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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVIII)/INF/11/Rev.2.

Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECU	European currency unit
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G-7	Group of Seven
G-24	Group of Twenty-Four
MOX	Mixed oxide
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
USA	United States of America

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1993 (GC(XXXVIII)/2 and Corr.1)
(resumed)

1. Mr. ZILLER (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that despite the various approaches of its Member States to nuclear energy related matters, the European Union remained strongly committed to international co-operation on the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy. With facilities covering the whole of the nuclear fuel cycle and generating about one third of the world's nuclear electricity, and with a safeguards system independent of national authorities and the EURATOM Supply Agency and the Joint European Research Programme, the main activities of which related to nuclear safety, fusion and safeguards, the Member States of the European Union felt a particularly strong responsibility for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and safety worldwide.

2. The strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime was among the chief priorities of the common foreign and security policy of the European Union defined in the Maastricht Treaty and the 1993 Annual Report rightly highlighted the continuing efforts of Member States and of the Secretariat to that end. Recalling its initiatives aimed at reaffirming the Agency's right to conduct special inspections and at establishing a universal reporting scheme, the European Union urged all Member States which had not yet done so to join and to implement that scheme in order to provide the Agency with a comprehensive picture of all international nuclear transfers. Furthermore, the European Union looked forward to the results of the programme to further strengthen the safeguards system, which the Director General intended to submit to the Board early in the following year, as that would enable a conceptual framework to be defined and concrete steps to be taken to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the system as a whole. A political debate was necessary to give safeguards activities an adequate financial basis. At the same time, the Agency had to concentrate its resources on priority areas so as to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. The European Union was working with the Secretariat to ensure the full implementation of the new partnership approach and repeated its request that the Director General prepare a study within Programme 93+2 on the criteria which would have to be met by other regional organizations in order to qualify for a partner relationship with the Agency.

3. With regard to the application of Agency safeguards in the DPRK, the European Union was greatly concerned at the continuing and even increasing non-compliance by that country with its obligations both under the NPT and the NPT safeguards agreement. It deplored the DPRK's failure to implement the essential elements of Board, General Conference and United Nations Security Council resolutions. At the Corfu summit meeting in June 1994 the European Union had noted with deep concern that the DPRK had not permitted the Agency to complete essential inspection activities, thus making it impossible to ascertain whether plutonium had been diverted for non-peaceful purposes. The persistent non-compliance with international obligations constituted a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime and to the safeguards system as a whole. The statement by the USA and the DPRK of 12 August 1994 could contribute to a satisfactory solution to the problem of safeguarding the DPRK's nuclear programme and its other obligations under the NPT. The European Union supported all efforts which, through consultation and dialogue, increased the transparency of the DPRK's nuclear programme and the stability of the Korean Peninsula. However, it wished to emphasize that its objective remained the securing of full compliance by the DPRK with its legal obligations.

4. Regarding the Agency's activities relating to the dismantling of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme of Iraq, the European Union noted that there had been positive developments since the previous session of the General Conference. The Agency and its action team, in close co-operation with the United Nations Special Commission and with considerable support from the European Union, was continuing to neutralize and eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons potential. Following Iraq's formal acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 in November 1993 and given the progress reported by the Special Commission since that time, the introduction of a long-term verification system might now be possible. That represented a further important contribution to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

5. The European Union welcomed the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation policy in Latin America, in particular the coming into force in March 1994 of the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency on the implementation of full-scope safeguards. It also noted with satisfaction that the Tlatelolco Treaty had now

entered into force for Argentina, Chile and Brazil, thus nearly completing an important regional non-proliferation system, and was also pleased at the recent announcement by Cuba of its decision to accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty. The next stage should be accession of all Latin American countries to the NPT. In that context, the European Union welcomed Argentina's decision to take the necessary steps before the end of the year.

6. The European Union was concerned to note that Ukraine, a major newly independent State, had not yet acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, contrary to the commitment it had given in the Lisbon Protocol and had reiterated in the trilateral statement (United States, Russian Federation, Ukraine) issued in Moscow in January 1994. While it welcomed the comprehensive safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the Agency, that agreement was no substitute for Ukraine's rapid accession to the NPT. It therefore repeated its appeal to that country to comply fully with its commitments under the Lisbon Protocol and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

7. The European Union was firmly committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, an objective which had been officially adopted by the European Council in July 1994. It also underlined the importance of universal accession to the NPT and therefore called upon all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible, preferably before the 1995 Extension Conference. It welcomed the recent accession to the NPT by Kazakhstan, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan and the ratification there by the Moldovan parliament. In that connection, it was encouraged by the progress being made in other important fields of arms control and non-proliferation, notably with regard to a comprehensive test ban treaty. It hoped that negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would open in the near future. Appreciating the progress made towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, it hoped that the States concerned would reach full agreement on all the provisions of the draft treaty soon. Finally, the Middle East peace process had made remarkable progress. The European Union strongly encouraged all States in the region to join the NPT as a step towards enhancing peace and security through the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

8. Recent cases of illegal transfers and smuggling of plutonium and uranium, sometimes of weapons grade, was a matter of serious concern to the Member States of the Union. The illicit trade in nuclear materials was a threat to the international system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The European Union urged Member States to apply the relevant legal instruments and Agency standards for physical protection and to seek assistance in cases where systems of material accounting, control and physical protection or export controls were inadequate. The installation of radiation monitoring equipment for border control purposes should be considered. For its part, the European Union would make substantial contributions to a joint effort in that regard. Given the urgency and importance of the matter, it would present a draft resolution to be discussed under the appropriate agenda item.

9. The European Union attached particular importance to the activities of the Agency in the field of nuclear safety and undertook considerable research and development work there and in the field of radiation protection and waste management. Between 1994 and 1998 it was expected to spend around 160 million ECU on research and development in key aspects of nuclear safety and radiation protection. It saw the completion of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it was proud to have initiated and which would be open for signature during the Conference, as a major achievement for the international community. It would facilitate harmonization of safety requirements, particularly through the peer review process, and would thus enhance nuclear safety worldwide. The European Union hoped that the greatest possible number of States, in particular those using nuclear energy, would sign and implement the Convention without delay and that its completion would encourage those concerned to proceed to the development of a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

10. The European Union and the Agency were co-operating to improve the situation with regard to nuclear safety in the States of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly-independent States. Considerable progress had been made since the 1992 G-7 summit in Munich, in bilateral and international assistance programmes. The Agency's activities to assess the safety of nuclear power plants in those States and to assist the G-24 in co-ordinating its nuclear safety assistance were of great value. At its Corfu summit the European Union had recommended a series of measures to Ukraine in the field of nuclear

safety and had pledged substantial financial and other assistance to encourage and support those measures. The early closure of reactor units 1 and 3 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and confirmation that unit 2 would not reopen remained high priorities subject to the introduction of acceptable alternative energy sources - possibly including new reactors with adequate safety standards. Reform of the energy sector, review of nuclear safety regulations and ratification by Ukraine of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability and the Joint Protocol were also to be seen as vital ingredients of that programme. The European Union would make available 100 million ECU in grants and 400 million ECU in loans to support the package of measures which had been formally adopted as an Action Plan at the G-7 Naples summit in July. The G-7 had pledged US \$200 million at the summit and additional funds had also been promised by other OECD States. Ukraine was currently considering the Action Plan and the European Union hoped that, given the serious concerns about the safety situation at Chernobyl, it would provide a basis for prompt decisions leading to the closure of that plant.

11. The report on the Agency's technical co-operation activities in 1993 mentioned certain elements - growth in the TACF and other funding instruments, higher implementation rates and increased delivery figures, for example - which showed that planning and programme implementation activities were on the right track. The Union considered technical co-operation a very high political priority and therefore planned to spend about 230 million ECU over four years on research and development projects in developing countries. At the Corfu summit it had announced its intention to increase financial assistance to countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific and to strengthen co-operative links with Latin America. It encouraged all measures further to improve programme implementation and to make the Agency's assistance more directly relevant to the needs and development priorities of the countries concerned.

12. The policy of real zero growth, although widely advocated, had not yet produced a readiness on the part of Member States and the Secretariat to set clear priorities among the Agency's programmes, sub-programmes and tasks so as to respond to changing or growing needs on the one hand and to unchanged or decreasing levels of resources on the other. That process would require a political debate between regional groups and meaningful dialogue

with the Secretariat. In the absence of discussion on priorities, the programme budget for 1995-96 kept within the limits of zero real growth but made little or no provision for new and enlarged responsibilities in connection with the review and improvement of the safeguards system, which were nevertheless of paramount importance. The problem, however, was general and could also affect technical co-operation and nuclear safety. The latter field in particular was of global concern and an inherent responsibility of the Agency, and should not have to depend increasingly on extrabudgetary funds from only a small number of Member States. Finally, bearing in mind the needs of developing countries, the European Union reaffirmed its willingness to remain a reliable partner on its own or in support of the Agency's efforts in programmes to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under international control.

13. Ms. O'LEARY (United States of America) first of all read out the following message from the President of the United States to the General Conference:

"Since its inception the International Atomic Energy Agency has been at the forefront of the international community's efforts to combat the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote the peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy.

"Nonproliferation is fundamental to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For that reason, the United States strongly supports the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. An NPT of unlimited duration will provide added assurance of international stability and security that will permit, under the IAEA safeguards system, continued international trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.

"The IAEA safeguards system is the foundation on which the NPT is established. Recent events have highlighted the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards not only with respect to declared nuclear activities, but also with respect to the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

"IAEA safeguards can also help to promote nuclear disarmament objectives. I announced last year that the U.S. would submit fissile material no longer needed for our deterrent to inspection by the IAEA. We are now implementing that offer, with a submission of approximately 10 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium and the commitment that this material will never be used to build nuclear weapons. In January, President Yeltsin and I agreed to establish a joint working group to consider steps 'to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA safeguards.'

"The United States is committed to the continuing effort to identify the resources necessary to implement existing and new safeguards measures. We encourage other member states to join with us in this important task.

"We endorse the commitment of the international community to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. In that vein, the United States applauds the opening for signature of the International Nuclear Safety Convention. This Convention provides States an opportunity to affirm their commitment to the safe operation and construction of nuclear power plants, which is essentially a national responsibility.

"We welcome the Agency's efforts in its diverse technical programmes, especially its efforts to enhance and streamline delivery of technical assistance to developing States, which is essential to assuring that the development of nuclear energy remains safe and peaceful.

"I look forward to the continued close cooperation between the United States and the IAEA. We approach this 38th session of the General Conference committed to the purposes for which the IAEA was founded and determined to help strengthen the Agency's ability to fulfill its mandate. On behalf of the people of the United States, I extend to you my best wishes for a productive and successful Conference."

14. The pace of change following the end of the Cold War had been astonishing: the United States and Russia no longer threatened each other with nuclear missiles, the prospect of an international consensus on the benefits of a nuclear test ban had moved closer than ever and the nuclear nations had agreed to be bound by strict international safety norms. The task now was to establish new and enduring structures which would assure a more secure and technologically advanced world. To that end, new strategies would have to be developed for ensuring the safety of civilian nuclear facilities and reducing the dangers posed by the world's nuclear arsenal and stockpiles of weapons-usable materials. The strategies for improving worldwide nuclear safety were to expand international collaboration, reach international agreements on nuclear safety, liability and waste, and improve the safety capabilities of nuclear States. To ensure a more secure future, it was essential to extend the NPT indefinitely, achieve a permanent nuclear test ban, establish transparent and irreversible nuclear disarmament, limit fissile material production and strengthen safeguards and physical security relating to nuclear materials.

15. The international community relied on the Agency to codify and implement those strategies around the globe. The tools at its disposal for that purpose were an international

and diverse work force, unrestricted access to information, adequate and prioritized funding, and technical co-operation. On the side of human resources, it was essential to ensure the participation of all, without distinction as to race, religion or sex, in the joint effort, and in that regard women in particular had a more important role to play. The target of 50% representation of women in the Agency had to be met by the end of the century and the Secretariat was to be commended on its strategy for their advancement. The United States delegation intended to submit a resolution on that matter to the General Conference and was proud to announce that the first scholarship in its programme to train women from developing countries would be awarded during the Conference. Openness was a prerequisite for the implementation of new strategies for nuclear safety. The international community needed to understand the problems at issue and the results achieved if it was to be mobilized. The United States would be establishing an international nuclear safety centre in one of the Department of Energy's national laboratories to promote ongoing technical exchange with the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, and to promote safety-related technologies. Russia likewise intended to set up an international safety centre as an example to other nuclear States.

16. Openness was also vital for transforming the international security environment. The United States had revealed more information about its nuclear weapons programme than any other country. It had divulged previously secret information regarding its stockpiles of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, its nuclear tests and the harmful effects of its nuclear programmes on human health and the environment. Those revelations served as a deterrent to proliferation while at the same time ensuring the necessary transparency for new methods of ensuring nuclear safety. Transparency, for example, could assure the world community that excess fissile material was not being used to manufacture new nuclear weapons. The United States had recently authorized the Agency to conduct inspections at Oak Ridge to safeguard excess highly-enriched uranium and intended to continue on that path. Access to information also fostered technological advancement; the declassification of information regarding inertial confinement fusion, for example, would allow scientists around the world to explore that potential future energy source.

17. The new strategies would require adequate financing and new funding priorities. The Agency could not be asked to assume new missions without increases in funding, reallocation of existing resources, or both. Before asking Member States to provide additional funds, a careful review of the Agency's priorities should be carried out to ensure that those resources would be used to the best advantage and, in the realm of safety, allocated to the most urgent needs.

18. Another important tool was technical co-operation. Many countries had benefited from the Agency's scientific and technical activities in a wide variety of fields ranging from health and agriculture to the environment. The United States supported the Agency's programme of technical assistance to developing Member States and encouraged voluntary contributions to the Agency's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund as well as contributions in kind. It financed various technical co-operation activities and had entered into partnerships with laboratories in developing countries.

19. However, nuclear energy did not provide only benefits, and the dangers posed by some nuclear power reactors were unacceptable and needed to be eliminated. One strategy was to adopt new mechanisms for multilateral co-operation on nuclear safety. Systematic training programmes for plant operators were an essential element of nuclear safety. The United States was involved in training activities for the newly independent States and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It also worked with partners on programmes aimed at reducing the near-term risks of accident in the most dangerous reactors. One example of multilateral co-operation in that area was the recent G-7 agreement to close high-risk reactors at Chernobyl. Nuclear safety could also be improved by formalizing multilateral co-operation through binding international agreements such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which achieved three objectives: to establish a set of internationally binding obligations, to provide for peer review process meetings at least every three years, and to confirm the responsibility of national Governments for assuring nuclear safety while recognizing the value of international co-operation. The United States delegation looked forward to signing that Convention, in whose preparation it had played an active part. Many aspects now needed to be defined, such as the form and content of national reports, the structure and procedures of the meetings of the parties and the nature of any

recommendations on improved compliance. The United States was eager to collaborate in that work.

20. Emphasizing the importance of arrangements governing civil liability for nuclear damage, the United States delegation welcomed the steps by several Eastern European countries to accede to the Vienna Convention. The United States had also submitted a proposal for an umbrella convention on nuclear liability to the Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability, and urged other countries to support it. Establishing liability protection would allow private Western companies to participate fully in international nuclear safety initiatives. As soon as the safety convention had been concluded, attention should be focused on the safe management of radioactive waste. Significant political and technical issues needed to be addressed but the consensus which had already been achieved on fundamental principles provided a good starting point. However, beyond international technical collaboration and conventions, it was critical that a strategy should be adopted which would allow each country to develop its own safety capabilities. That meant introducing rigorous standards for nuclear safety and strong, independent nuclear regulatory bodies to enforce them, developing local ability to evaluate and upgrade the safety of nuclear facilities, establishing comprehensive training centres for reactor operators, developing the domestic capabilities needed to maintain equipment and establishing centres for advancing nuclear safety technology.

21. To make the vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world a reality, new long-term security strategies should be created which emphasized disarmament, controls on civilian and military fissile materials, and improved safeguarding. The cornerstone of the strategies for stemming the spread of nuclear weapons was the NPT. With the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference only seven months away, the United States would make every effort to ensure that that Treaty became a permanent part of the global security structure. Uncertainty about the Treaty's future could only undermine the confidence needed for taking long-term action. As part of its strategy to promote non-proliferation, the United States had reopened negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. President Clinton had twice extended the United States' nuclear testing moratorium and had stated clearly that completing such a treaty was an essential step in reducing the danger of nuclear proliferation. The commitment to

ending nuclear testing was but one demonstration of the importance attached to the indefinite extension of the NPT, the other being the commitment to deep nuclear force reductions. The United States continued to implement the nuclear warhead reductions called for in the START I Treaty, even though the agreement had not yet been ratified, and remained committed to even deeper reductions as called for in the START II Treaty. President Clinton had also demonstrated the importance he attached to reducing and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the fact that the United States and Russia had de-targeted their nuclear missiles represented further progress in controlling weapons. The two countries were working together to eliminate nuclear weapons from the newly independent States and urged the latter to accede to the NPT. In that connection mention should be made of the historic trilateral agreement signed by the United States, Russia and Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine. The United States delegation hoped that Ukraine would follow the example of Kazakhstan and Belarus by joining the NPT in the near future.

22. The United States was also endeavouring to increase the transparency and irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process, a major aspect of which was the dismantling of nuclear warheads. That process would create considerable amounts of excess nuclear material. To demonstrate that that material would not be used to make new weapons, the United States had announced its intention to submit the material in question to Agency inspections and hoped that the other nuclear powers would follow its example. The last stage of disarmament was disposing of the excess nuclear-weapon material; the United States had concluded an agreement on the purchase of 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons which it intended to blend down into low-enriched reactor fuel. In addition to those measures, the United States supported efforts to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and to that end had concluded an agreement with Russia to close down all remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors by the year 2000. It was also working on a treaty at the Conference on Disarmament to prevent the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

23. The proliferation risks posed by civilian uses of weapon-usable fissile materials should also be reduced to the absolute minimum. In that connection two problems needed to be addressed: the continued use of highly-enriched uranium in civilian research reactors and

the growing accumulation of separated plutonium in excess of available fuel fabrication capacities or amounts needed for projected energy programmes. Under the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors programme, the United States was honouring its promise to take back, particularly from Europe, spent fuel elements with material of American origin. That programme was now facing a challenge in a Federal Court which could adversely affect the conversion of research reactors to low-enriched uranium, but the Government expected to be able to solve the problem. Furthermore, it had begun an encouraging dialogue with Russia on the conversion of Russian research reactors to low-enriched fuels and looked forward to co-operating with China and South Africa in that effort as well. The dialogue on the civilian uses of plutonium was in its early stages. The United States policy was nevertheless clear: it did not encourage such use but would respect its commitments as a reliable nuclear trading partner. It nevertheless sought to expand its dialogue with other countries to explore mutually acceptable means of stemming the unneeded accumulation of civil plutonium stockpiles and reducing the existing excess.

24. International attention had recently been focused on reports of nuclear material smuggling and much could be done to improve security in that area. The United States and Russia had taken measures to protect their large nuclear material stockpiles, but IAEA assistance was essential in co-ordinating the international response. Improving safeguards and their adaptation to new challenges were also important. Some quarters had called for substantial reductions in the significant quantities of civilian nuclear material to be safeguarded, which was a legitimate issue, although the goal should remain comprehensive safeguards improvements. The Programme 93+2 being conducted by the Secretariat was very useful in that effort and her delegation looked forward to the proposals which would be made at the Board of Governors meeting in March 1995. The safeguards improvements should also help the Agency in rendering Iraq's weapons facilities and equipment harmless and preventing that country from regenerating its activities. The Agency's role in the threat of proliferation in the Korean Peninsula had also enhanced the credibility of safeguards. The United States was determined that the negotiations which were due to be resumed in Geneva with the DPRK would result in compliance by that country with its safeguards commitments to the Agency.

25. Lastly, she expressed her confidence that by the end of the twentieth century new strategies for nuclear safety and security would be firmly established, and the United States delegation anticipated working together with other countries under the auspices of the Agency to achieve those results.

26. Mr. ROUVILLOIS (France), associating himself fully with the statement made on behalf of the European Union by the delegate of Germany, said that 1995 would be marked not only by the Conference of States Parties to the NPT but also by important developments in the key areas of the safety of nuclear facilities and the management of the back end of the fuel cycle.

27. It was of prime importance for the NPT to continue to be applied in the future, and France reaffirmed its determination to work for its indefinite and unconditional extension. France called upon all States Parties to work to that end, and appealed to all those States that had not already done so to accede to the Treaty. During the past year several countries possessing nuclear installations had acceded to the NPT, and Argentina had decided to sign it by the end of 1995. Brazil had ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, and would perhaps soon be joining the community of States Parties to the NPT; finally, it was to be hoped that Cuba would shortly be acceding to the Tlatelolco Treaty. The accession of Kazakhstan, which had followed that of Belarus, was very welcome, as was the fact that Ukraine had just concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. France hoped that Ukraine would soon accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, in accordance with the undertakings it had made more than two years before. In the Middle East, the recent agreements had opened up a new era in a region which had experienced long and painful conflict. France gave its encouragement to all efforts made to establish in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, and hoped that those efforts would bear fruit with the accession by the States of the region to the NPT and the monitoring of their nuclear installations by the Agency. Overall, and even taking account of the difficulties which still had to be resolved, recent developments had seen - with 165 signatories - accession to the NPT by the vast majority of States. Such developments proved that non-proliferation was a major concern of virtually all countries, whether or not they were Parties to the Treaty, and meant that the 1995 Conference could be approached with confidence.

28. Set against that, the violation by the DPRK of the undertakings it had given under the NPT and its refusal to apply the provisions of the agreement it had concluded with the Agency were all the more regrettable. The DPRK had to accept the rules of the international community and agree that the treaties and agreements it had concluded must be implemented in good faith. Faced with such an important question as non-proliferation, it was not possible to take refuge behind the unacceptable notion of special status. France trusted that the discussions under way between the United States and the DPRK would enable a more favourable climate to be created. The Agency must have access to all the nuclear activities of the DPRK and to all information regarding the operations the latter had been able to undertake in the past, and it must be able to draw up a complete inventory of materials treated in that country, including at the two sites which the Agency had not so far been able to inspect despite all the efforts that had been made by the Board of Governors and the Secretariat. The French delegation paid tribute to the Director General for the vigilance with which he was managing the present crisis, for the firmness with which he was endeavouring, in spite of all the pressures, to defend the Agency's prerogatives, and for the action he was taking to prevent safeguards from becoming a subject for negotiation. The effectiveness of the NPT, which was the most important element in the non-proliferation regime, rested on a system of control whose main constituent was safeguards. The French delegation actively supported the studies being undertaken to strengthen those safeguards, because the Agency could not content itself with verifying that there had been no diversion of declared nuclear materials in declared installations: the Agency had to have the means of detecting clandestine activities.

29. Apart from non-proliferation, States with nuclear facilities had a special responsibility in the area of safety, and the French delegation welcomed the fact that the present session of the General Conference was the occasion for the signing of the Convention on Nuclear Safety which had been the initiative of the European Union two years before. The fact that it had been possible to draw up the Convention so quickly had been due to the co-operation of all the countries concerned, which had addressed themselves to what was technically and in practical terms achievable on the basis of the safety principles recognized by the international community. The French delegation appealed to all States operating nuclear

reactors to accede to the Convention as soon as possible and to implement it with the utmost promptness. Profiting from the momentum which had thereby been established, it had been decided to lay down comparable provisions for the safety of nuclear waste management. That was an important task which had to be undertaken with the fullest degree of transparency. In that respect, France was ready to submit its waste storage sites to inspection by missions organized by the Agency under its Waste Management Assessment and Technical Review Programme (WATRP).

30. A considerable effort was still to be made before safety reached an equivalent level in all operational facilities and the co-operation of all countries was necessary in an area where there were countless difficulties. During the past year significant results had been recorded in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe due to action undertaken by the international community, and in particular the European Union, with the support of international banks and especially the EBRD. The most significant example was the effort made with Bulgaria and Lithuania to raise the level of nuclear safety and meet the energy demands of those countries. However, there were other situations that still gave cause for concern; that was particularly the case with the reactors which remained operational at the Chernobyl site and the closing down of which posed numerous and very difficult problems. The European Union and the G-7 had decided to make substantial financial assistance available in an attempt to solve those difficulties, and it was to be hoped that that goal would be rapidly achieved.

31. France had always accorded great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, although it was not always easy to measure their impact. The activities which had been undertaken in that area over the years had been very beneficial, and tribute should be paid to the Director General for his initiative in organizing a seminar during which the Agency's objectives and methods had been studied with a view to improving their effectiveness.

32. Management of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle was a special responsibility for all States operating nuclear facilities. For its part, France had decided to reprocess irradiated fuel in order to extract the plutonium and re-use it in reactors, the waste being separated and handled in the manner best suited to each category of material. Active research was under

way to ensure ongoing improvements in the techniques used, and that policy enabled energy sources to be managed in the most effective possible way while ensuring the greatest degree of protection for workers, the population and the environment. The plutonium produced was subject to very strict regulations in terms of radiation protection, accountability or physical protection, and did not present any unsurmountable hazards. It was the responsibility of all States operating nuclear installations to comply with the entire range of those regulations and to ensure that they were applied, but it was the duty of all who had contributed to their drafting to ensure that, wherever they were applied, the rules and regulations were satisfactory.

33. Public opinion should certainly be informed of the quantities that were involved and there should be greater transparency, but it was important for Governments to try to prevent the development of campaigns founded on erroneous information and exploiting people's fears. In fact, there were genuine questions that arose regarding three categories of fissile materials: those located in countries which had not acceded to the NPT and which were not subject to inspection by the Agency, excess materials produced by the dismantling of weapons in the United States and Russia, and the plutonium contained in non-reprocessed irradiated fuels. Those were problems which the international community would have to solve with the assistance of the nuclear industry, but they would not be settled by placing the blame on reprocessing technology or by fostering reflexes of an emotional nature among the public.

34. Giving an account of events that had taken place in France during the past year, he said that France had 54 nuclear reactors, which represented a net 57 GW(e). The French nuclear programme was continuing with the construction of the first stage of the N4 series, comprising four units of 1450 MW(e). The first unit was due to be connected to the grid in 1995, and the last in 1998. Electricity production from nuclear sources had been 350 TW·h in 1993, 8.8% more than in 1992. It had represented almost 78% of the country's entire generation of electricity. Exports to neighbouring countries had risen to 61 TW·h, nearly 14% of total production. The proportion of power stations operating with pressurized water reactors had been much higher than in 1992: 80% as against 71%. Furthermore, the Superphénix fast reactor, which would be devoted to research and demonstration purposes,

had been started up again. A programme had been launched to gain experience of the operation of fast reactors on an industrial scale, to demonstrate their suitability for working as consumers of plutonium and to contribute to the research programme on the possibilities of long-term radioactive waste elimination. Superphénix had gone critical on 4 August 1994, and its power build-up would proceed stepwise.

35. As for the fuel cycle, the most noteworthy event had been the completion of the Melox plant for the manufacture of MOX fuel, which was the largest such plant in the world. In 1993, five pressurized water reactors had been using MOX fuel, and that number would rise to seven in 1994. Later, MOX fuel would be used in sixteen 900 MW(e) pressurized water reactors. By then as much plutonium would be consumed in those 16 units, one third of whose fuel would be MOX, as they produced. In the reprocessing area, the UP3 plant at La Hague had been operating satisfactorily since it went into service in 1990. In May 1994, COGEMA had received authorization to open new shops to raise the capacity of UP2 to 800 tonnes of heavy metal per year. Since 1976 the La Hague plant had reprocessed more than 5000 tonnes of fuel from light-water reactors.

36. Regarding the management of long-term waste and highly radioactive waste, a mediator had been given the task of agreeing with local authorities on the sites where laboratories might be located. Four French Departments had been designated for preliminary work, after which the sites themselves would be selected. On its side, the national radioactive waste management agency had, in accordance with legal requirements, compiled an inventory of wastes. Apart from an improvement in waste management, France was also expecting increased opportunities for dialogue with the public and was hoping to be followed along that road by other countries.

37. In areas that were essential for the safety of the world, such as nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety, the future was burgeoning both with hopes and with challenges. The French delegation was in no doubt that, with its customary competence and with the support of the international community, the Agency would be able to fulfil the former and to take up the latter.

38. Mr. MIKHAILOV (Russian Federation) said his country valued greatly the Agency's pivotal role in the planning and development of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and nuclear power plant safety. The Agency's involvement in major global challenges such as nuclear arms reduction, meeting mankind's energy requirements and environmental protection was evidence of its effectiveness and drive. Russia appreciated in particular the Agency's constructive role in maintaining the effectiveness of the NPT. It was thus fully prepared to co-operate in improving the safeguards system and called for universal accession to the NPT and its indefinite extension. In that regard, it attached great importance to the forthcoming 1995 Review Conference.

39. Dynamic and complex, the end of the twentieth century embraced the collapse of old ideas and the appearance of fresh hopes, stimulated in particular by the massive reduction in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States undertaken at the end of the Cold War. Under the terms of the START II Treaty the two countries had agreed to reduce the number of their nuclear warheads by 70%. Russia was aiming to reduce its stock of nuclear weapons in order to achieve not only the objectives set by the START II Treaty but also those announced in unilateral declarations made by its leaders. On 23 June 1994, again with the United States, Russia had concluded an agreement to shut down reactors producing plutonium and abandon the use thereof for military purposes, complementing the agreement of 17 June 1992 on the transfer, storage and elimination of nuclear weapons, the prevention of their proliferation and the control and accounting of nuclear materials. Co-operation agreements on the safe elimination of nuclear weapons and peaceful utilization of the resulting materials had been signed with France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Japan. Agreements with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan providing for the elimination by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, on Russian territory, of the nuclear weapons located in the Republics of the former Soviet Union had been concluded or were in preparation.

40. The cost of nuclear disarmament was extremely high - around \$100 000 to dismantle a single nuclear warhead - but despite its economic problems Russia was spending almost a million million roubles every year on the operations in question. The large volume of investments required nevertheless delayed the process, which could be expedited if an

international fund to finance operations to eliminate nuclear weapons was established. In that connection, Russia wished to express its gratitude for the international assistance it had received for the elimination of its nuclear weapons, a problem which affected the entire planet. As a proponent of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, Russia was collaborating, mainly with the United States, in order to ensure that the ongoing nuclear disarmament process was fully transparent and irrevocable. It was also confident that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty could be open for signature in 1995. Since October 1990 Russia had observed a moratorium on nuclear explosions.

41. Turning to the illicit trafficking in nuclear material, which had been a source of anxiety to the international community for some time, he said that the accusations made in the press against Russia and its Ministry of Atomic Energy appeared to be unjustified. Troublemakers were at work, and he felt that not only the producers and the sellers but also the buyers should be punished, for it was they who initiated the process. A body should be established with special responsibility for finding out who was transporting the materials in question and under what conditions, and who the buyers were. The matter raised many questions requiring the intervention of international organizations. For its part, Russia had initiated bilateral co-operation with Germany with a view to stopping illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. All the nuclear powers should endeavour to improve their systems for accounting, control and physical protection of their military nuclear materials so that effective steps could be taken against trafficking therein. Russia was in favour of drafting international guidelines on technical customs control procedures and of establishing organizations with special responsibility for determining the sources of the trafficking and authorized to mark nuclear material extracted from weapons, in accordance with Agency recommendations. Russia was prepared to use such a marking system since it desired that the identity of the country of origin should appear on nuclear materials as a matter of routine. The Agency could play an essential role in combating illicit trafficking, mainly by co-ordinating the implementation of measures to strengthen physical protection, by helping countries enhance their nuclear materials accounting and control systems, and by training staff.

42. Concerning the control of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to which his country had always attached the greatest importance, he welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to enhance the effectiveness and economic viability of the safeguards system on the basis of recommendations made by SAGSI, some of which were ready to be implemented immediately. For example, the Agency could increase its co-operation with national systems of accounting and control, using as a basis the partnership agreement established with the Member States of EURATOM. Neither was there any need to postpone further the implementation of measures for administrative modernization and streamlining proposed by the Secretariat in Programme 93+2. Russia's technical support programme for safeguards included some 15 projects involving destructive and non-destructive analysis of nuclear materials. It regularly organized courses for Agency inspectors, and also courses on national systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Over the past year, it had allocated 510 million roubles in support of the Agency's safeguards, and it planned to make a larger contribution in the future. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to apply Agency safeguards in the Middle East. It was to be hoped that all the countries of the region would accept international monitoring of all their nuclear activities and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

43. Turning to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he expressed satisfaction with the Agency's work in 1993, and in particular with the constructive proposals put forward for resolving problems of energy and ecology worldwide. Russia, which was celebrating the fortieth anniversary of its first nuclear power plant, was collaborating closely with the Agency on matters relating to nuclear power. Nuclear plants accounted for 12% of the electricity generated on Russian territory as a whole, 30% in the area from the Urals to St. Petersburg and almost 45% in the North-west. Nuclear power had become essential to mankind's sustainable development and was sure to undergo rapid expansion in the twenty-first century. The only problems involved were those relating to scale, pace of expansion, economic viability, nuclear power plant safety, waste storage and environmental protection. The plans for the new generation of power plants attempted to solve those problems. They provided for inherently safe systems that eliminated the possibility of an uncontrolled chain reaction and a closed fuel cycle that included a safe waste

disposal system. Thermal or fast reactors operating on MOX fuel were examples of what was foreseen. Close international co-operation, including the world market, and reciprocal support for national programmes were necessary if mankind was to extract the maximum benefit from nuclear power. Scientific and commercial co-operation should be unrestricted and, as a forum for those who favoured the promotion of nuclear power, the Agency had an important role to play in that respect.

44. For a number of years, high priority had been given to co-operation on enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants equipped with first-generation reactors. In that context Russia was fully co-operating with all quarters, and especially the Agency. It had managed to resolve most of the theoretical problems affecting its technical co-operation programmes in the nuclear power field, but regretted that such co-operation was progressing slowly. The most successful results had been obtained in the bilateral projects, the most useful of those being the specific measures designed for particular nuclear power plants and completing a pre-existing Russian programme. In devising a new generation of reactors the more advanced States would have to take into account the interests of the developing countries. In order to reduce the costs of plant design and construction, the nuclear industry needed to design reactor types lending themselves to standardized, serial production. Russia was willing to participate in international programmes on such activities and was looking forward to receiving suggestions. It was already co-operating on the design of reactors for the twenty-first century with companies from the United States.

45. The Agency's programme and budget for 1995 assured the necessary funding for its priority activities, in particular the programmes that affected all countries. His delegation took a particular interest in the work planned with regard to nuclear power, the fuel cycle, nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, the International Nuclear Information System and nuclear constants. It commended the Secretariat on its contribution to preparing the Convention on Nuclear Safety, an instrument of major significance which would open the way to broad international co-operation.

46. Russia, which had always attached great importance to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities, noted with satisfaction that the volume of technical assistance for which the Agency had assured funding was increasing year by year, mainly

because of the indicative planning figures set for the TACF, and believed that the principle of voluntary contributions made in national currency should be retained. Despite the economic problems the country was facing, the Russian Government had paid 3000 million roubles into the TACF for the purchase of equipment and to finance courses and training for specialists from developing countries.

47. Mr. HOBEICA (Lebanon), expressing satisfaction at the Agency's efforts to promote peace and the well-being of mankind, noted with pleasure that safeguards were gaining ground and that more countries were accepting Agency inspections. In that respect, he welcomed the safeguards agreement concluded with Ukraine, which he hoped would soon enter into force, Cuba's decision, and the planned safeguards agreements with Belarus, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Dominica. He also welcomed South Africa's return to participation in the Agency as a country with a democratic government.

48. The Agency's most important achievement during the past year had been the preparation and adoption of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, which Lebanon intended to sign. The Convention would undoubtedly make a contribution to curbing the dangers that threatened mankind, and his delegation hoped that its scope would be extended to military nuclear facilities. It also acclaimed the Agency's efforts and the essential role it had played in the preparation of the Basic Safety Standards.

49. The problem of the application of safeguards in the DPRK had long been causing the Agency concern and had been the subject of much debate. His delegation was pleased to note that the current negotiations between the DPRK and the United States, which Lebanon had encouraged from the start, were going well and he hoped that they would reach a successful conclusion, something which would facilitate the Agency's task and permit it to monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities more thoroughly.

50. The Middle East was another area of the world that had occupied the Agency's attention. The peace negotiations were continuing, but what had been achieved so far would remain fragile unless tangible progress could be made on all fronts. The international community should realize that as long as Arab territories remained occupied by Israel, as long as international resolutions went unheeded and as long as a people was prevented from

returning to the land from which it had been expelled, complete peace would not be achieved. Lebanon, an active Member of the Agency which fulfilled all its obligations, particularly those pertaining to safeguards, trusted that the day would come when all States in the region would follow its example by accepting Agency safeguards, signing the NPT and deciding in favour of a just, global and lasting peace based on respect for the land and the rights of others and leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Israel should understand that by continuing to occupy Lebanese territory and refusing to comply with international law and Security Council resolution 425, which called for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa, it was not helping the peace negotiations in any way and was hampering the Agency's efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

51. A peace not accompanied by economic and social development and an improved standard of living was not a whole peace. That was where the Agency could play an additional role - its main role being inspections and the application of safeguards - by contributing effectively towards raising the standard of living, accelerating the development and improving the situation of populations with regard to health, nutrition and the environment. His delegation considered those to be the main objectives of technical co-operation projects. In that connection Lebanon, having co-operated fully with the Agency to help it achieve its goals and having ceased to receive technical assistance because of the war to which it had fallen victim, felt that it deserved some priority under the technical co-operation programme so as to be able to consolidate peace in the country, regain the ground lost in the nuclear field and re-establish its pioneering role in science and technology. That was what Lebanon hoped to achieve, aided by the Agency's technical co-operation managers.

52. The Middle East suffered chronically from a shortage of drinking water and from problems of irrigation. The potential of nuclear technology for groundwater exploration and seawater desalination suggested that the Agency would have an effective role to play, in parallel with its contribution towards enhancing the quality and storage life of foodstuffs, protecting livestock resources and developing agricultural methods.

53. The 1995 NPT Review Conference would be a unique opportunity for all States to work to strengthen the NPT in order to make it permanent and truly universal. One of the greatest threats currently facing the international community was illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. The Agency should take appropriate measures in co-operation with national authorities in order to combat the phenomenon.

54. In the light of the political changes which had occurred at regional and international levels during recent years, serious consideration should be given to introducing necessary changes to Article VI of the Statute, with a view to improving the balance of representation in the Board of Governors and adopting a classification of geographical areas appropriate to the new situation.

55. Lastly, his delegation shared the anxieties of the Agency's administration with regard to the financial situation. It feared that the lack of resources would lead to a reduction in the technical assistance which the Agency furnished to developing countries. All possible steps should therefore be taken to endow the Agency with reliable and predictable resources, and Lebanon appreciated the Secretariat's efforts to that end.

56. Mr. MEADWAY (United Kingdom), associating himself with the statements made by the delegate of Germany on behalf of the European Union and by the delegate of France, said that the future of nuclear power depended on the extent to which it could be competitive while complying with strict safety and environmental protection standards. In the United Kingdom, the Department of Trade and Industry was carrying out a study on the future of nuclear power, focusing on the economic and commercial viability of the country's new nuclear stations. The nuclear industry had been invited to make public its arguments in favour of expanding nuclear electricity generating capacity, and the strength of its case would be measured by its ability to attract private sector funding.

57. The past year had been a very successful one for the United Kingdom's nuclear industry. Its first pressurized water reactor, Sizewell B, would commence commercial operation at the beginning of 1995. It was a high performance design, incorporating advanced safety features that would have high export potential. British Nuclear Fuel's thermal oxide reprocessing plant at Sellafield had received final approval in March. The

Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear companies, independent since 1990, had improved their performance very substantially and now supplied a quarter of the United Kingdom's energy needs. In addition, the unit cost of nuclear electricity generation had continued to fall.

58. At international level, the central event was the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The Treaty had played an essential role in preventing nuclear proliferation while establishing a framework to encourage the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. The United Kingdom favoured the Treaty's indefinite and unconditional extension as the only option that demonstrated clearly the States Parties' commitment to supporting and maintaining the Treaty. An extension by one or several "fixed periods" would risk undermining confidence in the NPT. Indefinite extension was the best means of maintaining the current level of nuclear security, on which continued growth in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology depended.

59. Maintaining the credibility of the Agency's safeguards was essential in order to guarantee full implementation of the NPT, as the recent case of the DPRK had shown. The United Kingdom was deeply concerned by the DPRK's persistent failure to comply fully with the safeguards agreement it had concluded with the Agency. His country welcomed the agreement reached between the DPRK and the United States on 30 August, and hoped that the forthcoming talks would lead to a successful outcome. The United Kingdom, together with its partners in the European Union and NATO, had continued to reiterate to the Agency and the United Nations the importance it attached to the DPRK's abiding by its NPT and safeguards obligations. Without the DPRK's full co-operation the Agency could no longer guarantee that that country was not manufacturing nuclear weapons. It was important to reaffirm the Agency's right to carry out the inspections it considered necessary at all the DPRK's nuclear sites (including special inspections at undeclared sites).

60. His delegation endorsed the measures taken by the Director General and the Board of Governors to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system and looked forward to considering the integrated set of proposals that would be submitted in March 1995. Important measures were contemplated, and the United Kingdom welcomed the emphasis that was being placed on methods for the detection of undeclared activities which contravened non-proliferation undertakings, and the intention to introduce a new system of cost analysis. His delegation was concerned that, for the first time, the budget estimates for 1996 did not cover all the inspection requirements anticipated under existing or envisaged safeguards agreements. It was true, however, that it was difficult to produce cost estimates without a more precise definition of the safeguards strengthening measures and an accurate evaluation of the productivity gains that could be achieved.

61. The United Kingdom shared the general anxiety over recent seizures of smuggled fissile material and endorsed the initiative of the German Government which, as the government holding the Presidency of the European Union, had submitted a draft resolution on the subject to the General Conference. The immediate need was to define the real extent of the problem. The Agency was well placed to do that, and should continue to assist the countries concerned to improve their systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials.

62. Although safeguards were a major priority, the Agency's promotional activities were also very important, as was clearly demonstrated by the preparation of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. His Government fully supported the Convention, which it would sign during the present session of the Conference. He hoped that it would enter into force at an early date so that the consensus which had developed during the negotiations would prevail during the implementation of the Convention.

63. Turning to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities, he recalled that they had been spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for many years past, especially outside the power sector. Those activities remained most useful, and the United Kingdom appreciated the manner in which the Secretariat had reviewed and improved their functioning in order to ensure that the recipient States derived maximum benefit.

64. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his Government's full commitment to and support for the Agency's objectives and principal activities. The General Conference was meeting at a time when it was necessary to grapple with the consequences of major changes that had taken place in the global political and economical context. It was more than ever necessary to concentrate on ensuring that the Agency was able to carry out its essential roles. The United Kingdom was ready to contribute fully to the fulfilment of that important task.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

