclear materials in international transport.

8. International organizations and associations, as well as States, should intensify their assistance in the area of prevention to States or national entities that may need and wish such assistance.
9. Points of Contact should be maintained among the Agencies represented at the meeting. The IAEA offered to maintain such a list and periodically take action to update it. It was also recognized that among these organizations, there is considerable expertise which would be useful to be brought to bear in an incident. Consideration should be given to developing arrangements so that appropriate experts can be contacted in a timely manner, when needed.

ASSISTANCE NEEDS

10. Training, in general, was identified as the primary need for both the international organizations themselves and States. For example, there is a pressing need for simple manuals, particularly an internationally uniform manual (or set of guidelines) on nuclear material and radioactive sources (nature, shape, uses, etc.) for field personnel (customs, postal and police officers). Specific manuals, e.g., radiation protection and security guidance, should also be considered.

11. Another high priority requirement that was identified was the need for better detection equipment in the field. The IAEA should develop guidance and specifications for detection equipment and operational procedures for use at borders and airport facilities.

ILLCIT TRAFFICKING DATA BASES

12. Great emphasis should be placed on the availability of a reliable, extensive, consolidated and continuously updated data bases on cases of illicit trafficking. In view of the confusion prevailing in the media - and also in official organizations due to different definitions of what constitutes a case - a solid data base available to the public, e.g. that being set up by the IAEA, would be of immense help.

13. In the context of a data base and the exchange of case data, it would be desirable to define a common reporting scheme to ensure the registration of key information. Two reporting formats might be considered: one simple for fast reporting, one extensive for reliable case identification. This could facilitate a structured and well organized information exchange.

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

14. Urge co-operation and co-ordination between and among States and international organizations to avoid the duplication and overlap of efforts. Ways should be found to speed up the communication/co-ordination process. Information sharing among the international organizations and States should be carried out to the maximum extent compatible with national security interests and judiciary restraints.

15. In addition, among the organizations were unique capabilities and strengths that could be brought to bear on the issue of illicit trafficking. This first meeting was extremely informative. Yearly meetings should be held to review ways in which the organizations can better support each other's efforts in combatting the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.