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MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN MATTERS RELATING TO NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

The summary record of the discussion in the Board of Governors on 10 June 1993 on matters under the item "Measures to strengthen international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection" is reproduced in the Attachment.

EXCERPT FROM THE BOARD'S 817th MEETING

MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN MATTERS RELATING TO NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION (GC(XXXVI)/RES/582, 583 and 584; GOV/2658, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2666, 2668 and 2673; GOV/INF/694 and 695).

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1. The CHAIRMAN, introducing items 12 and 13*) of the Board's agenda (GOV/2676), recalled that item 12 had been placed on the agenda in response to a series of requests contained in resolutions GC(XXXVI)/582, 583 and 584, adopted at the thirty-sixth regular session of the General Conference in September 1992. Seven matters were to be considered under item 12, for all of which papers had been issued.

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4. Mr. SEMENOV (Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety) said that the Secretariat, following specific requests from the General Conference, had prepared a number of documents for the Board's consideration and eventual transmission to the Conference. The Secretariat had in addition prepared two information documents: GOV/INF/694, which described a new joint initiative of UNDP and the Agency for strengthening radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures in countries of the former Soviet Union; and GOV/INF/695, which discussed the sensitive problem of the transport of spent fuel by sea and the possible implications of abandoning the transport-mode-independent character of the present regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive materials.

*) Item 12 - "Measures to strengthen international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection" was discussed together with item 13 - "Safety fundamentals relating to the safety of nuclear installations". References to the latter have been omitted in this reproduction of the Board's summary record.

5. At the Board's session in February, the Director General had promised to report on further developments in matters of common interest to the IAEA and IMO, whereby sea transport of irradiated nuclear fuel and similar materials constituted the item of primary interest. A second meeting of the IAEA/IMO/UNDP Working Group had been held from 26 to 30 April 1993 and agreement had been reached on the final text of the Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel in Flasks On Board Ships (INF Code), by which the Code was also extended to plutonium and high-level radioactive waste. The Joint Working Group had also considered the IAEA's packaging requirements in relation to accident conditions on board ships and had concluded that they were adequate. Finally, the Joint Working Group had considered its tasks as completed and proposed to the constituent organizations that it be disbanded.

6. The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), meeting in its 62nd session from 24 to 28 May, had endorsed the conclusions of the Joint Working Group and proposed to submit them for adoption to IMO's General Assembly. A full account of the activities of the Joint Working Group was to be prepared for the information of the Board in September. The Joint Working Group had managed to conclude its work on a sensitive subject expeditiously, and in doing so had set a model for good international co-operation.

7. In response to subparagraphs 3(i) and 7 of General Conference resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/582, the Secretariat had prepared document GOV/2666, concerning the Agency's activities related to the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. The Board would no doubt recognize that the title had been changed from that of previous documents on the same subject, a change reflecting the fact that the document now covered a wider range of activities, extending to reactors of several generations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and also responded to certain comments that had been made by members of the Board. The document provided a briefing on the development of a common basis for safety assessment of the de facto circumstances arising from the operation of the reactors in question, on the Secretariat's activities in relation to the safety of WWER-440/230, WWER-440/213, WWER-1000 and RBMK plants, and also on continuing international co-operation, in particular with the G-24 Group of OECD countries and the commission of the European Communities - one aim being to avoid duplication of effort and to enhance the effectiveness of the programmes. The Agency's aim was to conclude the assessment phase as expeditiously as possible to facilitate the transition to the - rather delayed - implementation phase co-ordinated by the G-24 mechanism.

8. In paragraph 3(ii) of resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/582, the General Conference had urged the Board of Governors and the Director General to consider a more thorough and transparent nuclear safety overview process with the objective of achieving a high safety performance in all operating nuclear installations. In the interests of greater thoroughness and openness in the overview of nuclear safety, the Secretariat had for some years been endeavouring to maintain an "international" presence by offering services designed to enhance

operational safety, notably the OSART and ASSET services, and also the Incident Reporting System. In the same resolution the General Conference had recommended to Member States that they avail themselves fully of those services. In document GOV/2661 the Secretariat was submitting for the consideration of the Board a report which provided a form of briefing on the Agency's safety services. In particular, the achievements, status and future prospects of the OSARTs, the ASSETs, the Incident Reporting System and the International Nuclear Events Scale were summarized in annexes to that document. The problem that remained to be solved in the years to come was how best to direct those services to the NPPs that were causing most concern about safety.

9. In September 1991 the General Conference had recommended that the Agency, with the assistance of an international group of experts, should evolve safety principles for the design of future reactors on the basis of - inter alia - INSAG's Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants and other reports prepared by INSAG. A joint programme had been established between the Division of Nuclear Safety and the Advanced Reactor Programme of the Division of Nuclear Power to include both design and safety aspects of future reactors. General Conference resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/582, in subparagraph 3(iii), had urged that the process of developing safety principles for future reactors should be continued and requested a further report for consideration at the Conference's regular session in 1993. The report attached to document GOV/2663 was being submitted to the Board in response to that request. The work done thus far had yielded a first draft of a Technical Document incorporating all the modifications and additions to existing principles needed to ensure their applicability to future nuclear power plants. One of the most significant additions lay in the fact that protection against the consequences of severe accidents was now to be taken into account at the design stage for future nuclear power plants. It was expected that the Technical Document in question would be published in 1994 after careful review commensurate with its importance.

10. Document GOV/2673 provided information on developments relating to the preparation of a nuclear safety convention. In his statement, the Director General had already described recent events connected with the preparations for a nuclear safety convention and had tried to convey to the Board the Secretariat's sense of disappointment with the outcome of that important endeavour.

11. General Conference resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/583 had requested the Board and the Director General to inform the Conference at its regular session in 1993 of progress made in preparing new Basic Safety Standards. The report attached to document GOV/2658 gave a succinct summary of the historical background to the preparation of the new standards and outlined the progress which the Secretariat hoped would be achieved. It was now expected that a draft of the document would soon be circulated for comment to all Member States and then reviewed by a Technical Committee Meeting scheduled for December 1993 - which, it was assumed, would finalize the text. If that schedule could be followed, the final version of

the Basic Safety Standards should be ready for submission to the Board in February 1994. It was important to note that agreement had now been reached on the main outstanding issues identified by the Technical Committee that had reviewed the previous draft in December 1992. In that connection, he wished to express full agreement with the statement made by Dr. Brinkhorst, Director of the CEC. It was understood that the CEC could not, for legal reasons, join the international secretariat which was guiding the work on the new standards. At the same time, it was important to emphasize that the CEC had worked intensively with the Agency on the project and had provided liaison officers to ensure coherence and consistency between the standards and the forthcoming CEC directives. A good example of such co-operation was to be seen in the joint work on such important matters as the question of exemptions from the standards.

12. Resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/584 had requested the Director General to prepare a report for the Board, and for subsequent consideration by the General Conference, on a possible programme of education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety based on the proposal contained in document GC(XXXVI)/1016. The attachment to document GOV/2668 presented a possible programme to the Board. That document was self-explanatory. The programme submitted to the Board did not, however, reflect the level of ambition implicit in the spirit of resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/584 or in the proposal contained in document GC(XXXVI)/1016, which had triggered the resolution. The proposal should, nevertheless, be considered as the best compromise possible under the prevailing budgetary limitations. Should conditions change in the future - for instance through the procurement of extrabudgetary resources - the Secretariat would revise the programme and tailor it better to the spirit of document GC(XXXVI)/1016.

13. An important point to bear in mind was that document GOV/2668 was based on the assumption that additional contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund would be provided to ensure full implementation of the programme outlined in that document. Those additional resources had not yet been forthcoming.

14. The Secretariat had routinely informed the Board and the General Conference of the status of implementation of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. In document GOV/2662, the implementation and status of those Conventions had been updated for the Board's consideration. The concern expressed by a number of Member States about the status of the two Conventions in the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia was a subject to which the report gave some consideration.

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16. Mr. OJANEN (Finland) said that the Agency's work in the nuclear safety field had been highly commendable; it was in fact one of the organization's most useful and important activities. He proposed to touch on just two of the many topics included under item 12 of the agenda.

17. Regrettably, progress with the preparation of a nuclear safety convention had been very slow and unsatisfactory, although there now seemed to be some grounds for optimism. His delegation had from the outset emphasized the importance of a convention of wide scope, covering among other things the processing and final disposal of radioactive waste, and possibly extending to non-peaceful applications of nuclear energy as well.

18. In the interests of progress, however, Finland was now prepared to accept that the convention would, in the first instance, apply only to civilian nuclear power plants. On the other hand, the issues raised by the convention were a matter of enormous public concern, and it was accordingly very important that the contracting parties should commit themselves to continue to work for an extension of the convention to elements and aspects of the fuel cycle that seemed bound to be left out at the present stage. In Finland's view, a single convention incorporating such extensions would be far more practicable than separate new conventions.

19. His delegation felt that the best solution at the present stage might be to ask the Chairman of the Group of Experts to prepare a new draft which could be discussed at the Group's next meeting and perhaps submitted to the Board in February 1994. A diplomatic conference could then be organized, possibly even in 1994.

20. His second point concerned the Agency's activities in connection with the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Finland enjoyed quite extensive bilateral collaboration with the Russian Federation and had also contributed to the Agency's project by providing a number of cost-free experts. His delegation had also noted with satisfaction that UNDP had seen fit to launch a joint project with the Agency for establishing and strengthening the regulatory infrastructure in those States.

21. The Agency's prompt involvement in the work relating to radioactive waste dumped in the Arctic Seas also deserved commendation. That involvement was all the more important as it seemed that decisions on the decommissioning of nuclear-powered vessels operating in the Arctic Seas were still to be made.

22. His delegation wished to reiterate its view that the present pattern of financing the Agency's activities in matters of global concern exclusively through voluntary contributions was not satisfactory. Those activities deserved at least as high a priority as some other programmes whose topicality was less evident.

23. Mr. HÖGBERG (Sweden) said his delegation wished to express its keen appreciation of the Agency's accomplishments in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection. The Swedish Government attached particularly great importance to the work on a nuclear safety convention. At the February meetings of the Board, his delegation had voiced its concern about the difficulties which the Group of Experts was encountering - problems which were in fact impeding consensus on a number of very important issues. Appropriate steps should be taken to facilitate a successful and early completion of the preparatory process. To the great satisfaction of the Swedish delegation, it now appeared that ways were being found to resolve some of those outstanding issues, and he sincerely hoped that a spirit of co-operation and compromise would prevail, enabling the Group of Experts to reach consensus on a draft convention before the end of the year.

24. His delegation supported the idea of focusing efforts initially on a convention which would be limited in its scope to civil nuclear power reactors; at the same time, however, there should be a strong political commitment to begin negotiations on an international convention covering the safety of nuclear waste management and disposal as soon as safety fundamentals for that purpose could be agreed upon. The Agency and its Member States should work together to make such an agreement a reality. Further technical work within the Agency, dealing with the safety of other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, should, in time, lead to the consideration of further legal instruments. Peer reviews should also be further developed as an important component of the convention follow-up mechanisms. Such follow-up mechanisms should be agreed when the convention was opened for signing, not left to the first conference of the contracting parties.

25. It would be appropriate at the present time for the Board to express its support to the Group of Experts and its Chairman, commending them on the direction taken in their work and at the same time providing some guidance which, it was to be hoped, would lead to rapid completion of the work. If possible, a draft text should be submitted to the Board in February 1994 and at the same time further appropriate steps should be taken - one option being referral of the draft to a diplomatic conference as early in 1994 as possible. If that schedule was to be met, the Board would have to ask the Director General to request the Chairman of the Group of Experts to prepare a new draft of the convention, drawing on existing texts and the discussions held at the last meeting, to be used as the reference text for discussion at the Group's next series of meetings.

26. For the sake of brevity, he would restrict his remaining remarks under item 12 of the agenda to the subject of nuclear safety and radiation protection in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union - activities to which his Government attached particularly great importance.

27. The Swedish Government had so far funded bilateral projects worth about US \$12 million in that area, mainly in the context of co-operation with Lithuania and the Russian Federation. The Swedish bilateral programme was co-ordinated with other programmes being carried out within the framework of the G-24. Sweden had also contributed to the newly established Safety Account administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

28. Considerable progress had been achieved under the Swedish bilateral programme. The experience gained from it highlighted the importance of having a more or less continuous expert presence on site, and of continuous and co-ordinated interaction with the staffs of the nuclear power plants concerned, with the regulatory authorities and, when appropriate, with Government representatives. That in turn required close co-ordination with participating organizations, not least because many of the newly independent States had limited manpower available for participation in the various groups dealing with international co-operation and co-ordination.

29. The Swedish Government regarded the Agency's activities related to nuclear safety and radiation protection in Eastern European countries and countries of the former Soviet Union as an extremely important supplement and support for other efforts in progress. Sweden supported those activities through its participation in various groups and missions, and also by providing a certain amount of extrabudgetary support. The importance of the Agency's review missions - OSART, ASSET and IPERS - merited special emphasis. The Agency's efforts to strengthen regulatory activities in newly independent States with substantial nuclear power programmes also deserved strong support, as did the initiative aimed at strengthening national radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures. In all those activities the Agency should try to achieve the best possible co-ordination with other initiatives. The Swedish delegation had listened with great interest to what had been said, in the Director General's introductory statement, about the Agency's involvement in examining the problem of radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic Seas. That was an issue of great importance which required urgent action. Sweden did not accept the dumping of radioactive waste at sea and therefore fully endorsed the Agency's involvement.

30. Nuclear safety was undoubtedly one of the Agency's main activities under its Statute. Further integration of the Agency's nuclear safety projects on behalf of Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union with nuclear safety activities funded under the Regular Budget and the TACF would be extremely welcome.

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33. Mr. HULSE (United Kingdom) said that he felt bound to comment first on the deplorable lateness with which the papers on items 12 and 13 had been issued. The time available for Member States to study them between their dates of issue and the beginning of the Board's meetings had been wholly inadequate. Some of the papers, after all, contained important new points of principle which the Board should not be asked to accept at such short notice. Thus, in all the circumstances, his Government's reactions to the documents would have to be regarded as largely provisional. The United Kingdom delegation could not agree that the Board should tacitly endorse the content of the new papers by transmitting them to the General Conference as requested. The issues involved deserved fuller consideration by the Board at a subsequent meeting in the light of further reflection in capitals and further consultations with the Secretariat.

34. Subject to that caveat, he wished to offer provisional comments on certain items. Firstly, with regard to safety principles for future nuclear power plants (GOV/2663), the Technical Committee was surely being too modest in describing the changes which it had seen fit to recommend in the main safety principles and objectives of INSAG-3 as "relatively minor". Quite the contrary, his delegation believed that they would have a far-reaching impact on the design of future reactors. That being so, it did not believe that those changes should be adopted before INSAG - and possibly NUSSAG - had carefully discussed their implications and made their advice available to the Board.

35. Secondly, with regard to the preparation of new Basic Safety Standards (GOV/2658), his delegation welcomed the progress which had been made since the previous year but felt bound to repeat the United Kingdom's continuing strong reservations about the proposed inclusion of wide-ranging nuclear safety requirements. The United Kingdom was not at all convinced that it was either necessary or desirable to include such material in addition to the traditional criteria for radiological protection. If necessary, his delegation would return to the subject when the Basic Safety Standards were brought before the Board for approval.

36. With regard to the preparation of a nuclear safety convention, his delegation was concerned that the report in document GOV/2673 showed no clear path from the fourth meeting of the Group of Experts, where useful progress had been made, to the early convening of a diplomatic conference. Only if such a path were opened up would the report to the General Conference end on a more positive note. It was to be hoped that such a route in fact existed. What was needed was a single text which could serve as the basis for further

work by the Group of Experts, with a view to securing the endorsement of the Board in February 1994 and referring the matter to a diplomatic conference as early in 1994 as possible. If such a schedule was to be met, the Director General should invite the Chairman of the Group of Experts to undertake the responsibility of preparing a new text, drawing on existing texts and associating interested delegations with the work as appropriate. In that way, the Group of Experts might be able to make rapid progress at its next meeting.

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39. Mr. POONG-EIL JUHN (Republic of Korea) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with others in expressing appreciation to the Secretariat for the reports it had prepared on the seven sub-items included under item 12 of the agenda. His delegation would comment on sub-items (i), (ii) and (iii).

40. The Korean Government attached great importance to the Agency's activities related to the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. The international safety assessment being performed on power reactors of various kinds was an absolutely vital exercise. His delegation was pleased to inform the Board that the Korean Government was prepared to participate in the international safety assessment programme for RBMK reactors by dispatching several well-qualified technical experts to the countries concerned. In fact his delegation believed that more countries capable of assessing the safety of RBMK reactors should take an active part in the safety assessment programme.

41. With regard to sub-item (ii) - transparency and the Agency's safety services - he wished to express his Government's appreciation to the Secretariat for having helped Korea to host the ASCOT (Assessment of Safety Culture in Organizations Team) seminar held in April in Korea. Thanks to that seminar, the ASCOT concept had been fully understood by the nuclear regulatory authorities, nuclear power plant operators and institutional managers in the Republic of Korea.

42. His delegation also wished to thank the Agency for having sent OSART missions to the Republic of Korea on three occasions; through those missions, the safety of the country's nuclear power plants had been effectively evaluated and improved. The participation of Korean experts as observers in OSART missions to other Member States had also been very useful as a way of accumulating field experience, which in turn enhanced the safety of nuclear power plants. The Korean Government would welcome more opportunities to take part as an observer in future OSART and RAPAT missions.

43. His delegation was happy to inform the Board that Korea had subscribed to the INES system in March 1993.

44. Safety principles for future nuclear power plants - sub-item (iii) - were a matter of great importance to the Republic of Korea. That being so, his Government had decided to act as host to the international symposium on advanced nuclear power systems, to be held in Seoul from 18 to 22 October 1993. On behalf of the Korean Government, he wished to express appreciation to the Secretariat for co-sponsoring that important symposium, where design, technology, safety and strategies for the deployment of advanced nuclear power systems were to be extensively discussed. It was very much to be hoped that as many experts as possible from Member States would participate.

45. Late in 1992 the Korean Atomic Energy Commission had approved a ten-year nuclear research and development programme which was to receive an allocation of over \$2 billion during that period. The deployment of an advanced nuclear power plant, scheduled to be available by the year 2006, was one of the most important projects in the programme, and an expenditure of about \$400 million was anticipated for it. In that connection, Korea looked forward to the document entitled "Safety Principles for the Design of Future Nuclear Power Plants", to be published in 1994 by the Agency. The Korean Government considered that those important projects could best be executed through intensive international co-operation, particularly with the Agency, and looked forward to close consultations with the Agency over the ten-year period.

46. With those comments on sub-items (i), (ii) and (iii), his delegation concurred in authorizing the Director General to transmit the documents relevant to item 12 of the agenda to the General Conference at its forthcoming regular session.

47.

48. Mr. de LA FORTELLE (France) said he felt bound to endorse the comments of the Governor from the United Kingdom with regard to the tardy issue of documents.

49. France attached particular importance to sub-item (iv) - the preparation of a nuclear safety convention - under item 12 of the agenda, and his delegation had noted with great interest the report prepared by the Group of Experts. It was satisfying to see that some progress had been made since February, especially in relation to the scope of the convention. There were, of course, some points on which consensus was fairly easy and others which resisted consensus, but his delegation hoped that a complete draft would emerge fairly soon and that the Director General would be able to report at the Board's next February session that

the date for a diplomatic conference could be set. Ideally that should be done early in the year. Preparation of the draft could be entrusted to the Chairman of the Group of Experts, who would naturally arrange for all the necessary consultations. France would like to be associated with that work and to rely fairly heavily on existing texts, among others its own draft, which in the opinion of many delegations - not just that of France - deserved further attention and elaboration.

50. Turning to agenda item 12(i), he said that document GOV/2666 provided a good summary of the Agency's work on the safety of NPPs in Eastern Europe. France had provided strong support for that work, and wanted to encourage the Agency to collaborate closely with the G-24 and G-7. The frequent absence of some beneficiary countries in connection with the development of WWER programmes was regrettable.

51. As far as the RBMK programmes were concerned, it was to be hoped that the responsible authorities would share as much information as possible with the international community.

52. His delegation had noted with interest document GOV/2661, which gave a thorough account of the Agency's involvement in safety services. The Agency's OSART and ASSET services would continue to receive the support of France, and it was to be hoped that they would remain as effective as ever. Regular consultations with Member States and careful study of the impact which the OSART and ASSET services were having would obviously remain important. The establishment of a standing group to guide the OSART and ASSET services might be considered.

53. On the question of transparency, his delegation did not believe that the restrictions on the circulation of certain documents - a point referred to in paragraph 9 of Annex 1 to document GOV/2661 - should be lifted; it was surely up to the States concerned to decide whether these documents should be disseminated further or not.

54. As for the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), France felt that that Scale could most certainly not serve as a starting point for operational safety experience feedback. A system for that purpose existed already in the form of the IRS. Thus, paragraph 9 of Annex 4 should be omitted. Subject to those comments, his delegation was ready to endorse document GOV/2661 for transmission to the General Conference.

55. France believed that the development of safety principles for future NPPs (GOV/2663) should remain strictly within the framework of activities aimed at the promotion of nuclear power. It was vital to bear in mind the nuclear safety convention which was in the process of being elaborated, and for that reason it would be wise to refer to basic safety principles - the Basic Fundamentals as they were called - rather than the INSAG-3 document with which they were sometimes in conflict. As a general principle it was probably premature and therefore unwise to attempt to cover future NPPs in the present code.

56. His delegation did not approve of the formulation of paragraph 11, which could easily lead to tendentious interpretations. Much better would be a reference to the definition of the term "no significant radiological impact" as endorsed at the last Group meeting in April.

57. With regard to the preparation of new Basic Safety Standards (GOV/2658), he recalled that the French position outlined in September 1992 had stressed the idea that the final document should contain an initial part dealing with the basic elements of radiological protection. The remainder could consist of elements which might be of practical use to States and also to the Agency. Another part, possibly an annex, would contain relevant quantitative data. France believed that the Basic Safety Standards - which might be better described as basic principles - should be elaborated in conformity with the pattern he had described.

58.

59. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain), referring first to sub-item 12(i), commended the Secretariat for its clear exposition of the Agency's activities aimed at improving the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union (GOV/2666); the extrabudgetary projects intended to improve the safety level of the older WWER-440/230 and RBMK-type reactors of Soviet design had been particularly successful. Spain was participating actively in that work, which was continuing to serve as a basis for defining specific on-site projects such as those offered by the EC under PHARE and ISTAC.

60. Since so many participants were involved in the technical co-operation programmes in those countries, effective co-ordination was required in order to avoid any duplication of effort. The co-ordination mechanism established by the 24 OECD countries had a crucial role to play in organizing the programmes and identifying areas in need of attention, and the database set up by the G-24 Secretariat would be equally important in keeping donor countries and organizations as well as recipient countries informed.

61. He welcomed the joint UNDP/IAEA initiative, described in document GOV/INF/694, for strengthening regulatory bodies in the countries of the former Soviet Union and improving radiation protection in their research reactors, uranium mining, and other facilities using radioactive sources. The initiative was making full use of the Agency's organizing capacity and experience, and UNDP's project management skills.

62. Turning to sub-item 12(ii), he said that the safety services described in document GOV/2661 should be made universally available. If all interested countries participated, the result would be a more abundant exchange of experience and an improvement in safety. His delegation appreciated the improvements brought about by the OSART missions, and considered that other types of mission should be directed at achieving similar effectiveness. Spain had been actively involved in developing the OSART programme by supplying experts for various missions and receiving two missions in its own facilities. The Spanish Government was in fact considering the possibility of receiving a further mission in due course.

63. The growing use of INES revealed a tendency towards greater transparency about nuclear power plant operation and a determination to assess correctly the seriousness of nuclear events. His delegation felt that the Scale should be used primarily for transmitting information rapidly to the public and the media; other mechanisms, such as the IRS, should be used for the exchange of more technical and detailed information.

64. With regard to sub-item 12(iii) - safety principles for future nuclear power plants (GOV/2663) -, he emphasized that those principles would constitute an important factor for the development of the nuclear industry. In resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/582 the General Conference had stressed the importance of continuing the process begun at the "International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power" in September 1991.

65. It was important to try to achieve the widest consensus possible based on the principles set forth in the INSAG-3 document and on further development of the concepts termed "realistically conceivable severe accident" and "no significant radiological impact". Progress in that regard should be supplemented by progress on existing projects. There was no point in acting hastily in such important matters.

66. As to the preparation of a nuclear safety convention, dealt with under sub-item 12(iv), he recalled that the initial position of his delegation had been that the convention should cover both the nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. However, Spain was now prepared to support, if necessary, the compromise worked out by the Group of Experts whereby the scope of the convention would initially be limited to power reactors used for peaceful purposes, so that a consensus on the text could be reached in the shortest possible

time. In a future second phase of development, the scope of the convention would need to be broadened to include nuclear waste management, once agreement had been reached on the relevant safety fundamentals. It would be useful if the General Conference adopted at its forthcoming session a resolution urging the Director General to initiate that task.

67. Flexibility was required from all parties in order to achieve the consensus which seemed to be within reach. To that end, his delegation supported the proposal that the Chairman of the Group of Experts should prepare a final draft of the convention, holding such consultations as were necessary.

68. With regard to sub-items 12(v) and (vi), Spain supported and was participating actively in the preparation of new Basic Safety Standards and in the development of a programme for education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety.

69. His delegation could thus approve the transmission of all the reports mentioned under item 12 of the agenda to the General Conference.

70.

71. Mr. CAMPUZANO (Mexico), referring to sub-item 12(ii), noted that the Mexican Government was willing to pay the local costs and a percentage of the experts' travel costs in respect of the OSART mission planned for the Laguna Verde plant in the first half of 1995 (GOV/2661). It therefore requested the Secretariat to include in the appropriate section of the Programme and Budget for 1995-96 sufficient Regular Budget funds to cover the remaining costs of the mission. On the assumption that that would be done, his delegation favoured transmission of document GOV/2661 to the General Conference.

72. With regard to sub-item 12(iv), his delegation requested that the meeting of the Group of Experts for the drafting of a nuclear convention and the eighth meeting of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, both scheduled for October 1993, be held consecutively, without a week in between, to spare the experts, most of whom would be attending both meetings, considerable expense.

73. His delegation commended the Secretariat for its report on the work to prepare a nuclear safety convention (GOV/2673). It had participated in the four meetings of the Group of Experts held so far and considered that sufficient consensus had already been found on the main aspects of the future convention.

74. An example was the decision to limit the scope of application of the convention to civil nuclear power plants with the proviso that it would be broadened to include nuclear waste at a later date. Mexico felt that it should now be possible to produce a text which would attract a consensus, and which could therefore be finalized and submitted to a diplomatic conference in 1994. Subject to those remarks, his delegation could approve the report for transmission to the General Conference together with the report by the President of the fourth meeting of the Group of Experts held in May 1993.

75. Turning to sub-item 12(v), his delegation felt that, while the draft Basic Safety Standards constituted a well-produced theoretical document, it would be difficult and costly to put them into practice in countries where human and financial resources were limited. The Technical Committee due to meet in December should take due account of that problem. Subject to those considerations, his delegation could support the transmission of document GOV/2658 to the General Conference.

76. Turning to sub-item 12(vi), he said that the possible programme for education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety, set out in document GOV/2668, appeared to be well constructed. However, the implications of funding the programme from technical co-operation funds were unclear, and further study was necessary. Nevertheless, his delegation could support the submission of document GOV/2668 to the General Conference.

77. With regard to sub-item 12(vii), he urged all countries not already party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency to accede to them as soon as possible.

78.

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80. Mr. WALKER (Canada) thanked the Director General for his statement concerning the preparation of a nuclear safety convention and for the report attached to document GOV/2673 (sub-item 12(iv)). Canada attached high priority to the implementation of such a convention, as one element of its own nuclear energy and environmental policies and as a factor of strategic importance for bringing safety up to an acceptable level at operating nuclear power plants all over the world. It had done its best to promote wide acceptance of and adherence to such a convention and had participated fully in the programme organized by the Agency to discuss and resolve the relevant issues. Significant progress had finally been achieved in reaching consensus on key issues such as the scope of the convention and its

institutional arrangements. However, in view of the urgent need for such an instrument, it was essential to accelerate the pace of negotiations still further.

81. In particular, concerted efforts would be needed if the objective of submitting a final draft of the nuclear safety convention to a diplomatic conference in 1994 was to be realized. To that end, the Canadian Government strongly supported the idea of requesting the Chairman of the Group of Experts to prepare a new draft text as a basis for discussion at the Group's next series of meetings in October. The Chairman should draw on existing texts and the discussions from the fourth series of meetings, and should hold consultations as appropriate. Provided Member States committed themselves fully to such an approach, the Board should be in a position to present the text to the diplomatic conference on time.

82. With regard to sub-item 12(vi), his delegation was particularly pleased to note that the recommendations made in the Secretariat's report on a possible programme for education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety, attached to document GOV/2668, would not unduly strain the Agency's Regular Budget. The vital importance to operational safety and safety culture of a systematic and broad approach to the training of nuclear power plant personnel, including management staff, could not be overstated. Accordingly, his Government could support the recommendations contained in document GOV/2668, and the incorporation of the activities to which they referred into the Agency's nuclear energy and safety programme.

83. Mr. MENDEN (Germany) regretted that the late issue of the documents had made it virtually impossible for his delegation to assess and comment on the substance of items 12 and 13, and he urged the Secretariat to arrange for earlier distribution of such documents in the future.

84. Nevertheless, the subject of nuclear safety was one of utmost political importance in Germany, particularly in connection with the issue of public acceptance, and so he wished to highlight a number of his delegation's concerns about the documents before the Board.

85. First, with regard to sub-item 12(iii), his delegation was concerned about the proposal to depart from the Basic Safety Principles approved by INSAG, and felt that the issue needed further examination.

86. With regard to sub-item 12(v), his delegation was not certain that the approach to new Basic Safety Standards proposed in document GOV/2658 represented the best option; the German Government believed that the rules established by the ICRP should continue to provide the main basis for such standards, and that the norms defined by the Community should continue to apply in Europe.

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88. Sub-item 12(iv) dealt with the preparation of a nuclear safety convention, an issue to which his Government attached great importance. Germany welcomed the fact that so many delegations had been willing to make significant compromises at the most recent meetings of the Group of Experts in the interests of the consensus needed to make the convention a reality. Real progress had been made on matters of substance, especially with regard to the anticipated scope of the convention. That achievement now needed to be matched by similar progress in matters of procedure.

89. His delegation now invited the Director General to urge the Chairman of the Group of Experts to prepare a new draft of the convention, holding such consultations as he deemed necessary, so that the Group would have before it when it next met a text drawing on existing documents and previous discussions, not simply a compilation of various drafting proposals.

90. Mr. VIGASSY (Hungary), speaking on sub-item 12(i), expressed his delegation's appreciation to the Agency for having organized the advisory group meetings in 1992 to review the progress made under the Agency's nuclear safety programmes for Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. He also welcomed as a further step in the right direction the establishment of the Steering Committee to advise the Agency on its programmes related to the safety of WWER plants.

91. Similarly, his delegation highly appreciated the Agency's participation as technical advisor in the training working groups set up by the G-24 and its support for the G-24's efforts to establish a database on nuclear safety assistance.

92. Turning to sub-item 12(iv), he noted with satisfaction that, in spite of the complexity of the issues involved in the elaboration of an international convention on nuclear safety, significant progress had been made on important matters such as the convention's scope of application and the role of relevant institutions.

93. Although it was a matter for regret that significant differences regarding issues of secondary importance were hampering the work of the Group of Experts, his delegation was convinced that they could be resolved at the Group's forthcoming series of meetings, thus paving the way to a diplomatic conference as the next step.

94. The relevant resolution of the International Safety Conference in 1991 constituted a valid framework for future work on a nuclear safety convention. His Government looked forward eagerly to the early completion of a convention which would make a clear distinction between international and national responsibilities and provide a transparent and well-structured review system under which the contracting parties could examine national reports on implementation of the convention and determine whether obligations were being fulfilled in line with internationally recognized nuclear safety principles and standards. In that context the Agency should undoubtedly have a substantive role to play, and the comments compiled by the INSAG working group on the subject ought to be considered by the Expert Group when it next met.

95. With regard to sub-items 12(v) and (vi), his Government looked forward to being able to incorporate the new Basic Safety Standards, once they were approved, into its own radiation protection regulations, and also wished to indicate its willingness to host post-graduate courses in line with the Standard Syllabus contained in the Attachment to document GOV/2668.

96. In conclusion, his delegation was able to approve the transmission of the documents before the Board, updated as necessary, to the General Conference for consideration at its forthcoming regular session.

97. Mr. MOHAN (India) thanked the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety for his informative introductory remarks and congratulated the Agency on the work it had commenced in relation to the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, as described in document GOV/2666. It was to be hoped that the Agency would receive more extrabudgetary funds to complete that work, the fruits of which should subsequently be made available to all Member States so that they could benefit from the Agency's very considerable expertise in the safety field.

98. With regard to sub-items 12(iii) and (v), he noted that India had contributed to the work aimed at elaborating safety principles for future nuclear power plants; it was also looking forward to receiving the fourth draft of the new Basic Safety Standards from the Joint Secretariat.

99. With regard to sub-item 12(vi) - the possible programme for education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety (GOV/2668) - he was pleased to note that the Standard Syllabus for Post-Graduate Educational Courses in Radiation Protection was to be made available in all official languages. For its part, India had been holding post-graduate courses in radiological protection since 1962 - courses which were open to other countries of the region as well - and had also hosted an interregional post-graduate course in 1985.

100. He welcomed the fact that training manuals would continue to be published by the Secretariat, and looked forward to the appearance of the manual on the Safe Use and Regulation of Radiation Sources. It was to be hoped that the material from the planned pilot Interregional Post-Graduate Education Courses in Radiation Protection would also be published. With those remarks, his delegation could approve the report attached to document GOV/2668, subject to any necessary updating, for transmission to the General Conference.

101. Turning to sub-item 12(iv), he noted that India had been actively participating in the preparation of a nuclear safety convention, and commended the Secretariat and the Group of Experts for their efforts to achieve a consensus among the various participating delegations.

102. If such instruments were to be broadly based and universally acceptable, they had to be rooted in ideas and considerations that appealed to logic rather than mere convenience. The nuclear safety convention should cover all installations where there was a risk owing to the presence of large quantities of radioactive and/or toxic material. It might well be that more than one convention was needed. The convention currently being drafted should not distinguish between installations on the basis of their intended purpose, and should therefore include military installations.

103. It was gratifying to note that the objective was to establish a convention with an incentive character to which a large number of States could adhere. The issue of international co-operation needed to be considered, as it would be necessary to identify the problems a party might face in meeting its obligations under the convention and to assist certain Member States through the supply of essential items of equipment. His delegation considered it wiser to be prepared for such eventualities, and was willing to extend all possible help in that context.

104. The labours of the Group of Experts had led to impressive progress towards an acceptable compromise draft of the convention, and India felt able to endorse the action recommended in paragraph 3 of document GOV/2673.

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106. Mr. MONDINO (Argentina) thanked the Secretariat for the very informative documents it had issued in connection with item 12, and the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety for his introductory statement. Argentina's comments on sub-item 12(iv) - the preparation of a nuclear safety convention - would be made in a joint statement with the delegation of Brazil.

107. Although his delegation could approve the adoption by the Board of the measures proposed by the Secretariat in all the documents it had produced for discussion, he none the less wished to offer a number of observations.

108. In relation to sub-item 12(i), he noted with satisfaction that the title of document GOV/2666 had been amended in line with comments made in the Board and at the General Conference in September 1992, so that it now reflected the true aims of the activities in question.

109. Concerning sub-item 12(ii), he could confirm that an OSART mission would take place at the Embalse nuclear power plant in Argentina, as indicated by the schedule contained in Annex 1 to document GOV/2661. Similar documents in the future should contain information on the other nuclear safety services provided by the Agency. Moreover, the annex relating to INES could be presented as an integral part of the document which reported on the status of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

110. With regard to sub-item 12(iii), his delegation felt that document GOV/2663 should be further updated before being submitted to the General Conference, to take account of projects carried out in his and other countries and described in the international technical literature, but not hitherto considered by the Agency in its work on safety principles for future power plants.

111. As to sub-item 12(v), his delegation had participated actively in the preparation of the new Basic Safety Standards described in the Attachment to document GOV/2658 and was confident that they would be completed in time for consideration by the Board at its meetings in February 1994.

112. Turning to sub-item 12(vi), his delegation felt that the programme for education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety described in the Attachment to document GOV/2668 fully satisfied the requests made in resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/584. He also welcomed the fact that the annual eight-month interregional post-graduate course given in Spanish at the University of Buenos Aires since 1981 would continue to be held on an interregional basis in 1994 and 1996, and on a regional basis in 1995, 1997 and 1998.

113. As a rule, educational courses needed to be interregional if they were to disseminate the kind of uniform basic knowledge required. Only in that way could the best results be derived from specific training courses. However, given the need to offer courses in as many languages as possible, and also in the light of the prevailing financial situation, it seemed a reasonable solution to hold them alternately at interregional and regional level in several languages.

114. Finally, he wished to offer some brief comments on documents GOV/INF/694 entitled "Strengthening radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures in countries of the former USSR" and GOV/INF/695 entitled "The Maritime Transport of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel". With regard to the former, his delegation supported the initiative and wished to offer Argentina's collaboration in the form of expert services. As to the latter, his delegation agreed with the Secretariat's conclusion that the present successful multi-modal approach needed to be maintained. Certain specific situations might justify special measures being taken, but only on the basis of sound technical criteria determined by international agreement among experts.

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122. Mr. PENG (China) said that in recent years, and especially since the previous session of the General Conference, the Agency had made great practical progress in enhancing the effectiveness of existing nuclear safety services and developing new ones, progress which would undoubtedly contribute to increasing international co-operation in the area of nuclear

safety and radiation protection and to improving the operational safety of Member States' nuclear power plants.

123. Referring to document GOV/2661, he pointed out that China had achieved some measure of success in establishing its own codes and management system and looked forward to yet more intensive co-operation with the Agency, with a view to further improving its own nuclear safety levels and assisting the Agency's work in relation to the NUSS programme.

124. His delegation appreciated the Agency's efforts to increase the transparency of all the various safety services it provided. Such transparency was essential to the sharing of safe operation and management experience among Member States, dispelling public misgivings and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

125. With regard to sub-item (iii), he recalled that since the International Safety Conference in September 1991, the Secretariat had organized many advisory and technical group meetings to discuss safety principles for future reactors. His delegation supported the step-by-step approach advocated in document GOV/2663, the first step being the preparation of a technical document on safety principles for the design of future nuclear power plants. At the same time, important concepts such as "realistically conceivable severe accident" and "off-site radiological consequence" should be examined in greater detail and discussed fully among Member States. In that regard, due attention should be given to the fact that nuclear safety was ultimately the responsibility of individual States and that final decisions should be left with national nuclear safety authorities.

126. Turning to sub-item 12(iv) (GOV/2673), his delegation was pleased to note that some progress had been made in drafting the international nuclear safety convention and that many Member States and some international organizations had actively supported that process. Chinese experts considered that such a convention would constitute an important instrument for strengthening international co-operation in the interests of enhancing nuclear safety throughout the world. The convention should make explicit provision, on the one hand, for the responsibility of States to ensure the safety of their own nuclear facilities and, on the other, for the strengthening of international co-operation, both components being vital to efforts to achieve the desired level of safety everywhere.

127. It was gratifying that after four sessions the Group of Experts had reached a basic general agreement on the convention's scope and structure. It was to be hoped that the drafting process would now pick up speed.

128. Turning to sub-item (v), he noted his delegation's satisfaction with the work done so far by the Agency, together with five other international organizations, in preparing new Basic

Safety Standards. The wide scope of those Standards and the many new requirements and recommendations added recently, in particular by the ICRP, would raise practical problems for Member States. It was clear that much remained to be done before a broad consensus could be reached on the new Basic Safety Standards, and his delegation, for one, would appreciate an opportunity to study the relevant documentation in greater depth.

129. With regard to sub-item (vi), his delegation appreciated the fact that the contents of the proposed syllabus could be adapted to the particular needs and conditions of each country. However, it noted with concern that the budgetary allocations for education and training for the 1994-96 period showed a marked downward trend. In order to fulfil its function of promoting international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiation protection, the Agency needed to strengthen its educational and training activities, which entailed the allocation of increased human and material resources. For its part, China was ready to place its technical capabilities and expertise in the area of specialized education and training at the Agency's disposal and to act as host to the full range of interregional and regional training activities.

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131. Ms. BECKER (United States of America) said, with reference to sub-item 12(i), that her Government strongly supported the Agency's efforts to assess the safety of Soviet-designed reactors and would be following with great interest the Agency's progress in extending that important activity to other WWER plants and RBMK reactors. Her delegation also commended the Agency on its follow-up activities in the form of OSART and ASSET missions aimed at assessing the implementation of the recommended changes. As to the question of strengthening safety infrastructures in countries of the former Soviet Union, the Agency was to be commended on its initiative in reaching out to the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union and Baltic countries, many of which were not yet Member States or else had very little experience of Agency services. It was gratifying to note that the Forum organized on that subject had been attended by 13 of the 15 Governments invited. Her delegation also applauded the enterprise shown by two United Nations agencies in directing their respective missions towards achieving an important common goal.

132. Turning to sub-item 12(ii), she noted the valuable services provided by the Agency with a view to complementing rather than replacing national nuclear safety efforts and commended the openness of the recipient States using such services. Her delegation applauded the Secretariat's efforts to increase the transparency of its nuclear safety services and approved the recommendation that the Director General be authorized to transmit the material annexed to document GOV/2661 to the General Conference.

133. With regard to sub-item 12(iii), the United States supported the completion of the TECDOC dealing with Safety Principles for the Design of Future Nuclear Power Plants. That document should be regarded as representing the best judgement of the group of experts and as a reflection of recent thinking on the INSAG-3 document, along with potential ways of improving it. Eventually that input, together with further deliberations by INSAG, might help reactor designers by providing a set of principles reflecting the state of the art in reactor safety.

134. It was appropriate that the TECDOC should be a "stand-alone" document, and that it should be submitted in draft form to INSAG for comment. The final document approved by the experts should also be transmitted to INSAG for discussion. Her delegation was not in favour of treating the TECDOC as part of the NUSS safety series, nor did it support the proposal that the follow-on effort should be directed towards establishing criteria, since there was no agreement among the drafting experts to do so.

135. The status report which the Secretariat proposed to submit to the General Conference should be transmitted exclusively in the context of the 1991 General Conference resolution GC(XXXV)/RES/553 mentioned in paragraph 2 of document GOV/2663. Her delegation requested that significant changes be made in the report and stated its readiness to collaborate with the Secretariat and other members of the Board as soon as possible on the work of redrafting the report, which should then be promptly circulated to the remaining members of the Board for further comment and placed on the agenda of the Board's September meetings.

136. Turning to sub-item 12(iv), her Government believed that a nuclear safety convention aimed at improving plant safety should enter into force as soon as possible. Such a convention should establish a commitment to arrangements for a peer review mechanism to function at meetings of the Parties. Moreover, it should not detract from the obligations of individual States with regard to nuclear safety, which was ultimately their responsibility.

137. At the most recent meeting of the Group of Experts, consensus had very nearly been reached on the convention's scope. All the experts had agreed that it should cover civil nuclear power plants because civil installations posed the greatest threat to public safety and because there was a greater degree of international consensus on the measures necessary to ensure the safety of such plants. In view of the interest expressed by many experts, her Government was prepared to undertake to draft an international instrument covering nuclear waste once fundamental principles - like those for power plants - had been evolved.

138. Her delegation believed that the parties to a nuclear safety convention should be able to take advantage of Agency experience, but that the convention should not impose responsibilities on the Agency which it could not adequately discharge or specify requirements lying outside the Agency's normal programme and budget process.

139. On a negative note, her Government was greatly disappointed by the Group's failure to agree that its Chairman should be given responsibility for preparing the next draft of the convention, to be considered in October. It was to be hoped that the Board could now agree to ask the Director General to request the Group's Chairman to prepare such a draft.

140. With regard to sub-item 12(v), the United States supported the view that the Agency should amplify and revise its Basic Safety Standards whenever and wherever necessary, particularly for use by developing countries. Her delegation therefore recommended that the Director General transmit to the General Conference the Joint Secretariat's progress report on activities associated with the current revision of the Agency's Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection based on ICRP Publication 60.

141. The procedure being followed at present - involving careful consideration of a number of issues and the preparation of a new fifth draft - appeared to be effective. That draft should be circulated in sufficient time to allow comments to be prepared for the Technical Committee meeting in December.

142. With regard to sub-item 12(vi), her Government considered that, with the ever-increasing use of ionizing radiations in medicine, industry, agriculture and research and the need for nuclear power in some Member States, an international education and training programme designed to strengthen national radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures was more necessary than ever. However, it strongly believed that education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety were primarily a national responsibility and that the Agency should avoid duplicating general educational opportunities traditionally provided by national universities and other educational establishments. Similarly, in order to make savings wherever possible, the Agency should take advantage of existing courses in Member States through the fellowship and technical co-operation programmes.

143. Accordingly, her delegation felt that the 1994-98 programme for education and training in radiation protection should be revised and made consistent with the conclusions of the report of the May 1993 Working Group. Before the material attached to document GOV/2668 was transmitted to the General Conference, it should also be revised in accordance with that report. In addition, the United States would like the Director General to provide a status report to the Board on the programme after it had been approved and had been in operation for two years. Among other things, that report should include a detailed breakdown of costs and a detailed explanation of the implementation and selection policies and practices employed. The Board could then consider how the programme should be continued and in what direction.

144. Regarding sub-item 12(vii), her Government was in favour of authorizing the Director General to transmit the paper attached to document GOV/2662 to the General Conference and noted with appreciation the humanitarian assistance provided by France under the Assistance Convention. It also noted with appreciation that, after the recent incident at its Tomsk facility, the Russian Federation had followed the notification procedures established by the Early Notification Convention. She urged all States to adhere to both Conventions, as broad adherence would help ensure that the international community was prepared to act promptly in response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies.

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148. Mr. WALKER (Australia), commenting on sub-item 12(i), said his delegation was pleased to learn that the advisory group set up to review the progress of the Agency's nuclear safety programmes for Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union had agreed that those programmes had been helpful in tackling issues relating to the safety of the nuclear power plants in question and that the planned activities were relevant to the needs of those countries.

149. With regard to sub-item 12(ii), his delegation had found the information provided in document GOV/2661 to be very useful and hoped that the Secretariat would provide similar information on other safety services of the Agency, in particular the INSARR and RAPAT missions, and also the ASCOT missions at a later stage.

150. On the other hand, the lack of progress towards a nuclear safety convention (sub-item 12(iv)) was disappointing, given the importance attached to that project by so many Member States. He therefore wished to join previous speakers in asking the Director General to request the Chairman of the Group of Experts to prepare a new draft of the convention based on existing texts and on the discussions at the most recent series of meetings. That draft could then be used as a basis for further discussion at the Group's next session.

151. His delegation strongly supported the Agency's current efforts and priorities in the area of education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety and believed that the Standard Syllabus set out in Annex 1 of the Attachment to document GOV/2668 was both comprehensive and well geared to the aims of the programme. Through the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization, his country was prepared to support, wherever

possible, the proposed activities relating to training courses and workshops up to 1998. He wished to draw attention to Australia's sponsorship of an RCA project scheduled for 1993-95 on the development of training materials for radiation protection in connection with the industrial applications of radioisotopes.

152. In conclusion, he supported the transmission of all the reports prepared for item 12 to the General Conference.

153. Mr. AL TAIIFI (Saudi Arabia) said that his comments would refer to sub-item 12(vi) only. His delegation supported the proposal that the Agency should prepare a programme for education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety, as that would help competent national authorities to discharge their responsibilities in a manner consistent with the circumstances and needs of their own countries and to develop the manpower necessary for strengthening basic infrastructure. It was to be hoped that the Agency would be able to start implementing that programme very soon and that it would reconsider its decision to hold interregional seminars in a few languages only.

154. It seemed that the activities planned for the benefit of the Middle East region were confined to the holding of a single seminar in 1996. On a more positive note, however, he welcomed the translation of training manuals relating to the transport of radioactive materials into other official languages of the Agency in addition to Spanish.

155. Ms. MACHADO QUINTELLA (Brazil), speaking on behalf of the delegation of Argentina as well as her own delegation, said that she would confine her remarks to sub-item 12(iv).

156. Both Argentina and Brazil considered the elaboration and speedy entry into force of an international nuclear safety convention to be basic prerequisites for gaining general public acceptance of the nuclear power option. The safety issue, including the safe management of radioactive waste, was a crucial factor in influencing public opinion regarding that option, both in favour of it and, as in the past, against it.

157. Without nuclear safety, nuclear energy ceased to be feasible. Ultimately, therefore, commercial interests could not be considered prejudicial to nuclear safety, and it was in that context that technical co-operation in nuclear safety acquired its relevance. Accordingly, Argentina and Brazil attached great importance to the completion of the preparatory work on the convention and were correspondingly disappointed by the lack of progress made by the Group of Experts established for that purpose. The lack of results was even more

disappointing for those countries that had participated actively in the most recent meetings of the Group. The time had now come to refocus the efforts to achieve the goals pursued.

158. The Group's deliberations seemed to point to the extreme difficulty of formulating a general convention on nuclear safety; its title alone had given rise to a range of interpretations. One possible way forward might be to draft a specific convention on the prevention of accidents in nuclear power reactors, to be followed by other conventions of an equally specific nature relating to subjects such as accident prevention in research reactors, the reduction of radioactive environmental emissions, safe radioactive waste disposal, the safe transport of radioactive materials and so forth.

159. If the unavoidably political decision was taken to draft separate conventions of that kind, the next step would be to establish the relevant technical groups. That could be done consecutively in accordance with pre-agreed priorities.

160. Once the technical aspects of each convention had been clearly defined, the next step would be their consideration by legal experts, who would convert the texts into legally binding instruments enshrining States' mutual commitments. Only when all that had been done should the diplomatic conferences be convened. In general terms, the lesson to be learned from the entire episode was that skipping stages did not necessarily result in the quickest route to the desired objectives.

161. If that procedure was considered satisfactory, the Secretariat could include in the document to be transmitted to the General Conference a concrete proposal for a timetable ensuring the completion of the preparatory work by the earliest possible date. The Board could re-examine that document, with the proposed addition, at its September session.

162. In conclusion, she urged those Member States that had adopted a more rigid position in the Group of Experts to show greater flexibility in order to permit a swift and acceptable consensus. One possible option would be to entrust the Chairman of the Group with the task of preparing a draft convention in consultation with Member States.

163. Mr. KUME (Japan) said his delegation appreciated the fact that international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety had been strengthened on various important issues, as sound guarantees of nuclear safety were an essential element in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

164. The Agency had begun its activities relating to the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union at an early stage. It had stimulated the interest of other international organizations and should continue those activities in close co-operation with them. His Government would continue to make contributions of various kinds, including extrabudgetary, to all of the related projects listed in document GOV/2666, namely phase 2 of the WWER-440/230, RBMK and WWER-1000 projects.

165. Japan welcomed the fact that the Agency was undertaking many kinds of services in the field of nuclear safety, particularly the INES service, which alleviated public apprehension by providing prompt information to the nuclear community and to the mass media. The Japanese Government had contributed to INES at the outset by providing the services of experts and was prepared to continue its co-operation if there was a need to improve the system further.

166. His delegation was concerned about a possible duplication of effort, as in recent years so many of the Agency's services in the field of nuclear safety, including such traditional services as OSART or ASSET missions, had been carried out in parallel. The Secretariat should assess the real need for such services and implement them strictly on the basis of requests by recipient countries, streamlining them as far as possible to avoid any duplication.

167. Member States had requested a study of safety principles for future nuclear power plants. There again the Agency should be careful to avoid duplication, notably with the activities of the private sector, and should adopt a step-by-step approach.

168. The lively discussions of the Group of Experts for the drafting of a nuclear safety convention had been most welcome, as was the growing consensus on the major elements of such a convention among most of the participating countries. It was essential to continue those efforts without losing momentum and to produce a convention that would attract the support of as many countries as possible. Thus the Board and the Group of Experts should make every effort to complete the draft text and convey it to a diplomatic conference as early in 1994 as possible. The Director General should request the Chairman of the Group of Experts to prepare a new draft of the convention immediately and also ask all Member States to co-operate in that work.

169. With those comments, his delegation approved the transmission of the papers on sub-items 12(i) to (vii) to the General Conference.

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173. Mr. RIOBO (Chile), commenting on sub-item 12(iv) - the preparation of a nuclear safety convention -, said his delegation believed that the Group of Experts had not followed the recommendations made in resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/582, particularly in paragraph 1 of that resolution; and that set a rather regrettable precedent for the future. A majority of Member States had taken a decision at the General Conference and then a Group of Experts had been formed from about 30 countries and had not observed that decision.

174. No consensus had yet been reached as to the scope of activities of the Group of Experts.

175. His delegation had the greatest respect for the Chairman of the Group of Experts, but could not join those delegations which had asked for him to be given a mandate to produce a draft text. The Board could not make such a request as the Group of Experts had not been appointed by the Board. His delegation could accept, however, that the Chairman might wish to present a text voluntarily, and if that was done a representative of the Group of 77 should participate in the work.

176. Mr. SEMENOV (Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety) wished to respond to some of the comments and criticisms made by Governors.

177. The Secretariat had of course to take responsibility for the delay in preparation and publication of documents required for consideration by the Board and would try to be more punctual in the following year. Governors were aware that nuclear safety activities had been expanded over the past months and years and his Department had been involved in a number of very important and almost parallel meetings, including Steering Committee meetings for the WWER and RBMK projects, an INSAG meeting and a meeting on the safety convention. Meanwhile, the same staff had been working on the two documents for the Safety Review, two information documents and seven other documents to be submitted for consideration by Governors. The Department would try to plan its activities better in the future to avoid such delays.

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179. Turning to the safety principles for future nuclear power plants, he stressed that document GOV/2663 had been prepared only as a status report on progress achieved since the previous session of the General Conference. No approval of the safety principles was being requested. He hoped that the document would be accepted as a progress report, and the same comment applied at the present stage to the Basic Safety Standards (GOV/2658).

180. Some concern had been expressed at a possible departure from the Basic Safety Principles contained in document INSAG-3. However, there was no question of any departure from those principles. The General Conference had asked the Secretariat to prepare a document based - inter alia - on the work of INSAG. Thus the new document was not intended as a repetition but rather as an extension of those principles, taking into account the special new requirements for future reactors.

181. The French delegation had referred to Annex 4 of document GOV/2661, which contained a report on the INES. Paragraph 9 of the Annex would be amended.

182. Finally, the Governor from the United States had had some problems with the formulation of paragraph 16 in the paper on safety principles for future reactors, which stated that the next major step would be the preparation of a NUSS guide on safety principles for the design of future nuclear power plants, with the aim of subsequently developing a set of safety criteria for design. In order to avoid further delay, paragraph 16 could be deleted from the document: that would not close the door to further discussion of what the next step might be.

183. The CHAIRMAN said he hoped that Mr. Semenov's explanations concerning the delay in issuing documents had been noted and that in future the Secretariat would show greater efficiency and issue documents well in time.

184. With regard to agenda sub-item 12(i), there had been general appreciation for the Agency activities and programmes related to the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union and for the Secretariat's initiative in co-ordinating international efforts in that area.

185. There had also been a widespread feeling that the Agency should continue to play an active role in that area and should be available to provide technical support for efforts to enhance nuclear safety in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union.

186. He assumed that the Board wished to take note of document GOV/2666 and to authorize the Director General to transmit the report attached to it, updated as necessary, to the General Conference for consideration at its forthcoming regular session.

187. He further assumed that the Board wished to take note of document GOV/INF/694, relating to a joint UNDP/IAEA initiative, and to request the Director General to submit it, after any necessary updating, to the General Conference as an information document for its forthcoming regular session.

188. It was so decided.

189. The CHAIRMAN assumed that, under the sub-item entitled "Transparency and the Agency's safety services", the Board wished to take note of document GOV/2661 and to authorize the Director General to transmit the material in the document, updated as necessary, to the General Conference for consideration at its forthcoming regular session.

190. It was so decided.

191. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the sub-item entitled "Safety principles for future nuclear power plants", noted that various firm opinions had been expressed concerning the need for and usefulness of further consideration of document GOV/2663 by the competent national authorities of interested States on the basis - inter alia - of advice formulated by INSAG and possibly by NUSSAG. A decision regarding transmittal of the report attached to document GOV/2663 to the General Conference could therefore usefully be deferred until the September meetings of the Board.

192. It was so agreed.

193. The CHAIRMAN said that the sub-item relating to the preparation of a nuclear safety convention had generated considerable interest. The Board had taken note of the Secretariat report contained in document GOV/2673 and of the comments made by the Director General, and many members had expressed concern about the outcome of the recent meeting of the Group of Experts. Some progress had been achieved, notably with regard to the scope of application of a convention on safety. However, the lack of overall progress to date on producing a draft convention, which made it difficult to envisage the early convening of a diplomatic conference, had been a cause of concern to many.

194. The general opinion appeared to be that the Board should call upon all interested delegations to help prepare a draft text to be submitted to the Board in February 1994 and thereafter to a diplomatic conference to be held as early as possible in the course of 1994. In order to facilitate adherence to that timetable, the Board wished the Director General to request the Chairman of the Group of Experts to prepare, in time for the next meeting of the

Group, a new draft text after appropriate consultations and drawing on existing texts and on the discussions that had taken place during the recent meeting of the Group of Experts.

195. Mr. RIOBO (Chile) said that his delegation could not support the part of the Chairman's summing-up referring to a request by the Board for a new draft text to be prepared.

196. The CHAIRMAN said that the point raised by the representative of Chile would be reflected in the summary record. If there were no other objections, he would assume that his summing-up was acceptable and that the Board wished the Director General to transmit the report attached to document GOV/2673 to the General Conference for consideration at its forthcoming regular session.

197. It was so agreed.

198. The CHAIRMAN, turning to sub-item 12(v) and noting that many Governors had welcomed the progress made in the preparation of new Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, said that the Board had considered the difficulties raised by some delegations regarding document GOV/2658 - and especially the inclusion of wide-ranging nuclear safety requirements. It therefore seemed realistic that a decision on the document should be deferred until September so that further consultations could take place with interested delegations.

199. It was so agreed.

200. The CHAIRMAN, turning to sub-item 12(vi), assumed that the Board wished to take note of document GOV/2668 and to authorize the Director General to transmit the attached material, updated as necessary, to the General Conference for consideration at its forthcoming regular session.

201. It was so decided.

202. The CHAIRMAN, referring to sub-item 12(vii), assumed that the Board wished to take note of document GOV/2662 and to authorize the Director General to transmit it to the

General Conference for consideration at its forthcoming regular session, and also that the Board wished to call on Member States which had not yet done so to adhere to the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention.

203. It was so agreed.

204. The CHAIRMAN assumed that the Board wished the summary record of its discussion under item 12 to be transmitted to the General Conference.

205. It was so agreed.