



GC

GC(XXXII)/849
19 September 1988

GENERAL Distr.
Original: ENGLISH

International Atomic Energy Agency

GENERAL CONFERENCE

Thirty-second regular session
Item 7 of the provisional agenda
(GC(XXXII)/834)

ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND THREAT

Report by the Director General

On 15 September the Board of Governors took note of the appended report and agreed to its submission to the General Conference, together with the summary records of the Board's discussions under this item in June and September.

2512Y/211Y

88-04691

ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND THREAT

Introduction

1. In resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, adopted on 25 September 1987, the General Conference:

- (a) Demanded "that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards";
- (b) Requested the Director General "to consider implementation by the IAEA of provisions in United Nations General Assembly resolutions 41/12 and 41/93 in relation to the Agency";
- (c) Requested the Director General "to report to the Board of Governors and to the next session of the General Conference on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat and on the implementation of this resolution"; and
- (d) Requested the Director General "to bring this resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations".

2. In the resolutions referred to in paragraph 1(b) above, the General Assembly:

- (a) Called upon Israel to "urgently place all its nuclear facilities under ... Agency safeguards"; and
- (b) Reiterated its request to the Agency "to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities".

3. In response to the request referred to in sub-paragraph 1(c) above, the Secretariat submitted document GOV/INF/551 to the Board for consideration at its June 1988 session. The present document has been prepared in response to the request by the Board that the information in document GOV/INF/551 be amplified. The present document will also be submitted to the General Conference.

Actions taken by the Director General

4. The Director General wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 2 October 1987, enclosing a copy of resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470.

5. The Director General wrote to the Resident Representative of Israel on 17 November 1987, informing him of the Secretariat's readiness to discuss with Israel the conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement. On 26 July 1988 the Director General received the reply of the Resident Representative of Israel. In his reply the Resident Representative stated the position of his Government that the issue of full-scope safeguards could be satisfactorily settled within the context of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. He further noted that this position had been laid out in detail by Israel's Prime Minister at the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. The texts of the Director General's letter and the reply are reproduced in Annex I to this document.

6. General Assembly resolutions 41/12 and 41/93 were brought to the attention of the Agency's Policy-making Organs by the Secretariat in document GOV/INF/547. There appear to be no inconsistencies between these resolutions and the policies of the Agency as expressed, inter alia, in General Conference resolutions GC(XXV)/RES/381, GC(XXVII)/RES/409 and GC(XIX)/RES/443.

Resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
and the Agency's General Conference

7. A list of resolutions relating to Israel's nuclear armament adopted by the United Nations General Assembly since 1979 (when a study on Israel's nuclear armament was requested) and a list of General Conference resolutions relating to Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat adopted since 1981 are reproduced in Annex 2.

Report on Israel's nuclear capabilities

8. The Secretariat has no direct knowledge of nuclear installations in Israel that could be relevant to a nuclear weapon capability. A table listing peaceful nuclear installations in Israel, based on information made available to the Secretariat, is reproduced in Annex 3. The application of Agency safeguards has been provided for in an agreement of 18 June 1965 (INFCIRC/84) which was terminated in 1975 and in an agreement of 4 April 1975 (INFCIRC/249) which was extended by a Protocol of 28 September 1977 (INFCIRC/249/Add.1). Under these agreements Agency safeguards are applied to the IRR-1 Nahal Soreq research reactor and its fuel (both supplied by the United States) and to a quantity of heavy water (supplied by the United States).

9. The Secretariat has been informed that, as a result of discussions between Israeli and Norwegian officials, the heavy water supplied to Israel by Norway in 1959 will be placed under Norwegian safeguards, with the intention that safeguards responsibility will eventually be transferred to the Agency. This information was confirmed in a statement made by the Alternate to the Resident Representative of Norway at a meeting of the Board of Governors in June 1988.

10. Statements in the General Conference last year made it clear that the term "nuclear capabilities" as used in resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470 was intended to mean "nuclear weapon capabilities". The Secretariat of the IAEA

has not concerned itself with studies of nuclear weapon capabilities in any Member State; however, at the 42nd session of the United Nations General Assembly the Secretary-General of the United Nations submitted a report (A/42/581), under agenda item 68 of the General Assembly's agenda, entitled "Israeli Nuclear Armament". In that report, information was provided about Israeli nuclear armament, together with the views of Member States on Israel's nuclear development and nuclear weapons potential. The report concluded with the statement "Although the United Nations does not have conclusive proof that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, circumstantial evidence, together with the factors just cited, would seem to indicate that Israel has developed the necessary technology and has the means to manufacture nuclear weapons, if it so chooses."

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL TO THE
RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL**

17 November 1987

Dear Minister Ranen,

The second operative paragraph of General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470 requests me "... to consider implementation by the IAEA of provisions in United Nations General Assembly resolutions 41/12 and 41/93 in relation to the IAEA". Of these two, resolution 41/12 calls for the application of IAEA safeguards to all of Israel's nuclear activities - just as the General Conference resolution cited does.

It is prerogative of every State to decide whether or not to invite Agency safeguards. The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the readiness of the Agency to discuss with your authorities the conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement.

I would be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of your authorities. Operative paragraph 3 of resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470 requests me to report to the Board of Governors on this matter. A response by your Government would be helpful in this regard.

Yours etc.

(signed) Hans Blix

2515Y/211Y

**REPLY TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL BY
THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL**

25 July 1988

Sir,

Further to your letter of 17 November 1987 and to my acknowledgement of 22 December 1987, I have been instructed to acquaint you with Israel's position on the substance of your letter.

Israel remains committed to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region, as practised in the case of the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, as expressly spelt out in the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission) and as sanctioned by the United Nations. An agreement cannot be reached except by the States of the region themselves. The issue of full-scope safeguards can be satisfactorily settled within a NWFZ.

Initiatives by the States of the region, negotiations between them and mutual reassurances are the elements which Israel believes to be essential for the establishment of a genuine non-proliferation regime in the Middle East containing a mutuality of reassurances which will by their very nature also curb the incidence of local conflicts with which our region is plagued.

This position was laid out in detail and expressed prior to and during the 31st session of the General Conference of the IAEA. Let me refer you to documents GC(XXXI)/812 of 1 September 1987, GC(XXXI)/OR.298 of 18 November 1987 and GC(XXXI)/833 of 25 September 1987, of which the substance is summarized above. Most recently, the Prime Minister of Israel reiterated Israel's position in his address of 7 June 1988 to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Israel has repeatedly invited the States of the region to sit down and negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone in conformity with the above precedents and modalities. It has had no response to this invitation.

If the States of the region were to agree to discuss a framework for such negotiations, Israel is ready to make a proposal with this object in mind.

Also, Israel should not be enjoined to accept prescriptions in a matter on which each State is sovereign to make its own decisions. This principle was recognized by the Board of Governors of the IAEA. You know from our previous oral and written interventions that Israel objects to being singled out and to the IAEA being drawn into becoming an instrument of a political campaign against Israel unrelated to its mandate. Also, Israel wishes the IAEA to exercise its right to accept or reject United Nations resolutions as it sees fit within its mandate.

Accept, Sir, etc.

(signed) D. Ranen
Resident Representative

**RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE AGENCY'S GENERAL CONFERENCE**

A. United Nations General Assembly resolutions
(On Israeli nuclear armament)

1. 1979 -- resolution 34/89

The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament. The study was submitted to the General Assembly at its 36th session, in 1981.

2. 1980 -- resolution 35/157

The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts and to submit his report to it at its 36th session (see 1 above).

3. 1981-- resolution 36/98

After studying the Secretary General's report, the General Assembly requested the Security Council "to prohibit all forms of co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field" and "to institute effective enforcement action against Israel so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security by its nuclear weapon capability".

4. 1982 -- resolution 37/82

The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to keep Israeli nuclear activities under constant review and to report thereon as appropriate".

5. 1983 -- resolution 38/69

The General Assembly requested the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to implement its resolution 487 (1981) and requested the Agency "to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to Israel's nuclear capabilities".

6. 1984 -- resolution 39/147

The General Assembly reiterated the two requests referred to above and requested the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in co-operation with the United Nations Secretariat's Department of Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, to prepare a report relating to Israeli nuclear armament.

7. 1985 -- resolution 40/93

The General Assembly took note of the report prepared in response to the request made in resolution 39/147 and once more requested the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complied with its resolution 487 (1981).

8. 1986 -- resolution 41/93
Similar to resolution 39/147 of 1984.

9. 1987 -- resolution 42/44

The General Assembly reiterated its request to the Agency "to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities".

B. General Conference resolutions

1. 1981 -- GC(XXV)/RES/381

The General Conference decided "to consider at its twenty-sixth regular session the suspension of Israel from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership if by that time it has not complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 487 of 19 June 1981". Also, it decided "to suspend immediately the provision of any assistance to Israel under the Agency's technical assistance programme".

2. 1983 -- GC(XXVII)/RES/409

The General Conference decided -- inter alia -- to withhold research contracts to Israel if, by the 1984 regular session of the General Conference, Israel had not withdrawn its threat "to attack and destroy nuclear facilities in Iraq and in other countries".

3. 1984 -- GC(XXVIII)/RES/425

The General Conference considered that Israel had not fulfilled the provisions of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/409 and requested the Director General to seek personally from the Government of Israel an assurance that Israel would not carry out "any further attacks on nuclear facilities in Iraq or similar facilities in other countries, devoted to peaceful purposes, in disregard of the Agency's safeguards system".

4. 1985 -- GC(XXIX)/RES/443

The General Conference considered that undertakings given by Israel in a letter to the Director General of 23 September 1985 satisfied the requirements of resolution GC(XXVIII)/RES/425.

5. 1987 -- GC(XXXI)/RES/470

The General Conference demanded that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards and requested the Director General to consider implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 41/12 and 41/93 in relation to the Agency.

ANNEX 3

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS IN ISRAEL

(based on information made available to the Secretariat)

- IRR-1 swimming pool research reactor, highly enriched uranium, 5 MW
(Soreq Nuclear Research Centre)
- IRR-2 research reactor, natural uranium, heavy water moderator, 26 MW
(Negev Nuclear Research Centre)
- Hot cell laboratories and auxiliary installations at Soreq and Negev
Centres
- Food irradiation facilities (SORVAN)
- Isotope production and labelling laboratories at Soreq and Negev
Centres
- Pilot plant for extracting uranium from phosphates at Negev Centre

Summary records of the discussions under the item
"Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat"
at meetings of the Board of Governors
held in June and September 1988

RECORD OF THE 698th MEETING (held on 10 June 1988)

ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND THREAT (GC(XXXI)/RES/470; GOV/INF/551)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the present item had been included in the agenda pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, in which the Director General had been requested to report to the Board and the next session of the General Conference on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat and on the implementation of that resolution. Document GOV/INF/551 had been prepared in response to that request and could also be submitted to the Conference.
2. Ms. TALLAWY (Egypt) said that General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470 had two aspects of direct concern to the Agency in view of its mandate and statutory role: firstly, the request for Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards, and secondly, the monitoring and observation of the development of Israel's nuclear capability on which the Agency had been requested to report to the Board and the General Conference.
3. Egypt had several remarks to make concerning document GOV/INF/551. Firstly, paragraph 7 of that document (Report on Israel's nuclear capabilities) was based on a narrow, and therefore unacceptable, interpretation of the texts, which raised questions concerning the responsibilities and role of the Agency in considering that serious and important issue. The Agency's responsibilities could not be defined on the basis of an excessively literal interpretation of resolutions or parts of resolutions or by considering certain articles of the Statute and ignoring others; the objectives and main principles in whose name the Agency had been set up, to contribute to the cause of international peace and disarmament,

must also be taken into account. Finally, each case should be examined in its own context, which in the present instance was the political situation in the Middle East and its effects on peace and security.

4. The report itself was incomplete and inadequate, and could not be considered a positive and exhaustive response to the many points mentioned in resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470. Yet there was no shortage of relevant documents, whether in the Secretariat's records, United Nations publications or the archives of recognized research centres. The Secretariat could have made use of those sources of information, and she trusted it would do so in order to improve the report before the forthcoming session of the General Conference.

5. Still, Egypt welcomed some of the measures adopted by the Director General in pursuance of resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, particularly the contacts made with Israel with a view to negotiating a full-scope safeguards agreement for its nuclear installations. However, Israel had not yet replied to the letter from the Director General, who had been awaiting a reply since November 1987. Egypt deplored that silence and the negative reaction of Israel to the problems of safeguards and of adhering to the NPT. Application of the Agency's safeguards system to all Israeli nuclear installations was urgently required and was certainly the only means of alleviating the fear and concern of other countries in the region with regard to the Israeli nuclear threat. All members of the international community, and particularly those entrusted with preserving peace and security, should fulfil their responsibilities by encouraging Israel to meet that requirement. In requesting Israel to submit to the Agency's safeguards system, Egypt and the principal Arab States - which were themselves parties to the NPT and therefore applied that system - were only asking Israel to follow their example and to respect the relevant decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

6. Egypt had always had the aim of making the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. It had continually requested the creation of such a zone within the context of worldwide application of the safeguards system. It had also had a draft resolution adopted on that subject at the four previous regular sessions of the General Assembly, to which Israel had made no objection. Just a few

days earlier, the Israelis themselves had made a statement on similar lines at the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. In those circumstances, nothing could justify Israel's rejection of the safeguards system, when to accept it would be a proof of good will and a first step towards denuclearization of the region.

7. The threat posed by Israel's nuclear capabilities went far beyond regional boundaries to compromise international security. The Agency should therefore adopt a firm attitude towards Israel, as had other international organizations; the Agency could not claim non-competence without undermining its credibility in the defence of international peace and security, which were among its statutory objectives.

8. With regard to the heavy water supplied to Israel by Norway in 1959, paragraph 9 of document GOV/INF/551 indicated that discussions were under way with a view to placing that heavy water under Norwegian safeguards, the intention being that safeguards responsibility would eventually be transferred to the Agency. However, the wording of the paragraph gave the false impression that an agreement had already been reached, whereas in fact discussions were merely continuing between the two parties. Given the available information concerning the use of that heavy water and the possible dangerous consequences, she hoped that the discussions would soon be completed and that the Agency could exercise its responsibilities and carry out the regular inspections required, so helping to alleviate the fears and mistrust aroused by Israel's use of Norwegian heavy water supplied on condition of being used for exclusively peaceful purposes - for it should be remembered that the heavy water had been purchased from Norway under an agreement requiring its inspection. Egypt therefore requested the Director General to make a close study of the matter and to report to the next session of the General Conference on any new developments arising.

9. Finally, bearing in mind the gravity of the situation, Egypt requested the Agency to play its part and urged all Member States, particularly those responsible for preserving peace and security, to discharge their responsibilities by helping the Agency to achieve the objectives of resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, namely, peace and security in the Middle East.

10. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) thanked the Director General for promising, in his opening statement at the beginning of the current series of meetings, to add to document GOV/INF/551 by including any reply received from Israel in response to his letter of 17 November 1987 on the application of safeguards to all Israeli nuclear activities, and also any relevant information brought to the Secretariat's attention.

11. The Iraqi delegation associated itself with that of Egypt in considering that, with all possible good will, document GOV/INF/551 could not be described as a report. A report usually contained all the available information on the subject it dealt with. Obtaining such information called for research. The Secretariat was expected to carry out extensive research to collect all relevant information on the issue under consideration, to analyse it and to incorporate it in a report containing the conclusions drawn from its analysis.

12. The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Israeli nuclear armament, issued as document A/42/581 and mentioned in document GOV/INF/551, illustrated the format which should have been adopted by the Secretariat. Thus, the Secretariat's report should have included an introduction defining its purpose and the means used to attain it; an exhaustive list of Israeli nuclear facilities, whether or not under Agency safeguards, with a description of each and all relevant technical data; a chapter on Israel's other nuclear activities, such as the transfer of nuclear materials and equipment to that country by legal or other means; a chapter on Israel's attitude to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly and by the Agency's General Conference concerning its nuclear-weapon capabilities and safeguards; and, finally, an assessment of those data in the light of Israel's known nuclear policy, particularly with regard to attacks against the nuclear installations of other countries, and taking into account reliable information such as that revealed in 1986 by Mr. Vanunu and given wide press coverage. Other well-documented information had been published concerning Israel's nuclear activities, and he urged the Secretariat to make full use of it in the report requested by resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470.

13. The Israeli nuclear threat was a very dangerous reality. Israel had acquired nuclear weapons and possessed the means to deliver them to precise targets. An aggressive and expansionist Israel armed with nuclear weapons represented a grave threat to peace and security. In fact, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East was no longer a danger but a frightening reality which no one could ignore. In his message to the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, King Hussein of Jordan had revealed at the beginning of the month that Israel had introduced nuclear weapons to the Middle East. Israel was therefore responsible for introducing those weapons into the region. All States or individuals that were deeply concerned about the dangers of proliferation should show their determination to act decisively in that situation or be prepared to lose their credibility.

14. Finally, he hoped a consensus would emerge in the Board that the report in its present form was unsatisfactory and did not meet the requirements of resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, and that the Director General and the Secretariat should be asked to amend the text in the manner indicated, and then to re-submit it to the Board at its September meetings.

15. Mr. AL-MINAYES (Kuwait) felt that document GOV/INF/551 was unclear and did not do justice to the Agency's internationally recognized legal and scientific capabilities. Thus, paragraph 2 of the document cited resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in which the Agency was requested to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities. However, the report merely mentioned that fact without giving any other details, as if the Agency was not really concerned. The document was therefore inadequate and inappropriate for the purpose intended.

16. Paragraph 7, for example, explained and clarified points which had never given rise to discussion. In fact, the Director General had said that the Agency had no knowledge of Israeli nuclear-weapon capabilities but was responsible for ensuring that nuclear installations were not used for military purposes. That had been emphasized by the Governors during consideration of the Safeguards Implementation Report, under item 10(a) of the agenda. His delegation therefore could not possibly accept the treatment of that issue in the report.

17. Paragraph 8 on the application of Agency safeguards in Israel contained much erroneous information and referred to various confusing dates. Had the Agency at any time assisted Israel in its nuclear programme? Had Israel required such assistance, and what had been its purpose? In other words, had that assistance been directed only to peaceful uses? Those were points which should be clarified.

18. As to paragraph 9 of the report, it was also quite unacceptable, since Norway was not an international organization and therefore could not apply a safeguards regime to nuclear installations, and particularly to heavy water located in Israel.

19. Kuwait re-affirmed its complete agreement with what had been said by the Governors from Egypt and Iraq and urged the Director General to draft for the General Conference a clearer and more objective report more in keeping with the Agency's high level of scientific ability, as requested by General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470.

20. Mr. KATTAN (Saudi Arabia) considered that document GOV/INF/551 provided insufficient and incomplete information which did not meet the requirements of General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470. He therefore associated himself with the objections expressed by the previous speakers, since the Secretariat's report did not give a proper account of the increased Israeli nuclear threat, particularly in the light of certain practices such as transactions taking place through the black market or on the high seas and Mr. Vanunu's revelations. The information contained in the report was attempting to reassure while avoiding the real issue. It was now known that there was only one safeguards agreement between the Agency and Israel and that it concerned a single research reactor. As for Israel's attitude to international verifying organizations, that was also well known. It might be asked how the heavy water supplied to Israel by Norway would be submitted to Norwegian safeguards, as suggested in the document. The report went even further and indicated in all good faith that responsibility for the application of safeguards would be automatically transferred to the Agency. The Agency had mentioned that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as several States, had provided information on that subject at the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

21. His delegation therefore requested the Agency to present information meeting its high standards of technical competence and its specific responsibilities in that area, and to review document GOV/INF/551 in order to improve it. It was to be hoped that the Director General, as he had promised in his opening statement, would make efforts to include information which would respond to the deep concern felt by the international community about the objectives of the Israeli nuclear programme.

22. Mr. BAEYENS (France) said that his country did not consider it had the right to force another State to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. That could only be the result of a voluntary act, decided in full sovereignty. France would therefore continue to oppose any resolution attempting to impose such an action on Israel or any other State in the world. The Agency's safeguards system was an essential element of the climate of confidence which must reign in international nuclear relations and should under no circumstances be a means of exerting pressure or an instrument of punishment to be used against any State.

23. With regard to the report on Israeli nuclear capabilities mentioned in paragraph 7 of document GOV/INF/551, he noted with satisfaction the statement that the expression "nuclear capabilities" used in resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470 was intended to mean "nuclear-weapon capabilities". He entirely agreed with the Director General that the Secretariat was not in a position to prepare studies on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. In fact, nothing in the Agency's Statute gave it any authority to conduct research on the real or supposed military nuclear potential of any Member State.

24. Mr. MORALES PEDRAZA (Cuba) said that he would not repeat facts known to all, such as Israel's aggressive policy towards its neighbours, its repeated and effective threats or the power abuses of the Israeli Government against the peoples in the region, particularly the Palestinians.

25. With regard to the content of the document before the Board, it was no secret that Israel had a significant nuclear potential and that, in view of its aggressive foreign policy, the international community was justifiably and quite naturally concerned, since it could not be ruled out that Israel would use that potential to achieve its political aims in the Middle East.

26. In his delegation's view, the report submitted for consideration to the Board did not meet the requirements of resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470 and did not contain all available data on Israel's nuclear development and nuclear facilities, safeguarded or not, among other interesting aspects mentioned in document A/42/581. In its present form, such a report would not assist consideration of that issue at the forthcoming session of the General Conference, but on the contrary could make it more difficult. Similarly, the information in document GOV/INF/551 concerning the heavy water supplied to Israel by Norway was extremely brief and did not contribute to clarifying that issue.

27. For those reasons his delegation did not consider it appropriate to transmit the document in its present form to the General Conference, but requested that a detailed revision be carried out before submitting it again to the Board at its September meetings.

28. Mr. ZHOU (China) said that his Government had always been opposed to Israel's aggressive and expansionist policies and firmly supported the just struggle of the Palestinians and Arabs to recover the occupied territories and their national rights.

29. His Government respected the will of the countries of the Middle East to eliminate the nuclear threat in order to defend peace and security in the region. It therefore supported the request of those countries that Israel should implement United Nations General Assembly resolutions 41/12 and 41/93, as well as General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470 requesting it to submit all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards.

30. Ms. DAJO (Nigeria) said that the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat had been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Agency's General Conference for a long time precisely because of the danger those capabilities represented for the non-proliferation regime and for international peace and security. To deny that Israel had a nuclear-weapon capability, as its mentors did, was an exercise in self-deception. Recognized and respected nuclear experts had warned against Israeli's nuclear capabilities or concluded that Israel already had nuclear

weapons, and that had been confirmed by the revelations of Mr. Vanunu, an Israeli technician who had at one time worked in the Dimona facility. The situation was all the more alarming as Israel had refused to submit its nuclear facilities to full-scope Agency safeguards, in spite of various resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the General Conference.

31. It was well known that Israel was actively collaborating with South Africa, particularly in the military and nuclear fields. Both countries engaged in aggression and pursued policies of destabilization against neighbouring States and peoples. Israel's collaboration with South Africa was a demonstration of support for the continuation of apartheid.

32. Her delegation, too, called on Israel and South Africa to comply with the relevant United Nations and Agency resolutions to submit their nuclear facilities to full-scope Agency safeguards and to cease their terrorist acts against neighbouring independent States and occupied territories. Moreover, it agreed that the report under discussion should be reviewed.

33. Mr. SAHBOUN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his delegation did not approve the content of document GOV/INF/551 and supported unreservedly the statements made by the Governors from Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, China, Cuba and Nigeria. It hoped that the report which would be presented to the Board in September would take their remarks into account.

34. Mr. MBODJ (Senegal), recalling the importance his delegation attached to the issue of the problem of Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, said that Member States, which had created the Agency to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should use all their influence to avert the threat to the entire international community presented by the nuclear capabilities of Israel, which had close relations in that field with the racist régime of South Africa. Israel's expressed wish to acquire an increasing number of nuclear weapons - referred to by the Governor from Iraq, who had cited the statement made by King Hussein of Jordan at the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament - was deeply disturbing.

35. His delegation considered that, in the interests of international peace and security, Israel should submit all its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards. It therefore requested the Agency to suspend all scientific

co-operation with Israel which could contribute to strengthening its nuclear capabilities, particularly since Israel continued to oppress the Palestinian people and to violate regularly the territorial rights of Arab countries which were only observing their duty of solidarity with the Palestinian combatants.

36. In conclusion, he fully supported those speakers who had requested that document GOV/INF/551 be revised, taking into account particularly the comments made by the Governors from Iraq and Egypt, before submission to the General Conference.

37. Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America) recalled that his Government had long been opposed to such politicized issues being discussed at meetings of the Agency's policy-making organs. The ritual reappearance of the present item on the Agenda of the Board and General Conference burdened the debate with matters which could not be resolved within the Agency and which did nothing but sow controversy and discord.

38. The document prepared by the Secretariat confirmed what his delegation had said on many occasions, namely that the Agency did not have the ability to deal with those issues which were the subject of the present agenda item. His delegation did not agree with those who had criticized the report for not providing more details on certain Israeli activities and who had consequently suggested that the Secretariat expand on it, because the Secretariat had in fact presented a report which almost exceeded the limits of its responsibilities under the Statute. In that connection, he wished to stress three aspects of the document.

39. Firstly, regarding the contacts made by the Director General with the Government of Israel on the question of full-scope safeguards, that was, as the Governor from France had so well put it, a matter for Member States to decide in the exercise of their own sovereignty. His delegation would have liked to see a similar request being addressed to Governments of countries - some of them represented on the Board - which had unsafeguarded nuclear activities and which had also declared that they had no nuclear-weapon ambitions.

40. Secondly, paragraph 7 of document GOV/INF/551 confirmed that the Agency had no competence to conduct an independent inquiry into the development of weapons by Israel or any other State. All the Agency could do was to refer to a document prepared by another United Nations body. However, the fact that the Secretariat had referred to the United Nations General Assembly's report A/42/581 did not - and could not - confirm the accuracy of that report, but simply indicated its existence.

41. Lastly, where safeguards were concerned, the report rightly confined itself to a brief description of safeguards actually applied by the Agency in Israel. His delegation was strongly opposed to the idea of expanding the report by introducing second-hand information or rumours concerning Israel's nuclear activities. Information provided by the Israeli Government on its nuclear programme was publicly available and could certainly appear in the report, but that would then mean duplication with existing documents.

42. The Agency had done its best to act on General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, and it had to be recognized that it could go no further without exceeding its Statute and reaching the limits of credibility. His Government trusted that Board Members would understand, in the light of the report, that continued consideration of the issue did not serve the Agency's best interests, and hoped that the Board would decide to remove that item from its ever-crowded agenda at future meetings.

43. Mr. CLARK (United Kingdom) said that his delegation was also firmly convinced that the Secretariat's report went as far as was reasonable and possible for it to go within the limits of the Agency's competence. He fully agreed with delegations which had emphasized that the matter was one for the United Nations General Assembly rather than for the Board.

44. Like the Governor from the United States, he felt there was no point in burdening the Board's agenda in the future by including the item in its present form.

45. Finally, the United Kingdom authorities supported without reservation the views expressed by the Governor from France regarding paragraph 7 of the Director General's report, namely that the Secretariat was not competent to examine the real or supposed nuclear-weapon capability of any State.

46. Mr. SEMENOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) reaffirmed his country's position of principle on the subject of Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat and reminded the Board that, according to the report presented by the Secretariat pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, Israel still refused not only to comply with the request that it place its nuclear facilities under international safeguards, but also to make contacts or enter into discussions with the Agency Secretariat on the matter. His delegation considered that the part of the report where that refusal appeared amounted to a condemnation of Israel.

47. As other delegations had pointed out, the report should have provided much more detailed information on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. However, his delegation understood the formal difficulties which had prevented the Secretariat from collecting such a vast amount of documentation when preparing the report.

48. Mr. BERG (Norway)[*] read out extracts of a press release issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo the previous day:

"Talks between delegations of Norway and Israel on the subject of the 1959 Agreement between Norway and Israel regarding the Sale of Heavy Water by Norway to Israel were concluded in Oslo 9 June 1988.

"Previous meetings have taken place in Jerusalem in September 1987, in Oslo in December of that year and again in Jerusalem in April 1988.

"The Delegations reached and initialled an agreement, subject to the approval of their respective Governments, that will make accessible the residual heavy water delivered by Norway to a system of Norwegian Safeguards, and envisages the subsequent mutual transfer of the function of safeguards to the IAEA under a trilateral arrangement to be negotiated."

[*] In the summary records for this series of meetings (GOV/OR.691-698), Member States which were not members of the Board of Governors but which were nevertheless invited to take the floor under Rule 50 of the Board's Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

49. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq), referring to the press release just read out by the representative of Norway, said that the words "subsequent mutual transfer of the functions of safeguards to the IAEA" were meaningless - it might be as much as 50 years before that transfer took place.

50. At the current meeting, one Governor had said that the Agency's safeguards system should not be an "instrument of punishment". Those countries in the Middle East which - in the interest of peace in the region - had accepted the "punishment" by placing their nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards would undoubtedly ponder that statement.

51. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that the Secretariat would review the report contained in document GOV/INF/551 in the light of the various comments made during the Board's discussion and would include in it such further information as might become available before the Board's meetings in September. The brevity of the report had been due to the following factors:

- (a) Under its Statute, the Agency dealt with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and not with its military uses;
- (b) The Secretariat had tried to avoid duplicating work done elsewhere within the United Nations system; and
- (c) The Secretariat did not want to base its documents on newspapers or other non-official sources.

52. Paragraph 4 of the report, regarding heavy water, was admittedly short - but it was based exclusively on official information; if more such information became available before the Board's September meetings, it would be included in a revised version of the report.

53. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said he assumed that the Board wished to take note of document GOV/INF/551, but that - at the same time - the Board felt that the information in the document could usefully be amplified, in line with what the Director General had stated at the start of the Board's session and also a few moments previously regarding his intention to provide the Board with additional relevant information. He said he also assumed that, while welcoming the Director General's intention, the Board would like its discussion during the present meeting to be borne in mind when the information in question was being prepared.

54. Lastly, he said he assumed that the Board wished the item "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat" to be placed on the agenda for the Board's meetings in September, just before the General Conference's next regular session, at which time the Board could consider the report which the Director General would be submitting to the General Conference in the light of the Board's discussion during the current meeting.

55. Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America) said that, in his opinion, the Chairman's summing-up should have included - after the words "additional relevant information" - the phrase "if any was found to exist".

56. Ms. TALLAWY (Egypt) expressed the hope that all countries capable of providing the Director General with "additional relevant information" - including Israel - would do so in good time, in the interests of peace in the Middle East.

57. Mr. MORALES PEDRAZA (Cuba) said that at least some "additional relevant information" existed in paragraph 31 of United Nations General Assembly document A/42/581; that paragraph contained highly relevant information concerning Israel's Dimona reactor, which was not under the Agency's safeguards and was not mentioned in document GOV/INF/551.

58. The Chairman's summing-up was accepted.

PROVISIONAL RECORD OF THE 701st MEETING (held on 15 September 1988)

ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND THREAT (GC(XXXI)/RES/470; GOV/INF/554)

The CHAIRMAN said that the present item had already been discussed at the June session, when the Board had had before it a report (document GOV/INF/551) prepared by the Director General in response to a request made by the General Conference the previous year in resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470.

The Board had noted that report, and had decided to revert to the matter at its next session in September. An amplified version of the original report had now been prepared (document GOV/INF/554), which the Secretariat proposed to submit to the General Conference after discussion by the Board.

Mr. ZOBOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said his delegation appreciated the formal difficulties which had faced the Secretariat in preparing the report under consideration. That report was a considerable improvement over the one submitted in June, and was more fully in compliance with General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470. Accordingly, he would have no objection to the report being submitted to the forthcoming thirty-second session of the Conference.

Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) recalled that when the Director General's first report on the subject had been submitted at the previous session, many delegations, including his own, had expressed their dissatisfaction with it. He noted with regret that the new version of the report now before the Board had not taken those views into account. He was not convinced by the reasons advanced by the Secretariat for being unable to submit a fuller report, and found it disturbing that the document should have given Israel the opportunity of expressing its views, instead of requiring it to throw light on its military capabilities in the nuclear field. The fact was that Israel had flouted resolutions by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly and by the Agency's General Conference calling on it to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and it was unfortunate that the report had not arrived at that conclusion.

In its reply to the Director General (Annex 1 to the report), Israel sought to gain a political advantage; while pursuing its policy of aggression towards the Palestinian people, rejecting their right to self-determination,

and refusing to negotiate with their sole legitimate representative on the subject of their future, it sought to persist in threatening and blackmailing the countries of the region with the nuclear weapons in its possession.

His delegation wished to put on record its view that the report did not comply with the requirements of resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470. The Secretariat should therefore be requested to redraft it, or, if it still insisted it was unable to do so, should call on experts to perform the task. In conclusion, he wished to inform the Board that members of the League of Arab States had prepared a draft resolution on the item, which they would be submitting to the General Conference the following week.

Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America) said the views of his Government on the issue had been expounded at many previous meetings both of the Board and of the General Conference, and were already well known. The United States believed that further discussion of the item within the Agency would not achieve any productive result, but would rather have the effect of polarizing the debate, and diverting attention from issues on which genuine progress could be made.

His delegation could agree to the revised report being forwarded to the General Conference, but would appeal to Board members to consider carefully whether the ritualistic treatment of the item at each and every policy meeting of the Agency really served any useful purpose. He himself hoped that future meetings would not have to be burdened with it.

His delegation would need to be sure that any report forwarded to the General Conference would not single out any particular Member of the Agency or call upon it to assume responsibilities which other Members continued to reject. It would also oppose any efforts to depict safeguards - or any other non-proliferation obligations undertaken by States - as punitive or burdensome, and thus as having the nature of sanctions.

Mr. AL-MINAYES (Kuwait) agreed with the delegate of Iraq that the revised report was not much different from the original report submitted to the Board in June. He, too, wished to express his dissatisfaction that no account had been taken of the observations made at that time.

The fact that the Agency had failed to obtain any new information on Israeli nuclear capabilities, as requested in resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, meant that Israel was continuing to flout that resolution. Accordingly, the matter would need to be discussed by the Conference at its thirty-second session the following week.

Ms. TALLAWY (Egypt) said the report now under discussion (GOV/INF/554) did not fully respond to the requests made at the time of the submission of the earlier report (GOV/INF/551). For example, her own delegation had urged on that occasion that the Secretariat should make use of the information contained in United Nations publications or in the archives of recognized research centres on the subject of Israeli nuclear capabilities; such information could have been very useful. It was true that a list of nuclear installations was provided, but that list was very limited, and she hoped that in future much fuller details would be provided. In addition, the report should have given information on the subject of the transportation of nuclear material to Israel.

She had a number of comments on Israel's letter of reply to the Director General (Annex 1 to the report). It was claimed in that letter that Israel's commitment to the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was a sufficient answer to the problem of safeguards: that claim was quite unjustified. It was in any case Egypt, and not Israel, which had first put forward the concept of such a zone in a General Assembly resolution of 1974. Support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone was not a substitute for Israel's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nor did it exempt Israel from voluntarily placing its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards.

The letter gave the impression that Israel was using the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as an excuse for not entering into negotiations on the establishment of a non-proliferation regime. In view of the continuing threat posed by Israel's nuclear capability in a very sensitive area, she urged that pressure should be brought to bear on it to accept the requests made of it.

As she saw it, the argument that Israel was being unfairly singled out was misconceived. A number of factors had to be taken into account: the unsettled political situation in the region; the continued occupation by Israel of the territories of other countries; Israel's refusal to grant the Palestinian people their legitimate rights; and, finally, Israel's refusal to make any attempt to find an overall solution to the problems of the region. Those considerations meant that the question of Israeli nuclear capabilities could not be viewed in the same light as the question of the nuclear capabilities of other States.

In conclusion, her delegation believed that it would not be a waste of the Board's time to consider the subject at future sessions. The Agency bore a heavy responsibility in helping to preserve world peace by the application of safeguards and by the inspection of all nuclear installations, and if members had the will, they could ensure that their discussions on the subject contributed to a more settled situation in the region.

Mr. CHIKELU (Nigeria) thanked the Director General for the efforts he had made in preparing the report under consideration, in pursuance of General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470.

Although the new report showed some improvement over the original one, a few questions still remained to be answered, notably what progress had been made in implementation of resolutions calling for suspension of any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capability.

His delegation maintained that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was in no way incompatible with the safeguarding of Israel's nuclear facilities: other countries in the region which were likewise committed to the establishment of such a zone had already safeguarded their facilities. For Israel to take such a step could not but reassure its neighbours of its commitment to peace, whereas failure to do so would mean that those neighbours would continue to fear for their security.

It was well known that Israel had been actively collaborating with the apartheid régime of South Africa on the development of a nuclear-weapon capability, and that both countries had embarked on systematic campaigns of

aggression in order to destabilize their neighbours. Such activities threatened not only the non-proliferation regime, but also international peace and security. Only the safeguarding of nuclear facilities could allay the fears of those concerned by such developments. Accordingly, his delegation called on Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, as demanded by the relevant resolutions both of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Agency's General Conference.

Mr. EL MADANI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) recalled that in June Member States had expressed the hope that the new report would give fuller information about the nuclear capabilities of the Zionist entity. His delegation was sorry to note that document GOV/INF/554 was not in compliance with resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, in particular with operative paragraph (3) thereof. In fact, the report entirely disregarded the resolutions adopted both by the United Nations General Assembly and by the Agency's General Conference requesting Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under safeguards. His delegation therefore wished to request the Director General to prepare the report that had actually been asked for.

Mr. CASTRO DIAZ-BALART (Cuba) also regretted that, despite the efforts made by the Secretariat to implement the resolution adopted at the Conference's last session, no progress had been achieved, and Israel was continuing to practice the diversionary tactics it normally adopted on the eve of the General Conference. Those tactics consisted in attempting to focus attention on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, instead of replying directly to the legitimate concerns of the international community about its own nuclear capability. That manoeuvre could result in the problem being removed from the Agency's competence on the grounds that the subject of the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a matter for the Disarmament Conference. Although it might well be true that that forum was the appropriate one to discuss such a topic, Israel was nevertheless bound to accede to the request of the majority of Member States for information in respect of its nuclear capabilities as set out in General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470.

Mr. ERRERA (France) said the position of his delegation on the item was already well known: he would simply wish to reiterate certain basic principles which were essential to the proper operation and credibility of the Agency. As was stated in paragraph 10 of document GOV/INF/554, the Secretariat had not concerned itself with studies of nuclear-weapon capabilities in any Member States; in fact, it would be unable to prepare any such studies, because nothing in its Statute empowered it to investigate the real or supposed capabilities of any Member State.

The second vital principle that should be borne in mind was that safeguards constituted the keystone of international relations in the nuclear field. If safeguards were to be credible, Members should refuse to allow their use as a weapon for exerting pressure or imposing sanctions on any other Member. As had been pointed out by the Governor from the United States, safeguards should not be seen either as a punishment or as a reward, but rather as the result of a voluntary renunciation of some portion of national sovereignty in the wider interests of development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. An attempt to use them in any other way would be contrary to the purpose for which they were conceived, would jeopardize the very structure of the Agency, and would run counter to its principle objective, namely, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mr. AL NUWAISER (Saudi Arabia) also noted that the revised report was not much different from the original one. It would appear that the Agency was not in a position to impose its safeguards on Israel's nuclear activities, and that the industrialized countries, which had helped Israel to build up its nuclear capability, were neither willing nor able to bring pressure to bear.

It was clear that Israel's professed commitment to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone was merely a delaying tactic to avoid compliance with international resolutions. Peace in the region could only be achieved with the ending of Israel's oppression of the Arab populations in the occupied territories.

The essence of the matter was contained in General Conference resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/470, which called on Israel to accept IAEA safeguards and requested the Director General to take certain measures in that

connection. The Board should be considering what progress had been made in that respect.

Speaking both on behalf of his country and of all Member States of the region, he stressed that it was essential that the item be kept on the Board's agenda.

The CHAIRMAN said that all views expressed would be reflected in the summary records of the meeting.

Summing up, he assumed that the Board wished to take note of the report submitted by the Director General in document GOV/INF/554, and agreed to its submission to the General Conference at its forthcoming regular session, together with the summary records of its discussions on the item both at the June session and at the present session.

It was so agreed.

