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President: Mr. COLOMBO (Italy)
later: Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic)

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1986 (GC(XXXI)/800 and Corr.1) (continued)

1. Mr. ZILLER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that 1987 had brought the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Agency's foundation - a memorable anniversary for several reasons. First, the Agency was an international organization which had evaluated, promoted and monitored a new source of energy and the use of new energy technology virtually from its beginnings to its present stage as a mature technology. Secondly, it was a United Nations organization which had dealt exclusively with the issues and problems of a single technology and its applications. Thirdly, support for the Agency had been general and world wide, despite conflicting interests that might exist between its current 113 Members, and its political and technical competence was fully recognized.

2. The outstanding reputation enjoyed by the Agency throughout the world was based on its successes. Over the past thirty years it had struck the sometimes difficult balance between promoting and checking nuclear power - its two primary tasks and the two most important elements of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Despite widespread scepticism, there had been no increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons in the past twenty years - a fact to which the Agency's safeguards had made a considerable contribution. The importance of nuclear power and its use in developing countries had increased continuously as a result of steadily increasing funds and of enhanced efficiency in the execution of the Agency's technical co-operation projects. More recently, as a result of the Chernobyl disaster, the Agency had succeeded in creating the basic conditions for improving nuclear safety on an international level, thus establishing a precondition for restoring lost confidence in the safety of nuclear power.

3. He wished to convey the congratulations and the gratitude of the Federal Republic of Germany both to the Agency as an entity and to its present and former staff members who, with their high qualifications and personal commitment, had contributed to the Agency's successful work, and to their past and present Directors General.

4. In the debate on nuclear energy policy following the events at Chernobyl, the Federal Government had advocated the continued use of nuclear power with the highest possible safety standards and had stressed the

following consideration. Since the development of renewable sources of energy had not yet produced new options for energy supply in the Federal Republic to replace nuclear power in the foreseeable future, nuclear energy protected the non-renewable reserves of fossil sources of energy; if the Federal Republic and other countries gave up nuclear power, competition for fossil energy sources would greatly increase with adverse effects, in particular on many Third World countries; greater use of fossil fuels would drastically increase environmental pollution. For an industrial country like the Federal Republic, nuclear power also had considerable technological and economic significance. Those arguments had ultimately convinced the general public and the outcome of the general elections at the beginning of 1987 and of three other state elections seemed to have proved that a clear majority continued to support the nuclear power option. The Federal Government continued to adhere to the concept of the closed nuclear fuel cycle. For the long-term development of nuclear energy it supported advanced reactors, both the fast-breeder and the high-temperature reactor.

5. The Agency had performed an excellent job in 1986, in particular in the field of nuclear safety. The Federal Government had noted with satisfaction the prompt elaboration of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and their speedy entry into force after being signed by more than 60 nations. It called upon all Member States to continue to use their best efforts to ensure the closest possible international co-operation in that important area.

6. His Government wished to emphasize the need for a satisfactory solution to the problem of international nuclear liability. It welcomed the establishment of an IAEA/NEA working group to harmonize the Paris and Vienna Conventions on Nuclear Liability and hoped that its work would soon be successfully completed as a first step towards improving international nuclear liability. Special mention should be made of the Supplementary Nuclear Safety Programme drawn up by the Agency Secretariat with promptness, circumspection and a sense of perspective.

7. His Government also attached great importance to the Agency's ASSET, RAPAT and OSART missions and had asked for three OSART missions to be carried out at reactors in the Federal Republic. The two previous inspections had fully justified the confidence placed in the safety of German nuclear installations by the Federal Government and by a large proportion of the general public. He hoped that the great demand for OSART missions from all regions would continue. The integrity and technical competence of the Agency's teams guaranteed that the results of such inspections would be of great benefit to operators and government authorities.

8. The Federal Government appreciated the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety because they strengthened the population's confidence that the highest possible safety standards were being or would be applied to nuclear power on the basis of the responsibility of each government and in the framework of understanding and co-operation between countries.

9. His Government was pleased to note that in 1986 the Agency had again concluded that there was no evidence of any diversion or misuse of nuclear material under safeguards. While, however, that result was accepted by the international community because of its trust in the Agency's technical performance and political judgement, the Federal Government still considered that further improvement in safeguards concepts was necessary in order to enhance the credibility of the safeguards system still further, so as to avoid safety and radiation protection problems in their application and to make the best possible use of human and financial resources which at present could not be increased. There were two areas in particular where improvements could be achieved. First, the definition of safeguards targets, on which his country's competent authorities were endeavouring to continue their dialogue with the Agency with a view to defining more realistic safeguards targets so that under normal operation, even of a complex type of plant, and with a reasonable volume of inspection work, those targets could be achieved in practice. Secondly, the further development of safeguards technology, to which his country would continue to contribute through its safeguards support programme by providing cost-free experts, developing safeguards concepts with the assistance of expert plant operators and demonstrating their feasibility under real operating conditions. However, the success of international inspection

work depended not only on the specific measures he had just described but essentially on mutual trust between operators of nuclear installations, government supervisory authorities and the Agency and its inspectors.

10. The fact that all nuclear-weapon States had meanwhile placed, or had indicated their intention of placing, some of their facilities under Agency safeguards within the framework of voluntary offer agreements was of paramount importance and an essential contribution to enhancing the credibility of the safeguards system. His Government therefore called upon all nuclear-weapon States to include more installations of advanced technology than hitherto in order to increase the value of such voluntary offers.

11. All interested countries should have access to the technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency was the very institution able to implement programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear power and nuclear technology tailored to the needs of developing countries, and the realization of technical assistance projects would continue to be one of its most important tasks. His country appreciated the further progress achieved in that field. Available funds had again been increased - mainly by voluntary contributions from countries demonstrating their goodwill - while planning and realization of technical co-operation projects had been improved. His country was confident that the evaluation activities had helped to secure that success and would be grateful for further efforts by the Secretariat to evaluate projects.

12. His country attached the greatest importance to technical assistance and had always provided considerable funds for footnote-a/ projects, fellowships, training courses and so forth in addition to contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund (TACF). In 1986 it had contributed more extrabudgetary funds than any other Member State and it would continue to do its best.

13. He was pleased to inform the Conference that, subject to Parliamentary approval, his country could again pledge its full share of the target in the forthcoming year and also provide additional extrabudgetary support for fellowhips, experts, equipment, training courses, scientific meetings and co-ordinated research programmes.

14. He was particularly pleased to announce that his Government would be able to make a considerable extrabudgetary contribution, before the end of the year, towards expanding the training facilities at the Seibersdorf Laboratory, which would further improve its valuable services to developing countries.

15. The Federal Government was deeply concerned to find that the Agency's successful work was in jeopardy during its anniversary year, through an imminent violation of the principle of universality, which the Federal Government held in high esteem as a prerequisite for the functioning of a worldwide organization and because its application was the only way to facilitate critical debate and the mutual influence of all States which used nuclear energy. The Agency's work was also jeopardized as a result of a serious increase in the backlog of contributions to the budget. In view of the situation, his Government urged all Member States to use their best efforts to ensure that the Agency could continue to function in the years to come.

16. The Federal Government hoped that the present session of the General Conference would be able to concentrate fully on the tasks proper to the Agency without interference from irrelevant external influences and wished it a successful conclusion.

17. In the desire that the Agency, which was so important for the co-existence of peoples, would be able to carry on its well-established and generally recognized activities in the future, his Government wished to renew its commitment to vigorous support for the Agency and its objectives.

18. Mr. PARKINSON (United Kingdom) commended the Agency on its thirtieth anniversary: during the past three decades, the IAEA had become one of the most effective United Nations agencies, and its work was of vital importance for world peace and international nuclear safety. Its solid achievements resulted from a tradition of close co-operation, and one could only hope that it would continue along that path, as it would be most unfortunate if the Agency were side-tracked by devisive political debates on issues that had little to do with the objectives set out in its Statute. He paid a tribute to the leadership provided by the Director General and to the

dedication of the Agency's staff - the high esteem in which the organization was held throughout the world was a monument to their work.

19. His country was lucky enough to be rich in natural fuels, but the policy of successive governments had been not to rely entirely on a single source of energy. Nuclear power development had begun in the United Kingdom even before the Agency had been founded, and at present, about 20% of the country's electricity came from nuclear power: that figure would rise to 25% as more stations were commissioned in the near future. An independent public enquiry of unprecedented rigour had resulted in permission being granted for the construction of the United Kingdom's first pressurized-water reactor at Sizewell: no other nuclear installation had had to demonstrate its economic justification and operational safety under such tough scrutiny. An application for the planning of a second pressurized-water reactor had now been made, and would be followed by similar applications in the near future.

20. In developing nuclear power, a free country must have the support of its people. One of the challenges facing his Government was to convince the public of the merits of nuclear energy and to allay its fears about the risks. The consensus was moving perceptibly towards support for nuclear power development, largely because it had been convincingly demonstrated that the expansion of the nuclear power industry was accompanied by a concern for safety which, combined with the existence of a strong and independent regulatory body, prevented disaster from arising, either from design faults or from human error.

21. His Government's new policy of placing the State-owned electrical industry under private ownership was part of a broad programme designed to promote efficiency and thereby to benefit customers, taxpayers, investors and employees alike. Although a decision had not been taken on the future structure of the electrical industry, it was highly unlikely that it would be sold off in a block, and methods of splitting it up and introducing competition were being examined. Some reports suggested that by placing the electrical industry under private ownership, the Government would lose control over the implementation of its nuclear policy. Any such contention must be rejected as false. The aim of the measure was to render electrical supply more efficient, more competitive, yet equally secure. Nuclear power had a

vital role to play in that endeavour, and the benefits to be derived from it were in no way affected by the transition to private ownership.

22. The three arguments for a nuclear programme were valid for State-owned industry as well as for private enterprise: diversity in generation should be secured in order to ensure security of supply, fossil fuels were a finite commodity and should be treated as such, and cheaper methods of producing electricity should be developed. It was also clear from recent experience that safety was not affected by whether a power station was owned by the State or a private company, but was rather determined by the people who operated it and by the design and effectiveness of the regulators. It was clear, therefore, that his Government's nuclear safety standards would in no way be lowered by the decision to turn the electrical power industry over to private ownership.

23. His Government's programmes for the development of nuclear power could not be considered in isolation: in the nuclear world, no country was an island, as the tragic accident at Chernobyl had shown. That was why international co-operation was essential, and what made the work of the Agency so important. One of the most important aspects of that work was in respect of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

24. Non-proliferation clearly depended upon the political will and commitment of individual States, but international safeguards could also play a key role in maintaining public confidence in the system. His Government regarded the development of those safeguards as one of the Agency's priorities, and would continue to provide practical support for such endeavours.

25. Although his Government was determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, it would not wish the developed world to keep peaceful nuclear technology for itself. That was why it would continue to support the TACF. In addition to its pledged contribution of US $1.8 million for 1988, it would make an additional contribution for worth-while projects in countries which had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

26. Turning to aspects of the Agency's safety programme to which his Government attached particular significance, he said that the expanded safety programme agreed on in the aftermath of Chernobyl was an admirable example of how the Agency could meet new challenges, and the United Kingdom would continue to play an active role in its activities. His Government welcomed the revision of the Codes of Practice in the Nuclear Safety Standards and applauded the intention to make the revised Codes sufficiently flexible to accommodate not only different types of reactors, but also different national regulatory systems. It was to be hoped that as many States as possible would adhere voluntarily to the principles of the Codes: the more widely accepted they were, the more valuable they would be.

27. His delegation supported the work done by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) to develop general principles for nuclear safety that were applicable to all types of reactors. It supported the Agency's OSART missions, and was providing expert assistance for them. Indeed, his Government would formally invite an OSART mission to review operational safety at a nuclear power station in the United Kingdom as further evidence of its determination to maintain the highest possible safety standards and the most stringent procedures.

28. The United Kingdom believed that, properly controlled, the peaceful use of nuclear energy offered great benefits to mankind. The Agency's work was of immense importance and had the United Kingdom's full support. It was to be hoped that the next thirty years would be as fruitful as the past thirty years had been.

29. Mr. CASTILLO CONTOUX (Guatemala) expressed his Government's support for the Agency's programme in the area of nuclear applications which, by transfer of technology through the Agency, was contributing increasingly to improving the quality of life in his country. With regard to applications of nuclear energy, Guatemala's policy was to lay greater emphasis on techniques which were useful and could promote economic and social development. Thus, important advances had been made in the health sector, where, after becoming fully operational, the nuclear medicine unit had started the production of the main radiopharmaceuticals and, from March 1987, also the production of radioimmunoassay kits in order to reduce costs and to extend the service to more patients.

30. Considerable progress had been achieved also in other areas such as commissioning of the X-ray fluorescence analysis laboratory, non-destructive testing, agriculture and animal husbandry, where Guatemala had acquired the capability for carrying out research and teaching and offering certain services. It had held several training courses, including a regional seminar on recent progress in nuclear data acquisition and systems analysis. It was proud that its nationals had been sent as instructors by the Agency and that it had been requested to host fellows, scientific visits and regional events. His country's policy was to repay the assistance received by making available its modest experience to other countries with the same level of development.

31. In that connection, he wished to express his gratitude to the United States Government, which had supplied extrabudgetary assistance for the project on the secondary dosimetry laboratory, to the Governments of Argentina, Chile and Colombia for their collaboration and also to other countries whose contributions had made it possible to finance regional projects under the ARCAL programme.

32. The infrastructural support for activities in Guatemala would be strengthened immensely by the new and modern facilities for the laboratories of the Directorate General of Nuclear Energy, the civil engineering work for which was starting.

33. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Agency, he wished to make a brief comment on its principal activities in fulfilment of its objectives, which were to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure that the assistance provided by it was not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

34. He reiterated Guatemala's support for and confidence in the Agency's safeguards system since it was the appropriate means of ensuring non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which at present constituted the greatest threat to the very existence of mankind.

35. The technical assistance and co-operation programme was undoubtedly the basic activity which had benefited a large number of developing countries and provided them with resources to implement their national programmes.

36. In the area of technical co-operation, an important mechanism for regional development was the ARCAL programme. Guatemala therefore strongly supported it and wished to express its appreciation of the hard work done by the officials of that programme in overcoming the numerous difficulties faced during its co-ordination.

37. Before concluding he was pleased to announce that, as in the past, his Government was pledging itself to make a voluntary contribution to the TACF for 1988.

38. Lastly, he paid a tribute to the Director General and the Secretariat, thanks to whose efforts the Agency had successfully carried out its mandate during the preceding years and, he was confident, would continue to do so in future.

39. Mr. CAPRON (France), speaking on behalf of his Government and his delegation, warmly congratulated the President on his election, welcoming him not only as a scholar and an industrialist of international repute, but also as a friend of France and of Europe. The President had lent impetus to programmes of European co-operation and Italy's participation in such programmes owed much to his determination, foresight and personal prestige. He (Mr. Capron) was convinced that, under the President's authority, the General Conference would make good progress and reinforce the solidarity of the Agency's Member States.

40. In every society, no matter how different, anniversaries brought back memories. The international community had founded the Agency with the intention of making available to all countries, whatever the level of their development, the prodigious resources of a new energy source while ensuring that it would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Though a simple enough concept, the Agency's double task had been particularly difficult to accomplish because everything - the delicate nature of the technologies involved, the vast industrial interests at stake, the strategic importance of any energy policy, the high degree of State involvement - combined to make the nuclear area (or so one would think) most elusive to the authority of an international organization.

41. The Agency was therefore universally welcomed as an exemplary institution, almost unique in the history of international relations; more than one hundred States had agreed to surrender part of their sovereignty in order to allow everyone to benefit from the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In fact, there was no country on earth possessing a nuclear installation, no matter how small, which had not accepted, at least in part, the IAEA's presence on its soil. The Agency's thirtieth anniversary was an occasion on which to appreciate that remarkable success.

42. In fact, that very success meant that shrewd judgement was required in the application of obligations and duties. Safeguards were necessary when they fulfilled their purpose, but it was necessary to guard against unjustified or superfluous constraints which, if applied indiscriminately, would only be seen as an instrument of unacceptable pressure. Not only was such an attitude ineffective, it was even contrary to the aim envisaged: logic and experience had shown that forcing States to accept requirements incompatible with their sovereignty was tantamount to inciting them to embark on programmes of national self-sufficiency, and therefore to dispense with international safeguards.

43. What was needed, therefore, was the wisdom to maintain a balance equally distant from insufficient vigilance and emphatic interventionism. Truly, the path was a narrow one, but it had the virtue of uniting all parties in a common effort to realize a hope shared by most countries: that the peaceful use of nuclear energy would make an inestimable contribution to the development of all societies.

44. Mr. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of France, speaking at the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1986, had recalled that such was France's consistent policy. France would continue, Mr. Chirac had said, to help countries interested in sharing the benefits which the civil applications of nuclear energy could bring, so long as appropriate international controls were available to ensure that no diversion took place. France wanted to steer clear of both excessive constraints and "laissez-aller" attitudes, since it was certain that one and the other would be equally conducive to international nuclear disorder and would be incompatible with the consensus which only the Agency's credibility and authority could guarantee.

45. Such a consensus had enabled the Agency to face up to exceptional situations. In that connection, everyone could recall the exemplary manner in which negotiations had been carried out after the Chernobyl accident the previous year, negotiations which had produced in a remarkably short time the conclusion, signing and implementation of the two Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

46. Also, only that consensus would enable the Agency to overcome those financial difficulties which, were they to continue, risked influencing the Agency's activities, undermining its credibility and tarnishing the image of nuclear energy.

47. If the spirit of consensus was to be maintained in the longer term, it would be necessary to respect the balance between the Agency's two main functions, promotion of nuclear energy and verification of its peaceful use: the two functions were complementary and merited equal attention. It should not be forgotten that nuclear development would be inconceivable for most Member States without outside assistance with materials, equipment, exchanges of technology and training. Such exchanges would be impossible without the establishment of a climate of confidence founded on a system of mutually acceptable safeguards, which, accordingly, served the interests of nuclear development.

48. The same principle applied to nuclear safety, an area which had occupied much of the Agency's attention, especially during the last year. Nuclear energy could not develop without rigorous safety measures which, in turn, were the best gauge of nuclear development. His delegation was pleased to note that the Agency had now recognized that the establishment of obligatory international nuclear standards was not realistic. France had always had strong reservations on the matter, for fundamental reasons: that sort of responsibility could only be exercised by those who, alone, had the right to command and be obeyed - the Member States. France attached importance to international co-operation on safety matters, the objective of which was to help States, if necessary, to discharge their national responsibilities more effectively. Within the Agency, the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions were an excellent example.

49. Consensus among the Agency's Members also required that the different sensibilities within the organization - corresponding to the reality of today, not the reality of 30 years ago - should be reflected as faithfully as possible within the policy-making bodies. For France, and for many other Member States, that was a statement of fact and not an assertion of any claim. Adherence to that principle would favour the Agency's authority and help to uphold its credibility.

50. If the Agency's great tasks were to be carried out, if it was to be available and helpful to all - then, clearly, there was no lack of work to be done. The Agency should therefore not endanger its vital missions by venturing onto a terrain full of pitfalls. At thirty, one was still considered young, but it was often precisely at that time that one had to take care in choosing one's future path. Accordingly, it was a matter for satisfaction that the Agency had no ambitions to become a forum for disarmament. On the other hand, it would be a pity, especially at the present time, to see politics assume rights within an institution which hitherto had wisely kept away from direct responsibility in that area.

51. The Agency's Statute was the common wealth of its Members, and its misuse was contrary to everyone's interests. It was common knowledge that an institution which used the Statute on which it was founded for purposes other than those for which it had been set up would be putting itself in a perilous situation. That applied to any attack on the Agency's principle of universality, from which it would be dangerous to depart and which France would defend, no matter what the State whose legitimate rights were being unjustly questioned. It also applied to the safeguards system, which was fundamental to confidence in international nuclear relations and which could not be allowed to be used for punitive purposes. Finally, it applied to a tendency by some to associate the civil uses of nuclear energy with a threat to peace and safety. Such an analogy would be fatal to the smooth running of the Agency. A departure from the Agency's Statute in any of those directions would be all the more regrettable since there was much to be done in future years which would require the co-operation of all.

52. One of the present generation's main responsibilities was to guarantee a secure, reliable and inexpensive source of energy by the beginning of the next century; that was a condition for peace in a world bound, according to the forecasts available, to become increasingly overpopulated and more and more a prey to demographic imbalances. The task was far from simple and it required close international co-operation.

53. Far from being a transitional form of energy, nuclear energy would be called on to play an ever-increasing role. Traditional fuels, while still important, were subject to known limits: coal reserves could perhaps last for several centuries, but coal itself was a pollutant and its transportation and desulphuration costly. World oil reserves could perhaps last another 35 years at the present rate of consumption, but oil had the great disadvantage of being unevenly distributed in the world and was therefore subject to unpredictable price fluctuations. Natural gas was subject to even more onerous logistic limitations than oil.

54. By contrast, the world's uranium reserves could last at least a millenium, thanks to the possibility of using fast reactors when the need arose. From the point of view of environmental protection, nuclear power plants gave off hardly any noxious wastes; indeed, in France a substantial reduction in environmental pollution had been observed, directly linked with the growing role of nuclear energy in the provision of electricity. Financial studies of nuclear energy had clearly spoken in its favour. It was an independent source of energy, economically competitive, and a positive influence on the environment: those were the reasons why France had chosen nuclear energy.

55. In its nuclear energy programme, France's objective was to improve the performance of its installations steadily, at reasonable cost, while guaranteeing an excellent safety record; for that, long-term planning with optimum resources management was essential.

56. Application of the principles he had outlined permitted certain conclusions to be drawn.

57. As at 1 September 1987, France's nuclear power programme involved 64 units - already installed, under construction or on order - with a total capacity of 64 GW(e); 50 of those units (46 233 MW(e)) were within the national grid, and, of those, 44 (43 785 MW(e)) used PWR reactors (10 reactors of 1300 MW(e)).

58. The reactors, on average 5 years old, had achieved an availability coefficient of 80% during the previous 12 months, without notable incidents. Generation of electricity from nuclear sources in 1986 had represented 69% of total production, equal to 29% of France's primary energy requirements, i.e. 56 million Toe (tonnes-oil-equivalent).

59. Long-term plans had led to the study of new, less expensive, more available and flexible PWR-type reactors, while still concentrating on fast reactors as a necessity for the future. The transient difficulties which were being encountered with fast breeders were not abnormal for such a new area, and should not obscure the objective, which was economic competitiveness. He was convinced that such an objective could be attained with present technological capabilities, and within a reasonable time.

60. Within the reactor programme, much attention was being given to research in the field of nuclear safety, much of which was carried out in co-operation with partners abroad, notably within a European framework. An excellent example was the co-operation between France and Germany which benefited from ten years' experience.

61. In connection with the fuel cycle, the long-term goal of optimizing resource management had led France to undertake an active programme of research and development on laser enrichment, the results of which looked promising for the future.

62. The same principles applied to France's plans for the construction of reprocessing plants, the advanced technology he had mentioned being considered the best approach to the back end of the fuel cycle. Direct storage of irradiated fuel did not, in France's opinion, seem to be the best solution, from any point of view - good management of nuclear fuel resources, waste disposal or non-proliferation.

63. The excellent results obtained by the reprocessing plant in La Hague supported and reinforced France's point of view. Furthermore, France was not alone in acknowledging the importance of reprocessing, since countries such as Japan, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany had taken similar steps.

64. France's waste management policy was of course linked to its decision in favour of reprocessing, since future generations must be able to take over their heritage without excessive constraints. With that aim in mind, France was in the process of constructing a new facility for storing low- and intermediate-level waste and was looking for suitable sites for the storage of highly radioactive wastes.

65. Aside from considerations relating to energy matters, or economics and politics, which dictated the energy policy chosen by each individual country, France was convinced that nuclear energy was of paramount importance not only for France but for Europe as a whole: it afforded advantages not just in terms of energy independence but also in research, in overall technological capacity, and in industrial potential. Thus far, co-operation had been vast, diversified and had produced results about which everyone had had cause to be pleased: one need call to mind only CERN, nuclear fusion, Eurodif or Superphénix. Thanks to those efforts, which France intended to continue, European countries would have, within the international community, a vital role to play in those areas.

66. During the 30 years of the Agency's life nuclear energy had spread across the world through the most different societies. The problems which its development posed were now better understood and could be tackled more and more effectively thanks largely to international co-operation and an increased exchange of information between nations.

67. Nuclear energy had become an industrial reality of considerable importance, supplying the world with the equivalent of twice the amount of petroleum produced by Saudi Arabia and the equivalent of the USSR's coal production.

68. France was convinced that its confidence in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy would continue to be shared by many countries, and that the Agency, strong in its authority, would contribute to that. The Agency could rest assured that France would fully support its efforts in that direction.

69. Ms. PEREZ FERREIRA (Argentina) said that although her country's current difficult economic position had led to a reduction in the pace of its nuclear construction operations, the postponement of new undertakings and a reassessment of priorities, that should in no way be seen as a drop in the overall priority accorded to its nuclear programme. On the contrary, Argentina was still striving toward a level of advance in nuclear technology which would make it independent in its decision-making on matters of nuclear power. In that connection, priority was still accorded to the production of the basic materials necessary for its fuel cycle and to keeping up trained manpower resources in that vital area.

70. Despite the country's economic difficulties, nuclear power had continued to gain importance in Argentina. The country's two operational nuclear power plants had performed highly satisfactorily, accounting, in 1986, for 13% of the total electric power generated, and currently almost 20% of primary consumption. Basic and applied research were also proceeding well, as shown by the success achieved - almost simultaneously with that achieved by the world leaders - in the field of superconductivity at the Bariloche Nuclear Centre.

71. Speaking on the occasion of the thirty-seventh anniversary of the establishment of his country's National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) the previous May, the Argentine President had said that the future development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy called for realism and creativity, confidence in one's own strengths and objectivity in analysing the situation. In response to those demands, Argentina was now seeking to stimulate increased private sector participation in the CNEA so as to enable it to fulfil present and future tasks with less dependence on government funds.

72. With regard to international co-operation, Argentina had once again been very active over the preceding year. Despite its economic difficulties it had continued, and even intensified, its work under the Agency's technical

co-operation programme. It had once again provided a large number of experts - the largest from a developing country - to the Agency, while a significant number of Agency fellows from developing countries on all continents had received training in Argentina. Her country had once again given Agency-sponsored courses, namely, the "Interregional post-graduate course on radiation protection and nuclear safety", in its seventh consecutive year in Buenos Aires, the "Food irradiation course", related to the ARCAL programme, and the "Interregional course on the consequences of radiation-induced embrittlement on pressure vessel integrity", being held for the first time in a developing country. Finally, Argentina had put at the Agency's disposal the "Post-graduate course on nuclear engineering" at the University of Buenos Aires, for training Agency-sponsored professionals.

73. Argentina continued to support and actively participate - mainly as a donor - in the ARCAL programme, which, in little over two years, had provided the region with eleven projects and a further two in the process of incorporation. The number of participating countries had risen to 13, while the total funds allocated to the programme had increased by 31.4% from 1985 to 1986, thanks mainly to a considerable increase in contributions from Latin American countries and extra-regional donors. Within its current budgetary limits, the Agency should give the greatest possible support to that successful programme.

74. Argentina continued, within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), to give its support to the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission. In that connection, she noted that her country was for the seventh consecutive time providing a "Course on metallurgy and materials technology", as well as opening to the OAS the "Post-graduate course on nuclear engineering" for training professionals sponsored by that body.

75. On the bilateral level, Argentina co-operated with friendly nations on all continents. It was linked to a number of them by 18 co-operation agreements in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the most recent of which had been signed with Cuba and Guatemala. Particularly satisfactory and mutually beneficial had been its co-operative activities with Algeria, Brazil, France, India, Iran, Peru and the Federal Republic of Germany. Of those, its co-operation with Brazil stood out as a particular example of reciprocal confidence and of a shared desire for a better future.

76. The Agency's safeguards system represented the best means of ensuring that all peoples could - as they indeed should - benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, without the necessary materials being diverted into nuclear weapons. She noted with satisfaction that the Agency had once again been able to confirm that there had been no diversion of materials under safeguards.

77. At the same time the safeguards system could only remain viable and credible if it were allowed to retain its voluntary character, which would be distorted by any attempt to impose it against the sovereign will of a Member State. Nor could a consensus resolution in the present forum alter the voluntary nature of a country's decision to submit its nuclear facilities and materials to Agency safeguards; and to an even lesser extent could it render obligatory the so-called total safeguards, which did not exist in the Agency's Statute. Only a State's voluntary adherence to an international instrument establishing such an obligatory arrangement could render it legally binding. Argentina did not consider as valid any decision by a governing body of the Agency which sought to impose such an arrangement on a Member State, whatever the reasons invoked for so doing.

78. Also in connection with safeguards, she pointed out that Argentina had, the previous week, conditioned its approval of the Agency's Annual Report for 1986 as a means of expressing its disagreement with the continual and increasing use, in the chapter relating to safeguards, of terminology whose proper place was in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - an instrument to which a number of Member States, Argentina included, were not party. That attitude was not intended to hinder transmission of the Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, but rather to make clear her country's protest against an unacceptable attitude on the part of the Secretariat.

79. Her delegation praised and strongly supported the Agency's work in the areas of nuclear safety and radiation protection, particularly as demonstrated in its response to the Chernobyl accident. It also supported the expanded nuclear safety programme, noting in particular that - as the Chernobyl accident had shown - human actions were capable of invalidating the purpose and effectiveness of safety systems. Nuclear power plants should be further

automated through the introduction of operating programmes so designed as to minimize the effects of potential human operating error. At the same time, operators should be trained to an even higher level. She supported the Secretariat's proposal to conduct additional studies on the man-machine interface and to promote a true "safety culture" among Member States.

80. Also in connection with nuclear safety, she recalled that it had been Argentina which, at the twenty-seventh regular session of the Agency's General Conference, had submitted the draft which, with co-sponsorship from a large group of Member States, mainly Latin American, had eventually become resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/407, in which all Member States were urged to make every possible effort for the adoption of binding international rules prohibiting armed attacks against any nuclear installation devoted to peaceful purposes. Subsequently, at the twenty-ninth regular session of the General Conference, Argentina had actively promoted the draft which was to become resolution GC(XXIX)/RES/443, and which reiterated the same terms.

81. With regard to the sharing of nuclear-safety-related information, Argentina, being both a recipient and supplier of nuclear technology, was fully in accordance with such an initiative, and gave its fullest assurance that it would share any available nuclear safety information relating to installations supplied by it, without any conditions above and beyond those agreed under contract. In that connection, her country firmly believed that all supplier States should provide similar assurances.

82. As to the NUSS documents, the revised Codes should be generally acceptable to all Member States and should represent adequate safety standards, bearing in mind that there might be supplementary requirements in respect of certain Member States and that the level of adherence to the Codes should be both voluntary and flexible and should depend on the sovereign will of each Member State.

83. With regard to the activities of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), she noted with regret that the predictions made by the Governor from Argentina before the Board of Governors the previous February had come true. Owing mainly to the fact that the Committee had been unable to complete its work in time for it to be of use to the United Nations Conference for the

Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE), that conference, however much one might try to disguise the fact, had ended in failure. Argentina shared the view of the Group of 77 that within CAS there was not, nor had there ever been, the political will necessary to reach agreement on the principles of international co-operation for the assurance of nuclear supplies. She reiterated her delegation's doubt over the usefulness of maintaining CAS if there was no will to compromise in the search for a reasonable balance between all the different points of view.

84. Turning to the Agency's technical assistance activities over the previous year, she praised the steps taken to obtain maximum benefit from the limited resources available. Her delegation was, however, concerned at the situation whereby the utilization of extrabudgetary resources donated by certain Member States remained conditional upon adherence to a particular treaty, in open violation of the spirit of the Agency's Statute. It was concerned, too, at the continued validity of the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to govern the provision of technical assistance by the Agency, which contained a number of conditions that Argentina continued to view as unacceptable. Modifications would hopefully be introduced in the future.

85. Expressing her delegation's satisfaction at the positive results obtained in other programmes, notably in those related to agriculture, food and the biological and physical sciences, as well as at the work performed by the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, she nevertheless felt it necessary to sound a note of concern, since a number of those programmes - all promotional in nature - were still, despite their being a very useful form of technical assistance to developing countries, being cut back in real terms in the interests of maintaining near-zero real growth in the Agency's budget. That aim - which was shared by her delegation - should be pursued through the introduction of economies in the implementation of the safeguards programme, where clear excesses still persisted, for example, in the application of safeguards to materials and installations for peaceful purposes belonging to nuclear-weapon States and to certain non-significant installations in a number of Member States.

86. Mr. VISHNEVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Agency's thirtieth anniversary had received wide publicity in the Ukraine, where it was recognized that the Agency played a vital role in ensuring that nuclear energy was used only for peaceful purposes and in furthering the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. The Agency should be recognized by all countries as the proper forum for seeking agreement on those subjects.

87. New efforts to halt the arms race were essential to both regional and global stability, and in that connection the Agency's safeguards system was a unique achievement, as it had resulted in numerous sovereign States consenting to the application of international inspections to their nuclear activities. The goodwill which had made such a system possible could also lead to progress in disarmament and build up confidence that obligations assumed under international agreements would be fulfilled. In that regard the Ukrainian SSR shared the disquiet of the international community at the nuclear ambitions of such countries as South Africa, Israel and Pakistan, ambitions which threatened peace and security.

88. The Soviet Union had proposed to the 1986 special session of the General Conference a programme of action for international co-operation in safe nuclear power development. The need for such co-operation had been highlighted by the accidents at Chernobyl and elsewhere, which had shown the danger of nuclear energy when out of control. The consequences of the deliberate destruction of nuclear installations would be no less dangerous, and therefore the Ukrainian SSR supported all measures to prevent attacks on nuclear targets and nuclear terrorism in any form.

89. All countries, particularly those with a nuclear capability, and all international organizations and social forces with an interest in creating a comprehensive system of international security needed to co-operate in seeking the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy and the elimination of nuclear weapons from our planet. The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had put forward a proposal, co-sponsored by the Socialist countries and supporters of the non-aligned movement, for such a system of international security which had met with wide approval. Recognizing that nuclear weapons were a great evil and a threat to mankind, the Soviet Union had made new proposals for the reduction and ultimate elimination of such

weapons, for the reinforcement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and for a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests, in the hope of opening the way to a world free of nuclear weapons. As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, had emphasized in a recent article, there was a need to reflect on how, in furthering the process of disarmament, to reach agreement on ways to maintain security with substantially lower levels of non-nuclear weapons. Those questions were addressed in the proposal for an international system of peace and security put jointly to the United Nations by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Such a system would undoubtedly reinforce the authority of the United Nations and the Agency.

90. The Ukrainian SSR supported all the Agency's activities, but particularly supported its technical assistance programme, and to that end would be contributing an amount equivalent to US $482 600 to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1988, in addition to its contribution to the Regular Budget of the Agency. While on the issue of finance, he wished to mention that in answer to the Agency's appeal for prompt payment of contributions, the Ukrainian SSR had paid its contribution for the second half of 1987 in October, and, beginning in 1988, contributions would be paid each April and October.

91. The research institutes of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences were successfully continuing and expanding their co-operation with the Agency, and the Ukrainian SSR was taking an active part in the international exchange of information on nuclear science and technology and in the past decade had received nearly 800 experts from some 60 developing countries on training courses and scientific visits.

92. The year 1987 was seeing the tenth anniversary of nuclear power in the Ukraine; the four nuclear power plants operating there had during that period produced 232 000 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, or 16% of the total generated. The capacity of existing plants was to be increased further, and new plants built.

93. Finally, while recognizing the role of the Director General and the staff of the Secretariat in ensuring that the Agency fulfilled its tasks, the Ukrainian SSR, as one of the earliest Members of the organization, emphasized

the particular responsibility of the leading nuclear powers to ensure that nuclear energy served the interests of humanity.

94. Mr. SOWINSKI (Poland) congratulated the President on his election, which he considered to be an indication of Member States' recognition of Italy's contribution to the peaceful uses of atomic energy as well as an expression of esteem for the President and his achievements.

95. He said that the thirtieth anniversary of the Agency called for due consideration to be extended also to events which had occurred before the previous year; it was true to say that the achievements of those years had been enormous, and that they had stemmed from Member States' awareness that, as the Director General had justly remarked, co-operation was a necessity and not a luxury. Indeed, the Agency's key achievement had been that it had become a trusted partner in combining the efforts of different States and of entire regions in jointly seeking ways to find peaceful and safe uses for nuclear energy. That Member States possessed such a competent, efficient and enterprising organization was a source of pride to all.

96. The previous year had been an especially testing one for the Agency, but it had ridden out the difficulties and emerged from them with even greater authority. It had been a testing year also for the State bodies responsible for atomic energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection in the Agency's Member States; a wave of uncertainty about nuclear power had swept the world, but had mostly given rise to active measures to increase the safety of existing plants, those under construction and those at the planning stage. There could be no doubt that it was in the common interest for nuclear power stations to be accident-free.

97. Poland was a country which had only recently started on the road to nuclear power; it had begun construction of its first nuclear power station, (four units of 440 MW each), at Zarnowiec, in 1982. In implementing its nuclear programme, Poland had been guided not only by economic, but by humanitarian considerations also. In fulfilment of a resolution passed by the Sejm in 1985, a decision had been taken during the current year as to the site of a second 4 GW station.

98. The law concerning the exploitation of nuclear power which had been passed by the Sejm the previous year, which regulated legal relationships in that regard, ensured that the health and property of the citizens of Poland were protected, as was their environment. The law made particular provision for an independent State body to oversee nuclear safety and radiation protection, and had been based on Agency guidelines.

99. The NUSS documents defining basic nuclear reactor safety standards must have an essential part in resolving to the good questions of nuclear power safety, particularly in countries which were only beginning to implement nuclear power development programmes. In that regard, he expressed his agreement with the Director General's assertion that an open demonstration on the part of the Agency's Member States of a desire to observe the recommendations contained in those documents would redound favourably in public acceptance of nuclear power, and Poland intended to act in that wise.

100. Having resolved the question of liability for nuclear damage on its own soil by means of the aforementioned law, Poland considered it necessary to take steps to resolve the question internationally. Poland was prepared to accede to the Vienna Convention, but, as the Convention defined only civil law relationships, considered that there was a necessity to draft a convention on the liability of States for nuclear damage.

101. Active steps on the part of the Agency concerning liability for nuclear damage could become yet another essential factor in public acceptance of nuclear power if coupled with such important measures as updating NUSS documents, increasing the activity of OSARTs and taking part in agreeing intervention levels.

102. The attitude amongst broad sections of the public towards atomic energy, and nuclear power in particular, was, and would continue to be for a long time to come, emotional in nature; Poland was in no sense alone in being aware of the many complex reasons behind that attitude. Naturally, each country was dealing in its own way with matters affecting public opinon; none the less, Poland considered that, given the Agency's authority and experience, work on developing principles, methods and approaches to suitably influencing public opinion should be continued in that forum, and even intensified.

Despite the large volume of work that the Agency, other international organizations and individual countries had done over the year, many problems remained which were of concern to the public. Those were, firstly, the problem of protection in the event of sudden, unforeseen radioactive pollution of air, water, soils or foodstuffs; secondly, the problem of the final disposal of radioactive wastes; and thirdly, the problem of remote effects of radiation on the human body. Poland was well aware that it would be difficult to formulate any universal principles to solve those problems, and even impossible at the time of speaking; however, it considered the search for those principles and methods through the Agency to be useful and effective from the point of view of widely promoting atomic energy.

103. He touched upon one of the aspects of the international nuclear power safety regime which Poland considered most important, and one which, according to the Statute of the Agency, deserved particular attention: Poland shared the opinion of the Director General that non-proliferation and disarmament were of paramount importance for world security and for the development and wide acceptance of nuclear power, and had always sought in its foreign policy to bring about those ends, both on the global and the regional, European, level. Indeed, the next few days would see the thirtieth anniversary of the presentation by Adam Rapacki, then Foreign Minister of Poland, of a plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe; that plan had been the precursor of designs for nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, which were still the subject of discussion or which, as in the case of Latin America and, more recently, the South Pacific, had been implemented. Poland welcomed and supported the initiative in the South Pacific.

104. The Soviet Union's initiatives towards liberating the world from the nuclear threat before the end of the twentieth century were of prime importance, and Poland could not but express its satisfaction at the recent achievement of agreement in principle by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Shevardnadze, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Shultz, to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles. That agreement gave hope for further and faster progress on disarmament.

105. The President of the Polish Council of State, Mr. Jaruzelski, had in May of 1987 put forward a plan to increase security in Europe by reducing armaments and building confidence in the centre of the continent, its most sensitive part and the part with the highest concentration of nuclear weapons. The plan provided for the withdrawal from Central Europe of jointly agreed forms of both nuclear and conventional weaponry with a view to reducing the threat of armed conflict in Europe, including the threat of surprise attack. Reducing the quantity of war material was closely linked in the latest Polish initiative to far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures, and also to a strict system of monitoring. It seemed that the experience of applying Agency safeguards might well be taken into account in working out such a system.

106. The wealth and diversity of the Agency's programme both in nuclear safety and radiation protection and in atomic energy applications indicated how many problems were yet to be resolved. The United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) had demonstrated the great interest of States in widely applying nuclear techniques in various areas of life and the economy, and new ways to apply atomic energy were still appearing, for example, in environmental protection; in recent years, a new trend had been the development in some countries of nuclear techniques to neutralize sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in fossil fuel combustion gases. Poland could reveal with pleasure that, thanks to Agency assistance, a programme of that kind was to be developed there; Poland was prepared to put it into effect either on a regional or an interregional basis.

107. After the accident at the Chernobyl reactor, Poland had decided to give potassium iodide as a prophylactic measure to those under sixteen years of age; thyroid exposures had been cut severalfold as a result. It had been remarked, however, that the prophylaxis might itself be severely detrimental to health, and it had therefore been decided that detailed data on the effects of potassium iodide on the body would be collected in a large-scale, multi-year study of children, young people and adults. Any information about or from the experiment would be willingly shared with the Agency, if it so desired.

108. Poland had noted with satisfaction that there had recently been an increase in the Agency's activities to promote atomic energy, symptomatic of which had been the search for new fields in which atomic energy and nuclear and radiation technology might be applied, as well as the elaboration of improved forms of technical co-operation and assistance; it considered worthy of note the Director General's proposal as to the Agency's readiness to provide its Member States with information and data on all aspects of the use of nuclear energy. Poland was interested in receiving such information and therefore gave its warm support to the proposal.

109. The record level of technical assistance resource utilization in 1986 was a good example of the Secretariat's organizational ability; however, complete success was largely dependent on Member States and on their fulfilling their obligations. Poland, despite its economic difficulties, was attempting - to the limit of its abilities - to meet its obligations, and was prepared to expand its activities to the benefit of the Agency by: holding courses, seminars and training courses; increasing its participation in regional and interregional programmes; increasing the number of fellows; and by passing on to develping countries its experience in organizing, and providing a technical base for, measurements of radiation levels in the environment and in various materials and products, including foodstuffs. Poland was willing to consider any other wishes expressed by the Secretariat or by developing countries.

110. Poland considered that the existing system for financing technical assistance was the best possible, and indicated that it would, in accordance with the obligations which it had accepted, pay its voluntary contribution in 1988 in national currency; it gave its assurance also that it would continue actively to participate in the Agency's valiant efforts to promote the manifold peaceful and safe uses of atomic energy to the good of humankind.

111. Mr. ALER (Sweden) said that one of the crucial tasks before the world community was to preserve the global natural resources and to develop them for the benefit of all peoples. Modern technology had too often been utilized on an industrial scale without due regard to the consequences to health and environment. At the special session of the General Conference in 1986, the Swedish Minister for Environment and Energy had stressed that the

current problem was not lack of knowledge but lack of political determination to secure the introduction of new technologies already available for a more economical use of natural resources and for cleaning up the environment. That was also the main conclusion reached by the World Commission on Environment and Development in the Brundtland report. It was of crucial importance that all specialized agencies of the United Nations establish close collaboration in order to mobilize without delay the scientific and technical resources of Member States and thus secure the implementation of the programme of change which was inevitable for the survival of mankind.

112. The Swedish Government had recently presented to Parliament proposals on Sweden's future energy policy, which in many respects reflected the views presented in the Brundtland report. Parliament had previously decided that nuclear energy, which was providing half of the electricity production in Sweden, would be phased out by the year 2010, and as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident, the Swedish Government had decided that the phasing out should be accelerated. In 1988 the Government would present a development programme for energy conservation and new energy supplies, inter alia, in order to reduce the use of electricity for heating purposes. It should be possible to close down two of Sweden's power reactors in the middle of the 1990s. Work on waste management was proceeding according to plan.

113. It was natural that the work of the Agency during the past year had been concentrated on efforts to implement the enhanced nuclear safety programme. The annual report and the nuclear safety review for 1986, as well as the report by the Board of Governors to the General Conference showed clearly that much remained to be done in order to reach the necessary standard of safety that was a prerequisite for a continued reliance on nuclear power. Unless radical improvements were made, the probability of a major accident remained higher than acceptable. Public confidence in nuclear power was not altered by the fact that other industries might represent larger risks. Public confidence could be regained only by an improved record of safe performance by the nuclear industry.

114. His country noted with satisfaction that the Conventions on Early Notification and the Convention on Emergency Assistance had entered into force, but it was still essential to ensure that the highest standards of

safety were achieved in national programmes. It was not sufficient to apply new fundamental principles to new installations. It should be mandatory to re-examine periodically all existing installations and their performance in the light of contemporary standards and to prescribe remedies whenever necessary. Sweden was applying that policy to its own programme.

115. The resolutions passed unanimously by the General Conference at its special session in 1986 demonstrated that improved safety was essential for the future use of nuclear power. It was therefore with deep disappointment that Sweden noted the reluctance of many countries to give the Agency the resources it required for the enhanced nuclear safety programme and to make a radical overall reassessment of programme priorities. It was essential that the Agency should be able to fulfil its function to establish a common basis for national safety regulations. In other areas, such as improved measures for physical protection and agreements on liability, the primary responsibility for further progress rested with Member governments.

116. The other fundamental condition for a continued utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was the effective prevention of all diversion for military purposes. The safeguards system of the Agency provided the necessary verification of national undertakings. However, the only way to establish a sustainable policy was to establish the principle of universal application of Agency safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States. The confidence placed in the reliability of the Agency's safeguards made it imperative that the Agency's resources be sufficient to meet its growing obligations and that safeguards inspections in the nuclear-weapon States should be given a high priority.

117. An increasing share of the Agency's resources was devoted to its technical assistance and co-operation programme. It was particularly satisfying that applications of nuclear technology in the fields of research, medicine and agriculture as well as radiation protection were being developed in collaboration with other UN organizations. Sweden not only supported the increased target for voluntary contributions to the TACF but had also increased its own extrabudgetary contributions.

118. The financial limitations imposed by many Member States had to be taken into account in the planning of future programmes. To some extent, the Agency could rely on increased extrabudgetary contributions, and it might also be possible to make further savings. However, the time might have come for a more fundamental reorganization in order to give the Secretariat the greater flexibility required to follow the rapid changes taking place in the national programmes.

119. The strong wish of Member States to be able to participate more directly in the activities of the policy-making organs, particularly the Board, was reflected in the proposals for a change of Article VI of the Agency Statute. There should be continued consultations in order to find a more satisfactory distribution of seats on the Board. There might also be a need to review the rules governing the work of the Board and its committees in order to give all Member States improved possibilities to follow questions of special interest.

120. In conclusion, fundamental changes had taken place in the global perspectives during the 30 years of the Agency's existence. His delegation was convinced that the Agency would continue to help in building confidence across borders and thus contribute to peace and well-being in all States.

121. Mr. de la BARRE D'ERQUELINNES (Belgium) said that in the context of the Agency's thirtieth anniversary it was worth recalling that the Agency had devoted itself to promoting co-operation between Member States with due regard to the importance of safeguards, ensuring that the activities under its auspices were carried out for declared purposes. It was imperative to avoid any modification in the specific character of the Agency, as was reflected in its Statute, which was related to promoting the peaceful use of the atom. During those thirty years the Agency had demonstrated the quality of its work, in particular in the areas of radiation protection, safety of nuclear installations and nuclear applications in developing countries. That was why Belgium appealed to all States not to allow extraneous political considerations to upset the Agency's satisfactory functioning or to jeopardize its future. He was concerned at the tendency to link the participation of certain States to constraints which were not envisaged in the Statute: for example, non-acceptance of full-scope safeguards could not be a reason for the exclusion of a State.

122. The Agency must maintain its unique role under the Statute in the area of safeguards, which it was invited to apply and were not imposed. That role was accepted by almost all States and should be continued without detriment to the principle of universality and without discrimination among Member States. In its relations with the Agency, Belgium had always abided strictly by the Statute and would do so in future.

123. It was regrettable that a number of countries which played an important role in the nuclear field by producing a major part of its electricity from nuclear power, by supplying technical assistance, by making sacrifices in the form of accepting safeguards and, needless to say, by contributing to the Agency's budget were not, or were almost never, represented on the Board of Governors. The Agency's specific character required that the legitimate interests of those countries should be taken into account.

124. After the founding of the Agency, Belgium, as a supplier of uranium, had been a member of the Board at the rate of one year out of two. In spite of its dominant position at present among countries most advanced in nuclear technology, it was too often unrepresented on the Board and its main committees and other bodies like the Scientific Advisory Committee. Only an amendment of Article VI of the Statute would enable Belgium to take its place on the Board more frequently and to assume responsibilities related to its commitment in the area of nuclear energy by sharing its rich experience most effectively. He therefore attached great importance to the ad hoc working group, which should continue its work with a view to arriving at positive conclusions.

125. His country had recently had occasion to share its experience by actively participating in UNCPICPUNE and especially, though not exclusively, in the work of the committee on nuclear technology and applications. The statement of Belgium and that on behalf of the European Community had stressed the Agency's pivotal role in exchange and transfer in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

126. The decision of Spain, which occupied a prominent place in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to join NPT was very encouraging, especially as it had been taken after the Third NPT Review Conference. That made all the more

deplorable the position of States possessing or building important facilities from the standpoint of safeguards which had not found it politically possible to follow Spain's example. Wherever the Agency had been invited to apply safeguards, it had done so efficiently and it was for States to make use of its services. Unless all facilities in all States were under Agency safeguards, one of its main objectives - contributing to peace by fostering confidence between States - would not be attained.

127. As regards the important question of nuclear civil liability, he noted with pleasure the Board's decision to accelerate harmonization of the Paris and Brussels Conventions with the Vienna Convention, and in that connection, called upon States which had not signed one of those conventions to do so.

128. In the area of technical co-operation Belgium had given considerable support to the IAEA/FAO project on the biological control of the tsetse fly in Nigeria, and hoped other projects would be as successful as that project. However, the decision to participate in technical assistance projects was a sovereign prerogative of States, the limited resources available being a major constraint in that regard.

129. Of such projects, those relating to radioisotopes were important, and continuity in the production of radioisotopes in research reactors and their use in developing countries should engage the attention of the nuclear world. He recalled that the Belgian Institute of Radioisotopes was active in the production and marketing of those isotopes.

130. As to research programmes relating mainly to power applications, his Government had taken into account two factors in imposing budgetary restrictions - the country's critical economic situation and the general stagnation in nuclear programmes. The Nuclear Energy Research Centre had had to curtail its programmes, to concentrate its activities and to reduce staff. Moreover, it had been decided to stop the operation of the BR3 power plant and to continue that of the BR2 material testing reactor.

131. Referring to the nuclear power plants in Belgium, he pointed out that nuclear power had accounted for 67.2% of the total electricity generated or 2 out of 3 kWh in 1986. The utilization rate had remained high at 77.3% in spite of prolonged shutdowns for ten-yearly review of four out of eight units.

132. The experience gained in the sphere of efficiency and operational safety of power plants and public acceptance of nuclear power in Belgium, where the density of nuclear plants was the highest in the world, were significant factors which the Agency should take into account.

133. The foregoing information clearly indicated Belgium's willingness to participate even more actively in the work of the Agency and its policy-making organs.

134. As to the Agency's Annual Report for 1986 contained in document GC(XXXI)/800, he observed that activities relating to energy, electric system and nuclear power planning seemed to have been pursued without considering that there had been no general recovery in the form of orders for new power plants or construction. Staggering of activities in that sector would have enabled the programmes on safety and spent fuel management to be implemented without departing from the recommended zero growth. For that purpose, rigorous selection criteria should continue to be applied to activities.

135. The Agency should confine itself to the nuclear sector and should not be concerned with solar and wind climatology or non-radioactive pollution of the marine environment.

136. While the Agency was eager to co-operate with other United Nations institutions and international bodies, it was not clear from the annual report for 1986 which organization was carrying out which activity.

137. He welcomed the growth of promotional activities as part of technical co-operation. Belgium would continue to accept fellows in that area in its universities and research centres.

138. As to the safety of nuclear installations, his country which had the highest density of nuclear power plants, was making its expertise available to the Agency and fully supported its activities.

139. In the area of safeguards, he was concerned at the diversity of approaches applied to mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plants. Since the Agency had not followed the normal channel of convening expert working groups, as had been done in the case of enrichment and reprocessing plants, Belgium

did not feel itself bound by the advice of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) on MOX plants and, in spite of that advice, considered that, for it, the only reference document was INFCIRC/153.

140. The Nuclear Research Centre at Mol was pleased to participate in the network of safeguards analytical laboratories.

141. In order to improve the implementation of safeguards, his country had continued its support programme and participated in the third training programme for junior professionals from developing countries by accepting ten trainees at its research centre and nuclear facilities.

142. Mr. KATTAN (Saudi Arabia) said that the Agency had played a very important role in the 30 years since its establishment. Knowledge about nuclear energy had developed considerably and it was widely used in the fields of health, agriculture and industry. Furthermore, nuclear power plants were producing about 15% of the world's electricity and would probably achieve 20% by the year 2000.

143. The development of nuclear energy could only be useful if properly controlled through improved nuclear safety and improved radiation protection. Safety codes should be revised by the Agency and adopted by Member States. The activities of the OSART teams and the Incident Reporting System were also very important. The accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl had highlighted a number of important safety aspects and in particular had shown that it was important to guard against human error. The preparation of the Convention on Early Notification and the Convention on Emergency Assistance within the space of a few weeks was a remarkable achievement and his delegation was convinced that the Agency would also be able to adopt other conventions provided the necessary political will was present. Another important aspect of safety was nuclear waste management and it was essential to find solutions to the problems of high- and medium-level waste. Saudi Arabia was in the process of developing the possibility of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the Agency's assistance was very valuable in providing adequate training courses. The Director General's initiative in setting up a high-level group of experts in order to help developing countries to establish their own nuclear energy programmes was very welcome and it was to be hoped that those recommendations would be implemented in the near future.

144. The threat of the repetition of an attack on a nuclear power plant in the Middle East by Israel was a possibility which prevented countries in the region from making use of nuclear energy in the same way as was done in other regions. The international community should do everything possible in order to establish legal measures covering the possibility of attacks on nuclear power plants, whatever their form, since an attack would have the same effect as the Chernobyl accident or an even worse effect. It was to be hoped that the Middle East would be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but unfortunately that seemed unlikely in view of the nuclear arms that were present in the region. Nevertheless, the Agency should do everything possible to ensure that the Middle East did not become an area of nuclear conflict.

145. Mr. MANIATOPOULOS (Commission of the European Communities), speaking on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), noted that the Agency played a key role in facilitating the development of nuclear energy. The Community was particularly conscious of that role, since its dependence on the contribution of nuclear energy to its overall energy supplies continued to grow significantly each year. By 1990, nuclear power stations in those member States of the Community that had opted for nuclear power programmes should be able to provide more than 35% of electricity demand and meet about 15% of total energy demand in the Community. By 1995, it was likely that up to 40% of electricity in the Community would be generated from nuclear energy.

146. The Community was celebrating its own thirtieth anniversary, since the treaties which had set up both the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community had been signed in Rome in March 1957. Under those two treaties, the six founder members of the Community, and subsequently the six other members, all twelve of which were also Members of the Agency, had transferred to the Community certain responsibilities previously exercised by government. In the nuclear field, those responsibilities included research, health and safety, supply and safeguards. In all those fields, co-operation between the Community and the Agency was very important.

147. In the field of nuclear fission, nearly all EURATOM's research and development effort was focused on the safety and security of nuclear plants and materials and on the protection of populations and the environment against

the possible effects of nuclear radiation. Research expenditure on nuclear fission and radiation protection under the Community's 1987-1991 programme in the overall field of research and technological development would amount to 474 million ECU.

148. The European Community's research programme in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion continued to place the Community at the forefront of worldwide fusion research. Work at the Joint European Torus (JET) site in the United Kingdom had led to a world record value for the so-called "fusion product". The Next European Torus (NET), the second stage of the Tokamak programme, had reached the predesign stage and it was hoped that detailed design could begin in 1990-91. The possibility of worldwide collaboration on the conceptual design of such a next step (named ITER) was also being actively explored; there would be collaboration between the four major fusion programmes in the world (EC, USA, Japan, USSR) under the auspices of the Agency.

149. The Community nuclear research programme covered a wide field and helped to improve the cost effectiveness of Member State research programmes. It ensured a continuity of effort by covering periods of 4-5 years and provided the stability for major research initiatives, thereby demonstrating the validity of a multinational approach. Research was carried out in one or more of the Community's four research establishments (in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), and in Member State research institutions, or through co-ordination between Community and Member State programmes. The Community continued to affirm its readiness to co-operate more widely with the Agency.

150. Discussions were in progress in the European Community on Community adhesion to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and to the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The Community's Council of Ministers was examining a proposed Community system of rapid exchange of information in cases of abnormal levels of radioactivity or of a nuclear accident. The Council was also discussing a proposal to establish a system whereby specific limits for radioactive contamination of foodstuffs could be speedily introduced, if necessary, in the event of a nuclear accident. The Community had received considerable

assistance in that area from scientific experts of international organizations, particularly the Agency, and the Community looked forward to continuing that collaboration.

151. The Community was the only region in the world where two international safeguarding authorities collaborated together on their mutual responsibilities. The Agreements made between the Agency, the Community and its member States had laid down a secure basis on which the Community and the Agency worked together to ensure that safeguards were applied with due effectiveness on all nuclear material subject to those Agreements. The Community would continue to strive to consolidate its joint endeavour in the safeguards field.

152. It was a specific task of the European Community to establish relations with other countries and international organizations to foster progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The level of reliance on nuclear energy in certain member States of the Community necessarily brought with it not only levels of expertise, but a willingness to support other countries, particularly developing countries, keen to explore the possibilities of acquiring and exploiting nuclear technology. The Community was in a position to help and advise on all stages of preparation and development of a nuclear power programme. Under its various agreements with developing countries, substantial Community resources had been used to extend electricity transmission and distribution networks. The Agreement made in 1975 between the Agency and the European Community could constitute a significant instrument to reinforce the contribution of the Community to the Agency's technical assistance activities.

153. Mr. STEMPEL PARIS (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) said that the tenth regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), held in Montevideo, Uruguay, had reached important conclusions, some of which related closely to the co-operation between the IAEA and OPANAL.

154. Resolution 217(X) extended thanks to the Agency's Director General for his efforts in connection with the negotiation of safeguards agreements with OPANAL member States and expressed the hope that a formula could be found for

safeguards agreements with countries in the Latin American and Caribbean area to be concluded in accordance with the Tlatelolco Treaty, between the Agency and the States concerned. In that connection, operative paragraph 3 of the resolution indicated that the Government of Argentina had announced that it had taken up negotiations with the Agency in 1979 aimed at concluding a safeguards agreement conforming to the provisions of the Tlatelolco Treaty. With that in mind, he had asked the OPANAL Commission of Good Offices to arrange a seminar or workshop to discuss the difficulties which had prevented certain countries in Latin America, in particular those which were not parties to NPT, from concluding safeguards agreements pursuant to Article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The Commission of Good Offices had unanimously supported the proposal, emphasizing that the seminar should be at the polytechnical, not political, level and should be attended by all States in Latin America and the Caribbean interested in the matter, and that the Agency's co-operation would be indispensable. The seminar would be held in Mexico City, and it was hoped that the widest possible international participation would be achieved so that a formula for a safeguards agreement acceptable to all could be found.

155. Through its resolution 220(X), paragraphs 6-8, the General Conference had welcomed the progress of the Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL), expressed the hope that all countries in the zone of application of the Treaty would participate in it, and asked him to continue consultations with the Agency's Director General with a view to OPANAL contributing to the ARCAL programme. In that connection, he requested the Director General to permit OPANAL representatives to participate as observers in ARCAL working sessions where general programmes or activities were discussed at a senior level.

156. Operative paragraph 1 of resolution 223(X) requested the OPANAL Council, with the support of the competent international organizations, to investigate ways, including a possible additional protocol to the Tlatelolco Treaty, to prevent radioactive contamination by prohibiting the deposition of radioactive waste and other radioactive materials in the oceans adjacent to the continental and island areas of Latin America and the Caribbean within the definitive zone of application described in Article 4(2) of the Tlatelolco Treaty. Such an effort was necessary because little or no

knowledge had existed at the time of the drafting of the Tlatelolco Treaty about certain consequences of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as those which had been seen following recent accidents in nuclear facilities and those due to the dumping of radioactive wastes in continental seas.

157. Article 7 of the Treaty of Rarotonga contained very stringent provisions regarding the dumping of radioactive wastes in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Similarly, there had been attempts to amend the London Dumping Convention so as to prohibit the dumping not only of high-level but also of lower-level wastes; and in any case, there was a moratorium on the sea dumping of any radioactive wastes dating from 1983. Moreover, there existed a convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region with two additional protocols, one for the prevention of radioactive waste dumping in the area covered by the convention, the other providing for co-operation in dealing with emergencies due to contamination.

158. Another task entrusted to the Secretariat of OPANAL by its General Conference was the drafting of an additional protocol to ensure that peaceful nuclear explosions were carried out in accordance with the radiation protection regulations and standards accepted by the international community. The General Secretary of OPANAL had pointed out that, both in the Agency and in scientific circles, it was considered impossible, in the present state of technology, to distinguish a peaceful nuclear explosion from one of another nature. Although Article 18 of the Tlatelolco Treaty granted its parties the right to carry out such explosions under the strict control of both OPANAL and the Agency, the Agency's Director General had made it clear that such supervision could be exerted only under the guidelines for that purpose published in document INFCIRC/169. It was therefore possible that the safeguards agreements to be negotiated under the Tlatelolco Treaty would recognize such a right, but would make the exercise of that right subject to technological advances which would allow a distinction to be made between a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes and one for other purposes.

159. Turning to other matters, he expressed the OPANAL member States' gratification at the announcement by Brazil that it had acquired a technological capability for the production of enriched uranium and that the

Aramar Experimental Centre at Ipero, 100 km from Sao Paulo, would commence operations in 1988. In that connection, he welcomed the fact that the President of Brazil had stressed that his country had no intention of using its knowledge for warlike purposes and would be bound by the Tlatelolco Treaty; moreover, it had been Brazil which had proposed to the United Nations General Assembly the creation of a South Atlantic peace and co-operation zone. The time now seemed ripe for the zone of application outlined in the Tlatelolco Treaty to be fully established, and he hoped that goal would be reached in the shortest possible time for the sake of life and peace in the area.

160. In conclusion, he congratulated the Agency, on behalf of OPANAL, on its thirtieth anniversary and paid tribute to the valuable contribution to the cause of peace and security between nations which it had made during the period since its foundation. He wished it similar success in its noble efforts for the future as well.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.