APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Report by the Director General
to the Board of Governors and
to the General Conference

1. In resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601, the General Conference last year requested the Director General, on the basis of his report contained in document GC(XXXVI)/1019, "to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary step toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, referred to in resolution GC(XXXV)/RES/571."

2. The Director General was further requested "to submit to the Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its thirty-seventh regular session a report on the implementation of this resolution ...".

3. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Director General's 1992 report in document GC(XXXVI)/1019 give examples of the kind of obligations which might be undertaken by two groups of States, namely States of the region and declared nuclear weapon States, in an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Paragraphs 13 to 23 of the report identify possible verification requirements in such a zone, as well as the means of carrying out such verification. The report also recalls a need for some clarity on the part of States of the region as regards the material obligations to be included in a NWFZ agreement.
4. In his letters of November 1992 to the Governments of States in the Middle East, following adoption by the General Conference of resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601, the Director General asked those States to provide him with their comments on the obligations, verification requirements and modalities referred to in his report.

5. To date, six States have responded to the Director General's correspondence. Copies of the replies are attached hereto. A common theme among all of the responses is growing support for the concept of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Opinions differ, however, as to whether the establishment of such a zone should be linked to, precede, or follow a peaceful settlement in the region. In this context, one State has expressed the view that although the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East would provide a powerful impetus to a peace settlement, it continues to be an important objective in its own right and should be pursued as such. Another State considers that, to avoid disrupting negotiations, all pertinent topics relating to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, including the establishment of a NWFZ, need to be taken up in the context of the peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991. Accordingly, that State holds that any further action by the Director General pursuant to GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 should be contingent on an invitation by the States engaged in the peace negotiations.

6. Five of the States which have responded to the Director General consider it essential that all States in the region accept binding nuclear non-proliferation commitments, through acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and submitting their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. Three of those States have suggested that, without this important first step, it would be, in their view, premature to consider in depth any regional arrangements for verifying compliance with obligations to be undertaken either in a Middle East NWFZ or in a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. One State has expressed its support in principle for one of the verification modalities referred to in paragraphs 18-23 of the Director General's 1992 report, subject to further detailed study.

7. One State has given its views on specific features which might be included in a Middle East NWFZ. These include measures aimed at strengthening the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and at complementing those identified in the Director General's report concerning the verification of obligations which might be undertaken by States of the region; obligations of the declared nuclear weapon States with regard to a NWFZ in the Middle East; undertakings by States exporting nuclear technology; and specific measures to be carried out by the IAEA. The latter includes an expanded safeguards regime to be implemented in a NWFZ, the creation of a registry of nuclear-related exports to, and imports
into, the area and the provision of specific reports to the United Nations Secretary General. The State in question has also commented that, whilst it regards as valid all the models for verification requirements in a Middle East NWFZ described in the Director General's report, specific models would need to be introduced progressively and in step with developments in the peace process.

8. Also in fulfilment of the mandate conferred by resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601, the Director General has, since his last General Conference report, visited Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in November 1992, and Israel, in December 1992. State authorities in those countries reiterated their commitment to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. They also made clear that, in their view, the arrangements eventually designed to verify compliance with obligations undertaken by parties to such a zone would need to be comprehensive and far-reaching. Views differed, however, as to when a NWFZ in the Middle East region should be established. Two States regarded an essential first step in this direction to be a third State's accession to the NPT. That State reiterated its opinion that the creation of a NWFZ in the region cannot be viewed in isolation from an overall peace settlement, and that such zone could be established only when peace is assured and through direct negotiations among states of the region.

9. In paragraph 8 of his report in document GC(XXXVI)/1019, the Director General indicated that the Agency might also arrange seminars to familiarize Government officials in the States concerned with safeguards principles, practices and modalities in order to facilitate their choices of options for a future NWFZ. In his report, the Director General drew attention to a report of the United Nations Secretary General on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East (UN Document A/45/435). This report points to a number of options and problems on which consensus between the parties would be needed for the establishment of a NWFZ. The choices of options and answers to problems can emerge only through a process of discussion among them. The Director General's report noted that the Agency can contribute to the discussion process by explaining, in contacts with the States concerned, its experience of the merits and limitations of various safeguards approaches.

10. Against that background, the Agency convened a workshop in Vienna from 4-7 May 1993 on "The Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East" to assist relevant officials from the Middle East region in broadening their knowledge of different modes of verification that might be relevant to their region. A total of 61 participants, mainly though not exclusively from the Middle East region, attended the workshop which, over the four-day period, provided a full programme
of sixteen presentations by outside experts and in-house specialists. Topics ranged from the
general features of verification systems to detailed coverage of safeguards techniques and
practices. The Secretariat will now be looking at ways in which the workshop might be
followed up. Inter alia, it has published in compendium form the texts of all the
presentations made at the Workshop. It is hoped that, by this means, more States and people
will be able to benefit from them. The Secretariat also hopes that follow-up activities
designed to build upon the Workshop will attract an even greater measure of general support,
in particular from States in the region. Any step towards designing a Middle East NWFZ
will naturally be a matter for the parties to the zone. Pursuant to relevant General
Conference resolutions, however, the Secretariat can pursue in consultation with the parties
the objective of helping to familiarize regional experts with the types of issues and options
relevant to verification which will have to be examined and decided upon in any negotiations
on a NWFZ.

11. With that aim, the Secretariat participated, as part of the United Nations delegation,
in the third meeting of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional
Security held in Washington from 18-20 May 1993. That meeting of the Multilateral
Working Group, one of several Working Groups created to complement and support the
bilateral track of the Middle East peace process, engaged twenty-five regional and extra-
regional delegations in wide-ranging general discussions on aspects of arms control and
regional security issues. An outcome of the third Multilateral Working Group Meeting was
agreement upon an intersessional programme of practical activities, involving primarily the
regional parties and designed ultimately to lead to the formulation of specific confidence-
building measures for the Middle East region. For that purpose the Government of Egypt
hosted a Workshop on the Verification of Arms Control Agreements and Confidence-Building
Measures, held in Cairo from 11 to 13 July. As part of that Workshop, the IAEA was
invited to nominate an expert to give a technical presentation on "Verification Procedures in
the field of Nuclear Weapons within the Framework of the Global Approach." The
workshop was attended by 10 regional and 11 extra-regional delegations, as well as a
delegation from the United Nations. Participants showed considerable interest in all the
topics covered in the workshop. It has been suggested that many of the topics including
verification techniques, could be the subject of further study.

12. It is clear that the long-standing tension between parties in the region can only be
dissipated through the combined effects of many different types of measures including
political and military confidence building measures. The nuclear activities of each party will
be the subject of interest of all parties and the climate of confidence will be affected by the
way in which they are pursued and verified. Legally binding commitments by every party for an elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, will be vital elements. Ways must be found in which reasonable guarantees can be created for the reliance on such commitments and for the early discovery of departures from them should they ever occur. There is some experience in the world pointing to the usefulness of active co-operation between parties in the nuclear field - notably among European countries and between Argentina and Brazil - to create confidence through both openness and interdependence.

13. Verification arrangements do not of themselves create guarantees against departures from commitments in the nuclear field, but transparency and effective safeguards verification can give a considerable measure of confidence that such departures are not taking place and early warning, should they occur.

14. While strengthened comprehensive NPT-type safeguards of the IAEA have increased the verification and detection capacity of that system, parties in the Middle East may wish to incorporate other and/or additional features to strengthen confidence in a safeguards system for that region e.g. regional or mutual inspections by the parties. Such features would partly depend on the material obligations which the parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone may agree on. Different models can be tailored to meet specific requirements as experience in some other cases shows.

15. It should be mentioned that some of the examples listed in the Director General’s 1992 report illustrating the kind of basic obligations which could be considered by the regional parties to Middle East NWFZ are beyond the scope of existing treaties, conventions and safeguards agreements currently in force. Such would be the case with an undertaking to preclude research and development on the production, import or stock-piling of highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium; an undertaking to adopt a policy of transparency in all nuclear activities, including research and development, imports, exports and production; or an undertaking to accept safeguards on all nuclear material, installations, relevant equipment and non-nuclear material. However, some of these ideas have already been raised in various contexts, and it is possible that agreement on the kind of far-reaching commitment they represent may be indispensable to the building and sustaining of the requisite confidence.

16. Moreover, it should be noted that some existing security regimes, arms control agreements and verification arrangements do provide ideas which, with suitable adaptation,
might help to suggest a framework for, or components of, a verification system for an agreement on a Middle East NWFZ. A case in point referred to in last year’s report is the joint declaration for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. The recently concluded Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which provides some innovative verification arrangements is another example which would deserve to be examined by the regional parties e.g. prompt access by inspectors, challenge inspections. Another relevant example is the verification arrangements of the Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) agreement.

17. A further concept which could be relevant to a verification regime of a NWFZ in the Middle East and which might deserve consideration by regional parties relates to the possible use of soil, air and water sampling to enhance confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Preliminary conclusions from a Secretariat study indicate that environmental monitoring is both technically feasible and effective in pursuit of certain, well defined objectives.

18. Looking to the more immediate future, the Director General will pursue his consultations on the subject with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region with a particular view to the preparation of model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, as requested in resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601. To assist the Director General in implementing the mandate conferred upon him by that resolution, it would be helpful if States which have not yet responded to the Director General’s request for views on the obligations, verification requirements and modalities described in document GC(XXXVI)/1019 were to provide them.

19. The Director General intends to pay further visits to the Middle East region in the months ahead to discuss with the States issues relevant to General Conference resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601. In addition, the Secretariat, in consultation with the States of the region, will be considering other complementary measures which could be taken to facilitate the implementation of that resolution.
Dear Dr. Blix,

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 6 November 1992, addressed to H.E. Mr. Amr Moussa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the A.R.E. In your letter, you have requested preliminary comments on the obligations relevant to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, referred to in your report to the General Conference, contained in document GC(XXXVI)/1019.

At the outset we wish to highlight that the report of the Director General extrapolates the initiative of President Hosni Mubarak of April 1990 concerning the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the three components of which are:

1) that all weapons of mass destruction without exception be prohibited (nuclear, chemical and biological)

2) that all states of the region without exception make an equal and reciprocal commitment in this regard

3) that verification measures and modalities be established to ascertain full compliance by all states of the region with the full scope of that prohibition without exception. Relevant additional arms control and disarmament proposals have also been included in a letter dated July 1991 addressed by Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs Amr Moussa to the Secretary General.

In this regard, we would like to emphasize the importance of the early implementation of Resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 requesting the DG to continue his consultations with States of the area to facilitate the early application of Full Scope Agency Safeguards, being a necessary step toward the establishment of the NWFZ in the region. We would also like to express our deep appreciation for the efforts exerted by the Director General and for his comprehensive treatment of the necessary verification requirements for a NWFZ in the Middle East. The Director General's presentation of the issue highlights the significant role accorded to the Agency in this regard, the topicality of the verification regime and the necessity of strengthening it within the context of the non-proliferation regime.
In this context, Egypt welcomes the report of the Director General contained in document GC(XXXVI)/1019 dated 16 September 1992, and would like to offer the following additional complementary main points designed to supplement and not to replace the points made by the DG in his report, in the same order and under the relevant titles, with a view to strengthen the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East.

I. Obligations of the States located in the region of the Middle East

F - An undertaking to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials, stockpiles and installations located in their territories or under their control, including an undertaking to facilitate prompt access by inspectors.

G - an undertaking to report annually on all nuclear-related research and development.

H - "An undertaking not to permit the receipt, storage, installation, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon directly or indirectly on behalf of anyone else or in any other way".

I - An undertaking to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of such a zone, thus ensuring its genuine freedom from nuclear weapons.

J - Due to the special characteristics of the region of the Middle East, it is necessary to consider a special role assigned to the Security Council, to be agreed upon between the parties concerned, in advancing and ensuring the strict compliance of all parties with the objectives enshrined therein.

K - An undertaking to declare all past relevant nuclear activities.

L - An undertaking to declare all nuclear facilities on its territory or under its control.

M - An undertaking not to use force against declared facilities.

N - An undertaking to transport all military nuclear devices outside the area, with no right to its return.

II. Obligations of the Nuclear Weapon States with regard to a NWFZ in the Middle East

Bearing in mind that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes an explicit threat to international peace, and in order to deter such a threat and in conformity with Article 31 of the Charter, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States undertake certain obligations with regard to a NWFZ in the Middle East that might include:
A - an undertaking to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone in all respects relevant to the obligations of the States party to the NWFZ agreement;

B - an undertaking to provide assurances to all parties to the NWFZ agreement that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any of them (negative security assurances) by embarking on effective and immediate measures to deter such a grave situation in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant articles of chapter seven of the UN Charter.

C - an undertaking to provide assurances that if any party to the NWFZ agreement is attacked or threatened with attack by a State in possession of nuclear weapons, they will come to the assistance of and provide assistance to the threatened State (positive security assurances). This should also entail a comprehensive definition of "assistance" so as to include technical, scientific, humanitarian and financial assistance.

III. Nuclear Technology States

A - An undertaking by nuclear technology exporting countries to notify the Agency of all nuclear exports to the countries of the NWFZ.

IV. IAEA

A - The expansion of current Safeguards regime to be implemented in the Zone so as to include experiences gained recently.

B - Creation of a registry for the nuclear related exports and imports to the area.

C - To report to the SG on all information available to the Agency Secretariat pertaining to the goals of the NWFZ.

V. Verification requirements in the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East

General:

The report contains an exhaustive analysis of different models of verification. It is our view that the three models mentioned in the report (items 19, 20, 21, 22), are valid in general terms and could be applied progressively in the Middle East. Their applicability, though, given the particular nature of each model, relates to different momenta of peace in the region. These models or options also present thought provoking proposals for the establishment of a machinery designed for the application of safeguards. It is essential,
however, to anchor such verification models on transparency and openness in order to ensure their effective implementation.

Verification:

A - As to the institutional agreements that might be established, and due to the special nature of the region of the Middle East, Egypt considers that the first option, whereby the pivotal role is assigned to the Agency, is the most suitably applicable at this stage. The Egyptian Government would like to highlight the important role of the Agency in this respect, and also to emphasize the significance of the seminar proposed by the Director General concerning the application of safeguards in the Middle East in which all countries in the region may discuss the options proposed by the Director General and agree to select the most suitable verification measures and the relevant machinery applicable to the region.

The second option which includes the establishment of a regional authority and the creation of regional inspectorate to work jointly with the Agency, can be applied following the conclusion of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

As to the third option entailing inspections, carried out independently by the Agency and an inspection body consisting of the parties to the NWFZ, we are of the view that it will require further futuristic confidence building measures.

We hope that the aforementioned preliminary thoughts will prove useful to your endeavors to implement the relevant GC resolutions.

Sincerely,

(signed) Abdel Hamid Onsy
Ambassador
In connection with your letter of 16 February on modalities for the application of safeguards in a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, I have the honour to point out that the dangers of nuclear proliferation in the region of the Middle East have greatly increased in the recent past - on the one hand, because of the Israeli nuclear weapons, the existence of which no one can doubt any longer, and on the other, because of Iran's persistent attempts by various means to acquire the techniques, equipment and expertise which will accelerate the Iranian nuclear armament programme. Both these factors make it imperative for the world community and the international bodies concerned to take a serious and resolute stand in order to deal with this danger.

In the light of these facts it would be meaningless in practice to study regional mechanisms to verify that the region is free from nuclear weapons or any activities in this direction unless:

a) Israel became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

b) It made a declaration of its stockpile of nuclear weapons, its nuclear armament programme and the components and locations thereof;

c) It made a unilateral declaration of a programme of dismantling its stockpile of nuclear weapons.

In the event of the above steps being taken by Israel, Iraq considers that the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency should supervise, in connection with paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991), the verification of implementation of these steps, and only then will it be meaningful to study regional mechanisms that would constitute future measures for security.
You are aware, perhaps more than anyone, that Iraq has fulfilled its obligations in this respect, that nothing else is required of it and that its position is based on its sincere desire to arrive at practical mechanisms to achieve the aim of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Accept, Sir, etc.,

(signed) Muhammad Said Al Sahhaf
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Iraq
ISRAEL

PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 6 November 1992 regarding GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 adopted on 25 September 1992 by the General Conference of the IAEA on the item "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East". My Government has carefully considered your enquiry and I have been requested to transmit the following comments.

Israel has throughout the years supported the principle of non-proliferation and advocated the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The modalities for the establishment and management of such a zone, as envisaged by Israel, require that the NWFZ result from the initiative of the states of the zone, be freely and directly negotiated between them, and be based for reassurance on verification by mutual inspection. These elements are largely in line with the precedents set by the Treaties of Tlatelolco (Latin America) and Rarotonga (South Pacific).

While still denied peace by the Arab states - except for Egypt - and still considered unconditionally anathema by some, Israel hoped that the establishment of a credible NWFZ, by way of the modalities described, would eventually set the seal on peace in this area.

Israel’s attitude received independent confirmation in the analysis submitted by the Secretary-General of the UN to the General Assembly in 1990. In his report entitled "Study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East" (A/45/435), the Secretary-General insists on the primacy of creating confidence above all (para. 110), on the interdependence of all military and political factors which cannot be treated in isolation (para. 151), and says "most important of all, there must be progress in solving the fundamental conflicts in the region" (para 110).

Especially, the Secretary-General acknowledged the growing precariousness of Israel’s situation (paras 97 and 98), of which one need take account.

The Gulf war - Iraq’s designs on Israel, and the extent of its military potential - has given stark confirmation to Israel’s apprehensions, which until then had been discounted by most of the international community.
The peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991 and the ensuing bilateral and multilateral negotiations have for the first time opened up the prospect for peace in the Middle East. The peace process recognized that negotiations between the states of the region - rather than bland international dispositions - are the venue to peace, and that all pertinent topics need be taken up in context, and not in isolation. This, of course, includes the negotiation of a NWFZ, in due course. At the moment, it is simple confidence building measures, their character and testing over time, which occupy the multilateral talks on regional security. It is hoped that eventually also states which reject the peace process will be persuaded to join.

Israel places its faith in the peace negotiations, the ground-rules laid down and mutually agreed upon for their conduct and need withstand attempts to disrupt these negotiations by lifting isolated items out of their framework. This applies also to the eventual negotiation of a NWFZ between the states of the region. Israel need first be reassured that war against it has been renounced as a viable option for settling differences.

The above appreciation of Israel's situation will serve to explain our specific comments on your enquiry.

In our view, the IAEA should support the peace process, and we are certain that it does. The expertise of the IAEA in the matter of safeguards and verification should be put at the disposal of the negotiating states, once they call upon IAEA advice. We have taken careful note of the ideas set out in your report entitled "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East", document GC(XXXVI)/1019, and believe they satisfy the Director General's obligations under Resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601. Any further action should in our view be contingent on an invitation by the states engaged in the peace negotiations.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) Dr J. ALTER
Resident Representative
Sir,

In reply to your letter 230-M1.13.4 of 24 November 1992 in connection with resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 of 25 September 1992 relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, I have the honour to state Lebanon's position in this matter, which is as follows:

1. This subject has been included every year in the agenda of the Agency's General Conference and in that of the United Nations General Assembly since 1974.

2. The General Assembly at its 1991 session urged all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical steps required for the establishment of such a zone and invited them to comply with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

3. The subject of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East should not be linked with the peace process which started in Madrid and has continued at bilateral and multilateral levels, whereas this subject has been before the Agency and the United Nations for more than two decades. We consider it extremely important to strive for progress in the matter of establishing an NWFZ, which, if achieved, will strengthen the confidence-building measures and give an impetus to the efforts being made to achieve the peace which the region so desires.

4. Lebanon, like all the other Arab countries, supports the idea of establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East and considers that the first step in this direction should be for Israel to become a party to NPT and to place all its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.
5. The Resident Representative of Lebanon is ready to meet and discuss with you and the competent Agency officials the steps to be taken towards the establishment of an NWFZ and a model agreement consistent with Lebanon's sensitive strategic position.

Accept, Sir, etc.,

(signed) Fares Boueiz
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Immigrants
The People’s Bureau of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya presents its compliments to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has the honour to refer to his letter dated 6 November 1992 addressed to the Secretary of the People’s Committee of the People’s Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation concerning the resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East adopted by the Agency’s General Conference on 25 September 1992.

In this connection, the Jamahiriya wishes to reaffirm its position on the issue, which was conveyed to him in its letter 2/3/452 of 2 May 1990 and which is as follows:

1. The Jamahiriya has reservations about the statement in document/(III)887[*] concerning the inclusion of the Jamahiriya in the Middle East region, since United Nations documents and General Assembly resolutions contain no official definition of the Middle East as a region;

2. In accordance with its consistent stand based on principle, Jamahiriya strongly supports all international measures and efforts aimed at the complete elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction in their various forms.

It considers that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the conclusion of the relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements offer the best means of application of IAEA safeguards.

[*] Translator’s note: Presumably GC(XXXIII)/887.
The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is aware of the growing danger posed by the continuing possession by the two racist entities in occupied Palestine and in southern Africa of nuclear capabilities for military purposes, and requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to make every effort to draw the world community's attention to this danger and to seek to avert it.

The People's Bureau of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya takes this opportunity of reiterating to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest esteem.

(signed) Faraj Saeti

Secretary of the People's Bureau of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Austria and Resident Representative to the Agency
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Translated from Arabic

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE IN GENEVA

No.: 40/93

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations in Geneva presents its compliments to the International Atomic Energy Agency and, with reference to document GC(XXXVI)/1019 of 1992 dealing with the application of the safeguards system and verification requirements in connection with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, wishes to state the following:

1. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms its respect for and commitment to the principles on which the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly were based, in particular resolution 42/28, and considers that it is imperative to work towards the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, for which purpose:

   (a) All parties directly concerned should accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);

   (b) All nuclear activities of the parties concerned should be placed under Agency safeguards;

   (c) All the parties concerned should refrain from developing, producing, testing or acquiring nuclear weapons or permitting the deployment of such weapons or nuclear explosive devices in their territories or territories under their jurisdiction.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic wishes once again to draw attention to the fact that Israel continues to obstruct the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East:

   (a) By its persistent refusal to accede to NPT;

   (b) By its persistent rejection of Security Council resolution 487(1981), which called upon Israel to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, and by its disregard of the safeguards system;
(c) By its rejection of the idea that it should renounce the possession of nuclear weapons in spite of being called upon to do so by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the IAEA.

3. The Syrian Arab Republic wishes to reiterate that it is a party both to NPT and to a comprehensive safeguards agreement, that it has placed its installations under IAEA safeguards and that it supports the establishment of an NFWZ in the Middle East.

In view of the foregoing, the Syrian Arab Republic considers that:

(a) No step towards the establishment of an NFWZ can be taken unless Israel signs NPT and a comprehensive safeguards agreement and places its installations under IAEA safeguards;

(b) The Syrian Arab Republic cannot at this stage enter into the details of the arrangements regarding comprehensive verification and the requirements and forms thereof.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic takes this opportunity to renew to the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest esteem.

Geneva, 23 February 1993

(Seal of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic in Geneva)
Dear Dr. Blix,

With reference to your letter No. 230-ML.13.4 dated 6 November concerning the application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East, I would like to inform you that the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs asked its resident representative in Geneva to send to you an immediate preliminary answer which we hope that you received.

Further to the said answer, His Excellency The Minister of Foreign Affairs authorized me to convey to you the following:

"1- We agree on the context of the paragraphs 11 - 18 of Document GC(XXXVI)/1019.

2- Concerning paragraphs 18 - 23 on the verification requirements and modalities, we agree in principle on one of the mentioned modalities. But since the subject is very sensitive, we are carrying out a further deep study. The foundings of the current peace negotiations in the Middle East would help a great deal in crystallizing our stand and defining our position.

We hope to keep in touch with you on this important subject which the Syrian Government gives a great concern and attention."

Please accept, Dear Dr. Blix, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Prof. Ibrahim Haddad
Director General