THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
687, 707 AND 715 RELATING TO IRAQ

Report by the Director General

1. On 18 July 1991 the Board of Governors, after considering a report by the
Director General on non-compliance by Iraq with its obligations under its safeguards
agreement with the Agency (INFCIRC/172), adopted a resolution (contained in
document GOV/2532) in which it inter alia requested the Director General to keep
the Board and the General Conference informed of progress in the implementation

2. On 20 September 1991 the General Conference adopted resolution
GC(XXXV)/RES/568, in operative paragraph 5 of which it requested the Director
General inter alia to report to the Board and to the thirty-sixth General Conference

3. On 25 September 1992 the General Conference adopted resolution
GC(XXXVI)/RES/579 in operative paragraph 5 of which it requested the Director
General inter alia to report to the Board and to the thirty-seventh General
Conference on his efforts to implement Security Council resolution 687, 707 and

4. Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolutions, the Director General has kept
the Board of Governors fully informed about the Agency's activities in Iraq and
copies of the inspection mission reports containing detailed descriptions of
inspectors' work and findings, have been transmitted to the Board, the Agency's
Member States and the Security Council.
5. The attached chronology by the Director General on "The Agency's activities concerning Iraq in 1992-93 under United Nations Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715 (1991)" has been prepared with a view to updating information provided last year to the General Conference in documents GC(XXXVI)/1014 and GC(XXXVI)/1014/Add.1. It gives an overview of major events that occurred during the period September 1992 - August 1993, with references to the relevant documents.

6. The document is being issued simultaneously to the Board of Governors and the General Conference.
THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES CONCERNING IRAQ IN 1992-93
UNDER UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS 687, 707 AND 715 (1991)

CHRONOLOGY

1. At its thirty sixth regular session, on 25 September 1992, the Agency's General Conference adopted resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/579 strongly condemning Iraq's non-compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including its safeguards agreement with the Agency; demanding Iraq's immediate and full compliance with these obligations; commending the Agency for its efforts in implementing Security Council resolutions 687 and 707; requesting the Director General to take the necessary measures for the implementation of the long term monitoring plan in accordance with Security Council resolution 715; and requesting the Director General to report the views of the General Conference to the Secretary-General and to report to the Board of Governors and to the thirty-seventh General Conference on his efforts to implement Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715.

2. On 30 September 1992 the Director General transmitted to the Secretary-General, the second semi-annual report on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687. A copy of the Director General's report can be found in United Nations document S/24722.

3. On 21 October 1992, the Director General addressed the United Nations General Assembly. He presented the Agency's Annual Report, which included an account of the Agency's actions in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687, and elaborated on the lessons learned in Iraq and the progress of the non-proliferation regime.
4. The fifteenth Agency inspection mission under Security Council resolution 687 took place from **8 to 18 November 1992**. The sampling of the waterways of Iraq, begun during the fourteenth mission, was concluded during the fifteenth mission. The 37 sites sampled during this inspection brought the total number of sites sampled, along the full length of the Tigris-Euphrates watershed, to 52. More than 550 water and sediment samples have been collected. A detailed preliminary assessment of the conditions for removal of the irradiated fuel was carried out by experts. The assessment included an evaluation of fuel design, exposure history and current storage conditions. The Iraqi side acknowledged for the first time a role for the Engineering Design Centre, located at Rashdiya on the outskirts of Baghdad, in the design aspect of the centrifuge enrichment programme. They have also identified the role of certain key technical staff in the centrifuge enrichment programme. Interviews with these individuals have resulted in a more credible picture of the Iraqi centrifuge programme. A report on the fifteenth inspection mission can be found in document GOV/INF/677.

5. On **23 November 1992**, at the invitation of the President of the Security Council, the Director General attended the 3139th meeting of the Council and delivered a statement on the progress of the Agency's activities in Iraq under resolutions 687, 707 and 715. This statement is contained in United Nations document S/PV.3139 (Resumption 1). The meeting was also attended by an Iraqi delegation headed by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tarek Aziz, who addressed the Council on the matter of the various resolutions adopted since the end of the Gulf War.

6. It will be recalled that paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) requires Iraq *inter alia* to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable material under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA. Such material is to be removed from Iraq and permanently disposed of. In paragraph 4 of resolution 707 (1991), the Security Council has further determined that Iraq retains no ownership in the material which is to be removed.

Nuclear-weapons-usable material was present in Iraq, under IAEA Safeguards in the form of highly enriched uranium (HEU) contained in Iraqi research reactor fuel elements, in part as fresh (unirradiated) fuel, the remainder as irradiated fuel. As indicated in document GC(XXXVI)/1014, all fresh HEU known to be in Iraq, a total of 11.3 kg of U-235, was removed from Iraq under a contract between the IAEA and the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry.
Since July 1991, the IAEA had been exploring ways to remove the remaining irradiated fuel. On 27 November 1992, the IAEA sent out letters to the governments of some nuclear-weapon member states, soliciting their assistance in seeking proposals from qualified contractors in their country to help the IAEA in the implementation of the removal, processing and disposal of the irradiated HEU stored in Iraq. The closing date for the receipt of proposals was 28 February 1993.

7. The sixteenth Agency inspection mission under Security Council resolution 687 took place from 5 to 8 December 1992. The former headquarters buildings of the PC-3 project, where the sixth and seventh IAEA inspection teams had collected documentary evidence relevant to the Iraqi nuclear programme, were revisited by the IAEA team with the support of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)-CBW team members. These buildings are now used by the Military Industrial Committee (MIC) as an Engineering Design Centre which support the reconstruction of the Iraqi industry. Although no activity was observed or documentation found relevant to UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991), removal of documents from the site was observed upon arrival of the inspection team which constitutes a violation by Iraq of the rights of the IAEA and UNSCOM under the pertinent Security Council resolutions. The Iraqi authorities investigated the incident and their conclusion was that the violation resulted from the panicked action of a few individuals. Short notice inspections were carried out at an IAEC guest house in the Tuwaitha area and at a warehouse in the Al Atheer Centre. The Iraqi Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research and present Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Committee (IAEC), Dr. Human Abdel Khaliq Ghaffour informed the team that the Iraqi authorities would "deal positively" with inquiries from the IAEA regarding the procurement of equipment and materials for the Iraqi nuclear programme. A letter requesting specific information regarding the sources of maraging steel was sent to the Iraqi authorities on 18 December 1992. The Iraqi response, received on 22 December 1992, failed to provide the requested information. A report on the sixteenth inspection mission can be found in document GOV/INF/678.

8. On 14 December 1992, the Director General transmitted to the Secretary General the third semi-annual report on the implementation by the Agency of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in paragraph 12 of resolution 687. A copy of the Director General's report can be found in United Nations document S/24988.
9. By letters dated 16 and 25 December 1992, respectively, the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy informed the Director General that the Government of the Russian Federation had instructed the Ministry of Atomic Energy to provide the Agency with the services for the removal and processing of the irradiated fuel in Iraq.

10. The seventeenth Agency inspection mission under Security Council resolution 687 took place from 25 - 31 January 1993. A particularly important task assigned to this mission was a review of the inventory of machine tools under Agency seal at the Al Rabiya factory, following the 17 January 1993 cruise missile attack. Follow-up activities were carried out concerning the inventory of material, equipment and machine tools relevant to the revised Annex 3 of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of part C of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and with the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 707 (1991) (the long term monitoring plan). A report on the seventeenth inspection report can be found in document GOV/INF/682.

11. In accordance with paragraph 22 of the plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (UN document S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1), Iraq is obliged to declare to the IAEA items subject to the plan and to provide, inter alia, an inventory of all material, equipment and other items in Iraq identified in Annex 3 of the plan. The items in the Annex include those specifically prohibited under resolution 687, as well as others which may be prohibited, depending on their intended use, or subject to monitoring under the plan. On 30 January 1993, at the end of the seventeenth inspection, the Iraqi authorities provided the IAEA team a list of Annex 3 items which the Iraqis described as covering the period from 1 January 1989 and including all Annex 3 items which exist or existed in the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) facilities, universities and State Establishments which supported the IAEC programme. However, the Iraqi counterpart pointed out that this was still not final and reserved the right to include items which might have been omitted from the list, either through oversight or because they were not thought to be covered by Annex 3, in the next update, which is to be submitted in July 1993.
12. On 28 February 1993, a proposal for the removal, processing and disposal of irradiated HEU stored in Iraq was received from the Committee of International Relations on behalf of the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (CIR-Minatom). No other proposal was submitted to the IAEA. The CIR-Minatom proposal was discussed at several sessions in Vienna (March - June 1993) between the representatives of the IAEA, UNSCOM, UN and CIR-Minatom and its principal sub-subcontractor, the Nuclear Assurance Company of the United States.

13. The eighteenth Agency inspection mission under Security Council resolution 687 took place from 3 to 11 March 1993. Three facilities were inspected for the first time, including the Saddam University in Baghdad. During this visit, the Iraqi side attempted to restrict access rights of the inspection team, but they quickly changed their position and the inspection proceeded without difficulty. An inspection at the Hatteen Establishment, which was a follow-up on a quantity of RDX explosives stored there was extended to include workshops. The workshops were found to contain 242 machine tools, a large number of which, in the opinion of the team, should have been included for review to see if they qualified as dual-use items in the declarations made by Iraq under Annex 3 of the Agency's long term monitoring plan approved in UNSC resolution 715. The machine tools were identified and the specifications were evaluated. Activities aimed at verifying new information provided by the Iraqi side in their January 1993 declaration, required under UNSC resolution 715 (long term monitoring plan), were carried out at a number of sites. Short notice inspections were used to monitor the utilization of machine tools and to verify that the equipment was not being used for proscribed purposes. A number of sites were inspected as part of an ongoing investigation as to whether any type of nuclear facility (not only reactors) had been built underground. The in-field conclusions were negative. No progress could be reported on the provision by Iraq of information about foreign procurement and its procurement network. In this area, Iraq is still far from complying with the request of the IAEA. The IAEA-18 team requested, in writing, detailed procurement information for all equipment, components and raw materials, listed in Annex 3, which were used or intended for use in nuclear related research, development and production. The information requested covered not only the manufacturers' names, but the names of intermediate suppliers and other companies in the procurement chain. Information on companies and individuals that provided technical advice on procurement, utilization and design information was also requested. The Iraqi authorities were
again requested to provide answers relevant to the procurement of maraging steel. The Iraqi side replied that the IAEA had a great deal of information on the subject, including that from outside sources. They considered that these questions were too general, that dealing with such general questions was impractical and that such an attitude was aimed at maintaining the conditions for the continuance of the embargo. A report on the eighteenth inspection mission can be found in document GOV/INF/688.

14. On 8 April 1993, the Director General transmitted to the Secretary-General the third semi-annual report on the implementation of the Agency’s plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687. A copy of the Director General’s report can be found in United Nations document S/25621.

15. On 19 April 1993, an IAEA team of experts arrived in Iraq to carry out a detailed study on the removal of the spent fuel elements and to determine with IAEC officials the nature and the extent of the assistance, in terms of equipment, manpower and services that could be provided to the Agency and its contractors by the IAEC to facilitate the packaging and shipment of the spent fuel elements. Discussions were also held with the Iraqi national insurance company on the subject of insurance against accidents within Iraq. A memorandum of understanding concerning all the technical and practical aspects associated with the transport of the fuel was signed by both parties. The removal process is expected to start as soon as the contract is signed and will last several months.

16. On 22 April 1993, the Iraqi authorities transmitted to the Agency information which was described as covering the requirements of Annex 2 of the Agency’s long term monitoring plan. The information is currently being analyzed by the Agency.

17. The nineteenth Agency inspection mission under Security Council resolution 687 took place from 30 April to 7 May 1993. Inspection activities were carried out at 33 sites or establishments and included the collection of surface water, sediment and biota samples in the context of the periodic radiometric survey of the main water bodies in Iraq. This work is a continuing part of the long term monitoring effort in Iraq. As indicated in paragraph 13 during the eighteenth IAEA inspection of the Al Hatteen Establishment, a large number was found of Computer Numerically
Controlled (CNC) turning machines, none of which had been included in the Iraqi Annex 3 declaration. In the opinion of the IAEA, a number of these machine tools were Annex 3 relevant and should have been declared. The Iraqi position was that these machine tools did not meet the technical specifications of Annex 3 and therefore they felt no obligation to declare them. This disagreement was not limited to the CNC turning machines found in Al Hatteen and included scores of other CNC turning machines identified and sealed by IAEA inspection teams at a number of sites. The nineteenth inspection team included machine tool experts who carried out a detailed technical evaluation at Al Hatteen and other establishments. Their conclusion was that 144 out of 148 of the machine tools in question were not meeting Annex 3 specifications. Judgment was withheld on 4 machines pending accuracy measurements planned for a future inspection. Iraqi authorities were reminded that the Agency retains the sole authority to judge whether CNC machine tools as well as any other equipment and material are relevant to Annex 3. A number of establishments visited for the first time by a nuclear team were inspected for the specific purpose of verifying the completeness of the Iraqi Annex 3 declarations provided in January 1993. No UNSC resolution 687 proscribed activities or undeclared Annex 3 equipment were discovered. A visit was conducted at the Auqba bin Nafi establishment to check the possibility of using photo surveillance techniques for the long term monitoring of the utilization of four large diameter milling and boring machines. A detailed map of the building with indications of the individual machine locations was prepared in view of the future installation of surveillance devices. A report of the nineteenth inspection mission can be found in document GOV/INF/704.

18. On 16 June 1993 the Director General transmitted to the United Nations Secretary-General the fourth semi-annual report on the implementation by the Agency of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in paragraph 12 of resolution 687. A copy of the Director General’s report can be found in United Nations document S/25983.

19. On 21 June 1993, the Agreement between the IAEA and CIR-Minatom for the removal, processing and disposal of the irradiated HEU stored in Iraq was signed and entered into effect. According to this Agreement, within 20 months from its signature, CIR-Minatom will provide the following services:

- remove the irradiated fuel assemblies from Iraq and transport them to a facility in the Russian Federation for reprocessing;
- store the recovered uranium oxide for three years or until sold earlier by the IAEA;

- condition the radioactive waste by vitrification;

- permanently store the vitrified waste at a final repository site in the Russian Federation.

Work under the Agreement is to be carried out by CIR-Minatom in accordance with all safety standards and measures of the IAEA, with the IAEA/ICAO/IATA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material as well as with the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Agreement further requires that all HEU be placed by CIR-Minatom under IAEA Safeguards.

20. The twentieth Agency inspection mission under Security Council resolution 687 took place from 25 to 30 June 1993. The team observed Iraqi preparations for the removal of the irradiated fuel. Civil engineering preparations were well underway and appear to be adequately designed. An 80-ton mobile crane is now available for lifting casks. The team surveyed the route to the airport and did not observe any restrictions that would cause transport problems. The status of the irradiated fuel stored at location B was evaluated and the fuel storage remains safe despite the primitive conditions. Water was added to the tanks to compensate for evaporation. The IAEA had independent information about machine tool deliveries to Iraq which led to an inspection of a conventional munitions plant. Fifty machines matching procurement data were found. Analysis is required to see if these machines are covered by dual use criteria. Inspectors visited five other sites on routine dual use equipment inventorying and monitoring tasks. The team was successful in locating additional pieces of equipment that had been identified in the Iraqi Annex 3 declaration. A few pieces of equipment identified from supplier data were also located and catalogued. Preparations for consolidating HMX explosives in a single sealed location were started. Some activities planned for IAEA-20 were inhibited by military operations in Baghdad on 28 June 1993. These activities will be incorporated in IAEA-21. There was no progress on the impasse over supplier information.

21. The twenty-first IAEA inspection mission under Security Council 687 took place from 23 to 28 July 1993. Iraq is proceeding with plans to build new non-nuclear facilities at former nuclear sites that have been destroyed. The twenty-
first inspection team assessed activities at four former nuclear sites, Al Jazirah, Ash Sharqat, Al Tarmiya and Al Furat. Iraqi activities at these four facilities range from preliminary planning to actual construction. The new activities bear no relation to the former nuclear work. The Iraqi side was requested to provide detailed documentation on the planed reconversion of all its nuclear sites. The team inspected an industrial complex comprised of at least five separate facilities south of Taji. This site had not been inspected previously. None of the plants have a nuclear function, but several produce dual-use materials with applications in the nuclear and missile fields. The Al Kindi small missile site was the subject of a monitoring visit. Al Kindi has facilities and equipment that could be useful in nuclear weapons development. The irradiated fuel removal specialist reviewed Iraqi plans and preparations for the upcoming operation. The process is proceeding smoothly and appears to be on schedule. Preparations for installing surveillance cameras at facilities with large machine tools continued. The nineteenth team had surveyed potential sites and made arrangements. A specialist on this team checked suitability, structures for mounting and utilities. Many items of dual use equipment covered by the IAEA long term monitoring plan were located. The inventory and disposition process for such equipment continues. The issue of missing procurement and supplier information came up again. The Iraqi side expressed a new willingness to provide information as part of the upcoming technical talks in New York. No new information was provided to the IAEA-21 team. A consolidated report of the twentieth and twenty-first inspection missions can be found in document GOV/INF/707.