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RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Tuesday, 22 September 1992, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr. ADEKANYE (Nigeria)
later: Mr. WAGNER (Czechoslovakia)

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[*] GC(XXXVI)/1001.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVI)/INF/313/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EC	European Community
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
MESA	Middle East and South Asia
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
RADWASS	Radioactive Waste Safety Standards
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
US $	United States dollar
WAMAP	Waste Management Advisory Programme
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1991 (GC(XXXVI)/1004) (continued)

1. Mr. MIKHAILOV (Russian Federation), having welcomed those countries which had recently become Members of the Agency and noted that the current session of the General Conference was the first to be attended by a delegation from Russia, drew attention to the increasingly important role which was being assigned to international organizations in the wake of recent political developments following the ending of the Cold War.

2. The Agency, for its part, had a wide range of extremely important programmes such as the study of current and future technology in the fields of nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste management, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the physical protection of nuclear material, the comparative assessment of nuclear power and other energy sources, the evaluation of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, the enhancement of nuclear and radiation safety, and technical assistance. His delegation supported those activities and regretted that Russia's economic problems had caused a number of financial difficulties within the Agency and disruptions to those programmes. However, he was pleased to announce that his country had just made an initial contribution payment and that subsequent payments would be made in accordance with the commitments which it had accepted.

3. The serious economic difficulties faced by many countries made it all the more important to maintain zero real growth in the Agency's budget. Efforts to reduce non-productive administrative expenses and to enhance the effective use of the Agency's existing human and material resources should therefore be continued. In that connection, it should be noted that following the steps taken to convert parts of the Russian nuclear defence industry to peaceful purposes, over half of the country's former nuclear and military experts were now engaged in peaceful programmes, and could be made available to assist the Agency.

4. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, worldwide concern had been expressed about the fate of its nuclear arsenal. Such concern was unnecessary since the foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had led to the establishment of a unified system of control for strategic nuclear

weapons. Russia's decision to take over the functions of the former Soviet Union as signatory of the NPT, including its role as a depositary, had been recognized by the other parties to the Treaty and had been formally approved by a decision of the Heads of State of the countries of the CIS taken on 6 July 1992. The CIS had recognized Russia as the only nuclear-weapon State of the former Soviet Union, and all the other members of the Commonwealth had undertaken to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. By 1 July 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had transferred their tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling. The radical changes in the international situation and growing climate of confidence between the nuclear-weapon States made it possible to agree on major cuts in nuclear arms and the decisions taken by Russia and the United States to cut their nuclear arsenals and the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for military purposes were particularly important. However, real nuclear disarmament would only be achieved when the colossal stocks of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium had been destroyed. Another important prerequisite was the establishment of a worldwide ban on nuclear testing, including underground testing.

5. In view of the importance of the NPT, it was essential that the NPT Review Conference to be held in 1995 should extend the Treaty indefinitely and make it a genuinely universal international legal document. In that connection, he welcomed the increase in the number of parties to the Treaty, and was particularly pleased to note the recent accession of China and France, which meant that all the nuclear-weapon States had now become parties to the NPT. He also welcomed the accession to the NPT of the Baltic States, and expressed the hope that the other members of the CIS would soon follow that example.

6. The international non-proliferation regime had also been strengthened by the measures taken by Argentina and Brazil to ensure full implementation of the Tlatelolco Treaty and by the joint safeguards agreements between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the Agency. The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular and the signing of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK were other significant developments.

7. As far as the Middle East was concerned, peace and security in that region would be strengthened if all its nuclear facilities were to be placed under Agency safeguards, either following the accession to the NPT by all countries in the region or by the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, in the case of Iraq, the Agency's safeguards system had proved inadequate. The Iraqi Government needed to be made to comply strictly with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, it was clear that the Agency's control, verification and inspection mechanisms needed to be improved and that more sophisticated measures had to be developed. Russia was prepared to assist fully in that process by making available its highly qualified experts. The Russian authorities were also actively co-operating in the implementation of Agency inspections at Russian nuclear facilities, and in a whole range of tasks under the national programme of scientific support for Agency safeguards.

8. All supporters of the nuclear non-proliferation regime should take joint action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons. In the case of his own country, a presidential decree of 27 March 1992 prohibited the export of nuclear material from Russia to non-nuclear-weapon States which had not placed all their nuclear activities under Agency control. Russia was also reviewing the agreement drawn up by a number of nuclear suppliers to introduce a unified control mechanism for the export of dual-use items.

9. Turning to the current nuclear energy situation in Russia, he said that 28 units, including 12 of the WWER type, were in operation at 9 nuclear power plants, with a total capacity of 20 000 MW. There were a further 15 units with uranium-graphite reactors and 1 with a fast neutron reactor. A careful watch was kept on the operation of the first-generation units and operating certificates were granted annually with the involvement of Agency experts. Four units had been taken out of operation - units 1 and 2 at Beloyarsky and units 1 and 2 at Novovoronezh. Three units were currently under construction at the Balakovo, Kursk and Kalinin plants. Work was also continuing on the construction of the Voronezh nuclear district heating plant.

10. After the setbacks caused by the Chernobyl accident, the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Power now adopted a long-term view of the nuclear power industry in Russia, and looked forward to the further development of both WWER

and RBMK reactors, despite the Director General's comment in his opening statement that he did not think that any more RBMK-type reactors would be built. Russia thought it inadvisable to discontinue the development of a reactor which might well be capable of meeting the highest safety standards in the future. In its long-term planning, Russia was also giving consideration to fast-breeder reactors and the use of nuclear techniques for desalination purposes.

11. Recently, a number of regions in the country had submitted applications for the construction of new nuclear power plants. Those would be a new generation of extremely safe units with passive defence systems. Considerable amounts of money had already been spent on redesigning existing plants, but that programme had been seriously affected by the country's present financial constraints. He therefore appealed to Member States to try to co-operate commercially with Russia by making use of the scientific and technical expertise within its Ministry for Nuclear Power. Such co-operation, which would be mutually beneficial, would help to improve the safety of Russia's nuclear power plants. His country was also interested in co-operating with the international community in areas such as fast neutron reactors and hybrid reactors using nuclear fusion and transmutation.

12. One of the most important problems for the safe development of nuclear energy was radioactive waste management, another area where international co-operation was essential. Russia had established a comprehensive policy to deal with such problems at its operating plants, and also at those planned or under construction.

13. A fine example of what could be achieved by international co-operation was the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor which had been developed under the auspices of the Agency, the EC, the United States and Japan. The experience of organizing such a large-scale project could perhaps be applied in other areas as well.

14. In conclusion, his delegation joined other delegations in approving the Annual Report for 1991 and noted that the positive results achieved by the Agency were a tribute to the effectiveness of the work carried out by the Director General and the Secretariat.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION (GC(XXXVI)/1001)

15. The PRESIDENT reported that the General Committee had recommended to the General Conference that the agenda for the current session should include all the items listed in document GC(XXXVI)/1001, with the sole exception of item 26 (Elections to the Agency's Staff Pension Committee), the deletion of which had become necessary as all members presently serving on that Committee were available to continue. The General Committee further recommended that the items be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in the provisional agenda.

16. During discussions on the matter, some members of the Committee had expressed reservations with regard to the inclusion of item 8 entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat", while others had expressed support for its inclusion. It had also been suggested that the Committee should defer making a recommendation on the item to the Conference until further discussion among interested Member States had taken place.

17. With respect to the order of items, the Committee recommended that the order appearing in document GC(XXXVI)/1001 - adjusted as a consequence of the deletion of item 26 - be retained, on the understanding that the exigencies of the moment or the efficient conduct of business might well call for changes to be made both in the plenary session and in the Committee of the Whole.

18. The General Committee's recommendations were adopted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

19. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had recommended to the General Conference that Friday, 25 September 1992, be set as the closing date of the thirty-sixth regular session and Monday, 27 September 1993, as the opening date of the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Conference, which would be held in Vienna.

20. The General Committee's recommendations were adopted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1991 (GC(XXXVI)/1004) (resumed)

21. Mr. GHAFOUR (Iraq) said that as the present occasion was the first opportunity provided to Iraq, since the imposition of the blockade on Iraq, to address the General Conference, he wished to comment on Iraq's nuclear programme and to present Iraq's views of all that had happened. Clarification was necessary since reports about the Iraqi nuclear programme had been exaggerated and distorted by official circles and the news media in certain countries and it had been claimed that the Iraqi nuclear programme was devoted to the development of weapons of mass destruction.

22. Providing the historical context for the Iraqi nuclear programme, he said that Iraq had adopted, along with many other development projects, a programme to use atomic energy. In the early sixties, a contract was signed with the former Soviet Union to build a 2 MW(th) research reactor in the vicinity of Baghdad devoted to scientific research and to the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial uses.

23. At a later stage, following the signing and ratification by Iraq of the NPT, agreements were concluded with France, Italy and other countries. Those agreements related to: experimental laboratories for the fabrication of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants; research laboratories for spent fuel reprocessing; extraction of uranium from phosphates; the Tammuz 1 reactor complex for materials research and its related facilities; the upgrading of the Soviet research reactor from 2 MW(th) to 5 MW(th); and the first stages of the nuclear power plant project.

24. Although that programme had been quite open and was covered by IAEA safeguards, certain countries had not wanted to see Iraq achieve any technological or industrial progress. For many years, the Israelis planned and perpetrated acts of sabotage against the programme and assassinated Iraqi scientists and engineers. Israel then carried out an air raid which destroyed the Tammuz 1 reactor. When Iraq appealed to the international community to punish Israel for its flagrant aggression, Iraq received no redress and the Agency's only response was to introduce a routine item on the agenda of the Agency's General Conference and to condemn the Israeli action in terms which became increasingly weak as time passed. Israel continued its threats

undeterred, while the Agency's safeguards system failed to provide Iraq with any protection. As a result, Iraq was forced to adopt new formulas in order to acquire nuclear knowledge and technology, by resorting to self-reliance. Such a move was particularly necessary in view of the reluctance shown by foreign companies to co-operate with Iraq. Iraq had also adopted a policy of not disclosing the results of its efforts until they were advanced enough to minimize the effects of the kind of abortive acts that were perpetrated by the Israelis.

25. That stage of the Iraqi nuclear programme included extraction of uranium from carbonates, purification and conversion of uranium, enrichment of uranium using the electromagnetic isotope separation method, enrichment of uranium using the gas diffusion process, enrichment of uranium by the centrifuge method, chemical enrichment of uranium isotopes, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the nuclear power plant project.

26. Following the Israeli aggression and the loss of the Tammuz 1 reactor, which had served as the basis for the planned nuclear power reactor programme, Iraq had concentrated on the enrichment programme and activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle to keep in line with international technological developments in the nuclear field and to spare it from being dependent on foreign sources of nuclear fuel. It was clear to the inspection teams which visited Iraq that Iraq had never been in any hurry to achieve any part of its programme or to produce any particular quantity of enriched uranium or plutonium. There had been no timetable for the programme, whose main objective had been to develop the most appropriate technologies for enrichment and other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Those who criticized Iraq for not disclosing its programme should not forget that Iraq was the only country in the world where nuclear installations had been subjected to military attack and aggression repeatedly since 1980. It should also be recalled that Iraq was given no guarantee that the aggression perpetrated against its nuclear programme would not be repeated.

27. On 28 November 1990, the Security Council had adopted resolution 678, which the United States and its allies had then interpreted as being a licence for them to use military force against Iraq to implement resolution 660. Only five days after resolution 678 had been adopted, the United Nations General

Assembly had adopted a resolution prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear installations. However, the United States and its allies failed to comply with that resolution and made the Iraqi nuclear installations their first target during the aggression which they inflicted upon Iraq from 17 January to 28 February 1991. As the Iraqi reactors were operating at the time of the first attack on Baghdad, a major nuclear accident might have occurred. Thousands of tonnes of bombs and explosives were dropped by allied aircraft on the Iraqi nuclear installations and the Al Tuwaitha site alone was subjected to more than 3000 tonnes of explosives.

28. Although the conditions for an official cease-fire laid down in resolution 687 were unprecedented in the history of the United Nations, his Government had accepted the resolution in order to spare the Iraqi people any further harm. At the time of implementation of the resolution, Iraq was suffering the bitter aftermath of the comprehensive destruction of all its economic sectors, its power plants, its transport and communications networks, and its civilian industries. No understanding had been shown for Iraq's terrible, tragic situation. On the contrary, certain members of the inspection teams had behaved arrogantly and provocatively, with complete disregard for the realities of life prevailing in Iraq at the time and indifference to the feelings of the Iraqi scientific staff who were treading over the remains of their scientific endeavour and technological achievements.

29. Security Council resolution 707 prohibited Iraq from any effective nuclear activities. Despite that and other unfair resolutions subsequently adopted, Iraq continued to co-operate fully with the inspection teams. Those teams had encountered no problems, despite the difficult and sensitive nature of some of their tasks and of the material destruction and psychological damage they inflicted upon Iraq. On the contrary those teams had praised the co-operativeness of the Iraqis.

30. By 7 September 1992, 14 nuclear inspection teams had visited Iraq and spent a total of 3449 inspection days in Iraq, conducting 279 inspection visits, including 106 visits to sites related to the Iraqi nuclear programme, over 60 visits to support sites, and 47 visits to locations unrelated to the

programme, including such places as the Mosul Prison, the Baghdad Sewage Department, a civilian shelter and a private farm. The teams also conducted 40 surprise visits and took back with them more than 600 samples together with hundreds of radioactivity tests and samples.

31. The teams removed all fresh nuclear fuel containing enriched uranium totalling 18 kg of ^{235}U and 5.26 g of plutonium. The teams also made an inventory of and sealed 543.284 tonnes of various types of natural uranium. The inspection teams oversaw the destruction of more than 2000 items of machinery and equipment, blasted and destroyed buildings covering a total area of 47 750 m^2, placed their seal on nearly 900 different items, machines and equipment, and destroyed more than 4000 tonnes of iron used in the electro-magnetic isotope separation programme. Prior to that, the Iraqi side had itself destroyed more than 260 000 items, the remains of which had then been checked by the inspection teams. Huge quantities of raw materials had also been destroyed.

32. By August 1991, Iraq had handed over thousands of pages of documents and drawings, and provided, either at meetings or through lectures and seminars, detailed presentations concerning its nuclear programme. All that, together with what was subsequently submitted at the request of the inspection teams, provided sufficient information to enable the true picture of the Iraqi nuclear programme, as it was now known to the Agency, to be drawn. The so-called full, final and complete declaration had been submitted to the Agency and the Special Commission on Iraq.

33. Twenty-nine inspection teams had also visited Iraq in connection with Section C of resolution 687 relating to chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and had carried out a total of 243 inspection operations, including 142 surprise visits. Those inspection teams oversaw the destruction of missile systems, chemical weapons, equipment and their accessories. A total of some 14 862 items had been destroyed. Iraq had itself destroyed more than 23 470 items, the remains of which had then been examined by the inspection teams. Iraq no longer possessed any weapons, munitions, systems or subsystems prohibited under resolution 687. The Special Commission had also received a full, final and complete declaration pertaining to those weapons.

34. For its part, Iraq had honoured all its obligations in the nuclear field under resolution 687. There was still one paragraph in resolution 687 which had not yet been implemented, but the Agency, not Iraq, was responsible for not implementing it. Despite the 14 inspection visits and the speedy response of the Agency in moving fresh fuel and destroying buildings, installations and equipment, the Agency was slow to remove the spent fuel. The spent nuclear fuel cells from the Tammuz 2 reactor had been kept in a specially designed pit, in accordance with the required safety standards and had been under constant surveillance until exceptional measures were taken during the military operations to remove them to a provisional open-air site near the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Centre. Since then, Iraq had been waiting for the Agency to remove the spent fuel from Iraq. Immediately after the cease-fire, Iraq took the necessary measures to build a new well where the spent fuel could be stored. However, those measures were halted after the inspection team had said that the fuel would be removed in three months. The spent fuel had not yet been removed and was in poor condition. There was a danger that some of the fuel cells would rupture causing a radiation accident and serious consequences for the environment.

35. The Security Council resolutions allowed Iraq to use radioisotopes for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, but the Agency had established a very complicated procedure for enabling Iraq to obtain radio-isotopes. Iraq had requested some radioisotopes for medical purposes 10 months previously, but had still not received any. Since Iraq had fulfilled all its obligations, it was time for the Agency to lift all sanctions on technical assistance, particularly in the medical and agricultural fields.

36. During the war, which far exceeded the scope of Security Council resolution 660, more than 135 000 tonnes of bombs and explosives had been dropped on Iraq paralysing all the industrial and economic sectors. Only 2 of the 20 electrical power stations in operation before the war remained safe and they were producing only 3% of the electrical power produced before the war. In the communications sector, 400 000 of the 900 000 telephone lines were destroyed and all the local and international communication centres and networks came to a halt as a result of the air attacks. Furthermore,

133 bridges were destroyed, as well as railways and roads. As a result, communication and transport systems had been completely paralysed. The destruction of oil refineries had caused the stoppage of most of the drinking water pumping stations and irrigation systems. As a result, crops had been damaged and soil salinity had increased.

37. The destruction during the war of hospitals, clinics and medicine stores had resulted in large quantities of medical supplies and instruments being damaged. A study conducted by a research team of Harvard University in May 1991 on the general health of Iraq after the Gulf War indicated that 170 000 children under the age of five were expected to die during 1992 from the effects of the war, in other words an increase of 100%. In fact, the number of deaths of children under five years of age rose to 3500 per month during the first half of 1992, compared with an average of 712 in 1990. Furthermore, the number of major surgical operations performed in Iraq decreased in the first half of 1992 by 63% as compared to 1989, because of the lack of basic necessities and medicines. In the education sector, universities, technical institutes, and hundreds of primary and secondary schools were damaged or destroyed by the heavy bombardment. Even mosques, churches, museums, cultural centres and food depots had not escaped destruction.

38. The report on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq, dated 20 March 1991, by the United Nations mission headed by Mr. Martti Ahtisarri, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, stated that most means of modern life support had been destroyed or rendered tenuous and that Iraq had, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age.

39. Iraqi technicians, including those working on the nuclear programme, had started to reconstruct what had been destroyed during the war. They faced great difficulties since no machines, instruments or equipment had been imported to Iraq since August 1990 because of the economic sanctions. Many of the reconstructed factories faced the threat of having to stop at any moment because of the shortage of spare parts. The Iraqis were struggling to use all the available local materials. Repeated calls had been made to the Special

Commission and to the IAEA to stop the unnecessary destruction of buildings and equipment, pointing out that they could be placed under continuous monitoring instead.

40. The Iraqi nuclear programme was currently at zero and the Agency's monitoring plan would ensure that Iraq would be incapable of producing what had been prohibited by the provisions of resolution 687. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz had announced to the Security Council on 11 March 1992 that Iraq was ready to continue co-operating with the Special Commission and the IAEA in fulfilling the tasks specified in resolution 687, including the inspection and future verification operations based on respect for Iraq's sovereignty and national security, and with a view to arriving at practical arrangements that did not go beyond the purposes identified by the Security Council.

41. In a letter dated 10 October 1991, the Foreign Minister informed the United Nations Secretary-General that Iraq had abandoned its nuclear programme. All those who had been working on that programme were now working on the country's reconstruction and on research and development to find local alternatives to imported items in the agricultural, industrial, and medical sectors. The Agency should help those scientists, engineers and technicians in their new work and give them the opportunity to communicate with their counterparts in the rest of the world.

42. Operative paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 called for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Although that resolution had been passed a long time ago, no steps had been taken towards implementing that important paragraph. It was time for the Agency to take action in that area. It should, as a matter of priority, subject all Israel's nuclear installations and institutions to comprehensive control and inspection and should work towards removing all that country's nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Without such steps, the region would remain an arena of permanent conflict and turmoil.

43. For more than two years, the people of Iraq had been suffering from great shortages of food and medicine and the scarcity of other basics of everyday life. It was now time to lift the sanctions imposed on Iraq and

allow the Iraqi people to import tractors to plough their lands and pumps to provide water for drinking and irrigation. Iraq had fulfilled its obligations under resolution 687 and the Agency should, for its part, recognize that fact and respond appropriately.

44. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) welcomed the Republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Uzbekistan as new Members of the Agency, and noted with satisfaction the accession of France and China to the NPT.

45. The Agency's recent steps to strengthen its safeguards system, particularly with regard to the early submission of design information and the reaffirmation of the Agency's right to conduct special inspections, were important developments. As inspection techniques improved, the Agency's performance had become more effective despite the increasing number of facilities which had to be inspected. The results of studies by expert groups, such as SAGSI, should be used to improve still further the effectiveness and efficiency of inspections to ensure that nuclear energy was being used exclusively for peaceful purposes by all signatories of the NPT. His delegation endorsed the basic concept and broad objectives of the universal reporting system and hoped that an efficient regime based on the principles of transparency and non-discrimination would be set up in the near future.

46. The increase in nuclear materials, in particular plutonium and enriched uranium which were being recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons or produced from spent fuels, was cause for concern. Serious thought would need to be given to the possibility of finding new ways of managing those materials at international level or of involving the Agency to ensure the peaceful use or storage of those materials. It was also essential that appropriate methods of radioactive waste management be found in order to protect present and future generations. As a result of the expansion of nuclear power activities in a number of countries, including his own, there had been a substantial increase in the quantities of low-level radioactive waste and spent fuel and the safe disposal and storage of such material had become a matter of grave international concern. The time had come to consider seriously international standardization and close monitoring of measures for the safe disposal and

storage of radioactive waste. Commendable progress had been made so far under the RADWASS programme and it was to be hoped that phase I would be completed by 1994 as scheduled. A solution to the problem of radioactive waste management was crucial in order to improve public acceptance of nuclear energy and the Agency should focus increased attention on providing Member States with the necessary assistance and co-operation in that area.

47. Nuclear safety was one of the most important aspects of the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although individual States were ultimately responsible for the safety of their own nuclear facilities, international co-operation was equally important in ensuring the implementation of more effective and efficient nuclear safety measures. His Government shared the concern expressed by several Member States about the safety of reactors in some Eastern European States and welcomed the programme on the safety of RBMK reactors which the Agency had recently launched.

48. It was expected that, by the early years of the next century, most of the world's new nuclear power plants would be constructed in north-east Asia. At the same time, since the region was one of the most densely populated in the world, accounting for one third of the world's total population, a major accident at a nuclear power plant in one country could cause serious radiation problems, both in the country concerned and in neighbouring countries, and impede the expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There was therefore an urgent need for a regional co-operation regime, under the auspices of the IAEA, to guarantee the nuclear safety of the region as a whole.

49. As one of the founders of the RCA, the Republic of Korea attached great importance to projects which promoted regional co-operation and noted with satisfaction that substantial progress had been achieved in the industrial, medical and agricultural applications of nuclear techniques. His country had contributed to that progress and would continue to share its technology and experience with other Member States in the region.

50. The Republic of Korea, which had built its first commercial nuclear power plant in 1978, currently had nine units operating. In terms of the proportion of total national electricity production accounted for by nuclear power, the Republic of Korea ranked fourth in the world and was planning to

expand its nuclear power programmes still further. At the end of the preceding year, construction had started on Wolsung Unit 2, a pressurized heavy water reactor, and in May 1992 work had begun on Ulchin Units 3 and 4, which were both pressurized light water reactors. Two more units would be added by the end of the year. Ulchin 3 and 4 would be the first Korean standardized nuclear power plants designed and built with local technology. By 2006, it was expected that 60% of the country's electricity needs would be met from nuclear energy.

51. Given its scarcity of natural resources, nuclear power was seen as the key to self-sufficiency in energy and the Republic of Korea had accordingly embarked upon a long-term nuclear research and development programme to be implemented over the next decade. In implementing that programme, it was as determined as ever to adhere to its policy of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in full compliance with the NPT and based on close international co-operation. In that context, it was pleased to be able to host the 1993 IAEA International Symposium on Advanced Nuclear Power Systems in Seoul. As one of the newly emerging developing countries with a significant nuclear development programme, his country should be given the opportunity of playing a more important role in the Agency and of making a greater contribution to the Agency's work. It was therefore following closely the discussions on the amendment of Article VI of the Statute.

52. In the recent Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, South and North Korea had solemnly pledged that nuclear energy would be used for peaceful purposes only, that no nuclear weapons would be tested, manufactured, produced, received, possessed, stored, deployed or used, and that neither party would possess reprocessing or enrichment facilities. That declaration was an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.

53. However, his country was concerned at the fact that following the entry into force, on 10 April 1992, of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, a visit to that country by the Director General and three ad hoc inspections had revealed that the DPRK's nuclear facilities were more extensive than was required to meet its current nuclear energy requirements.

It had been constructing a full-scale reprocessing plant and had also been engaged in unsafeguarded plutonium extraction activities. His delegation again urged the DPRK to halt the construction or operation of reprocessing-related facilities and to dispose of them in compliance with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Only through the full implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement and of the denuclearization agreement, based on a comprehensive mutual inspection regime, would the DPRK be able to gain international confidence and clear itself of suspicion.

54. The Republic of Korea was also worried about the safety of the nuclear power reactors which were either in operation or under construction in the DPRK. There was concern that those reactors, which had been developed indigenously, might fall far below international safety standards. The Agency and countries in the region should therefore devote special attention to the safety of the nuclear facilities in the DPRK and consider the development of appropriate measures to improve safety.

Mr. Wagner (Czechoslovakia) took the Chair.

55. Mr. CLAUDIO ARANZADI (Spain), having welcomed Slovenia and Croatia as Members of the Agency, said that his country fully subscribed to the statement made by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Community.

56. In 1991 nuclear power in Spain had accounted for 55 578 GWh, or 34.8%, of total national electricity production. With an installed capacity of 7400 MW(e) and more than 7000 operating hours per year at full power, the performance of the Spanish nuclear power plants had improved satisfactorily over the past nine years and reached an average load factor of 86.1% in 1991. Alongside the Spanish nuclear programme, a significant industry had developed, ranging from nuclear and fuel-cycle component manufacture to engineering companies and support services for the power plants.

57. One of the priorities of the National Energy Plan, ratified by the Spanish parliament in April 1992, was to continue promoting efforts to ensure that nuclear power plants were being operated under optimal conditions of safety and reliability. Achievement of such conditions required both continued reliance on the industrial and service network which provided

high-quality support to the nuclear sector, and also continual updating of the knowledge of nuclear power plant staff to meet the increasing demands of safety and operational efficiency. That point was of particular importance since with the construction of new power plants in most European countries at a standstill, there was a danger that technological and human capability would be lost and that it would be difficult to maintain the safety of existing power plants or cope with future nuclear programmes which foresaw the design of advanced and intrinsically safe reactors. His Government therefore supported participation by national industry in international programmes on such reactors. Although the average age of Spain's nuclear power plants was one of the lowest in the OECD (eight years), his country was also paying particular attention to the decommissioning of nuclear installations and was actively co-operating in international programmes on the subject, especially European Community research and development programmes. A major task was the decommissioning of the Vandellos I power plant, which was shut down in 1989, and ecological recovery of defunct uranium mines.

58. Turning to radioactive waste management, he said that expansion of the El Cabril intermediate- and low-level solid waste storage facility had reached completion and the facility would receive an operating licence later in 1992. It would provide adequate capacity for the safe and reliable storage of all such waste produced by Spain up to the year 2010.

59. The Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety and radiological protection were very useful and Spain particularly welcomed the development of the RADWASS programme, which would set down internationally agreed radioactive waste management standards and would become a reference point in the same way as the NUSS code had set standards for the safe operation of nuclear power plants.

60. His country also supported initiatives to improve operational safety through the OSART, ASSET and RAPAT missions, as well as missions to review regulatory structures, which were particularly useful for countries going through a period of major structural change. In connection with the restructuring process taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, it had become evident that there were safety problems associated with the design of

certain reactors and that there was a need to revise nuclear safety legislation and regulations and the way in which they were applied. An extensive programme of international assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, had been launched to solve those problems. His country was participating in that assistance, mainly through European Community programmes and the Agency's technical co-operation programme. The Agency had a fundamental role to play in helping to resolve the safety problems in those countries by acting as a technical advisory body to determine what was required and to assess the efficacy of the solutions proposed. Given the number of activities in that field, it was absolutely vital that co-ordination mechanisms, such as those being set up by the G-24 Group, be established to avoid duplication and overlapping of the assistance given.

61. The time had now come to set up an international nuclear safety convention. Such a convention should not merely be a declaration of intent and it should also cover all fuel cycle installations and radioactive waste facilities. While upholding the principle of the responsibility of the individual Member State for the safety of its nuclear facilities, that convention should establish basic safety principles and peer review verification mechanisms. His country also attached importance to the basic safety and radiological protection standards soon to be published. The incorporation of the new ICRP recommended dose limits and the definition of criteria for the extension of regulatory control would serve as a guide in the updating of Spanish regulations. Spain also found that the Agency's public information activities, in particular the International Nuclear Event Scale, were an effective supplement to efforts at the national level.

62. In the area of safeguards, positive progress had recently been made in the common task of improving the present safeguards system. His country approved the various proposals to strengthen the safeguards system made by the Director General and welcomed the Board's decisions on the implementation of special inspections and on the provision of information to the Agency regarding new nuclear projects in Member States. Spain, in co-ordination with the other members of the European Community, intended to provide detailed information on inventories and transfers of nuclear material and equipment, and he trusted that other Member States would do likewise.

63. His country, in conjunction with a group of nuclear supplier countries, had recently adopted revised guidelines on nuclear transfers, endorsed guidelines on transfers of dual-use material, equipment and technology, and announced the application of comprehensive safeguards as a prerequisite for nuclear exports. Those decisions would help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system and prevent the development of clandestine nuclear programmes in violation of international agreements.

64. Turning to technical co-operation activities, he noted that there had been a drop in the implementation rate of the approved programme as compared with 1990, the first year of the biennial cycle. He would like the Secretariat to analyse the reason for that drop and, if necessary, to introduce suitable corrective measures. In 1991 Spain had more than doubled its total voluntary contributions for technical assistance as compared with 1990. As to the Director General's concern about the drop in the percentage of the TACF target met, his delegation felt that the present system of financing was inappropriate. Voluntary contributions to the TACF were the first to suffer the effects of the restrictive budgetary policies in force and significant increases each year in the targets for the TACF merely led to a growing gap between those targets and reality. His delegation was interested in participating in the discussions of the working group on the financing of technical assistance in order to help develop a new, more appropriate, system.

65. In conclusion, his country was convinced of the absolute necessity for continuing to operate nuclear power plants. The necessary conditions for the development of a new generation of nuclear power plants were the maintenance of a high level of safety in existing plants and the finding of a definitive solution to the problem of the disposal of high-level waste.

66. Mr. SAFRA (Tunisia), having welcomed those countries which had recently joined the Agency, expressed his delegation's concern that the Agency's financial difficulties would disrupt its programmes and impair its achievements. He therefore urged those Member States which had not so far fulfilled their financial obligations to do so at the earliest opportunity. Tunisia, for its part, had always paid its regular contributions on time and intended to make a further voluntary contribution of US $16 000 early

in 1993. His country had also undertaken to clear all its arrears to the TACF and had taken steps to ensure that future contributions to the Fund would be paid in a timely manner.

67. Tunisia had established a National Atomic Energy Commission to provide the framework for all nuclear activities in the country and to co-ordinate with the Agency. It was also currently finalizing the nuclear safety legislation which it had been developing since the early 1970s.

68. His country set great store by co-operation between Arab States in the development of nuclear science and technology for peaceful application and had become the host country of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, which had already co-operated successfully on many occasions with the Agency. It was hoped that the Agency would also co-operate in the proposed establishment of an Arab centre for the peaceful applications of nuclear science.

69. Tunisia had also been one of the first countries to ratify the AFRA Agreement, and was currently involved, together with other African countries, in seven regional projects. The Governments of France and Spain, in particular, were to be commended for the support they had given to the AFRA programme. One very serious problem faced by the African continent was chronic water shortages coupled with a population increase of some 3% per year. He therefore urged the Agency to intensify its efforts to develop nuclear desalination techniques, in line with the provisions of resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/540, and to support regional seawater desalination programmes.

70. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, Israel's refusal to comply with Security Council and General Conference resolutions by placing its facilities under Agency safeguards increased tensions in that region and hampered efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The region had had enough of the horrors of war, and now needed to concentrate on growth and development. His delegation therefore called upon all Member States to try to convince Israel of the need to comply with all the relevant resolutions.

71. In conclusion, with reference to safeguards, he drew attention to the difficulties faced by developing countries which were parties to the NPT and called upon the industrialized nuclear countries to offer greater assistance to the poorer countries in order to help them meet their safeguards obligations.

72. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran), after welcoming the new Agency Member States, expressed his condemnation of the tragic ethnic war being waged, and the atrocities being perpetrated, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deplored the inadequate responses of the Security Council, the European Community, and even human rights activists and organizations.

73. One of the very few reassuring signs among the disorder that was breaking out in various parts of the world was the concerted effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The crusade against the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery was a noble cause to which his country fully subscribed, both on humanitarian grounds and for the simple reason that Iran was the only State which had suffered the deployment of chemical weapons against its people during the recent past, and thus had first-hand experience of the tragedies caused by the use of such weapons. The present justified concerns about proliferation of such weapons were clearly a direct consequence of misguided policies of certain régimes, although the industrialized States which had knowingly, or unwittingly, assisted the development of "parallel" programmes under those régimes were also to blame. In any event, restrictions were now being imposed to compensate for the lapses of the past, and policies to that end, however belated, would have his country's full support if they were indeed effective in stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

74. The current non-proliferation initiatives focused on: (1) State, intergovernmental and supplier-imposed restrictions on the export of material, equipment and technologies; (2) new international conventions, treaties and agreements, as well as the strengthening of existing instruments, to control, implement and enforce restrictions on the transfer of direct or dual-use materials, equipment and technologies; (3) the development of inventory control and accounting systems, special inspection programmes and intelligence-gathering networks; and (4) stronger support for international organizations with control and verification mandates. Thus, the scope and extent of non-proliferation initiatives and efforts were clearly immense. However, his country believed that two major criteria must be applied if those efforts were to succeed, as he sincerely hoped they would: firstly, any enhanced control and verification mechanism, and all conventions and treaties

to enforce them, should be implemented and enforced without discrimination; and secondly, they should not impede legitimate and peaceful development programmes.

75. As far as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was concerned, three major instruments were currently available, namely the NPT, the Agency's full-scope safeguards system and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Iran had on various occasions proclaimed its support for the extension of the NPT. It was also, in principle, in agreement with various proposals aimed at strengthening the safeguards regime. Furthermore, it had been the first State to propose the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and it continued to promote that cause. However, there had always been obstacles to the successful implementation of the three instruments just mentioned. The NPT had not been entirely successful because the nuclear-weapon States party to it had never completely fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty, be they related to technical support of peaceful nuclear programmes in the developing States or, on the opposite side of the spectrum, to preventing the transfer of nuclear materials and technology to States suspected of aspiring to "parallel" programmes. In particular, neither sufficient pressure nor any form of sanctions had ever been brought to bear to persuade States with well-known "parallel" nuclear programmes to accede to the NPT. There had also been cases of régimes with well-known and entirely non-peaceful nuclear programmes being allowed to proceed unimpeded.

76. In that context, well-researched and authoritative documents based on credible sources were available which described how Israel had developed its nuclear weapons with the full knowledge and tacit approval of some, if not all, of the nuclear-weapon States. As a result, States not party to the NPT had never felt obliged to accept the full-scope safeguards regime of the Agency, although they had in some cases agreed to voluntary-type safeguards agreements which had only served to overburden the Agency's already strained budgets. Moreover, ironically, Israel and other States not party to the NPT and thus beyond the verification mandate of the Agency had been allowed to remain IAEA members and even to benefit from its technical assistance.

77. Thus, as a direct consequence of mishandling of the NPT and of IAEA safeguards, nuclear weapons programmes had been permitted to bear fruit in certain States, and the noble idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones

as an effective non-proliferation option had been undermined, for no region could reasonably be expected to become free of nuclear weapons as long as some States within the region already possessed nuclear weapons clandestinely and persistently refused to relinquish that option. More specifically with respect to the Middle East region, who was going to force Israel to forfeit its nuclear-weapons capability if the nuclear-weapon States were prepared to tolerate the constant threat posed by that capability? Clearly, if the NPT Depositaries neglected to prevent the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons, whether from pure political negligence or out of some sort of favouritism, that could not but provide an incentive for neighbouring States to seek weapons parity.

78. It was his country's belief that the proliferation issues in South America, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula could be resolved politically, whereas the situation in the Middle East was far more complicated. For years the Israeli régime had arrogantly defied all internationally recognized instruments of nuclear control and verification, while an increasing number of States, including Middle Eastern ones, had recently sought adherence to those instruments. As a result, Israel's position on the proliferation issue had become much more isolated and its negative stance in the face of current trends even more unacceptable and inexplicable. In seeking a way out of that isolation, the Zionist-dominated news media and institutions, as well as the officials of the Israeli régime, had embarked on a propaganda campaign, highlighting alleged weaponization programmes in certain Middle Eastern States - including the Islamic Republic of Iran - in a bid to focus public concern on such fictitious threats and thus to justify the maintenance of Israel's own nuclear weapons arsenal.

79. However, the February 1992 visit of an IAEA mission to Iran, and the subsequent Agency reports, had proved that Iran's nuclear programmes were entirely peaceful. His country's authorities had invited the Agency mission to visit Iran on their own initiative, and the invitation remained open since Iran did not intend to hide anything. Unfortunately, that openness and transparency, instead of being rewarded by support for the implementation of peaceful programmes, was being met by the imposition of ever more stringent

restrictions. For example, the Government of Germany had refused to issue the required export licences for the completion of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, in which billions of dollars had been invested so far and the maintenance costs of which represented an ongoing financial burden. Such restrictions were imposed despite the decision of the International Chamber of Commerce that the supplier should complete the plant or hand over the outstanding components and documents to Iran - which after all was an NPT signatory under full-scope Agency safeguards, supported strengthened safeguards regimes and nuclear-weapon-free zone initiatives, accepted Agency missions on an open-invitation basis, and had indicated its willingness to leave the spent fuel handling process for Bushehr to the supplier.

80. Given the adverse environmental consequences of utilizing fossil fuels, his country believed that hydroelectric and nuclear energy were the only practicable alternatives for generating electrical power on large scales, and that developing States having accepted all the required control and verification mechanisms should not be deprived of any of those options through unfair and arbitrary restrictions.

81. In view of the biased attitude of the Government of Germany on the one hand, and the chronic need for additional electricity generating capacity on the other hand, his country had inevitably been forced to look elsewhere for alternative sources of supply of nuclear technology. While intending to continue to maintain the partly completed Bushehr plant, Iran also planned to purchase nuclear power plants from the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and it would very much welcome the assistance of the Agency in attaining optimum standards of safety and reliability for those projects. Co-operation agreements on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy had recently been signed between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, with due respect of all the relevant international rules and standards, including the safeguards regime of the IAEA. Iran therefore expected the Agency's full support in implementing those peaceful projects intended solely for the production of electrical power.

82. During the past two years his country had had the honour of serving on the Board of Governors of the Agency, and it felt its contributions had been positive and constructive at a time when the Agency had had quite a number of complex issues to deal with. Iran believed that each and every Member State should do its utmost to help the Agency fulfil its mandate through such demanding times. It hoped, however, that there would be no undeclared changes in that mandate, since recently the impression had been given that even peaceful applications of nuclear energy were questionable undertakings. The Agency's mandate must remain the promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear energy without in any way compromising non-proliferation objectives, and the Islamic Republic of Iran would co-operate with the Agency by whatever means were necessary as long as that noble aim was upheld.

Mr. Adekanye (Nigeria) resumed the Chair.

83. Mr. MOYO (Zimbabwe) pointed out that at a time when the Agency's role was being enhanced through the strengthening of safeguards, the implementation of new safeguards agreements and the elaboration of an international convention on nuclear safety, it was essential to reassess the 13% reduction in its budget, which could seriously affect one of its most important programmes, namely technical assistance. Also, when considering cases in which Member States had failed to fulfil their financial obligations, the Agency should make allowances for the political, economic and environmental conditions prevailing in those countries.

84. The Agency could help drought-prone African countries by means of co-ordinated research programmes to improve food production and agriculture, in particular through irrigation scheduling to increase the effective use of scarce water resources. The Agency deserved special praise for initiating a programme for the development of water resources, as a result of which it was hoped that the disappointing performance of many irrigation projects could be improved.

85. It was pleasing to note that in the course of the year four RAPAT and five WAMAP missions had been carried out. Zimbabwe had benefited greatly from such missions, especially with respect to regulatory provisions for the handling, use and disposal of spent radiation sources, and also from

scientific visits to other developing countries with established national radiation protection services. Zimbabwe would be establishing its own national radiation protection service in the near future and thanked the Agency for its assistance with regard to the recent workshop on radiation protection and quality assurance in diagnostic radiology held in Zimbabwe. His country would also be represented at a workshop to take place in Kenya in connection with the recently established regional technical co-operation project entitled "X-ray fluorescence laboratory network in Africa".

86. The Agency also deserved praise for setting up the spare parts service for technical equipment launched in Latin America in 1987. Shortages of spare parts were also a constant problem in Africa, and in dealing with that problem it was important to encourage local manufacturing capacity as far as possible.

87. Turning to the issue of public opinion in relation to nuclear power, he noted that nuclear power now provided a considerable portion - around 17% according to one report - of the world's electricity, a contribution on a par with hydroelectric power and in the absence of practical alternatives it would be short-sighted for the world to abandon the nuclear power option. To do so would not in any case result in the elimination of nuclear weapons or the technology responsible for them.

88. The signing by the major powers of numerous treaties to limit or ban certain categories of nuclear weapons were welcome developments, but while stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction still existed, efforts to eliminate them should not be allowed to slacken. The best way forward was to reduce nuclear arsenals drastically in the nuclear-weapon States and to encourage universal adherence to the NPT by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Agency's inspection system must be strengthened accordingly and the staff of the inspectorate should be drawn from developing countries as well as developed countries and the Agency.

89. As in any other sphere of human activity, incidents and accidents could not be avoided entirely, no matter how sophisticated the protection mechanisms in place. The lessons learned from such incidents or accidents should therefore be made widely known to prevent their repetition and to improve safety levels for the future.

90. Efforts must also be directed towards further improving the simplicity and inherent safety of the present generation of nuclear reactors. Without the long-term option of safer, simpler reactors, developing countries would find themselves in dire straits when fossil fuel sources finally ran out. The Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency drawn up after the Chernobyl accident had been widely adhered to. It was to be hoped that the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste adopted in 1990 and the international nuclear safety convention which was being prepared would be made legally binding upon all Member States. In that connection, Zimbabwe supported the establishment of a body of international nuclear law combined with international review and advisory services.

91. Zimbabwe intended to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency in the near future and it was his country's fervent hope that, with South Africa's conclusion of a similar agreement following its accession to the NPT, Africa would gradually be able to move towards becoming a nuclear-weapon-free zone. While on the subject of South Africa, he stressed that the international community should continue to press for more radical change in that country. It was also to be hoped that, as in Angola, the conflict in Mozambique could soon be resolved, since meaningful development could only take place in an atmosphere of peace and trust.

92. Finally, there was still a need for continued vigilance to prevent the dumping of toxic waste. It was an unfortunate side-effect of scientific and technological activities that, while enhancing standards of living and life expectancy, they also brought about undesirable environmental changes. As the world population continued to grow, pressure on the environment was mounting at a corresponding rate and the need to manage the environment intelligently and responsibly was becoming ever more critical. It was imperative that the nations of the world learned to act in such a way as to minimize damage to the environment, if not to prevent such damage completely.

93. Mr. SIRCAR (Bangladesh), having welcomed Croatia, Slovenia and Uzbekistan as new Member States of the Agency, noted that although there had been recent positive changes in the international political situation,

environmental problems affecting the future of the planet still remained unresolved. The recent United Nations Conference on Environment and Development which had been held in Rio de Janeiro had come to the conclusion that action programmes needed to be developed to save the planet from the threat of the greenhouse effect. Were the sea level to rise as a result of the greenhouse effect, Bangladesh would be one of the worst sufferers and it was therefore understandably concerned about environmental problems. The priorities and problems of socio-economic development had to be restructured and redefined on a global basis, since the lack of physical and human resources and inadequate national infrastructures made it difficult for developing countries to deal with those problems.

94. The NPT had played a major role in enhancing peace and security in the world and with the recent changes in the political situation, there was reason to hope that nuclear arsenals would eventually be totally eradicated. While reiterating his country's commitment to the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, he pointed out that the signatories to the NPT should also benefit from their commitment to non-proliferation. In particular, the developing countries which had acceded to the NPT should have easier access to nuclear technologies which might help them solve their national problems more economically and effectively.

95. The Agency's activities in the field of the transfer of nuclear technology had benefited many developing countries, including his own. In Bangladesh, nuclear technology was being used in many areas such as in medicine, food preservation, the sterilization of medical products, agriculture, industry, non-destructive testing, radioisotope production, elemental analysis, electronics, hydrology, prospecting for and exploitation of heavy minerals, radiation protection services, and the development, adaptation and use of computer software.

96. Bangladesh was also actively involved in various programmes under the RCA, including research projects and the development of much-needed human resources. It had begun to provide training opportunities in some fields and had started hosting regional activities with the support of the Agency. Activities under the RCA were of great benefit and should be widened even

further to include areas such as groundwater surveying, and studies on international rivers and problems associated with their flow and sedimentation using tracer technology. However, although he did not wish to undervalue the role of such peripheral uses of nuclear technology, he stressed that most developing countries were still waiting to benefit from the use of nuclear power to generate electricity.

97. The role of energy, and in particular electricity, in promoting socio-economic development could hardly be over-emphasized. The demand for electricity was increasing rapidly and it had been predicted that world electricity demand would double by the year 2010. Consumption in the developing countries was expected to increase by 150% over that period. The particularly high rate of growth in those countries was due to the fact that their current level of consumption was very low. Bangladesh needed electrical power for its development programmes and, as it did not have adequate supplies of conventional fuels, nuclear power was an attractive option. He hoped that, as Bangladesh was already committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards, the Agency would assist it in obtaining a medium-size nuclear power plant.

98. The lack of indigenous primary energy resources made it increasingly difficult for many developing countries to ensure even modest growth in the energy sector. Consequently, the gap in energy consumption, and therefore in economic activities, between the developing and developed nations was increasing. The known reserves of fossil fuels in the world were inadequate to meet such a growing energy demand. There was therefore an urgent need to introduce and promote alternative power generation technologies on a global basis.

99. Problems associated with safety and the management of radioactive waste were frequently cited as reasons for discouraging the expansion of nuclear power. However, the technologies for solving those problems were available. It was difficult to understand why such obstacles were placed in the way of developing countries wishing to embark upon nuclear power programmes, when reactors even of older designs were still being operated and new reactors were being built in the developed countries.

100. In conclusion, while appreciating the Director General's efforts to achieve an appropriate balance between the Agency's promotional and regulatory activities, he noted that a balance had not yet been achieved as far as representation within the Agency's Board of Governors was concerned. Changes were particularly necessary in the case of the representation of the areas of MESA and Africa. Bangladesh therefore supported the revision of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute and hoped that the resolution which was before the Conference on that issue would receive a favourable response from all.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.