



International Atomic Energy Agency

GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC(XXXV)/OR.338
13 November 1991

GENERAL Distr.

Original: ENGLISH

THIRTY-FIFTH (1991) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna
on Wednesday, 18 September 1991, at 3.5 p.m.

President: Mr. SANTANA CARVALHO (Brazil)
later: Mr. LOOSCH (Germany)

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[*] GC(XXXV)/982.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXV)/INF/301/Rev.2.

Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor (Soviet Union)

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1990 (GC(XXXV)/953) (continued)

1. Ms. TALLAWY (Egypt) said that the current session of the General Conference was taking place during a period of international rapprochement and harmony which gave rise to the hope that co-operation and mutual understanding would replace conflict and that construction of arsenals of weapons and nuclear deterrents would give way to developmental activities and the utilization of science for the well-being of mankind. Nuclear energy had a vital role to play in creating the prosperity to which the peoples of the world aspired and in solving developmental problems. The new international atmosphere would, she trusted, do away with the military uses of atomic energy and invalidate the theory of nuclear deterrence or terror.

2. The Agency had played an effective part in fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and she hoped that it would expand that role in future to meet the increasing needs of Member States in various fields. The Agency's achievements in promoting nuclear safety and radiological protection after the Chernobyl accident bore witness to what it could do. However, its success in assuming a greater role in that area would depend much on Member States' financial support.

3. Safeguards was one of the main activities of the Agency and a principal prop of the non-proliferation regime. Recent events had borne out the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system, which had also been stressed by the Fourth NPT Review Conference. She welcomed the studies that the Agency had initiated on a number of aspects with a view to strengthening the safeguards regime.

4. The Agency's role in implementing Security Council resolution 687 had confirmed the importance of supporting the safeguards system and giving the Agency the means of ensuring that nuclear energy was not misused for non-peaceful purposes. Egypt considered that, in strengthening the safeguards regime, the following principles must be adhered to:

- (1) Safeguards should be applied to all equally, uniformly and comprehensively and should not be used as a means of discrimination between one State and another.
- (2) They should not serve as a means of concealing nuclear activities in violation of the obligations assumed by States;

(3) Safeguards should not be utilized to impede States' right of access to nuclear technology and to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. Egypt had therefore supported the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors condemning Iraq for its violation of its safeguards agreement.

6. The Egyptian delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to sign its safeguards agreement and to implement it as soon as possible, and called upon the Government of South Africa to declare all its nuclear activities, to provide information on its installations and to place them under safeguards in accordance with the agreement which it had signed with the Agency. Moreover, it appealed to all States which had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so and to conclude a safeguards agreement, and in particular to Israel, as a first step, to place its nuclear installations under safeguards without delay and thus to demonstrate its good intentions and sincerity about establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. It must at last be recognized that the concept of nuclear deterrence was untenable and that the resources expended thereon had been wasted, since international political criteria did not permit the use of such weapons of mass destruction.

8. Her Government was optimistic about the positive developments in the area of arms control and disarmament, which marked historic changes in international relations. It welcomed the measures adopted in that connection, including the agreement between the Superpowers on the reduction of strategic weapons, the recent proposals about arms control and disarmament and the steps taken by a number of States to accede to the NPT and to sign safeguards agreements with the Agency. Those developments would have a positive impact both at the international and the regional level, especially in regions of tension and conflict. Egypt was pleased to note the intention of France and China to accede to the NPT and the accession to it by South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

9. Egypt had been among the first to demand arms control and disarmament at the international and regional levels, and in particular in the Middle East, because an arms race involving nuclear and other weapons of mass

destruction would not only jeopardize peace efforts in the region but also threaten peace and security in the region and in the world as a whole.

10. For more than 15 years Egypt had been advocating positive international steps towards arms control and the banning of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In 1974 at the United Nations, it had called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, and its appeal had enjoyed the support of the world community for more than a decade. In April 1990 President Mubarak of Egypt had announced his support for declaring the Middle East a region free from weapons of mass destruction of all kinds. His initiative had been based on three principles:

- (1) Banning of all weapons of mass destruction, with no exceptions, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, from the Middle East;
- (2) Equal and mutual commitment in that regard on the part of all States in the region, with no exceptions;
- (3) Establishment of verification and inspection procedures and models to make sure of compliance by all the States in the region, without exception, with their obligations under the total ban.

11. In connection with the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the subject, Egypt had submitted specific proposals to the Secretary-General including the following points:

- (1) The States in the region which had not done so should accede to the NPT and place all their nuclear installations under Agency safeguards, concluding with it a full-scope safeguards agreement;
- (2) Until those steps were completed, the States in the region should submit individual declarations to the Security Council, supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and stating that they would not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or any nuclear explosive devices;
- (3) The States in the region should submit to the Secretary-General lists of their nuclear facilities and place them under Agency safeguards;

- (4) States outside the region exporting nuclear material and equipment to States in the region should submit lists thereof to the Secretary-General.

12. In July 1991, during a discussion on the subject, the Egyptian Foreign Minister had made the following specific proposals:

- (1) The main weapon exporters, especially the Permanent Members of the Security Council, should deposit with the Security Council in writing statements expressing their clear and unconditional support for declaring the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and indicating that they would do nothing which might impede the realization of that objective;
- (2) The States in the Middle East which had not yet done so should undertake: (a) not to use nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; (b) not to manufacture or acquire any nuclear weapons; (c) not to manufacture or acquire any nuclear material that could be used for military purposes; (d) to accept international inspection of all their nuclear facilities by the IAEA.

13. The recent events in the Middle East had underlined the importance of the Agency's inspection and verification activities. Its work in implementing Security Council resolution 687 had demonstrated its capacity to assume a wider role in the context of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In that connection, Egypt urged the Agency to take appropriate steps with a view to the early application of safeguards, bearing in mind the standpoints of the States concerned and the conditions prevailing in the Middle East.

14. She had considered it necessary to comment in detail on safeguards because that was a vital issue in the Middle East region. However, Egypt did not attach any less importance to the other activities of the IAEA, and hoped that an appropriate balance would be established between those activities and safeguards.

15. The Agency's work in the area of nuclear safety and radiation protection was an essential part of building confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and had contributed much since 1986 to overcoming the crisis of confidence in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. The recent

International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power had constituted another positive step towards formulation of a strategy for the future which, in Egypt's opinion, should include: establishment of international nuclear safety standards applicable to the stages of planning, construction and operation; apart from safe reactor designs, provision of the necessary means of protection of the environment and health and protection against the effects of radioactive releases; provision of assistance to developing countries to enable them to produce equipment and devices needed to attain accepted international safety standards; attention to the issue of radioactive waste (on that subject the Agency had done laudable work by preparing a code of practice for the transport of waste, which could be elaborated into an internationally binding document for waste transport and disposal); and lastly, due attention to understanding and participation by the public and decision-makers where problems of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were concerned.

16. Egypt considered that the Agency's technical assistance and promotional programmes were among its most important activities. They represented the other aspect of its role, apart from safeguards. She wished to reiterate her country's view that those activities should be assured of optimum financing.

17. African States' experience with AFRA demonstrated how the Agency could assist developing countries. That regional agreement had been in existence for two years and the implementation of a number of projects under it had started. Egypt wished to express its appreciation of the French Government's financial contribution to one of the projects, and appealed to all donor countries to assist in the attainment of AFRA's objectives. It hoped that the Agency, too, would devote adequate resources to AFRA activities.

18. The Egyptian delegation attached importance to the exchange of views between the Agency and Member States during the planning of its programmes of scientific meetings, the purpose of which was to promote development in nuclear technology and to give a better idea of what that technology could offer. The report which the Secretariat had started preparing on the subject would be of great help in that regard.

19. In conclusion, she hoped that the present session would mark the beginning of a new era in international relations and in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

20. Mr. ALKITAL (Iraq) said that the Director General and a number of delegates had referred in their statements to what they called Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. All those statements had been inspired by known political motives, were unjust, lacked objectivity, and totally disregarded the facts. He wished therefore to review briefly the sequence of events since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687(1991).

21. First, on 18 April 1991 the Foreign Minister of Iraq had informed the Director General that there was no material intended for non-peaceful purposes in his country and that all nuclear material there had been under the safeguards of, and was thus known to, the Agency. Nevertheless, the Agency had asked Iraq to send a fresh list of that material, which Iraq had done on 27 April 1991.

22. Second, the first inspection team, which had arrived in Iraq on 14 May 1991, had inspected all nuclear material and the installations located at the nuclear research centre and those 10 kilometres away from there. In addition, they had inspected another site designated by the United Nations Special Commission. The head of the team had reported that the presence of nuclear material under Agency safeguards had been verified and that there had been no loss or diversion of any part thereof for other uses.

23. Third, the second team had begun its inspection in Iraq on 22 June 1991 and had again inspected the installations at the Tuwaitha site and those 10 kilometres away, as well as a site designated by the Special Commission. That visit had coincided with the Feast of Great Bairam, one of the most important Islamic holidays, and some problems had arisen because most of the responsible officials had been absent and especially because the team had wanted to enter military sites without the prior agreement of the military authorities. The matter had been greatly exaggerated in spite of the fact that the Foreign Minister of Iraq had personally received the inspection team and tried to explain the situation.

24. Fourth, immediately after the visit of the high-level mission, including the Agency's Director General, on 29 June 1991, orders had been issued to all Iraqi military and civilian authorities asking them to co-operate fully with the inspection teams and to facilitate their entry into all sites which they wished to inspect without prior notice.

25. Fifth, the third team had begun its inspection in Iraq on 7 July 1991 and had encountered no difficulty in entering all the installations and sites it wanted to inspect. An assurance to that effect had been contained in the Foreign Minister's letter of 7 July 1991 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which had supplied a full list of all nuclear installations and material and indicated progress made in the uranium enrichment programme. The latter programme had been in the stage of research and development and had not reached that of production, as the Director General had reported to the Conference on 16 September.

26. In its report the third inspection team had noted that it had met with full co-operation from the Iraqi authorities, who had provided all the information requested and had replied to all queries. He wished to stress that the information had been provided by Iraq voluntarily in compliance with resolution 687(1991) and had not been uncovered by the inspection teams, as had been claimed.

27. Sixth, starting 27 July 1991, the fourth team had inspected the same sites which had been visited by the third team and put the same questions to the Iraqi authorities. It had submitted another report containing theories, surmises and speculations of a predominantly political character and drawing conclusions lacking any scientific or technical basis. In that connection, it was worth recalling the fourth team's statement that it had found no conclusive evidence as to the existence of weaponization activities. That finding totally contradicted what the Director General had said on the subject in his statement to the Conference.

28. Indulging in conjecture was inconsistent with the task assigned to the Agency by the Security Council in its resolution 687(1991), which had clearly requested the Agency to carry out on-site inspection of installations declared by Iraq and those designated by the Special Commission. Instead of speculating, the teams should have adhered to the limits set by the Security

Council and requested access to any site which they considered necessary to enter in order to accomplish the given stage of their work. If inspections were to be based on false expectations, the operation would go on for ever.

29. It must not be forgotten that the inspection activities had been carried out under difficult conditions created by the bombing of Iraq by the Allied forces, in the course of which more explosives and bombs had been used than throughout the Second World War. A large part of that bombing had been directed at nuclear installations in Iraq, resulting in the complete destruction of the installations, including those under Agency safeguards. Those who pretended to defend safeguards were the very people who had acted to undermine the foundation of the system and to discredit it.

30. On the basis of the information which Iraq had provided voluntarily, the Director General had convened a special meeting of the Board of Governors on 18 July 1991 and reported to it on what he had called non-compliance by Iraq with its obligations under the safeguards agreement - because it had produced half a kilogram of 4%-enriched uranium. On that occasion, Iraq had made the following points:

(1) The quantity of uranium in question was of no significance and should not cause any concern whatever from the practical point of view;

(2) The uranium enrichment facilities were still incomplete.

Mr. Zifferero, the Agency's Action Team Leader, had estimated that those facilities would have taken at least 18 months to reach the production stage. Neither the NPT nor the safeguards agreement required Iraq to inform the Agency of the construction of any nuclear installation. All that was required under the safeguards agreement was to provide design information at least six months - and not 18 months - before nuclear material was introduced into a new facility;

(3) In applying safeguards the criteria followed must be the same for all States.

In that connection, he wished to cite two examples showing how different and discriminatory criteria had been applied to different cases. Security Council resolution 487(1981), which had been adopted unanimously and which had called upon Israel to place all its

installations under safeguards, had been left on the shelf without ever being complied with. But the United States or other delegations had made no mention of that, whereas they had devoted so much time to Iraq. Nor had the Director General in his report referred to Israel, although the Conference's agenda contained an item on that country's nuclear capabilities.

In 1985 the Agency had discovered that Luxembourg had exported 41 tons of depleted uranium to Israel without notifying the Agency, in clear contravention of the safeguards agreement under which Luxembourg had been obliged to do so in order that the Agency could apply safeguards to that material in Israel, regardless of whether the latter was or was not a party to the NPT. He wondered why in that case of clear violation no steps had been taken by the Board. Some delegations might have been unaware of the incident, since it had not been publicized in the same way as the case against Iraq was being spotlighted at present. He wondered where all those tons of uranium had gone. Were they under Agency control or were they regarded as safe as long as they were in Israeli hands?

(4) Iraq's declaration of the enrichment plant and handing over of half a kilogram of low-enriched uranium was a sufficient corrective step, and it had asked the Agency to regard it as such. But under political pressure with hostile designs against the people of Iraq, the Board had adopted a resolution against Iraq, which was now before the Conference.

31. With reference to the production of three grams of plutonium, he considered that the issue should not have been dealt with in the manner in which it had been treated at the Board's meeting the preceding week, since the relevant information had been contained in the Iraqi Foreign Minister's letter of 7 July 1991 to the United Nations Secretary-General and had therefore been known before the Board's meeting on 18 July. Iraq's declaration of that production had been an expression of its sincere commitment to comply with the Board's resolution of 18 July 1991. Why should that be held against Iraq rather than being regarded as something in its favour?

32. He considered it important that the real intentions behind the manoeuvres against Iraq should be exposed. The Director General had reported to the Security Council the so-called non-compliance by Iraq with its obligations under the safeguards agreement even before the special meeting of the Board on 18 July 1991. The resolution adopted by the Board had also been transmitted to the Security Council, which had then adopted measures on the subject. That being so, he failed to see any need to bring the matter before the General Conference again. The Board was the only body competent to deal with non-compliance with safeguards obligations, not the General Conference. It might be asked why the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia or other Western countries were overzealous about passing a new resolution on the same topic. There was clearly a political purpose, namely to find excuses in the Security Council to put obstacles in the way of any attempts to lift the blockade against the people of Iraq. He strongly objected to the Agency being used for such inhumane political purposes. That was incompatible with the Agency's functions, which were to make atomic energy serve mankind and contribute to its prosperity.

33. Iraq was conscious of its responsibilities as a Member of the Agency and therefore could not but feel concerned to see that the organization was deviating increasingly from the objectives enshrined in its Statute and that it was progressively becoming an agency for armament control rather than one seeking to accelerate and enlarge the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind, as had been conceived by President Eisenhower in the Atoms for Peace programme of 1953.

34. The real purpose behind the United States' campaign against Iraq was not what President Bush had indicated in his message to the General Conference but to safeguard the security of Israel, as General Schwarzkopf had made clear.

35. Nevertheless, his country persisted in its hope that Member States would ensure that the Agency carried out the functions for which it had been established - by concentrating on its technical co-operation and nuclear safety programmes and thereby strengthening confidence in the role of atomic energy in meeting the energy needs of States.

36. In conclusion, he welcomed the new members of the Agency and in particular the sister Republic of Yemen.

37. Mr. ALP (Turkey) reaffirmed his country's commitment to the Agency's Statute and to strengthening the Agency's important role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and in promoting international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear technologies. The Agency had proved that it was one of the most vital international organizations, and could adapt itself to rapid technological changes and the requirements of the new international environment.

38. Since the previous session of the General Conference, the world had witnessed rapid and dramatic changes in East-West relations, which had contributed to the winding down of the arms race in general and to nuclear disarmament in particular. However, the war in the Gulf region had posed new dangers to peace and stability, and the importance of Agency safeguards had once again been highlighted. The Agency, as expected, had risen to the occasion and effectively fulfilled its role.

39. His Government strongly supported the safeguards regime and believed it should be implemented in an even more effective and productive manner in the coming years. The Department of Safeguards should continue its studies concerning possible improvement of the present regime, particularly in view of the growing number of facilities subject to safeguards inspection. It was also vital that the nuclear supplier States should require full safeguards on their new supply arrangements.

40. Turkey attached great importance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which over a twenty-year period had proved a strong and effective barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. Hoping that those countries with significant nuclear facilities which had not yet done so would join the Treaty as soon as possible, his Government welcomed the accession of France to the NPT, the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to conclude a safeguards agreement, and the signing of an agreement by South Africa. It urged the other non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so to make a legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to accept Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities. Should any doubt arise about the commitment of any State Party to the NPT, the Agency should not hesitate to take all the necessary international action.

His Government would welcome a study by the Agency of a special inspection procedure for such cases, as already proposed by many other States Parties.

41. With regard to the chronic problem of unjustified non-accreditation of safeguards inspectors, he said that that unacceptable practice was continuing despite repeated appeals to correct the situation. For example, in view of the negative attitude of at least one Member State, Turkish nationals were not granted accreditation to the Agency's list of safeguards inspectors for non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the European Community. He regretted that political decisions, taken by some Member States individually or as a block, should thus hamper the Agency's activities. Turkey was left with no alternative but to retaliate by refusing accreditation to inspectors from the States concerned, as the only available means of drawing attention to such discriminatory practices.

42. The Agency had performed remarkably well in placing increased emphasis on nuclear safety matters on the basis of lessons learned from the Chernobyl disaster. However, the Agency's role in nuclear safety and radiological protection was still limited and it was the responsibility of individual Governments to ensure full and strict implementation of the Agency's rules and guidelines.

43. Turkey, like many other States, was deeply concerned about the poor condition of some of the older nuclear reactors in its region and welcomed the Agency's activities for the assessment and improvement of the safety of WWER-type reactors, particularly those at Kozloduy and Bohunice. Although a complete shutdown of those reactors would create serious energy crises for Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, an accident could have dire consequences for all States. Turkey fully supported international co-operation on the safety aspects of nuclear energy, which was a vital component of global energy policy. It also welcomed the recent Agency initiatives to implement a programme for reviewing the operational safety of other older reactor types.

44. In view of increasing energy consumption worldwide and the high level of public awareness of ecological issues, including the impact of energy production on the environment, nuclear energy had to be considered in the context of future policies regarding energy supply and environmental

protection. Nuclear power was certainly a potential source of problems, including the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and the danger of radioactive wastes, but the contribution of nuclear energy to the general energy picture could not be denied. Efforts on energy conservation and development of new energy sources thus remained of primary importance. Some of the views put forward largely by non-governmental organizations were neither ideal solutions nor even arguments for possible solutions. However, increasing energy needs and use should not necessarily result in increased pollution. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development offered the most appropriate forum to discuss overall questions relating to environmental and energy issues. All efforts should be directed at finding an acceptable balance between the need to produce energy and the ensuing environmental effects, despite the difficulties involved.

45. One important aspect of environmental conservation was the need to ensure the highest possible degree of coverage for liability for nuclear damage, which should include damage to the environment. Further efforts were needed to establish a comprehensive and universal regime in that area.

46. Turkey appreciated the Agency's provision of technical assistance, including its activities to minimize the negative impact of nuclear waste. A national programme for the management of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes had been established in Turkey with Agency support to handle wastes from various applications throughout the country. In addition, Turkey had hosted several regional training courses, research co-ordination meetings and Agency workshops on nuclear electronics, industrial radiation sterilization, seismic data for the siting and revalidation of nuclear facilities, food irradiation and the management of radioactive wastes from hospitals and other nuclear applications. His country would continue, to the extent of its capabilities, to contribute to the successful implementation of the Agency's activities in the years ahead.

Mr. Loosch (Germany) took the Chair.

47. Mr. ALER (Sweden), welcoming the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Yemen as new Member States of the Agency, said that, since the previous session of the General Conference, world events had moved at an

unprecedented pace potentially influencing the Agency's activities in many ways. The ideals of democracy, freedom and human rights had been instrumental in bringing about those changes, and the United Nations had proved its ability to support peace and development.

48. There had been remarkable and encouraging progress in global efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons: the decisions of France and China to adhere to the NPT were particularly welcome, in that as a result, all declared nuclear-weapon States would soon be parties to the Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. The accession of Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa to the NPT was also welcome since it paved the way for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The agreement between Argentina and Brazil was another important contribution to non-proliferation, and it was to be hoped that the negotiations on comprehensive safeguards conducted by those countries with the Agency would reach a speedy conclusion. The prestige and authority of the NPT had been strengthened by all those developments, and it seemed that regional agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and elsewhere might prove to be the best way of achieving global coverage of the system. In that context, he urged States Parties to the NPT to conclude and implement the required safeguards agreements with the Agency without delay if they had not yet done so.

49. Verification was the key element in any arms limitation undertaking, and the non-proliferation regime was founded on the Agency's safeguards system. He was firmly convinced that a legally binding commitment to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy was a prerequisite for its utilization. Complete transparency for all nuclear activities through Agency full-scope safeguards was the best way of verifying that commitment. It was logical to make all partners in international co-operation and trade subject to full-scope safeguards, and he urged all nuclear suppliers to adopt that policy, for the nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility in that respect. That policy had in no way hampered his own country's development and use of nuclear energy.

50. Against that background, Iraq's failure to honour its commitments under the NPT and the safeguards agreement with the Agency had been a shock. The

Board of Governors had condemned Iraq's non-compliance and, as required by the Statute, brought it to the attention of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the General Conference. The violation of the agreement was particularly serious since it did not appear to have been caused by any oversight or administrative error but was the result of a deliberate attempt to mislead the Agency's inspectors and pursue clandestine activities proscribed by the letter and spirit of the NPT.

51. To maintain the credibility of Agency safeguards, it was imperative to re-examine the implementation of the safeguards agreements and national trade regulations in that field. A study on that topic had been initiated after the previous NPT Review Conference, and the work had received a fresh impetus from the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 and 707.

52. Although the scope and frequency of the Agency's inspections might need to be changed, focusing particularly upon areas where the risks of diversion were greatest, and although new materials, equipment and installations should perhaps be included in the interests of a more comprehensive picture of the nuclear activities of States, the basis of a more rigorous regime must be a willingness to allow full transparency for all peaceful nuclear activities by all States. The Statute and the existing safeguards agreements entitled the Director General and the Board of Governors to undertake close scrutiny if needed, and the Agency could also exercise its right of access to the Security Council.

53. His country, like all others he hoped, was prepared to accept stricter regulations. The nuclear-weapon States also should agree to submit their peaceful nuclear activities to Agency safeguards, with full reporting to the IAEA as a first step.

54. It was inevitable that greater resources would be required for the Agency's future safeguards activities. Although every opportunity for simplifying and supporting inspections must be sought through technical developments and extended collaboration with regional and national safeguards regimes, the Agency had a legally binding obligation to discharge its safeguards responsibilities. The reliability of the safeguards system must not be left in doubt. While the scope and volume of safeguards might change in

ways impossible to predict in the long term, the financing of those activities had to be secured. Accordingly, it was disappointing to note that the negotiations on a new safeguards financing arrangement had not yet come to fruition, though he hoped that all Members would approach the remaining tasks with an open mind and determination to achieve results.

55. The recent International Safety Conference in Vienna had covered an area of the Agency's activities which was of increasing significance, and its conclusions and recommendations had specified many topics for national and international action in the coming years. The recommendation by the Board that the Director General should prepare an outline of the contents of a possible nuclear safety convention, drawing upon the advice of standing groups and other expertise from Member States was particularly welcome.

56. The Nordic countries had drawn attention to the need for additional work on the management of all categories of radioactive waste and spent fuel from power and research reactors; there seemed to be a requirement for legally binding agreements on the governing principles in that area. It was only logical for that work to be carried out under the auspices of the Agency and for the results to be included in a framework convention on nuclear safety, which might also transform the agreed Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste into a legally binding instrument.

57. Technical assistance and co-operation were prominent among the Agency's activities, and there was an increasing demand for assistance from developing Member States, in particular in non-power applications such as medicine, radiological protection, agriculture, environmental protection, hydrology and industry. The system of financing those activities needed reassessing in view of the uncertainty surrounding pledges and payments to the TACF, a particularly disturbing development in areas such as nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. The Agency's work for developing countries should preferably be financed from the Regular Budget. His country, for its part, had pledged its full share of the target for the TACF in 1992, and owing to its high regard for the competence and efficiency of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities, his country was making extrabudgetary contributions larger even than that share.

58. The wider co-operation between the Agency and other United Nations specialized agencies, in particular FAO, WHO and UNEP, was welcome. In view of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) to be held in 1992, the whole United Nations system must be mobilized towards work on the "Agenda 21" action plan, and the Agency should re-examine its role with regard to sustainable development and environmental protection.

59. Since the financial restraint currently being exercised by most countries made it difficult for the Agency to meet the many demands placed upon it, he welcomed the agreement to prepare a Medium-Term Plan for the years 1993-98, which would help to reassess programmes and thus release resources for new, high priority tasks.

60. Mr. O CHANG (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) commended the Agency on successfully carrying out its mission to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy for world peace and the welfare of mankind in 1990, and endorsed the Agency's Annual Report for that year.

61. In view of his country's economic progress and the attendant rise in production, increased energy supplies were urgently required. Power plants using various energy sources, including hydropower stations, thermopower plants and nuclear power plants were being built during the third seven-year plan (1987-1993) to meet a goal of generating 100 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually. A project was under way for the construction of a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 1.76 million kilowatts, and siting problems were reaching the final stage of solution.

62. Great efforts were also being made to introduce nuclear methods into industry, agriculture, public health and other areas of the national economy. Many factories and enterprises made extensive use of radioactive isotopes in the monitoring and control of production processes, the quality control of products and in analysis. Locally-made radioactive flaw detectors, densimeters and various kinds of radiation instrument had been introduced to assist with the management of production processes. In agriculture, various tracers were used to study the effectiveness of fertilizers in order to help increase grain yields and the growth of plants.

63. The national public health system's requirements for various radioisotopes used in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases were increasing. In order to facilitate the domestic production of isotopes for medical use, a cyclotron was currently under construction with technical co-operation from the Agency.

64. Owing to the extensive use of nuclear methods and isotopes in various fields of the national economy, close attention to nuclear safety and environmental protection was required, including enhancement of the technical abilities of personnel dealing with radioactive materials, the training of specialists and the revision of the relevant regulations.

65. Two training courses, the "National Workshop on State Infrastructure for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection" and the "National Training Course on Non-Destructive Testing" had been held in Pyongyang, with technical assistance from the Agency. Those courses had made a substantial contribution towards increasing the use of nuclear methods and isotopes and hence developing the national economy.

66. The Korean nation, which, together with the Japanese nation, had suffered greatly from the nuclear disaster in August 1945, was categorically opposed to nuclear weapons. His Government, in view of its noble desire to remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean Peninsula and contribute to durable peace and security in his country, in Asia and in the rest of the world, had put forward a proposal to turn the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

67. According to that proposal, the North and South of Korea should make a joint declaration on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. The United States, the Soviet Union and China should then legally guarantee the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Peninsula once a declaration had been adopted to that effect. The non-nuclear-weapon States in Asia should support and respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsula and assist in achieving that aim at the earliest possible date.

68. The nuclear weapons deployed in the Republic of Korea posed a serious threat to the existence of his own country and constituted a great danger to peace and security in Asia and the world. Prompt withdrawal of nuclear

weapons from the south of the Korean Peninsula and the early cessation of all military exercises, including provocative nuclear military exercises, were urgent tasks requiring immediate attention in order to turn the Peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Achievement of that aim would strengthen the non-proliferation system and make a substantial contribution to consolidating peace and security in Asia and throughout the world. It would also create favourable conditions for establishing a broader nuclear-weapon-free zone in North East Asia. All peace-loving countries would surely pay close attention to that proposal and extend their full support to his people's struggle to prevent the danger of nuclear war.

69. During the general debate, several delegations had raised the issue of safeguards and nuclear activities in his country, although it had already on many occasions declared that it had no intention of developing nuclear weapons and had no capability to do so. His Government had requested the United States of America to facilitate conclusion of a safeguards agreement by removing the nuclear threat which endangered his country's right to survival. That demand was in no way contradictory to the ideas of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet the United States had not so far taken any positive action. If the United States sincerely wished to settle the safeguards issue with his country, it should first withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea and make a legally binding commitment not to use nuclear weapons. His country was willing to hold official intergovernmental negotiations with the United States either in Vienna or in Geneva for that purpose. Any attempt to exert international pressure on his country, which valued its sovereignty and which consistently endeavoured to implement its obligations under the NPT, would not be conducive to resolving the safeguards issue but, on the contrary, would only cause difficulties.

70. The South Korean delegate had referred to the safeguards agreement issue in his statement. Yet the south Korean authorities, contrary to the desire of all Korean people, had invited foreign nuclear weapons into the Korean Peninsula, thereby threatening the very survival of the Democratic People's Republic. The South Korean authorities had therefore lost the right to discuss the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and should take full responsibility for converting the Republic of Korea into a base for a foreign

State's nuclear weapons. The only way in which the South Korean authorities could contribute to an early solution of the safeguards problem was by demanding the withdrawal of the United States nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and joining the North in its efforts to turn the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

71. In conclusion, his delegation confirmed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would continue to develop its co-operative relations with the Agency and would faithfully carry out its obligations.

72. Mr. LOUHANAPESY (Indonesia) said that his Government was pleased that France and China had declared their intention to adhere to the NPT and wished to welcome Yemen, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as new Members of the Agency.

73. While the present dramatic changes in the world might affect the Agency in some ways, it ought not to be seriously hindered in fulfilling its statutory functions and should endeavour to contribute to creating an atmosphere of reconciliation and mutual understanding in regions where conflicts and tension still prevailed.

74. With regard to nuclear applications, Indonesia had in the past placed emphasis on areas such as agriculture, health care and industry, which it considered of greatest relevance to human needs as well as significant sources of revenue. In its plant-breeding projects, for instance, it had been successful in improving varieties of rice, soya bean and mung bean. Progress had also been achieved in irradiation technology, both on the research side and in terms of public acceptance, the latter thanks to an extensive public information campaign. A private company was currently engaged on the construction of a commercial irradiator for medical sterilization with a view to commissioning early in 1992.

75. Nuclear techniques were also becoming established in hydrology, where radiotracers were being used to study sediment movement, in geothermal exploration in the search for renewable energy resources and in the re-exploitation of abandoned oil wells. In particular, the use of radiotracers in harbour dredging had resulted in a saving of millions of dollars.

76. In the field of nuclear medicine and biology, Indonesian institutes were making great progress. He was pleased to announce, in that connection, that the Fifth Asia and Oceania Congress of Nuclear Medicine and Biology was to be held in Indonesia in October 1992.

77. Having decided that nuclear power was a viable option, Indonesia had recently awarded a contract to a Japanese company to conduct a study with a view to the construction of the country's first nuclear power plant. The necessary personnel would be drawn from the nuclear industrial complex in Serpong, where they had gained considerable experience, particularly with respect to the safety aspects of plant operation. In that connection, a radiometallurgy and engineering safety laboratory had recently been opened at the Serpong complex. In addition, the Serpong facilities had been used in a number of international and regional training courses and seminars organized in co-operation with the Agency.

78. Indonesia's national energy plan provided for electricity generation based on hydropower, coal and nuclear power, with synthetic fuel and electricity being used in industry and microhydropower, gas and solar energy being used for household purposes. The nuclear programme was based on a plan formulated by the National Atomic Energy Agency and covered a 15-year period with provision for annual revisions. The Agency's Medium-Term Plan should be similarly flexible to allow for shifts of emphasis in the future.

79. His Government was aware of the great importance of safety, but wished to point out the prohibitive costs for many developing countries of introducing new safety features on an excessively large scale. In its technical assistance endeavours, the Agency was called upon to help such countries to strike a balance between the demands of safety and financial constraints.

80. Still on the subject of technical assistance, he was pleased to note that the Agency was making unprecedented progress in that area of its activities. It was gratifying that increasing numbers of experts from Indonesia had been entrusted to act as consultants in other developing countries.

81. Indonesia had benefited greatly from RCA activities in the past and fully supported the new UNDP project proposal concerning the use of isotopes and radiation to strengthen technology and support environmentally sustainable development.

82. As a signatory of the NPT, Indonesia supported full-scope safeguards. Recent events had demonstrated that efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system would be fully justified. However, before any new measures were implemented, the rules and procedures governing them should be clearly defined. For its part, Indonesia was hoping to contribute towards security in its own region through the establishment of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" based chiefly on the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free area. It would welcome the establishment of any other such zones throughout the world, the Middle East being an area of particular relevance in that regard.

83. Finally, he stressed the need to protect the Agency from political pressures and to allow it to draft a more balanced budget based on a widely approved Medium-Term Plan.

84. Mr. KABBAJ (Morocco) wished, first of all, to greet Yemen, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as new Members of the Agency.

85. He pointed out that the world's growing energy needs, compounded by successive crises with serious effects on the international petroleum market, made nuclear power one of the most efficient and economic alternative sources of energy, apart from its being environmentally the least dangerous. The use of nuclear energy for power production had been a major technological success during the preceding 30 years, with the result that nuclear power now accounted for 17% of the world's electricity output. Aware of its potential, many developing countries, and in particular those with no fossil fuel resources, had undertaken studies on nuclear power projects with a view to gradually reducing their oil imports, which impeded their economic development. However, the problems of financing and acquiring the necessary technology stood in the way of realizing those projects. In that connection, Morocco appreciated the Agency's assistance to developing countries in the planning and implementation of their nuclear power programmes and commended

the efforts of other international agencies to solve the financial difficulties.

86. For the purpose of mitigating the financial and technological problems, and to strengthen co-operation between States, Morocco suggested that a study should be carried out on joint nuclear power projects shared by neighbouring countries. Such projects would be consistent with regional co-operation projects which the Agency had been promoting in recent years and which aimed at pooling scientific, technical, industrial and financial resources for joint endeavour.

87. The issue of nuclear safety and radiation protection continued to be a major preoccupation for both the public and the authorities to the extent that further development of nuclear power had become subject to absolute mastery over safety and in particular protection from nuclear hazards. Within the framework of international co-operation, which was urgently necessary in that area, the Agency had a basic role to play in the matter of exchange of information, dissemination of knowledge and creation of a climate for exchange of experience. In that connection, he welcomed the results of the International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power held recently in Vienna.

88. The Kingdom of Morocco attached great importance to and was keenly interested in the Agency's activities and recommendations relating to standards and regulations for nuclear safety and radiation protection. Those activities of the Agency should have absolute priority so that the Member States in need could acquire as speedily as possible the necessary human, technical and organizational resources. He considered, therefore, that the Agency should continue to satisfy the requirements for services under the RAPAT programme, in particular by expanding the scope of assistance in the area of radiation protection.

89. Morocco was at present co-operating with the Agency in the establishment of a national radiation protection centre, which would be concerned with the health protection of workers, safety of the environment and training of radiation protection specialists.

90. His country supported the Agency's efforts in the area of nuclear waste management, especially those relating to the establishment of national programmes on the subject. Furthermore, the adoption of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Nuclear Waste in 1990 had been an important step towards the conclusion of an international convention under the Agency's aegis.

91. As for the effects of nuclear accidents on neighbouring countries, Morocco considered it very important that bilateral co-operation agreements be concluded between such States, particularly those operating nuclear power plants, with a view to exchange of information and creation of mechanisms to be utilized in the case of a radiological emergency.

92. At his country's request the Agency had co-operated in evaluating the assistance which it had provided during 1980-90. The evaluation had shown that the assistance had generated satisfactory effects, which would certainly lead to the development of national scientific and technical capabilities and infrastructure. That would also help to identify new approaches to the improvement of nuclear techniques and areas where co-operation between Morocco and the Agency could be expanded.

93. With regard to Morocco's nuclear power programme, he announced that detailed technical and safety studies in connection with the selection of a site for the first nuclear power plant were under way. The feasibility and techno-economic studies were also continuing. In that context, a nuclear power planning advisory team had visited Morocco the preceding year and made a comprehensive evaluation of the capabilities and capacities for a nuclear power programme. The results of that mission would be very useful for further studies and planning in relation to such a programme. At the same time, work was in full swing on the establishment of the National Centre for Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, which would have a 1.5 MW TRIGA Mark II research reactor.

94. His Government noted with satisfaction the important role played by the Agency's technical assistance in the promotion of nuclear techniques. Without that assistance many countries would hardly have achieved what they had done in the nuclear field.

95. Particular mention should be made of multisectoral uses of nuclear techniques in the five continents and the promotion of regional projects under the Agency's auspices. He considered that, since it had gained substantial experience in that field, the African continent also should benefit from similar projects which met its requirements.

96. Morocco attached particular importance to the implementation of two regional projects, one of which was on nuclear desalination of sea water in North Africa, while the other came under AFRA. He appealed to all Member States to provide the necessary support to those projects, which were important for the economic and social development of the peoples of the region.

97. Lastly, his Government welcomed the change in the position of an important group of Member States, some of which had announced their accession to and others their willingness to sign the NPT. At the same time, he deplored Israel's persistent refusal to sign the Treaty, which revealed its motives and clearly indicated the real dimensions of the danger facing the region as a whole.

98. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) joined other delegations in congratulating Yemen, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on their admission to the Agency.

99. He observed that the Syrian nuclear programme, which had started in 1979 with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, was a modest one and had been developed with the co-operation, advice and guidance of the Agency. His Government was grateful to the Agency for the equipment and materials, experts' services and training facilities which it had provided in that connection. Syria was proud of its achievements in establishing a technical infrastructure, and he was especially happy to note that the Agency's Secretariat was satisfied that his country's programme and activities were devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture, geology, biology and industry. He hoped that the trust between the Agency and the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission would continue to develop even though Syria had not signed a full-scope safeguards agreement.

100. His Government was seriously studying the question of signing such an agreement, having regard to the developments in the United Nations and in the

Agency, the new international trends and the conditions prevailing in the region, especially the position of Israel, which had thus far refused to be a party to the NPT and to sign a full-scope safeguards agreement. In that context, it must be borne in mind that Israel had nuclear weapons and was a threat to the security of the region.

101. His country had been a party to the NPT for more than 22 years, thereby demonstrating the importance it attached to the Treaty and its sincerity about peace and security. It had declared in the past and wished to do so now that it would not hesitate for a second before signing a full-scope safeguards agreement as soon as such an agreement had been signed by the countries in the region and in particular Israel. Syria had also declared to the Agency that it was willing to conclude a partial safeguards agreement in respect of every nuclear installation requiring such an agreement which might be built in its territory. Since at present there was no nuclear installation in Syria that required inspection, conclusion of a partial safeguards agreement would virtually put it on a par with a State which had signed a full-scope agreement. He hoped, therefore, that the Agency would understand that fact and that Syrian projects would be supported by the Agency.

102. The recent war in the Middle East with its international dimensions had proven the truth of what had been pointed out repeatedly over the preceding years in justifying the inclusion of the item on Israeli nuclear capabilities in the agenda of the General Conference. The Member States should approach that issue in the same way as they would approach the nuclear capability of any other State in the region. The situation in the Middle East was highly explosive and would remain so unless a solution was found to the basic problems there, including that of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological. For that reason, Syria appealed once again to the General Conference to take a positive decision on the matter so as to put pressure on Israel to accept safeguards, recalling that application of pressure by the United Nations, the IAEA and the international community had ultimately been successful in the case of South Africa.

103. He regretted that, owing to the events in the region, the Director General had been unable to conduct further consultations during the year with

a view to arriving at a practical approach in connection with the implementation of resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/526 and hoped that the year 1992 would be more propitious for that purpose.

104. In his opinion, the Secretariat should concentrate on the simplest general model, namely that each country in the region should be a party to the NPT and conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement, instead of going into various theoretical models, as it had done in document GOV/2511, for such an exercise would entail loss of time. That was the conclusion reached by a United Nations team of experts which had recently studied the matter on the spot.

105. Referring to what was called the New World Order, which was talked about so much in the press, he pointed out that Syria, too, was in favour of such an order. While mankind rejoiced at the end of the cold war and at détente and supported the international efforts to guarantee human rights and to put an end to international terrorism, a world order based on those principles alone would be weak and would not satisfy the aspirations of the world community as a whole. He therefore considered that a new world order should be built on three principles: first, guarantee for the right of individuals to a life of freedom, democracy and sufficiency; second, guarantee for the right of nations to national sovereignty and independence and to development; third, guarantee for the right of mankind to a planet free of pollution, and of threats of mass destruction.

106. He observed that talks about human rights had reached exaggerated proportions, even though man was a small and transitory being, while nothing was being said about a bigger and permanent entity - the nation. History, especially very recent history, had shown that the nation as a living being demanded recognition of its nationhood and its independence, regardless of whether it had been annexed or occupied or whatever.

107. If the Great Powers guaranteed those three rights, progress would be made towards a human community governed by trust, confidence and co-operation, away from hegemony and monopoly. For that purpose, it was necessary to find radical and just solutions to problems in the hotbeds of world tension. Only then would conditions be created for a new human community with a new lasting and living world order.

108. If the situation in the nuclear area was examined in the context of that new international order, as some Member States of the Agency wished, it was found that the nuclear regime was short-sighted and unbalanced, marred by tensions and lack of trust. The safeguards system was a palliative that treated the external symptoms but did not cure. If the Agency concentrated on that aspect, it was bound sooner or later to become an agency for inspection and control. Such a trend would be a historic mistake for the Agency because it would be based on distrust, whereas a permanent and living new international order needed trust and the building of that trust required other basic treatments.

109. By focusing on safeguards and by relegating other activities to second place, the Agency would be putting the cart before the horse because those activities had to be carried out first and every State must exercise its right to acquire nuclear science and technology on its own and with the assistance and support of developing and developed countries as well as the Agency. He hoped that safeguards would not become a means of monopolizing nuclear science and technology. A community that contained a monopolist was restless and was lacking in trust. And it was trust that was lacking at the international, regional and local levels. If trust had existed, there would have been no need for safeguards, and the small differences which had required discussion for more than ten years at sessions of the General Conference, including the issue of amendment of Article VI of the Statute and of the staffing of the Secretariat, would have been irrelevant. Therefore, he called upon the international community to break new ground in co-operation and to help create a new living and lasting international order in which trust would be the basic criterion and thereby to lift the Agency from the level of formalities and trivialities to become a model of international confidence.

110. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the advanced countries, which boasted about democracy, would themselves practise that democracy in relation to nations so that every State could enjoy its right to international representation and to science, technology, development, sovereignty and independence. Only then would everyone enjoy the benefits of a new living and lasting international order.

111. Mr. PAREJA CUCALON (Ecuador) said that the world-changing events of the past few years had revealed the Agency's effectiveness and shown its outstanding leadership in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Nuclear non-proliferation was a matter of singular importance and, in that regard, he reaffirmed that Ecuador, in keeping with its pacifist policies, had acceded to all the relevant international instruments. He expressed his country's great concern to see safeguards universally accepted and all nuclear installations used for peaceful and appropriate purposes.

112. His delegation was gratified by the agreement reached between Argentina and Brazil, which meant that Latin America would soon be protected under the Tlatelolco Treaty, and free of the threat of nuclear weapons. In the spirit of universal application of safeguards and the peaceful uses of atomic energy, his delegation wished to welcome Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Yemen to membership of the Agency. He also stressed the importance of the announcements by France and China that, in principle, they intended to accede to the NPT, and said that South Africa's ratification of that Treaty with the Agency was of great international significance.

113. He expressed his delegation's approval of the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency and looked forward to it being speedily concluded and brought into force. Likewise, he was confident that full compliance with Security Council resolution 687 would soon be achieved.

114. He noted that, while safeguards agreements were very important, the Agency should not forget the terms of Article III of its Statute "to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world". Technical assistance was a highly significant field which must not be sacrificed to the sole advantage of safeguards activities. It had to be said, also, that despite the Secretariat's efforts, the numbers of specialists from developing countries on the Agency's staff were still low, particularly in the higher grades.

115. His country placed special emphasis on conservation of the environment, the inheritance of future generations. It had the largest area in the region given over to national parks, protected woodland and wildlife, amounting

to 38% of its national territory. Ecuador was actively collaborating with international organizations to set up an environmental control laboratory in the Amazon region and was the pioneer in the region of the use of unleaded petrol to reduce air pollution.

116. His delegation believed that, at both regional and subregional level, the work of the ARCAL programme was of great importance in ensuring the free flow of technology, and his country would continue to offer its most resolute support.

117. Thanks to the importance accorded by his Government to the activities of the Ecuadorian Atomic Energy Commission and the assistance provided by the Agency, he was able to announce the opening of the Laboratory for Geochemistry and Radiochemical Fractionation and Distribution. Techniques had been developed, in partnership with centres of higher education, for exploiting deposits of uranium in conjunction with vanadium. In areas of research such as ecotoxicology, mutations in barley, assistance in nuclear techniques for farmers and ranchers, and technology for archaeological and cultural research, important successes had been attained. Demand was growing in his country for non-destructive testing, such as the programme for determining underwater corrosion and quality control in civil engineering. The Atomic Energy Commission had begun to participate in the field of isotope hydrology, in close collaboration with the competent authorities, to measure leaks, seepage and sedimentation in Ecuador's lakes.

118. In the field of nuclear medicine, a great deal of effort had been invested at a number of public hospitals, bringing the benefits of modern diagnostic and therapeutic techniques to the poorer parts of the population. At the same time, the radiological protection programme had been improved considerably. The Centre for Nuclear Information had much extended the application of nuclear techniques in the fields of - inter alia - induced mutations and pest control.

119. The excellent results obtained by the Atomic Energy Commission compelled his delegation to express once more its appreciation to the IAEA and to friendly States for their generous and extensive collaboration in the various activities, all of which were profoundly humane and social in their content.

120. Mr. DALKHSUREN (Mongolia) said that his delegation welcomed the Republics of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Yemen to membership of the Agency and was ready to collaborate with them in all aspects of the Agency's activities.

121. In the year since the previous session of the General Conference, the Agency had made remarkable progress in furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world and had accomplished much to help Member States develop nuclear power and apply nuclear techniques.

122. The Agency's work in organizing international co-operation on nuclear safety, assisting with research into the disposal and treatment of nuclear waste, and strengthening radiation safety had won the widespread approval of its Member States. The Agency should be thanked for the measures it had taken to increase the effectiveness of its technical co-operation projects, to make efficient use of the resources allocated to them, and also to evaluate their results. Moreover, the combined efforts of Member States and the Secretariat had enabled the Agency to play an effective role in implementing safeguards.

123. It was becoming more widely realized that the use of organic fuels produced a latent effect on the climate and the environment. Nuclear energy would be essential in lowering pollution levels in the atmosphere and reducing the greenhouse effect.

124. In that regard, the Agency should continue its comparative research into the risks and consequences associated with the use of nuclear energy and other forms of energy, so that the community would come to a wider recognition of the advantages of nuclear power, based on convincing scientific evidence.

125. For many developing countries, the Agency's programme of assistance in the application of nuclear techniques and the development and uses of nuclear power was highly significant. The Agency should take account of their needs and allocate an appropriate share of its programme and budget to them.

126. His delegation was pleased to express its support for the Agency's mainstream activities related to safeguards, nuclear and radiological safety, nuclear power, technical co-operation, the environment and INIS.

127. Noting the success of the Agency's activities over the previous year, as reflected in the Annual Report for 1990, he endorsed the Board's recommendations concerning the Agency's programme and budget and the TACF for 1992.

128. His Government had adopted a programme to build a democratic State based on the rule of law, the transition to a market economy, and wide-ranging co-operation with all countries. Mongolia was finding international understanding for its difficult reforms and was counting on the support and help of international organizations, including the IAEA.

129. Mongolia attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities and had benefited from many projects concerned with agriculture, geology, medicine, science, education and environmental protection. The fact that the Agency's first Mongolian staff member was working as an inspector in the Department of Safeguards was an indication of the effectiveness of the Agency's technical assistance programme. Further examples of successful co-operation with the Agency during the previous year had included the organization of a national course on radiation protection and nuclear safety, the taking of samples from the Mount Tsambagarav glacier as part of an effort to reconstruct climate changes and to assess radioactivity levels and fallout in western Mongolia, and other activities involving Agency experts for which his country was grateful.

130. In conclusion, he gave his country's assurance that it would actively support and participate in the Agency's activities and fulfil all its obligations.

Mr. Santana Carvalho (Brazil) resumed the Chair.

131. Mr. GAILI (Sudan) joined previous speakers in expressing pleasure at the Republic of Yemen and the three Baltic Republics becoming members of the Agency.

132. He noted that the current détente in international relations was conducive to the objectives of the Agency, which were to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in various areas of development and to contribute to preventing nuclear-weapons proliferation by creating the appropriate climate

for encouraging those uses and by strengthening confidence in the safety of nuclear technology and its applications.

133. Sudan was strongly in favour of establishing areas free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and urged that the Middle East and Africa be declared as such areas. He therefore commended South Africa's accession to the NPT and its conclusion of a safeguards agreement. In that connection, he deeply regretted Israel's persistent rejection of Security Council resolutions calling upon it to submit all its nuclear installations to the Agency's safeguards system. Its refusal to do so and to sign the NPT posed a direct challenge to the peace and security of the region and its inhabitants.

134. One of the main functions of the Agency was to promote the transfer of nuclear know-how in the areas of medicine, industry, agriculture, etc. from the developed to the developing countries, helping thereby to save human lives, improve human health, increase food production, reduce pollution and raise the quality of industrial products.

135. That was why he attached great importance to the technical assistance provided to the developing countries, which were now aware of the advantages of nuclear techniques in controlling agricultural pests, in plant improvement, in medicine, hydrology and so on. They had also realized the importance of sustained and sustainable development by seeking technically sound substitutes for conventional energy sources. For those reasons, the question of the Agency's technical assistance to developing countries should receive serious consideration by the Conference.

136. Despite the laudable efforts of the Department of Technical Co-operation, the financial resources made available by Member States for that Department were not adequate, based as they were on voluntary contributions and donations which fell far short of needs. With reference to the Director General's statement that the contributions to the TACF for 1991 did not exceed US \$19 million, against a target of \$49 million, he hoped that the General Conference would take necessary measures so as to ensure that technical assistance was financed out of the Regular Budget or other predictable and assured resources, instead of donations and voluntary contributions.

137. The African regional arrangement AFRA had made a start with projects in the areas of medicine, agriculture, livestock improvement, equipment production and maintenance, radiation protection, environmental protection, water supply and manpower training. However, the fact that technical assistance and specifically AFRA projects could not rely on assured funding, together with other problems in the region, made it difficult to implement those projects. In that connection, he suggested that: (1) AFRA should be given greater support from the Agency's budget; (2) The Agency should, in co-ordination with the AFRA countries, seek financial support from more developed and richer countries for AFRA projects; (3) The AFRA countries, for their part, should co-operate in and support those projects to the best of their abilities.

138. Most African countries, including Sudan, depended on livestock as a source of food and wealth. His delegation was therefore pleased to note the success of the screwworm eradication project in Libya, to which the Director General had referred in his statement. That was one of the domains where the Agency should continue its activities.

139. His country set great store by the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety and on the establishment of basic safety standards and guides relating to nuclear power plants, radiation protection of workers and the population, environmental protection, radiation sources and fuel handling activities.

140. In the context of safety, he hoped that the issue of disposal of radioactive waste on the territory of developing countries would be settled within the framework and policies laid down in the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, and that the latter would lead to a mechanism for regulation of such movements under the Agency's supervision.

141. In conclusion, he emphasized Sudan's increasing interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was developing basic regulations and programmes for the application of radioisotopes and radiation sources in agriculture, medicine and industry. The co-operation between his country and the Agency in those activities, especially in hormone radioimmunoassay, had

been fruitful. He also expressed his appreciation of the advisory services and technical assistance which the Agency had provided for the development of infrastructure and scientific capabilities in the areas of radiation protection, environmental monitoring, food, groundwater studies and the establishment of electronics workshops.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

