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<u>President</u>: Mr. BAER (Switzerland) Later: Mr. GARCIA DE LA CRUZ (Cuba)

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[*] GC(XXXVIII)/25.

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
Basic Safety	
Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing
	Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
G-7	Group of Seven
GNP	Gross national product
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
LDC	Least developed country
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency (of OECD)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	Nuclear-weapon-free zone
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and
	the Caribbean
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1961)
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WHO	World Health Organization
World Bank (IBRD)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1993 (GC(XXXVIII)/2 and Corr.1) (continued)

1. <u>Mr. FRANK</u> (Israel) said that it was impossible to predict how the momentous changes occurring in many parts of the world in recent years would evolve further. In many instances, however, endeavours could be made to shape the future.

2. In the Middle East, too, the past year had seen remarkable developments with a significant breakthrough in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians resulting in the Declaration of Principles and, subsequently, the Gaza-Jericho Accord. Furthermore, the talks with Jordan had resulted in the termination of the state of war with that country and were expected to lead to a gradual normalization of relations.

3. It was to be hoped that those achievements would act as a catalyst to further progress in the peace process, ushering in a new era of understanding, reconciliation, security, co-operation and economic growth in the region. The process had only just begun, however, and goodwill, patience and restraint would be required from all the parties in order to create a climate conducive to the confidence necessary for further progress. It should be noted that some States in the region kept themselves aloof from the peace process or - even worse continued to deny Israel's right to exist and refused to forswear war as a means of settling disputes.

4. Parallel to the bilateral talks, the multilateral track of the peace process was also yielding promising results, despite the inherent regional problems. Israel and its partners had made important progress in the five working groups dealing with the environment, water, refugees, economic co-operation and arms control and regional security. In the last group, agreement was imminent on practical confidence- and security-building measures such as the establishment of a regional communication hub, co-operation in maritime search and rescue operations, and joint modalities for dealing with incidents at sea. The group's May meeting in Qatar had resulted in a joint declaration on arms control and regional security to be signed in Morocco in December.

5. That declaration consisted of three parts, the first of which dealt with the fundamental principles governing security relations among the participants in the arms control and

regional security process. The second part, which laid down guidelines for the process, specified that arms control and regional security were integral to the peace process and emphasized the comprehensive scope of the security process, covering a broad range of measures and addressing all threats to security and all categories of arms. It also set forth a step-by-step approach, establishing a series of ambitious goals to be attained by realistic methods. The basis for decision-making on each issue was to be consensus among the regional participants directly concerned. The third part of the declaration included statements of intent with regard to a number of specific objectives, namely conflict prevention, the limitation of military spending, the reduction of stockpiles of conventional arms and prevention of a conventional arms race, and the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

6. In view of the complexity of the peace negotiations in progress, the international organizations should refrain from any activities, including the adoption of resolutions, that might detract from the interrelated and comprehensive character of the regional negotiations. The evident changes in the Middle East should encourage the Agency's policy-making organs to adopt positions more in tune with the new situation and to demonstrate the caution and restraint warranted by the region's unique problems. Above all, the Agency should endorse the primacy of the peace talks and support the principles of free and direct negotiations between the parties without attempting to single out any one issue. While matters of security should be settled among the States of the region alone, the Agency could, at the invitation of the negotiating parties in the peace process, place its expertise at their disposal with a view to contributing to efforts to build confidence and reduce hostility among the States.

7. The General Conference, at its previous year's session, had taken some cognizance of the peace process, and the substantive and irreversible concessions Israel was supposed to be making were well known. It should be remembered, however, that consensus on the General Conference resolutions adopted since 1991 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East had only been reached after the discouragement of attempts in 1992 and 1993 to invest the Agency with greater powers in matters falling within the scope of the peace negotiations. Non-proliferation was to be assured primarily through the establishment of a credible nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which should be directly negotiated between all States of the region and include stringent mutual verification arrangements. It should be negotiated within the framework of the peace negotiations, but not until peaceful relations had been established in the region. As long as several States continued to deny Israel's right to exist, it was inconceivable that measures infringing on its security should precede the establishment of peace on the negotiating agenda. However, as an expression of support for the eventual establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, Israel was willing once again to join the consensus on the resolution, provided no changes were made in the previous year's resolution in an attempt to introduce divisive issues and detract from the sovereignty of the peace negotiations.

8. In view of the challenges facing the nuclear community and the vast potential of nuclear applications, it was essential for the Agency to concentrate on matters directly related to its mandate.

9. The Agency was to be commended for its tireless efforts to dispel public misconceptions and gain public acceptance, especially in the field of nuclear safety. It deserved congratulations, in particular, on its contribution towards the successful completion of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, whose development Israel had supported and assisted from the outset. The Convention made available to Member States the combined experience and expertise of the nuclear community worldwide and could therefore be assured of the widest possible support.

10. Israel had endorsed the Annex to the Final Act, which provided some necessary guidelines for the subsequent development of the Rules of Procedure. In particular, it called attention to the principle that overall responsibility for nuclear safety rested with national authorities alone and that no attempt should be made, when implementing the Convention locally, to change or dilute that responsibility.

11. Israel also attached great importance to the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, which had done important work in reviewing existing documents and elaborating a supplementary funding convention. Israel would be presenting its views on those matters, including the very promising new proposal by the United States of America, at the Committee's meeting in October. It hoped that the vital work in that area would also be completed successfully and that it would gain the unanimous approval of all the Member States.

12. Risk management and the issue of public acceptance were generally regarded as crucial for any future development of industrial nuclear applications. The public's perception of risk was based not merely on statistical probabilities such as the expected numbers of deaths, but was also influenced by psychological factors. The Agency should explore ways and means of improving the communication of information on nuclear risk. It could, for instance, establish guidelines for providing unbiased information geared to public perceptions with a view to permitting more informed and rational decision-making. Most importantly, it should assist in the establishment of criteria for the detailed, objective evaluation of the information disseminated.

13. The Agency's activities in the field of water desalination in arid areas had resulted in state-of-the-art documents and recommendations. Much remained to be done, however, in order to resolve that serious problem which affected his region among others. A thorough investigation of the optimal nuclear as well as non-nuclear options and their full implications was needed before a recommendation could be made concerning a demonstration plant. The Agency could and should act as a focal point, providing guidelines and recommendations for desalination based on any energy source.

14. The Agency was to be commended for its excellent work in the high-priority area of food irradiation. The application of that urgently-needed technique - wholeheartedly recommended by all the relevant organizations - was being subjected to unjustified delays and obstacles, hence the pressing need to get to the root of public misgivings and to provide the necessary information explaining the enormous advantages of the technique.

15. With regard to the item on the restoration of IAEA technical assistance to his country, he recalled that Israel had submitted a resolution to the General Conference calling for such action. The adoption of that resolution would represent an important step towards restoring Israel's confidence that it could expect fair treatment from the Agency's policy-making

organs and that it would be permitted to enjoy its full privileges as a Member of the Agency in accordance with the statutory principle of the sovereign equality of Member States.

16. -Finally, he hoped that in the coming months progress would be made in the peace process in his strife-torn region and that genuine confidence and reconciliation among all States in the region would overcome old suspicions and hostility. The Agency and the General Conference could support that process by squarely endorsing the primacy of the peace process.

17. <u>Ms. OK</u> (Turkey), noting that the thirty-eighth General Conference was meeting in a changed economic, political and social climate in which international concerns about the Cold War system of security no longer existed, said that a more realistic collective security system had to be developed. The contemporary challenge was twofold: peace, on the one hand, and development on the other. Turkey heartily welcomed developments in the Middle East peace process and believed that the present momentum should be fully utilized to move at an accelerated pace towards the ultimate objectives set forth in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The General Conference should examine ways and means of providing assistance to the Palestinian autonomous authority.

18. Four years had elapsed since the crisis in the Persian Gulf had been precipitated by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Tension in the region persisted. Turkey was, however, pleased at the positive co-operation between Iraq, the Agency and UNSCOM with a view to implementation of Security Council resolutions 707 and 715. It urged Iraq to meet all of its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions so that it could resume its place in the international community.

19. Her delegation was also heartened by the improving situation on the Korean Peninsula and hoped that Agency inspections would be applied to the second processing line. Peace on the Peninsula was important for détente in the world as a whole. As the time approached for the extension of the NPT, the international community wanted to see guarantees for and a commitment to full compliance with the Treaty. Her delegation hoped that those consultations on the Treaty's extension would be fruitful. 20. One of the Agency's outstanding achievements of the past year had been the preparation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which Turkey had signed. The Convention should help improve safety at nuclear power plants. Although the Convention represented a major step forward in terms of formulating national safety regulations, its scope remained limited. Work should proceed on developing further international safety instruments for other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

21. The Secretariat was to be congratulated on finalizing the Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, contained in document GOV/2715. That document would fill a major gap in that particular area at the international level.

22. Her delegation was pleased at the progress made by the Secretariat in promulgating the Safety Fundamentals document on the principles of radioactive waste management. It urged the Secretariat to expedite finalization of all the documents in the Safety Standards series and to plan activities leading to the drafting of a safety convention on waste management.

23. Although it had no nuclear power programme, Turkey attached great importance to the subject of radioactive waste. It had - with the Agency's help - set up a radioactive waste processing plant at the Istanbul Cekmece Nuclear Research Centre to process low-level radioactive waste from medicine and industry. Her Government hoped that the Agency would make more use of the plant in future for regional training purposes.

24. In view of the significance of studies to evaluate the dumping of radioactive waste at sea, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority had proposed the establishment of a laboratory, similar to that in Monaco, to carry out research into radiological and environmental waste management.

25. Substantial work had been done during the past year on the question of liability for nuclear damage. Unfortunately the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had not been able to reach agreement regarding the two alternative systems for a supplementary funding convention. Her delegation hoped that the Standing Committee would

be able to settle the outstanding issues at its forthcoming meetings in October and November and reach consensus on a final text of a convention on supplementary funding.

26. Nuclear applications had a major role to play in the assessment of limited water resources and their optimum management. Turkey was pleased with the activities and regional projects being undertaken by the Agency in that field and had itself been actively involved in the regional project entitled "Isotope Hydrology in the Middle East" (RER/8/002). While Turkey's freshwater resources were sufficient for the time being, future development schemes would involve more complex hydrological systems where nuclear applications would be of particular use. Turkey's national isotope hydrology laboratory, established in 1964, provided services to all the relevant national bodies. The laboratory had recently been upgraded and now had a full analytical capability for undertaking environmental isotope analyses of water samples for hydrological applications. Her country was grateful for the support given by the Agency in that regard and was willing to co-operate in future regional projects in the Middle East in the field of isotope hydrology.

27. Her Government was closely following the Agency's activities in relation to the safety assessment of RBMK and old WWER-type reactors in Eastern and Central Europe. It welcomed the follow-up safety missions to all WWER-440/230 plants and the seismic review missions. Nevertheless, it reminded the Secretariat that under Article 6 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, if the safety of a nuclear installation could not be upgraded, plans to shut down the installation should be implemented as soon as practically possible. The Secretariat should therefore keep Member States, particularly those situated near such plants, informed of the Agency's activities to strengthen the safety of such plants. It should also submit periodical reports on safety improvements to review conferences of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and make recommendations as to whether individual plants should be allowed to continue operating. Furthermore, concerned Member States should have access to information available in the Secretariat on the accident risk, operational standards and seismic situation of those plants. Her delegation also believed that the development of national legal and regulatory structures in the countries in which those reactors were located was of the utmost importance. The Secretariat should provide assistance to the States concerned and report on progress to the Board.

28. The forthcoming NPT Extension Conference in 1995 focused attention on the Agency's increasing role in developing a more effective safeguards regime. While there was a strong commitment on the part of many countries, including Turkey, to extend the NPT regime unconditionally and indefinitely, there were also serious concerns about its shortcomings, particularly with regard to its monitoring and verification mechanisms. One of the most efficient ways of strengthening the NPT was international monitoring of trade in fissionable material and technologies. The Board had already endorsed a voluntary reporting scheme under which Member States would provide information required under existing safeguards agreements. That was a positive development and her country hoped that all Member States would participate. Her delegation also welcomed the measures put forward by SAGSI to enhance the Agency's ability to detect undeclared facilities and activities.

29. The General Conference should take advantage of the current climate of détente and try to close loopholes in the safeguards regime. Whereas, in the past, Agency safeguards had been limited to declared programmes, the demands had changed since the case of Iraq. The Secretariat's ability to detect undisclosed nuclear installations and material was enhanced by access to information from Member States. The Agency was pursuing its right to undertake special inspections and the Security Council had been much more active than before in utilizing its right to take enforcement measures in cases of non-compliance. While fully supporting those developments, Turkey considered that the NPT Extension Conference should make a new leap forward in reinforcing the safeguards system in general by a declared consensus of the signatories. That would further strengthen the Agency's continuing search for verification methods. Turkey called on all Governments to agree to increased nuclear transparency through the addition of new features to the safeguard's system. It should be remembered that safeguards were dynamic and that new verification means would develop in the nuclear arms and disarmament field. The Agency would assume new tasks and responsibilities and consequently would need new experts and techniques to carry them out. Her delegation looked forward to those developments and supported the Director General's endeavours in that regard.

30. A major deficiency in the safeguards system was inefficient control of the removal, transfer and sale of fissile material. At the previous session of the General Conference, her delegation had reported incidents of trafficking in nuclear material in Turkey. Since then, cases had been discovered in other countries. The time had come to take measures to prevent trafficking. The Secretariat should prepare a programme to assist the countries of origin of such material to develop national control and enforcement regulations and should also help establish an international control mechanism. Her delegation proposed that a standing group of experts should be set up to elaborate the details of such a mechanism. Certain measures could be taken within the context of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The group should also examine the possibility of including additional provisions in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material aimed at controlling illegal trafficking at border crossings.

31. Her delegation commended the Secretariat on the Agency's performance in 1993 within the scope of the zero-growth budget. Although Turkey had paid in full its voluntary contribution to the TACF for 1994, its assessed programme costs for 1993, and had pledged \$166 050 to the TACF for 1995, the amount of technical assistance envisaged for Turkey for the period 1995-96 did not seem satisfactory compared with previous years. As that situation was apparently attributable to the Agency's present financial difficulties, ways of obtaining new financial resources for technical assistance should be explored as well as co-operation with other international organizations active in similar areas.

32. Turkey supported the model project concept and other steps to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of technical assistance and co-operation in line with the conclusions of the 1994 Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar. It also noted that new geographical groupings had been established for joint regional activities under the technical co-operation programme in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and felt the Agency had an important role to play in enhancing the environment for such activities.

33. The use of nuclear energy in non-power as well as power applications had gained momentum. It was therefore important to organize mass media education programmes for the general public describing the immense benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Public opinion had become very sensitive after the Chernobyl accident and environmental issues presented additional concerns. The Agency could contribute to programmes of that type in countries where the public was particularly sensitive about the use of nuclear energy.

34. The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority was hosting more and more Agency coordinated research studies, and regional and interregional training activities. The ninth International Meeting on Radiation Processing, arranged by the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission in co-operation with the Agency had just taken place in Istanbul. Turkey was prepared to allocate additional resources to host more such activities. Furthermore, Turkey had proposed, as a new area of co-operation, technical co-operation between the Black Sea countries on radiation protection and environmental safety and hoped that the Agency would actively support that project.

35. Finally, turning to the subject of staffing of the Secretariat, she said that her delegation appreciated the measures taken by the Secretariat to increase the representation of nationals from developing countries and the representation of women. It welcomed the substantial increase in well-qualified and qualified applicants from developing countries and the fact that 41.5% of vacancies were filled by applicants from developing countries. It hoped that more well-qualified women, particularly from developing countries, would be made aware of vacancies and apply for posts in the Agency. The Secretariat should also ensure that sufficient promotion opportunities were being offered to applicants from developing countries from developing countries and to women.

36. <u>Mr. MKAPA</u> (Tanzania) noted that the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations provided useful guidance on the formulation of strategies for the spread of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

37. His country was grateful for the technical assistance which it received from the Agency. As one of the least developed countries, Tanzania urgently needed support and assistance with the acquisition and adaptation of nuclear techniques which would accelerate its social and economic development and help combat poverty, disease and famine. His country was appreciative of the support which the Agency was giving to Tanzania through

the funding of twelve projects that formed a basis for the development and improvement of the use of nuclear technology.

38. The Agency's approval of a model project on the total eradication of the tsetse fly on Zanzibar Island was particularly welcome. The project had been initiated in January 1994 and it was estimated that it would cost \$8 314 800 up to 1997. The Agency, together with Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, had already contributed \$1 612 800, which was sufficient to fund all the project activities which were being carried out during 1994. His country was highly appreciative of that bilateral assistance and requested other Member States to provide additional extrabudgetary funding through the Agency for that project.

39. Conditions in sub-Saharan Africa were ideal for numerous animal pests and diseases which hampered the development of agriculture and livestock thus preventing countries from achieving self-sufficiency in food production. More than any other disease and pest combination, the tsetse fly and the debilitating disease it transmitted, trypanosomiasis, profoundly affected the pattern of agriculture in the region, approximately 10 million km², or about one half of the non-desert area of Africa. Zanzibar was a clear example of the problem and provided a unique opportunity to demonstrate the potential benefits of an integrated approach to tsetse eradication.

40. He was grateful to Member States for the contributions they had made to the TACF and for the experts they had provided thus enabling the Agency to provide assistance to LDCs like Tanzania. The understanding which the Agency and Member States had shown with regard to Tanzania's difficulties in meeting its financial obligations owing to economic constraints had also been noted and was deeply appreciated.

41. He commended the Agency's efforts to promote regional co-operation ventures as a means of accelerating the acquisition of nuclear technology, and in particular the support which was being given to the activities of AFRA. The aim of that regional grouping was to create and implement viable programmes through genuine sharing of resources, expertise, knowledge and technologies between members, in order to build up regional capabilities for the accelerated introduction of nuclear technology. The Agency was making concerted

efforts through the TACF and extrabudgetary funds to ensure the success of AFRA programmes. His delegation noted those efforts with great appreciation and appealed for their continuation. He also commended France and Spain for the support they had provided in the form of extrabudgetary contributions and appealed to other donors to come forward and support the 1995/1996 AFRA programme.

42. The efforts made by the Agency to review its policies and programmes through consultation with Member States, such as the recent Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar, were highly commendable. Owing to financial constraints, Tanzania had not been represented, but it endorsed the Seminar's conclusions and hoped that the recommendations which had been made would be acceptable and beneficial to all Member States.

43. He associated himself with those Member States which had expressed the view that technical assistance should be funded through the Regular Budget or from comparably predictable and assured resources. Developing Member States were particularly worried that the efforts to strengthen safeguards might inhibit funding of technical assistance or impair the predictability of technical co-operation resources.

44. While Tanzania acknowledged the desirability that the Agency, by virtue of its highly technical nature, should be devoid of politics, politics often could not be avoided in the implementation of such statutory functions as the enforcement of the NPT through the safeguards system or in discussions on the nuclear capabilities of both signatory and non-signatory States to the NPT. In such cases, the salient issues had to be debated frankly and openly, and with a lot of goodwill.

45. <u>Mr. ARGÜELLO</u> (Nicaragua) commended the efforts made by Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the first half of the year to complete the legal processes necessary for ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty. In that context, Nicaragua welcomed Cuba's decision in August to become a full party to that Treaty, which would turn Latin America and the Caribbean into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and strengthen the move towards demilitarization, harmony and political democracy, with attendant material and social benefits for the people of that region. 46. Nicaragua also joined other countries in approving the progress made in the Middle East peace talks the previous year and trusted that they would help to create an environment of mutual confidence and provide the security necessary for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that part of the world.

47. Nicaragua was a firm believer in the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parallel to economic reforms and a consolidation of its democratic system, it was fulfilling the legal requirements necessary to enjoy such benefits. At the end of 1993, Nicaragua had deposited the instruments of ratification of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. It had also promulgated a Law on Ionizing Radiation, had created an Atomic Energy Commission and completed the procedures necessary for joining INIS and ARCAL. Finally, having approved the amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty, it was ready to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety approved by the Diplomatic Conference in June.

48. Co-operation between the Agency and Nicaragua was already beginning to bear fruit. The installation of a cobalt-60 teletherapy unit, which would also serve neighbouring countries, had recently been completed with the assistance and collaboration of the Agency and substantial financial support from Norway and France. Other activities included programmes to improve agricultural production, the diagnosis of animal diseases, geothermic field studies, and the introduction of isotope techniques in hydrology. He was confident that the dedication of the staff of the Department of Technical Co-operation would help to ensure the successful implementation of the projects in spite of the difficult physical conditions. The training courses for technicians and professionals organized by the Agency in the field of nuclear technology were an important component of the co-operation.

49. Repeating an appeal made the previous year urging the Board of Governors to increase the total percentage of the Agency's resources allocated for technical assistance, he formally requested that additional resources be made available for technical assistance in Central America, particularly as the Agency did not have to devote any of its safeguards budget to that region.

50. The poverty, environmental destruction and political chaos prevalent in different parts of the world were, like disarmament and non-proliferation, universal issues creating challenges for the whole of humanity. Inequalities between countries were no more acceptable than inequalities within a single country. The peaceful use of nuclear energy was one way in which those inequalities could be eliminated. To skimp on the capital and technology required to promote the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was not only morally unacceptable, but also politically counterproductive. Environmental pollution and the lack of political freedom produced by underdevelopment and poverty were a time bomb which threatened the whole of humanity.

51. <u>Mr. GARCIA GONZALEZ</u> (Colombia) commended the Agency for its excellent work in promoting international co-operation in the field of radiological protection and nuclear safety. In particular, its recent success in securing the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety would provide the necessary legal framework for the safe development of nuclear power.

52. His country attached great importance to achieving a balance between the Agency's promotional and regulatory activities and to the role played by safeguards in maintaining the non-proliferation regime. Together with the safety of nuclear installations, one of the most urgent challenges confronting the international community in the field of nuclear energy was that of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The particular task now facing Member States was to examine recent political changes and technological developments throughout the world with reference to the Agency and its future activities, and to assess those activities in terms of their impact on the Member States. The Medium Term Plan, based on a consultative process between the Agency and Member States, provided the strategic framework necessary for the Agency's orientation in the coming years.

53. The Agency's efforts to promote regional co-operation with a view to the transfer of technology to developing countries deserved special mention. The assistance provided to Latin American countries through the ARCAL programme was proving successful in ensuring the efficient and effective use of the available resources and evaluating the results achieved both nationally and regionally. The recent conclusion of a tripartite agreement between the Agency, Colombia and the United States of America for the supply to Colombia

of special fissile material in the form of fuel elements for its IAN-R1 research reactor was a specific instance of the Agency's success in that area of its work.

54. On the eve of the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, Colombia's concerns were to strengthen the Treaty's application to ensure its continued value as a means of preventing proliferation and to reaffirm its status as the only instrument available to the international community for dealing with the nuclear-weapon States that were party to it.

55. Five basic undertakings were enshrined in the Treaty: the repudiation of the possession of nuclear weapons; the obligation to eliminate existing nuclear stocks; the adoption of measures to rid the world of nuclear weapons; the fostering of international co-operation in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and the provision of special assistance to developing countries to that end. The Treaty needed to be reviewed, however, in the light of present-day and future needs. Changes were necessary to make it equitable and non-discriminatory, with an equal obligation being placed on all the parties not to develop, manufacture or maintain nuclear weapons. Only if it were strengthened along those lines would the Treaty succeed in attracting universal accession.

56. As a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, Colombia welcomed the moves made towards establishing other denuclearized zones in the world and was encouraged by the recent developments in that direction in the Middle East, developments which augured well for improved nuclear co-operation in that region and reinforced the peace process.

57. Colombia regarded nuclear technology as an extremely valuable tool at the present time of transition towards becoming a developed society and had adopted some ambitious plans both to raise the profile of science and technology, increasing investment in that area fourfold, and to open up its economy to world markets through improved competitiveness. One of the results of its new policies was the creation of a Ministry of the Environment responsible for co-ordinating activities relating to conservation and environmental protection, especially in the energy field.

58. Colombia's Institute for Nuclear Science and Alternative Energies (INEA), which had recently celebrated its thirty-fifth anniversary, was, thanks to the technical co-operation provided by the Agency, an efficient organization with well-trained staff. The Institute was

engaged in technical co-operation projects in the areas of health, nutrition, industrial applications, radiation protection and training. In disseminating the benefits of nuclear technology, it was involved in technology transfer, research and development and the improvement of national economic competitiveness.

59. <u>Mr. JUÁREZ TOLEDO</u> (Guatemala) recalled the importance attached by his country to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a means of promoting national development. Its technical co-operation programme covered the fields of health, agriculture and quality assurance in industry. In view of the socio-economic level of the majority of the country's population, all projects had an appreciable social content and took account from the outset of environmental protection considerations. Workers subject to occupational exposure also benefited from a radiation protection programme which aimed to ensure optimal utilization of ionizing radiation and radiation generators.

60. The General Directorate for Nuclear Energy had developed an ambitious project involving a specially designed set of structures for the implementation of activities within the framework of the Agency's technical co-operation and for the development of research contracts, co-ordinated research programmes and other projects within the ARCAL programme. One of the main structures was the Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratory designed in accordance with the Agency's requirements and recommendations. The laboratory, which contained highly sophisticated equipment obtained through technical co-operation with the Agency and other countries, had seen the addition during the year of three calibration bunkers. As of 1995, Guatemala intended to use its infrastructure, equipment and qualified staff to offer dosimetry and radiation protection services to the countries of Central America and the Caribbean.

61. With regard to nuclear applications, a number of projects had been developed with a view to involving local institutions and companies interested in community development. Guatemala was keen to promote nuclear technologies and was grateful to the Agency for the assistance provided over the previous 15 years. The Agency was to be commended for its balanced distribution of resources and assistance to developing countries and, for its part, Guatemala would make every effort to pay its contribution to the TACF.

62. In the agricultural sector, nuclear techniques were being used in research on mutation breeding of sugar cane. Co-operative efforts were also being continued with institutions interested in improving the nutritive value and resistance of staple foodstuffs such as rice, corn and beans, thereby helping to combat malnutrition in the country.

63. With regard to nuclear applications in the health sector, a department of nuclear medicine was being developed to provide in vitro and in vivo diagnosis and to produce reagents for radioimmunoassay and radiopharmaceuticals for diagnosis using gamma cameras. As a result, it had been possible to start setting up rural units in national hospitals within the country to improve medical services in those areas and avoid overcrowding of facilities in the capital.

64. Under the Agency's auspices, a project had been initiated four years earlier to improve the quality of radiotherapy and to increase the number of treatment units. Through its activities the National Cancer Institute had helped considerably in providing low-income inhabitants of the country with access to radiotherapy.

65. In the area of nuclear analytical techniques, a programme for monitoring soil to determine natural background radioactivity had been completed. It was hoped that the Agency would help with the modernization of a laboratory for activities such as elemental analysis, and the certification of agricultural exports as free from radioactive contamination.

66. As to radiation protection, licences were being issued for operators of X-ray generating equipment and radiation facilities, and efforts were continuing to establish installations for the management and final disposal of radioactive waste. The Government-funded programme, which would involve the concentration of all radiation sources and other waste in the country, also called for the updating and monitoring of the national inventory of radiation sources in use.

67. In conclusion, he welcomed the Agency's new Member States and expressed his satisfaction at the progress made in the area of non-proliferation through the ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty by Argentina, Brazil and Chile and the imminent accession to it by Cuba, and also through the new inspection system established by Brazil and Argentina through ABACC.

68. <u>Mr. VELÁZQUEZ RODRÍGUEZ</u> (Peru) expressed his delegation's satisfaction with the activities carried out by the Agency reflected in both the Annual Report for 1993, and the report on the Agency's technical co-operation activities in 1993.

69. Since the previous session of the General Conference Peru had taken the final steps in establishing an efficient and orderly public administration within the framework of a freemarket economy. The gross national product had shown an increase of 12.6% in the first six months of the year and the rate of inflation would be brought down to below 20% in 1994 and attain a single digit figure in 1995. Those results had been achieved only through the virtual eradication of terrorism and progress in the fight against drug trafficking. The measures adopted had enabled the country to make better use of the international technical co-operation offered by organizations such as the Agency.

70. As a peace-loving nation, Peru had always attached particular importance to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, above all in those sectors which could bring benefit to the majority of the population - agriculture, industry and medicine. The Agency's technical co-operation programme played an essential role in technology transfer. His country also appreciated the extrabudgetary support provided by the United States of America and the United Kingdom which had enabled the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute to implement important technical co-operation projects.

71. His Government welcomed the priority attached by the Agency to human health programmes and programmes related to sustainable development and the environment. The Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute - in line with Agency policy - had given priority to projects with real socio-economic impact. He commended the Agency on approving the first model projects, which were of undoubted importance.

72. Turning to activities in the nuclear field carried out in Peru with Agency assistance, he said that the task of training highly qualified personnel was continuing. A new course in nuclear engineering was being offered to more than 30 young graduates from various scientific and engineering disciplines. He welcomed the Agency's decision to approve additional assistance for the implementation of a new course in medical and instrumental physics for personnel in the country's various medical services. He invited countries of the region to put forward - through the Agency - candidates to take part in the programme so that it could benefit the entire region.

73. He reiterated his country's interest in continuing energy planning studies with a view to possible nuclear energy power generation and thanked both the Agency and the Government of the United States of America for the support they had given.

74. Production of radioisotopes continued but some difficulties had been encountered in marketing them abroad. Initiatives were under way to establish a joint venture with international partners for the production and marketing of radioisotopes such as iodine-131, technetium-99 and iridium-192. Within the framework of those efforts, steps had been taken to intensify co-operation with the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission.

75. The eradication of terrorism had not only been welcomed by the population of Peru, but had also created a much safer and more conducive climate for the development of co-operation activities. Two Peruvian institutes currently involved in such activities - the Institute for Tropical and Upland Veterinary Research and the National Agricultural University - had been able to carry out their research without interruption. In the field of food irradiation, the necessary physical infrastructure for the first multipurpose irradiation plant in the country had been completed. The plant - due to start operating in 1995 - would be part of a national food marketing and distribution centre. As to the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, Peru now had highly trained technicians and the necessary equipment to cope with any nuclear emergency or accident. Furthermore, the Government of Peru had decided to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which would enhance and strengthen international co-operation and improve safety levels at all nuclear installations.

76. Finally, the ARCAL programme deserved a special mention as it was of real benefit to the 17 participating countries and enabled institutions of the region to have expedient and easy, albeit still limited, access to technology transfer.

77. <u>Mr. SANDOVAL</u> (Ecuador) said that, in keeping with its pacifist principles, his country fully supported the diverse applications of nuclear energy, which offered developing countries in particular a valuable tool for resolving their development problems in many different fields. It also commended the Agency for its efforts to conclude new safeguards agreements with countries throughout the world and encouraged it to persevere in that direction. Furthermore, it welcomed the efforts being made to attain universal accession to the NPT within a reasonable period of time, believing that to be a legitimate aspiration for all the world's peoples.

78. Cuba's recent decision to accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty, thereby formalizing the status of the Latin American and Caribbean region as the world's first densely populated nuclear-weapon-free zone, was very welcome. The Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency, which had entered into force in March, also represented a step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

79. Efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa would be considerably furthered by the agreement reached by the group of experts of the United Nations and the OAU on the draft text of a Treaty establishing such a zone, the task of verification being assigned by the Treaty to the Agency. In that connection, South Africa's declaration of its intent to renounce the manufacture of nuclear weapons and share its nuclear capabilities with other countries for exclusively peaceful purposes was an interesting development.

80. Regarding the application of safeguards in Iraq, the Director General had reported in reassuring terms on the constructive co-operation received from that country in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715. Such co-operation was most welcome and to be further encouraged. Efforts should also be maintained on the part of all those concerned in order to ensure the effective implementation of the Agency's safeguards agreement with the DPRK.

81. Concerning the strengthening of the Agency's main activities, he said that Ecuador was firmly convinced of the need for an adequate balance between all the Agency's activities and stressed the political importance of the provision of technical assistance to the developing countries through technology transfer, which also had social and economic repercussions. Ecuador was grateful to the Agency for the assistance it had received in connection with a number of projects and programmes in diverse areas including research, health, agriculture, the environment, radiation protection, product evaluation and - perhaps of greatest interest

for the national economy - mutation breeding in relation to staple food crops such as the potato and banana.

82. Although its scope was unfortunately limited to land-based civilian facilities, the Convention on Nuclear Safety - adopted in June by 84 countries, including Ecuador - nevertheless represented a landmark in international efforts to achieve the highest possible safety standards. In the field of radioactive waste management too, the elaboration of safety principles and standards leading to the adoption by consensus of an international convention would represent a significant step forward towards banishing once and for all the threat to mankind posed by such waste.

83. Illicit trafficking in nuclear material was a problem that was assuming worrying proportions and was quite rightly included on the Conference's agenda. The Secretariat should collaborate with the Member States in collecting as much information as possible on that subject in order to establish the origins and probable destination of the material in question and to improve the efficiency of nuclear material accounting and control systems.

84. With regard to the staffing of the Secretariat, he requested that greater consideration be given to qualified applicants from developing countries, which continued to be underrepresented at all levels on the Agency's staff.

85. On the question of the amendment of Article VI of the Statute, he reiterated his country's position that if the Board were enlarged, the relative proportions of its current composition should be preserved. Ecuador was also in favour of continuing to prohibit re-election under Article VI.A.2(a) in order to ensure a more fluid and democratic representation on the Board. The designation of Board members was an issue that warranted detailed consideration of all the relevant facts, interests and proposals.

86. <u>Mr. ROMAN-MOREY</u> (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), noted that the majority of OPANAL's Member States had now signed the amendments to Articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which had been adopted during the seventh extraordinary session of OPANAL's General Conference in 1992 and were in the process of ratifying the Treaty. 87. During the past year St. Kitts and Nevis had signed the Treaty and, following the amendments that had been made, Argentina, Chile and Brazil had been able to ratify it. Although the latest amendments that had been adopted altered the system of verification, the basic principles of the Treaty remained unchanged. Prior to ratifying the Tlatelolco Treaty, Argentina and Brazil had also signed a joint safeguards agreement with the Agency.

88. To date, the Agency's Board of Governors had approved 24 safeguards agreements relating to the geographical area covered by the Treaty. The comprehensive safeguards agreements negotiated hitherto under Article 13 prohibited the use of nuclear materials for the production of any nuclear explosive device.

89. The further consolidation and growing international stature of the Tlatelolco system was highly gratifying. Twenty-eight of the thirty-three States in the regional group were now full members of the system. Three had signed the Treaty and not yet ratified it, and only two had not signed. Moreover, Cuba's recent announcement of its intention to accede to the Treaty as a full member meant that the region would become the first densely populated area to be free of nuclear weapons.

90. The task of the Treaty was only just beginning, although after 27 years of productive and difficult work the initial scepticism felt by many had proved unfounded and the Treaty now provided a model for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in densely populated areas. OPANAL was able to offer unique and valuable experience in that regard.

91. As a valid international legal instrument of long-standing, its mandate respected by the major powers and almost universally applied within its region, the Tlatelolco Treaty, together with the system of peace, security and development that rested upon it, now ensured that the Latin American and Caribbean region played an ever-increasing role in the multilateral disarmament agenda.

92. In conclusion, he reiterated his conviction that the problem of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at regional and global level required an integral and comprehensive approach that was balanced and non-discriminatory, so as to prevent any hindrance of the full expansion of advanced dual-use technologies for exclusively peaceful purposes.

ELECTION OF MEMBERS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (GC(XXXVIII)/3 and 28)

93. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> recalled that in 1989 the Conference had approved a procedure whereby, when there was agreement regarding the candidate or candidates from a particular area, no secret ballot would be held; balloting would only take place for areas where no candidate had been agreed upon. That procedure considerably facilitated the rational use of the Conference's time.

94. Accordingly, he proposed - and it was agreed by the Conference - that Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure, which provided that elections to the Board should be by secret ballot, should be suspended in respect of the areas for which agreement had been reached.

95. Under Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the presiding officer had to indicate to the General Conference those elective places on the Board which had to be filled. In that connection, he drew attention to document GC(XXXVIII)/28 and said that agreement had been reached among the Member States in all areas except Africa. There were two seats to be filled for that area, and more than two candidates for those seats were listed. A secret ballot would therefore have to be held in respect of that area.

96. He assumed that the General Conference wished to elect Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay to the three seats for Latin America.

97. Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay were duly elected.

98. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> assumed that the General Conference wished to elect Spain and Turkey to the two seats for Western Europe.

99. Spain and Turkey were duly elected.

100. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> assumed that the General Conference wished to elect the Slovak Republic to the seat for Eastern Europe.

101. The Slovak Republic was duly elected.

102. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> assumed that the General Conference wished to elect Pakistan to the seat for the Middle East and South Asia.

103. Pakistan was duly elected.

104. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> assumed that the General Conference wished to elect Thailand to the seat for South East Asia and the Pacific.

105. Thailand was duly elected.

106. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> assumed that the General Conference wished to elect Algeria, from the area of Africa, to fill the so-called "floating" seat.

107. Algeria was duly elected.

108. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> invited the General Conference to proceed with a vote by secret ballot for the two seats for Africa.

109. A secret ballot was held to fill the two seats for Africa.

110. At the suggestion of the President, a member of the Malaysian delegation and a member of the United Kingdom delegation were appointed as tellers.

111. The <u>PRESIDENT</u>, noting that the counting of the votes would take some time, suggested that the General Conference should resume the general debate until the results could be announced.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1993 (GC(XXXVIII)/2 and Corr.1) (resumed)

112. <u>Mr. SHTEINBERG</u> (Ukraine) said that in accordance with the 16 July 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty of Ukraine and the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet on 24 October 1991 regarding Ukraine's non-nuclear-weapon status, Ukraine was determined to become a State without nuclear weapons. The practical steps taken by the Ukrainian State confirmed that it had de facto embarked on the path of achieving non-nuclear-weapon status and was approaching the attainment of that goal. The most recent stages in that process had been the Tripartite Declaration signed on 14 February 1994 by the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States of America and the decision taken by the Ukrainian Parliament on 3 February 1994 to withdraw its reservation in respect of Article V of the Lisbon Protocol and to exchange instruments of ratification of the START Treaty. Strategic missiles were being dismantled and nuclear warheads were being sent to Russia according to schedule, and Ukraine had the right to expect that the nuclear-weapon States would make greater disarmament efforts and also assist Ukraine through deeds - not just words - in the process of achieving non-nuclear-weapon status.

113. The international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT was of crucial importance for ensuring global security and stability. The Board of Governors had approved an agreement the previous week between Ukraine and the Agency for the application of Agency safeguards to all nuclear material used in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory, under the jurisdiction or under the control of Ukraine. That event was a very important part of the process of his country's accession to the NPT and achieving non-nuclear-weapon status.

114. Despite an extremely difficult economic situation, Ukraine was taking practical steps to minimize the time needed for the start of safeguards implementation. Preparation of the initial inventory of nuclear materials was near completion, the installation of containment and surveillance equipment had begun and other practical measures connected with the placing of peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards were being taken. Ukraine appreciated the assistance and support provided in that area by Sweden, Finland, the United States of America, Japan, Hungary and other countries.

115. Document GC(XXXVIII)/INF/6 gave an idea of the significant progress being made with regard to international co-operation in nuclear and radiation safety, which was occupying an increasingly important place in the Agency's programmes. His delegation was generally pleased with the information presented in that document.

116. In recent years, serious efforts had been made to assess the safety of nuclear power plants in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The Agency's Secretariat had played an exceptional role in those efforts and an international consensus was gradually emerging with regard to the safety of plants of Soviet design. It was important that that consensus be based on a realistic assessment of both their strong and their weak points. There was a growing realization that no amount of assistance could resolve the entire complex of existing problems - there was a need for close co-operation and collaboration between East and West in the field of nuclear safety and for assistance in the establishment of infrastructures capable not only of launching, but also of sustaining programmes for the

enhancement of nuclear power plant safety. Clearly, such problems could not be resolved quickly - a long period of painstaking effort would be necessary, not so much for resolving technical issues as for making radical economic and administrative changes and for developing nuclear regulatory regimes. It was essentially a question of creating a nuclear safety culture on a national scale, and it would be utopian to expect rapid results. The Western specialists who had initiated the development of the nuclear safety culture philosophy knew very well how slow that process had been in their own countries.

117. Nuclear power played a significant role in Ukraine's energy production. In 1993, nuclear power plants had generated 73 800 million kW \cdot h of electricity, representing 32.9% of all the electricity generated in Ukraine that year. The proportion of electricity production attributable to nuclear power was still growing. However, nuclear power was in a critical situation. With the pricing policy in Ukraine, nuclear power plants could not recover the full cost of producing electricity. The payments crisis had led to a shortage of financial resources and to a curtailment of the already extremely limited activities for enhancing plant safety. Ukraine's nuclear power plants were not in a position to pay staff salaries on time and in full. To be quite frank, at present it was not a matter of enhancing safety, but of struggling to maintain it at its existing level.

118. With Ukraine's uncertain economic situation, it was impossible to make a firm forecast regarding possible power supply sources in the near future, which in turn meant that no accurate forecast could be made regarding the closure of different units for reconstruction work or decommissioning. In that connection, the decision taken at the G-7 summit in Naples regarding the need to shut down the Chernobyl plant raised many issues for his country. The Government of Ukraine had stated many times that the question of decommissioning certain units at the Chernobyl plant would be resolved in the light of the socio-economic problems which might arise as a result of the cessation of operations at one or the other unit and with nuclear safety as the primary consideration. The only technical approach possible in preparing for important safety-related decisions had to be based on the results of the current safety reassessment of each unit at the Chernobyl plant and of the current assessment of the economic resources necessary for ensuring their safety.

119. All work relating to the safety of the operating units at Chernobyl was being done by Ukraine alone, without any support from the international community. Moreover, a shutdown of the Chernobyl plant in its entirety - called for by some delegates in their statements - was impossible, and talk of a shutdown was technically nonsensical. For example, one could not close down a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and it was equally impossible to shut down the world-famous "sarcophagus".

120. Ukraine had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and would take measures to maintain and enhance the safety of all its nuclear facilities as provided for in the Convention. However, sufficient financial resources could be ensured for that purpose only after the economic situation had stabilized. In signing the Convention, Ukraine was fully aware of its responsibility for the safety of the nuclear power plants under its jurisdiction and recognized all the difficulties and the length of the path to be traversed before it could fully comply with the requirements of the Convention. However, Ukraine was determined to follow that path. The Convention was the most important step towards achieving a harmonized global regime for nuclear safety. The world community had acquired an important instrument for the regulation and enhancement of nuclear safety. The Convention was of particular importance for countries which did not yet have their own nuclear legislation, including Ukraine, and it was to be hoped that it would enter into force without significant delay.

121. The Ukrainian delegation welcomed the adoption of the new Basic Safety Standards, which should provide a good basis for the development of national regulations for protection against ionizing radiation and the safety of radiation sources.

122. It also welcomed the significant progress made in the development of standards for radioactive waste management. That had always been a more complex issue from the public acceptance point of view than any other in the nuclear field, and it was therefore important to proceed on the basis of an international consensus. The adoption of the Safety Fundamentals document "The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management" would undoubtedly be an important step towards such a consensus, and the process of approving that document should be completed at the December session of the Board of Governors. The next step should be a convention on radioactive waste management, the preparation of which

Ukraine fully supported. He called upon the Director General to take the appropriate action. A convention based on an international consensus would make it easier to reach agreement on radioactive waste management issues in individual countries and would facilitate international co-operation, including co-operation relating to the concept of regional storage facilities.

His delegation supported the Agency's activities relating to the establishment of a 123. comprehensive regime of civil liability for nuclear damage and accepted the basic principles of such a regime, recognizing the need for Ukraine's nuclear facilities to be covered. A bill currently before the Ukrainian Parliament on the use of nuclear energy and radiation protection contained provisions establishing the exclusive and absolute liability of the operator for compensation for nuclear damage and also the standards, regulatory conditions and time limits for such compensation. At the same time, when considering the real possibility of Ukrainian participation in such a regime, one had to bear in mind the present economic and financial situation in Ukraine and the lack of an insurance market, of an adequate compensation system and of appropriate legislation there. In addition, the question of joining the regime was connected with the completion of the task of revising the Vienna Convention and the development of a convention on supplementary funding. A number of delegates had called for immediate accession to the Vienna Convention. However, accession without the creation of proper national legislative and financial structures would lead only to a fictitious extension of the Convention's coverage.

124. Elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was one of the Ukrainian Government's priority tasks. Fortunately, the matter remained one of interest to international organizations, including the Agency. In March, for example, experts from many countries had taken part in an international symposium, organized with the support of NEA/OECD, at which the problems of ensuring the safety of the former Unit No. 4 at Chernobyl had been discussed. In the course of a very open discussion, a general assessment had been made of the status of that unit, the basic problems had been defined and different regulatory approaches to those problems examined. He looked forward to further fruitful co-operation with experts from other countries in resolving the important and scientifically interesting safety issues relating to the unit that had been destroyed by the accident and welcomed the Secretariat's willingness to provide Ukraine with expert support for safety assessments.

125. His delegation endorsed the Agency's programme and budget for 1995-96. Unfortunately, the severe economic situation in Ukraine had prevented it from paying its arrears of contributions to the Regular Budget, which were due to the fact that the former Soviet Union had not paid part of Ukraine's contributions for 1991 and to the unfair increase of approximately 60% the previous year in Ukraine's base rate of assessment within the United Nations and consequently within the Agency. The Ukrainian delegation was taking appropriate steps within the United Nations. The recommendations formulated at the fifty-fourth session of the Committee on Contributions would be discussed at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, and he hoped that would result in a gradual reduction in Ukraine's assessment rate from 1.87% to 1.09% by 1997. He also hoped that a similar decision would then be taken within the Agency. However, such a reduction was really needed at the present time - while Ukraine was still in serious difficulties - rather than in the future, however close that future might be.

126. In conclusion, he said that Ukraine greatly appreciated and endorsed the Agency's varied activities aimed at strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and would do all it could to help resolve the extremely important issues facing the Agency.

127. <u>Mr. MIKHALEVITCH</u> (Belarus) said that his country remained firmly committed to the objective of achieving non-nuclear status, set forth in its new Constitution. In 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Belarus and strategic nuclear warheads were currently being transferred to Russia, pursuant to the bilateral agreement between Russia and Belarus. In 1993 Belarus officially acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

128. Furthermore Belarus had decided to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency. Agency representatives had visited Belarus in 1993 to examine the organizational, technical and legal aspects of implementing the agreement. Belarus was grateful to Japan and Sweden for their assistance in co-ordinating and planning a State system of accounting for

and control of nuclear material, as well as its physical protection. He hoped that the United States would also participate, and that the obligations would be met on time, thereby enabling Belarus to implement the safeguards agreement successfully.

129. In view of the importance of the development of bilateral and multilateral relations in connection with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection of the public, Belarus had signed an agreement within the framework of the CIS on co-operation in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and it was preparing an agreement with Poland on an early warning system for nuclear accidents. In addition it was preparing a similar agreement with Lithuania, as well as a co-operation agreement with the United States of America.

130. Following its independence Belarus had experienced grave economic difficulties. It was extremely poor in fuel resources and in order to improve the situation and reduce dependence on imports, it would be necessary to update the existing thermal power plants using modern combined-cycle plants and to construct new units.

131. Belarus attached great importance to co-operation with the Agency in areas including energy planning research, the creation of an appropriate infrastructure and a normative-legal basis ensuring nuclear safety and radiation protection, as well as the development of methods for the storage and disposal of radioactive waste. It welcomed the efforts of the Agency, the UNDP, the European Commission and WANO to increase the safety of nuclear facilities and to strengthen the nuclear safety and radiation protection infrastructure in countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

132. With regard to the Chernobyl accident, he said that Belarus had been the country that had been the most affected from the aftermath. It could not cover alone the direct and indirect costs resulting from the accident, estimated at \$45 000 million for the period 1986-2015. In that connection, he wished to thank the Agency for its assistance, and expressed the hope that it would continue. Belarus had submitted projects related to the Chernobyl accident to the Agency's technical assistance programme for 1995-96 and hoped that those projects would be included in the programme, particularly as Belarus had not - until recently - required assistance from the TACF.

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133. His country was pleased to note that international organizations, including the European Community, UNESCO and WHO were also providing assistance to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, and welcomed the fact that the issues of nuclear power safety and energy planning in Eastern Europe and in other Member States were being addressed by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. However, in some cases there was a lack of co-ordination, and in order to make good use of the Agency's resources, the Secretariat should co-ordinate its technical assistance programme more efficiently with national and international projects, where possible.

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134. Recalling the 1990 International Chernobyl Project, experts had agreed that the methodology employed in studying the consequences of the Chernobyl accident in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus had, on the whole, corresponded to international standards. Scientists and specialists in Belarus had accumulated a vast amount of knowledge which would be of interest to the entire world community. However, further internationally co-ordinated scientific research was required to obtain a better understanding of the consequences of radioactive contamination and radiation exposure in order to improve protection for people all over the world. He therefore called for the creation of an international group of experts to analyse and summarize the results of all studies pertaining to the Chernobyl accident, and to produce a special final report to be made available to the world community. For its part, Belarus was ready to co-operate fully in that task.

135. As a result of the country's acute economic situation, worsened by expenditure to mitigate the after-effects of the Chernobyl accident, Belarus had not been able to meet its budgetary obligations. The recommendation of the Committee on Contributions to the United Nations General Assembly was for Belarus's contribution to be reduced from 0.48% to 0.28%. Belarus hoped that that recommendation would be adopted by the General Assembly and that the Agency would follow that example.

136. In spite of the fact that its per capita GNP was less than one third of that of the fifteen most developed countries, and there was no significant nuclear power activity in the country, Belarus was in the unshielded group of countries with regard to its contributions towards the safeguards component of the Regular Budget. His country felt that it should be transferred to the group of shielded countries.

137. Finally, the General Conference had every reason to take a positive view of the Agency's work in 1993, and to approve the annual programme and budget. He was confident that the Agency would enjoy continued success in uniting and co-ordinating the efforts of its Member States to achieve broader utilization of nuclear energy in the interests of peace, health and welfare.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.