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President: Mr. BAER (Switzerland)

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AGNES	Advanced General and New Evaluation of Safety
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ELISA	Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G-7	Group of Seven
GNP	Gross national product
ICTP	International Centre for Theoretical Physics (in Trieste)
London Convention	Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972)
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency (of OECD)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
Paris Convention	Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (July 1960)
PHARE	Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic reconstruction
Quadrupartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
RADWASS	Radioactive Waste Safety Standards
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
RIA	Radioimmunoassay
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1961)
WAMAP	Waste Management Advisory Programme
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION (GC(XXXVIII)/1, Add.1 and 2)

1. The PRESIDENT reported that the General Committee recommended to the General Conference that the agenda for the present session should include all the items listed in document GC(XXXVIII)/1, except item 2 (Applications for membership of the Agency) as no applications for membership had been submitted, together with supplementary items A (Restoration of technical assistance to Israel), requested by Israel, B (South Africa's position in the IAEA and the Board of Governors), requested by South Africa, and C (Designation of members of the Board of Governors), requested by the Philippines, contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/1/Add.1, and the additional item (Measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear material), proposed by Germany on behalf of the European Union, contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/1/Add.2. The Committee further recommended that the Conference waive the time limit of seven days prescribed for additional items in Rule 15 of the General Conference's Rules of Procedure and consider the item on illicit trafficking during the present session.

2. With respect to the allocation of items for initial discussion, the Committee recommended that the items listed in the provisional agenda and the supplementary list be taken up for discussion as indicated in documents GC(XXXVIII)/1 and Add.1. The Committee's recommendation with the regard to the allocation of the item entitled "Designation of members of the Board of Governors" had been taken by a vote. With regard to the additional item entitled "Measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear material", contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/1/Add.2, the Committee had decided after a vote to recommend that it be discussed initially in the Committee of the Whole.

3. As to the order of items, the Committee recommended that the order appearing in document GC(XXXVIII)/1 be retained and that supplementary item A (Restoration of technical assistance to Israel) should be inserted between items 28 and 29 of the provisional agenda; that supplementary item B (South Africa's position in the IAEA and the Board of Governors) be taken up immediately after item 24; and that supplementary item C (Designation of members of the Board of Governors) be inserted between items 21 and 22. With

regard to the additional item (Measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear material), the Committee recommended that it be taken up immediately after item 22 of the provisional agenda. All items would be renumbered accordingly. It was understood that after due notice and depending on progress of work some changes to the order might be necessary.

The General Committee's recommendations were adopted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

4. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had recommended to the General Conference that Friday, 23 September 1994 be set as the closing date of the thirty-eighth regular session and Monday, 18 September 1995 as the opening date of the thirty-ninth regular session of the General Conference, which would be held in Vienna.

The General Committee's recommendations were adopted.

REQUEST FOR THE RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS (GC(XXXVIII)/INF/7)

5. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had received a request from Iraq that the last sentence of Article XIX.A of the Statute be invoked in order that it might be permitted to vote during the present session of the General Conference. The General Committee recommended that the General Conference reject that request.

6. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) pointed out that document GC(XXXVIII)/INF/7 explained that the unjust embargo imposed on Iraq not only prevented it from having the necessary financial liquidity to fulfil its obligations to the Agency, but also meant that it was unable to provide food, medicine and other basic requirements for its population. Iraq had requested that its assets be released and financial transactions allowed, but had met with a negative response. The General Committee had in the past discussed similar problems of force majeure and had allowed a number of countries to enjoy their basic right to vote. When the matter had been brought up the previous year it had been dealt with in a political fashion and not in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the Statute. He called on the Conference to deal with the matter in a spirit of justice and fairness and not to respond to political pressures.

7. The PRESIDENT said that each request for restoration of voting rights was examined on its own merits. He took it that the Conference accepted the General Committee's recommendation.

8. The General Committee's recommendation was adopted.

QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION BY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

9. The PRESIDENT said that the Committee also recommended that, in accordance with Rule 30 of the General Conference's Rules of Procedure, the Conference permit the representative of the DPRK to participate in the discussion of the item relating to the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the DPRK, being a matter of direct concern to that country, should he so wish.

10. The General Committee's recommendation was adopted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1993 (GC(XXXVIII)/2 and Corr.1) (resumed)

11. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) noted that the end of the Cold War had done nothing to remedy the deprivations of developing countries or to eliminate the conflicts in sensitive regions and potential hotbeds of global crises. Increased military presence and deployment of foreign forces, the stock-piling of weapons, the strengthening of military alliances and increasing growth in military spending, particularly in the sensitive region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, all contrived to make it virtually impossible to achieve peace and security. The present-day realities were as frightening as the apparent Cold War confrontations. There was particular reason to be dismayed when comparing the unprecedented mobilization of certain States in the case of Kuwait's occupation with the actions of those same States in the case of the tragic crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12. In order to achieve peace and security, all States should work to eradicate prevailing prejudices and injustices and to create balance and equity within the global disarmament process. If the endeavours of Agency Member States in the General Conference could, directly or indirectly, lead to global disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful

applications of nuclear energy in a just manner, there would be renewed hope of establishing a more secure world.

13. The main prerequisite for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the effective implementation of measures to halt the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries possessing such weapons. Effective measures should therefore be taken at the NPT Extension Conference to halt the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and to dismantle the existing arsenals within a specified time. The NPT Extension Conference should also clearly indicate the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States in that respect. The Treaty's objectives would be jeopardized if the Treaty were extended indefinitely without specifying time limits or the scope of responsibilities and means of verification.

14. The success of past NPT Review Conferences had been hampered by the non-fulfilment on the part of nuclear-weapon States of their Treaty obligations. Those countries had not taken any major steps within the past five years in the area of nuclear disarmament, had not refrained from exporting nuclear-weapons-related materials and equipment to other countries, and had not provided positive and active technical co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy with non-nuclear-weapon States.

15. The Agency's safeguards system, based on the existing agreements between the Agency and Member States, and the Agency's record in implementing safeguards agreements had been successful. The exceptional instances of violation, as in the case of Iraq, should not serve as an excuse for the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the United States, to undermine the Agency's statutory tasks and obligations or to exert pressure to perform unconventional inspections and interfere irresponsibly with and violate the sovereign rights of other countries under the pretext of strengthening safeguards. In order to strengthen the Agency's safeguard system, it was necessary to respect the Agency's mandate and jurisdiction, to refrain from indulging in discrimination and applying double standards, and to maintain a strong stand against the unilateral actions of certain nuclear-weapon States.

16. In that context, the efforts taking place at international level to divert the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the United Nations Security Council were not only in

sharp contrast with the mandate foreseen for the Security Council in the Charter of the United Nations, but could also undermine the effective implementation of Agency safeguards.

17. The Agency, under the pressure of influential powers, had so far not been able to provide a balance between its duty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and its duty to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Most parties to the NPT, particularly those which acted more independently, had been deprived of easy access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes. During the preparation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the industrialized countries had opposed the inclusion of phrases in the draft that would have facilitated the exchange of the required technical know-how needed by Member States to ensure the safety of their nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the unilateral actions of certain nuclear-weapon States in preventing the transfer of so-called dual-purpose materials and technology, based on arbitrary interpretations, was unacceptable. Such transfers should be devoid of any political aims and objectives and should be negotiated at international level, within the framework of a legitimate and transparent process.

18. The Islamic Republic of Iran had been one of the victims of such gross injustices and, although its nuclear activities had always been approved by the Agency, it had been subjected to strong pressure from the United States and certain other Western countries. Countries such as the United States apparently did not recognize the right of the people of the Third World to enjoy the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

19. Concerns associated with infringement of national sovereignty as a result of political pressure and the consequent increased difficulty of benefiting from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy had led some developing countries to cease their co-operation with the Agency and even to renounce the NPT. If the objectives of the developing countries in joining international treaties on nuclear weapons and technology were not met, such countries could not be expected to comply with the provisions of such treaties.

20. The application of selective and discriminatory standards in the sensitive area of the Middle East, such as the United States' unequivocal support of Israel's nuclear activities and increasing pressure on other countries of the region, under the pretext of promoting a

nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, undermined the NPT's credibility and hampered security-building measures in the region. There could be no peace in the Middle East while Israel continued to reject the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone and continued to renounce the NPT. By rejecting the NPT and by developing nuclear weapons with the tacit approval of the United States, Israel had become not only a serious threat to the region, but also to peace and security in the whole world.

21. His country had initiated the nuclear-weapon-free zone plan for the Middle East and had repeatedly emphasized that it should be established in a fair and comprehensive manner. The regional objectives would never be fulfilled and countries in the region would not be encouraged to co-operate, so long as unilateral and discriminatory pressure was applied and Israel's threatening stance continued to be supported by the United States and overlooked by certain countries in the West.

22. Turning to the subject of nuclear safety, he welcomed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, although it was limited to nuclear power plants, which constituted only a small portion of the fuel cycle. His country believed that a similar convention should be prepared covering all applications of nuclear energy. Although it was common knowledge that nuclear installations with military applications presented more serious dangers than peaceful facilities, international organizations, such as the Agency, had no information or control over such facilities. International conventions to control the safe operation of such facilities should therefore be drawn up at the earliest opportunity. A convention on the management and safe storage of nuclear waste should also be drafted and signed by Member States as soon as possible.

23. The programmes of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization covered the utilization of nuclear energy for generating part of the country's electrical energy requirements; the acquisition of technology for the design and manufacture of reactors; the training of the necessary specialists and the transfer of technical know-how; the provision of nuclear services in the fields of industry, agriculture and medicine; the protection of the environment and the population against the dangers of radiation; and the provision of the raw materials required for Iran's fuel cycle.

24. In order to achieve those objectives, a number of activities were being undertaken including co-ordination of contractual work related to the construction of the Esteghlal nuclear power plant in Bushehr with the co-operation of the People's Republic of China and completion of unit 1 of the Bushehr nuclear power plant by the Russian Federation; installation of a zero-power research reactor and a training reactor; completion of the existing radioisotope laboratories and installation of a cyclotron accelerator for the production of industrial, medical and research isotopes; production of various types of lasers; expansion of the capacity of the existing gamma irradiation centre and establishment of food irradiation centres in other regions of Iran; expansion of dosimetry and thermoluminescence services; establishment of a pilot plant for the production of fuel and nuclear material; and training of personnel in the field of nuclear science and technology.

25. As his country had a large, suitable infrastructure for peaceful nuclear applications, it was prepared to host trainees and experts taking part in specialized courses organized by the Agency. It had also suggested that the Agency organize regional training courses, seminars and meetings and conduct regional joint projects using the facilities of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization.

26. His delegation commended the Department of Technical Co-operation on its efforts to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology to Member States within the framework of model projects. That was a positive step in the right direction. However, if a model project was successful in one Member State and another Member State had the required facilities to receive the technical assistance involved, the Agency should also implement the same model project in that State. Furthermore, a country with financial resources should not be placed at a disadvantage when the allocation of technical assistance was being reviewed and assessed. He noted with regret that implementation of the technical co-operation programme had been disrupted by the failure of some Member States, particularly those with extensive financial means, to pay their share of the target for voluntary contributions.

27. Amendment of the Agency's Statute was one of the subjects which had been discussed for many years and, with the Agency's increased membership resulting from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the establishment of new republics, such an amendment had become even more necessary than before. The number of members of the

Board of Governors should increase in line with the Agency's increased membership. Furthermore, the structure of permanent and elected membership of the Board should become more logical. A further review of the development of nuclear industries for peaceful purposes in Member States should be carried out so that the permanent seats on the Board of Governors could be fairly distributed among the countries which had more advanced nuclear industries.

28. Mr. UTCHANAH (Mauritius) , having welcomed South Africa's return to the General Conference after a long absence, said that the Agency's two-pronged role could be perceived as the promotion of the use of nuclear energy and verification of its peaceful use. With the ever-increasing number of applications of atomic energy and number of nuclear installations that had to be safeguarded, the Agency's task was becoming increasingly complex and arduous.

29. There were at present a number of areas of concern to his delegation, such as the cases of nuclear trafficking that had been detected, the conclusion of RAPAT and WAMAP missions that radiation protection and waste management infrastructures were weak in many countries, the problems arising from the disposal by certain industrialized countries of nuclear waste in developing countries and from the disposal of nuclear waste at sea, and the problems associated with technically defective nuclear power plants that were known to have endangered the lives of hundreds of people.

30. On the other hand, he noted with satisfaction the importance attached by the Agency to the transfer of nuclear technology. In providing that technology, it was essential to ensure that the technology was in line with the development norms of the recipient country and that proper training and guidance were provided. Applications of nuclear techniques in areas such as food processing and storage, animal production and medicine were of great importance to many developing countries in general and the isotope hydrology methods developed by the Agency could be of immense value to many sub-Saharan African countries where economic development was dependent on adequate water supplies.

31. Mauritius, for its part, was already benefiting from Agency assistance in the fields of water resources development, agriculture and medicine. It was, however, proceeding

cautiously by making sure that the use of nuclear technology was appropriate and that it had properly trained manpower.

32. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) said that although the threat of global nuclear war had diminished in the light of the dramatic changes of recent years, the nuclear non-proliferation regime still faced serious challenges, such as non-compliance and the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Moreover, the Governments of many countries were finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the growing public resistance to nuclear power and radioactive waste management. Such developments called for the Agency to reassess and strengthen its roles and responsibilities.

33. With regard to recent press reports on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, he welcomed the European Union's initiative in raising the issue and reiterated his delegation's concern that the Agency should take a more active role in the storage and management worldwide of sensitive fissile materials. Individual national authorities should also strive harder to prevent the unauthorized circulation of nuclear material. An international system should be established under the auspices of the Agency in order to monitor such activities and help guarantee full nuclear transparency. His delegation was willing to participate actively in whatever measures the Conference might wish to recommend.

34. With regard to the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, his Government supported the principle of extending the Treaty and would consult with the other parties concerned with a view to achieving that objective in a manner acceptable to the international community. His delegation also looked forward to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and agreements to cease the production of nuclear material for nuclear weapons, and called upon the Agency to explore means of further developing its role in those areas and in the management of the nuclear materials resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear arsenals.

35. His Government strongly supported Programme 93+2, under which it had invited Agency experts to the Republic of Korea earlier in the year to carry out field testing of environmental monitoring techniques.

36. Turning to safety-related matters, he welcomed the Secretariat's continued efforts to enhance nuclear safety at national and international level since the accidents at Three Mile

Island and Chernobyl, and called for the further development of technical programmes such as OSART and ASSET.

37. His Government intended to contribute fully to the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it believed would open a new era of international co-operation in the enhancement of safety at nuclear power plants, and had noted with great interest the Secretariat's recent efforts to prepare the guidelines for periodic safety reviews, which should further improve their safe operation.

38. His delegation recognized that, despite the existence of proven technologies and practices, the issue of radioactive waste management remained a politically sensitive one, and considered that greater effort would be required at national and international level in order to change public perceptions. His Government was pleased to note that final agreement had almost been reached on the draft Safety Fundamentals and, recognizing the importance of the RADWASS programme, welcomed that fact the General Conference would have before it a draft resolution designed to enable the Agency to take further measures aimed at enhancing international co-operation on radioactive waste management.

39. His country had recently become a signatory to the London Convention and, in line with the resolution adopted by the contracting parties of the Convention in November 1993, looked forward to the ending of the unlawful dumping of radioactive waste into the sea. The Secretariat should continue to make its expertise available to the Member States concerned.

40. The Republic of Korea now generated over 40% of its total electricity from nuclear power plants, an achievement for which it was indebted to the various technical assistance programmes provided by the Agency and donor countries. His country was now ready to increase its contribution to the promotion of international co-operation in that area, and accordingly in 1995 planned to share its experience of safe reactor operation with countries of the Asia and Pacific region by hosting an IAEA regional workshop. It also intended to sponsor an interregional training course on nuclear power project management and to make a special contribution amounting to US \$200 000 to the RCA programme.

41. Significant geopolitical changes affecting nuclear development worldwide had occurred since the Agency's Statute had last been amended in 1973. His Government

considered that thorough review and revision was urgently required in order to accommodate the changes and ensure the Agency's continuing relevance. In that regard, he urged Member States and the Secretariat to pursue without delay further consultations aimed at building a consensus on the revision of Article VI of the Statute.

42. His Government was firmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to nuclear transparency. In that connection, a national Technology Centre for Nuclear Control had recently been established for the purpose, inter alia, of helping Agency inspectors implement their work more effectively and efficiently at his country's nuclear facilities. It was hoped that the Agency would provide technical help to train the personnel involved.

43. His Government was also studying seriously the possibility of joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in the near future.

44. The DPRK's persistent non-compliance with its safeguards obligations remained a matter of great concern to the international community. While his delegation welcomed the positive signs emerging from the current bilateral talks between the United States and the DPRK, such negotiations could neither defer nor replace the DPRK's obligation to implement fully its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

45. His Government was willing to take a leading role in assisting the DPRK to convert to light water reactors, provided full nuclear transparency was not in doubt. His Government appreciated and fully supported the Secretariat's continuing efforts to implement the Agency's safeguards agreement with the DPRK and the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference, the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council. His Government also considered that it would be appropriate to reconvene the inter-Korean talks on nuclear-related matters in parallel with the talks between the United States and the DPRK, with the objective of implementing the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

46. Mr. HREHOR (Czech Republic), having endorsed the Agency's Annual Report for 1993, noted that the thirty-eighth regular session of the General Conference was of particular importance to all Member States because it was the last one before the 1995 NPT Extension Conference and because it was associated with the signing of the Convention on

Nuclear Safety. In addition, for his country, it was the first milestone in its membership of the Agency.

47. The Agency's role in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had been steadily increasing. The Agency had also gained considerable importance in the field of nuclear safety through international co-operation programmes and the implementation of internationally recognized measures.

48. The NPT, which would celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary in 1995, was one of the cornerstones of the international security system at both global and regional level. It was an essential tool, which was helping to preserve world peace and security. His country, therefore, strongly supported all activities leading to the extension of the existing Treaty. The Agency played a valuable role in verifying compliance with the Treaty through its safeguards system, which was an integral part of the whole nuclear non-proliferation regime. In that context, his country fully supported the Agency's efforts to fulfil its safeguards obligations in the DPRK and in Iraq.

49. It also appreciated the Agency's close co-operation with other supporting mechanisms of the NPT, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, in which the Czech Republic had always played an active role. It was convinced that those mechanisms did not create any restrictions to the transfer of technologies for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy for countries with honest intentions.

50. His country was deeply convinced that the most promising way to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards was through closer co-operation between a State and the Agency on the basis of an integrated safeguards system combining all the elements of the existing system, together with the new supplementary measures that had been introduced and proposed during the last few years. It was following with interest the development of Programme 93+2 and appreciated the invitation by a number of Member States to carry out the necessary field tests within the framework of that Programme and reiterated his own country's willingness to participate in those tests.

51. Turning to nuclear safety, he noted that the Dukovany nuclear power plant was entering its tenth year of commercial operation. Despite the plant's high efficiency and

operational safety, the operating organization was preparing an extensive safety upgrading programme and, upon request by the State Office for Nuclear Safety, a new safety analysis report, which would re-examine the plant's operational safety. The Czech Republic's second nuclear power plant, Temelin, which was under construction and belonged to the group of the most advanced WWER reactors, was also undergoing design changes with a view to improving its safety.

52. The Czech Republic would be one of the first countries to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety and considered that step as a contribution to the efforts to enhance nuclear safety worldwide through national measures and through international co-operation. It would thereby also enable the international community to examine objectively the safety level and overall safety culture at Czech nuclear facilities.

53. The successful technical co-operation between the Czech Republic and the Agency had been very useful in improving the safety of Czech nuclear facilities. In that connection, he noted that the Agency's extrabudgetary programme focusing on the identification of safety problems connected with WWER reactors had also been very valuable.

54. One of the key prerequisites of the defence-in-depth concept was the use of high-quality materials for all the critical components. His country's experience showed that the use of non-destructive methods for the identification of defects in those materials required special skills, which had to be permanently maintained and verified. The planned Agency programme to compare different NDT laboratories in Central and Eastern Europe would provide a further significant contribution to the safety of WWER reactors.

55. The Czech Republic had always attached great importance to the application of nuclear safety principles within its legal framework. Although the State's function and role in that area and the rights and duties of all nuclear energy users were defined in the existing Czech nuclear legal framework, a new Atomic Energy Act was being prepared. That Act would readdress all the principal areas of nuclear safety and the suggested legislative changes would correspond to internationally recognized recommendations and practices. In parallel, the competence of the State Office for Nuclear Safety was going to be expanded and it was

expected that it would also include the area of radiation protection, which was currently covered by the Ministry of Health.

56. One of the important steps in enhancing his country's credibility was its signing in June 1994 of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability and the Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and Paris Convention. The new nuclear legislation would confirm explicitly the widely recognized principles, such as channelling liability to the operator, the need for a nuclear liability insurance system and financial guarantees by the State for compensation for damage.

57. Mr. PUNGOR (Hungary) said there was no doubt that since the last General Conference, nuclear issues had become increasingly prominent in political life worldwide. The Agency had done a great deal in the past year to ensure that nuclear energy was used for human welfare and to create greater assurances about the peaceful nature of its use.

58. The NPT, concluded nearly 25 years ago, and the regime based upon it, had become not only a fundamental instrument for maintaining international security and stability, but had also served as a solid basis for peaceful nuclear co-operation among nations. His Government supported the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty and appealed to all countries that had not done so to accede to the Treaty and conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.

59. Hungary fully supported the safeguards system and the programme launched by the Secretariat to strengthen it. The objective was an efficient safeguards system capable of providing reliable assurances on the peaceful nature of nuclear activities, including detection of undeclared facilities. The challenging events of the recent past fully justified such aspirations. His country continued to offer its modest assistance in the elaboration and testing of Programme 93+2, which would, it was to be hoped, be adopted in 1995 by the Board of Governors.

60. Hungary had consistently supported the Agency's activities in relation to full implementation of the Security Council resolutions on Iraq. It welcomed the report on the progress made in that area and the co-operation of the Iraqi authorities, which should continue through the long-term monitoring and verification process.

61. Despite several attempts made by the Agency, the problems relating to implementation of the safeguards agreement with the DPRK had not yet been fully solved. Hungary welcomed the latest positive developments and hoped that as a result of the negotiations between the DPRK and the United States, the Agency would soon be able to perform all the required activities with regard to nuclear facilities in the DPRK.

62. Hungary shared the concern expressed by some delegations about recent cases of illegal transfer and smuggling of nuclear materials. That situation represented a serious challenge to the non-proliferation system and raised safety and environmental concerns as well. The Agency had an important role to play in facilitating international co-operation, including technical assistance to countries in fields not related to law enforcement. The Director General's recent initiative in that regard was to be commended, and the Hungarian authorities were ready to co-operate with the Agency to curb the problem of nuclear trafficking.

63. The countries present at the General Conference had much in common: they all sought a peaceful world and a clean, healthy environment, and knew that nuclear energy could help them to achieve those goals. They were well aware, however, that if the world continued to rely on nuclear power and the many other applications of nuclear technology, it was essential for nuclear materials and facilities to be handled safely. National activities and international co-operation could help to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. One outstanding result of the joint efforts of Member States and the Agency had been the Convention on Nuclear Safety. His Government had signed the Convention and was convinced that it would greatly contribute to the enhancement of nuclear safety. Hungary would do its utmost to comply fully and hoped that a large number of States would sign and ratify the Convention soon. However, no Convention could relieve countries of their ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety within their borders.

64. Considerable efforts had been made to solve problems relating to waste management in Hungary, to bring the regulatory system in line with international standards, and to improve nuclear safety. The Hungarian radioactive waste management project launched 18 months previously, had to be carried out within a framework of appropriate regulations. His Government therefore looked forward to approval of the Safety Fundamentals and the other

materials in the RADWASS programme and supported the proposal to develop a safety convention in the field of radioactive waste management.

65. A new law on nuclear energy was under preparation in Hungary: the final revision of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage had been awaited so that domestic regulations could be adjusted accordingly. The country was updating its regulatory framework overall and finalizing the evaluation of safety at its nuclear power plant. The AGNES project to reassess the safety of the Paks nuclear power plant had been launched in late 1991. The conclusions demonstrated that the safety of the plant was acceptable and that, with further safety enhancement measures, its long-term reliable functioning could not be questioned.

66. Hungary had benefited from the effective technical assistance provided through a number of projects under the Agency's technical assistance programme. A model project on strengthening training for operational safety at the Paks nuclear power plant had been developed and implementation was already well under way. The project aimed at restructuring the training system for the most important jobs at the plant, establishing a maintenance training system and enhancing the safety culture. The project was being supported by a number of organizations and countries, to which he expressed gratitude.

67. His Government had decided to pledge a voluntary contribution corresponding to its share of the target for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1995. Training in various Hungarian institutions had been increased and a number of scientific visits had been hosted.

68. In conclusion, his delegation congratulated the Secretariat on its excellent performance in spite of the financial and other constraints of the past year. The Agency had successfully worked to fulfil its main objectives of enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity and to ensure that it was not used for military purposes. It would enjoy Hungary's firm support in those endeavours in future.

69. Mr. HELLER (Mexico) said that changes in the world political map had thrown up new challenges both regionally and globally putting nuclear non-proliferation at

the top of the international agenda. The main advances made during the year in relation to non-proliferation needed to be evaluated in that context.

70. The regime foreseen by the Tlatelolco Treaty was continuing to gain in strength and confirmed the merits of diplomacy in achieving objectives that some had previously dismissed as utopian expressions of goodwill. As depositary of the Treaty, his Government welcomed the action taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the first half of the year towards completing the legal procedures necessary to bring the Treaty fully into force. It also appreciated the decision of the Government of Cuba to accede to the Treaty as a full member. Latin America and the Caribbean would thus become the world's first densely populated nuclear-weapon-free zone. The entry into force of the Quadripartite Agreement and Protocol thereto concluded between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency would further bolster the Tlatelolco Treaty and other international non-proliferation regimes through its innovative, transparent and co-operative system of safeguards and reciprocal inspections, aimed at strengthening confidence with regard to non-proliferation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

71. Regional denuclearization was also proceeding apace in Africa, where agreement had been reached in principle - if not on every detail - on the draft text of a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that continent. In the Middle East, the substantial practical progress made in the peace negotiations over the past year could well contribute to creating an atmosphere conducive to the establishment in that region of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Security and confidence would be strengthened in that region through the application of safeguards, both by the Agency and through a special regional mechanism.

72. Mexico earnestly hoped that the necessary conditions could be created for the speedy implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Mexico welcomed the dialogue between the Governments directly concerned and hoped that it would yield a constructive solution ensuring the DPRK's renewed membership of the Agency and enabling it to fulfil its obligations under its safeguards agreement.

73. Mexico also welcomed the safeguards agreement concluded between Ukraine and the Agency, which represented a step towards its definitive accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

74. The illicit trafficking of nuclear material presented a new challenge to non-proliferation efforts. It was incumbent upon the Agency's Member States at least to discuss the modalities of any contribution it might make towards eliminating that new hazard.

75. The NPT Extension Conference due to be held in April 1995 would afford an outstanding opportunity to review the proper implementation of the agreements concluded over the past 25 years with respect to safeguards, horizontal and vertical non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, as well as the development of peaceful nuclear applications and international co-operation. The success of that Conference was to be measured not only in terms of the decision adopted regarding its extension, but also in terms of the readiness shown by the States parties to evaluate its operation at a practical level and to get to grips with challenges confronting them in the world today.

76. The peaceful applications of nuclear energy contributed to sustainable development through energy generation, food production and preservation, pest control and improved health care. It was particularly important to protect the inalienable right of States, in accordance with Articles III and IV of the NPT, to develop such applications and to strengthen international co-operation, while establishing new mechanisms to strengthen the international safeguards regime and improve standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

77. With regard to Article VI of that Treaty, Mexico welcomed the progress made by the ad hoc committee on the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which it hoped would be concluded and enter into force as soon as possible. It was essential that, in the meantime, all nuclear powers should extend their suspension of nuclear tests indefinitely. His delegation was grateful to the Agency for the technical assistance provided to the Committee in evaluating the possible verification activities that the Agency might perform in connection with the Treaty.

78. In the course of the past year, his country had noted the advances made in strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system through Programme 93+2 and remained convinced that the success of that process was dependent on the taking of mandatory, universal and non-discriminatory measures, the establishing of a legal framework for defining their scope and the determining of their financial implications. A package of new safeguards measures incorporating all those elements needed to be put together in time for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. As a demonstration of its full support for the international non-proliferation regime, his Government was willing to consider applying the proposed new safeguards measures and had accordingly entered into contact with the Agency to define the terms and scope of co-operation in that area.

79. He hoped that all States would sign and ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety as soon as possible in order to expedite its entry into force and the finalizing of arrangements on procedural and financial matters, national reports and the conducting of review meetings on the basis of the clarifications issued by the Diplomatic Conference in the annex to its Final Act.

80. The Convention was not an end in itself for Mexico, which would, in December, be approving the Safety Fundamentals relating to radioactive waste and promoting the speedy negotiation of a convention on that subject. In that regard, it was his country's view that the international nuclear safety regime should extend to all high-risk nuclear installations, including military ones. With regard to radiation protection, his delegation welcomed the approval by consensus of the Basic Safety Standards, the drafting of which had involved experts from the Latin American region.

81. Regarding the development of nuclear power in Mexico, loading of fresh fuel had recently been completed at the second unit of the Laguna Verde plant and the startup process had been commenced, thus bringing Mexico's total nuclear energy production capacity to 1300 MW and making it the region's top producer. Mexico was extremely grateful to the Agency for its assistance and collaboration in that endeavour.

82. The Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities in pursuit of its statutory objectives were a fundamental part of its *raison d'être*. Its growing membership reflected

the increasing interest throughout the world in the safe expansion of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. A balance was therefore essential among the Agency's main activities, especially between its safeguards activities and those unrelated to safeguards. It was inconceivable, after all, that the regulatory side of the Agency's work should be strengthened without a concomitant strengthening of the promotional activities requiring regulation. It was matter of profound concern, therefore, that the resources pledged or paid to the TACF were in decline and that the appeals issued in various General Conference resolutions for assured and predictable funding for technical co-operation activities had met with little response. Mexico, for its part, would shortly be in a position to pay its traditional contribution to the TACF and to the Regular Budget.

83. The current year marked the thirtieth anniversary of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture, the great success of which was due to the excellent co-ordination achieved among the different bodies of the United Nations system for the benefit of the entire international community. In a similar connection, his delegation was appreciative of the regional co-operation that had led to an expanded use of nuclear techniques through the ARCAL, AFRA and RCA programmes. It hoped the Agency and the donor countries concerned would continue to provide crucial support for those programmes in view of their great importance for the sustainable development of the regions in question.

84. In the light of the ever-increasing role played by the various peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Mexico's social and technological development, gratitude was due to the Secretariat for its assistance, especially in the areas of food irradiation, radioisotope production for industry and medicine, and environmental protection through electron beam purification of flue gases. He hoped that that assistance could be continued and that measures could be taken to promote the transfer of high-level technology to local industry in developing countries.

85. From the point of view of building international confidence in non-proliferation, transparency was acquiring increasing importance as a guiding principle in all the multifarious aspects of the Agency's work and the Member States' activities. In the area of administration, the harmonization of financial documents and reorganization of the budget would lend the Agency's management processes greater transparency, while also facilitating

evaluation of its activities and enabling it to make the most rational use of its scarce resources.

86. The designation of members of the Board, a process of the utmost importance and complexity, was no exception to the transparency rule. In order to establish such transparency, it was necessary to follow the lines laid down in Article VI of the Statute and to establish clear and precise criteria for comparing the levels of nuclear development attained by different countries. Revision of Article VI was a prerequisite for strengthening the Agency and, to that end, the composition of its policy-making organs needed to be modified to reflect the new international situation, the Agency's increased membership and the political regrouping of countries and regions. That fundamental step would equip the organization to meet the demands of heterogeneous societies with diverse and changing interests, while at the same time enabling it to transmit technological advances more even handedly and safely by means of improved mechanisms for guaranteeing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

87. Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan) noted that it was important for the General Conference to reaffirm its support for the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy because the remotest possibility of any negative impact of nuclear energy seemed to dominate the media and rivet the attention of the world. Even the Agency's own documents did not appear to be immune in that regard. The introduction to the Annual Report for 1993 began with a reference to strengthened and extended safeguards and controls, then to nuclear safety, with technical co-operation activities trailing in third place. For the majority of Member States, technology transfer through international co-operation remained the most important aspect of the Agency's mandate, indeed the Agency's *raison d'être*. For its part, Pakistan was very grateful for the valuable technical co-operation that it had received through the Agency.

88. The progress towards peace in the Middle East and the dawn of democracy in South Africa were welcome developments. On the other hand, the proliferation of conflicts in many parts of the world was cause for concern. The world community had to address those disputes and conflicts seriously since their resolution was often related to the realization of non-proliferation objectives, arms control and disarmament.

89. Pakistan had been proposing the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia since 1972 and that proposal had been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. The situation there had become even more critical owing to the emergence of ballistic missile capabilities. The deployment of ballistic missiles would create a tense security environment in South Asia, a situation which should be avoided at all costs.

90. He therefore welcomed the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, which should help reduce the threat of vertical and horizontal proliferation, both globally and in South Asia, and looked forward to the conclusion of a convention on fissile materials. However, a comprehensive test ban treaty, a convention on fissile material and the extension of the NPT would not in themselves counter the danger of nuclear proliferation. Specific measures were required to address the real, rather than imagined, threats of proliferation in various regions of the world on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis.

91. In that context, he noted the recently disclosed seizures of material, which reportedly contained traces of plutonium. As the Director General had confirmed, those incidents did not have proliferation significance, but they did involve radiation and health hazards. States possessing nuclear-weapons-usable material should give the utmost attention to its physical protection. It was unfortunate that the incidents in question had been sensationalized by the media, which had made irresponsible allegations. Behaviour of that kind undermined international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

92. Energy, and in particular electricity, held the key to productivity and prosperity. The developing countries, where 75 % of the world's population was concentrated, used only 30 % of the primary energy and 25 % of the electricity produced in the world. That glaring disparity was reflected in living standards. Energy input was needed to increase productivity; the resulting prosperity fuelled further demand for energy. While overall energy use had kept pace with the growth of GNP, the demand for electricity had increased much faster in developing countries. The energy requirements of energy-deficient countries such as those in the Asia and Pacific region doubled every seven years. The only significant non-fossil-fuel energy resources were hydroelectric and nuclear power, which together contributed more than one third of the world's electricity output. However, hydroelectric power was seriously limited by geographical considerations and was also beset with settlement and displacement

problems. Nuclear power plants, on the other hand, could be located near load centres thereby avoiding the costs and inconvenience of long-distance transmission. As the Director General had pointed out, 1994 marked the 50th anniversary of the start of nuclear electricity generation. It was time both to look back and ahead. If nuclear power did not meet the increasing electricity demand in Asia and the Pacific, fossil fuels would fill the gap thus adding to the greenhouse effect. Unfortunately, over the past decade only a few new countries had joined those already operating nuclear power plants. In many countries, there was great potential for introducing nuclear electricity into the grid, but there were practical difficulties which should be addressed by the Agency.

93. Since many Third World countries had a relatively small grid, the development of small and medium power reactors was of special interest to those countries. Such plants offered the additional advantages of a simpler design, adaptability to modular construction, and greater utilization of the industrial infrastructure of less developed countries. Over the preceding years, Pakistan had repeatedly asked the Agency to strengthen its activities in that area. As a first step, an international working group could be set up to produce detailed technical studies. Concurrently, the Agency might consider sponsoring research, design and development activities in that field, placing particular emphasis on nuclear safety. Transfer of experience and know-how on the validation and verification of the relevant computer codes and models should be facilitated. The search for financial backing for the building of nuclear power plants needed to be pursued vigorously and such backing should be along the lines of international financial support for fossil fuel and hydroelectric projects.

94. He commended the Agency's work on the extension of the lifetime of nuclear power plants. A large number of operating nuclear power plants were well into their second or third decade of operation and were suffering from various ageing problems. Safe extension of the lifetime of those power plants would be of considerable economic benefit to the respective countries. Western financial aid through agencies like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development had been arranged to improve the safety of some of the nuclear power plants in the Russian Federation. The possibility of similar financial support to improve the safety of nuclear power plants operating in developing countries should also be explored. He commended the inter-agency project on data and methodologies for the

comparative assessment of the health and environmental impact of different means of electricity generation and noted that Pakistan was actively participating in that project.

95. One of the highlights of the Agency's activities over the preceding year had been the finalization of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which his delegation had just signed. The adoption of that Convention should facilitate international technical co-operation with a view to achieving the desired safety levels.

96. Apart from power production, nuclear energy could also be used to solve such problems as lack of fresh water, desertification and salinization of soil. Biotechnology techniques to improve crop varieties could be used to reverse deforestation and land degradation. Reforestation could go a long way towards meeting demands for fodder and fuel and improving the quality of the environment. However, the selection and improvement of suitable tree species through conventional methods was a time-consuming process. Various biotechnology techniques could help expedite the process by allowing early selection with the help of molecular markers. Similarly, various genes responsible for stress tolerance and disease resistance could be introduced using recently developed genetic engineering techniques.

97. Recent advances in recombinant DNA technology had opened up new vistas for animal biotechnology. Its application in disease diagnosis, vaccine production and the development of transgenic animals with desired traits were some of the possibilities which should be exploited for the betterment of mankind. The Agency had played a leading role in the development and propagation of new technologies. In agriculture, the use of radiation-induced mutations in the 1970s and 1980s had helped many countries, including Pakistan, to evolve high-yield crop varieties. Similarly, as biotechnological approaches became an ever greater component of development strategies, the Agency should play its due role in disseminating that technology as a supplement to nuclear techniques in developing countries.

98. The Director of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Professor Salam, had recently retired after rendering meritorious service to the cause of science in the Third World. The ICTP had played a very useful role promoting scientific development in the developing countries. Pakistan would co-operate and hoped that under

the leadership of the new Director of the Centre, the ICTP would maintain its traditions of quality research.

99. Over the past year, Pakistan had continued to make progress in various areas of nuclear technology. The construction of the Chashma nuclear power plant had officially started in 1993. Since then, work had proceeded strictly according to schedule. Pakistan was completely satisfied with the performance of the Chinese scientists and engineers working at the site. Pakistani civil and quality assurance engineers were actively involved in the construction work. The Agency had made a useful contribution by evaluating the safety of the design. In addition, the fuel channel integrity assessment project for the Karachi nuclear power plant had been successfully completed. He thanked the Agency and the various Canadian agencies for their co-operation and help in that regard.

100. A fully fledged National Institute for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering had started operating at Faisalabad. It had been formally inaugurated in January 1994. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had developed isotope-aided research programmes on nutrition and reproduction in the buffalo and the goat. The Agency could help that research by providing relevant assistance in such fields as RIA, ELISA and genetic mapping of different breeds.

101. In the fields of agriculture, cotton production in Pakistan had dropped by over 4 million bales over the preceding three years owing to a virus epidemic which could not be controlled using chemicals. Material was being developed which was resistant to the virus. In the field of hydrology, the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology had introduced isotope-aided techniques to solve a number of hydrological problems relating to groundwater resource evaluation and development. In the area of nuclear medicine, construction work had started on two new medical centres, the Karachi Institute of Radiotherapy and Nuclear Medicine and the Punjab Institute of Nuclear Medicine at Faisalabad. With the establishment of those centres, the number of medical centres which had been established by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission would increase to eleven. In the field of industrial applications, a fully fledged centre for non-destructive testing would start operating soon.

102. The proposed amendment of Article VI of the Agency's Statute had been under discussion for a long time. Since the last revision of Article VI there had been a considerable increase in membership of the Agency and substantial progress had been made in the nuclear programmes of several Member States. There was therefore an urgent need to enlarge the Board. The increasing number of countries with advanced nuclear programmes should be allowed to play their due role in the principal executive body of the Agency as designated members; similarly, the number of elected members should be increased to mitigate the under-representation of certain areas. The pursuit of consensus had blocked any significant progress in the matter. It was therefore an opportune moment to establish a more effective mechanism for pursuing serious negotiations.

103. General Conference resolutions GC(XXXVII)/RES/621 and 622 had called for enhanced representation of the developing countries among Professional staff and an increase in the number of women in the Secretariat. Commendable improvements had been made in those areas. However, the Agency needed to take more effective steps in that direction.

104. Mr. AMMAR (Tunisia) said his country attached great importance to strengthening technical co-operation, particularly with other Arab and African States. As the host country of the Arab Atomic Energy Commission, Tunisia endeavoured to promote co-operation between Arab countries on the peaceful uses of nuclear techniques. It had been the first African State to join AFRA. Its ties to the African continent had deep historical, geographical and civilization roots. In June 1994, Tunisia had hosted the African summit attended by the reunified African family of nations after the return of South Africa. South Africa had done away with its reprehensible policy of apartheid and had established a new regime aimed at achieving a balanced and integrated society which assured the rights of all. Tunisia believed that the difficulties facing the African continent were mainly due to a lack of adequate international support for African development efforts, as well as its high debt burden. To remedy the situation intensified technical co-operation was needed as well as a greater interest in all areas of African development, particularly through the AFRA project. Tunisia was grateful to all those States which supported that project.

105. The developing countries were basing great hopes for the rational development of nuclear energy on the strengthening of technical co-operation with the Agency - the ideal

framework for international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear techniques. In the context of the African countries, Tunisia called for higher priority to be accorded to small and medium power nuclear plants; by ensuring optimum design and reducing construction costs developing countries could use them to meet their energy and drinking water requirements. Greater opportunities for training, as well as more broad-based scientific meetings, were required on small and medium power plants. In resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/540, which related to a plan for producing potable water economically, the General Conference had requested the Agency to assess the costs of potable water production using nuclear desalination plants and to make a comparison with the costs of desalination by other means. In order to help solve the increasing need for water in the world due to population growth, a number of developing countries were counting on the development of adequate and cost-effective nuclear techniques for seawater desalination. He therefore urged the Agency to attach greater importance to such projects. He also asked the Agency to support the North African regional programme for desalination using nuclear techniques in addition to programmes developed by groups of experts studying and designing small and medium power nuclear reactors. Tunisia, for its part, was willing to strengthen its efforts with regard to feasibility studies.

106. Progress achieved in food preservation by irradiation had provided a tool for ensuring food self-sufficiency. The developing countries had chronic difficulties with the storage of foodstuffs and Tunisia believed that strengthening co-operation in that area would have a positive impact. Tunisia had elaborated a pilot irradiation plant under the supervision of its National Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology. It was grateful for the moral and material support it had received from other countries, particularly African countries, in that respect.

107. Tunisia welcomed the accession of new parties to the NPT and praised the Agency for the efforts it had made in that regard. Accession alone, however, was not enough. It must be accompanied by an effective safeguards system. It was therefore necessary for all Member States to conclude safeguards agreements. Tunisia, which had concluded such an agreement with the Agency in 1989, had endeavoured to fulfil its safeguards obligations.

108. Tunisia noted with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. That Convention represented a considerable advance in international co-operation. Member States acknowledged their obligations and duties and accepted that nuclear activities in one State had an effect on neighbouring States. Tunisia hoped that there would be an increase in international activities in support of nuclear safety and radiation protection as well as safeguards procedures.

109. The African countries, aware of the danger of nuclear proliferation and convinced that non-proliferation in their continent would help to reinforce co-operation both in Africa and the world as a whole, had announced at the 1994 African summit that they would renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons and called on all other peace-loving countries to do likewise. Nuclear weapons control in general and non-proliferation in particular would help establish peace in the Middle East. The application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone was the best way of achieving a global and just settlement of the chronic problems that had been suffered by that region for decades. Tunisia fully supported the Agency's efforts to that end.

110. Turning to safeguards in general, he urged all States to co-operate with the Agency in order to enable it to carry out its functions in that field. The Member States all agreed that it was necessary to attach the utmost importance to international safeguards. Tunisia believed that the advanced nuclear countries, which benefited the most from atomic energy, should increase their share of the costs of the required inspections, control methods and equipment, but not to the detriment of technical co-operation activities. Any useful and equitable international safeguards system must go hand in hand with international technical co-operation. Universal safeguards - applicable to all members of the international community and covering all areas of nuclear activity - would ensure the safety of mankind.

111. Mr. HÖGBERG (Sweden) said the Swedish Government attached great importance to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Efforts to uphold and strengthen that regime were vital in order to maintain and enhance international peace and security. During the nearly 25 years that the NPT had been in force, the Treaty had been of fundamental importance: it was the most successful disarmament treaty ever. The Swedish

Government supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and considered it imperative that every effort be made to achieve the successful outcome of the Extension Conference in 1995. All States that had not yet done so should accede to the treaty at the earliest possible date, thereby making it truly universal. Sweden welcomed Kazakhstan, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan as new parties to the Treaty and was pleased that the Moldavian parliament had ratified it. As to Ukraine, Sweden felt that it should accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and while, welcoming the Board's approval of a safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the Agency, hoped that it would be succeeded rapidly by a safeguards agreement under the NPT. All States parties to the NPT that had not yet done so should conclude and implement the required safeguards agreements with the Agency without delay.

112. Other positive developments had occurred in 1994 in the non-proliferation field. The Tlatelolco Treaty had come into force for Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and Cuba had recently announced its decision to accede to it. The Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency had now entered into force. In Africa, progress had been made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Sweden hoped that all the States concerned would soon reach agreement on all provisions for the establishment of such a zone and expressed its appreciation of the Agency's preparatory work.

113. There had been serious challenges to the non-proliferation system in recent years. Iraq had violated the NPT by secretly embarking on a nuclear weapons programme. Sweden commended the Agency for the work carried out, in close co-operation with UNSCOM, to trace and eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons potential, and welcomed the steps taken in respect of long-term monitoring and verification. The DPRK had refused to meet its obligations under its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency, thereby creating doubts as to its intentions in the nuclear field. Sweden urged the DPRK to fulfil those obligations and to abide by the resolutions of the Board of Governors, the General Conference and the Security Council, as well as by the statement made on 30 May 1994 by its own President. Everything that could enhance the openness to scrutiny of the DPRK's nuclear programme was worthy of support.

114. Non-proliferation efforts alone could not guarantee international peace and security: they had to be supplemented by verifiable disarmament measures. It was gratifying that negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty were now well under way at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Those negotiations should continue with a view to achieving an agreed text at the earliest possible date. Sweden had proposed that the Agency be entrusted with verification of the treaty. Reduction in nuclear arsenals presupposed a cut-off in production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The mandate for the negotiation of a cut-off treaty was now being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament.

115. A thorough review was being carried out of the Agency's safeguards system to increase its effectiveness and cost efficiency, and important new measures had been introduced. Sweden strongly supported the Agency's programme in that area and looked forward to a decision by the Board on an alternative safeguards system.

116. The Agency's safeguards responsibilities were increasing and all States should ensure that it was provided with adequate resources for meeting its statutory obligations. A lasting and equitable solution had to be found to the vital question of the financing of safeguards.

117. Recent information about illegal sales and transport of nuclear material was a matter of concern. The main responsibility in that field rested with national Governments and authorities. All Member States should take the necessary measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear material and should support co-ordinated international co-operation and assistance programmes with that objective. The Director General should intensify the Agency's activities that supported Member States in that area and should examine additional options for Agency action.

118. Sweden welcomed the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety by the Diplomatic Conference in June 1994 and urged all Member States to sign and implement the Convention as soon as possible. Sweden had just signed the Convention and called for unilateral application of its provisions to all nuclear installations, pending the development of future international instruments.

119. His Government welcomed the Board's recent decision to invite the Director General to start planning for the drafting of a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. All Member States should participate in that work in the same spirit of co-operation as had been shown in the drafting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The convention's scope should be as wide as possible, covering civil as well as military radioactive waste. Sweden looked forward to completion of the Safety Fundamentals on radioactive waste management in December 1994.

120. The Agency's safety review mission programmes provided Member States with valuable opportunities for peer review and comparison with good practices in other countries. His country also supported initiatives to strengthen national radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures. The work on nuclear safety and radiation protection in Eastern Europe and the newly independent States was of particular importance, and the greatest possible degree of co-ordination between all parties involved was essential. In that context, the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage should be completed as soon as possible. All States not parties to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol should accede to those instruments as a necessary step towards the attainment of improved nuclear safety.

121. Sweden attached high priority to the Agency's technical co-operation activities: there had been a strong demand for assistance in such areas as food and agriculture, radiation protection, safety of nuclear installations and management of radioactive waste. It was important that the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund should receive financing on a firm and predictable basis and it was very unsatisfactory that all Member States had not pledged and paid according to their share of the Fund's target. Sweden urged all Member States to pledge and pay promptly: Sweden, for its part, had pledged its share of the 1995 target and its total extrabudgetary contributions for technical assistance averaged nearly \$1 million annually. Sweden valued the great competence with which the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities were carried out and welcomed the new emphasis on the development of model projects and the improvement of overall implementation in 1993.

122. The coming 12 months would offer many opportunities as well as challenges for the Agency; Sweden looked forward to further progress in all the Agency's main activity areas.

123. Mr. DJITEDJIAN (Armenia) said that since joining the Agency, Armenia had always fulfilled its obligations while endeavouring to contribute to the work of the organization. Armenia was bound by major commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and had ratified all the relevant conventions. It also intended to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it would implement as a way of demonstrating its commitment to nuclear safety. Furthermore, its nuclear power plant operators had recently joined the World Association of Nuclear Operators.

124. Armenia's nuclear power plant at Metsamor comprised two WWER-440/270 reactors. Annual output from the plant was 5000 million kW, equivalent to one third of all electrical power production in 1988. The two reactors had been installed in 1976 and 1980 and shut down in February and March 1989.

125. Armenia was now facing the difficult economic and social situation characterizing all the republics of the former USSR, a situation exacerbated by the scarcity of domestic energy resources and the complexity of the transport network. Despite such adverse conditions, the country had managed to maintain a democratic orientation in its political institutions and economic development; it had preserved domestic political stability and industrial and scientific potential, while continuing with the process of economic reforms. Although a cease-fire with Azerbaijan of unspecified duration had gone into effect, the standard of living had plummeted and the population was experiencing considerable hardship. Over the past two winters, living conditions had been very difficult owing to the scarcity of energy (a maximum of two hours of electricity every day) - virtually no homes had been heated. In 1993, Armenia had produced 6300 million kW of electrical energy, only 40% of the overall demand, and most of the electricity produced had gone to industry.

126. The severe energy restrictions imposed in recent years had exhausted all domestic reserves and now threatened the reform process. Policies were being carried out that would enable the country to increase its energy potential over the long term. Small hydroelectric plants were being built and renovated and the capacity of thermal power plants was to be increased, while construction of a gas pipeline in the south of the country would continue. However, numerous studies carried out by Armenian and foreign specialists indicated that there was no solution in the short term other than re-starting the nuclear power plant.

127. In conformity with the Agency's recommendations, a power plant operating body had been set up as well as a national monitoring authority - a governmental advisory committee dealing with the use of atomic energy and nuclear safety. All the problems connected with the startup of the second reactor had been charted, taking into account assessments made by organizations of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, experts from French firms and the Agency itself.

128. The monitoring of the primary and secondary systems and equipment was close to completion, and the metal in the reactor vessel, pipes and body of the steam generators as well as in the main circulation pumps had already been tested. Equipment for steam and water circulation and turbo-generators had likewise been checked.

129. Considerable repairs had been made to enhance the plant's seismic stability, and Agency experts had given effective assistance there. The studies would be completed in October 1994, but it could already be stated that there were no serious problems. The Agency had provided assistance on technical, legal, organizational and safety matters, and Armenia was carefully studying all the relevant proposals. It hoped that the technical co-operation missions to be carried out in 1995 would be equally fruitful.

130. The results of assessments made to date showed that key sectors of the nuclear power plant could be made operational, so there were no major technical obstacles to its reopening. The rehabilitation work by specialized Armenian, Russian and other organizations was proceeding according to plan. Russian groups were overseeing project implementation and organization, as well as the mobilization of specialists. His Government attached particular importance to the training and organization of the teams to work at the plant. The final stage preceding the startup of the plant would start shortly.

131. The Government of Russia had provided invaluable technical and financial assistance, which had been covered by an agreement between the two Governments and co-ordinated through an intergovernmental commission. Armenia had greatly appreciated the personal participation of high-level officials from the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy in organizing the rehabilitation efforts and had welcomed their regular visits to the nuclear power plant.

132. There was no doubt that the primary concern was operational safety, and a plan aimed at increasing it had been drawn up, covering the period both before and after restart of the plant. His Government believed that the level of safety at the plant was at least equivalent to that of similar facilities currently in operation, but in order to achieve an even higher level, additional technical and financial assistance was indispensable. He hoped that other countries would become involved in the efforts made by Russia, whose commitment had been given despite its own economic and financial difficulties. The Agency's Member States which were leaders in nuclear technology were well aware of Armenia's unusual energy situation and of the economic viability of reopening a plant whose technical reliability would be equivalent to that of similar facilities operating elsewhere.

133. In conclusion, he hoped that, in accordance with its declared principles, the Agency would continue to lead the international community's efforts to promote the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy. Its advisory services for the restarting of unit 2 at the Metsamor plant were deeply appreciated and represented a form of international co-operation that fully confirmed the Agency's reputation and image.

134. Mr. PAEMEN (European Commission) said that, for the European Commission, the most significant event since the previous session had been the entry into force in November 1993 of the Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union. The Treaty had established a common foreign and security policy for the Union and non-proliferation had been identified from the very beginning as one of its priorities.

135. A second crucial event of the previous year in Brussels had been the successful completion of the negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden. While the final word lay of course with the peoples of those countries, the European Commission would be very pleased if all of them were to ratify - as had Austria - the decision of their Governments to join the Union.

136. The safety of nuclear reactors was the responsibility of the countries that operated them. However, industrialized countries considered the improvement of the safety of reactors built to earlier standards in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to be one of the top priorities. In 1994, both the Corfu European Council and the G-7

summit in Naples had reaffirmed that priority and had provided additional policy guidelines as well as financial commitments.

137. The G-7 had particularly welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the nuclear safety assistance programme agreed earlier, while confirming that an effective framework for co-ordinated action was in place. The Commission had continued to play a major role within that framework, relying on the Agency's sound technical advice.

138. During the past year, the European Union's TACIS and PHARE nuclear safety assistance programmes had achieved significant progress in all areas included in the G-7 programme of action. However, the continuation and enhancement of technical assistance depended on a satisfactory solution of the nuclear civil liability issue. The Commission appreciated the efforts of the Agency and of the NEA in that sensitive area and encouraged both institutions to continue to contribute towards a proper long-term solution, which in the view of his delegation should be based on the accession by all countries receiving technical assistance to the relevant international conventions.

139. Given the serious concerns about the safety of the Chernobyl reactors, the European Union at the Corfu European Council and the Naples G-7 Summit had put forward a specific action plan aimed at achieving an early closure of the Chernobyl site. That plan had included the completion of three new Ukrainian reactors to adequate safety standards within the context of an overall energy strategy that incorporated conservation measures and the use of alternative sources. To implement the Chernobyl plan, the G-7 had agreed in Naples to provide an additional initial amount of \$200 million in grants while in Corfu the European Union had expressed its readiness to raise \$500 million in European loans and to provide an extra \$100 million in grants over three years.

140. To be effective, the international safety assistance efforts had to be part of broader reforms. A fundamental measure in that respect should be the consolidation in recipient countries of legally based and independent safety authorities with adequate resources. In addition, short-term grants should be followed by loans to fund long-term projects, including the completion of new and better reactors. The European Union would be able to participate

directly in those lending actions via the EURATOM loan facility and the European Investment Bank.

141. Turning to more general nuclear safety matters, he noted that a more solid framework for international co-operation was needed. The Commission therefore welcomed the successful conclusion in June of the Diplomatic Conference that had adopted the Convention on Nuclear Safety, now open for signature. The Commission was taking the necessary steps to enable EURATOM to conclude the Convention in its own right and looked forward to a rapid entry into force.

142. The Commission was now ready to contribute to the commencement of work on a radioactive waste convention. At the European Union level, the Commission had already prepared a radioactive waste management strategy.

143. The past year had witnessed a number of trade developments of paramount importance. First and foremost, the Uruguay Round had been successfully completed. One of its major results was the creation of a new World Trade Organization, which would be open to universal membership and should therefore be a key instrument in promoting open, non-discriminatory and equitable trade at the global level.

144. In the energy sector, the negotiations to prepare the European Energy Charter Treaty had been concluded and that Treaty would be open for signature by the end of the year. That international instrument was the result of another European Union initiative and was expected to improve the trade and investment in energy between the countries of Europe and some of their major non-European counterparts.

145. As far as the international uranium markets were concerned, the Commission had been monitoring closely recent developments, including the significant broadening of offers from the countries of the former Soviet Union. The Commission would continue to address those developments taking into account the need to assure a stable long-term supply as well as the viability of basic nuclear industries in the European Union.

146. In view of the characteristics of trade in nuclear materials and the relevant political considerations, it should be in the interest of all Member States to find a multilateral

arrangement, as had already been done for materials of much lower economic and strategic value.

147. The European Union attached the greatest importance to the preparatory work for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. The Corfu European Summit had agreed on the guidelines for European Union joint action, the main objective being to secure an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT at that Conference. The European Commission fully supported the joint action.

148. In the area of EURATOM safeguards, which covered the civil nuclear material in the Union, the Commission was pleased to report generally smooth and positive relations between the EURATOM and Agency safeguards inspectorates. Implementation of the new partnership approach was producing efficiency gains and reduced logistic costs for the Agency which was a major contribution at a time of increasing challenges and budgetary constraints.

149. Illicit trade in nuclear and other radioactive materials had unfortunately increased in the past few years and could become a significant threat to safety and to non-proliferation objectives. That trafficking should be stopped at its source or, if that proved impossible, through appropriate co-operation between all parties concerned. Consequently, the Commission was increasing its bilateral assistance and co-operation with countries where that trade might originate. Its actions were intended to help reinforce and modernize in potential source countries the systems of accounting for and control of nuclear and radioactive materials and to improve the capabilities of their competent authorities.

150. In the area of nuclear safety, progress had been made with the Community Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection. Intense and satisfactory technical co-operation was ensuring that the European Union's binding text was consistent with the Agency's recommendations. The Commission and the Agency had complementary roles: the latter was generally concerned with standards in the form of recommendations that addressed the entire world, while the Commission prepared legally binding instruments for adoption by the European Union.

151. That complementarity of the Commission and the Agency had been highlighted in 1994 by the work on radiation protection, safety assistance and safeguards, but it could expand to other areas in the future. The Commission looked forward to continuing to work actively and constructively with all of its international partners. Its overriding objective was to ensure that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy continued to make a positive contribution towards sustainable growth and the well-being of present and future generations.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.