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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVIII)/INF/11/Rev.2.

Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASCOT	Assessment of Safety Culture in Organizations Team
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
INES	International Nuclear Event Scale
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
Joint Division	Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture
MOX	Mixed oxide
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PHARE	Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic reconstruction
RADWASS	Radioactive Waste Safety Standards
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
Rarotonga Treaty	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SIT	Sterile insect technique
TACC	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1961)
WAMAP	Waste Management Advisory Programme
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1993 (GC(XXXVIII)/2 and Corr.1)
(continued)

1. Mr. OCHOA ANTICH (Venezuela) said that his country had always supported the Agency's activities, particularly those relating to technical assistance, as they contributed to socio-economic growth in the developing countries, thus helping to maintain international peace and security.
2. Venezuela attached great importance to the technical co-operation it received from the Agency, which had led to considerable progress in the use of nuclear techniques and isotopes in priority areas such as health, agriculture and stock-breeding, radiation protection, industry and the environment. Some problems remained which required appropriate and effective co-operation from the Agency.
3. He reaffirmed his country's support for ARCAL and thanked the Agency for its contribution to that regional co-operative effort, which was a valuable instrument for the application of nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture, medicine, industry, research and teaching. He urged the Agency to continue its efforts to provide financial resources for ARCAL projects and he welcomed the support provided by countries and institutions outside the region.
4. As a party to the NPT, his country paid special attention to the Agency's safeguards system, which had helped to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-implementation of the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency was very disturbing. If no definitive solution could be found, that situation would have to be taken into account at the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, which would consider measures for establishing a truly universal non-proliferation regime.
5. He congratulated the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile for their accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Cuban Government for its intention to do so. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in one of the most densely populated areas of the world, Latin America and the Caribbean, set a precedent for the NPT regime.
6. The Secretariat had made commendable progress in developing Programme 93+2, in which new ways were being sought to reduce safeguards implementation costs while

maintaining their full effectiveness. It was important to have a suitable and comprehensive framework to cover the technical, financial, legal and political implications of the proposals to be presented by the Secretariat for possible adoption by the Board of Governors at its March 1995 meeting.

7. The Agency's nuclear safety and radiation protection activities were of benefit to all of humanity. However, activities directly connected with reactor safety should be financed from extrabudgetary funds so as to make more financial resources available for improving the safety of nuclear applications in medicine, agriculture, industry and research and for strengthening radiation protection infrastructures in the developing countries.

8. The meetings of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had discussed in depth many important aspects of civil liability. Nevertheless, some aspects required further consideration in order to ensure fair and equitable reparation for victims of a nuclear accident.

9. His Government supported the development of internationally acceptable safety fundamentals, standards and guides which would ensure the safe use of nuclear techniques. The Nuclear Safety Convention would be a useful instrument for regulating international conduct. Liability and ultimate authority lay in each State, but the Agency could play a valuable consultative role in that area.

10. He commended the Secretariat on its efforts to increase the percentage of posts occupied by nationals of developing countries, in particular at the higher levels, in the Agency's various Departments. However, the representation of women, particularly from developing countries, was still in need of further improvement.

11. Mr. EL FASSI (Morocco), emphasizing the importance which his country attached to non-proliferation, said he looked forward to the Agency's valuable contribution to the success of the forthcoming NPT Extension Conference. The strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system and the widening of its scope of application were essential for the creation of a climate of international confidence. In that context, the efforts made by the African countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone on their continent clearly reflected those countries' irreversible attachment to the principle of non-proliferation.

12. His delegation welcomed the recent positive changes in the Middle East and believed that there was a real chance, given the application of safeguards, to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons there, too. Efforts should continue with a view to achieving long-term peace and stability in that region.

13. The question of illicit trafficking in radioactive material was a serious cause for concern throughout the international community. Morocco strongly supported all measures which might be taken to face that challenge, and indeed welcomed generally the Agency's work in the field of physical protection of fissionable material

14. The questions of nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, and environmental protection continued to give rise to concerns around the world. The further development of nuclear energy was virtually contingent upon the complete mastery of safety and waste management problems, and international co-operation was absolutely essential in those areas.

15. The Agency had done excellent work in drafting and opening for signature the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which reflected the global desire to develop an international safety regime.

16. At a regional level, major successes had been achieved under AFRA despite financial difficulties and constraints, and had made the countries of the region aware of available local potential and infrastructure and of the benefits to be derived from regional collaboration in the pursuit of common goals. Although AFRA projects had high priority, funds were still required for their implementation, and support from Member States would therefore be most desirable. In that context, the conclusions and recommendations of the AFRA co-ordination meeting hosted by Morocco in April 1994 had indicated a willingness to strengthen regional ties and opened up new perspectives for development and co-operation.

17. As part of the effort to consolidate its nuclear infrastructure, Morocco was continuing work on the nuclear research centre, which was to play a decisive role in training, research, radioisotope production, radioactive waste management and, more generally, in the development and promotion of nuclear techniques on a national scale.

18. Construction work was in progress on the national radiation protection centre, which would monitor the application of radiation protection regulations and engage in training and research activities, and university laboratories for teaching and scientific research in the field of nuclear technology were also being established and developed.

19. In the agricultural sphere, Morocco was interested in the technology of food irradiation and was setting up a pilot installation with a view to the gradual introduction of commercial-scale operations.

20. Parallel to those developments, the recently created National Nuclear Energy Council had the task of co-ordinating the development of nuclear techniques in the light of national priorities. Basic regulatory texts which took full account of Morocco's international commitments had been elaborated. The text concerning the licensing and control of nuclear installations had already been approved by the National Nuclear Energy Council, while the text on protection against ionizing radiation was in the process of approval.

21. There had been a shift in his country's policy of diversifying energy sources towards encouraging new technologies and allowing private electricity generation on a concession basis. The nuclear option stood to benefit from that shift. Siting and feasibility studies for a nuclear power plant, initiated several years previously, were nearing completion, and the results would be used in determining the role of nuclear power within the national energy production system.

22. Such progress would not have been possible without the Agency's support, and he congratulated the Agency on its efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and enhance their contribution to the socio-economic development of Member States.

23. The Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar held the previous week had demonstrated the Agency's resolve to improve the quality of its technical co-operation programme, and he was convinced that Morocco's achievements in the nuclear energy sector could only benefit from any new approaches adopted.

24. In conclusion, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Joint Division, he paid tribute to the fruitful co-operation between FAO and the IAEA in the field of food and

agriculture, and noted that the scope of the Agency's work and its broad responsibilities testified to its positive role in promoting and safeguarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

25. Mr. OMAR (Sudan) said that he hardly needed to remind the present assembly of scientists, politicians and executives of the rapid pace of development in science and technology, or of the importance of nuclear power and its applications, which were changing the face of the modern world. The institutions which managed those scientific developments naturally played an essential role, and his country considered the Agency to be the foremost among those institutions in view of the progress and well-being which were the result of its fruitful activities in the various areas of application of nuclear energy.

26. Sudan wished to express its appreciation for the assistance provided by the Agency. In the medical field, the Agency had helped to establish radiological diagnostic and therapeutic services. In the field of agriculture, laboratories had been set up for research in pedology and on pesticide residues. Assistance had been provided in the diagnosis of animal diseases, and also for animal feeding and reproduction. There had been assistance with water supplies, for the identification of underground water sources and the estimation of their volume. Other fields covered included environmental monitoring, radiation protection of workers, food controls, equipment maintenance and training of local manpower. The assistance received, while not overwhelming in terms of quantity or funding, was certainly of great value.

27. Turning to the continent of Africa as a whole, which was not a nuclear continent, he said that AFRA provided a basis for co-operation within Africa and with other regions. All of the scientific activities that had taken place in the previous year under AFRA had been praiseworthy. Thanks to the Agency's co-operation, the financial problems of the first phase had been successfully overcome. He also expressed appreciation to the Governments of France and Spain for their assistance with various projects. The number and scope of projects listed in the 1995-96 programme demonstrated the extent of co-operation with Africa, for which increased funding from the TACF had been proposed. He took the opportunity to announce that Sudan would be participating in AFRA for the next five years.

28. His country would welcome an increase in the Agency's technical support both for itself and for Africa as a whole. Technical assistance was of vital importance for the developing countries in general and for the least developed countries among them in particular. Although the Agency was giving priority to its new obligations, that vital importance should receive clearer recognition.

29. On the previous day, Sudan had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It would like Africa to remain a zone free of all nuclear weapons. The Middle East had already been proclaimed a nuclear-weapon-free-zone. However, despite all the efforts made to ensure that all countries in the region were actually applying the safeguards system and had signed the NPT, Israel was still openly refusing to sign the NPT and refusing to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Questions had to be asked about the relevance of international criteria, and whether international relations were not based on double standards. He hoped that the countries which were working for the future of mankind and which had close relations with the State of Israel would bring their influence to bear on that country and help the Agency to implement the General Conference resolutions relating to the application of the safeguards system in the Middle East. That would be a first step towards achieving peace, not only in that region but worldwide.

30. Mr. ZENARI (Holy See) said that the Holy See, had always striven to be objective as far as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was concerned. However, some of its statements dealing with the principles of the utilization of natural forces to aid the progress and development of mankind and the relevance of the application of nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes had occasionally been heavily criticized. Although many people still seemed to focus on the use of nuclear energy for military purposes and the imminent danger of major accidents, it should be recalled that the Agency had in fact been created with the sole aim of developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that enormous progress had been achieved through nuclear research in practically all fields, not only in the field of energy supply, but also in agriculture, hydrology, medicine and many others.

31. It should also be noted when making comparisons, that the methods used to detect and analyse radioactive substances in the environment were much more accurate and sensitive

than the controls carried out in connection with many other industrial activities that were dangerous and contributed to air, water and soil pollution.

32. His delegation welcomed with satisfaction the recently concluded Convention on Nuclear Safety and supported the adoption of the Basic Safety Standards. While safety was the unique responsibility of each State, the Agency could provide advice and assistance to improve safety-related activities when requested.

33. Turning to the Agency's safeguards system, he noted that if required individual States give up part of their sovereignty so that the Agency could carry out the necessary inspections and controls and provide assurances to the international community that the nuclear material present in States which had concluded safeguards agreements with the Agency was being used for peaceful purposes. The task entrusted to the Agency and to its Secretariat was clearly an indispensable one for the safety and security of mankind.

34. Mr. von TSCHARNER (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of the delegation of Liechtenstein, welcomed the signing, after somewhat lengthy preliminaries, of the Nuclear Safety Convention, an instrument broad in scope which marked the start of a new era of international collaboration on the safety of power reactors and which would help Member States share their experience in that field. He appealed to all Member States to sign the Convention promptly so that it could come into force with a minimum delay, and announced his Government's intention to ratify it in short order.

35. His delegation had also insisted on several occasions on the need for a convention on the safety of nuclear waste. Unfortunately, he still saw no progress. The year before, his delegation had stressed how important it was to avoid giving the public the impression that no agreement could be reached on basic safety principles. While recognizing that serious efforts had been made, he once again urged that work on the drafting of a convention on the safety of nuclear waste be pursued with all due vigour.

36. International activities aimed at enhancing the safety of older RBMK reactors had continued throughout the year and had brought about substantial improvements in existing reactors. Much remained to be done, however, and the Agency should step up its exertions in close collaboration with the European Union, the EBRD and the Member States involved.

His Government continued unreservedly to support those efforts and intended to contribute a further 200 000 Swiss francs before the end of the year for the improvement of the safety of RBMK reactors.

37. Turning to the situation in Switzerland, he said that the controversy on nuclear energy continued, although questions of energy policy were not currently a priority concern amongst the population. As elsewhere, the recession had brought about a momentary reduction in electricity consumption and a temporary oversupply.

38. The most important event of the year in his country had been the final choice of a site for the storage of short-lived low-level waste. The body responsible, CEDRA, had signed a contract with the municipality concerned covering payments to be made. An organization had also been created to manage the facility, but a concession from the canton and the authorization of the Federal Parliament still had to be obtained. Construction should be able to start before the end of the century, putting an end to almost 15 years of preparatory technical and legal work and, above all, political discussion.

39. His delegation was pleased to note the continued reduction in the number of nuclear weapons in the course of the year. One result, however, was that increasing quantities of highly enriched plutonium and uranium were becoming available for other purposes. As that material represented a major source of energy and as the storage of nuclear warheads presented serious risks because of the possibility of proliferation and subsequent re-use for non-energy purposes, he saw no reason why that material should not be converted into MOX fuel elements for use in civilian nuclear plants subject to Agency safeguards.

40. Several cases of illegal trafficking in plutonium and other radioactive substances had recently been discovered in Europe. It was reassuring to note that the material had not apparently been diverted from sources subject to Agency safeguards and was also unlikely to have come from military stocks. Although there were sellers, there appeared to be very few buyers - apart from journalists. The situation was nevertheless being taken very seriously in his country and various precautionary measures had been implemented. In particular, no Swiss laboratory would agree to analyse such material on a private commercial basis. In view of the potential enormity of the stakes, it was essential that all the countries

concerned should make sure that the security systems in their installations containing fissile material were in perfect working order, although the main focus should be on stopping the traffic at its source.

41. At an international level, close collaboration between the national control authorities and the police was indispensable. In addition, Article 5 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material provided for various specific co-operative measures. Should traffic in plutonium continue in the long term it might be necessary to review the recommendations on physical protection or even replace them by an international convention.

42. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference in New York in January, Agency experts had presented excellent account of the political, legal and technical aspects of the Agency's safeguards system and technical co-operation programme, once again giving representatives of the States Parties an indication of the major role played by the IAEA in various areas covered by the NPT.

43. Safeguards was one of the most important areas of the Agency's work but while the principle of safeguards was generally accepted, its implementation raised a number of questions. He congratulated the Director General and his team on their work and commended the Agency for launching Programme 93+2 for the reappraisal of safeguards in response to SAGSI's very interesting recommendations. In spite of the zero real growth budget and the ever increasing number of members, the safeguards system could still be improved given imagination in finding new ideas and courage in abandoning traditional ones. His country had already formulated specific suggestions for improvements and had volunteered for an "any place, any time" inspection trial to test safeguards.

44. He realized that the Agency did what it could with the resources at its disposal, and he did not wish to discuss the total amount available for the financing of safeguards. That could be more appropriately examined once Programme 93+2 had been completed. Nevertheless, the mechanism for distributing the financial burden of safeguards was a legacy of the past which produced grotesque injustices and was no longer acceptable. His delegation was willing to participate actively in any attempt to arrive at a reasonable and realistic solution, but it felt the time had come for all members of the Agency to

acknowledge their shared responsibility for adequate and equitable financing of safeguards and to stop hiding behind the status quo.

45. Mr. MARSCHIK (Austria) said that the DPRK's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and its failure to respond to resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council represented a serious challenge to the Agency's mandate and authority and to the international non-proliferation regime. The Agency, in reacting with competence, impartiality and firmness, had lived up to its duties and to his country's expectations. The DPRK's decision to withdraw from the Agency was regrettable and it was to be hoped that that country would soon see its way to a return to the Agency. Meanwhile, Austria appealed to the DPRK to honour its commitments under the NPT and under its safeguards agreement.

46. Nuclear safety had rightly continued to remain one of the focuses of the Agency's activities. Eight years after the disaster at Chernobyl, many people were still traumatized by that tragic event and fearful of a possible repetition of such a catastrophe. Austria appreciated the Agency's work to support the improvement of the safety of older reactors in Central and Eastern Europe under an extrabudgetary programme, to which Austria had contributed both financially and through the participation of experts. It appealed in particular to the Government of Ukraine to implement the recommended measures for the improvement of safety.

47. His delegation welcomed the Nuclear Safety Convention, although it would have preferred a broader and more far-reaching convention covering all nuclear installations and the entire nuclear fuel cycle that would have corresponded more fully to the preoccupations of neighbouring countries and ensured that the Agency played a more comprehensive role in its implementation. The present Convention appeared to be the best attainable compromise and its early and wide application would undoubtedly be a significant contribution to international efforts to improve the safety of nuclear power plants and to guarantee the best possible protection of the population and the environment.

48. Austria had signed the Convention on the understanding that agreements pertaining to the other areas of the nuclear fuel cycle would soon follow. It welcomed and strongly

supported the decision taken by the Board of Governors the previous week to request the Director General to initiate the process for the preparation of a convention on the safety of nuclear waste management, pending a decision on the adoption of the revised draft Safety Fundamentals entitled "The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management".

49. Little, if any, progress had so far been made on an improved international regime on liability for nuclear damage. As basic differences of view on the revision of the Vienna Convention and on its interrelationship with the concept of a proposed supplementary funding convention persisted, and as the deliberations of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage were in their fifth year, the time had perhaps come to embark on radically new approaches in the search for a solution to that pressing issue.

50. Like other countries, Austria was alarmed at the increasing number of illegal transfers of nuclear material. It was important that all States should take effective measures as a matter of urgency to stop that criminal activity. The initial action already taken by some countries to that effect was encouraging. While the main responsibility in that field must, of course, remain with national Governments, the Agency should also, within its mandate, assist those efforts, and his delegation hoped that the General Conference would take appropriate action to deal with the problem of illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

51. Political developments during the past years had prompted the Agency to re-evaluate and, where necessary, adjust its safeguards system. It was very important to strengthen the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities and Austria was following with interest the work in progress on the development and testing of alternative safeguards measures, including environmental monitoring and the expanded involvement in verification activities of national systems of nuclear accounting and control.

52. Austria continued to attach the greatest importance to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and regarded the NPT as the cornerstone of those efforts. It was encouraged by the fact that additional countries had acceded to the Treaty during the past year and appealed to those that had still not done so to accede to it in order to make it universal.

53. Austria would support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Extension Conference and welcomed the valuable contribution being made by the Agency to the preparation for that Conference. His delegation noted with satisfaction that during the past year a number of additional countries had concluded safeguards agreements in accordance with Article III of the NPT and urged all Parties to the NPT that had not yet done so to honour that obligation.

54. His delegation welcomed the safeguards agreement just approved by the Board of Governors with Ukraine, but regretted that it was not yet concluded under the NPT and continued to plead for Ukraine's earliest possible accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

55. With only one exception, all nuclear-weapon States were continuing their moratoriums on nuclear testing. Austria believed that all States should make every effort to advance the negotiations for the early completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The success of such a treaty would depend to a large extent on the work of the organization entrusted with its verification. As such an organization would undoubtedly benefit from close co-operation with the Agency, his Government had decided to invite the organization that would be responsible for such verification to establish its headquarters in Vienna.

56. His Government had consistently supported the Agency's technical co-operation activities and accordingly had paid its share of the 1994 target for the TACF in full and in a timely manner, as well as pledging its share of the 1995 target. His delegation had noted with great satisfaction the innovative responses to the changing requirements and demands of recipient countries, such as the model project approach initiated during the past year, and hoped that the input from the recently concluded Third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar would provide further guidance to the Secretariat enabling it to meet the challenges of the years to come.

57. Mr. YANEV (Bulgaria) said that the Agency continued to play a vital role in maintaining global peace and security by promoting co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Bulgaria supported the Agency's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system,

to improve the scope and effectiveness of its nuclear safety programme, and to serve as a major source of technical assistance to Member States.

58. The recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and the increased reliance of the United Nations on preventative diplomacy had highlighted widespread concerns about the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the international regime designed to cope with that danger. Technical co-operation in the nuclear field should be conditional on accession to and strict compliance with the NPT or other binding bilateral or multilateral agreements. In view of the fact that its primary responsibility related to the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations Security Council should become the effective forum for non-proliferation enforcement in the new international environment, with the power to sanction States which violated the relevant international agreements.

59. The international community needed effective measures to safeguard weapons-grade nuclear material and also to detect and prevent the clandestine production of nuclear weapons. The Agency's important role in that respect was well established and should be further enhanced. The Agency had to be given all the support it required to strengthen its safeguards regime, conduct special inspections and refer unresolved cases of proliferation to the Security Council. The actions which the Agency had taken to implement the concept of universal reporting of exports and imports of nuclear material, inventories, relevant nuclear-related equipment and other non-nuclear material deserved to be encouraged and developed further.

60. The recent accession of all nuclear-weapons States to the NPT had created a favourable political environment for affirming non-proliferation objectives, and served to demonstrate the growing international effort to ensure the viability of the Treaty at a crucial moment in the history of non-proliferation. He urged other Member States which were not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it, and in that connection looked forward to the early accession of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, as well as that of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, in order to consolidate the recent promising developments regarding the NPT, all the Treaty's provisions - in particular Article VI -

should be fully implemented, and the process towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be advanced.

61. The recent progress in nuclear disarmament was a significant step in implementing the NPT. Uninterrupted continuation of that process would greatly facilitate extension of the Treaty beyond 1995. Bulgaria favoured this indefinite and unconditional extension, and would work towards that goal at the NPT Extension Conference in 1995.

62. With regard to the recent developments on the DPRK safeguards question, his delegation supported the efforts being made by the countries concerned to find a solution to the problems. It also supported the Agency's activities in that area, and endorsed the draft resolution submitted on the subject.

63. Bulgaria attached particular importance to the Agency's programmes to develop standards for and provide assistance in ensuring nuclear and radiation safety. It was also strongly committed to enhancing nuclear safety culture worldwide and had participated actively in the elaboration of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. He was pleased to announce that Bulgaria had already approved and signed the Convention.

64. The prevention of a possible nuclear accident was of the highest priority for individual States and the international community as a whole. At the same time, it was essential that a generally acceptable, predictable and effective liability regime with broad participation be established to provide prompt and fair compensation for nuclear damage. He wished to inform the Conference that the Bulgarian National Assembly had ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. Universal participation in the international liability regime was very important for its success. Therefore he urged all States which had not already done so to consider acceding to those two instruments.

65. Turning to the work of the Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability, he expressed the view that an agreement on major issues of principle still had to be reached, in order to achieve broad participation in the revised Vienna Convention. Bulgaria was convinced that the revision process should not be decoupled from the elaboration of a supplementary funding system.

66. October 1994 marked the completion of 20 years' commercial operation of the first reactor of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. During that period, the plant had produced more than 208 billion kW·h of electricity. In 1993, despite the fact that one of the WWER units was under reconstruction, Kozloduy had produced a total of 13.897 billion kW·h, representing 36.48 % of the total power generated in the country. That placed Bulgaria tenth in the world in terms of percentage of power produced by nuclear means.

67. Since 1991, an extensive programme to upgrade WWER-440/230 reactor safety had been under way. The programme, partially funded by the European Union under the PHARE programme, involved 37 Bulgarian companies and institutes along with more than 20 companies worldwide. Furthermore, a consortium of regulatory bodies and independent organizations from the European Union had been established to advise the Bulgarian regulatory body on licensing procedures after upgrading and reconstruction.

68. Kozloduy nuclear power plant was a unique example of efficient international co-operation on safety matters, with the Agency playing an important co-ordinating role. It was planned to expand the use of nuclear power in Bulgaria, despite the difficulties involved in the transition from a planned to a market economy.

69. His delegation had studied thoroughly the report on the Agency's technical co-operation activities in 1993, contained in document GOV/2721, and wished to associate itself with others in approving that report, which illustrated the useful work being done by the Agency for its Member States. He noted in particular that the new resources available for the technical co-operation programme had increased by 31.3 % in 1993, while the value of the adjusted programme had risen by 16.9 %.

70. During the year Bulgaria had received technical assistance on 13 national projects, the bulk of it concerned with safety work at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in such areas as quality assurance, waste handling and instrument calibration. In addition, anti-seismic work had been carried out, including equipment anchoring and reinforcement of buildings, and assistance had been provided to the national regulatory body. Bulgaria was profoundly grateful for all the technical assistance it had received from the Agency, including fellowships and scientific visits, although the number of the latter approved of late had gone down.

71. His country attached great importance to the Agency's regional projects, in which Bulgarian specialists had participated, and welcomed the Agency's benchmark study programme, which would be of great significance for assessing the seismic reliability of WWER-1000 type reactors in Bulgaria. It also supported the Agency's activities on research contracts and co-ordination programmes.

72. Finally, he congratulated the Agency's Secretariat on its efficient and productive work during the year, commended the substantial contribution of the Director General, and pledged the unreserved support of the Bulgarian Government for the Agency in its task of promoting international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and controlling nuclear weapons proliferation.

73. Ms. MACHADO QUINTELLA (Brazil) said that despite the end of the Cold War, the world was faced with a succession of crises and conflicts, presenting new risks and challenges to mankind. Although there had been indisputable progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, new causes for concern had emerged, the most recent one being illicit trafficking in nuclear material. Disarmament, non-proliferation and international security were interrelated issues. The existence of nuclear arsenals that were not subject to international control and verification constituted a threat to the non-proliferation regime. Brazil, therefore, supported the adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty and a cutoff treaty on the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Both treaties would help to reduce the risks of vertical and horizontal proliferation and, once they were adopted, there should be a significant role for the Agency in their implementation. In view of the cases of illicit trade in nuclear material, it would perhaps be advisable for the cutoff treaty not to restrict itself to the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, but to tackle the issue of existing stocks as well. The illicit trafficking in nuclear material was causing great concern and her delegation shared the opinion that the Agency's expertise should be used in solving the problem. However, the physical protection of nuclear material was primarily a national responsibility and any new measures envisaged involving the Agency should not be detrimental in any way to the Agency's other activities.

74. Concerns regarding international security and non-proliferation, no matter how legitimate, should not relegate to second place the Agency's main objective of accelerating

and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Increasing costs faced by the Agency in the performance of its new functions in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation should not adversely affect promotional activities, nor should concerns related to safeguards and control prevent Brazil and other developing countries from obtaining access to the advanced technologies required for their national development.

75. Brazil was very concerned about the funding of the Agency's activities and, in particular, the decreasing support for the TACF and the high degree of reliance on extrabudgetary resources. At a time when so many countries were faced with difficult financial situations, it was appropriate that Member States which were in a position to do so should make additional contributions. However, promotional activities should benefit from such funds as well as regulatory ones, and the acceptance and expenditure of extrabudgetary resources should be kept under the control of the Board of Governors.

76. The promotion of the transfer of sensitive technology for peaceful purposes was beneficial to both supplier and recipient States. Universally accepted norms and guidelines were urgently needed to regulate such transfers in order to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security and access to technology, services and know-how that were essential for the economic and social welfare of all nations.

77. As was well known, the Brazilian Government was developing a comprehensive confidence-building strategy based on the adoption of more effective non-proliferation measures. Brazil's contribution to nuclear non-proliferation was demonstrated basically by three international agreements - the bilateral agreement with Argentina for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, the Quadripartite Agreement with the Agency, Argentina and ABACC, and the Tlatelolco Treaty, which had entered into force for Brazil in May 1994. That development was of great significance for Brazil and for the whole of Latin America, since it helped to promote the Treaty's application in the entire region. The announcement recently made by the Government of Cuba concerning its decision to accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty had also been warmly welcomed in Latin America.

78. Convinced of the important role that regional measures on disarmament and non-proliferation could play in promoting international peace and security, Brazil was following with great interest the assistance provided by the Agency to the parties concerned with a view to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East.

79. With regard to Iraq, her delegation had taken due note not only of the progress made over the past few months in the Agency's activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions, but also of the fact that data provided by the Iraqi authorities on foreign sources of supply and technical advice had been found to be correct and complete and that the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification activities in Iraq had been implemented on a full-time basis since the beginning of the month.

80. As to the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, her delegation called again on that country to re-establish full co-operation with the Agency. Brazil was paying close attention to current bilateral developments that might help solve that question and looked forward to further progress on the matter in the very near future.

81. On the subject of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and Programme 93+2, her delegation was willing to discuss the matter once the Secretariat had submitted a comprehensive report to the Board covering all seven tasks undertaken in accordance with the Programme. Brazil attached particular importance to Task 7 concerning the assessment of all financial and legal implications.

82. Brazil believed that by contributing to the enhancement of nuclear safety around the world, the Convention on Nuclear Safety would also help to increase public confidence in the safety of nuclear power and facilitate the promotion of other peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That Convention was an important first step, but others would have to follow. After the Board's approval in December of the Safety Fundamentals relating to waste management, it was expected that drafting of a convention on waste management would start. It was crucial to secure the widest possible participation of regions and Member States in the drafting of such a convention, which should include a provision for assistance to developing countries in establishing their waste management infrastructures.

83. The implementation of the Basic Safety Standards would impose a heavy burden upon institutions using ionizing radiation and it was to be hoped that international co-operation would not fail where it was needed.

84. The revision of the international liability regime within the framework of the Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability seemed excessively ambitious. One of the main points, the amount of compensation, contemplated in Article V of the Vienna Convention was still an open question and had been addressed by the Standing Committee only circumstantially. However, an exaggerated effort had been made to facilitate acceptance of the global mechanism of supplementary funding, an area where consensus had been quite difficult to reach. The Brazilian delegation had stressed its strong preference for a solution to the question of supplementary funding which would take country characteristics in each region into account. The next meeting of the Standing Committee should give greater attention to the analysis of the proposal presented by the United States of America, which appeared to provide a basis for a possible compromise on the subject involving the co-existence of regional and global systems.

85. In the light of certain political developments and the increase in the Agency's membership, questions pertaining to the amendment of Article VI of the Statute had gained new impetus. The Brazilian delegation therefore supported the proposed re-establishment of the informal working group. The enlargement of the Board and the maintenance of its efficiency were not irreconcilable objectives. However, the Agency had fulfilled its objectives in a very satisfactory way under the existing Article VI and any revision should therefore be considered with great care.

86. The measures taken by the Director General in response to resolutions GC(XXXVII)/RES/621 and 622 on the increase in the number of staff drawn from developing countries and the representation of women in the Secretariat were commendable, although the percentages of staff members from developing countries in posts subject to geographical distribution and of female staff were still unsatisfactory. Of special concern was the situation at the higher-level posts of the Secretariat, where nationals of developing countries were not found in adequate numbers and there were no women. Developing Member States should nominate more candidates, particularly female candidates, and request

the Director General to make additional efforts to achieve the goals set by the General Conference.

87. Turning to the Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar, she said that it had been very successful. Regarding radiation protection and waste management, Brazil shared the Seminar's view that emphasis should switch from technical assistance to technical co-operation, which should also be provided by experts from developing countries. With regard to the medium-term country plans, it agreed with the Seminar that there was need for flexibility in the formulation, framing and approval of such plans. With reference to the impact of technical co-operation projects, it endorsed the Seminar's conclusion that socio-economic impact should not be the only element considered and that continuous attention should also be given to projects which could contribute to scientific advancement and the development of infrastructures.

88. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that over the past year the Agency had made major and sustained contributions towards the development of a strengthened safeguards regime, more effective technical co-operation, and the development of strengthened international norms relating to nuclear safety and the physical protection of nuclear material. Arms control and disarmament had gathered pace since the Cold War, and there was a growing need for the international community to develop effective verification systems in new areas. Australia believed the Agency's experience would be invaluable in that regard. It was important that the Agency's capacity to contribute to prospective developments - and its contribution to international security through preventive diplomacy - should not be constrained by inadequate resources.

89. Australia had long recognized that the assurance of the peaceful use of nuclear technology by a State, and the independent verification of that use, were important factors in other States' assessments of their own security interests. His country had been a strong proponent of efforts over the past three years to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system and had actively supported Programme 93+2 to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of its safeguards practices.

90. Australia had been one of the first States to endorse the principle of an extended access safeguards regime and had been discussing with the Secretariat the possibility of a field trial in Australia. The Secretariat had already commenced field testing there of environmental sampling for safeguards purposes. Australia considered that remote surveillance systems had considerable potential both for making savings in inspection days and increasing safeguards effectiveness, and had developed and demonstrated such a system. It was currently participating - with a number of other countries - in a trial of advanced United States technology in that area. Australia urged other States to participate in similar trials to assist with the development of safeguards.

91. Recent regional developments clearly demonstrated the benefits of the Agency's safeguards system. The African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty was close to being finalized. The countries of South East Asia were considering the development of a similar zone in their region. Australia had shared with both regions the experience it had gained in negotiating the Rarotonga Treaty. The Tlatelolco Treaty also looked set to enter into force soon.

92. In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted resolutions calling for negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a convention to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, known as "cut-off". Such a convention could involve a significant verification role for the Agency. Australia hoped that all Member States would acknowledge the Agency's potential contribution to those international co-operative efforts and support its involvement in any such verification.

93. The future of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons programmes, as well as the increasing amounts of plutonium from reprocessing of spent fuel, had attracted considerable international attention. Recent instances of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials had been a further cause for concern. A potential role in that context for the Agency was being discussed. He urged Member States to support the Agency once the nature of its role had been defined. The Agency also had an important role to play in assisting Member States to acquire accountancy and physical protection skills. Member States could assist each other; Australia, for its part, had held a course on State systems of

accounting and control of nuclear material in May 1994, which had been attended by 24 participants from 12 countries.

94. Turning to the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, he regretted that that country had still not complied with its obligations. The issue was not a mere technicality but one which bore on the central purpose of any safeguards agreement, which was that the country concerned should co-operate with the Agency in demonstrating that all its nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. The DPRK's attitude presented a threat to international and regional security, and also a challenge to the safeguards system of the Agency. There were, however, encouraging signs from the talks currently under way between the United States and the DPRK. Australia hoped that the DPRK would respond to many calls by the international community to implement fully its obligations under the NPT.

95. Australia was looking forward to the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, which would provide an opportunity for thorough review of the benefits the Treaty had brought to international security and to co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

96. His country welcomed all recent accessions to the NPT - including that of some States with advanced nuclear capabilities - and the news that Algeria and Argentina intended to follow suit. It was also gratifying that Ukraine had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency and had re-affirmed its intention to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. His delegation urged Ukraine to take that step in the near future. Australia renewed its call for universal membership of the Treaty, a goal which was coming more and more within reach as membership had now increased to more than 165 States.

97. The Nuclear Safety Convention - which had been opened for signature at the current session of the General Conference - illustrated the benefits of co-operative approaches to common problems. It offered an assurance to other States of the safety of nuclear power plants. Australia had already signed the Convention and called on all States, particularly those operating or intending to operate nuclear power reactors, to do so at the earliest opportunity.

98. Australia shared international concerns that all nuclear facilities throughout the world should operate to stringent safety standards. It urged all States to attach a high priority to continued monitoring and necessary upgrading of safety standards in nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. Australia particularly welcomed the Agency's activities to that end in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It also urged all States to participate constructively in negotiations covering liability for nuclear damage.

99. His country was pleased with the progress made by the Agency in developing the RADWASS and other safety standards documents and felt that a high priority should continue to be given to that activity. It looked forward to the commencement of negotiations for a radioactive waste management safety convention in 1995 and urged all States to consider the benefits of participation.

100. Australia welcomed the decision of the contracting parties to the *London Dumping Convention* to prohibit the dumping of all types of radioactive waste at sea. As an active proponent of such a ban, it was pleased that all but one party had accepted that decision. It looked forward to the outcome of the Agency's investigation of past radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic Seas and the Sea of Japan.

101. The Agency's technical co-operation programme had for many years been a principal mechanism for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - in both power and non-power applications. The Agency was responding to the changing interests and needs of Member States. It had implemented the model project concept to demonstrate the tangible benefits of various nuclear techniques. In addition to its established activities in the fields of human health, food and agriculture, industry and environmental science, it had in recent years formulated new activities in, for example, the fields of insect eradication, potable water and food preservation. His delegation endorsed the increasing attention being paid to the potential impact of technical co-operation activities on poverty alleviation and the environment, and on the needs of women.

102. The Agency's ability to respond to Member States' interest in the technical co-operation programme was constrained by the failure of many Member States to contribute in full their share of the TACF target. Australia urged all countries to make full and timely

voluntary contributions and, for its part, would again pledge its share of almost US \$1 million for 1995. In addition, it was providing substantial support to the RCA for Asia and the Pacific through an extrabudgetary contribution of 1.5 million Australian dollars over the three-year period up to 1995.

103. Australia had a long-standing commitment to the Agency's technical co-operation activities and to implementation of Article IV of the NPT. It had for many years provided expert assistance and training facilities in a range of non-power nuclear applications. It had made a number of suggestions at the 1993 TACC meetings, aimed at enhancing the effective use of available funding to maximize the impact of the Agency's technical co-operation programme.

104. Turning to developments in the nuclear field in Australia over the past year, he said that the 9th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference held in Sydney in May 1994 had been attended by representatives from 6 international organizations and 35 countries. The theme of the Conference had been nuclear energy, science and technology - Pacific partnership and a range of topics had been covered.

105. Australia was seeking a site for a national repository for low-level and short-lived intermediate-level radioactive wastes generated by medical, research and industrial uses of radioisotopes. The communities concerned were being closely involved in that process.

106. A project manager had been selected for the former United Kingdom nuclear weapons test site at Maralinga, marking the start of the engineering phase of the Maralinga Rehabilitation Project. Work had begun on a detailed engineering design for the project and upgrading of the site infrastructure. The project was expected to last five years and his Government was keeping the Agency informed of developments.

107. At the end of 1993, his Government had announced further improvements to the nuclear regulation arrangements in Australia. A new Australian Institute for Radiation Protection, an amalgamation of the Australia Radiation Laboratory and the Nuclear Safety Bureau, would have regulatory and licensing powers for nuclear and radiation activities at national facilities. The Government had also decided that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would assume portfolio responsibility for the Australian Safeguards Office, which

administered Australia's nuclear safeguards obligations arising from the NPT. In due course, the expertise of the Australian Safeguards Office would serve as a basis for administering Australia's domestic obligations under other arms control treaties such as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

108. Australia had been an active proponent of programme and budgetary reform within the Agency. While recognizing that it was difficult for Member States to support continuous real growth in future Agency budgets in a situation of domestic budgetary restraint, Australia felt that the Agency's current level of commitment to existing priority activities must continue. His delegation therefore urged all Member States to make full and timely payment of their assessed contributions to the Regular Budget.

109. In conclusion, the increased attention paid in the Annual Report for 1993 to the impact of Agency activities would assist Member States in their consideration of the benefits of Agency membership. That report was an excellent example of the Secretariat's willingness to respond to Member States' requests.

110. Mr. UMARU BABA (Nigeria) said the achievements outlined in the documents before the Conference reflected the qualities of leadership, commitment and vision which the Director General had brought to the Agency at a time of immense challenges. As a result, respect for the role of the Agency and its highly motivated staff had increased.

111. That respect was nowhere more evident than in the Agency's promotional activities. Since the last session of the General Conference, the Agency had taken bold steps to promote nuclear techniques in the areas of agriculture, industry and medicine. He welcomed recent progress in the genetic improvement of crops through the combined use of induced mutations and other techniques. The proposal to place more emphasis on basic foods would, like the Agency's joint efforts with FAO to encourage the use of food irradiation on a commercial scale, do much to alleviate food shortages in developing countries.

112. His country greatly valued the Agency's activities aimed at the transfer of nuclear technology, primarily because they could help to strengthen Nigeria's scientific and technological base and thus its national economy. Thanks to extrabudgetary resources provided by some of its development partners, Nigeria had continued to benefit from the

Agency's technical assistance programme, and he urged that the current welcome focus in that programme be sustained.

113. In recognition of the importance of technical assistance for development, the Nigerian Government, notwithstanding its economic and financial difficulties, had pledged the sum of \$123 000 as its voluntary contribution to the Agency for 1995. He urged other Member States to make similar pledges, and, more important, to fulfil their pledges fully and on time. That was essential if the Agency's capability to meet programme costs was not to be hampered.

114. He noted that recent increases in the Agency's activities had been achieved in the face of severe resource constraints imposed by the maintenance of zero real growth in the budget, as well as by declining contributions to the TACF. The arguments in favour of an increase in the Agency's resource base now seemed overwhelming. It needed not only to respond to the challenge of its enlarged safeguards functions, but also to meet the concern of developing Member States that funding for technical assistance activities be assured. He wished to stress that any additional resources received should not be used to the disadvantage of promotional activities.

115. He was pleased to note that prospects for combating and possibly eliminating the Mediterranean fruit fly through sterile insect techniques were encouraging, and appealed to the Agency and donor countries to assist Nigeria in the completion of its SIT project.

116. He wished to express thanks to the Agency for establishing AFRA and to Spain and France for their support for that programme. He hoped that the United States and China, two leading members of the Agency, would soon be adding their support. In view of the enthusiasm shown by Member States for the programme, and the immense benefits it was expected to produce, Nigeria urged that the agreement be renewed when its expiry date was reached.

117. His Government supported the new concept of merging radiation protection with radioactive waste management, a concept which was a direct consequence of the RAPAT and WAMAP missions. Nigeria would be organizing a workshop on the concept at national level within the next 12 months.

118. Recent activities in the field of peaceful application of nuclear techniques in his country had included surveys to determine background radiation levels by the Energy Commission of Nigeria, soil fertility and geochemical mapping by the Centre for Energy Research and Training, and radioimmunoassay work in animal production and human medicine by the Nigerian Animal Protection and Research Institute.

119. His Government was grateful for the Agency's support for technical co-operation projects under the 1993-94 cycle. Experience gained in the execution of those projects had shown the need to focus on projects which would improve the national economy and which could serve the needs of several institutions and organizations without unnecessary duplication. He urged the Agency to give Nigeria's proposals for the 1995-96 cycle serious consideration.

120. His delegation had noted the steps taken by the Secretariat to implement General Conference resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/581, which requested the Director General to ensure harmony and compatibility between the Agency's programme and budget documents and its annual reports and accounts in order to facilitate comparison. He welcomed those efforts and urged that the change from an organization-based to a programme-based appropriation system be carried out as rapidly as possible, since it would eventually result in improved transparency and better management.

121. An effective safeguards system was vital to a credible non-proliferation regime, and Nigeria had followed recent developments in that area with interest. He particularly commended the work done by the Agency under Programme 93+2, which would permit evaluation of the technical, legal and financial implications of the recommendations made by SAGSI for the improvement of the safeguards system. The importance of cost-effectiveness could not be over-emphasized, and he was confident that Member States would lend support to the new approaches.

122. It was reassuring that the Agency's financial situation appeared to be stabilizing, largely as a result of compliance by Member States with the request that they meet their financial obligations fully and in a timely manner. He hoped that the new pattern of payments would be maintained and urged that any further delays in programme

implementation be kept to a minimum so that the important tasks entrusted to the Secretariat would be carried out.

123. His delegation was deeply concerned that pledges to the TACF for 1994 had not met the expected target and appealed to major contributors in particular to fulfil their pledges. It also called on all Member States to make their pledges for the coming year as soon as possible.

124. His delegation noted with satisfaction the progress made in formulating a draft treaty on an African nuclear-weapons-free zone. The establishment of such a zone would contribute to the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime, as well as strengthening peace and security in the region. Nigeria, as an active participant in the process, greatly valued the Agency's assistance to the OAU group of experts in that regard.

125. The recently-adopted Convention on Nuclear Safety was one of the Agency's greatest achievements. The Convention represented a significant step towards a safer, better regulated and more environmentally sound nuclear world. Nigeria's decision to be an early signatory to the Convention bore witness to its Government's commitment to support measures that would strengthen nuclear safety worldwide.

126. With regard to the question of revision of Article VI of the Statute, the need to ensure that the principal policy-making organs of the Agency, and notably the Board of Governors, reflected changes in membership was generally recognized. However, the best way of achieving a proper balance between requirements for equitable representation and the demands of the nuclear industry was still a subject of debate. In his view, the issue should not be set aside on the pretext of lack of consensus. If Member States were to have confidence in the Agency's decision-making bodies, those bodies should be properly representative, and the inadequate representation of the African region in particular needed to be remedied. The Agency should take advantage of an emerging consensus on the issue to discuss and agree on proposals that would strengthen the organization, and he was confident that if that were done the needs of the African region would receive the attention they deserved.

127. Mr. de YTURRIAGA (Spain) said that in 1993 the electricity produced from Spain's nuclear power plants, with a load factor of 86.5%, had risen to 53 900 GW·h, accounting for 35.3% of the country's total power production. That was the fruit of advanced technology, as well as of experience gained over the years in the areas of design, operation, safety and maintenance, experience which was now being applied to helping upgrade plants in Eastern Europe and the CIS.

128. Decommissioning and radioactive waste management would be two major challenges for Spain in the future. The Vandellós 1 plant, which had been shut down in 1989, was due to be decommissioned starting 1996, and the associated plan was currently being considered by the Regulatory Authority. In that regard, he wished to stress the urgent need to establish internationally agreed exemption criteria for waste, which would enable regulatory control to be concentrated on those waste materials presenting a radiological risk. As for the present, the El Cabril facility for the treatment of low- and intermediate-level waste was in operation and geological work was under way in order to obtain sufficient information to select a site for a high-level waste repository. In addition, an extensive research and development programme was being carried out to develop the requisite technologies and to gain a thorough insight into the various processes and parameters involved in the storage of waste, as well as to demonstrate the long-term safety of waste storage.

129. Turning to nuclear safety and radiological protection, he welcomed the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety which had struck a balance between national and international responsibility. As statutory approval had not yet been received from the Council of State, his delegation had not been able to sign the Convention, but hoped to do so in the very near future. Spain would have liked the Convention to apply not only to nuclear power plants, but also to fuel cycle and waste treatment facilities, and he wished to underscore the commitment that had been made to prepare a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. In that connection, he trusted that the Board of Governors would approve the Safety Fundamentals document entitled "The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management" at its December meeting, so that preparatory work on a waste management convention could commence.

130. Spain was following with great interest the Agency's work under the RADWASS programme, particularly in the area of decommissioning. It also attached great importance to the services provided by the Agency in the field of nuclear safety through the OSART, ASSET and RAPAT programmes and had made experts available and received missions at its own facilities as part of those efforts.

131. His delegation welcomed the Agency's initiative in establishing the IRRRT service with a view to strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of Member States' nuclear regulatory bodies, as well as the establishment of the ASCOT service.

132. Spain supported the Agency's work to develop a common basis for assessing the safety of nuclear power plants built to earlier standards, and the initiative to establish a material properties database with a view to gaining a better understanding of the ageing of the principal systems and components of nuclear power plants. In that connection, his country would continue to support the Agency's assistance programmes for upgrading older power plants by making available the services of Spanish firms and institutions.

133. Furthermore, Spain would co-operate closely with other Member States and the Agency itself on the organization and standardization of regulatory bodies and in order to create a common international framework in the future.

134. His delegation was pleased that the INES was being applied for a trial period to facilities other than nuclear power plants. It regarded the scale as a useful means for establishing a climate of understanding between the media and those responsible for nuclear safety, and expected its extension to other facilities to result in an improvement of the IRS.

135. Spain was pleased to note that, at the previous week's session, the Board of Governors had approved the revision of the Agency's International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources based on the latest ICRP recommendations, and looked forward to the preparation of guidelines on the practical application of the Basic Safety Standards, aimed at reducing radiation exposure.

136. His delegation welcomed the progress made on the work to revise and update the Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, incorporating the ICRP's latest recommendations, with the object of bringing them into line with the new Basic

Safety Standards, and hoped that a new edition would be published in 1996. It likewise appreciated the establishment of a database for the annual publication of a report on approval certificates for packages, and the forthcoming publications on quality control in transport operations.

137. Spain attached particular importance to the revision of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the elaboration of a supplementary funding convention. It regretted that the scheduled Diplomatic Conference on the subject had had to be postponed because of disagreement within the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, and hoped that the latest proposals would break the deadlock. His delegation trusted that, pending the entry into force of those instruments, as many countries as possible with nuclear installations - particularly those with power reactors - would accede to the current Vienna Convention. In that connection it welcomed the recent accession thereto of a number of Eastern European countries.

138. Turning to non-proliferation and safeguards, he welcomed Brazil, Argentina and Chile's accession and Cuba's forthcoming accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty, the entry into force of the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the Agency, the progress made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, the accession of a number of CIS Member States to the NPT, and the signature of full-scope safeguards agreements with some of those countries - all of which were significant steps towards the worldwide application of full-scope safeguards. Spain hoped that that spirit of co-operation would extend to the Middle East and that all the countries of that region would soon accede to the NPT, paving the way for it to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

139. The only discordant note was the attitude of the DPRK, which had prevented the Agency from applying the safeguards provided for under its safeguards agreement and had withdrawn from the Agency. It was to be hoped that a satisfactory solution would be found and that the DPRK Government would honour its international commitments.

140. Spain, which was currently chairing the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, appealed to all supplier countries which had not already done so to join the Group and to accept the

Guidelines for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology, which were set forth in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Parts 1 and 2.

141. It was to be hoped that work on strengthening the safeguards system would result in the Secretariat including in future reports a detailed statement on any failure to detect clandestine activities. Spain looked forward to the specific proposals which the Director General would be presenting to the Board in March 1995 and trusted that they would lead to a substantial reform of the safeguards system, to enable it to cope with the ever-increasing workload, and also bring about a significant improvement in the quality of safeguards. Such reform should be effected with the minimum of change to the legal framework and the minimum of extra costs, given the budgetary constraints currently prevailing.

142. Referring to the Agency's technical co-operation activities in 1993, he welcomed the substantial increase in the resources provided to the technical assistance programme. Spain had made a great effort and managed to maintain its voluntary contributions to the TACF at \$752 000 despite the devaluation of the peseta. It had also contributed to the technical assistance programme in other ways, such as hosting training courses, receiving fellows and providing experts for missions - services which his country would continue to offer, if the Agency so required. With regard to the model project concept, Spain fully supported that approach, as witness the co-operation it had lent to the project "Strengthening training for operational safety at Paks NPP" in Hungary.

143. In conclusion, he expressed confidence that the Agency would successfully meet all the new challenges ahead and pledged Spain's continued full support.

144. Mr. COLL (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that in the two years which had passed since his Agency had attended its first IAEA General Conference as an observer, it had made satisfactory progress. From the time of launching its activities at its Rio de Janeiro Headquarters in July 1992 to the end of 1994, it would have completed its organization, implemented its accounting system for all balance areas, ordered the necessary equipment and embarked on its first design verification inspections.

145. In the course of 1993, priority had been given to those facilities which were not under Agency safeguards, by verifying the design and initial inventory and implementing the common system of accounting and control (SCCC) for all those facilities. By the end of the year it had achieved its objective of ensuring that all Argentinian and Brazilian facilities were under either ABACC or IAEA safeguards. The work of organizing the transport of samples, setting up the network of laboratories in both countries, training inspectors and developing the necessary inspection infrastructure had required considerable effort.

146. At the beginning of 1994, ABACC had concentrated on the interim inspections and on the design verification of the facilities already under Agency safeguards. In March, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency had been signed, making the IAEA responsible for bringing all the nuclear material in both countries under safeguards.

147. The States Parties had undertaken to place all the nuclear material in all nuclear activities under safeguards to ensure that none was diverted for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Agency had the right and obligation to apply safeguards in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. In applying its safeguards, ABACC undertook to co-operate with the Agency. The Agency would apply its safeguards in such a manner as to enable it to verify the findings of the SCCC to ensure that there had been no diversion of any nuclear material. All four parties to the Agreement would co-operate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, and ABACC and the Agency would avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities.

148. The States Parties had signed the Agreement pursuant to Article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty, to which Argentina and Brazil had acceded in January and May 1994, respectively.

149. ABACC had already sent the Agency its initial report on the nuclear material in its two countries and had sent off the design information questionnaires for each of the facilities in Brazil and Argentina. It had also prepared the first drafts of the facility attachments for those facilities which had been under its control prior to the entry into force of the Agreement and which were now controlled by the Agency. The Liaison Committee set up under the Protocol had held its first meeting in May.

150. In June the first ABACC/IAEA joint inspections had been carried out to verify the initial inventory and the design of the facilities. The inspections had involved a total of 132 man-days in Brazil and 157 man-days in Argentina, and the results had been satisfactory. A similar inspection effort would take place in November 1994 and should enable the verification of the initial inventory to be completed by the end of the year, thus completing the initial phase of the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. Full implementation would require the preparation of procedures for ad hoc inspections, the co-ordination of activities to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and discussion on the facility attachments.

151. Co-ordination to avoid duplication was particularly important for ABACC. In that connection, it was ABACC's understanding that the requirement for each organization to reach independent conclusions in order to guarantee the effectiveness of their respective safeguards did not prevent them from sharing activities and results provided that in so doing their independence was not affected. It was also in the interests of the States Parties that duplication should be avoided. ABACC was confident that it would find the necessary balance and hoped to complete the Subsidiary Arrangements in the near future.

152. In conclusion, ABACC was grateful to the Agency, EURATOM, and other countries such as the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom for their co-operation in its launching.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.