SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

Report by the Board of Governors and the Director General

At its 628th meeting, on 20/21 September 1984, the Board of Governors decided to transmit the material in the Annexes hereto to the General Conference as a joint report of the Board and the Director General submitted in response to the request made last year by the Conference in operative paragraph 5 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.
ANNEX 1

The International Atomic Energy Agency and South Africa

General Conference resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408

1. In resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 (see Attachment 1) the General Conference made a number of requests to the Board of Governors and the Director General:

(a) In operative paragraph 2, it demanded "that South Africa submits all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the Agency" and requested the Director General "to take the necessary measures in that connection";

(b) In operative paragraph 4, it requested the Board of Governors and the Director General to consider the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions referred to in the preamble "in what relates to the Agency and especially the request to the Agency to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which may assist it in its nuclear plans and in particular the participation of South Africa in the technical Groups of the Agency";

(c) In operative paragraph 5, it requested the Board of Governors and the Director General "to report to the twenty-eighth regular session of the General Conference on the implementation of this Resolution"; and

(d) In operative paragraph 6, it requested the Director General "to bring this resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations".
2. The resolution makes specific reference to resolutions which were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 37th regular session and which relate to South Africa's nuclear capabilities. As reported in document GOV/INF/434, in resolutions 37/74 A and 37/74 B, on implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and the nuclear capability of South Africa, the Assembly called upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa and demanded that South Africa terminate forthwith "its development of the capability to produce nuclear weapons and submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency". In resolution 37/69 A, the Assembly requested "all intergovernmental organizations to exclude the racist regime of South Africa and to terminate all co-operation with it". Also, it requested the Agency "to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which may assist it in its nuclear plans and, in particular, to exclude South Africa from all its technical working groups".

3. At its 38th regular session the United Nations General Assembly further addressed this matter. As reported in document GOV/INF/449, in resolution 38/39 A, "Situation in South Africa", the General Assembly again requested the Agency "to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which may assist it in its nuclear plans and, in particular, to exclude South Africa from all its technical working groups".

4. In resolution 38/181 the General Assembly again demanded "that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency".² Also it requested the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization for African Unity, "to provide data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability"; the Agency is assisting in this task.

² See GOV/INF/449, para. 18.
Action taken by the Director General pursuant to resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408

5. The Director General made an oral report to the Board in February 1984 and a written report in June 1984 on the action which he had so far taken pursuant to resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408:

(a) Pursuant to operative paragraph 6, the Director General brought the resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in a letter dated 21 October 1983.

(b) Pursuant to operative paragraph 2, the Director General addressed a letter dated 11 November 1983 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa informing him of the resolution and indicating the readiness of the Secretariat to enter into discussions with the South African Government with a view to concluding the safeguards agreements and arrangements necessary for implementing operative paragraph 2.

Safeguards at semi-commercial enrichment plant

6. As also reported by the Director General to the Board in February, South Africa, through a press release issued on 31 January 1984 (circulated as INFCIRC/314), has stated its willingness to resume safeguards discussions, which have been dormant since 1980, on its semi-commercial enrichment plant. It has not, however, agreed to full-scope safeguards as demanded in resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. The Resident Representative of South Africa subsequently informed the Director General that the statement in the press release represented the official standpoint of the South African Government. The Director General replied to the Resident Representative suggesting discussion of the arrangements and timetable for the resumption of negotiations. South Africa's acceptance of the suggestion was communicated to the Director General in a letter dated 11 May 1984. At a meeting with the Resident

3/ See GOV/OR.615, para. 27, and GOV/INF/454.
Representative on 18 May, the Secretariat drew attention to operative paragraph 2 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 and recalled the steps taken in 1976 and 1977 with regard to South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant - namely, the transmittal to South Africa of a design information questionnaire and a draft safeguards agreement. The Secretariat invited South Africa to send representatives to Vienna for negotiations at the earliest possible date and stated its readiness to send to South Africa, upon invitation, a team which would visit the enrichment plant in order to determine the technical safeguards approach.

7. South African representatives came to Vienna on 7-8 August 1984 for discussions on safeguards; they were led by Dr. J.W.L. de Villiers, Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Corporation. The Secretariat again drew attention to operative paragraph 2 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, and to the view expressed by many Board members that South Africa should place all its nuclear facilities under safeguards, and requested that its statement be reported to the South African authorities. The South African representatives informed the Secretariat that they had no authority to discuss resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, but only to resume discussions on the application of safeguards to South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant in accordance with the South African statement of 31 January 1984, which was not to be regarded as a response to operative paragraph 2 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. They agreed to convey the Secretariat's statement to their authorities.

8. In the discussion on safeguarding the semi-commercial enrichment plant, the Secretariat explained its approach towards applying safeguards at enrichment plants which use centrifuge enrichment technology. South Africa gave a presentation of the enrichment process and plant layout at its semi-commercial enrichment plant. The plant is designed to produce low-enriched uranium, primarily for the fuel for the KOEBERG power plant (see para.21), and is scheduled to come into operation in two to three years' time.
9. It was agreed that: (1) South Africa would send to the Secretariat the information on the design of the plant necessary for the Secretariat to determine the technical safeguards approach and to draw up the detailed safeguards arrangements; (2) the Secretariat would prepare and send to South Africa a revised draft safeguards agreement including provisions and formulations incorporated in the agreements based on INFCIRC/66.Rev.2 most recently approved by the Board. It is envisaged that further discussions on the technical arrangements and on the safeguards agreement will proceed in parallel.

Status of the Agency's relations with South Africa

Membership

10. South Africa became a member of the Agency in June 1957. It was a member of the Board of Governors until June 1977, when the Board decided that Egypt should be designated - in place of South Africa - as the most advanced Member State for the area of Africa under Article VI.A.1 of the Statute.

11. South Africa's current base rate of assessment is 0.41%. As reported in the Agency's accounts for 1983 (GC(XXVIII)/714, Schedule B.1), South Africa's outstanding contributions to the Regular Budget amounted to US $ 682 115 as at 31 December 1983. South Africa's assessed contribution for 1984, US $ 249 183, is also outstanding.

12. Until 1978, South Africa made voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in accordance with its base rate of assessment. In 1979 it contributed in accordance with its base rate for 1978. Since 1979 it has not made any voluntary contributions.
General Conference

13. The credentials of the South African delegate to the 1979 regular session of the General Conference were rejected. The rejection applied to that session only, but South Africa has not since sought to attend a General Conference session.

Committee on Assurances of Supply

14. The Board of Governors decided in September 1981 that South Africa should not participate further in the meetings and work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS).

Participation of South Africa in Agency activities

15. As stated in sub-paragraph 1(b) above, in operative paragraph 4 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 the General Conference referred to the United Nations General Assembly's request to the Agency "to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which may assist it in its nuclear plans and in particular the participation of South Africa in the technical Groups of the Agency".

16. South Africa is not in receipt of any technical assistance from the Agency, and at present the Agency has no research contracts with any institutes in South Africa.

17. As a member of the Agency, South Africa has the right under the Statute to participate in activities open to all Member States, including attendance at meetings, except where a Policy-making Organ has explicitly determined otherwise — as in the case of the Board's decision in September 1981 regarding CAS (see paragraph 14 above). From time to time, South Africa attends meetings of which, like other Member States,
it receives notice—for example, meetings on nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiation protection. South Africa attended the Agency's Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held in Vienna in September 1982 and the International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management held in Seattle in May 1983.

18. As regards technical groups, South African experts have been participating, as reported in document GOV/INF/454, in the work of Agency groups on uranium geology and of joint working groups of the Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of OECD on various aspects of uranium. The work of the Agency's own groups has now been completed; the results of the uranium geology group were reported at the 27th International Geological Congress which took place in Moscow from 4 to 14 August 1984. Accordingly, these Agency groups have now been brought to an end.

19. In respect of the joint groups with NEA, the Director General has concluded that the Secretariat will no longer continue with them, and the NEA has been so informed. Thus, these joint groups have also been brought to an end. However, the approved programme activities hitherto coming within the purview of the joint groups, including the periodic preparation and publication of the book "Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand", are of a continuing nature and considered by many Member States to be important and valuable. These activities will now be undertaken by the Secretariat in co-operation with the NEA Secretariat within the framework of the co-operation agreement between the two organizations*. It will be the aim of the Secretariat to continue to carry out this work effectively for the benefit of Member States.

Nuclear resources and activities

20. A summary of South Africa's nuclear resources and activities is contained in Attachment 2.

4/ INFCIRC/25.
Safeguards

SAFARI research reactor

21. The Agency has been applying safeguards to the SAFARI research reactor since 1967 under a safeguards agreement between the Agency, the United States of America and South Africa (INFCIRC/98).

KOEBERG nuclear power plant

22. Safeguards at the KOEBERG nuclear power plant are applied under a safeguards agreement between the Agency, France and South Africa (INFCIRC/244). The co-operation agreement between France and South Africa specifically provides that the reprocessing of the fuel and the storage of the derived plutonium must take place outside South Africa, in locations mutually agreed upon by both countries and under Agency safeguards.

Semi-commercial enrichment plant

23. The latest position as regards the safeguards discussions on South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant is described in paragraphs 6-9.

Other facilities

24. None of the other facilities listed in Attachment 2 is under safeguards. However, uranium enriched in the pilot plant at Valindaba and fuel fabricated for the SAFARI and KOEBERG reactors would come under safeguards upon being introduced into the reactors and would remain under safeguards thereafter. That is to say, safeguards would continue to be applied to irradiated fuel from these reactors sent for post-irradiation examination at the hot cell complex which is being constructed (see paragraph 6 of Attachment 2). Design information on the hot cell complex has been submitted by South Africa to the Agency and reviewed by the Department of Safeguards.
Twenty-seventh regular session

Agenda item 7
GC(XXVII)/700

 GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1982

Resolution adopted during the 256th plenary meeting on 14 October 1983

SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

The General Conference,

(a) Having considered the Annual Report of the Agency for 1982 and, in particular, paragraphs 63 and 309,


(c) Recalling Resolution 37/69F of the United Nations General Assembly on relations between Israel and South Africa, particularly in the nuclear field,

(d) Alarmed that South Africa's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities enable it to acquire the capability of producing usable material for nuclear weapons,

1. Takes note of the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 37/74 and 37/69;

2. Demands that South Africa submits all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the Agency and requests the Director General to take the necessary measures in that connection;

3. Calls upon those Member States of the Agency which have not done so yet to end all nuclear co-operation with the South African regime and, in particular, to terminate all transfers of fissionable material and technology to South Africa which could be used for developing the capability of producing nuclear arms;
4. Requests the Board of Governors and the Director General to consider the implementation of the above-mentioned United Nations General Assembly's resolutions in what relates to the Agency and especially the request to the Agency to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which may assist it in its nuclear plans and in particular the participation of South Africa in the technical Groups of the Agency;

5. Further requests the Board of Governors and the Director General to report to the twenty-eighth regular session of the General Conference on the implementation of this Resolution; and

6. Requests also the Director General to bring this resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
South Africa: Nuclear resources and activities

Uranium resources

1. South Africa's uranium resources as at 1 January 1983 are reported to be:

<table>
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<th>Reasonably Assured Resources Recoverable at</th>
<th>US $ 80/kg U</th>
<th>US $ 80-130/kg U</th>
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<td>191 000 tonnes U</td>
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<td>122 000 tonnes U</td>
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<tr>
<th>Estimated Additional Resources Recoverable at</th>
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<th>US $ 80-130/kg U</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>99 000 tonnes U</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48 000 tonnes U</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Uranium production

2. Since 1980 South African uranium production has been running at about 6000 tonnes a year.

Uranium enrichment

3. A pilot uranium enrichment plant has been in operation at Valindaba since 1971. This plant enriches uranium to 45% for the fuel for the SAFARI research reactor.

4. A semi-commercial enrichment plant with an estimated capacity of about 300 tonnes separative work units (SWU)/year is under construction.

1/ Uranium Resources, Production and Demand, joint report of the Agency and NEA, December 1983.
Fuel fabrication

5. A fuel fabrication plant producing fuel for the SAFARI reactor is in operation. There have also been reports of an experimental line for the fabrication of fuel elements for the KOEBERG power plant.

Research

6. The National Nuclear Research Centre at Pelindaba, the main governmental research organization, undertakes research on mineral prospecting and mining, mineral exploitation, reactor and reactor fuel development, radiation and health physics, metallurgy, reactor safety and operation, applications of radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture and industry, and nuclear physics. The Centre contains the 20-MW (thermal) SAFARI research reactor, which was supplied by the United States and went into operation in 1965. In 1975 the United States ceased to supply fuel for the reactor and South Africa is manufacturing the fuel itself (see paragraph 5 above). A hot cell complex is being constructed at the Centre, primarily for the purpose of post-irradiation examination of fuel and materials irradiated in the KOEBERG and SAFARI reactors.

KOEBERG nuclear power plant

7. The KOEBERG nuclear power plant comprises two 900-MW (electric) pressurized-water reactors supplied by France. One of the reactors is now in operation.
Summary record of the discussion on the item "South Africa's nuclear capabilities" at meetings of the Board of Governors in June and September, 1984

RECORD OF THE 624TH MEETING (held on 8 June 1984)

SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES (GC(XXVII)/RES/408; GOV/INF/454)

24. The CHAIRMAN said that at the Board's February session the Director General had made a statement describing the factual position at that time regarding South Africa's participation in technical working groups of the Agency and also the steps he had taken so far towards implementing resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. The Board had requested the Director General to provide a further report in time for the Board's June session; that report was contained in document GOV/INF/454.

25. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that, in his report to the Board in February, he had indicated his willingness to provide, if the Board considered it useful, a paper describing the status of the Agency's relations with South Africa. The Board had requested him to provide such a report, which had been submitted to the Board as document GOV/INF/454. The report outlined the steps taken so far to implement General Conference resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, and a revised and updated version of its text might serve as a basis for the report of the Board and of the Director General to the General Conference requested in operative paragraph 5 of that resolution, if that were acceptable to the Board. The present text might be supplemented by the summary record of the discussions on the item at the current session of the Board and by such additional information about the implementation of the General Conference resolution as might be available at the time when the document was issued.

26. Mr. SHASH (Egypt), while commending the Director General on his efforts to ensure implementation of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, deplored the fact that there had been no significant change in the policies and attitudes of South Africa and that the resolution was still far from having been implemented. The resolution called on South Africa to submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the Agency, and paragraph 6 of the Director
General's report showed that South Africa had not yet agreed to full-scope safeguards. Also, South Africa had not responded to the Director General's suggestion that the arrangements and timetable for the resumption of negotiations be discussed at the earliest possible date. He therefore asked the Director General to provide the Board at its September meetings before the 1984 General Conference with a further report on the results of his contacts or negotiations with South Africa and on its readiness to comply with resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.

27. In that resolution the General Conference had also asked the Board and the Director General to consider the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 37/74 and 37/69. Although he appreciated the steps taken in response to those resolutions, he believed that much still remained to be done.

28. Mr. GHEZAL (Tunisia) said that the statement issued on 31 January 1984 by the South African authorities, in which they had announced that they were prepared to resume discussions on safeguards for a semi-commercial enrichment plant, did not constitute the undertaking required by resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, since it excluded the Valindaba pilot plant from Agency inspection. Furthermore, despite the steps taken by the Director General to ensure the implementation of that resolution, South Africa had done nothing which would indicate that the statement of 31 January was anything other than a piece of propaganda. He asked the Director General, in connection with the reorganization of joint working groups of the Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA) in which South Africa participated (paragraph 16 of document GOV/INF/454), to bear in mind the provisions of operative paragraph 4 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.

29. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Agency could do more than it had done so far, as described in paragraphs 14-16 of document GOV/INF/454, to exclude South Africa from participation in Agency activities. Moreover, noting that the application of safeguards at two nuclear facilities in South Africa had been achieved at the instigation of third parties, he said that until South Africa voluntarily placed all its nuclear facilities under
Agency safeguards it would have to be assumed that it intended to produce nuclear weapons. The placing of part of that country's nuclear facilities under safeguards would thus be a waste of time and resources, and negotiations should therefore relate to full-scope safeguards.

30. **Mr. MALU wa KALENGA (Zaire)**, supporting the statements by the Governors from Egypt and Tunisia, said that all co-operation between the Agency and South Africa should cease while full-scope Agency safeguards were not being applied in that country.

31. **Mr. UMAR (Nigeria)** expressed his appreciation of the Director General's efforts to implement resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. However, document GOV/INF/454 did not show any significant developments since February 1984. The declared intention of South Africa to negotiate with the Agency on safeguards was therefore not credible.

32. He noted with approval that the Agency was assisting the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in providing data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability, as requested by General Assembly resolution 38/181. However, his delegation would have wished for a report in response to its statement at the February session of the Board. 2/ Although it was no secret that South Africa had been spending heavily on the development of its nuclear capability, the Director General had not provided the Board with any information on South Africa's nuclear activities during the time since it had apparently exploded its first nuclear bomb. Investigators who had detected the explosion had confirmed that aeroplanes had been sent to collect air samples to ascertain whether it had been caused by a nuclear bomb. The information available to his Government indicated that there was no direct evidence that South Africa had exploded a nuclear bomb in the area in question. However, the nature of the event had not been stated and he asked the Secretariat to provide all the information it could on South Africa's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

33. The exchange of correspondence between the Director General and South Africa had not yet produced any significant results. South Africa was clearly unwilling to accept full-scope safeguards. He urged those countries which supported South Africa by maintaining with it contracts relating to nuclear activities to cease to do so.

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2/ GOV/OR.616, paragraphs 57-59.
34. He asked whether the continuing participation of South Africa in technical working groups of the Agency did not undermine the latter's credibility and urged that South Africa be excluded from such groups immediately. Moreover, a correction needed to be made in the "Red Book" (Uranium Resources, Production and Demand) produced by the NEA/IAEA Working Party on Uranium Resources, in which South Africa participated. Although the erroneous listing of Bophuthatswana as an independent country in the 1982 edition had been corrected, the map on page 259 of the 1983 edition still showed Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Venda as independent States.

35. **Mr. CHUTHASMIT** (Thailand) said it was the duty of the Board and of the Director General to implement resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 by reporting further on South Africa's nuclear capabilities to the General Conference. His Government shared the concern of many countries that the development by South Africa of nuclear weapons had undermined the declaration by the Organization of African Unity that the African continent should remain a denuclearized zone.

36. **Mr. KHLISTOV** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Agency should continue its efforts to achieve full implementation of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. The recent statement by South Africa about its nuclear policies did little to alter the situation, and South Africa continued to refuse to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and to accept full-scope Agency safeguards. The agreement by the South African authorities to resume discussions on the safeguarding of a semi-commercial enrichment plant was entirely insufficient to convince the international community of their peaceful intentions. It was only by South Africa's acceding to NPT that resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 could be said to have been fully implemented.

37. **Mr. RUSALES** (Cuba) said that the stated intention of South Africa to take some of the measures demanded by many countries and to resume negotiations with the Agency on safeguards for its principal nuclear facilities did not constitute implementation of United Nations and General Conference resolutions on the subject.
38. While supporting the efforts made by the Secretariat to ensure implementation of General Conference resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, he regretted the fact that South Africa was still able to participate in certain joint IAEA/NEA working groups and hoped that steps would be taken to prevent that.

39. Finally, he reiterated his delegation's full support for resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 and stated that it would be prepared to consider further means of ensuring that South Africa complied with all resolutions passed by the Agency.

40. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) associated himself with the views expressed by the Governors from Egypt and Tunisia.

41. Mr. PEŠIĆ (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation had on several occasions expressed its views on the disinclination of South Africa to comply with resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Agency's General Conference. His delegation shared the opinion of the African delegations that there was no indication of any change in South Africa's basic position. He took note of the Director General's report contained in document GOV/INF/454 on the understanding that it would be submitted to the General Conference for consideration and assessment and for the adoption of appropriate measures.

42. Mr. WILLIAMSON (United States of America) said his delegation had taken note of the status report contained in document GOV/INF/454 and could agree with the suggestion that it might serve as the basis for the report of the Board and the Director General to the General Conference. He shared the hope expressed by others that the South African Government would move quickly to begin substantive negotiations with the Agency aimed at placing its semi-commercial enrichment plant under safeguards and that it would find it in its own interests to accept safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. That was a policy which all Member States should consider adopting, as was envisaged in NPT. His Government was pleased at the recent steps taken by South Africa in that regard and encouraged that country to proceed with all speed.
43. As the Director General had rightly pointed out, participation in Agency activities which were open to all Member States could not be denied to one Member State in the absence of a decision to that effect arrived at in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. As was clearly stated in Article IV.C, the Agency was based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all Members. To exclude a member from the technical working groups of the Agency constituted a denial of a right and privilege of membership. There was no evidence that South Africa had failed to fulfil any agreement with the Agency or any provision of the Statute, with the exception that it had not paid its assessed contributions following the non-acceptance of its delegation's credentials at the 1979 session of the General Conference. It was true that it did not have Agency safeguards on all of its relevant nuclear activities, but that was not a requirement for membership. According to the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1983, the same situation prevailed in six Member States altogether. His Government had repeatedly expressed its abhorrence of the apartheid system practised in South Africa, but that issue was not relevant to the question of membership of the Agency. To engage in political quarrels would only damage or destroy the credibility of the Agency. Universality was the foundation of the United Nations system.

44. In another respect, too, excluding South African experts from participating in Agency-sponsored technical working groups was against Members' interests. Having examined the work of the joint IAEA/NEA technical groups, his delegation was convinced that the information on uranium resources, exploitation and world demand provided by South African experts represented an extremely important contribution to that work. Without that information, the reports published would be much less useful to Member States. Furthermore, it seemed obvious that the exclusion of South Africa from that activity could only harm the prospects for extending the coverage of Agency safeguards in South Africa, prospects which were currently being explored by the Secretariat and South African officials.

45. Mr. HENDERSON (United Kingdom) recalled that his delegation had frequently urged South Africa to adhere to NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under safeguards. It was not his Government's policy to collaborate in any way with the South African nuclear programme. At the Board
session in February, his delegation had welcomed South Africa's announcement that it would abide by the spirit of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines on NPT in its external nuclear dealings and that it was willing to resume negotiations with the Agency regarding the safeguarding of its semi-commercial uranium enrichment plant. It was disappointing, therefore, to hear that little progress had been made since February. He urged South Africa to take active steps to implement its stated intentions in that matter and supported the proposal that the Director General should submit a further report to the Board in September on progress in the negotiations.

46. Mr. OUVRIEU (France) said his country's position on apartheid was well known and he would therefore restrict himself to the technical aspects of the question before the Board. South Africa had made a statement on the provisions of NPT which it was willing to respect with regard to its uranium exports and the possible transfer of sensitive technology. In addition, it had made a proposal concerning the submission of its semi-commercial enrichment plant to Agency safeguards. Those declarations seemed to be a step in the right direction and should be judged pragmatically and on their own merits. He hoped that something concrete would come of the proposals in the near future and that the negotiations with the Agency would commence soon.

47. Mr. RUGGIERO (Italy) said his Government's views on the system of apartheid were widely known. He was pleased to note that South Africa had recently taken some steps towards placing its nuclear facilities under safeguards, but he was dismayed at the lack of progress since the Director General's last report on the subject. He trusted that the next report would indicate that some headway had been made.

48. Mr. ERNEMANN (Belgium) considered that the Director General's report was both excellent and exhaustive and could be submitted to the General Conference in its present form. Operative paragraph 2 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 demanded that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards. While his delegation would welcome any step which resulted in the submission of South Africa's nuclear facilities to safeguards, it had to be stressed that such an act was an entirely voluntary one and must remain so. South Africa could not be expected to accept
discriminatory treatment when several Members of the Board did not themselves accept Agency safeguards on their facilities. His delegation opposed the exclusion of South Africa — and indeed of any Member State — from participation in Agency activities. It was not just the principle of universality of the United Nations which would suffer from the ostracism of South Africa but also the non-proliferation objectives pursued by the Agency.

49. Mr. LOOSCH (Federal Republic of Germany) said his country's general views on South Africa were familiar to the Board. He commended the Director General on the report contained in document GOV/INF/454. The South African statement on safeguards and nuclear export policy reproduced in document INFCIRC/314 was an important step but did not go far enough. He appealed to the Director General to expedite negotiations with South Africa on the submission of its nuclear activities to safeguards and requested him to report again on that matter to the Board in September.

50. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) thanked the Director General for his report on South Africa's nuclear capabilities and for his efforts to implement resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. As was well known, South Africa's apartheid policies were unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of the United Nations' Member States. His delegation found it particularly disturbing that South Africa was believed to have exploded a nuclear device some time previously in collusion with some other countries. Consequently, South Africa should not be given any assistance which could help it to use nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes. Further, he noted that South Africa had not been paying its assessed contributions, a fact which would automatically exclude it from exercising the privileges of membership. Finally, he urged the Director General to continue his efforts towards the full implementation of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.

51. Mr. SINGH (India), associating himself with the views expressed — inter alia — by the Governors from Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zaire and Tunisia, said the Board was well aware of India's views on apartheid and on the oppression which stemmed from it.
52. The Board was also aware of the importance which India attached to the Agency's Statute and to the relationship agreement between the United Nations and the Agency. In his country's view those two legal instruments made it incumbent on the Agency to bring its practice into line with that of the United Nations. Accordingly, his delegation was disappointed at the limited progress made in implementing resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. No indication was given in document GOV/INF/454 that efforts had been made to implement operative paragraph 3 of that resolution. Operative paragraph 4 of the same resolution requested the Director General and the Board to consider taking specific action on the participation of South Africa in the technical groups of the Agency. However, it was his impression, although perhaps a mistaken one, that paragraph 16 of document GOV/INF/454 reflected an attempt to avoid so doing. That paragraph suggested that the matter was being discussed with the Secretariat of the Nuclear Energy Agency. It should be emphasized, however, that South Africa was participating in joint working groups not on the strength of its membership of NEA but as a Member of the Agency.

53. With regard to the statement made by the Governor from Belgium, he wondered how long the Governor from Belgium thought it would be before South Africa attained the age of enlightenment.

54. Mr. KELSO (Australia) said his Government's opposition to apartheid was well known. His country had welcomed the South African statement in January that steps would be taken to increase safeguards coverage in South Africa but regretted the lack of progress since then. His Government would like to see South Africa become a party to NPT and submit all its nuclear facilities to safeguards. Indeed, it urged all countries to accept the comprehensive obligations of NPT and place all their nuclear facilities under safeguards.

55. His delegation endorsed the Director General's report. It was essential that the efforts made to obtain South Africa's acceptance of safeguards should be constructive. What his delegation did not want was action which harmed the Agency more than it did South Africa. The nuclear industry derived considerable benefit from the NEA/IAEA "Red Book". For that book to continue to provide the best possible global picture of the status of
uranium resources, it was important that contributions to it be extended rather than reduced. Also, it was important that action taken with regard to South Africa be effective against apartheid and not harm the Agency and its Member States.

56. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said his Government had repeatedly condemned the apartheid policy of South Africa. His delegation wished to associate itself with the views expressed by Governors from other developing countries and urged the Director General to take the necessary steps to implement fully resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.

57. Mr. SULLIVAN (Canada) supported the proposal put forward by the Director General for future action. Canada had never refrained from expressing its repugnance at the apartheid system in South Africa. Nonetheless, neither the principle of universality nor the call in resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 for South Africa to open its nuclear installations to Agency inspection could be ignored. It should be noted, however, that there was a certain inconsistency in seeking to limit South African participation in the Agency while at the same time insisting that it place all its facilities under Agency safeguards. The South African statement and that country's meetings with the Director General appeared to represent an important opportunity to extend safeguards coverage in South Africa. That objective could most easily be achieved if South Africa were to sign NPT and open all its facilities to inspection by the Agency. In the meantime, he encouraged both parties to proceed with negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a satisfactory safeguards agreement. His delegation would welcome further reports by the Director General on the progress made.

58. The DIRECTOR GENERAL, in response to a comment made by the Governor from Nigeria and by some other Governors, said that in his opinion he and the Board were in the process of doing precisely what the General Conference had requested them to do in operative paragraph 4 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 - namely, considering the implementation of certain United Nations General Assembly resolutions "in what relates to the Agency and especially the request to the Agency to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which may assist it in its nuclear plans and in particular the participation of South Africa in the technical groups of the Agency".
59. He did not take resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 to mean that the General Conference had already decided to apply sanctions against South Africa and, while the Secretariat would carry out fully all directives given to it by the General Conference or the Board of Governors, it could not of its own accord apply sanctions.

60. With regard to the references which had been made to South Africa's having detonated a nuclear explosive device, there had been rumours to that effect some years before but he did not think that the Secretariat had been requested by the General Conference to shed light on that matter. If the Conference did want it to do so, then the Secretariat would obtain the available information for Member States, although he imagined that the latter would already have obtained that information through the United Nations, to which the Agency itself was providing data as described in paragraph 4 of document GOV/INF/454.

61. With regard to the latest edition of the "Red Book", although the text did not contain the regrettable error which had occurred in an earlier edition, there was a map which had been rightly criticized by the Governor from Nigeria. That map, which showed "Bantustans" as independent States, had not been submitted to the Agency's Secretariat for scrutiny; he would, of course, request the NEA Secretariat to issue a correction.

62. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that the Board had obtained from document GOV/INF/454 a picture of South Africa's involvement in the Agency and especially of its participation in Agency activities, including technical groups. In particular, the Board had noted that the matter of reorganizing four joint working groups of the Agency and NEA was currently being discussed with the NEA Secretariat. He understood that, at its meetings in September, the Board wished to have before it, under the item "South Africa's nuclear capabilities", a revised report on that question by the Director General together with the summary records of the discussion just held.

63. It was so agreed.
64. **Mr. HAWAS** (Egypt) requested that the results of the negotiations with South Africa on the submission of its nuclear facilities to safeguards also be included in the report.

65. The **CHAIRMAN** said he was sure the Director General would take account of that request.

**PROVISIONAL RECORD OF THE 628TH MEETING (held on 21 September 1984)**

**SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES (GOV/INF/459)**

**Mr. UMAR** (Nigeria) said the question of South Africa's nuclear capabilities was of grave concern to all African States. On behalf of the Chairman of the African Group in Vienna, he wished to thank the Secretariat for providing that Group with information on South African participation in NEA/IAEA joint technical meetings and on the Agency's efforts to persuade South Africa to submit its nuclear installations to full-scope safeguards. He commended the Secretariat on its prompt action following his delegation's earlier complaint concerning the erroneous listing of Bophuthatswana as an independent country in the 1982 edition of the "Red Book". He was particularly grateful to the Director General for his personal intervention in ensuring that the map on page 259 of the 1983 edition of the same book—which showed Bophuthatswana, Transkai and Venda as independent States—had also been corrected. His delegation had taken note of the termination of South African participation in the NEA/IAEA Working Groups on uranium geology.

In his statements to the Board at its meetings in February and June, he had emphasized that the South African Government was not serious in stating its willingness to resume safeguards discussions with the Secretariat on its semi-commercial enrichment plant. Paragraph 7 of document GOV/INF/459 stated that the South African representatives had informed the Secretariat that they had no authority to discuss resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, but only to resume discussions on the application of safeguards to South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant in accordance with the South African statement of 31 January 1984, which was not to be regarded as a response to operative paragraph 2 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. South Africa's disregard for the resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly
and the Agency's General Conference was well documented. The declared intention of South Africa to negotiate with the Secretariat on safeguards was not credible, and his delegation intended to comment further on that important issue at an appropriate venue.

He appealed to developed countries to assist in implementing resolutions concerned with the increasing nuclear preparedness of South Africa and drew the attention of the Board to the current negotiations between South Africa and some developed countries on the purchase of heavy water plants for South Africa's nuclear development. He trusted that the standard safeguards clause would be included in the purchase contract.

Mr. SHASH (Egypt) welcomed the clear and comprehensive report presented in document GOV/INF/459. Although the Director General had done his best to persuade South Africa to respond to resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, it was clear from the report, and in particular paragraph 7 thereof, that that country was not sincerely intending to implement the resolution. Attachment 2 of Annex I of the report containing data on South Africa's nuclear resources and activities showed that its offer to submit its semi-commercial enrichment plant to safeguards was of little significance. At all events, operative paragraph 2 of the resolution in question called for all that country's nuclear installations and facilities to be placed under Agency safeguards.

It had been pointed out that some other Member States had not placed their nuclear reactors under Agency safeguards. That analogy, however, ignored the fact that some Member States felt their security to be threatened by South Africa's refusal to accept safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. The main reason for the existence of the safeguards system was the feeling of security it inspired in all Member States, but the African countries and the international community would not feel secure until all South African nuclear installations were subject to inspection by the Agency.

His delegation felt that the report annexed to document GOV/INF/459 was suitable for submission to the General Conference, which would draw its conclusions and adopt an appropriate resolution.
Mr. GHEZAL (Tunisia) recalled that operative paragraph 2 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 urged South Africa to submit all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards. His delegation, however, could not see anything that had been done to implement that part of the resolution. In a press release in January 1984, South Africa had stated its readiness to undertake negotiations with the Agency on the submission of its semi-commercial enrichment plants to safeguards. The results of the subsequent contacts with the Agency were far from convincing and his delegation was forced to conclude that the press release was simply an example of delaying tactics.

The South African regime was universally held to be racist, aggressive and expansionist and in those circumstances the development of its nuclear capabilities could only be seen as a threat to African countries and to international peace. Consequently, every effort should be made to ensure that all of South Africa's nuclear facilities were placed under Agency safeguards and that all the provisions of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 were implemented. Further, it should be noted that the submission of South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant to safeguards would have no impact on its nuclear capabilities unless the pilot plant at Valindaba was also placed under safeguards.

Mr. CASTRO DÍAZ BALLART (Cuba) noted that, in defiance of the wishes expressed by the majority of the Agency's Member States, South Africa continued to refuse to submit all its nuclear facilities to safeguards. Furthermore, the negotiations that the South African Government had embarked upon with the Agency on the application of safeguards to one of its nuclear facilities were proceeding at a very slow pace, a fact which showed that Government's lack of interest in implementing the resolutions adopted by the Agency's General Conference and the United Nations General Assembly. Much remained to be done to implement fully resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, and in that connection his delegation was prepared to consider any new proposal aimed at ensuring its implementation.
Mr. SINGH (India), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77, commended the Director General on the report contained in document GOV/INF/459 and endorsed the views expressed by the Governors from Nigeria, Egypt and Tunisia.

Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq), supported by Mr. HADDAD (Syria), associated himself with the statement made by the Governor from India.

Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America) said his delegation's general views on the question had not changed since the Board's meeting in June. There were two new developments in the revised report submitted to the Board. The joint NEA/IAEA working groups had been terminated, although much of the work done by those bodies would be continued. His Government and many others found the reports and studies produced by the working groups - particularly the annual report entitled "Uranium Resources, Production and Demand" - to be of extremely high quality and value and he urged the Secretariat to work closely with the NEA under their new agreement to ensure that the same high standards were maintained. He welcomed the fact that, as the Director General had reported, substantive talks had finally begun on the application of safeguards to South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant. He hoped those talks would proceed rapidly with the aim of reaching an agreement in the near future. His Government was in favour of safeguards being applied to all peaceful nuclear facilities, including those of South Africa.

Mr. PANDEV (Bulgaria) supported the demand that South Africa submit all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards. Until that was achieved, the Secretariat should adhere strictly to the provisions of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.

Mr. LAMPARELLI (Italy) said his delegation had taken note of the Director General's report and particularly paragraphs 18 and 19 thereof. He regretted that the recently resumed discussions with South Africa on the submission of its semi-commercial uranium plant to safeguards had not produced any results. He hoped that rapid progress would be made towards
the conclusion of a safeguards agreement and that such an agreement would be only part of a process leading ultimately to the submission of all South African nuclear facilities to safeguards.

Mr. WANGURU (Kenya) supported the views expressed by the Governors from India, Nigeria and Iraq.

His delegation had pointed out at the February meetings of the Board that the South African Government's response through a press conference to the Director General's letter did not constitute an official reply. His misgivings on the subject had been confirmed by the refusal of the delegation sent by South Africa to discuss the implementation of paragraph 2 of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408, or indeed to discuss the content of that resolution at all. While the Director General had clearly complied with the instructions of the General Conference to the best of his ability, South Africa had adamantly refused to fulfil the requirements of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. It would be useful if the Board could draw up a statement on the action to be taken to ensure implementation of the measures foreseen in that resolution.

Some delegations had stressed the importance of the universality of the Agency's membership. His delegation did not oppose that principal, but it did object to the participation in Agency activities of a Member State which obstinately refused to accept the directives of the United Nations General Assembly contained in resolutions 37/69A, 37/74A, 37/74B and 38/39A. The last of those resolutions requested the Agency to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which might assist it in its nuclear plans, and, in particular, to exclude South Africa from all its technical working groups. His delegation would endorse any action the Board might take to achieve that objective.

Kenya welcomed the efforts of the Australian Government earlier in 1984 to establish a nuclear emergency and accident relief group composed of countries in the Indian Ocean area.
His delegation recommended that document GOV/INF/459 be attached to a draft resolution submitted by the Board to the General Conference requesting it to take the action necessary in view of the South African Government's unwillingness to comply with the requirements of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.

Mr. SEMENOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the report contained in document GOV/INF/459 could serve as a basis for the report from the Board and the Director General to the General Conference. The Agency should continue to take appropriate measures to secure full implementation of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408. The United Nations and the international community had repeatedly stated that the stubborn attempts of South Africa to create its own nuclear capacity posed a serious threat to world peace and security. The recent announcement by South Africa to which many Governors had referred did not alter the situation since that country had consistently refused to become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to accept full-scope safeguards. All supporters of the non-proliferation regime should therefore exert pressure on South Africa to persuade it to join NPT and to submit all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards.

The CHAIRMAN assumed that the Board wished to take note of the Director General's report in document GOV/INF/459 and that it wished the contents of that document, together with the summary records of the discussion on the item "South Africa's nuclear capabilities" at the current session of the Board, to be transmitted to the General Conference as the report from the Board and the Director General to the General Conference requested in operative paragraph 5 of General Conference resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408.

It was so agreed.