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President: Mr. XUTO (Thailand)

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980 (GC(XXV)/642, 642/Corr.1, 642/Corr.2)
(continued)

1. Mr. LUCZKIEWICZ (Poland) said that the Agency, which had been founded to promote the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and which had the task of monitoring the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), had functioned over the past year under highly unfavourable external conditions. The international situation over that period had evolved in a direction contrary to the statutory tasks of the Agency. Plans for modernization of medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Western Europe and the production and prospect of the deployment on the European continent of neutron weapons ran counter to the aims of the Agency.
2. The world had also witnessed an act of terrorism unprecedented in time of peace in the form of an armed attack on the Iraqi atomic research centre. The Polish people and Government resolutely condemned that act of aggression, which had been committed in violation of all the norms of international law. In an official statement of 11 June 1981, the Polish Government had stated that the Israeli argument of an alleged threat to the security of Israel was unfounded and could not mislead anybody. The Iraqi nuclear research centre had not been designed to serve military purposes. That fact had been corroborated by the declarations of Agency experts who supervised the nuclear programme of Iraq, a State party to NPT. Israel, on the other hand, though operating nuclear reactors for many years, had not yet acceded to NPT. His delegation consequently supported the recommendation contained in the resolution set out in document GOV/2040 that the General Conference should examine all the implications of that attack, including the suspension of Israel from the exercise of its rights and privileges as a Member of the Agency.
3. Against the background of those adverse developments, the role and activities of the Agency in terms of strict observance of NPT and its universalization were cast in sharp relief. The problem of further organizational and technical improvement of the Agency's safeguards system was becoming particularly important. Hence the further improvement of the safeguard system and its support by an ever increasing number of countries were basic requirements for further strengthening the supervisory role of the Agency as envisaged in NPT.

4. In an era fraught with a worsening energy crisis, broad international co-operation in the development of various sources of energy, mainly nuclear energy, was of paramount importance to all countries, particularly the developing ones, which were in need not only of a technological base but also of reliable sources of fissile materials enabling them to undertake long-term rational planning for the development of their nuclear programmes. One of the ways of meeting that challenge was the newly established Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). As a member of that committee, Poland had actively joined in the efforts to develop a universal system of nuclear transfers in which assured supplies would be paralleled by non-proliferation obligations. Work in that respect should develop favourably, with advantage being taken of the vast experience of the Second NPT Review Conference, the "London Club" and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE).
5. An important event in 1983 would be the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of Peaceful Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which would analyse the international co-operation in that area and give guidance for general development in the coming years. The Agency should participate both substantively and organizationally in the preparations for and work of the Conference. Also of great importance was the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience which was being organized by the Agency in 1982 and which would permit an exchange of experience in the field of nuclear energy between countries with long-standing programmes and countries just beginning to introduce nuclear energy on a broader scale. The results of operation of nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union and other Socialist States would contribute considerably to the work of that conference.
6. His delegation also appreciated the work which the Agency had undertaken with regard to new international machinery in the field of plutonium management. An equally high priority should be accorded to expanding the Agency's programme in the area of nuclear safety. It was of importance to draft an international agreement on nuclear safety co-operation and on mutual emergency assistance in connection with nuclear accidents. Such an instrument would be an important step towards increasing confidence in nuclear energy on the part of the public at large.

7. Poland approved the Agency's report for 1980, in particular those parts of it concerning the implementation of the safeguards system, which confirmed the effectiveness of the key provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

8. There had been a significant increase in Agency outlay on technical assistance in 1981, and a further increase was planned for 1982. Commensurate with its possibilities, Poland was contributing to the Technical Assistance Fund. It shared the view of those delegations which supported the concept of voluntary contributions to the Fund and of payments in national currencies. His country's contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund for 1982 would not be smaller than that for the current year.

9. It was gratifying to see that the draft budget for 1982 envisaged zero real growth, and it was hoped that a similar approach would be pursued in the future as well. The proposed budget and the Agency's programme for 1982 were fully supported by the Polish delegation.

10. Mr. BARREDA DELGADO (Peru) said that in the course of the past year Peru had continued to implement its national nuclear energy plan, which was basically aimed at setting up the Nuclear Research Centre. Advances had been made in the construction of the relevant facilities in Peru itself, while the components and equipment were in process of manufacture in Argentina and the fuel elements were being fabricated in the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, aerial survey of prospective uranium-bearing regions of the country had been continued and potential reserves of the order of 5000 tonnes were theoretically envisaged.

11. Generally speaking, the development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes involved a symmetric relationship between two sharply defined groups of countries - first, those engaged in supplying or exporting nuclear materials, equipment and technology and, second, the recipient or importing countries.

12. Neither group had the exclusive right to resolve the nuclear dilemma of peaceful co-operation and horizontal non-proliferation in its own favour, far less to determine or prejudice the interests of the other. The crisis that marked international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the present day and age was not so much a matter of supply or of inadequate resources, but rather a loss of confidence that had shaken the very foundations of such co-operation. The principle of reciprocity in the supplier-importer relationship had gradually been replaced by a less democratic and unethical system securing greater rights and fewer obligations for the more developed nuclear countries.

13. Horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be prevented by a reduction in the number of nuclear products on sale, nor by the imposition of additional obligations on importing countries, but rather by strengthening regional security and adopting consistent policies in the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.

14. No policy of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy could be based on extreme notions, as such would inevitably lead to a confrontation and to clandestine attempts to make the bomb. The international community would have to foster the creation of a stable and balanced international nuclear order that would make nuclear energy an instrument of peace in the service of humanity.

15. As a full member of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a signatory of an Agency safeguards agreement applicable to all its nuclear materials and facilities, Peru was morally in a position to warn against the tendency to favour extreme positions, and urged the international community to help dispel the present climate of distrust by taking action to reduce uncertainties in supply and the risk of technological dependence. To avoid clandestine horizontal proliferation there had to be a renewal of trust and initiation of a downward trend in vertical proliferation, which was closely connected with it.

16. Although it was largely up to the supplying and importing countries themselves to restore the lost confidence, a great deal of the multilateral effort could also be channelled through the Agency. In that connection it was essential for the Agency to seek to achieve a balance between technical assistance and safeguards and to place greater emphasis on the verification and control of supplies and on the adoption of additional measures in the area of physical protection.

17. The Agency was not solely a policing organization, but one which promoted nuclear co-operation for peaceful purposes. The application of safeguards was admittedly one of its main tasks, but not one to be carried out at the expense of technical assistance. The more advanced nuclear countries, however, appeared not to wish to see the Agency play the part devolving upon it in peaceful nuclear co-operation.

18. The Agency's fundamental purpose was to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, without any resultant horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; hence his delegation viewed with great concern the military attack that had been made by Israel on Iraq's nuclear facilities. Apart from endangering peace and security in the Middle East, the unjustified attack had cast doubt on the effectiveness of the safeguards system. The passing on by a former safeguards inspector of information obtained in the course of his duties as an international civil servant was equally a cause for concern; it called into question the Agency's credibility and diverted attention to safeguards, which were already receiving excessive funds from the Regular Budget. Lastly, all attempts by supplier countries to impose restrictive conditions on nuclear commerce, together with a number of ambiguities in some of the importing countries, were prejudicial to the Agency and encouraged the notion of clandestine horizontal proliferation.

19. A dialogue based on good will and a genuine desire for agreement would help to solve the problem of distrust which divided those interested in the development of nuclear energy. The present political and economic situation in the world made it advisable to establish, on an urgent basis, a new international order that included the field of peaceful nuclear co-operation. The task of building a just world, to which the developing countries were committed, was in no way alien to the Agency, which was called upon to become a tool for exchange aimed at achieving greater democracy, greater efficiency and greater solidarity.

20. Mr. ALI SKALLI (Morocco) remarked that it was impossible for the consumption of energy to continue in such an exponential manner without seriously affecting world economic growth and without hindering, in particular, the efforts of the developing countries to raise the standard of living of their populations.

21. In the statement which he had made at the recent energy conference in Nairobi, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had stressed the close relationship between energy and certain aspects of the present international crisis. The Secretary-General's statement faithfully reflected the feelings of anxiety manifested by the international community in the face of the world-wide exhaustion of fossil sources of energy.

22. Another factor giving grounds for anxiety was the ever increasing poverty of numerous third-world countries. The scant results obtained from the numerous North-South meetings and from the extensive negotiations between rich and poor countries scarcely encouraged optimism.

23. That being so, the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was acquiring quite particular importance. The Moroccan delegation was happy to note the importance of the Agency's work in furthering that utilization, particularly by the provision of technical assistance. The Agency also had a vital responsibility in the matter of strengthening the non-proliferation regime and guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the right to which was explicitly enshrined in Article IV of NPT, had become an urgent necessity for the developing countries, whose present consumption of energy was only one tenth of that of the advanced States in spite of their having a much larger total population.

24. Since the developing countries did not dispose of adequate fossil energy resources, the adoption of nuclear power appeared the most appropriate solution for meeting the crisis with which they were faced.

25. In that connection his delegation was pleased to note the increase in the funds made available for technical assistance activities in 1980 as compared with 1979, and he also wished to take the opportunity to thank UNDP for having substantially increased the funds which it allocated to the Agency for technical assistance activities and the organization of training courses. He hoped that Member States, particularly the industrialized countries, would continue to make the maximum possible contribution to voluntary technical assistance funds. That would be the best possible solution pending a decision, which his delegation believed was called for, to integrate technical assistance activities in the Agency's Regular Budget.

26. Still within the context of assistance, the safeguards system set up to prevent nuclear energy from being diverted from peaceful to military uses should be strictly implemented. That system, under which non-nuclear-weapon States were called upon to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency, should of course embrace all the nuclear activities of those States. His delegation was gratified that a large number of countries had already concluded such agreements with the Agency.

27. He now wished to turn to an event whose seriousness and outrageous character had already been universally condemned, namely the attack by Israeli aircraft on the Iraqi nuclear research centre. His Government again denounced that criminal assault, which reflected the efforts of Israel to prevent a State from exercising its sovereign right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. By acceding to NPT and accepting Agency safeguards, Iraq had given proof of its wish to use nuclear energy strictly for peaceful purposes and thus to obey the rules governing international co-operation in that sphere. His delegation was pleased to see that an item on the Conference agenda was devoted to the matter in question, a criminal act which should not go unpunished.

28. As regards non-proliferation, his Government had already had occasion to signify its anxiety on the subject following the Second NPT Review Conference at Geneva. Its apprehensions had been enhanced by the absence of agreement, at the Review Conference, on the text of a final act. At all events Morocco believed that it was essential to bring about genuine non-proliferation founded on the following points:

- (1) Vertical non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- (2) The complete security of non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT; and
- (3) Urgent, concrete and specific assistance to those States in their efforts for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

It was sad to observe that eleven years after the entry into force of NPT nuclear tests were still going on and that the nuclear arms race continued unabated.

29. It was vital for non-nuclear-weapon States to receive from the nuclear Powers the security guarantees necessary for the preservation of their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. In that connection his delegation was pleased to learn of the establishment of a working group under the Committee on Disarmament for the purpose of making effective international arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. His delegation likewise firmly upheld the principle of establishing denuclearized zones. The application of that principle would represent an important step on the road to disarmament, though the United Nations resolution on the denuclearization of Africa would be ineffective as long as the racist Government of South Africa refused to submit its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards.

30. Morocco's rising energy requirements had induced its Government to adopt a policy for the rapid and intensive mobilization of the national energy potential. That policy embraced all forms of energy from fossil, through nuclear, to solar, biomass and wind power.

31. At the present time the country's largest energy resource lay in its oil shales. It had therefore been decided to launch an energy programme based on the burning of oil shales and involving the construction of a 1000-MW power station consisting of four 250-MW units. Construction of the first unit would be started at the end of 1981, and it was expected that it would be commissioned in 1985.

32. Turning to uranium resources, Morocco was paying particular attention to prospecting for and mining uranium, and the field prospecting work which had so far been carried out had revealed promising areas in the region of Marrakesh and elsewhere.

33. Regarding the extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid, a decision had been taken to construct a first extraction unit, which would go into operation in 1984 with a production of 280 tonnes of uranium oxide per year. The programme would be implemented in association with the construction of phosphoric acid production units. Towards the year 2000 uranium oxide production was expected to reach about 2000 tonnes per year. Morocco, whose phosphoric acid installations were among the largest in the world, would thus be among the world's major producers of uranium on the basis of phosphates.

34. Morocco had also developed a nuclear power programme for meeting base-load demand. The first nuclear plant, of 600 MW, might become operational towards 1993, and by the year 2000 four units of 600 MW each might have come into service. To sum up, his country was aiming at using all new and renewable forms of energy, but it nevertheless appeared that at the present time nuclear power was the most suitable form of energy for meeting the country's long-term energy requirements.

35. That being so his Government regarded the Agency's technical assistance as valuable and indeed indispensable. Provision of that assistance had already started, and he accordingly wished to express his satisfaction and gratitude to the Agency.

36. Finally, the Moroccan delegation hoped that the proposal to make Arabic an official and working language of the Conference would be favourably received.

37. Mr. KOLYCHAN (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the 1970s had represented an important stage on the path of increasing co-operation between States with different social systems and a period of positive achievements in international relations and the strengthening of peace and security. Unfortunately, however, the world had recently seen a worsening of the international situation and serious obstacles had arisen in the path of détente.

38. At the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev had suggested that scientists throughout the world should set up an international committee which would bear witness to the vital need for preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Everybody at the present session of the General Conference concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy should join forces in an attempt to avoid the danger of nuclear war.

39. An important factor in the preservation of peace was the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The Agency should act resolutely against any attempt to destroy that regime - and such attempts were being made by States such as the Republic of South Africa and Israel. By its attack on the Iraqi nuclear centre, intended for the peaceful use of atomic energy, Israel had shown its complete disregard both for the authority of the Agency and for its safeguards system. The Byelorussian delegation strongly condemned that act of premeditated and unjustified aggression against a sovereign State since it contravened all the norms of international law and the statutes of the United Nations and the Agency.

40. The role of nuclear energy in economic and social development was increasing. Under those conditions, international scientific and technical co-operation was becoming more and more important, especially for the developing countries. Such co-operation depended to a large extent on the Agency and could not successfully be developed without the Agency's participation. Byelorussia therefore had supported and would continue to support the Agency's scientific and technical programme, which was directed towards the peaceful uses of the achievements of nuclear science and technology.

41. The Byelorussian delegation highly appreciated the Agency's work on safeguards. The manpower situation had improved and new equipment and new methods were being introduced. Despite the increase in the number of facilities and the amount of fissile material subject to safeguards, the Agency was dealing efficiently with its task. It was important to ensure observance of the principle that safeguards should be applied to all nuclear activities in recipient countries. Also, physical protection measures should be an essential condition for the export of nuclear materials.

42. The improvements made in the mechanisms for granting and implementing technical assistance and the increase achieved in effectiveness were to be welcomed. Over the past two years there had been a real tendency for the number of "old" projects to decrease. The introduction of forward planning and the idea of multi-year projects had made it possible to link a number of Agency scientific and technical programmes with large-scale UNDP activities and had facilitated the use of non-convertible currencies. The Secretariat's work on post-project evaluation should also bring positive results.

43. The Byelorussian delegation attached great importance to Agency programmes for helping developing countries to build up their own nuclear infrastructure. It had been empowered by the Government of the Republic to announce an increase in its voluntary contribution from 40 000 roubles for 1981 to 50 000 roubles for 1982.

44. Out of the overall 10.5% increase in the Agency's draft budget for 1982, it was to be noted that the actual programme increase was only 1.2%, the rest being the result of inflation. The Secretariat and the Board of Governors were to be commended on the work they had done in producing a balanced budget and finding ways of introducing savings.

45. The Agency's programmes on nuclear power, nuclear safety and safeguards were the most important and ought to be accorded the highest priority. For the majority of Member States and for the world economy as a whole, it was very important to develop the nuclear power programme since in the future nuclear power would supply the basic needs for electricity and thermal energy. In that connection it was important to note that the Secretariat and the Director General had laid great emphasis on the economic and safety aspects of nuclear power.

46. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, together with its socialist neighbours, attached particular importance to the development of fast reactors. It was continuing its research and design work on the 300-MW industrial prototype BRIG-300 power station - a single-loop plant with a gas-liquid cycle and a fast gas-cooled reactor using N_2O_4 as the coolant and working medium. The simplicity of the design and the unique thermophysical properties of the coolant should ensure high efficiency. Operating tests had been carried out on almost all the technological features of the design.

47. In Minsk, preparatory work was being done on the construction of a power station with two WWER-1000 reactors for the production of electricity and of heat for district heating. Such developments could be of value to many Member States.

48. The Agency's programme on nuclear safety and protection of the environment was comprehensive and well planned. Support should also be given to Agency activities related to the International Nuclear Information System (INIS), in which Byelorussian institutes were taking an active part. Work in the Republic was being carried out on the production of evaluated nuclear data files and the development of new theoretical methods for evaluating nuclear constants.

49. In addition to work on nuclear power, Byelorussian institutes were carrying out fundamental research, and wide practical use was being made of ionizing radiation in various branches of the national economy. Special emphasis was being given to radiation sterilization for the production of bacterial fertilizers, the use of radiation in the production of new structural and semiconductor materials and in industrial chemistry processes, the irradiation of agricultural products and the use of radiation techniques in medicine. Fundamental nuclear physics research was being carried out and studies being made of radiation effects on important materials used in the electronics and optics industries. Work was being done on the production and properties of mutants of agriculturally important plants and the effects of radiation on animals and man.

50. The Agency's most important role remained that of seeking "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" and of making every possible effort to ensure that the practical development of atomic energy did not involve the spread of existing types of nuclear weapon or the production of new, more barbaric types such as neutron devices.

51. Mr. KORHONEN (Finland), recalling that the world's nuclear generating capacity was not increasing at the same pace as growing energy needs, said that that was due to a variety of uncertainties about safety, non-proliferation and public acceptance. A great deal of serious work was required in order to resolve those uncertainties.

52. The Stockholm Conference on Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues had furnished strong evidence that contemporary power reactor technology was well established and made it possible to construct nuclear power plants without unacceptable risks. As far as the nuclear fuel cycle as a whole was concerned, there were still problems to be solved, especially at the back-end of the cycle, but none of them were unsurmountable.

53. Nuclear energy had accounted for 17.2% of Finland's electricity generation in 1980. He mentioned that because, for some reason, Finland's position as one of the leading nuclear power producers had not been recorded in paragraph 69(a) of the annual report. At the end of 1980 two additional nuclear units had been commissioned, and it was expected that the share of nuclear energy generation in Finland would attain one third of the total during the current year.

54. Finland welcomed the success of Agency safeguards activities during the past year. Several new States had acceded to NPT and several new safeguards agreements had been concluded. At the same time it was regrettable that the number of unsafeguarded facilities capable of producing weapon-grade nuclear material had not diminished and that the amount of unsafeguarded nuclear material was thus constantly increasing.

55. It was essential in that context to draw attention to the serious implications of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre. The attack represented a new form of international violence, having been perpetrated against a State party to NPT and a facility under Agency safeguards. In addition, it had been committed by a State which itself had not acceded to NPT and which possessed non-safeguarded nuclear facilities.

56. His delegation supported the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 12 June 1981, strongly condemning the Israeli attack, and also the resolution in similar vein unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 19 June. The spirit of mutual confidence on which the international non-proliferation regime had so far been based must be maintained.

57. The incident constituted a reminder of the Agency's duty to strengthen and develop the present safeguards system and to extend its scope. In his Government's view all nuclear material associated with all pertinent nuclear activities should be submitted to Agency safeguards. The safeguards system should be adapted to cover all uses of nuclear material and should permit efficient implementation of safeguards in any type of facility. Finland was prepared to support substantial increases in the safeguards budget if that proved necessary. In that connection, his delegation noted with satisfaction that the negotiations for a joint study to develop new methods for routine inspection of spent fuel assemblies were proceeding well between the Secretariat of the Agency and the Finnish Institute of Radiation Protection.

58. As had been often pointed out, the principal aspect of the non-proliferation problem was not technical but political. It was vital for the future of the international non-proliferation regime that those countries which accepted stringent non-proliferation conditions should in return get adequate supplies and services on a preferential basis and should not be put in a less advantageous position than countries which accepted no non-proliferation obligations or were even working on a nuclear explosive device.

59. That was one reason why Finland considered the Committee on Assurances of Supply to be a most useful forum for discussions and negotiations. It was his delegation's hope that the pragmatic approach which had characterized the work of the Committee would prevail in future also.

60. The Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage was doing valuable work, and it was expected that the establishment of an international storage system would make the rights of prior consent now required in bilateral agreements unnecessary in certain cases or would at least unify the practice of their application.

61. Finland was gratified to see the rapid increase in the funds available for technical assistance, which was one of the three principal objectives of the Agency. The Government of Finland was also ready to accept a substantial increase in the target for voluntary contributions. Following its past practice the Government intended in 1982 to provide substantial funds over and above its share of the target for the purpose of financing certain Agency technical assistance projects. Finland was also offering to place the services of a highly qualified expert, the head of the country's nuclear safety authority, at the Agency's disposal for one year on a cost-free basis. As far as the general

trend of technical assistance was concerned, he believed that the emphasis should be on safety, training and the development of infrastructure.

62. He had already referred to some aspects of nuclear safety, which was the third principal objective of the Agency. The Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in connection with Radiation Accidents, concluded in the early 1960s between the Nordic countries and the Agency, was a precedent in its field and facilitated appropriate action in a situation which one hoped would never arise. The Common Nordic Guidelines, approved in 1976 and concerning the establishment of nuclear power plants in frontier areas, were worthy of note.

63. Although the Agency had put growing emphasis on safety matters, Finland still felt that safety-oriented activities were suffering from some shortage of staff. That had led to slow implementation of certain technical assistance projects in that field.

64. Certain problems tended to concentrate at the back-end of the fuel cycle in connection with spent nuclear fuel and high-level wastes. The present situation was not satisfactory, and practically all countries, even with very small nuclear power programmes, had to rely on their own storage and disposal facilities. In that area the Agency should demonstrate the technical and economic benefits of centralized management of spent fuel.

65. Finally, his delegation welcomed the proposal for an international convention on nuclear safety co-operation and mutual emergency assistance in connection with nuclear accidents. A convention in that field would represent a most helpful instrument, not least for solving public acceptance problems.

66. The Conference was meeting at a time which was marked by growing international tension and increased mistrust between nations. The efforts to halt the arms race have proved unsuccessful, and stockpiling of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, was going on apace. He thought it appropriate on the present occasion to recall the basic objective of the Agency, which was to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The Agency had rendered great services to peace. Those services would be demanded in future also and might in future be even more vital for mankind than they were at present. It was therefore the duty of every Member State to do what it could to preserve and strengthen the credibility, working capacity and prestige of the Agency.

67. Mr. AUWAERTER (Liechtenstein) said he believed that the standard of living and the economy of countries without sufficient energy sources were in danger and that only atomic energy – which was clean, economical and relatively safe – could help make up the deficit. A country like Liechtenstein was particularly well placed to appreciate that. Only co-operation with Switzerland and its far-sighted energy policy guaranteed the existence of the highly developed industry of Liechtenstein.

68. As in other economic fields, only experts could judge the complexities of the relationship between technology and pure scientific knowledge. The great good fortune of the Agency had lain in Dr. Eklund's deep understanding of those complexities. Of particular importance had been the conclusion, under his leadership, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which probably represented the only possibility of preventing the abuse of nuclear energy.

69. The twelve months which had elapsed since the twenty-fourth session of the General Conference had seen an ever-increasing politicization of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That meant that one of the Agency's most important tasks in the immediate future was to see that the public was better informed. For the lay person, a differentiation between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy was often difficult to make; one heard again and again from certain of the media that an expansion of the military use of nuclear energy would follow on the heels of the construction of a nuclear power plant.

70. However, it would only be possible to clear up those misconceptions when the explanation was presented in a language that the hearer could understand. He thought that the Agency should form a committee capable of doing that. The languages of scientists and technologists were not those of the general public, and a "translation" that did not create even more distrust, such as might result from any incomprehensible statement, was urgently needed.

71. Convinced that the Agency would be able to solve the problems and fulfil the diversity of tasks put before it in the new working year, his Government wished to extend its thanks to the Board of Governors and to the Secretariat for the work they had accomplished in the working year just drawing to a close.

72. Mr. BRENNAN (Ireland) said that events over the past few years had not been auspicious either for the steady growth of nuclear power or for non-proliferation, the twin objectives of the Agency. In the first place, in the mid-seventies, nuclear power programmes in a number of nuclear-oriented countries had begun to falter on account of the recession, the high cost of capital, and public opposition. Sharp rises in oil prices have done little to reverse that trend.

73. Secondly, in 1980 there had been a further setback with the failure of the Second NPT Review Conference to reach agreed conclusions.

74. Since the previous session of the General Conference the widespread concern felt with regard to nuclear weaponry had been heightened by decisions to acquire new and horrifying weapons systems that threatened the world's collective future. The Agency had been playing its part in containing horizontal proliferation, but vertical proliferation had gone unchecked. Nuclear-weapon States had a heavy responsibility to take urgent steps to halt that process.

75. A further cause for concern had been the bombing by Israel of Iraq's nuclear research facility. His delegation wished to reiterate its conviction, already expressed in the Security Council debate, that the Israeli attack had been misguided and would have far-reaching implications for the future conduct of other States. Apart from the loss of life and material damage caused by the raid, there was a possibility that it would deepen existing hostility; furthermore, the implications for world peace of a situation where one country felt itself free to attack another which it saw as a threat were clear. Such an approach would frustrate all the efforts made since the Second World War to base relations between States on universal principles and obligations and would lead to anarchy. There was a marked risk that the attack would weaken an international system designed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Israel's action represented a challenge of a fundamental kind to the safeguards system of the Agency, of which Israel was itself a Member, although it had refused to accept fully the Agency's system of safeguards.

76. His Government was gratified to note the Agency's progress in concluding safeguards agreements over the past year. In particular, there had been some movement towards bringing civil installations in certain nuclear-weapon States into the regime. That was to be welcomed as it would help to reduce long-existing inequalities. However, no safeguards regime could be absolutely foolproof when there were shortages of manpower and equipment. Among the practical expedients for improving Agency safeguards were provision of the most up-to-date containment and surveillance equipment, more frequent inspections and, if necessary, full-time on-site inspectors. But, ultimately, non-proliferation depended more on the reduction of international tensions and the creation of a peaceful international environment.

77. The work of the recently formed Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) would be of great help in providing agreed conditions of supply and also in strengthening the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. The Irish Government had an interest in multilateral solutions to the problems of nuclear industry and was anxious that the deliberations of CAS should produce tangible results.

78. Ireland had given considerable thought over the past few years to building a nuclear power station, but the international recession, resulting in a falling-off of demand growth, had led to a reduction in the country's energy estimates. The delay afforded by the recession could, however, be utilized to await the outcome of further developments in R&D programmes dealing, for example, with reactor safety, fuel reprocessing and waste disposal.

79. It was encouraging to note that the Stockholm conference on nuclear power station safety held in 1980 had concluded that there were no technical difficulties in the operation of nuclear power plants that were beyond solution. The options were limited by the problem, highlighted in the Agency's report, that the majority of nuclear stations were designed for units of 1000 MW and above. Such large units could not be readily accommodated within the grids

of smaller countries. The problem of scale modified the hopes held out in earlier years that nuclear facilities would provide abundant, cheap energy for the world's poorer countries.

80. Apart from the high capital expenditure involved in the construction of the power station itself, there were the costs of enrichment, reprocessing, and waste management and disposal. If nuclear energy was to be made accessible to smaller or poorer countries, it would be necessary to lighten the burden by providing regional or multinational reprocessing and enrichment plants, in collaboration with the Agency. As part of its promotional and safeguards activities the Agency should be involved in developing regional fuel cycle centres and an international fuel bank. The report indicated progress in international plutonium storage and regional and multinational reprocessing, which was encouraging since they would have a considerable effect on the cost and attractiveness of nuclear power for a small country like Ireland.

81. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials had been concluded to deal with the problems of sub-national diversion. Ireland hoped to be able to ratify or sign the Convention in the not too distant future.

82. The question of the siting of nuclear facilities close to frontiers, which had been raised by the Government of Austria, was of real interest to Ireland, since the country lay in close proximity to nuclear States. Also, the question of the sea dumping of low-level radioactive waste was a matter of extensive public interest, and the Agency was to be commended for the guidelines used in the Nuclear Energy Agency surveillance system; they should be kept under constant review and strengthened where necessary.

83. The provision of technical assistance was one of the two fundamental activities of the Agency, and he welcomed the steady growth of the Agency's technical assistance programme. He was also pleased to announce a pledge of \$25 600 for the Agency's technical assistance programme. Despite all the difficulties experienced in the past year by the Agency, the Irish Government continued to have full confidence in the Agency, its staff and its safeguards regime.

84. MR. AMBIA (Malaysia) said that, in an effort to improve the quality of life through science and technology, Malaysia had embarked upon a programme of nuclear development. The immediate policy objectives were to apply the benefits of nuclear techniques in medicine, agriculture and industry. It was recognized in so doing that success could only be assured through mutually beneficial co-operation with Member States engaged in similar fields.

85. Although Malaysia's present nuclear science programme was only a small step forward, it had nevertheless encountered difficulties that were a reflection of the shortcomings of the prevailing approach to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

86. The reluctance to facilitate a smoother transfer of nuclear technology appeared to stem from an obsessive fear of possible abuse of such technology for nuclear proliferation. That fear had pervaded the Agency and influenced its programme structure. The Agency tended to engage more in regulatory than promotional activities - a tendency which, if not remedied, could only prejudice its long-term interests and jeopardise its credibility. Hence the Agency's future programmes would need to reflect a more balanced division between the regulatory and promotional activities, as enshrined in its Statute.

87. The supplier countries had established very stringent conditions for the export of nuclear equipment, technology and material. Such developments were not conducive to the free flow of nuclear technology and the implementation of nuclear energy programmes in developing countries. At the same time, Malaysia was aware of the legitimate fears of the real dangers of nuclear proliferation. It was also a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and firmly supported its safeguards provisions. However, restraining the free flow of nuclear technology beyond the requirements of the Agency's safeguards objectives and conditions in the name of non-proliferation appeared unnecessarily restrictive.

88. The unwarranted attack by Israel on the Iraqi nuclear research centre, a facility under safeguards, had serious implications for the Agency. It had been a flagrant violation of international law and all norms of international behaviour. Furthermore, it constituted an attack on the Agency's safeguards system, which had been accepted internationally as the foundation of NPT. His delegation strongly condemned the Israeli military attack.

89. With regard to the disposal of low-level radioactive waste through sea dumping, Malaysia felt strongly that such a method of disposal should not be allowed to create adverse effects on the environment and should accord with internationally agreed procedures, the dumping being carried out under supervision.

90. It was clear that energy was vital for the socio-economic development of all countries and that nuclear energy was the only alternative energy source immediately available for power generation. International consensus on the question of assurances of supply, consistent with the requirements of non-proliferation, was therefore vital. The progress made in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and in preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, scheduled to take place in 1983, was promising. His Government attached great importance to both sets of deliberations and hoped that they would contribute to the development of a nuclear energy order meeting the needs of all concerned.

91. The advanced countries were in possession of a vast amount of nuclear technology in comparison with the developing countries. It was therefore encouraging that certain delegates from the advanced countries had emphasized the need to share the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Yet there still existed a gap between policy and implementation, or rather between declarations of intent and their translation into concrete action.

92. There was consequently a need for greater and speedier transfer of technology to the developing countries in order for them to meet their energy requirements and for a policy of less dependence on conventional sources of energy. It was hoped that some action in the form of a concrete resolution would be taken during the present Conference session.

93. It would be naive to assume that the advanced countries would render such services without considering their own interests. In the present-day inter-dependent world, however, it was in the interest of all countries that the less-developed countries should be assisted in their development. After all, the greater the success achieved in the economic growth of the developing countries, the more they would be able to contribute to the economic well-being of the industrialized countries through their increased purchasing power.

94. With regard to the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Agency's Statute, it was important that a solution for that issue be found without further delay. It was generally recognized that there were valid grounds for the amendment in order to achieve more equitable geographical representation on the Board. It was in the interest of the Agency that the imbalance in the representation of the various regions be redressed. Furthermore, the staffing structure of the Agency, particularly at the senior levels, had remained basically unchanged and did not reflect the composition of the Agency's membership, which had radically changed in the last 25 years. Serious efforts should be made to remedy that situation.

95. As far as the financing of technical assistance was concerned, the problem had to be solved in such a way that the funding of technical assistance would facilitate efficient planning of programmes over a period of time. The real need was to arrive at an agreement for obtaining the funds on an assured and predictable basis. Any decision leading to the funding of the Technical Assistance Fund on such a basis was to be welcomed.

96. In that connection, the Government of Malaysia would continue to attach importance to programmes related to the use of nuclear techniques in agricultural, medical and industrial applications. The co-operation programmes developed on the RCA model had been singularly successful, and Malaysia was keen to participate in projects under UNDP programmes. His delegation wished to express satisfaction with regard to the progress of the NUSS programme; increased emphasis should now be given to promoting the acceptance and use of NUSS documents through intensive missions, training courses and seminars.

97. In conclusion, he wished to thank the Agency for its assistance and co-operation in the development of Malaysia's infrastructure for nuclear science and technology and to express gratitude to the Governments of Australia, Japan, the United States, Pakistan, India, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, among others, for providing technical assistance and training facilities on a bilateral basis for Malaysia's nuclear development programme. Malaysia would continue to contribute to the Technical Assistance Fund, with a contribution of US \$14 400 for 1982.

98. Mr. ROSENZWEIG-DÍAZ (Mexico) said he wished to start by commending Sigvard Eklund for the great skill with which he had guided the affairs of the Agency during his years of service as Director General and by warmly welcoming Zimbabwe as a new Member of the Agency.

99. At a meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 September he had had the satisfaction of voting in favour of the resolution set out in document GOV/2054, by which South Africa had been excluded from the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). Mexico's attitude on that issue was based, of course, on its categorical rejection of racial segregation as an inhuman practice, but also on certain legal and technical considerations. While it was undoubtedly true that the régime in Pretoria was an important supplier of uranium, it owed that status to the extraction of ore from a territory which it was occupying illegally, a territory for which the United Nations had direct responsibility. If it had allowed South Africa to continue its participation in CAS, the Board would in effect have been sanctioning the actions of a United Nations Member State against the United Nations, and the theft of resources belonging to the people of Namibia.

100. It was unfortunate that, eleven years after the entry into force of NPT, the Treaty should have failed to halt the arms race and to prevent the use of nuclear energy for military purposes by certain industrialized countries. In that connection he wished to state that the Government of Mexico was resolutely opposed to the development of the neutron bomb.

101. Mexico had unequivocally condemned Israel's military attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre, which had damaged the installations and also resulted in a loss of human life. That action, apart from posing a threat to the security and peace of the region, had demonstrated a clear disregard for the Agency's safeguards system and NPT, and could seriously prejudice progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

102. In that connection, the delegation of Mexico wished to stress the inalienable right of all Member States of the Agency - a right laid down in Article II of the Statute and in Article IV of NPT - to pursue the peaceful uses of atomic

energy as a means of promoting their scientific, economic and technological development and the obligation of all Members of the United Nations - laid down in Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter- to refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

103. The Mexican energy programme published in the course of 1981 specified the goals of electricity generation for the last decade of the century. Under that programme, nuclear power was to contribute 2500 MW in 1990 and 20 000 MW in the year 2000; in other words, the percentage of electric power generated by nuclear reactors was to rise to about 20% by the end of the century.

104. However, the feasibility of Mexico's programme would depend in large degree on the economic and political state of the nuclear market in the years to come; the country was not bent on developing its nuclear infrastructure whatever the cost. Characteristic of Mexico's nuclear programme as a whole was a determination to retain autonomy in decision-making and to accentuate technological independence. The respect which potential supplier countries showed for that position of principle would be a determining factor in the selection of new reactors for the coming decade.

105. The developing countries had not yet seen any compensation for their unilateral and voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons, and many of them - observing that States not party to NPT had succeeded in gaining broad access to nuclear technology - were beginning to wonder whether the Treaty had not become an obstacle rather than a help where the civilian uses of nuclear energy were concerned. Mexico maintained that non-proliferation concerns must not be used as a pretext to prevent States from acquiring and developing nuclear technology or to impose on them conditions incompatible with sovereignty and independence.

106. During the past six years there had been no report of diversions, abuses or anomalies in the nuclear activities subject to Agency safeguards. But, despite the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT had scrupulously met their obligations under the Treaty, some nuclear exporters had unilaterally imposed restrictive measures which went beyond the safeguards required by NPT, on the pretext of wishing to prevent horizontal proliferation. Such

unilateral measures had given rise to serious problems between countries and in some cases had caused delays and additional costs. Consequently, Mexico was keenly interested in the work of CAS and hoped that it really would facilitate negotiations which would enable the country's nuclear requirements, including its need for fuel cycle services, to be satisfied. It was clearly important for CAS to find mechanisms by which supplies could be assured in a climate of confidence and harmony between supplier and consumer countries.

107. The Agency should be an efficient vehicle for international co-operation, but at present a number of problems were causing the developing countries serious concern; if they were not solved, the mission of the Agency might be seriously threatened. They were: the appointment of the Director General, adequate representation of developing countries in the Secretariat, the question of financing technical assistance, and a revised composition of the Board of Governors (Article VI).

108. It was most unfortunate that the Board had not attained enough convergence of views to agree on the appointment of a new Director General. His delegation felt that the Board should redouble its efforts in order to find a satisfactory solution to that problem in the near future.

109. With regard to the representation of developing countries in the Secretariat, his delegation wanted to point out that those countries could offer highly qualified personnel for both administrative and technical posts at the professional level.

110. Nevertheless, in August 1981 only one out of five Deputy Directors General had been from a developing country; of 22 Directors, only five had been from developing countries; and of 115 posts at the P-5 level, only 17 had been occupied by nationals of those States. That problem clearly needed to be dealt with as soon as possible.

111. As to the financing of technical assistance, the real criterion of growth should not be a comparison with figures from previous years but rather the actual requirements of Member States and the availability of funds. On that basis the growth of technical assistance was certainly inadequate. Nevertheless, if technical assistance targets in the past had in fact been fully met, it would have been possible to satisfy all the technically sound requests of Member States.

112. Finally, with regard to Article VI, his delegation believed that a reasonable and equitable increase in the size of the Board was long overdue and would not impair the Board's efficiency. The Board should give its attention to that problem again in the very near future.

The meeting rose at 11 p.m.