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### RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,  
on Tuesday, 17 September 1991, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr. SANTANA CARVALHO (Brazil)

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Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
BICOT	Biological Control of Tsetse
CANDU	Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor]
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NUSS	Nuclear Safety Standards
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
US \$	United States dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAMAP	Waste Management Advisory Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor (Soviet Union)

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1990 (GC(XXXV)/953) (continued)

1. Mr. PABON GARCIA (Venezuela), after welcoming the four new Members of the Agency and congratulating the President and the officers on their election and the Director General on his introductory statement, commended the quality and volume of activities accomplished by the Agency, as reflected in the Annual Report for 1990.
2. His Government had always given extensive support to those activities, particularly those relating to technical assistance and co-operation, as they were of vital importance for the socio-economic growth of developing countries and thus contributed significantly to maintaining international peace and security. His delegation had therefore always urged that they should be supported as far as possible - indeed should be regarded as the Agency's main objective. He emphasized once again that efforts should continue to distribute the resources of the Agency's budget in a more equitable manner among its various components, so that the necessary resources were available for technically sound co-operation projects.
3. It was a cause for concern that technical co-operation continued to depend on voluntary contributions to the TACF and that some Member States did not pay their contributions on time, thus rendering it difficult to use them as required for the implementation of planned projects. That situation, together with the reduced level of pledges in relation to the target for the TACF, showed the urgent need for financial resources to be assured, predictable and adequate if technical co-operation was to respond effectively to the growing needs of developing Member States.
4. He noted with satisfaction that the implementation rate for technical co-operation and assistance activities had increased substantially in 1990 and that, as in preceding years, Latin America had benefited extensively. He particularly congratulated the Department of Technical Co-operation for its notable and tangible efforts to improve project implementation.
5. Technical co-operation with the Agency had enabled Venezuela to make considerable progress in the application of nuclear techniques and isotopes in priority sectors such as health, agriculture and stock-breeding, radiation protection, industry and the environment. Some problems, however, had not yet been solved, and further co-operation with the Agency was required.

6. He reaffirmed his country's support for the ARCAL programme and its infinite gratitude to the Agency for the way in which it had contributed to that regional co-operation effort, which was a valuable tool for working towards shared objectives in the application of nuclear techniques to agriculture, medicine, industry, research and teaching, areas where development would improve living conditions in the participating countries. He invited the Agency to continue those efforts to ensure that ARCAL projects had the financial resources necessary for their implementation. He thanked the countries and institutions outside the region which had already provided financial support for the ARCAL programme, and emphasized the importance of such assistance for its success.

7. The Fourth NPT Review Conference and the events which had taken place in the Gulf earlier in the year had drawn attention to the deterioration in the non-proliferation situation and the need for a more comprehensive and coherent approach to the problem. The international community had been impelled to give new emphasis to the establishment of an international security system. Under its Statute and the agreement it had concluded with the United Nations, the Agency had an important role to play within its own area of competence.

8. The arms race, whether horizontal or vertical, involving nuclear or conventional weapons, not only increased military expenses throughout the world, but also added to insecurity and mistrust between States. At a time of serious crisis such as the Gulf war, the international community became aware of the threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction and the need to design and implement specific measures to eliminate such threats. His country therefore welcomed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) recently concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union as a very significant milestone in the annals of bilateral negotiations on arms control. That treaty should contribute to establishing a climate of greater transparency in international relations and to replacing nuclear deterrence by a strategy based on joint security.

9. As a party to the NPT, Venezuela was particularly interested in the Agency's safeguards system, which had helped to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; however, it was concerned at the persistent

imbalance in the budget between the funds allocated to safeguards on the one hand and to technical assistance on the other. Venezuela supported the strengthening of the safeguards system in order to consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but was convinced that that objective could be reached without increasing the financial burden on Member States, particularly those whose nuclear development was modest or just beginning and did not therefore justify such a measure. Accordingly, he urged that the system be revised by rationalizing expenditure and making better use of safeguards support programmes financed by extrabudgetary contributions, which could absorb the cost of increased activities in that area. He recalled that the Fourth NPT Review Conference had also appealed to the Agency to take the necessary measures to increase the funds for technical assistance.

10. His country took great interest in the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, as they were of benefit to the whole of humanity. Nevertheless, given that some of those activities were of more immediate benefit to developing countries, his delegation would recommend that those directly related to power reactor safety should be financed from extrabudgetary funds. That would ensure that financial resources were available to improve the safety of nuclear techniques used in medicine and agriculture, industry and research, and to strengthen the radiation protection infrastructure in developing countries.

11. Venezuela would support the development of internationally accepted basic principles, standards and guidelines to guarantee the safe use of nuclear techniques. The conclusions and recommendations of the International Safety Conference should be closely examined, particularly those which could affect the developing countries and have financial implications for the Agency.

12. His delegation had already given its opinion on the Medium-Term Plan, to which it attached great importance, and wished simply to restate its preference for a strategic plan sufficiently flexible to enable the Agency to meet its obligation of responding to the individual needs of Member States, and in particular to help the developing countries to complete their projects relating to both power and non-power applications of nuclear techniques.

13. He reaffirmed his Government's support for safeguards and nuclear safety activities. However, the bias of the Medium-Term Plan in favour of those activities was disturbing, as it might, in view of the Agency's limited financial resources, lead to the non-power applications to which his delegation gave priority being neglected. He therefore once again stressed the need to maintain an equitable balance in the Medium-Term Plan between the Agency's various areas of activity.

14. His delegation realized that nuclear energy, together with renewable energy sources, would in the future be called on to play an important role in countries lacking energy resources. It was also aware of the uncertainties affecting conventional resources, both with regard to the size of the existing reserves and to pollution problems. All the same, some of the opinions which had been expressed on the environmental effects of using fossil energy sources, including oil, should be seriously questioned, especially since experts were still studying the data on the extent of the pollution caused by those energy sources. Most surprising of all were certain tax measures adopted in some countries to reduce energy consumption, which were aimed primarily against oil and its derivatives. His delegation had many times emphasized that simplistic decisions should be avoided when dealing with energy and the environment. All matters relating to the environment must be considered in a global, objective and impartial way if sustainable development was to be achieved. It was quite unacceptable to promote any energy source in a biased manner without proper scientific basis.

15. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had dealt in depth with many important aspects of civil liability and had discussed issues of extreme importance. However, some issues still required attention in order to ensure that victims of a nuclear accident received fair and equitable compensation for the damage sustained. To that end, a general liability regime needed to be established, based on State liability. His delegation accordingly supported the efforts made in the Standing Committee to obtain from the international community more extensive commitments to guarantee prompt and appropriate compensation for victims of a nuclear accident.

16. Finally, he thanked the Director General, the Secretariat and particularly the staff of the Department of Technical Co-operation for their efforts in implementing the Agency's programmes, which would continue to receive his delegation's full support.

17. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) welcomed the admission of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Yemen to the Agency. He also noted with great satisfaction that the NPT family had expanded further with the accession of South Africa to the Treaty and France's announcement of its decision, and China's of its intention, to do the same.

18. He was pleased to announce to the General Conference that in the course of the day the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would become members of the United Nations. That was an important milestone not only for the Korean Peninsula, which had been divided for the past four decades, but also for the international community as a whole. However, while the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations was a great privilege for the Korean nation, it was also a heavy burden in view of the overwhelming responsibilities involved. Full respect for international law was an essential condition for being considered a peace-loving State in the sense of Article 4 of the United Nations Charter. As a founding Member of the Agency and a party to the NPT, and having concluded an NPT-type safeguards agreement with the Agency, the Republic of Korea was firmly attached to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as the Republic's President, Mr. Roh Tae-Woo, had emphasized in his statement of 27 April 1991.

19. His delegation noted the approval given by the Board of Governors the previous week to a safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK. In concluding that agreement, the DPRK had taken an important step towards meeting its obligations under the NPT, to which it had been a party for almost six years. Although it had been exceptionally slow to meet the obligations in question, he congratulated the DPRK on respecting the commitments made at the Board meetings in June 1991. Nevertheless, it was disappointing that the DPRK had remained evasive until the last moment with regard to the signature and ratification of the agreement approved by the Board of Governors the preceding

week. The delegation of the Republic of Korea took particular note of a threatening gesture from the DPRK which could be interpreted as a refusal to meet immediately its obligations under the NPT.

20. The DPRK should be aware, however, that the strategy of delaying the fulfilment of its obligations would no longer work. The resolution adopted by the Board of Governors the preceding week reflected the firm resolve of an overwhelming majority of countries. The fact that the DPRK had not immediately followed up that resolution continued profoundly to disturb the world community and could lead to compulsory inspections of that country's nuclear facilities and materials. He therefore appealed to the DPRK to sign the approved agreement forthwith, to ratify it without delay, and to discharge its NPT obligations faithfully.

21. His country was particularly interested in establishing an Agency regime of special inspections to be applied in the case of violation of NPT safeguards agreements. The case of Iraq was a cause for grave concern for the entire international community, which feared that other States might violate NPT safeguards agreements in a similar manner. His country was therefore closely observing the way in which the United Nations Security Council and the Agency were dealing with that case. The mandating of the Agency to conduct special inspections in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 was the beginning of a new era in its history. He congratulated the Agency's Secretariat on the admirable way in which it had carried out that task.

22. Action to ensure the effectiveness and credibility of the Agency's safeguards system should be initiated as soon as possible so as to take advantage of the momentum of current efforts to strengthen the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. In that connection, his delegation supported the proposal made the previous day by the Director General to develop and strengthen the Agency's special inspection system by issuing a clear mandate and indicating detailed procedures for the Agency's competent bodies. It was in any case essential that the system should be linked to the action of the Security Council.



23. Nuclear safety was an extremely important subject, and everything possible should be done to avoid another Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. Those accidents had nevertheless caused greater care to be taken in the operation of nuclear plants and had accelerated research and development in that area. His country commended the results of the International Safety Conference which had taken place at the beginning of the month in Vienna.

24. Public acceptance of nuclear energy was also very important, particularly where the disposal of radioactive wastes was concerned. International work in that field under the auspices of the Agency should be strengthened so that the public would have a greater understanding of peaceful nuclear energy. The Republic of Korea was prepared to support meetings such as the one organized by the Agency in Vienna the previous week on public information in the field of nuclear energy.

25. Nuclear power accounted for 50% of electricity production in the Republic of Korea, which had various projects in that area: nuclear fuel fabrication, standardization of power plants, research and development work for an advanced reactor, enhancement of operational safety, and radioactive waste management. While implementing a footnote-a/ project on computer-assisted nuclear safety analysis, the Republic of Korea would be organizing the fourth RCA training course on nuclear power pre-project activities and manpower development in October 1991. It was also preparing a programme of simulator training for plant operators.

26. Regional co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy was of growing importance, particularly for the countries of Asia and the Pacific. He hoped that all the countries of the region, including the DPRK, would be able to contribute to the development of regional nuclear co-operation. The Republic of Korea was prepared to share its nuclear technology and experience with the DPRK, including that related to the construction and operation of power plants, as soon as the DPRK allowed the Agency to inspect its nuclear facilities and materials within the framework of an NPT safeguards agreement.

27. Mr. PUNGOR (Hungary) said that the past year had been one of historic significance which would determine the course of events for a long

time to come. From the point of view of the Agency, the positive developments in the area of nuclear non-proliferation had been particularly important. He welcomed the decision of France and China to join the NPT and hoped that their accession would take place in the near future. He also welcomed the accession of South Africa to the NPT and the prompt conclusion of the full-scope safeguards agreement between that country and the Agency, which had entered into force on the previous day and must be regarded as a positive response to the wish expressed on many occasions by the international community. He hoped that that striking development, which had followed the accession of Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania, would soon lead to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in southern Africa. He urged all other States which had not done so to follow the example of the States mentioned. It was also vital that all States Parties to the Treaty should conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement.

28. The other major event of the previous 12 months with the most direct impact on the Agency had been Iraq's violation of its obligations under the NPT, and in particular the provisions of the safeguards agreement it had concluded with the Agency. It was the first time that the Agency had detected such a violation, and his delegation vigorously supported the prompt and resolute measures taken by the Board in response to that event. He also commended the Director General and his colleagues for the very competent and skilful manner in which they had carried out the extremely sensitive and complex tasks entrusted to the Agency by the Security Council.

29. Given the weaknesses in the existing safeguards regime which had only recently become apparent, the exercise in Iraq should not be considered as a special case having no consequences for routine safeguards activities. On the contrary, the Board of Governors and the Secretariat should be asked to look into the matter and to propose the short-, medium- and long-term measures needed to eliminate those weaknesses. For the short term, his delegation supported the relevant conclusions of the most recent Board meetings, and in particular the specific proposals made by Member States of the European Community concerning initial priorities for improvement of the Agency's safeguards system.

30. He shared the opinion of other delegates that the political changes in the Soviet Union would have significant repercussions for the Agency's future work on nuclear safety and non-proliferation. The Agency should pursue its major task of offering its considerable experience to contribute to the operational safety of nuclear power plants in the Republics of the Soviet Union and in the emerging new States. In that context, he wholeheartedly welcomed the admission of the Baltic States to the Agency - which should help them make a clear separation between their military and civilian nuclear activities so that they could continue to fulfil existing non-proliferation commitments. His country was ready to co-operate in that endeavour on such crucial questions as nuclear safety, safeguards, technical assistance, budgetary issues and the revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole.

31. In the light of recent political developments in the countries of central and eastern Europe, the issue of prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities should not be forgotten. That was of course an extremely sensitive issue, but it must nevertheless be pursued until an appropriate solution had been negotiated.

32. Hungary belonged to a region where changes of true historical significance were taking place. Its economic recovery was far from complete and specific help in the form of expertise and know-how were required in order to adjust to the new rules, practices and standards. Reactor safety remained a priority in that respect, and in the past ten years two five-year research and development programmes for the improvement of safety at Hungary's nuclear power plant had been completed. His country was convinced that the operational safety of that plant should be periodically reassessed in the light of the latest scientific advances. The relevant Hungarian organizations were therefore developing a new programme for that purpose.

33. International co-operation in that field should be organized in such a way as to minimize expenditures for donor countries and to maintain efficiency at the highest possible level. To that end, international efforts should be co-ordinated and the necessary structure created, particularly as new countries were expected to emerge in Europe in the near future. Hungary, whose nuclear plant had an internationally recognized good safety record, wished to contribute to those activities.

34. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the International Safety Conference held recently in Vienna had produced an international consensus on the main topics. Its conclusion that responsibility for the enforcement of nuclear safety must primarily remain at national level was very important. At the same time, his delegation fully recognized the need for an integrated international approach to all aspects of nuclear safety, including those concerning radioactive waste management. The Agency should facilitate the elaboration on a step-by-step basis of a framework convention on that issue.

35. The changes in Hungary had also affected governmental supervision and control of nuclear power plants. In accordance with a decree adopted at the end of the previous year, the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission had been reorganized to act as an independent nuclear regulatory body responsible for regulation, licensing and inspection of all nuclear facilities. In addition, the Commission would fulfil all of its previous tasks and thus remain the national nuclear authority responsible for maintaining relations with relevant international organizations such as the Agency. The main objective of that restructuring had been to ensure the independence of the Commission in order to facilitate full implementation of all safety requirements. In performing backup research, the regulatory body could draw on its own resources (experts or research contracts) instead of relying on results provided by the electrical utility. Those changes were in line with both the NUSS recommendations and the general endeavour of the international nuclear community to strengthen control in the nuclear power field.

36. The Hungarian WWR-213 nuclear power plant was the most reliable energy source in the country. It had an excellent operational record and the annual and cumulative load factors of its units were among the best in the world. The further development of electricity production would be based on a diversity of energy sources, and in that connection he underlined the importance of the initiative for a European Energy Charter. The choice of the type and size of units for the new base-load power plant depended on various economic, social and political factors, and his country hoped to make use to a large extent of foreign capital and technology. It was also vital to obtain public consent when formulating the main concepts of a future energy policy. It was therefore urgent to provide the public with the necessary information.

An important step in that direction had been the seminar on the most challenging problems of nuclear energy held with the Agency's assistance for the media and local administration in Budapest in May.

37. The report on technical co-operation in 1990 showed that the Agency had taken further successful measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its activities in that area. He noted with satisfaction that the funds available for Agency technical assistance had increased once again. In that connection, he announced that his Government had pledged a voluntary contribution to the TACF for 1992 corresponding to its share of the target.

38. In conclusion, he approved the Agency's Annual Report for 1990.

39. Mr. CHIKELU (Nigeria) welcomed the four new Members of the Agency, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Yemen, and thanked the Director General and his colleagues for the excellent documentation they had produced for the General Conference.

40. His delegation had read with interest the report on the Agency's activities contained in document GC(XXXV)/953 and was pleased to have contributed to them, as on the whole they showed that the Agency was continuing to work towards the achievement of its statutory objectives. The aim of those activities was to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities, an issue about which the international community was rightly concerned in view of the increasing use of nuclear energy for electricity production, to place safeguards on nuclear materials so as to ensure their peaceful use in Member States, and, in particular, to provide enhanced technical assistance in the areas of nuclear applications, food and agriculture, medicine, and training.

41. The Agency's dynamic role had received well-deserved commendation from all Member States. The United Nations General Assembly, at its forty-fifth session, had reaffirmed its confidence in the Agency's role in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. His delegation noted with satisfaction the professional manner in which the Agency had carried out the special task entrusted to it by the Security Council in its resolution 687(1991). He commended the Agency and hoped that it would not relax its efforts in that area.

42. Nigeria attached great importance to the Agency's role in promoting international co-operation in nuclear technology and its applications. In the past year the Agency had increased its involvement, together with other international organizations, in activities relating to the health and ecological consequences of the Chernobyl accident, the safety analysis of various types of power reactor and the Helsinki Symposium on Electricity and the Environment.

43. It was clear from document GC(XXXV)/INF/294 that the scope and value of the Agency's technical co-operation activities continued to grow. The overall implementation rate for technical co-operation had increased from 56.5% in 1989 to 67% in 1990. That positive development was no doubt due to the introduction of the two-year cycle. His delegation looked forward to the outcome of the programme evaluation to be undertaken in the present year by the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee. However, it was already evident that additional resources would be necessary for the proper implementation of the technical assistance programme. He hoped that, in the process of evaluation, the issue of the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries would be dealt with in detail.

44. He welcomed the fact that Africa's share of the Agency's technical assistance had increased substantially, from 18% in 1989 to 23% in 1990, and that the expenditure reflected regional development priorities. His country intended to provide US \$105 000 as a voluntary contribution to the TACF for 1992, thus expressing its satisfaction with the overall results obtained by the Agency in implementing its technical assistance and co-operation programme.

45. With regard to nuclear safety, there was continued emphasis on improving radiation protection services in developing countries, and RAPAT and WAMAP missions had taken place in a number of countries in the region, including Nigeria. It was reassuring that the training of radiation protection officers had been stepped up. In December 1990 Nigeria had hosted a regional workshop on basic radiation protection and development of a national infrastructure for radiation safety, which had brought together various participants from African countries.

46. His Government had recently approved the final text of a decree on nuclear safety and radiation protection. The RAPAT and WAMAP missions had recommended the adoption of such legislation, which was considered essential for the effective control and regulation of the use of ionizing radiation and the management of radioactive waste.

47. For the eighth consecutive year, the Agency would in 1992 maintain the principle of zero real growth in its budget. However, the Agency was increasingly being called upon to carry out tasks which could scarcely be accommodated within a zero-growth budget. To carry out those tasks, the Agency must be able to rely on the timely payment of contributions by Member States. He therefore urged Member States to respond to the Director General's appeal to pay their contributions in a timely manner so that the Secretariat would not have to ask for further increases in the Working Capital Fund in the immediate future. He also urged them to reconsider the zero-growth policy, which, if continued, would seriously hamper the Agency's activities.

48. In that context, the extrabudgetary resources available to the Agency were of great importance for developing countries, including Nigeria, and they should therefore be increased so as to facilitate the implementation of a greater number of projects. Of the 159 projects completed in 1990 under the technical assistance and co-operation programme, two had been in Nigeria, in the areas of nuclear medicine and pest control.

49. The BICOT project for the biological control of the tsetse fly had been launched in 1979 with extrabudgetary resources from four Member States, namely Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. He thanked those countries for their assistance, and also the United States Government for its contribution towards the nuclear medicine project.

50. In the case of the BICOT project, a good foundation had been laid for the second phase, which aimed at expanding the tsetse fly eradication programme to cover an additional 12 000 km<sup>2</sup> of agricultural and grazing land. In view of the good results already obtained using the sterile insect technique, his delegation was confident that donors would come forward to support the second phase.

51. Turning to the African Regional Co-operative Agreement (AFRA), to which 12 States were already parties, he expressed the conviction that it was essential for providing effective assistance to the region. The meeting of the first technical working group, which had taken place in Cairo in September 1990, had been followed in July 1991 by a second meeting in Algiers, and Nigeria had participated in both. Those meetings had resulted in the identification of specific projects in the areas of food preservation, irradiation processing and the use of radioisotopes in animal production and plant mutation breeding which were now included in the Agency's programme. Full advantage should be taken of AFRA to expand co-operation among African countries, and his country wished to assure AFRA Member States of its full co-operation to that end.

52. The question of amending Article VI.A.2 of the Agency's Statute, which had been on the agenda of the General Conference for over ten years, remained a cause for concern. The time was long overdue for reaching agreement on the issue of under-representation of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia on the Board of Governors. The divergence of views on that issue could be bridged if all parties would show greater determination and a spirit of give and take.

53. As the Fourth NPT Review Conference in September 1990 had once again emphasized, safeguards were one of the Agency's main areas of activity. It was encouraging that the safeguards role had been acknowledged on many occasions by the international community. Confidence in the Agency's safeguards was reinforced by the 1990 Safeguards Implementation Report, which confirmed that nuclear material under Agency safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or had been otherwise adequately accounted for.

54. He regretted the lack of agreement, despite years of debate and numerous consultations, on the issue of the financing of safeguards and technical co-operation. At a time when the benefits of nuclear technology were becoming universally available, all Member States should make an effort to place safeguards and technical co-operation on a sound financial basis. His delegation was convinced that all Member States would exhibit the necessary qualities of political will and flexibility.



55. Nigeria attached great importance to the issue of radioactive waste management and had strongly advocated the adoption of measures to protect developing countries against the dumping of radioactive wastes and toxic materials on their territories. He noted the expeditious manner in which the Director General had circulated to Member States the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste. He looked forward to the implementation of the Code and its use as the basis for the development of a convention.

56. His delegation had supported the idea of drawing up a Medium-Term Plan in the belief that such a plan would assist in the formulation of bold strategic policies and in setting achievable goals for the Agency. He therefore thanked the Director General and his colleagues for the efforts they had made to that end, and expected that the crucial issue of technical co-operation and resource mobilization would be properly addressed when the Plan was finalized.

57. His country had followed with interest the political developments in the Middle East and their potentially positive impact on non-proliferation in the region as a whole. It was encouraging that all parties were trying to tackle the problems which had so far prevented the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. He urged them to take full advantage of the present opportunity to resolve the outstanding problems.

58. Africa also was undergoing significant changes. He noted the release of political prisoners and the removal of legal barriers created by the apartheid system in South Africa. It was also clear from the documents before the General Conference that South Africa had acceded to the NPT and had negotiated and signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency. The prospects for nuclear non-proliferation in the region had thus been considerably enhanced.

59. Those developments confirmed the wisdom of previous General Conference decisions on that matter. However, as events in other parts of the world had recently shown, caution was required. The steps taken by South Africa in the nuclear field should be reinforced by full co-operation with the Director

General to ensure that the entire nuclear programme was adequately and effectively safeguarded and that the full benefits of nuclear energy could be enjoyed by all the people of South Africa.

60. Despite the euphoria created by those developments, the international community should not forget that some crucial obstacles remained. There was a continuing need to work towards an atmosphere conducive to the development of democratic and constitutional institutions. The course of events would depend to a great extent on the South African Government. The Nigerian Government and the Organization of African Unity had declared their readiness to support the return of South Africa to the community of nations, provided of course that that country took definite and irreversible steps to dismantle apartheid and live in peace with its neighbours.

61. At the thirty-fourth session of the General Conference, the prospect of important developments in the nuclear non-proliferation area had emerged, and those hopes were now being fulfilled. In particular, it had become clear that the non-adoption of a final document at the Fourth NPT Review Conference had not been due to a lack of will to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. He welcomed the decision of France and the expressed intention of China to accede to the NPT. All those developments, together with the emerging trend towards non-proliferation in Africa as well as other regions, were important components of the non-proliferation regime which the Agency was responsible for promoting.

62. The responsibilities of the Agency were growing with the continued expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology, but he was convinced that the Agency was capable of meeting those challenges - if it was given the necessary resources. He hoped, therefore, that the will to strengthen the Agency would be amply demonstrated at the present session. His delegation would participate as fully as it could in the process of revitalization.

63. Mr. MUSATESCU (Romania) thanked the Director General for his tireless efforts to strengthen the Agency's role and its participation in solving the serious problems facing the international community, to increase the Agency's contribution to the development of peaceful applications of

nuclear energy, and to enhance its international prestige. On behalf of his country, he welcomed the admission of Yemen, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which was a further step towards universal membership of the Agency.

64. The peaceful use of nuclear energy had been and remained a major element of Romanian economic policy. His Government therefore attached particular importance to the Agency's promotional activities and to international co-operation in that area. It welcomed the results achieved in the past year, which confirmed the increasingly important role of the Agency for Member States and the international community as a whole.

65. Romania gave high priority to the Agency's programmes and activities in the areas of enhancing the safety of power plants and other nuclear facilities, radiation protection, effective implementation of the safeguards system, technical assistance and co-operation, and nuclear research and applications. Through all those activities the Agency had become an indispensable part of the present worldwide system of international co-operation and security.

66. His country regarded the NPT as a vital element in international stability and security. As a party to the Treaty, it had fulfilled the relevant obligations in full and in good faith, and hoped to extend its co-operation with other States to help achieve the objectives of the NPT. There was no doubt that confidence in peaceful nuclear applications was heavily dependent on respect for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

67. His country was convinced that the objective of the safeguards system, namely the prevention of nuclear-weapons proliferation, could only be achieved by means of effective control measures, and the system should be further strengthened and expanded to cover all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation had noted with satisfaction that important developments in the past year had contributed to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the decision of France and China to accede to the NPT, the conclusion by South Africa of a safeguards agreement with the Agency, and the accession to the NPT of Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. He also hoped that the process of concluding a safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency would soon be

completed. His country welcomed all those political acts as important steps towards universal application of the NPT, an objective which should be pursued by the international community. It fully supported the values which the NPT and the Agency's safeguards system were aiming to uphold.

68. As a party to the NPT and to the Agency's safeguards system, his Government had already taken regulatory and institutional measures to comply with the most rigorous international standards and to ensure their strict application with regard to nuclear exports. To that end, Romania had incorporated in its national legislation principles applicable to the control of nuclear exports in accordance with the provisions of documents INFCIRC/209 and INFCIRC/254, principles to which the Romanian delegation had drawn attention in an information document. The fact that Romania had participated for the first time in the work of the Zangger Committee bore witness to the confidence of other Member States in its policy of non-proliferation and control of nuclear exports, as well as in the effectiveness of the measures it had taken to implement that policy.

69. His country saw the application of safeguards as a key element in its non-proliferation policy, in its trading activities and in international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Romania had also accepted simplified procedures for the designation of Agency inspectors, and had concluded the necessary agreements with the United States and the Agency for the replacement of highly enriched fuel for its experimental reactor by fuel enriched to less than 20%. It also supported the application by the Agency of the provisions of the framework agreement on unannounced and special inspections and the access for inspectors to additional information and sites, as well as the idea of carrying out special inspections at the request of Member States. It also favoured the establishment of a universal Agency notification system, and had accepted and was observing the principle of applying full-scope safeguards, which should become the norm in international nuclear co-operation and trade.

70. As members were aware, Romania had, from the outset of its nuclear energy programme, opted for the CANDU-type reactor in view of its inherent characteristics, particularly those relating to safety. Construction of the

first Romanian nuclear power plant had begun in 1980 at Cernavoda. The most important recent step had been the renewal of the contract concluded between Romanian firms, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, and Ansaldo Impianti (Italy).

71. His country was grateful to the Agency for the assistance it had provided by sending several missions to analyse in depth the safety of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant, and was resolved to implement the recommendations of those missions. In the field of safeguards, a seminar-workshop had been organized jointly by the Agency and Romania in June 1991 in order to determine the system to be established in that power plant.

72. The Agency deserved congratulation on its activities in the past year. Its accomplishments were presented in a comprehensive manner in the Annual Report for 1990, which showed that the Agency had carried out the tasks entrusted to it as well as possible in the face of financial constraints. Technical co-operation was one of the Agency's essential activities and was just as important as safeguards and nuclear safety. In recent years the Secretariat had made significant efforts in that area in order to respond better to the needs of Member States. The new system based on the two-year programming cycle had begun to yield good results, as shown by the increase in implementation rates and the more equitable distribution of resources by area and by region. It was gratifying that the total real value of new resources available for the programme in 1990 had reached the highest level yet, which indicated that the programme and its financing methods remained healthy.

73. His country attached a high level of priority to the technical co-operation programme because of its importance for the promotion of nuclear science and technology, and hoped to continue to benefit from it. He thanked the Agency and Member States which had contributed to technical assistance for Romania. That assistance had been very useful and effective, particularly in the case of approved projects relating to nuclear safety and licensing for the Cernavoda power plant, which had reached an advanced stage of construction.

74. Romania gave high priority to all matters concerning nuclear safety and radiation protection, and its nuclear programme had been established on a sound basis. The Cernavoda nuclear power plant project had been subject from the very beginning to control and supervision by the competent body, which was

ensuring strict compliance with national and international standards at all levels - design, technology, construction, material and equipment, quality assurance and control - as well as appropriate personnel training to maintain operational safety at the plant. He drew attention to the international co-operation which had thus been established and which would increase further thanks to the efforts of the Agency and Member States. His Government was convinced that nuclear safety activities were an essential element in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

75. The enhancement of international co-operation did not in any way relieve the countries concerned of the responsibility to apply effective safety and radiation protection measures within their borders. Nuclear safety was equally relevant to all Member States, whether or not they operated nuclear power plants. Conscious of the vital need to protect its population and its territory against the possible transboundary effects of nuclear accidents, Romania was very interested in activities such as the extra-budgetary project on WWER-440/230 reactors. In that connection, he thanked the Director General for his favourable reception of the joint request from the Romanian and Bulgarian Governments relating to a safety review of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. Germany had already carried out a detailed evaluation of its WWER-440/230 reactors, and Romania intended to use that work as a basis for future evaluations of that type of reactor. The nuclear industry was evidently capable of showing exemplary objectivity in the evaluation of its own safety.

76. His Government had initiated the necessary process for Romania to become a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and to the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention.

77. The content of the Agency's programme for 1992 was satisfactory; his delegation was prepared to accept the proposed budget figure and noted with pleasure the efforts made to maintain that figure within the limits of zero real growth. With regard to the draft Medium-Term Plan, he appreciated the work already carried out, but hoped that the Plan's final version would show a

better identification of priorities, as great attention must be paid to high-priority activities such as the nuclear safety and radiation protection programmes, safeguards, technical assistance, and the applications of radiation and isotopes in various areas. His Government would provide the Agency with ten fellowships in 1992, for periods of six to ten months each, to enable specialists to receive training at Romanian institutions in various areas of nuclear physics research and nuclear applications.

78. Romania was fully prepared to extend and diversify its co-operation with the Agency and Member States in order to assist the Agency in carrying out the important tasks assigned to it in connection with international co-operation and the implementation of safeguards. It was in that spirit that the Romanian Government had decided to seek election to a seat on the Board of Governors.

79. The current session had been called upon to map out the future activity of the Agency, particularly in view of the Agency's participation in the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning the Gulf War and its consequences. Romania was a member of the Security Council and had taken an active part in the drafting and adoption of those resolutions. Accordingly, it appreciated the measures taken by the Agency to implement them within its own sphere of activity. His delegation was ready to join others in supporting the Agency in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by those resolutions.

80. The necessary lessons should be learned and effective measures taken to strengthen the NPT, the Agency's safeguards system and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, while avoiding any adverse impact on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

81. In conclusion, he reaffirmed the importance which Romania attached to the Agency's vital role, the confidence it had in that organization and the Director General, and its willingness to continue to co-operate actively towards achieving the Agency's objectives.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION  
(GC(XXXV)/952, Add.1 and Add.2/Rev.1)

82. The PRESIDENT reported that the General Committee recommended to the General Conference that the agenda for the current session should include all the items listed in document GC(XXXV)/952, together with the supplementary item A (Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations) proposed by the Board of Governors in document GC(XXXV)/952/Add.1, and the supplementary item B (Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East) requested by a group of Member States in document GC(XXXV)/952/Add.2/Rev.1. The General Committee further recommended that the items in question be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in those documents.

83. With respect to the order of items, the Committee recommended that supplementary item A be inserted between items 21 and 22 of the provisional agenda, and that supplementary item B be inserted between items 7 and 8, the items being renumbered as necessary.

84. The General Committee also recommended that the conclusions of one or two of the groups which would be meeting under the special scientific programme should be reported to the General Conference during a plenary meeting, interrupting the general debate briefly if necessary. He would invite the chairman of the group or groups in question to take the floor at a suitable moment.

85. Ms. TALLAWY (Egypt) recalled the position which her delegation had adopted within the General Committee: the issue of the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East should come between items 20 and 21 of the agenda and should not be dealt with immediately after the general debate, for a number of reasons. It was a new item. Negotiations between delegations were still in progress. The item should be viewed in the context of safeguards in general and should not be linked to the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. She requested that those points be borne in mind during the discussion of the President's proposal.



86. Mr. AMMAR (Tunisia), Mr. AL-TAIFI (Saudi Arabia), Mr. SALLOUKH (Lebanon) and Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) endorsed the suggestion put forward by Egypt.

87. Mr. LEE (Canada) pointed out that the question had already been discussed at great length by the General Committee. The Canadian delegation had supported the President's proposal that the item on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East should be included in the agenda either as item 7(a), or between items 7 and 8, since the issue was clearly closely linked to that of Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. To a certain extent the issues were identical. It would therefore be sensible to deal with them one after another. Thus, it would be preferable to go along with the General Committee's decision.

88. Mr. VILAIN XIII (Belgium) agreed with the delegate of Canada that the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat and supplementary item B on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East were clearly connected. In the interests of efficiency they should be discussed close together. A compromise solution might be to place the supplementary item between items 20 and 21, as suggested by the delegate of Egypt, and to insert item 8 between the new item 22 and the current item 22. He hoped that might prove acceptable.

89. Mr. de KLERK (Netherlands), recalling the position adopted by his delegation in the General Committee, said he favoured a joint discussion of the two issues for the reasons put forward by the delegate of Canada. Moreover, as the issue of the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East could attract a broad consensus, it would be preferable to discuss it first. Though he was speaking on behalf of his own delegation, he thought that his statement also reflected the position of the countries of the European Community.

90. Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) and Mr. RIHA (Czechoslovakia), endorsing the comments made by the delegate of Canada, expressed their support for the General Committee's decision regarding the order of items on the agenda.

91. Mr. LAMPARELLI (Italy) and Mr. RIOBO (Chile) suggested that the two items should be moved nearer the end of the agenda, as had been proposed by the delegate of Belgium.

92. Mr. AL-SAEID (Kuwait) said that, as the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat had already been discussed many times and at length and had on several occasions been voted upon, discussion of it would probably take up a great deal of time. By contrast, the issue of the application of safeguards would probably attract a near-total consensus, and discussion would be brief. Moreover, Member States were still involved in consultations on the issue. If it were to be discussed immediately after the general debate, delegations might not be quite ready. It would therefore be wiser to place it between items 20 and 21.

93. The PRESIDENT, noting that the General Committee had discussed the issue at length, and that the Committee represented all regions and all interests and had been able to examine all the positions put forward, suggested that the General Conference should adopt the agenda recommended by the General Committee.

94. It was so decided.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

95. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended to the General Conference that Friday, 20 September 1991, be set as the closing date of the thirty-fifth regular session. Should it prove necessary to extend the session, however, he would consult the General Conference again.

96. The General Committee's recommendation was adopted.

97. The PRESIDENT further reported that the General Committee recommended that the thirty-sixth regular session of the General Conference should commence on Monday, 21 September 1992, and that it should be held in Vienna.

98. The General Committee's recommendations were adopted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1990 (GC(XXXV)/953) (resumed)

99. Mr. ZILLER (Germany), speaking for the first time on behalf of the united Germany, said that it took its responsibilities towards the Agency as seriously as the Federal Republic of Germany had always done since the establishment of the Agency. He extended a sincere welcome to the delegations of the three Baltic republics and united Yemen as new Members of the Agency.

100. In Germany, nuclear energy continued to make a major contribution to diversification of the energy supply and therefore also to energy security; by avoiding carbon dioxide emissions, it also contributed to environmental protection. Nuclear energy remained indispensable, and international co-operation on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, particularly with European partners in the East and the West, constituted an integral part of German policy.

101. Since the previous session, events in the Gulf had taken a dramatic turn and had caused grave anxiety, but they had also produced a ray of hope. While the re-establishment of the sovereignty of Kuwait was a subject for rejoicing, it was horrifying that, at the very moment when the General Conference was discussing environmental protection and the role nuclear energy could play in that regard, hundreds of oil wells were burning and polluting an entire region. Unfortunately, the problems did not stop there: the action taken pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 had revealed that Iraq had been misleading the Agency and its Member States for many years. That country had gravely violated its commitments under the safeguards agreement it had concluded with the Agency pursuant to its obligations under the NPT by deliberately concealing from the Agency nuclear materials and activities. He called upon Iraq to honour its obligations in their entirety, to comply fully with the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors, to abide completely by both the letter and the spirit of resolution 687, and to discharge scrupulously its responsibilities under international law.

102. It was to be hoped that that instance of serious violation of a safeguards agreement would remain an isolated case. Nevertheless, care should be taken to ensure that the situation did not repeat itself. Together with its European partners, the German Government had emphasized the necessity of

further enhancing safeguards effectiveness, as set out in the statement of the European Council in June 1991. The long-term reliability of safeguards would be strengthened if the proposals submitted recently by the European Community were implemented promptly. The Director General had already put forward his proposals concerning Agency safeguards and the Board had discussed them in detail. The German Government would support all efforts aimed at reinforcing the effectiveness of international safeguards with a view to inspiring confidence and thus ensuring peace.

103. He therefore appealed to all the countries in the Middle East to play their part in ensuring that all peoples in the region could look forward to a peaceful future after the horrors of the war. The States concerned should try to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, or a zone free of all means of mass destruction, where full-scope safeguards would be applied. Such a zone would be in the interests of the region and the international community.

104. He once again appealed to all countries which had not yet done so to accede to the NPT. He welcomed the imminent accession of France to the Treaty and China's expressed intention to accede to it. It was cause for particular satisfaction that South Africa had also joined the NPT, and that the relevant safeguards agreement had been signed in record time, had entered into force, and would be applied without delay. He noted the positive influence which the accession of Zambia and Tanzania had had in that regard, and expressed his conviction that it would initiate a major move towards peace in the southern African region. It was equally pleasing that the negotiations between the Agency, Argentina and Brazil concerning full-scope safeguards were progressing well.

105. The fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was delaying the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the Agency was causing serious concern to the German Government, which expected that country to sign the agreement forthwith, to provide for its entry into force without delay, and to embark immediately on preparations to ensure its full application as soon as it had entered into force.

106. The NPT and the system of full-scope safeguards which was based upon it constituted the main means of ensuring that nuclear energy was used exclusively for peaceful purposes throughout the world. It was the policy of the German Government to refuse licences for any significant nuclear export if the importing State was not willing to submit its whole nuclear fuel cycle to Agency safeguards, and he expressed the hope that all supplier countries would make similar arrangements.

107. International co-operation in the nuclear safety area also needed to be reinforced. Five years after the event, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were still suffering from the traumatic consequences which Chernobyl had had for several countries. The International Safety Conference organized by the Agency had come at exactly the right moment. He welcomed the findings of that Conference and the recommendations of the Board of Governors. The General Conference should act swiftly and positively to ensure that a start could be made with the step-by-step setting up of an international regime covering all aspects of nuclear safety. The German Government was confident that an international framework convention on safety could be concluded rapidly.

108. As in previous years, Germany would be pledging a contribution to the TACF based on its rate of assessment, and would make additional voluntary contributions for footnote-a/ projects. However, it had to be recognized that the targets which had been fixed for the TACF in recent years had risen to such an extent that it was quite impossible to meet them.

109. On the other hand, the German delegation shared the Director General's concern with regard to the payment of contributions. In view of the major importance of the Agency's tasks for the world, he could not see why so many Member States did not pay their contributions promptly.

110. In conclusion, he recalled that international co-operation within the Agency in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy remained one of the cornerstones of international peace. He felt sure that the Agency would face the new challenges successfully.

111. Mr. MARTINENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), noting that the Chernobyl tragedy had affected one Byelorussian in five, expressed his deep gratitude to all those who had taken part in the International

Chernobyl Project. His delegation was greatly appreciative of the efforts which had been made to gather objective information on the current situation five years after the accident. He thanked the 200 scientists from 25 countries who had made regular evaluations and studied the development of the situation. As a scientist himself, he felt that their conclusions might be open to serious criticism owing to the complexity of their task. However, that in no way diminished the gratitude of Byelorussia or undermined its attitude to the project.

112. Since it was impossible to predict the development of a non-linear dynamic system on the basis of a body of statistical data which could, at best, be viewed only as initial information, the scientific community could not take seriously any conclusions concerning the expected development of the consequences of Chernobyl, the study of which had only reached a first stage. For that reason, Byelorussia was officially requesting that cognizance be taken of the need to carry out a more in-depth study of all the radiophysical, chemical, radiochemical, technical, medical and biological problems which the consequences of the Chernobyl accident had given rise to. Definitive judgements could not be made until reliable data had been collected. A complete picture was required both by Byelorussia and the USSR and by the forces of international nuclear co-operation in order to ensure that the efforts to eliminate the consequences of the accident were deployed in the most effective way, and in order to determine, amidst all the rumours and flights of fancy, what specific action needed to be taken in the short term. The future of atomic energy as a whole would depend in large measure upon the efficiency and effectiveness with which the work to heal the wounds of Chernobyl was conducted.

113. The future of power production was directly linked to nuclear energy and would depend in large part on the situation in the Chernobyl region. The Chernobyl accident had frozen the development of nuclear power for several years. The best way of encouraging continued development would be to plan for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Byelorussia, where one was needed in terms of energy demand, but where social factors were clearly against such a move.

114. Such an approach to the situation by the international community seemed entirely justified. No one had the right, vis-à-vis future generations, to ignore the immense quantity of concrete data which had been collected following the tragedy, in an area where the health of hundreds of thousands of people was deteriorating seriously. The nuclear community and all the Member States of the Agency must be made aware of how all the medico-biological and radiophysical consequences of the accident were developing, for nobody could be sure that something similar would not occur again. For that reason, an arsenal of protection resources had to be amassed. Thus, it now seemed essential that the Agency should include all aspects of the Chernobyl catastrophe in its permanent technical programmes and, in particular, that it should encourage the various countries involved in the development of nuclear power to lend their assistance and to provide resources to help clean up the consequences of the accident. He felt sure that the moral principles proclaimed by the Agency would be translated into specific measures to that end.

115. In addition, he expressed his sincere thanks to the Co-ordinator of United Nations activities relating to Chernobyl, Ms. Anstee, for the efforts which she and her colleagues had made. He hoped that the international community would respond appropriately to the appeal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations by providing support to help eliminate the consequences of Chernobyl within the framework of the Chernobyl Pledging Conference to be held on 20 September in New York.

116. At the end of 1990, the Board of Governors had approved a footnote-a/ project to set up a radiological monitoring station in Byelorussia as part of the Agency's technical co-operation programme. Byelorussia had a strong interest in seeing that project implemented and the Byelorussian Government, in view of the fact that an agreement was already in existence concerning the provision of technical assistance by the Agency to the Byelorussian SSR, appealed to all the policy-making organs of the Agency to try to find appropriate ways of funding that important project.

117. Although he was not sure that he had all of the information at his disposal, he was astonished that the Agency had no programmes on alternative energy sources or energy-saving measures. Nowadays, all industrialized countries took an interest in energy conservation efforts at regional level, and so programmes of that kind should also form part of the Agency's work.

118. The Secretariat should consider setting up joint WHO/IAEA and UNEP/IAEA divisions or sections with a view to co-ordinating more closely the study of ecological and especially medical problems related to nuclear energy. It would also be useful if the Agency were to take an active part in a broad-based examination of world energy and ecology problems, in particular during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) which would be taking place in 1992. One major way of restoring public confidence in nuclear power would be to strengthen the role played by the Agency in environmental protection, and to pay greater attention to the link between the safe use of atomic energy and improvement and protection of the environment, as well as the problem of final disposal of radioactive waste and spent reactor fuel.

119. Byelorussia attached great importance to, and supported with all the means at its disposal, the development of the technical assistance and co-operation programme which occupied such an important position in the Agency's work. Clearly, the increased volume of activities in that programme called for a corresponding increase in the resources allocated to it. In that regard, it was essential that the current programme for the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident be included in the programme.

120. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Agency's role and position of authority with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, and the solution of world energy and ecology problems would continue to expand.

121. Mr. RYZHOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that for some time his country had been experiencing events and changes of truly historic significance. Totalitarian structures and an autocratic mentality were being replaced by a genuinely democratic system of government based on the primacy of values common to all men and respect for the rights and liberties of both individuals and nations.



122. By granting freedom to others, the Soviet Union was liberating itself and entering, once again as a free democratic union of peoples sharing a thousand-year history, a new era in its development as a constituent part of the democratic world. A new union of sovereign States was being born, and, like all births, it was painful. The Soviet Union nevertheless believed that the great Eurasian democracy would become a cornerstone of a new free and safe world.

123. The international community was following events in the Soviet Union closely. That was natural, since it was an enormous country made up of a multitude of nationalities, rich in natural resources, with a large and diversified economy, shaken by serious crises, and, finally, possessing a vast military potential, including nuclear weapons. Understandably, participants in the Agency's General Conference were primarily interested in the nuclear aspect of events in the Soviet Union, meaning the situation with respect to nuclear arms, nuclear energy and the nuclear industry.

124. The leaders of the Soviet Union and of the Republics attached the highest importance to the nuclear aspects of current events in the Soviet Union. The recent Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR had taken fundamental decisions on how the State would be governed during the transition period. Under no circumstances would that period entail a vacuum in political power or State control. The decisions which had been taken guaranteed continuity and no interruption in activities. One of the first decisions towards creating a new union of sovereign democratic States had been the drawing up and conclusion of an agreement between the Republics on the principles of joint security and defence according to which a single armed force would be retained, with unified control of the arsenals of nuclear, and other, weapons of mass destruction. During the transition period all the international agreements and obligations entered into by the Soviet Union, including those relating to arms reduction and control, would be upheld without exception.

125. An economic union of States would define the regulations and mechanisms of a single economic area and would also solve all problems involved in the management of nuclear energy and the nuclear industry in the Soviet Union, including the safety of power plants and all nuclear fuel cycle installations

intended for peaceful as well as military use, nuclear exports, the physical protection of nuclear installations and material, and international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, including co-operation with the Agency.

126. In that context, he wished to express his delegation's great satisfaction at the acceptance of the three independent Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as Member States of the Agency. His delegation felt sure that those three Republics would adhere to the NPT without delay and conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency. The Soviet Union also congratulated Yemen on becoming a Member of the Agency.

127. It seemed fitting and important, at a session of the General Conference of the Agency, the international organization entrusted with watching over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to dwell on some aspects of the non-proliferation problem. Remarkable achievements had been seen in the past year. Two nuclear powers, France and China, had announced their intention to become parties to the NPT.

128. The process of change in South Africa initiated by President de Klerk, which was leading to the breakdown of the inhuman system of apartheid, also had nuclear implications. After three years of negotiations with the Depositary Governments of the NPT, the South African Government had officially acceded to the Treaty and had concluded, in an unprecedentedly short space of time, a safeguards agreement with the Agency which had been approved the preceding week by the Board of Governors, had been signed on 16 September and had entered into force the same day. Those actions by South Africa brought with them an easing of the situation in the Agency and its policy-making organs and an end to factors which had interfered with its work.

129. Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia had adhered to the NPT at an earlier stage. Now Angola had just taken the decision, in principle, to do the same. He commended the leaders of those African States on their wisdom. Those decisions meant that the conditions had been met for the creation of a denuclearized zone in southern Africa which would make the entire African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as advocated by the Organization of African Unity.

130. He also welcomed the decision by Argentina and Brazil to accept full-scope safeguards and to conclude an agreement to that effect with the Agency. He hoped that that decision, together with Cuba's new status as an OPANAL observer, would help strengthen the Tlatelolco Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime.

131. The fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency had been able to agree on the text of a safeguards agreement, and that the Board of Governors had approved it, was also encouraging. The Soviet Union urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to sign, ratify and implement that agreement as soon as possible. That would help to normalize the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Far East as a whole, and improve the chances of creating a denuclearized zone in that region.

132. He approved and welcomed the inclusion of the item "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East" in the agenda for the current session of the General Conference and hoped that a resolution on that matter would be adopted by consensus, since implementation of such a resolution would help strengthen confidence and contribute to the attainment of a lasting peace and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

133. It would be desirable for the beneficial processes of strengthening and universalization of the international non-proliferation regime also to spread to other regions of the world. However, events in the Persian Gulf area contrasted unfavourably with the encouraging results obtained elsewhere in strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the decisive steps taken by the United Nations Security Council to bring it to a halt had led to a chain of events and actions following which the Board of Governors, on the basis of Agency inspections carried out in Iraq in accordance with Security Council resolution 687, had concluded that Iraq had failed to meet its safeguards obligations. The case of Iraq did not prove that there was any inherent weakness in the Agency's safeguards system, but merely showed that a State intent on pursuing evil aims of its own could circumvent the system. The task now, therefore, was to prevent irresponsible politicians from misleading the peace-loving community in the future, and to that end it was important to take appropriate measures swiftly and prudently to enhance the effectiveness of the Agency's verification system.

134. The most important aspects of the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime were nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear testing. The process of effective nuclear arms reduction which had started with the signing of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, pursuant where to all means of transport of such missiles in those two countries had been destroyed during the current year, had continued with the drafting and the signing in Moscow of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The Soviet Union was prepared to go still further towards radical reductions of nuclear weapons, including the banning of underground tests.

135. The Annual Report showed that the Agency had essentially acquitted itself of its tasks relating to the organization of international collaboration in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It had again demonstrated its ability to react swiftly and accurately to a changing situation and to the emergence of new problems. He wished to draw particular attention to the independent international assessment of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and to express his delegation's heartfelt gratitude to all involved in that project and to the staff of the Secretariat who had ensured that it was carried out efficiently.

136. The Soviet Union attached high priority to the Agency's activities aimed at safeguarding the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and to improving the operation of the Agency's international safeguards system, which played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms and facilitating normal international trade in nuclear materials, installations and technology.

137. While welcoming the Director General's report on the Agency's activities pursuant to Security Council resolution 687, his delegation, as already noted previously, would like to see a clearer distinction made between the Agency's activities in accordance with safeguards agreements, which constituted its normal statutory activities, and activities related to the implementation of special tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council.

138. The Soviet Union co-operated closely with the Agency in the inspection of its peaceful nuclear installations under the agreement for the application of safeguards in the USSR. It also gave the Agency material and technical help with increasing the effectiveness of safeguards through its national programme of scientific and technical support. The 1991-92 programme, for the financing of which 5 million roubles had been made available, provided for research work, training courses for Agency inspectors, courses on nuclear material accountancy and control systems, the development of methods and instruments, etc.

139. Among the most important elements of the Agency's activities, and also of major importance to the Soviet Union, were the further development of nuclear energy and the guaranteeing of its safety. Prior to the Chernobyl accident there had been scarcely any doubt about the need to develop nuclear power as a priority, and the Soviet energy programme had provided for a rapid increase in nuclear generating capacity. The Chernobyl accident had marked a turning point. Strong and mounting opposition to the further development of nuclear energy and even to the operation of nuclear power plants had been voiced by the public. It should be pointed out, however, that public opinion had recently shown a shift in favour of nuclear energy; thus, the Councils of People's Deputies in several regions of the USSR had decided to construct new units with a total capacity of 12 million kilowatts.

140. The Soviet nuclear industry had significant reserves at present and could therefore undertake a programme to modernize a number of nuclear fuel cycle installations and to adopt new technologies aimed at protecting the environment and ensuring fuller utilization of uranium ores.

141. An important element of Soviet participation in international co-operation was the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services. Until recently, those services had been limited to uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication for nuclear power plants and installations constructed with Soviet aid. The USSR had just entered the world market, where it proposed selling natural and enriched uranium. During the period 1991-95, it could sell up to 5000 tonnes of natural uranium per year, an offer it could increase if there were sufficient demand on the world market.

142. The total uranium reserves of the Soviet Union were estimated at 2 million tonnes, of which 735 000 could be extracted for less than \$60 per kilogram. The technology of isotope separation by centrifugation meant that foreign trading partners could be offered, alongside long-term contracts, short-term and, if necessary, single-delivery contracts.

143. The Soviet Union was also actively involved, with a deep sense of responsibility, in improving nuclear power safety and enhancing standards of personnel training, and was making use of foreign expertise to do so. The problem of radioactive waste was considered particularly important. The technical policy in that area was to look for integrated solutions to the waste problem in operating and planned installations. In that context, the International Safety Conference which had just taken place in Vienna had been extremely useful, and he congratulated it on its success.

144. In order to solve the energy problems which confronted mankind, especially in the field of nuclear energy, it was essential that international co-operation in that area be strengthened. The collective approach to major world problems had already proved its worth. The Agency had an exceptionally important role to play in that context by actively contributing to the development of international co-operation in the field of nuclear science and technology.

145. Finally, he approved the Agency's Annual Report, and commended the Agency on its activities, the success of which could be attributed to the efficient work of the Secretariat and the Director General.

146. Mr. MONDINO (Argentina) welcomed, on behalf of his Government, the four new Member States of the Agency: Yemen, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

147. His country believed that nuclear power would play an increasing role in the present decade, and that its true importance as the only viable energy option from the technical, economic and ecological point of view, as confirmed by the conclusions of the recent Helsinki Symposium, would emerge by the end of that period. Argentina was at present in the midst of a difficult process of economic adjustment and change, but the first signs of a promising future were already visible. A sharp increase in electricity demand was anticipated in the future, and it would therefore be necessary to complete construction of

the country's third nuclear power plant, already at an advanced stage, as soon as possible and to begin construction of the next plant, long delayed because of the serious economic crisis.

148. Nuclear activity in Argentina had nevertheless been intense. The two nuclear power plants currently in operation continued to function under very satisfactory conditions. In particular, the Embalse plant, with a load factor of 96.1% in the period from September 1989 to September 1990, had taken first place among the world's 340 nuclear power plants in the over 150 megawatt category. In 1990 it had taken second place, among the 26 power plants of the same type, with a load factor of 95.3%. Nuclear power production had accounted for 16.9% of total electricity production in Argentina in 1990 and was achieving a monthly average of 17.7% during the current year.

149. Another encouraging fact was that commissioning tests, also long delayed because of economic difficulties, had begun at the Arroyito heavy water plant. Construction was almost completed and it was hoped that industrial production would start around the middle of 1992. The first Argentine research reactor, RA-1, which had been shut down for several years, had been put into operation again after modernization. That reactor had been entirely designed and constructed in Argentina in 1958. Its restart confirmed Argentina's resolve to continue pursuing nuclear energy.

150. With regard to co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Argentina was convinced that it was both necessary and just to make all the advantages of nuclear energy available to all nations without restriction or discrimination, but with appropriate safeguards to ensure that the technology, installations and materials transferred would be used only for peaceful purposes. Argentina's continued activities in the field of technical co-operation, both multilateral and bilateral, demonstrated that it was prepared to act on those principles.

151. Within the framework of the Agency, Argentina continued to take part in the technical co-operation and ARCAL programmes by hosting courses and workshops, training numerous fellows and scientific visitors and making a considerable number of experts available to the Agency. In 1990, Argentina had ranked third among all Member States in training scientific visitors and fellows, and fourth in providing experts and lecturers.

152. With regard to bilateral co-operation he pointed out that, since the last session of the General Conference, three new co-operation agreements had been signed (with the Soviet Union, Romania and Morocco), and biennial co-operation programmes had been adopted within the framework of existing agreements with Cuba, Chile and the Soviet Union.

153. Argentina strongly supported worldwide efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, both vertical and horizontal. The Argentine Government not only pursued a policy of purely peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but also continued to support, through all international bodies, full disarmament under strict and efficient international control, and in particular nuclear disarmament, since nuclear weapons presented the greatest danger to the survival of mankind. It was in that spirit that the Argentine President, Mr. Carlos Menem, and the Brazilian President, Mr. Fernando Collor de Melo, had made a joint declaration on 28 November 1990 at Foz do Iguaçu on Argentine-Brazilian nuclear policy, establishing three successive stages to give full transparency to the nuclear activities of both countries: setting up of a common system of accounting and control of nuclear materials in all installations; negotiation of a joint full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency covering verification of the common system of accounting and control; and steps to update and improve the text of the Tlatelolco Treaty with a view to its full entry into force for the two countries.

154. The common system of accounting and control of nuclear material had already been implemented. The required legal framework to ensure credibility and stability had also been established: the agreement for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, signed on 18 July 1991 at Guadalajara (Mexico), was currently being ratified. In addition, negotiations on an Argentine-Brazilian full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency had reached an advanced stage, and Argentina hoped that the Board of Governors would soon be able to approve that agreement. Finally, during its twelfth session, in May 1991, the General Conference of the Tlatelolco Treaty had approved a resolution calling for the co-operation of OPANAL in the implementation of the Foz do Iguaçu Declaration.



155. Argentina was firmly convinced that those steps, together with the technical co-operation agreements which had been concluded with Brazil in the 1980s, gave the international community the broadest assurance regarding the aims of the two countries' nuclear programmes.

156. He commended the Secretariat on the perseverance it had shown in resolving problems relating to technical assistance and expressed his delegation's acknowledgement of the results obtained. After a break of ten years, Argentina had in 1991 once again taken full advantage of the Agency's technical co-operation programme. The reasons for those two decisions had been given at the time they were made; he wished only to emphasize that his delegation was most satisfied with the Secretariat's response and that the first results achieved fully justified his country's decision.

157. Like other Member States, Argentina considered the effectiveness and credibility of the Agency's safeguards system to be of prime importance, as was borne out by the fact that twelve safeguards agreements were currently in force between the Argentine Government and the Agency, and that Argentina and Brazil had agreed to entrust the Agency with verification of their common system of accounting and control of nuclear material.

158. Accordingly, he urged the Secretariat to improve the reliability of safeguards through radical rationalization of implementation methods, rather than by simply introducing additional control measures entailing potentially intolerable cost increases, as demonstrated by the current attempts to find new financing formulas.

159. He commended the work done by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, which had made considerable progress in examining a number of points with a view to revising the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Argentina was a party to that Convention and had always called for universal adherence thereto.

160. He was also pleased at the success of the International Safety Conference, reflected in the formulation of a coherent set of conclusions which, together with the new ICRP recommendations, could serve as guidelines for the Agency. There was justification for extending the scope of Agency activities in nuclear safety, on condition that it was done carefully and in a progressive and well-planned way.

161. There was a clear consensus in favour of developing international safety criteria, but there was serious doubt as to the necessity of establishing mandatory international standards within the framework of an international convention. Nuclear safety was primarily based on national regulatory mechanisms and the strict application of safety criteria and codes of practice. Any step which reduced responsibility at the national level would lead to a deterioration, and not an improvement, in safety.

162. Once again, the Agency was to be congratulated on the results obtained in the fields of food and agriculture and biological and physical sciences. The International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste also deserved its customary thanks from Argentina for the quality of the work it had been carrying out for many years.

163. As in previous years, the Argentine Government sincerely commended the Director General and the entire Secretariat staff on their devotion and efficiency, which had compensated for the negative effects of the policy of zero-real-growth budgets. As always, Argentina was prepared to offer full support for and active participation in the Agency's activities. Finally, his delegation approved the Annual Report for 1990.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.