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GENERAL CONFERENCE

THIRTY-FIFTH (1991) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna, on Friday, 20 September 1991, at 11.30 a.m.

President: Mr. SANTANA CARVALHO (Brazil)

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[*] GC(XXXV)/982.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXV)/INF/301/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ORAL REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

1. <u>Mr. WILSON</u> (Australia), Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, presented the Committee's report on agenda items 11 to 21, noting that he would report on the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/983 concerning strengthening of the Agency's promotional activities later, when its consideration was completed.

2. Under item 11, "The Agency's accounts for 1990", the Committee recommended that the General Conference adopt the draft resolution on page III of document GC(XXXV)/954.

3. Under item 12, "Measures to strengthen international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/984 concerning the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/992 entitled "Revision of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection", the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/993 entitled "Education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety", the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/997, and the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/997, contribution to sustainable development".

4. The Committee had briefly discussed agenda sub-item 12(e), "Prohibition of all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes whether under construction or in operation", without reaching any conclusion.

5. Under item 13, "The Agency's budget for 1992", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt draft resolutions A, B and C in Annex IV to Part I of document GC(XXXV)/955. Under the same agenda item, the Committee also recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/999 entitled "Strengthening of the safeguards system".

6. Under item 14, "Scale of assessment of Members' contributions for 1992", the Committee recommended that the General Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/967. 7. Under item 15, "The financing of safeguards", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/986. In addition, the Committee recommended that the Conference request the Director General to transmit the summary record of the Committee's discussion on that agenda item to the informal working group on the financing of safeguards.

8. Under item 16, "The financing of technical assistance", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/987.

9. Under item 17, "Plan for producing potable water economically", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/988.

10. Under item 18, "Staffing of the Agency's Secretariat", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/994.

11. Under item 19, "Amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute", the Committee recommended adoption of the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/990.

12. Under item 20, "Revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole", the Committee recommended that the General Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/991.

13. Lastly, under item 21, "Rule and policy on the appointment of the Director General", the Committee recommended that the Conference take note of the report by the Chairman of the Board of Governors contained in document GC(XXXV)/965.

14. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> suggested that the Conference should consider one by one the agenda items which had been referred to the Committee of the Whole and its recommendations thereon, and take up the matter of the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/983 at a later stage.

The Agency's accounts for 1990

15. The draft resolution on page III of document GC(XXXV)/954 was adopted.

Measures to strengthen international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection

16. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> assumed that, as recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the General Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/984 concerning the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/992 entitled "Revision of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection", the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/993 entitled "Education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety", the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/997, and the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/997, and the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/997, contribution to sustainable development".

17. It was so decided.

The Agency's budget for 1992

18. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that, as recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the Conference wished to adopt draft resolutions A, B and C in Annex IV to Part I of document GC(XXXV)/955.

19. <u>The draft resolutions entitled "Regular Budget appropriations</u> for 1992", "Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund allocation for 1992" and "The Working Capital Fund in 1992" were adopted.

20. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> also assumed that, as recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/999 entitled "Strengthening of the safeguards system".

21. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/999 was adopted.

Scale of assessment of Members' contributions for 1992

22. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/967 was adopted.

The financing of safeguards

23. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/986 was adopted.

24. <u>The Director General was requested to transmit the summary record of</u> <u>the Committee's discussion on the financing of safeguards to the informal</u> <u>working group on the financing of safeguards</u>. GC(XXXV)/OR.341 page 6

The financing of technical assistance

25. <u>The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/987 was adopted</u>. Plan for producing potable water economically

26. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/988 was adopted.

Staffing of the Agency's Secretariat

27. <u>The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/994 was adopted</u>. Amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute

28. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/990 was adopted.

Revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole

29. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/991 was adopted.

Rule and policy on the appointment of the Director General

30. Note was taken of the report contained in document GC(XXXV)/965.

SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES (GC(XXXIV)/RES/545; GC(XXXV)/966, 989/Rev.1)

31. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> pointed out that the item had been included in the agenda pursuant to resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/545 adopted by the General Conference in 1990. As requested in that resolution, the Director General had presented a report which was contained in document GC(XXXV)/966.

32. South Africa had become a party to the NPT by depositing an instrument of accession to the Treaty on 10 July 1991. At its meetings immediately preceding the present session of the General Conference, the Board had approved an agreement between the Agency and South Africa for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty.

33. The General Conference also had before it, in document GC(XXXV)/989/Rev.1, a draft resolution submitted by Zaire on behalf of the African Group.

34. <u>Mr. GHONDA</u> (Zaire), introducing the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/989/Rev.1 on behalf of the African Group, said that it was the result of intensive consultations and enjoyed broad consensus. Although it could not be denied that South Africa had made some progress in responding to the requests of the Agency and of other international organizations, that progress was not far-reaching enough in the eyes of the African countries concerned. The African countries therefore recommended continued watchfulness to ensure that the obligations undertaken by South Africa were strictly observed.

35. <u>Mr. BAKSHI</u> (India) recalled that when a similar draft resolution had been tabled at the recent meetings of the Board of Governors, his delegation had been one of six that had abstained from voting, for although it had understood the motivations and concerns of the sponsors, it had been concerned that the resolution was not in accordance with the provisions of the Agency's Statute.

36. The draft resolution now under discussion likewise assigned to the Director General the responsibility of verifying the completeness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear facilities, equipment and material. However, his delegation was convinced that neither the Agency's Statute nor document INFCIRC/153, which governed the Agency's rights with respect to safeguards agreements concluded with NPT signatories, provided for such a role for the Agency. Under the Statute, the application of safeguards by the Agency in any State could only be on the basis of a voluntary request by that State - except, of course, when safeguards were applied to assistance provided by the Agency.

37. The Agency's role in the application of safeguards only began after a State had approached it with a request to apply safeguards to all or some of its facilities. That remained true regardless of whether the request had been made by the State to the Agency voluntarily or in pursuance of a bilateral or multilateral arrangement - such as, in the present case, the NPT. The responsibility of verifying that South Africa made a comprehensive declaration of all its nuclear facilities, equipment and material, in fulfilment of obligations undertaken outside the IAEA, for instance under the NPT, lay with the signatories to the NPT. Therefore the Director General could not legally be asked to verify whether South Africa had in fact declared all its facilities as required under the NPT. That aspect of the matter should be considered during the discussion of the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/989/Rev.1.

38. Before concluding, he reiterated India's consistent and long-standing support of the just struggle of the people of Africa, particularly South Africa. India had stood shoulder to shoulder with its African brothers and sisters and would continue to do so in the years to come. There could be no question about the need for the international community to ensure that all the nuclear facilities, equipment and material in South Africa were placed under safeguards.

39. Mr. UMAR (Nigeria) said that, as a member of the African Group, his delegation agreed with the position expressed by the representative of Zaire regarding the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/989/Rev.1, the intent of which was to keep the matter of South Africa's nuclear programme under review. His delegation was fully aware that South Africa had signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency, and acknowledged the commitment made by the South African Government through the statement of its representative to the Board of Governors. As his country had already made clear in its general debate statement, it recognized the potential impact of those developments on non-proliferation in the region. Nevertheless, considering how much effort had been needed to make that much progress on the matter, there was no room for complacency. The draft resolution should allow the Agency time to monitor the implementation of the safeguards agreement, which was essential for the non-proliferation system, and so his delegation urged the General Conference to adopt it unanimously.

40. <u>Mr. KENNEDY</u> (United States of America) pointed out that South Africa's accession to the NPT on 10 July was a significant foreign and nuclear non-proliferation policy achievement. The United States had applauded that bold step by President de Klerk, and wished again to commend South Africa on its action, which would strengthen the NPT. It was another in a series of bold, positive decisions by the South African Government and paved the way for reducing tension in southern Africa. He noted the satisfaction expressed by the representative of Zaire in introducing the draft resolution. South Africa's accession to the NPT would give important impetus to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, a goal endorsed by a number of delegations.

41. South Africa's prompt conclusion and signature of its full-scope NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency was also important. He commended both the Agency and South Africa for the speed with which they had acted in completing the process well within the 18-month period prescribed by the NPT. That was an example which should set the standard for the future.

42. It was clear that South Africa had responded fully to the recommendations made by the Board of Governors in its report to the thirty-first session of the General Conference pursuant to resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468 and other resolutions on that subject adopted by the General Conference, most recently resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/545. Accordingly, his delegation fully supported the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXX)/989/Rev.1 and joined in the call for its unanimous adoption.

43. <u>Mr. ZHOU</u> (China) recalled that for a long time South Africa had applied a policy of racial segregation, had rejected the relevant resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly and the General Conference of the Agency, and had undertaken nuclear activities not subject to Agency safeguards. As a result, it had been condemned on numerous occasions by the international community, and in particular by the African countries.

44. For some years tension had eased somewhat in southern Africa. The South African Government's policy of racial discrimination had become milder and, in the area of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, South Africa had adopted a more positive position as demonstrated by its accession to the NPT and by its signing of a safeguards agreement with the Agency. All Member States had welcomed that positive development, although it should not be forgotten that racial discrimination remained an acute problem in South Africa. His delegation hoped that South Africa would abandon that inhuman policy once and for all, and that it would honestly abide by its obligations under the NPT and the safeguards agreement it had signed.

45. <u>Mr. LAVIÑA</u> (Philippines) thanked the representative of Zaire for his constructive attitude in trying to find a consensus on the draft resolution. Although in the past the Philippine delegation had always voted in all international authorities against South Africa, and in particular against its policy of apartheid, his delegation had pointed out during the discussion on a similar draft resolution which had taken place at the recent meetings of the Board of Governors that a resolution of that type did not seem necessary and that South Africa should be congratulated on its decision to accede to the NPT and to sign a safeguards agreement with the Agency. Nevertheless, in view of the past record just outlined by the representative of China, his delegation had voted in favour of that draft resolution, and it would do the same in the case of the draft resolution now before the General Conference.

46. <u>Mr. PLUG</u> (Netherlands), speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, recalled that over the past few years many delegations had tried to prevail upon the Government of South Africa to accede to the NPT. It was therefore a source of satisfaction that South Africa had acceded to the Treaty and had negotiated, swiftly, a safeguards agreement which had just recently entered into effect. The Twelve not only took note of that development, but warmly welcomed it. They assumed that the Director General would, as a matter of course, implement that safeguards agreement, as he implemented all safeguards agreements. Under those circumstances, the Twelve would support the draft resolution under discussion.

47. Mr. SILANGWA (Zambia), associating himself with the statement made by the representative of Zaire, recognized the very encouraging steps taken by South Africa which had certainly led to a lessening of tension in southern Africa. South Africa's nuclear capability had been a subject of great concern in the region. The aim of the draft resolution was to establish whether South Africa was acceding to the NPT as a nuclear-weapon or a non-nuclear-weapon State. He recalled that there had been a great deal of doubt about the nuclear weapons capability of South Africa. If the nuclear material and facilities in South Africa were verified with the help of the Agency, fears on that subject would be assuaged. The draft resolution merely sought to ensure that information would be available in southern Africa concerning the level of South Africa's nuclear capability at the time of its signing the NPT. His delegation therefore hoped that the resolution would be adopted by consensus.

48. <u>Mr. ROSALES ARIAS</u> (Cuba) said that the energetic support his country had given to the South African people's struggle to rid itself of the hateful regime of apartheid was well known. Although from some technical points of view the draft resolution did not entirely conform with established procedure, Cuba felt able to join the consensus in favour of its adoption which seemed to be emerging in the General Conference. 49. The <u>PRESIDENT</u>, noting that there were no further speakers, asked the General Conference if it was ready to adopt the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/989/Rev.1 without a vote.

50. It was so decided.

51. <u>Ms. MACHADO QUINTELLA</u> (Brazil), supported by <u>Mr. MONDINO</u> (Argentina) and <u>Mr. ARAIN</u> (Pakistan), said that her delegation had joined the consensus and understood and shared the concerns and apprehensions of the sponsors, but wanted to place on record its view that the request contained in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution did not fall within the mandate of the Director General. For that reason, that paragraph should not be held to constitute a precedent or a new guideline for the application of safeguards by the Agency.

IRAQ'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS (GC(XXXV)/978 and Add.1, 995)

52. The <u>PRESIDENT</u>, noting that the item had been placed on the General Conference's agenda at the request of the Board of Governors, which had discussed the issue once again the preceding week, pointed out that in documents GC(XXXV)/978 and Add.1 the General Conference had before it a fairly comprehensive set of documents which included Security Council resolutions 687 and 707.

53. Document GC(XXXV)/995 contained a draft resolution which had been submitted by Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Switzerland, Ukraine, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Subsequently, Australia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Republic of Korea had co-sponsored the draft resolution.

54. <u>Mr. AL-KITAL</u> (Iraq) said that consultations were still in progress on items 8 and 9 of the agenda and the Iraqi delegation was involved in them. The content of his intervention on item 23 would depend closely on the results of those consultations, since all three items related to safeguards and their application. He therefore requested that item 23 not be taken up until those consultations had been concluded. 55. <u>Mr. KENNEDY</u> (United States of America), supported by <u>Mr. TALIANI</u> (Italy) and <u>Mr. TREMEAU</u> (France), said that he had some difficulty in discerning a connection between the draft resolution under consideration and items 8 and 9 of the agenda. He therefore saw no need to defer discussion of item 23.

56. <u>Mr. AL-KITAL</u> (Iraq) said he simply wished to avoid the General Conference becoming embroiled at such a late hour in a discussion which might prove lengthy. However, he also wished to raise another point: the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXV)/995 had not been distributed until 6.30 p.m. on the preceding day. In accordance with the procedure which had always been followed, at least 24 hours had to elapse between the distribution of a draft resolution and the discussion thereof. He was not asking that discussion of the draft be postponed until 6.30 p.m., but only that it be postponed until the afternoon.

57. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> read out Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference concerning proposals and amendments:

"Proposals and amendments shall normally be introduced in writing and handed to the Director General who shall circulate copies to all delegations. As a general rule and subject to Rule 67 of these Rules, no proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote unless its text has been distributed to all delegations not later than the day preceding the meeting. The presiding officer may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments, or of motions as to procedure, even though these amendments or motions have not been distributed or have been distributed the same day."

Consequently, though it was true that only a short time had elapsed since the draft had been distributed, that period of time was sufficient under Rule 63. As no other delegation had voiced its opposition, he assumed that the General Conference wished to begin its discussion of item 23 of the agenda immediately.

58. <u>Mr. KENNEDY</u> (United States of America) said that the draft resolution in document GC(XXXV)/995 needed no commentary. Close examination of document GC(XXXV)/978, and in particular the cover note and the Director General's report, made the need for such a resolution self-evident. The way in which Iraq had discharged its obligations under the NPT, the Agency's Statute, the Charter of the United Nations, and the resolutions of the Security Council was, to say the least, unsatisfactory in every respect. The draft resolution attempted to remedy the situation in part by demanding that Iraq take the necessary measures to comply with international law. He therefore hoped that the draft would be adopted unanimously.

59. <u>Mr. AL-KITAL</u> (Iraq), noting that he had informed delegations of all measures which had been taken to implement Security Council resolution 687 and all facts relating to the application of the safeguards system in Iraq in the statement he had made during the plenary meeting on the preceding Wednesday, said that he wished to draw attention to a number of important points.

60. Firstly, Iraq had made a complete and definitive declaration of all aspects of its nuclear programme and had disclosed all information, documents, equipment and materials relating to that programme, as had been stated by the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations which had been distributed to all delegations.

61. Secondly, Iraq had co-operated fully with the inspection teams and had granted them access to all the sites they had wished to inspect. He reiterated his request to the inspection teams to indicate which sites they wished to have access to without prior notification. The third and fourth inspection teams had confirmed that the Iraqi authorities had co-operated with them.

62. Thirdly, as was clear from the explanations which had been provided by Iraq to the Security Council and the General Conference, the so-called violation by Iraq of its safeguards agreement was a purely technical issue, the importance of which had been grossly exaggerated. He pointed out that many laboratories, especially in certain European countries, were performing experiments on laser and centrifuge enrichment and on the chemistry of plutonium without notifying the Agency.

63. Fourthly, all the corrective measures required under the safeguards agreement between the Agency and Iraq had been implemented at the appropriate time.

64. Fifthly, the Board of Governors was the only body which had the necessary competence to verify the application of safeguards agreements in

States, and a safeguards implementation report was published every year for that purpose. The Board was also the only body authorized to report on the matter. It had already done so with regard to Iraq and, on 18 July 1991, it had adopted a resolution on the matter which had been transmitted to the Security Council. It was not the business of the General Conference to discuss the application of the safeguards system, and he assumed that the delegations present at the Conference were aware of the fact that they had never examined that question before.

65. Sixthly, it was up to the Security Council to ensure that its resolutions were implemented. Accordingly, it was unthinkable and unjustifiable from a legal point of view for the General Conference, spurred on by ill-intentioned political pressure, to presume to take the place of the Security Council.

66. Seventhly, most of the States which had attacked Iraq for its so-called non-compliance with its safeguards obligations should themselves be condemned for serious violations of the safeguards system which they had committed either openly or in secret. He recalled the violations committed by Luxembourg which, as was reflected in the summary records of the relevant meetings of the Board, had sent 41 tonnes of depleted uranium to Israel. Those materials had still not been placed under Agency control and nobody was able to say where they were at present. Israel, however, was the only State in the region which had developed nuclear weapons. Moreover, the United States and its Western allies had exported nuclear technology and materials to Israel without informing the Agency and had thus enabled the Tel Aviv Government to build up a nuclear arsenal in the Middle East.

67. Eighthly, the attempts made by the inspection teams to prolong indefinitely the operations in Iraq, acting as they were with the clear support or even on the order of the United States and its allies, were not innocent and had nothing to do with the implementation of the Security Council resolutions which were fallacious pretexts designed to justify the continued interference in the internal affairs of Iraq and the theft of Iraqi technology and data by countries which had made hostility towards the Iraqi people and the Arab nation the watchword of their international politics. Such actions ran entirely counter to the obligations of the Agency which, under its safeguards system, had the responsibility of preserving the confidentiality of such information. The problem needed to be discussed in depth so that the world would know upon what path the Agency was embarked, for the measures it was taking in the field of armaments control were progressively turning into a technical and scientific espionage service.

68. The draft resolution which was before the General Conference had no foundation in law and was not based on a single correct fact. It had been submitted by States which had themselves committed serious and dangerous safeguards violations and which had condoned discriminatory policies and double standards for the application of the safeguards system, for instance in their recent refusal to impose special inspections on the racist régime of South Africa, as reflected in the summary records of the preceding week's Board meetings. The draft resolution contravened the working methods of the Agency and its Statute. It was an attempt to transform the Agency into an executive instrument for policies wielded in the name of the so-called "new world order" at the instigation of the United States of America, supposedly the only superpower in the world.

69. The Iraqi delegation did not intend to propose any amendment to the wording of the draft resolution, which it rejected totally and considered illegitimate. Nevertheless, in the interests of helping the sponsors of the draft resolution, if indeed they were willing to include at least one truthful statement in it, he suggested they might add the following paragraph to the preamble:

"<u>Noting</u> that all Iraqi nuclear facilities, including all facilities under IAEA safeguards, have been totally destroyed by aerial and missile attacks during the American-led war against Iraq".

It was, incidentally, incorrect to speak of Iraqi nuclear facilities now given that those facilities had all been destroyed during the war.

70. The draft resolution was politically motivated and bore witness to the desire of certain States to continue wreaking harm on the Iraqi people by fabricating absurd, malicious and trumped-up accusations. If it were adopted it would provide the United States with a pretext for renewed aggression against the Iraqi people. It was a well-known fact that the United States was currently concentrating troops in the region in preparation for such an act of GC(XXXV)/OR.341 page 16

aggression. A vote for the draft resolution would be a vote in favour of the continued departure of the Agency from the objectives of its Statute and from the truth, and its continued refusal to grant the peoples of the Third World the right to scientific knowledge and technology, and the use thereof within their development programmes. Iraq for its part had done nothing but exercise that right, namely the right to possess various types of technologies.

71. In conclusion, and in the light of the foregoing, the Iraqi delegation requested that a roll-call vote be taken on the draft resolution, which it urged the General Conference to reject.

72. <u>Mr. WAGNER</u> (Czechoslovakia) said that his delegation had stated its position clearly during the general debate. He unreservedly supported the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXV)/995 and asked to be included in the list of co-sponsors.

73. <u>Mr. LOOSCH</u> (Germany) said that Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations was a matter for great concern, as were Iraq's persistent attempts to justify itself, for example in the letter dated 3 September 1991 addressed to the Director General by the Resident Representative of Iraq (GC(XXXV)/978, Attachment 4). An issue as serious as non-compliance with obligations entered into under an agreement concluded with the Agency was undeniably the concern of the Agency as a whole, and therefore of the General Conference, whatever special functions the Board might have in that respect. Furthermore, Germany, as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXV)/995, was naturally opposed to the amendment of the preamble which had been proposed by the Iraqi delegation.

74. <u>Mr. AL-KITAL</u> (Iraq) said that the representative of Germany had just repeated a statement which he had made previously and which was entirely incorrect. Iraq had taken all the necessary corrective measures to remedy, on a technical level, its non-compliance with its obligations under the safeguards agreement it had concluded with the Agency, and had communicated to the Agency all the relevant information.

75. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> invited the General Conference to vote on the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXV)/995.

76. At the request of the delegate of Iraq, a vote was taken by roll-call.

77. <u>Cameroon, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to</u> vote first.

78. The result of the vote was as follows:

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, In favour: Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Iraq.

<u>Abstaining</u>: Algeria, Cuba, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Namibia, Sudan.

79. There were 71 votes in favour and 1 against, with 7 abstentions. The draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXV)/995 was adopted[*].

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

^[*] The Government of El Salvador subsequently informed the Secretariat in writing that, if it had been able to take part in the vote on the draft resolution, it would have voted in favour of its adoption.