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President: Mr. SANTANA CARVALHO (Brazil)

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[\*] GC(XXXV)/982.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document  
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Abbreviations used in this record

ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
INES	International Nuclear Event Scale
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
IRS	Incident Reporting System
ITER	International Themonuclear Experimental Reactor
MW	Megawatt
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NUSS	Nuclear Safety Standards
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PWR	Pressurized water reactor
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
TUIWE	Trade Unions International of Workers in Energy
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
World Bank (IBRD)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor (Soviet Union)

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1990 (GC(XXXV)/953) (continued)

1. Mr. SAN (Malaysia) said that the past year and recent months, in particular, had seen rapid political changes in Europe, bringing new members to the Agency in unprecedented numbers. He congratulated Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on their admission to the Agency as independent sovereign States, and also welcomed Yemen. He was confident that they would contribute constructively to the Agency's activities. He also welcomed the accession by additional countries to the NPT and the fact that others had expressed their intention of doing likewise. He urged the new parties to the Treaty to sign and implement a safeguards agreement as soon as possible.
2. Malaysia, as one of the first countries to sign the NPT and join the Agency, had always believed in the importance of the role of international organizations such as the Agency in striving to fulfil the aspirations of mankind and that they should be guided by those aspirations in expressing the common will. They should never impinge upon national sovereignty, whether at the instigation of one or more of their members or on their own initiative. No Member State should be made to feel that another member wished to impose upon it liabilities or bonds that clearly exceeded its obligations under an agreement. The Agency should endeavour to ensure at all costs that its impartiality was not only respected but also seen to be respected, otherwise the confidence Member States had in it could be jeopardized. If the Agency was to achieve that, it was essential for all Member States to refrain from seeking to impose, through the Agency, their sectoral values or interests on other members. It was the duty of all to ensure that the universality and impartiality of the Agency was strictly observed, as only then could Member States be expected to contribute constructively to its work.
3. His country attached considerable importance to the Agency's safeguards system. It had noted, however, the efforts being made by some to improvise and add further measures to the well-established safeguards system, without due regard for the sanctity of treaties. That might well erode faith in international nuclear co-operation and even create a sense of insecurity among certain members, thus sapping their confidence in the Agency. Any renegotiation should pay due heed to the interests of all the parties involved and

be motivated by a desire to share both the obligations and the advantages of nuclear power. States must not selfishly block any collective effort to develop policies designed to bring the benefits of nuclear science to mankind, for it was just as important to foster the constructive applications of nuclear science as to safeguard against its abuse.

4. Similarly, any review of the Agency's Statute should be comprehensive and should take into account the changes that had taken place in the application of Member States' nuclear policies and their relevance to the work of the Agency. In that connection, any revision of Article VI of the Statute should give comprehensive consideration to the changes that had taken place and the present configuration of interests of Member States.

5. As to its own nuclear activities, Malaysia was striving to exploit the positive aspects of nuclear science for national development. It was currently identifying the sectors of its national development plan where nuclear energy could best be used to enhance productivity and the quality of its economic and social development. The implementation of the Agency's first biennial technical co-operation programme in 1990 had been of immense benefit to his country, which was of the view that the open transfer of technology to accelerate progress in developing countries would further augment the prestige and support enjoyed by the Agency.

6. He welcomed the initiative taken by the Secretariat in preparing the Agency's Medium-Term Plan for the period 1993-98. His country attached great importance to the Agency's future activities and firmly believed in the necessity of maintaining a judicious balance between its regulatory and promotional functions, a balance that must also be reflected in its principal strategies and in the distribution of its manpower and financial resources.

7. It was with that consideration in mind that his delegation proposed that the recommendations of the recent International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power be implemented from extrabudgetary contributions. The Conference's recommendations were far from global in nature and appeared to focus on the problems of a particular region. That situation ought to be corrected in the light of the Agency's global mandate.

8. The Agency's technical co-operation programme had demonstrated the viability of developing countries' pooling their resources, knowledge and technology. Such co-operation between developing countries - on a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis - could be further improved and would complement the existing co-operation between industrialized and developing countries. The use of ionizing radiation and isotopes in industry was a case in point. The techniques involved were already fully established in most industrialized nations and could be extended to other countries through international co-operation based on a regional arrangement such as the RCA. His country participated actively in the RCA programme and wished to express its gratitude to donor countries for their contributions to it.

9. However, the Agency's success in encouraging the transfer of technology to developing countries had not been matched by the results of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1987. The regrettable failure of that Conference had deprived many Third World countries of access to nuclear power and had left the international community in a state of despondency. If the world valued a common destiny in which mankind would share the benefits of nuclear technology, it should not allow such a situation to happen again.

10. Mr. SQUICCIARINI (Holy See) said that the General Conference was meeting under circumstances quite different from those of previous years. Nuclear energy, its dangers and its inherent possibilities, the necessity for it as well as the need to find substitutes for it, appeared in a new light.

11. The threat posed by nuclear weapons and the danger of their spreading throughout the world had led, almost twenty-five years previously, to the elaboration of the NPT, to which many nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States had become parties. The Agency had an important role to play in connection with safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to that Treaty.

12. Unfortunately, accession to the NPT did not always guarantee that the country concerned intended to abstain de facto from acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it seemed that safeguards agreements could not always prevent fissionable material from being used to produce nuclear weapons. It

was disappointing to find that States were capable of conducting a clandestine programme aimed at producing nuclear weapons despite the safeguards agreements they had concluded with the Agency and the latter's inspections.

13. Under such circumstances, the question might be asked whether the NPT did not rely too much on information provided by national authorities and whether, by trusting in the good faith of the State concerned, the Agency was discharging its responsibilities properly in carrying out the necessary checks. It appeared that the information provided was not always complete and that the plans disclosed were not always correct. If that were so, then it must be acknowledged that the goodwill which might have been created between the Agency and the particular State was insignificant in relation to the goodwill lost by the Agency in respect of those States which must surely feel that they had been let down in their efforts to abide by the obligations they had undertaken in order to make the world safer.

14. Moreover, if the international community were to come to the conclusion that an illegal and clandestine nuclear-weapons programme in a particular State made it imperative to take countermeasures, the question arose as to whether the use of force was the only way to respond and to uphold Article III.A.5 of the Agency's Statute. The consequences for all concerned were far more serious than those that might ensue from insisting at the outset on strict inspections. The conflict in the Persian Gulf had clearly demonstrated the disastrous consequences that even a limited war could have in modern times. Apart from the human suffering inflicted, it had also resulted in one of the greatest ecological disasters caused by man. Almost all the oil wells in Kuwait had been set on fire, not only destroying precious energy resources but also having an impact on the environment that could only be compared with, perhaps, the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

15. Central and Eastern Europe also faced serious energy problems with severe environmental impacts. It would be impossible for the countries of that region to meet their energy needs without continuing to use, at least for a number of years, outdated nuclear power plants whose safety was problematic. Alternatives were not available, at least not in the States of

Central and Eastern Europe, which were also facing grave ecological problems because of the excessive use of fossil fuels, and especially soft coal.

16. Under such circumstances, all initiatives - and particularly research into clean energy sources - that were aimed at improving the energy situation were welcome. In that connection, he wished to recall the plan for ensuring Europe's energy supply which had been submitted by the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mr. Lubbers, at the Conference of Ministers of the European Community Countries held the previous year in Dublin. That plan, which dealt also with the reconstruction of the energy economy of the new Central and Eastern European democracies and with the development of the huge energy resources of the Soviet Union, had since received a positive response both from European Community countries and from other States. The next step ought to be the adoption of a European Energy Charter, an initiative that already enjoyed the support of 25 European countries. He welcomed that initiative and all plans aimed at extending the application of such an instrument to other regions, including not only the United States and Japan, but also countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

17. Energy, and in particular nuclear energy, was obviously not an end in itself but merely a means for advancing the development of mankind. If global resources were used in such a way as not to deplete them within one generation, energy policy would be moving in the right direction.

18. Mr. SANGIAMBUT (Thailand), after welcoming the four new members of the Agency, namely Republic of Yemen, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, said that significant progress had been made in the past year in the prevention of nuclear proliferation. He welcomed the accession of South Africa to the NPT and its conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the Agency. He was also pleased to note the expressions of intent of France and China to accede to the NPT and the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had agreed to conclude a safeguards agreement.

19. Like most developing countries, Thailand derived considerable benefit from the Agency's promotional activities and from its technical co-operation programme in particular. The assistance provided to his country under that

programme had contributed significantly to its development efforts in the important areas of agriculture, industry, health care and medicine. His country had participated actively in the training courses, seminars and research and development activities organized by the Agency and had also benefited greatly from the RCA programme. Its active participation in all those activities had yielded highly satisfactory results. Furthermore, Thailand expected that it would need more and more nuclear technology for its future development.

20. In order to strengthen the technical assistance programme, his country had already pledged, for the current year, a voluntary contribution of US \$52 500 to the TACF. His delegation wished to express its appreciation to those Member States which had contributed to that much needed Fund.

21. His delegation was very concerned about the doubts that were emerging with regard to the reliability and effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system. In common with most Member States, his country felt there was an urgent need to find ways of improving and strengthening the safeguards system as a whole. For that reason, it welcomed the Medium-Term Plan for 1993-98, which rightly proposed to strengthen activities in the areas of nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, safeguards and the transfer of technology.

22. The Agency's resources were very limited and could not meet all the demands placed on it. He therefore hoped that in implementing its Medium-Term Plan the Agency would maintain a balance between safeguards and non-safeguards activities - in other words, ensure that the budget for technical assistance was not less than that for safeguards. He was confident that the Secretariat, under the strong leadership of the Director General, would be able to achieve such a balance.

23. Mr. LAVIÑA (Philippines) said that his delegation continued to be aware of the Agency's crucial role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices through its safeguards system. It therefore welcomed the initiatives taken by the Agency to strengthen that system and increase the level of assurance and confidence it provided. In



meetings of the Board and in his statement at the beginning of the session, the Director General had submitted various recommendations on the matter, the most important and far-reaching of which was the proposal for special inspections. While he fully appreciated the intention behind that proposal, certain clarifications would be required before such an activity could be undertaken. His understanding was that, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Agency's Statute and document INFCIRC/153 (corrected), special inspections would be carried out only after consultation with, or with the agreement of, the parties concerned. The suggestion to undertake unannounced inspections, for example, would have serious implications for the Statute and would infringe national sovereignty. Nevertheless, his delegation was looking forward to receiving further details concerning the mechanisms and procedures for implementing special inspections and to discussing the matter in depth in future meetings of the Board.

24. The measures proposed by the Director General should, of course, be given consideration, but in addition his delegation, like others, proposed that the review and evaluation of the overall effectiveness of present safeguards approaches be given high priority in the Medium-Term Plan. The results of such a review would have a decisive bearing on the various proposals to strengthen the safeguards programme and on discussions concerning its financing.

25. His delegation welcomed the conclusion of safeguards agreements between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Africa. It also supported the measures being taken to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Those developments were a further step towards the achievement of a nuclear non-proliferation regime and international peace and security.

26. Two weeks previously the Agency had hosted the very important International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power, which had discussed past and current measures taken at the international level in the area of nuclear safety and had drawn up an international strategy for the future. The findings of the Conference merited the closest scrutiny, particularly by those Member States which had been unable to send experts to participate.

27. His delegation was especially interested in the proposal for steps to be taken towards creating a formalized international approach to all aspects of nuclear safety, including radioactive waste management and disposal, since that would constitute a truly significant contribution towards creation of a favourable environment for sustainable development for the generations to come. His delegation also welcomed the statement that safety should be enforced primarily at the national level, as the concept of safety was relative and differed from one country to another depending on how it was perceived and on the particular circumstances prevailing.

28. The International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power had focused mainly on nuclear power plants. At present, fewer than 30 countries had nuclear power programmes and/or operating nuclear power plants. While he appreciated the value of strengthening the Agency's nuclear safety programme, that should not be done at the expense of other equally important programmes. It was well known that the majority of the Agency's members either did not have or else had only limited nuclear power programmes. Non-power applications, which were of higher priority to those countries, should therefore be accorded equal attention.

29. His delegation was gratified to note the wide range of the Agency's technical co-operation activities, which had enabled nuclear technology to be transferred to developing countries. It therefore welcomed the fact that the implementation rate for all technical co-operation funds in 1990 had reached a record level despite some difficulties encountered by the Secretariat. It noted, however, that the share of the Asia and the Pacific region in the 1990 programme had decreased to 26.6%, and expressed the hope that that was not the start of a downward trend and that the situation would be remedied in the future.

30. For its part, the Philippines continued to pursue a national programme to exploit nuclear applications in agriculture, biology, medicine, industry and research. The 620 MW PWR project planned for the Bataan Peninsula remained mothballed. Present activities were consistent with the strategies set out in the national master plan on science and technology, whose target was to make the Philippines a newly industrialized country by the turn of the century.

31. Nuclear power for large-scale electricity production had not been ruled out by his country. Recent developments had indicated the need to maintain a body of specialists in the field who would keep abreast of technological developments and could be called upon if the country decided to revive its nuclear power programme.

32. As to radiation protection, his country was fully aware that the options offered by nuclear techniques were viable only if their safe use was assured. The level of radiation protection provided had to keep pace with the expanding use of ionizing radiation.

33. The Philippines continued to participate actively in the RCA programme and fully supported the extension of that agreement for another five-year period beginning in 1992. The RCA had established a well-developed network for fostering international co-operation and promoting nuclear energy in the region and had shown what could be achieved in that area of technical co-operation. It was becoming evident that the Member States of each region would have to depend more and more on each other, since resources from outside might not be able to keep pace with what was desired. The use of experts from developing countries, especially for assignments in their own region, should be encouraged.

34. In the working group on the financing of safeguards, his delegation had proposed that the group consider the fundamental principle that those countries which owned, possessed or operated nuclear power plants were responsible for safeguarding them and for the financing thereof. The moral and legal basis of that truism could hardly be disputed. His delegation had, in fact, recommended that that cardinal principle be acknowledged before accepting the secondary proposed principle that Member States had the right and the duty to contribute to the financing of safeguards.

35. His delegation had also emphasized that, as the Agency's Statute prescribed two equally important responsibilities, namely safeguards and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Board should tackle the question of the financing of safeguards together with other longstanding issues such as the financing of technical assistance. The Agency's safeguards programme was being financed from the Regular Budget, while technical

co-operation, which was concerned with the implementation of promotional activities, remained subject to the vagaries of voluntary funding. The time had come to find a solution which complied fully with resolution GC(XXV)/RES/388 and which would ensure that technical assistance was funded from the Agency's Regular Budget or through other comparably predictable and assured resources.

36. In that connection, his delegation had proposed to the Board that the twin issues of the financing of safeguards and of technical assistance be linked realistically to other vital and outstanding questions, such as the enlargement of the membership of the Board of Governors. Without such linkage, all those issues would remain unresolved indefinitely.

37. Finally, he recalled that, at its thirty-fourth session, the General Conference had adopted, by consensus, resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/544 submitted by the Group of 77 and entitled "Rule and Policy on the Appointment of the Director General" in which the Board had been requested to adopt an appropriate policy and procedures to govern the appointment of the Director General. The Board had recently approved the informal guidelines proposed by its Chairman on the procedure for selecting the Director General. They were informal because they had not been incorporated in the Board's existing Rules of Procedure and did not amend them in any way, but that was probably better than having no guidelines at all. However, they contained no proposal regarding the Director General's tenure of office. Further consideration should be given to that matter with a view to affording qualified candidates from other, particularly developing, regions the opportunity to run for the post. Such a proposal had been made by the Group of 77 in three resolutions adopted by the General Conference during the past 12 years. Rotation was an accepted practice within the United Nations system, and he saw no good reason why the Agency should be an exception.

38. Mr. BOBADILLA (Chile) said that the Annual Report showed that, as in previous years, the Agency had made an important contribution to peace, health and prosperity in the world in 1990. In particular, the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had made rapid progress in an area which was of major importance for the use of nuclear energy. A conceptual

design for ITER, which had been carried out under the Agency's auspices, had been completed, providing further proof that the pooling of efforts in the interests of a common aim could yield good results. It was to be hoped that the future activities of that project would be equally successful. He also welcomed the approval of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste. Member States should continue to work on their national standards in the light of that code in order to facilitate its application, particularly with respect to prior notification and the granting of consent of exporting States, importing States and transit States. The examples he had mentioned indicated that the Agency's work was having concrete results.

39. Chile welcomed the efforts which the Secretariat had made in the area of technical co-operation. The significant increase in the project implementation rate and the better balance of project components were the result of an improvement in the structure of the support systems and implementation mechanisms of the Department of Technical Co-operation and - a highly important point - the establishment of efficient communication systems. Chile also appreciated the efforts which various countries had made to halt the alarming decline over recent years in the percentage of the TACF target which was actually pledged and paid. He appealed to Member States to continue their efforts to reach and surpass the percentages achieved before 1982, as he was convinced that that would help increase the productivity of the Agency's technical co-operation activities.

40. The technical assistance provided by the Agency in Chile had made a major contribution to the general development of the country by strengthening applications of nuclear technology in various important areas. Chile's nuclear development programme involved all of the scientific and technical capacity of the country, and the Agency's technical assistance had thus benefited all specialized establishments. Apart from the development of technologies related to reactors and the nuclear fuel cycle, Chile had been carrying out activities in the fields of health, industry, mining, agriculture and studies of natural resources and the environment.

41. In the health sector, an attempt had been made to reduce the cost of imaging methods and to improve them by modernizing equipment, adopting computer techniques, and using more specific radiopharmaceuticals.

42. The production and availability of food were a priority for any country. Chile had therefore set up various inter-institutional groups for the application of isotopes and radiation in agricultural production. Nuclear techniques were being introduced to study the use of fertilizers and to improve plants of economic importance. In the stock-breeding area, efforts had focused on improving animal productivity using radioimmunoassay and related techniques to diagnose disease.

43. The mining industry was particularly important in Chile and nuclear techniques were currently being used to control, optimize, and help with the design of processes. Nuclear techniques were also being used to study water resources, particularly in areas where a lack of water was restricting development.

44. Considerable effort had been put into improving the environment, and nuclear techniques were playing a major role in the study of pollution of the atmosphere, water, food, marine resources, and areas damaged by human activities.

45. The safety of nuclear installations and radiation protection of all people directly or indirectly involved in nuclear activities were thus issues of major importance for Chile.

46. The Agency would soon be evaluating the technical assistance provided to Chile during the 1980s. He felt sure that the expert group which would be performing that evaluation would find that the joint efforts of the Agency and counterpart institutions had not been in vain and that the technologies transferred and the equipment supplied had been used rationally, were contributing to the achievement of the objectives set for each project, and had given a great boost to development in various areas.

47. At the regional level, ARCAL had promoted both technical co-operation between countries with a similar level of development and collaboration to respond to common needs. The resources available had thus been used in a more rational manner, better results had been obtained, and dependence on other regions with different interests had been reduced. The first phase of the ARCAL programme had demonstrated that it was an excellent mechanism for stimulating regional co-operation. However, future results would depend on the

efforts made within the region to achieve the level of self-sufficiency which had been fixed as a target at the beginning of the programme. Chile would continue to support the ARCAL programme.

48. The draft Medium-Term Plan which had been submitted by the Secretariat should be flexible and subject to revision. It should strike an adequate balance between all the Agency's activities, and in particular between safeguards activities and promotional activities in view of the importance of the latter for developing countries. The strengthening of safeguards provided for in the Plan should be accompanied by an improvement in their efficiency and a rationalization of costs. A revision of inspection criteria and procedures might help achieve that goal while maintaining the reliability of the system.

49. The transfer of technology by the Agency to developing countries should be strengthened in order to promote progress in those countries. It was, of course, essential that the technical co-operation programme respond to the needs identified by Member States and to their requests.

50. His delegation could go along with an increase in the Working Capital Fund to finance unforeseen expenses, on the condition that it did not involve an increase in Member States' contributions.

51. Chile had successfully implemented a comprehensive training programme in various aspects of nuclear energy and hoped that training would figure among the objectives of the Medium-Term Plan.

52. It was impossible to remain indifferent to the major changes which were taking place in the world and were resulting in a rapprochement between nations. That situation would no doubt foster mutual trust between Member States and have positive repercussions on the Agency's safeguards system.

53. Mr. AALTO (Finland), after welcoming Finland's three Baltic neighbours - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - and the Republic of Yemen to the Agency, said that the constantly rising demand for electricity in developed countries, despite extensive efforts to save energy, together with increasingly stringent standards for the reduction of carbon dioxide and other emissions, could not but strengthen the case for the nuclear option, even if

it was not accepted everywhere as a safe form of energy. His delegation shared the Director General's view that the international community should continue its efforts to demonstrate that nuclear power worked well and to ensure that it was seen to do so. The main focus of the Agency's activities should be on safety and non-proliferation in order to restore public confidence, since that was a sine qua non for the future of nuclear power.

54. The Agency had done valuable work in the nuclear safety area, drawing up codes, guidelines and recommendations which had become widely accepted. His Government was prepared to take an active part in efforts to establish a more clearly defined and transparent safety regime. The Agency should coordinate the elaboration of safety objectives in the form of goals accompanied by fundamental principles based mainly on Safety Series document No. 75-INSAG-3. His delegation was in favour of establishing a framework convention on nuclear safety that would incorporate binding commitments, since a measure of that kind was essential for the continued use of nuclear power.

55. The enhancement of nuclear power plant safety in Central and Eastern Europe was a challenge for international co-operation. Since nuclear power played an essential role in electricity production in those countries and would continue to do so for some time, his Government was supporting the efforts being undertaken to provide them with technological and financial aid in the nuclear safety area. Finland had taken part in the Agency's extra-budgetary project on WWER-440/230 plants, which had produced a large number of recommendations for improving safety. Finnish nuclear utilities had taken part in similar activities with a view to evaluating the priority of backfitting measures.

56. Halting the spread of nuclear weapons was the main task of the parties to the NPT and was a common endeavour of the Agency's Members. The Fourth NPT Review Conference had reached a number of unanimous conclusions regarding measures which might improve the situation. Tightening of export controls had been seen as the most useful instrument in that respect, and the Conference had urged all nuclear suppliers to make any future shipments subject to internationally legally binding non-proliferation commitments and the acceptance of full-scope safeguards. In that context, work related to the export of dual-use equipment and materials should be continued.



57. As a strong supporter of the NPT, Finland was pleased to note that a number of countries had made moves to become parties to the Treaty. He welcomed the accession of Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, and looked forward to the prospect of China, France and Zimbabwe also acceding to the Treaty. He urged all countries which had not yet done so to sign the NPT in order to make that instrument of non-proliferation truly universal. Approximately 50 countries had failed to conclude safeguards agreements within the prescribed time limit. Those agreements were not a mere formality, and it would be appropriate for the Agency to offer practical assistance in that respect and for the countries concerned to make use of it.

58. The Director General had on several occasions expressed his conviction that the current safeguards system should be reviewed. The suggestions he had made at the meeting of the Board of Governors in July 1991 would fundamentally change the present safeguards system and deserved careful examination.

59. The Agency's inspections in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 had revealed a situation that Member States had wanted to believe was unthinkable. The reports so far told of clandestine or "unreported" activities for which, as the Director General had said, no plausible peaceful objective could be identified. In the light of those events, the Finnish Government shared the concern which had been expressed regarding the validity of the Agency's safeguards inspection system and was ready to participate actively in all efforts that might be necessary to reshape the present system.

60. Though the Agency's work programme had always been of high quality and had always been executed in a professional manner, in recent years it had been suggested, partly owing to the constraints imposed by zero real growth, that it should be reviewed and its priorities redefined with a view to reducing or phasing out certain obsolescent components and incorporating new and more relevant activities. That was a difficult but indispensable task if the funding needed for new priorities was to be made available.

61. The work on the drawing up of the Medium-Term Plan was an important step in the right direction. That Plan should define the broad objectives of Agency activities and a strategy for the elaboration of dynamic and relevant future programmes. Co-ordination with other relevant organizations was

essential. The Senior Expert Symposium on Electricity and the Environment held in Helsinki the previous May had been a good example of such co-ordination.

62. Safety and safeguards, complemented by appropriate technical assistance, would remain the cornerstones of the Agency's activities. In view of the financial constraints and increasing demands the Agency was facing, the immediate focus had to be on improved quality and efficiency, and Finland was prepared to contribute to those endeavours.

63. Mr. ROUVILLOIS (France) recalled that the previous year he had expressed both his satisfaction at the positive developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the genuine détente in East-West relations, and his concern over a regional crisis of unprecedented scale in the Persian Gulf. One year later, developments in Eastern Europe and recent events in the USSR had confirmed that something irreversible had taken place in that part of the world. That was a matter of great rejoicing for everyone, but perhaps those who lived on the European continent and had a sense of a common history and destiny had even greater cause for joy. His delegation therefore extended a special welcome to the three Baltic Republics which were taking part in the General Conference for the first time.

64. By contrast, the Gulf war had bequeathed the General Conference some difficult and pressing problems. The Conference's thoughts and efforts were focused, of course, on the conclusions to be drawn from the discovery that, for the first time in the history of the Agency, a Member State had been found to be in clear violation of its obligations to the Agency. In conducting a clandestine and large-scale nuclear programme enabling it to accumulate nuclear materials which should have been subject to international safeguards, Iraq had violated its obligations as a party both to the NPT and to the agreement it had signed with the Agency in 1972. Moreover, it had reneged on its obligations under Security Council resolution 687, since it was the on-the-spot inspections which had made it possible to uncover and gradually piece together the various elements of the clandestine programme.

65. He wished to pay tribute to the Agency's inspectors and the experts who had worked with them, since it was thanks to the work they had done since May,

under often tricky and always stressful conditions, that a picture was now available of the major elements of the Iraqi programme. Without them and their expertise, the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 would have been problematic. Since the previous session of the General Conference, the Board of Governors had considered the new situation on five occasions. At its meeting in July 1991, it had adopted a resolution which would mark an epoch in the history of the Agency: for the first time, it had formally reported and condemned a Member State's non-compliance with its commitments. His delegation did not share the view of those who claimed that Iraq's non-compliance did not constitute a serious violation of the agreements it had entered into. On the contrary, such arguments were dangerous and could imperil the future and the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The presence in Iraq of large quantities of clandestine nuclear materials was, in fact, a major breach of its written undertakings.

66. The discovery of about 20 nuclear sites, when inspectors had previously been aware only of the Tuwaitha Centre, and even then only a small part of it, was clear proof that the main part of the Iraqi nuclear programme had been developed secretly. The least that could be said was that the aim of the secret programme was not clear: for what purpose was a country which owned no nuclear power plants installing equipment capable of producing hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium which, if it did have nuclear power plants, it could procure much more cheaply on the market?

67. International opinion, aware of the uneconomic nature of that programme and concerned by the fact that all the activities necessary for the production of a nuclear weapon were present in Iraq, was now convinced of the military aim of the programme and expected measures to be taken which would prevent the repetition of that situation either in Iraq or elsewhere. Strict measures must therefore be taken immediately to prevent the activities forbidden to Iraq from being carried out on its territory. More specifically, the time had come to apply Security Council resolution 687 to the letter, removing from Iraq or neutralizing or destroying not only the material but also the facilities and equipment which could contribute to the manufacture of a nuclear weapon by Iraq; no time should be lost in doing so. It was also most

important to adopt a plan which would provide sufficient assurances of post-destruction verification. That plan should include activities which did not necessarily form a part of the Agency's traditional tasks and for which the assistance of external experts would be necessary.

68. It was in that context that substantial proposals were expected from the Agency - in other words Member States - in the safeguards area. As long ago as February, the Director General had made it plain that that was essential. Seven months later, it was time to define precise objectives for the future. A package of measures to improve the present safeguards system should be put together by the end of the year.

69. With that in mind, the European Community had proposed the following measures to the Board of Governors, which the latter had accepted: the establishment of a compulsory procedure whereby a facility must be declared to the Agency as soon as the decision was taken to construct it; the obligation under INFCIRC/153-type agreements to declare all nuclear materials from the concentrate stage onwards; the effective application of the existing provisions for special inspections and their extension to permit the inspection of undeclared facilities if an anomaly was found; the application of safeguards to nuclear equipment; and, finally, the establishment of a universal register of transfers of such equipment. In effect, Member States must either show that they were able to heed the sharp reminder they had been given or else compromise the credibility of the Agency and jeopardize international nuclear trade through a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of safeguards. It was for that reason that the French Government had also actively supported the plan to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. That would require safeguards and verification procedures agreed to by all the parties involved.

70. In other areas of the world, there had been positive developments. Argentina and Brazil had signed a bilateral agreement on the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes on 18 July 1991. The two countries were engaged in negotiations with the Agency with a view to signing a bilateral safeguards agreement covering all their nuclear facilities in the near future. South Africa had deposited an instrument of accession to the NPT in

Washington on 10 July 1991 and had signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency. In June 1991, France had declared its intention to accede to the NPT. Even though, as everyone knew, France had in fact been applying the provisions of the Treaty for many years, the decision to formalize that policy and to give it legal force was a demonstration of the importance which France attached to nuclear non-proliferation and the role it intended to play in the formulation and implementation of the measures required today. France's accession would strengthen European unity which had already been demonstrated on previous occasions, notably at the Dublin summit and for several years at the General Conference. Finally, in August 1991, China had declared that it intended to sign the Treaty, a step which would greatly strengthen that international instrument: all five nuclear-weapon States would then be parties to it.

71. Nuclear safety was another important issue. In that area, too, there was a growing conviction that safety was not only a determining factor in the development of nuclear energy throughout the world, but also that the demand for higher safety levels for all countries and all types of technology implied a need for solidarity with those countries where the safety level was judged to be insufficient.

72. The International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power which had just been held in Vienna at the Agency's initiative, had provided an opportunity for a broadly based discussion between decision-makers, officials from safety authorities, operators and technicians from Member States. Objectives and criteria had been identified for improving the safety of operating facilities, whatever the technologies employed. Consideration had been given to concepts for optimizing the safety of future reactors and to the safety of radioactive waste disposal facilities. The conclusions and recommendations of the Conference were an important step towards the achievement of a broad consensus concerning safety within the international nuclear community and might serve as the basis for a discussion of the orientation of the Agency's future programmes.

73. Among the important activities undertaken in the safety area, the completion of the International Chernobyl Project and the presentation of its

findings at an international conference in Vienna in May 1991 deserved to be singled out. That project highlighted the role the Agency could play as a catalyst of large-scale international co-operation on a problem of major interest. There was no need to stress the importance of that evaluation of the radiological consequences of the Chernobyl accident on health and the environment in the USSR; however, it would be advisable to publish the results as widely as possible in order to avoid the dissemination of poorly substantiated information by the media.

74. Through the project on WWER-440/230 plants and by sending teams of experts to plant sites, the Agency was also making an important contribution to international efforts to improve facilities which had been constructed and were being operated in accordance with old standards. The complementary nature of the Agency's activities and those of other national or international technical and financial institutions should, in the case of the Bulgarian Kozloduy reactors in particular, help achieve a level of safety compatible with internationally accepted criteria without causing immediate danger to the economy of a State which depended heavily on such facilities for its electricity. That emergency programme should not, however, divert attention from the medium- and long-term objective of replacing such plants by other energy sources such as modern and safe reactors.

75. Finally, research and achievements in the field of safety should be universal in nature, and no one should hold back information on progress made in that area. Only the joint efforts of all the countries involved would ensure progress.

76. One of the main responsibilities of the current generation was to ensure that safe, reliable, low-cost and environmentally friendly energy supplies were available at the beginning of the next century. That was a difficult task which required a high level of international co-operation. Nuclear power had a role to play in satisfying those energy requirements. It would do so all the better if the risks of proliferation were averted and safety requirements fulfilled.

77. In line with the tradition that delegates should give a brief account of the nuclear power programmes in their own countries at the General

Conference, he observed that the direction of France's work in the safety area was towards ever more intensive international co-operation. He had already stressed the high priority France gave to that issue. The joint declaration of Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium of 25 March 1991 had confirmed the determination of those countries to work together in that area and had affirmed the common responsibilities which the large number of nuclear power plants they possessed imposed on them.

78. In view of its major investments in nuclear power, France was actively preparing for the future with respect both to reactors, where it was working on designs for the year 2000 and where it welcomed the progress made by Nuclear Power International, and to the fuel cycle, where mixed oxide fuel was gradually being introduced in French facilities, research was being conducted into new uranium enrichment procedures, and new reprocessing facilities were being commissioned at La Hague.

79. Another important question for the future was the priority to be given to radioactive waste disposal. France had done a lot of work on that subject and had made major progress. A draft law on radioactive waste management was currently being considered by the French parliament and should be adopted in the near future.

80. In conclusion, he noted once again that the Agency had faced important challenges in the past year. All Member States hoped that the Agency would be able to meet those challenges in the future and would help it in that task. The questions to be resolved were clear, and the Agency already had at its disposal a range of responses. Member States thus felt justified in looking forward to some important developments during the months ahead.

81. Mr. TA NGUYEN (Viet Nam), after welcoming the Republics of Yemen, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as new Member States, said that in the 34 years of its existence the Agency had made a great contribution to the development of atomic energy for peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. His delegation highly appreciated the Agency's many and invariably effective efforts in carrying out its safeguards and technical co-operation activities and in enhancing international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

82. His delegation also appreciated the special role played by the Director General in expanding the Agency and in increasing its influence. At the invitation of the Vietnamese Government, the Director General had visited Viet Nam in April 1991 where, after a warm welcome from the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he had visited the Da Lat Nuclear Research Institute and other nuclear science and technology institutions and had attended a working meeting with the Vietnamese National Atomic Energy Commission. During the visit he had stated that Viet Nam was making very effective use of Agency assistance, which would continue to be provided to the extent that the Agency's resources permitted.

83. In March 1991, Viet Nam had also had the honour of hosting the thirteenth RCA Working Group Meeting, in Ho Chi Minh City, which had been attended by representatives of 11 countries participating in RCA activities and by the Deputy Director General for Technical Co-operation. His country took an active part in RCA activities and would welcome further co-operation in the field of nuclear science and technology with interested countries in the region.

84. His country had made significant progress in the nuclear field in the past year. The gamma irradiation facility supplied by the Agency as part of technical co-operation project VIE/8/004 had been installed on the outskirts of Hanoi and put into operation at the end of July. That project was a very important step in the promotion of food irradiation and radiation technology in Viet Nam. The facility would be used for irradiating food and sterilizing medical supplies, and his delegation wished to convey its sincere gratitude to the Agency for its assistance with that project.

85. Following the signing of the safeguards agreement for the Da Lat nuclear research reactor, Viet Nam had signed a safeguards agreement in connection with the NPT in 1990. At the beginning of 1991, a team of Agency inspectors had visited Viet Nam for the first time under the new agreement, and the results indicated that his country was complying with its obligations to the Agency.

86. During the Director General's visit, the Vietnamese Government had assured him of its full support for the development of nuclear science and



technology and had reaffirmed its policy of using atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Nuclear technology was in its infancy in Viet Nam, which was why the results to date had been rather modest. However, there was no doubt that, with the assistance and co-operation of the Agency and the international community, the development of nuclear science and technology would proceed apace in the years to come.

87. Mr. VETTOVAGLIA (Switzerland) said that the events of the past year had had and would continue to have a direct impact on the Agency. The profound political and military changes which had taken place in the Soviet Union affected the Agency in various ways, but he would limit himself to congratulating Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had just regained their independence, as well as Yemen on joining the Agency.

88. With regard to the strengthening of the non-proliferation system, the nuclear danger had not disappeared with the end of the Soviet threat: in the future, the real danger would lie in proliferation. Universal adherence to the NPT was essential to ensure that the system was effective. The decision in principle of France and China to sign the Treaty demonstrated that non-proliferation had become a universal standard, and the accession of other new States offered further proof. The accession of South Africa and other African States was especially welcome as it would contribute to the goal of achieving an Africa free of nuclear weapons. In the future, South Africa should be able to play a full part in international organizations, including the Agency.

89. The formal decision by Argentina and Brazil to renounce the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons and their willingness to submit all their nuclear facilities to a mutual inspection regime under the aegis of the Agency indicated the usefulness of a regional approach to non-proliferation. His delegation supported the search for new methods within a regional approach and believed that the Agency could play an important role in that connection and that special inspections were one of the methods which could be employed in connection with such arrangements.

90. The non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its obligation under the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency, while continuing to build sensitive nuclear facilities, had been a

cause of concern to the international community for too long. The signing of an agreement, followed by its ratification and rapid and scrupulous implementation, was the only way to dispel the doubts which had arisen concerning the nature of that country's nuclear programme.

91. The Swiss authorities had been dismayed to learn of the Iraqi Government's violations of its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The scale of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme proved that it was not intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. By concealing part of its nuclear programme, Iraq was in breach of the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The Board of Governors, of which Switzerland was not a member, had quite rightly condemned that unprecedented behaviour in unequivocal terms.

92. His country commended the Agency for the prominent role it had played in implementing Security Council resolution 687. It thanked the Director General and his dedicated staff for their efforts to carry out that difficult task and offered its support in that regard. It noted with regret the obstacles that the Iraqi Government had placed and was still placing in their path.

93. It was extremely disappointing that a country had been able to develop a clandestine programme despite regular Agency inspections. Iraq's action called into question the credibility of both safeguards as applied until now and the non-proliferation system. Yet there was no indication that the Agency's Secretariat, and more specifically the Department of Safeguards, had been negligent in their duties. It was up to the Agency's Member States to take action to remedy that situation.

94. Some suggestions had already been made for strengthening the present system. In December 1991 and in February 1992, the Board of Governors would have to consider immediate measures, including special inspections, to improve the effectiveness and credibility of safeguards within the framework provided by document INFCIRC/153. His Government was looking forward to those discussions and was willing to give the Agency every assistance in improving the system. Judging from discussions in the Board of Governors and from the Director General's statements, there was clearly a strong desire to move forward and act without delay. However, two factors seemed to indicate that

great perseverance would be required to define a new safeguards and non-proliferation system to replace the present one, which was twenty years old and reflected a balance of power that no longer obtained.

95. The first was that simply reactivating document INFCIRC/15 would not produce a new system - although it would certainly be a start. However, a re-evaluation of the whole question of the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards and a reappraisal of the general functioning of the Department of Safeguards, after twenty years of good and loyal service, seemed both indispensable and inevitable. The new safeguards system should form a coherent whole, and such a highly complex exercise could not be hurried.

96. The second vital factor was the financing of safeguards. How were Member States to meet the additional expenses incurred by the Department of Safeguards as a result of new safeguards agreements such as the one concluded with South Africa or of the commissioning of new plants? No sound and evolutionary formula had yet been devised to finance the Agency's safeguards activities from 1993 onwards. The responsibilities involved were immense and the Agency must not miss its appointment with history.

97. It was important in every instance that the additional costs associated with new measures should not be out of proportion to the benefits expected in terms of non-proliferation. The introduction of full-scope safeguards in nuclear-weapon States would not satisfy that condition.

98. With regard to nuclear safety, it was clear that the majority of countries had not yet succeeded in substantially improving the public perception of nuclear power. That was certainly so in Switzerland, despite the fact that it had nuclear facilities which had been running safely and normally for years. Accidents, failures and deficiencies at some reactors in other countries had inspired in large sections of the population fears that were virtually impossible to allay. Nuclear safety had therefore rightly been one of the Agency's priorities since the Chernobyl accident. The prevention of such accidents in the future was the main objective of all the Agency's efforts. Accordingly, his country strongly supported the work undertaken in Eastern Europe, which must continue. With so many States and organizations active in Eastern Europe, care should be taken to ensure the proper co-ordination of the work being done. The Agency's assistance should above all

aim at supporting and strengthening the authorities responsible for nuclear safety in Eastern Europe.

99. His Government was very pleased with the outcome of the International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power held recently in Vienna. Its final document was an important step towards a consensus on the principles that should govern international co-operation in that field. He wished to make three points on the subject of safety. First of all, primary responsibility for nuclear safety rested with the State. That responsibility was twofold, since the State must ensure the safety not only of its own citizens but also of the citizens of neighbouring countries. Secondly, he welcomed the idea of an integrated approach to all aspects of nuclear safety and, in that connection, recognized the value of a step-by-step approach to a framework convention. However, the first step - and indeed a prerequisite for drawing up a convention - must be to define the areas which should constitute the basis of the convention and on which it would be possible to reach consensus. His country supported the procedure suggested by the Board. Thirdly, it supported the International Conference's recommendation that a small group of experts be established to define safety criteria for the design of future reactors. Switzerland was willing to participate in the work of that group.

100. Swiss energy policy in general was governed by the referendum held in September 1990, in which 53% of the votes cast and the majority of cantons had been against abandoning nuclear power completely. On the other hand, a similar percentage had supported the idea of a ten-year moratorium on the licensing of new nuclear plants. The moratorium had therefore become part of the Swiss constitution, and a 10% increase in the power of existing nuclear plants was now planned. The Swiss Government was therefore prepared to keep the nuclear option open.

101. Mr. TSOUNIS (Greece) said that his Government strongly supported the work of the Agency and wished to congratulate the Director General on his effective leadership. It had no difficulty in endorsing the Annual Report for 1990 and in agreeing to its submission to the United Nations General Assembly. His delegation associated itself fully with the statement made by the delegate speaking on behalf of the European Community. Also, it wished to congratulate Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Yemen on becoming Members of the

Agency. In the past year, and in particular during the last few months, a number of serious events and political developments had taken place which had a direct impact on the Agency's work. He wished to make a few general observations and suggestions in that connection.

102. Stressing his country's interest in Agency activities regarding the safety of older reactors, he recalled that in 1990 the General Conference had endorsed, in resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/529, a project for international assistance in assessing the safety of nuclear reactors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Kozloduy nuclear complex in Bulgaria was a good example to take. He very much appreciated the active manner in which the Agency and the CEC were co-operating in the field of nuclear safety, a subject of great concern because of the potential risks to neighbouring countries. It was gratifying to note that the CEC, the European Community countries and others had responded immediately with steps to strengthen the safe operation of the Kozloduy plant. The Agency's action in offering its services and bringing together the interested parties had been very useful and the early initiative taken by Greece to obtain Community help for Bulgaria had already yielded results: the Community and several of its Member States had, like the Agency and WANO, decided to offer immediate assistance.

103. However, a sustained effort would undoubtedly be required to help Bulgaria overcome its present problems and bring its nuclear plants up to the safety standards required by the international community. The nuclear industry should be called upon to supply both the expertise and the funds needed to support the nuclear power programme in Bulgaria. Greece was prepared, within its capabilities, to grant all possible assistance to its neighbour, Bulgaria. A spirit of friendly co-operation existed between the two countries not only in the nuclear field, but also in other important areas. Since the previous session of the General Conference, Greece had signed the second, technical, part of a bilateral agreement with Bulgaria, which provided for early notification in the case of nuclear accidents, the exchange of information on the nuclear activities of the two countries, and scientific co-operation.

104. The Agency was to be congratulated on the energetic way in which it had performed, and was continuing to perform, the tasks entrusted to it by the

Security Council in resolution 687. The inspections in Iraq had brought to light a great deal of information and had proved that Iraq had been engaged in clandestine activities whose purpose was non-peaceful and was outside the scope of the NPT, to which it was party. He strongly supported the efforts being made by the Agency with regard to long-term inspection planning. He deplored Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency and observed that it was the first instance of such non-compliance in the history of the Agency.

105. The inspections performed by the Agency had lent a new dimension to its activities and had given fresh impetus to the idea that, in order to achieve higher verification goals and to increase the credibility and effectiveness of safeguards, the safeguards system would have to be reassessed. The time had come to find ways of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, and to that end the Board's views and approval should be sought as soon as possible. He urged the Board to act quickly on that issue. The inspection regime should include, among other things, special inspections, and their scope ought to be extended to undeclared nuclear facilities. Consequently, his delegation strongly supported the Director General's proposals for the strengthening of the safeguards system.

106. He also endorsed the proposals on that subject put forward by the delegate of the Netherlands in the joint statement he had made on behalf of the European Community. The present uncertain world needed a solid system on which to build hopes for peace and stability. Greece was willing to work with the Agency towards the early achievement of those objectives and proposed that a small working group of experts be established which, with the assistance of the Secretariat, would prepare a document for discussion as soon as possible.

107. Greece was firmly committed to non-proliferation. It had been among the early signatories of the NPT and had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency in a timely manner. It therefore welcomed the recently approved safeguards agreements with South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as South Africa's early conclusion of a safeguards agreement. As for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it was to be hoped that the safeguards agreement would soon be implemented. His country was also gratified by the remarkable progress made by Argentina and Brazil towards the

conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. Finally, the non-proliferation declarations made by France and China were of great significance.

108. Agency safeguards were of paramount importance for the security of the world and the experience gained by the Agency through the verification of the non-proliferation commitments of States was extremely valuable. Clearly, universal accession to the NPT would contribute to the confidence-building measures needed by the world at present.

109. Non-proliferation objectives could also be served through regional approaches. He therefore welcomed the Egyptian initiative concerning the application of Agency safeguards and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Given the situation prevailing in the region, that initiative deserved careful consideration. The safeguards regime should take into account the specific requirements of the region and include measures to meet local conditions. It should incorporate the basic provisions of a regional arrangement and should allow the Agency to apply stricter safeguards than at present, whether comprehensive or not. All nations in the region had a right to exist and peace was a necessary element of coexistence. The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime would lay an additional stone in the foundations of a more lasting world peace.

110. Non-proliferation objectives could not, however, be achieved through the verification of political commitments alone. Member States should increase their national control of nuclear exports and prevent them from being diverted for unauthorized purposes. He therefore endorsed the relevant proposals contained in the statement made on behalf of the European Community.

111. There was no doubt that the use of nuclear energy for electricity production continued to face a number of problems of varying degrees of severity. Public perception of nuclear energy and political factors had caused many delays and in a number of cases had resulted in a reduction in the nuclear contribution to energy production. Although nuclear energy was not part of Greece's energy programme at present, the Greek Government was very carefully following efforts to improve the safety of nuclear reactors and research into useful renewable energy sources. It gave high priority to

protection of the environment. Nuclear accidents and climatic changes due to the greenhouse effect were the main risks associated with nuclear and thermal power plants, respectively.

112. No cost should be spared in trying to reduce further the risk of nuclear accidents. Phenomena associated with the greenhouse effect should be studied more extensively, in which connection international co-operation under the sponsorship of the Agency and other international organizations was of paramount importance. The Agency was to be commended for having organized, in the spring of 1991, the Helsinki Symposium, which had considered the world's growing demand for electricity and the need to protect the environment. Greece's attitude to nuclear power would be based on a careful examination of the potentially harmful effects of both nuclear and thermal electricity generation techniques on the environment.

113. As both a donor and recipient of technical assistance, Greece appreciated the efforts that the Deputy Director General for Technical Co-operation and his staff had made to meet all requests within the present budgetary constraints. There was a need to further extend the scientific applications of nuclear techniques in developing countries, and Greece welcomed all initiatives taken by the Director General to that end.

114. In conclusion, he was pleased to announce that the Greek Government would continue, as in previous years, to make its voluntary contribution to the TACF. It recognized the important role that the Agency played in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy and in bringing peace and security to the world, and fully supported its activities.

115. Mr. WAGNER (Czechoslovakia) said he wished first to join other delegates in welcoming the new Members of the Agency: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Yemen.

116. The changes in Europe and other parts of the world were imposing extraordinary demands and a heavy workload on the Agency - for example, assistance to Czechoslovakia and other countries to improve the safety of WWER-type reactors, the study of the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union, the inspections carried out by the Agency in Iraq, and the organization of the very successful International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power.



117. The results of the Agency's activities in 1990, which had been described in the Annual Report and the Director General's opening statement, showed that the Agency had coped with its tasks more than satisfactorily. The joint efforts made by Member States within the framework of the Agency to ensure the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy had reached a point where Member States must carefully and responsibly examine ways of fulfilling the very topical statutory objectives of the Agency in both the near and more distant future. It was no exaggeration to say that expansion of the Agency had reached its limits, especially under zero-real-growth budget conditions. His delegation therefore believed that the Medium-Term Plan for 1993-98, now in its final stages, would be an effective instrument for restructuring and rationalizing the Agency's activities.

118. Environmental problems in general and the impact of energy production on the environment in particular were assuming increasing importance. The conclusions of the Helsinki Symposium on Electricity and the Environment held in May 1991 seemed to confirm that the urgent need to improve the status of the environment would lead to increased interest in the nuclear option. It was thus essential to evaluate, without any ideological or political prejudices, the advantages and disadvantages of that source of power and to compare it with other energy sources.

119. His Government intended to conduct an important reassessment of the role of nuclear power in Czechoslovakia when drawing up an overall economic plan for the country. Nuclear power, which had recently been the target of both justified and unjustified criticism, would not play as dominant a role in the primary energy mix as in France. It was nevertheless clear that no progress would be possible on the economic or especially the environmental front unless nuclear power occupied a steadily increasing share of electricity production.

120. Czechoslovakia's eight WWER-440 units, located on two sites, were operating in a stable and reliable way. With a total power of 3500 MW(e), they represented almost 30% of the country's installed capacity and accounted for 30% of annual electricity production. The construction of four WWER-440 units at Mochovce and two WWER-1000 units at Temelin would roughly double the present installed nuclear capacity and make it possible to shut down a large

number of the most obsolete coal-fired power plants that produced almost half the present emissions from electricity generation.

121. The decision to reduce the number of 1000 MW units at the Temelin nuclear power plant from four to two had been taken because it had been recognized that the safety level of the WWER-1000 reactors, even after upgrading with a simple containment, did not meet present, and certainly not future, requirements. The top world producers of nuclear power plants were at present preparing bids for the construction of - probably two - further 1000 MW units at a site still to be determined.

122. The operating organization and the regulatory authorities were maintaining a very careful watch on the operational safety of all nuclear power plants. Safe operation was the crucial issue not only in the national but also in the international context. That applied particularly to the two WWER-440/230-type units at the Bohunice plant, which were among those receiving assistance under an Agency extrabudgetary project aimed at improving the operational safety of older reactors.

123. In January 1991 the State Supervisory Body for Nuclear Safety of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission had issued a decree which changed the operating licence issued for the full design lifetime of the V-1 nuclear power plant into a temporary one, renewable each year subject to certain conditions. In addition, approximately 80 significant modifications would have to be made in 1991 and 1992. The continued operation of the V-1 nuclear power plant after 1995 was conditional on a major upgrading being completed by that date. He was very grateful for the assistance provided to his country by the Agency, which had arranged a number of expert missions to that nuclear power plant and others in Czechoslovakia.

124. Although Czechoslovakia had always proceeded from the principle that national bodies held fundamental responsibility for the safe operation of a country's nuclear facilities, further progress in the technical and regulatory aspects of nuclear safety could not be achieved without effective international co-operation. The Agency would continue to have a specific and crucial role to play in that area.

125. As a result of positive changes in the world and the Agency's efforts, the past year, and particularly the last few months, had seen some progress in

expanding and strengthening the non-proliferation regime. He wished to join other delegations in welcoming the accession of Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa to the NPT and welcomed the commitment made by France, China and Zimbabwe to sign the Treaty. The accession of France and China to the NPT would be a milestone in the development of the non-proliferation system since all nuclear-weapon States would then be parties to the NPT.

126. He also welcomed South Africa's rapid action in signing a safeguards agreement with the Agency and was pleased that the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been approved by the Board the previous week. He looked forward to the early conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with Argentina and Brazil.

127. The steps taken by South Africa, its accession to the NPT, its prompt signing of a safeguards agreement with the Agency and its determination to implement the agreement fully and without delay had very positive implications for the situation in Africa and rendered unnecessary the further examination of the South African nuclear programme as a special item on the agenda of the Agency's governing bodies.

128. With respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the resolution approved the previous week by the Board of Governors expressed the hope that the agreement would be signed, ratified and fully implemented in a timely fashion. He urged those States which were Party to the NPT but had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency to do so.

129. He wished to thank the Director General, members of the special inspection teams and the entire staff of the Agency for the way in which they had fulfilled the tasks associated with the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 on Iraq's nuclear programme. The Agency should continue those activities until all the objectives set in the relevant parts of the resolution had been met in full. No State party to a safeguards agreement should be exempted from the obligations that agreement imposed on it.

130. The case of Iraq clearly demonstrated the need to strengthen Agency safeguards. Czechoslovakia was closely following the steps being taken to make Agency safeguards more efficient and was ready to contribute actively to the strengthening of safeguards whether within existing agreements or outside

that framework. The implementation of Security Council resolution 687 had proved that the Agency had enough experience with safeguards to carry out tasks which went beyond the present standard inspections. A careful evaluation should be made of that experience and of certain new elements such as special ad hoc inspections and the use of satellite information. There was no doubt that present circumstances required a strengthening of the safeguards system. His delegation had in the past suggested examining some options under the overall title of "a system of selective safeguards". Czechoslovak experts were ready to help develop an effective and reliable system of safeguards which corresponded to the needs of the age and was better able to fulfil its preventive function.

131. Czechoslovakia had always supported, and would continue to support, Agency technical assistance to developing countries, which it considered to be one of the Agency's most important activities. The proposal to set the level of voluntary contributions to the TACF for 1992 at \$52.5 million was acceptable, and his Government had decided to make its contribution to the TACF in full in Czechoslovak crowns.

132. In conclusion, he could approve the budget proposed for 1992. At a time of zero real growth in the budget, it represented a difficult, but well-balanced compromise between the so-called promotional and the regulatory activities of the Agency. He believed that the Agency's programme and budget for 1993 and 1994, which was to be based on the Medium-Term Plan, would strike an appropriate balance between programme priorities and financial resources.

133. Mr. YANEV (Bulgaria) welcomed the three Baltic republics and the Republic of Yemen as new members of the Agency.

134. The previous year had been one of complications and contradictions for Bulgaria's nuclear power programme. The lack of alternative energy resources and the low quality of lignites, the country's other main energy source, had made Bulgaria dependent on nuclear power. With the commissioning a few days previously of Unit 6 (a WWER-1000 reactor) of the Kozloduy plant, nuclear power was providing over 40% of the country's total energy production.

135. The state of old WWER-440/230 units had - with good reason - become a cause of serious concern for the public and experts in Europe and elsewhere.

It was well known that the design parameters of those old units did not meet modern safety standards. In addition, the OSART mission conducted in June 1991 as part of the Agency's extrabudgetary project on old reactors in Eastern Europe had found a number of additional technical, organizational and material deficiencies which, although not posing an immediate threat of a nuclear accident, were unacceptable from the point of view of the prevention, management and mitigation of the consequences of an accident.

136. The Bulgarian Government had accepted the conclusions and recommendations of the mission and had taken immediate action to eliminate the shortcomings despite the serious impact of those measures on the economy. Units 1, 3 and 4 had been shut down and Unit 2 was about to be shut down. The repair and renovation work carried out on Unit 4 had remedied the problems of immediate concern identified by the mission. The unit had been returned to service after a detailed survey by the national regulatory body in the presence of Agency representatives, who had confirmed the quality of the work carried out. The same procedure would be followed before restarting the other three reactors. The work had been possible as a result of the assistance which had been so rapidly provided by the European Community, WANO, and the Governments of countries such as Germany, the United States of America and Japan, with the Agency serving as intermediary. His country wished to express its deep gratitude for that support which, it hoped, would be extended to cover the whole range of problems associated with the upgrading of old reactors.

137. The design parameters of the Kozloduy WWER-1000 reactors were close to international safety standards. The reactors had been examined by a number of Agency missions and had been found to be in good condition and well managed. Nevertheless, a programme for the further upgrading of those reactors had been drawn up, with the emphasis on improving instrumentation and control. His country hoped to implement the programme with the assistance of the World Bank.

138. His delegation was fully aware of the importance for Bulgaria and the entire nuclear community of the measures being taken to improve the safety of the Kozloduy plant. Improving nuclear safety and public confidence would have a broad international impact. International co-operation therefore not only had economic, scientific and technical value but was also politically and

socially important. For those reasons, the Bulgarian Government had adopted and was strictly following a policy of openness in the nuclear sphere and was keeping the public informed of any problems encountered. Bulgaria had joined the NUCNET information system of the European Nuclear Society. It was a member of the IRS and was using the INES to evaluate incidents. Two ASSET missions had been carried out in Bulgaria in the past year and another would be taking place soon at Kozloduy. A consortium of regulatory bodies from some Member States of the European Community would be providing assistance to the Bulgarian regulatory body - the Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes - and also to the Kozloduy plant in order to improve control and enforcement procedures and to increase the reliability of safety-significant systems.

139. A complete evaluation of the plant site, and particularly its seismic characteristics and the seismic resistance of equipment, was under way as part of a national technical assistance project. An on-site review had been conducted in May of the current year. Additional measures had been recommended, particularly for some auxiliary installations, and they would be carried out.

140. A major effort would be made to update Bulgarian nuclear and radiation safety standards and to bring them into line with the Agency's NUSS documents. Bulgaria hoped to obtain advice and technical assistance for that purpose from the Agency and from the regulatory bodies of countries which had reached a high level of development in the nuclear energy field.

141. A number of other conditions must also be met to ensure the safe use of nuclear energy: the physical protection of nuclear material, the prohibition of armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations, and monitoring of its peaceful use. His country attached great importance to those questions and was contributing actively to efforts to resolve them. As a party to the NPT, it supported the Agency's safeguards system. Safeguards goals had been fully attained at Bulgarian nuclear facilities. His country was complying with the guidelines on the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology and was participating in the work aimed at solving the problems posed by the export of dual-use items.

142. Bulgaria was deeply concerned at the fact that Iraq had not observed the obligations resulting from its safeguards agreement with the Agency and supported the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on that matter.

143. His delegation approved the Annual Report for 1990, which covered a wide range of very useful activities in all areas of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. During the past year, the Agency's role as a recognized centre for international co-operation in those fields had continued to grow. His delegation particularly appreciated the work carried out by the Department of Nuclear Energy and Safety and its active co-operation with Eastern European countries. It also wished to thank the Department of Technical Co-operation for its work and the Deputy Director General for Technical Co-operation and his staff for their exceptional understanding of the economic difficulties which had affected Bulgaria the previous year and for their valuable assistance which had enabled Bulgaria to participate fully in the Agency's activities. Despite those difficulties, Bulgaria would continue to support the Agency's vitally important technical assistance programme. It accepted specialists from other countries for training courses and was willing to expand that activity and to make available its experts. It hoped that the Agency would continue to provide assistance regarding metrology in nuclear and radiation safety, manpower training and other applications of nuclear energy.

144. Bulgaria could approve the Agency's budget for 1992 and would fulfil its budgetary obligations. It also approved the Agency's accounts for 1990. Its well-known position concerning the staffing of the Agency's Secretariat and the amendment of Article VI as a whole and of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute remained unchanged.

145. Bulgaria made voluntary contributions to the financing of technical assistance in national currency in accordance with the Indicative Planning Figures. His delegation reiterated its view that the 8% charge for assessed programme costs in respect of technical assistance provided had lost its original significance and should be abolished.

146. With regard to the financing of safeguards, his country could accept the increase in contributions from "shielded" countries. The decrease in the percentage of the safeguards component of the Regular Budget paid by

"shielded" Member States was to be expected in view of the very nature of "shielding". Further consultations would be necessary in order to reach a mutually acceptable decision on that subject.

147. The work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage was of great importance for international co-operation in the nuclear field. His country was following that work closely and was participating in it as far as possible. The Committee had made a useful contribution the previous year by clarifying the positions of Member States and by formulating proposals to improve existing international instruments. However, those proposals contained certain shortcomings with regard to the assessment of the economic status of countries in connection with the establishment of a mechanism for compensating for nuclear damage. It might be difficult to secure universal adherence to an international convention on liability for nuclear damage which only dealt with the technical aspects of the issue and neglected social and economic aspects.

148. In conclusion, his delegation reaffirmed its full support for the Agency's efforts to expand international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bulgaria would continue to co-operate with the Agency and other Member States to help the Agency achieve its noble objectives and to strengthen its role and authority.

149. Mr. CONNOLLY (Ireland), after welcoming the four new members of the Agency, associated himself fully with the statement made the previous day by the delegate from the Netherlands on behalf of the 12 members of the European Community. His comments would focus on three issues, namely safeguards, safety and liability.

150. Since the previous session of the General Conference, some major developments had taken place in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. He was particularly gratified by the decisions by France and China to accede to the NPT. It was clear that the full support and participation of all nuclear-weapon States would strengthen the Treaty and make it the most effective arms control agreement to date. In addition, he welcomed the accession of Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa to the Treaty, and hoped that that augured



well for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa in the near future.

151. The mutual trust created through the Agency's safeguards system was a key element in the international non-proliferation regime. His delegation therefore welcomed the new safeguards agreements recently concluded with the Agency and looked forward to their full and early implementation. It was also following with great interest the current moves to further strengthen and update the safeguards system and hoped that specific and constructive proposals to that effect would emerge from the work being carried out by the Secretariat under the guidance of the Board of Governors.

152. Unfortunately, not all of the new developments in the past year had been positive. Ireland shared the concern of many States at Iraq's violation of its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency. It commended the Agency for the crucial role it had played in implementing Security Council resolution 687 and urged the Iraqi Government to respect fully its safeguards commitments and, in particular, to place no further obstacles in the path of the Agency's inspection teams.

153. Ireland had consistently supported the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety and had been closely involved in the preparations for the International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power held recently in Vienna. The many important issues debated at that Conference would have considerable significance for the future of nuclear power. Although in some respects its conclusions had not met expectations, the Conference had nevertheless identified areas where further action could be taken. His delegation had noted with satisfaction the participants' intention conscientiously to apply appropriate principles and practices and to improve the safety level of sub-standard plants. It shared the growing concern about the safety of reactors in operation in Eastern Europe and endorsed the Agency's role in mobilizing and co-ordinating efforts to resolve that serious problem. It welcomed the Conference's invitation to the Agency to "develop a more vigorous overview process" not only through existing services to operating plants but also by "promoting the achievement of sufficient national regulatory oversight". The Irish authorities had frequently emphasized that theme in the past, both in the Board of Governors and at previous sessions of

the General Conference. The key to safety lay in regulatory control, and his delegation supported an enhanced role for the Agency in that area, which it believed had previously been neglected. Specifically, a start should be made by introducing an arrangement - based on the OSART model - whereby regulatory authorities could voluntarily invite a review of each other's practices and procedures. That relatively small step forward would have enormous advantages and would help strengthen national safety regimes.

154. One of the most important proposals made by the International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power concerned the establishment of an international convention which would commit Member States to adopting internationally accepted safety standards for all applications of nuclear energy. In the context of trends towards closer international co-operation in other related areas such as non-proliferation and arms control, it would be timely to promote and consolidate nuclear safety by means of a convention. His delegation hoped that the General Conference would give the Agency a clear and unambiguous mandate to pursue that important proposal.

155. The risk of a nuclear accident could never be entirely eliminated, and there was general acknowledgement of the need to reconsider the questions of liability and compensation. He welcomed the report submitted by the Board of Governors concerning the issue of liability for nuclear damage and paid tribute to the work done by the outgoing Chairman of the Standing Committee on that subject, Mr. van Gorkom of the Netherlands, and by the Secretariat. Considerable progress had been made in producing specific proposals to improve the international regime for compensating the victims of a nuclear accident.

156. Ireland was participating actively in the work of the Standing Committee. As a non-nuclear country, it believed that the Chernobyl accident had demonstrated the need for a comprehensive liability regime to protect the innocent victims of a nuclear accident, wherever they might be. His delegation supported many of the proposals and concepts which had been formulated by the Standing Committee and which would extend the scope of the liability convention both geographically and environmentally. A number of other very important amendments had been proposed, all of which should contribute to a revised convention that adequately reflected the risks of the present nuclear industry. It was difficult to understand the attitude of some nuclear States

to that issue: while they stressed the high level of safety in their own industries, they seemed reluctant to accept a wide-ranging liability convention.

157. The adoption by all countries of effective conventions on safety and liability would not only help improve international relations but also enhance public acceptability of the nuclear industry and its future development. His Government was firmly convinced that the large-scale development of nuclear power should take place only when the utmost priority was accorded to safety and where a system of independent verification was applied. With regard to liability, the international dimension of risk and damage should be fully accepted by countries with nuclear facilities. His delegation hoped that, with the Agency providing a forum, rapid progress could be made in all those areas.

158. Mr. AAMODT (Norway) welcomed the three Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) and the Republic of Yemen as new Members of the Agency. He congratulated the Baltic States on the speed with which they had applied for membership of the Agency and looked forward to co-operating closely with them, particularly in the field of nuclear safety.

159. He was pleased to announce that, subject to approval by the Norwegian parliament of Norway's contribution to the Agency's budget, his delegation could accept the Regular Budget for 1992. His country also supported the target of \$52.5 million for voluntary contributions to the TACF for 1992. Subject to parliamentary approval, Norway would contribute its assessed share of that Fund.

160. He also supported the Board's proposal to increase the level of the Working Capital Fund by \$2 million in 1992 in order to ensure the continuous and efficient operation of the Agency. An increase in the Working Capital Fund should not however be regarded as a solution to the problems created by the late payment by Member States of their contributions to the Regular Budget. His delegation was aware that in some cases those delays were due to the economic difficulties faced by the countries concerned. However, the Agency's financial problems stemmed largely from arrears owed by Member States which were not facing such difficulties. He therefore fully supported

the repeated appeals to Member States made by the Director General during the past few years for timely and full payment of assessed contributions.

161. The last few years had seen a substantial increase in the resources available for technical assistance: the target set for the TACF for 1992 was \$52.5 million, which represented an increase of more than 54% over the figure of \$34 million set for 1987. In view of the great importance which it attached to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, his delegation welcomed that increase, which demonstrated the effectiveness of the existing system of Indicative Planning Figures and voluntary contributions. There was therefore no need at present to adopt a different method of financing.

162. Nuclear safety and radiation protection must remain one of the Agency's main fields of activity. The various Agency missions to Member States, the assessment of the radiological consequences of the Chernobyl accident and the activities carried out to improve the safety of older power reactors were of particular importance. The Agency had a vital role to play in helping to solve problems common to various countries and in providing an international forum for the discussion of safety issues. In the long term, the extensive use of nuclear energy would be accepted only if operating nuclear facilities in all countries could meet the strictest standards of safety and environmental protection.

163. It was satisfying to note that the number of Member States which had ratified or acceded to the Early Notification and Emergency Assistance Conventions had increased considerably in 1990. However, the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes continued to be a matter of great concern in Norway. His delegation had on several occasions expressed its concern about the dumping of radioactive waste at sea and expected dumping sites to be monitored. It therefore welcomed the adoption by the General Conference the previous year of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste.

164. The handling of high-level radioactive waste and irradiated fuel in one country could also be of concern to neighbouring countries. He would therefore be in favour of basic international undertakings concerning the safe handling of such materials. He also supported the conclusions of the recent International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power and looked forward to

the establishment of a framework convention on nuclear safety, which should also cover the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes. His delegation expected the Director General to initiate the necessary preparations without delay.

165. On the subject of safeguards, he welcomed the fact that in 1990, as in previous years, the Secretariat had not detected any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material or misuse of facilities or equipment subject to safeguards.

166. His delegation welcomed the accession of Albania and Mozambique to the NPT. It also noted with satisfaction the entry into force of the safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the NPT with Kiribati, Malta, Saint Lucia, Tunisia and Viet Nam and the unilateral submission agreement with Algeria covering a research reactor.

167. It was regrettable, however, that at the end of 1990 51 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not concluded safeguards agreements with the Agency within the prescribed period of 18 months after ratification or accession to the Treaty. That was the same number as at the end of 1989. Although only two of those States had significant nuclear activities, it was very disappointing that such a large number of States had not fulfilled their obligations under the NPT.

168. The year 1991 appeared to have been a particularly important one for the NPT. His delegation was deeply satisfied at South Africa's accession to the Treaty and at the fact that its safeguards agreement with the Agency had already entered into force. His delegation was also pleased to note that Tanzania and Zambia had signed the NPT. It attached particular importance to France's decision to accede to the NPT and to the fact that China had announced its intention to do likewise. Norway also welcomed the fact that a safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT had been negotiated between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It expected that agreement to be signed, ratified and implemented at an early date.

169. Norway had been very concerned to learn that Iraq had been engaged for a considerable period of time in an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme in clear violation of its obligations under the NPT and its

safeguards agreement with the Agency. Norway condemned Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and called on the Iraqi Government to co-operate with the Agency and disclose fully its clandestine activities. Norway fully supported the Agency's strong and decisive reaction to that situation.

170. That first case of non-compliance in the history of non-proliferation threatened to undermine worldwide confidence in the Agency's safeguards system. There was thus an urgent need to strengthen the system and to confer wider inspection rights on the Agency. The time had come to improve the system. The target should be the application of Agency safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. His delegation therefore supported the gradual extension of the application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. Those States should make a complete separation between their peaceful and military nuclear activities and begin to report to the Agency all the nuclear material used in their peaceful nuclear activities.

171. Despite a steady increase in the quantities of nuclear material and in the number and complexity of new facilities subject to safeguards, the Department of Safeguards had experienced serious budgetary constraints for a number of years. In the light of that situation and recent experience with Iraq and its likely repercussions on the safeguards system, the safeguards budget would obviously have to be increased in real terms after 1992 in order to maintain a reliable system.

172. Mr. MIELNICKI (Trade Unions International of Workers in Energy (TUIWE)), after thanking the Agency for inviting him to attend as an observer at the thirty-fifth session of the General Conference, said that his organization highly appreciated the Agency's activities and followed with great interest its work in the important area of nuclear energy and safety. One of the main tasks of the TUIWE, laid down in its statutes and in the policy and action platform drawn up at its second international conference in December 1990 in Paris, was to provide constructive assistance to the Agency and to draw on the Agency's work, experience and views. Nuclear safety was one of the TUIWE's main concerns; the central tenet of its programme was the development of energy accessible to all, and its priorities were energy policy, safety, prevention of accidents, working and living conditions and co-operation with all organizations concerned with energy. One of the TUIWE's primary objectives was to promote

international co-operation in radioactive waste disposal, since such waste posed an increasing threat to mankind and was a problem which could only be resolved at the international level.

173. He wished to thank the representative of the Agency for the active part he had played at a seminar which had been sponsored by the Agency in Moscow on the fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster and in which several organizations from the energy sector and scientific organizations from the whole world had participated. Since the Chernobyl accident, the operation of nuclear power plants had provoked considerable discussion, and public reaction was often passionate. From the outset, nuclear power had been overshadowed by events such as the Hiroshima drama, nuclear tests threatening the future of mankind, and the Chernobyl accident. As a result, nuclear power tended to be identified with its destructive potential rather than its peaceful applications in medicine, agriculture, science and technology. The conclusions of the Moscow seminar had confirmed that nuclear power was the most promising form of energy for the future development of mankind. However, the seminar had also underlined the inherent unreliability of man and control systems, even in traditional technologies, and his organization was therefore alarmed at the technical state of certain nuclear power plants and, in particular, at the negligence of governments and operators. Three years previously, delegates to the conference of energy experts from Balkan States had been informed during a visit to the Kozloduy nuclear power plant that it represented state-of-the-art nuclear technology, whereas the Agency had recently reported that it was in a lamentable condition.

174. The TUIWE attached great importance to international co-operation between the Agency's Member States and wished to see it expanded to all countries without exception. Through such co-operation an effective system of management, control and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy could be established and the highest possible level of safety in all power plants and the maximum level of environmental protection could be achieved. The socio-economic changes currently taking place in the world had created fertile conditions for the enhancement of such international co-operation and for the creation of a system ensuring nuclear safety. Now that the hostilities which had soured East-West relations were no more, mankind seemed to be moving towards a more balanced and peaceful world.

175. In conclusion, he wished to reiterate TUIWE's support for the expansion of nuclear power, which it regarded as a clean source of energy for the future, and its belief that the prerogative of States and regions to choose freely the energy best suited to their situation should be respected.

176. Mr. STEMPER PARIS (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)) said that, at the twelfth regular session of the General Conference of OPANAL in Mexico in May 1991, important statements made by representatives of certain States in the region had opened up the prospect of the rapid establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone provided for in Article 4 of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

177. Furthermore, as a follow-up to the Foz do Iguacu joint declaration on common nuclear policy signed by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil in November 1990, the representatives of those two countries had reiterated their Government's desire to conclude with the Agency a safeguards agreement which would provide the assurance that they would use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes and to take the necessary steps for the Tlatelolco Treaty to become fully applicable to them.

178. The representative of Chile had stated, at the twelfth session of the OPANAL General Conference, that his country had decided to accede fully to the Tlatelolco Treaty and hoped to make an active contribution to its implementation. The President of Cuba had requested observer status for his country at OPANAL. The French Government had welcomed all moves which could help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, especially in Latin America, and had stated that it was aware of the importance that certain countries in the region attached to the ratification by France of Additional Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty. France, however, preferred to wait and see how the situation in the region developed before taking a decision on the matter.

179. From the views expressed it could be seen that there was a common desire to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean as soon as possible.

180. In its resolution 278 (XII), the General Conference of OPANAL had taken note of the OPANAL Council's report on the prevention of radioactive contamination of the marine environment within the framework of the Tlatelolco Treaty



and the annex thereto had requested those Member States that were a party to Additional Protocols I and II to give their views on how the scope of the Treaty could be extended in that direction. The annex in question was an update which took due account of the observations made by various specialized agencies, including the Agency.

181. The General Conference of OPANAL had decided, in its resolution 280 (XII), to request the Agency and the members of ARCAL to support OPANAL's application to participate as an observer in the co-ordination and planning meetings of the ARCAL programme.

182. Finally, by resolution 275 (XII) the General Secretary of OPANAL had been requested to continue to co-operate with the Member States which had signed the Tlatelolco Treaty with a view to concluding, as soon as possible and in co-ordination with the Agency, the agreements provided for in Article 13 of the Treaty. That resolution also urged States party to the Treaty and to Additional Protocol I which had not yet done so to sign such agreements.

183. In conclusion, he thanked the Agency once again for its valuable support in the service of peace, disarmament and world security.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

