STRENGTHENING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

Report by the Director General to the General Conference

Corrigendum

ANNEX 2

In document GC(39)/17, the first two pages of Annex 2 were inadvertently omitted. Attached is a complete version of Annex 2.
ANNEX 2


Excerpt from the record of the Board's 858th meeting

21. As requested, document GOV/2784 spelled out the technical, legal and financial aspects of specific measures proposed to strengthen the safeguards system and improve its cost-effectiveness. The report in that document represented an important step in an intensive effort that had begun with the Board's endorsement - in December 1993 - of Programme 93+2, a development programme proposed by the Secretariat. The point had now been reached where decisions must be considered - decisions that would determine the continuing credibility of the safeguards system as an effective instrument in the pursuit of global security objectives. He trusted that the Board would shoulder its responsibility in the serious and constructive manner for which it was well known, and he wished to offer some comments which might be useful as background to the Board's discussion.

22. Firstly, after the events in Iraq it had been evident to the Board - and indeed to the world - that the safeguards system must be strengthened, particularly in order to provide greater assurance that government declarations of nuclear material and installations were correct and complete - that nothing had been forgotten or hidden. The Secretariat had already been taking steps in that direction, with certain new measures supported by the Board, including the early submission of design information and the more extensive reporting of nuclear-related imports and exports.
23. It had been the Board that had concluded that a more systematic exploration of new approaches and techniques was needed and SAGSI that had first sketched out a programme. After discussion in the Board, the programme elements had been subjected to analysis and extensive testing by the Secretariat with the generous help of many Member States.

24. The Secretariat was now presenting measures which, in its view, would lead to significant improvements in the safeguards system - beyond the improvements continuously made in the past - while at the same time achieving economies.

25. Early in the Iraq affair he had identified greater Agency access to information and greater inspector access to sites as key elements of more effective safeguards. In the report before the Board, the Secretariat had proceeded on that basis, envisaging - as it should - also the use of new techniques.

26. Not only the case of Iraq pointed to the need for the Agency to strengthen safeguards. With expanding nuclear disarmament and arms control measures, all countries would demand highly credible verification in the nuclear field. Although the measures described in document GOV/2784 were designed with only comprehensive, INFCIRC/153-type safeguards in mind, they might prove to be of importance later - say in the verification of a cut-off agreement. It was necessary to be forward-looking.

27. Secondly, the Board should continue to work with determination, maintaining the momentum which it had already developed - but it should not rush. There should be full discussion, attention should be paid to criticism and to new suggestions, and adjustments should be made where necessary. He hoped there would subsequently be constructive conclusions. In the 25th year of the NPT, and at a time when the Tlatelolco Treaty might soon enter fully into force, the world would certainly be watching how the Agency adapted to today's verification challenges.

28. The report described a number of measures which, in the view of the Secretariat, could be taken on the basis of existing authority - for example, environmental sampling as a new surveillance method at sites where the Agency was already entitled to perform inspections. Other measures, in the Secretariat's view, presupposed the giving of new, specific consent by individual safeguards partners. He believed that the Secretariat had steered a reasonable course in the interpretation of safeguards agreements. The form in which such complementary authority might best be given, where it was needed, would have to be discussed.
29. Thirdly, the Secretariat did not believe that the measures described were very onerous or that they would in the long term burden the budgets of the Agency or of States. They would, however, call for greater co-operation and good will - for example, the abolition of visa requirements for inspectors visiting countries for inspection purposes, or at least the issuing to them of multiple-visit visas, and the granting to inspectors of greater freedom of access beyond so-called strategic points within safeguarded nuclear installations during routine inspections. On the other hand, they would not allow inspectors to move about at will.

30. Fourthly, although some of the proposed measures could be taken independently of others and still be useful, the greatest additional strengthening of safeguards and the greatest economies would be achieved through adoption of the whole spectrum of measures.

31. Finally, acceptance by the Board of the recommendations contained in paragraph 110 of document GOV/2784 would not imply an endorsement of the specific measures described in the document or of the legal interpretations which were advanced. Such endorsement would have to await consideration by the Board in June of the merits of the measures and the plan for implementation, with regard both to the measures for which, in the Secretariat’s view, legal authority already existed and to those for which specific authority might need to be obtained through the consent of the relevant Member State. However, acceptance of those recommendations - perhaps with some minor adjustments - would enable the Secretariat to proceed with the preparation of specific proposals for consideration and approval in June.