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President: Mr. XUTO (Thailand)

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980 (GC(XXV)/642, 642/Corr.1, 642/Corr.2) (continued)

1. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland) said that the events of the 1970s had clearly demonstrated the interdependences which existed at the international level and the national requirements which resulted from them. Only by seeking an international nuclear policy which integrated the various national policies would it be possible to remove the barriers raised by public opinion and to accord nuclear energy its proper role in the world energy scene. In the realization of that objective, the Agency and its Member States had complementary responsibilities.

2. The Swiss delegation wished to underline the importance of the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; it firmly believed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the main instrument by which that principle would be upheld. The best method of achieving the universal acceptance of NPT was to make it more attractive by putting into effect all its provisions. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study had shown that a nuclear power programme would not be the simplest or easiest way of obtaining weapons-grade explosive material. No combination of measures for preventing possible abuses in a civil programme could be considered an adequate alternative for political action aimed at eliminating possible incentives for the production of nuclear weapons and at promoting international co-operation for peaceful purposes. It was essential therefore to recognize that political efforts should henceforward have priority. In carrying out the tasks entrusted to it in connection with non-proliferation, the Agency, which depended on the co-operation of all its Member States, merited their implicit confidence. In that context, the Swiss delegation condemned the military attack carried out by one Member State against the nuclear facilities of another. It was from now on a question of supplementing the technical activities of the Agency by political measures or options on the part of Member States.

3. With regard to technical co-operation, the Swiss delegation gave its full approval to the Director General's proposal to discontinue use of the term "technical assistance" and saw the change as confirmation of the importance and meaning of that essential activity. In that connection, it was encouraging to see that, whereas the real increase in the Regular Budget was temporarily close to zero, the voluntary contributions for technical co-operation were at present undergoing substantial real growth and a reliable and predictable system of financing should be found in order to permit multi-year planning. With regard to nuclear power plants in developing countries, he was aware that the voluntary budget for technical co-operation could do no more than help in the preparation of isolated projects in a limited number of Member States. To ensure complete financing, it was up to the Agency to request international financial institutions to give such projects the importance they deserved in their investment planning programmes.

4. As far as the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) was concerned, his delegation attached great importance to its work, the results of which should help to strike a dynamic balance between guarantees of non-proliferation and assurances of supply.

5. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Agency was approaching the completion of its work on the standardization of safety measures at nuclear power stations with the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme and that it was now actively involved in helping Member States to apply the relevant codes and guides. Also, it supported the studies undertaken on emergency measures at nuclear power stations and hoped that the results would soon appear in the form of mutual assistance procedures for Member States. Furthermore, it was looking forward to the completion of comparative studies by UNEP, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, UNSCEAR and WHO on the environmental and health aspects of different energy sources; the results might appreciably broaden the basis for judgement and decision available to the Governments of Member States and also the framework for public debate on global policy in the field of energy.

6. In the field of waste management, the Swiss delegation noted that it was now a matter of urgency to complete the safety evaluation and develop international regulations for the disposal of radioactive waste since public concern in regard to nuclear energy would only be significantly reduced when the feasibility of all the operations involved in the conditioning and disposal of high-level waste had been demonstrated (perhaps by means of a specific geological disposal project) and it had been proved that the risk involved was negligible. The first Member State to achieve that goal would have rendered a significant service to the international community.

7. The Swiss Federal Government had recognized the need to build a new nuclear power station (1000 MW), which would be an addition to the five already existing and would go into service during the 1990s. The choice of a site for the new power station would have to be made soon.

8. The Swiss delegation had noted with great interest the remark by the Director General to the effect that, given equal professional qualifications and experience, preference was given in the recruitment of staff for the Secretariat to nationals from developing countries.

9. He wished to stress once again that the establishment of a universally accepted non-proliferation regime would require a continuous dialogue between both North and South and East and West and that such a dialogue was only possible on the basis of mutual concessions.

10. Mr. COLOMBO (Italy) noted the conclusion of the Nairobi Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy that nuclear energy was the main source which could be relied on to fill the gap between demand and supply under stable and safe economic and political conditions. INFCE had stressed that it was necessary to develop international co-operation and to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy without underrating the importance of guarantees against the risk of proliferation. In that connection, Italy had frequently emphasized its unconditional support for the total enforcement of NPT; its fundamental aim was to promote international co-operation and the economic growth of all countries in order to ensure world-wide participation in the Treaty. The Italian delegation noted with satisfaction that the international community seemed to have acquired a better understanding of the necessity for full application of the Treaty and that the United States Government had recognized that an increase in bilateral and multilateral exchanges between developed and developing countries in connection with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was of vital importance. In that spirit, Italy would progressively strengthen its co-operation with developing countries which had acceded to NPT or otherwise accepted Agency safeguards.

11. Italy had always regarded safeguards activities with great interest and considered it important to make sustained efforts to improve them. It agreed in principle on the necessity for universal application on a non-discriminatory basis of full-scope safeguards for all importers of nuclear materials and technology. It wished to reaffirm its reservation regarding the principle of "prior consent", since it could have results quite the opposite of those intended. The fact that no diversion of nuclear material had occurred in 1980 had proved once again the effectiveness of the safeguards system and the validity of the Agency's role in that very sensitive area.

12. Italy had been deeply concerned at the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre and reiterated the strong condemnation already expressed by the Italian Government in various fora and particularly the Security Council. The co-operation between Italy and Iraq in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was perfectly legitimate and was being carried out with full respect for NPT, especially Article IV. Italy confirmed its intention of continuing its peaceful nuclear co-operation with Iraq. The Israeli attack clearly demonstrated disbelief in the Agency's ability to carry out its responsibilities effectively and represented an attack against safeguards. In order to restore the Agency's fundamental role to its full credibility, the international community, and the States parties to NPT in particular, should take initiatives to promote universal acceptance of the Agency's safeguards system and should firmly resist any attempt to the contrary.

13. Italy had a particularly strong interest in the Agency's activities, especially in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and the Expert Groups on International Plutonium Storage and Spent Fuel Management. It continued to give full support to the Trieste International Centre for Theoretical Physics, which it considered one of the Agency's most significant achievements. In that connection, the Italian delegation was pleased to announce that the difficulties over the payment of the Italian contribution had been resolved. The Italian Department for Development Co-operation had decided to finance in 1981 five important Agency projects for developing countries - essentially of a regional nature - and to partly finance four courses at the Trieste Centre. There would also be a significant increase in its voluntary contribution for 1982.

14. In 1980, the economic situation in Italy had seen the demand for electricity rise by 3.4% over the 1979 figure, representing a consumption of 41.6 million tonnes of oil equivalent. Out of the total amount, 29.2% had been accounted for by fossil fuels and 12.4% by hydroelectric, geothermal and nuclear energy. In view of the oil crisis, it was important for Italy to become less dependent on that source for its electricity production and to speed up the construction of

coal-fired and nuclear power stations. For that purpose, a national energy plan had been adopted and 15 regions had signed agreements with the National Electricity Company and the Atomic Energy Commission.

15. Italy was pleased with the progress achieved in its international co-operation in research and development relating to the application of nuclear power and was earnestly implementing the co-operation agreements that it had concluded with Brazil, China and Indonesia - agreements whose objective was fully consistent with the peaceful nuclear programmes of those countries.

16. In conclusion, he wished to pay tribute to Dr. Eklund, whose intelligence, managerial ability and diplomatic skill had earned him the admiration of Member States during his years of office.

17. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which had taken place in 1981, had confirmed that the guiding principle in the foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government had been and would remain the struggle to reduce the threat of war and restrain the arms race. Speaking at the Congress, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, had said: "The situation in the world today requires new and additional efforts to eliminate the threat of war and strengthen international security .... To maintain peace is now the most important task at the international level for our Party, our nation and indeed for all nations on this planet". In order to encourage the efforts being made in the name of peace and international security, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, in its appeal "to the parliaments and peoples of the world", had solemnly declared: "The Soviet Union threatens nobody and does not seek confrontation with any State in the West or the East. It has not achieved military superiority. It has not and will not initiate new turns in the arms race spiral. There is no form of weapon which it would not agree to limit or prohibit by mutual accord with other States." The Soviet Union was ready to undertake immediate talks on all outstanding international questions. That was of particular relevance at a time when certain militaristic circles were going to unprecedented lengths to pursue the arms race. They were refusing to undertake talks on controlling armaments, on eliminating centres of conflict and on finding solutions to difficult international problems. They were shamelessly

engaging in acts of open aggression and international gangsterism. The atmosphere of tension in the world was becoming more and more dangerous.

18. One of the manifestations of that attitude was the military attack by Israel against the Iraqi nuclear research centre on 7 June 1981. That attack by a State not party to NPT against a State which was party to the Treaty represented a crude attempt to destroy trust in the international non-proliferation regime, including the Agency's safeguards system. The actions of the aggressor had been condemned in resolutions adopted by the Agency's Board of Governors and the Security Council of the United Nations and also by the whole world community. The Soviet Union actively supported those resolutions and was in favour of their strict and immediate implementation.

19. It was a matter of the utmost importance in the international sphere to halt the nuclear arms race, relinquish the production of neutron bombs and erect a solid barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons. Huge stocks of those weapons with an immense destructive power had been built up in the world, and the nuclear arms race was creating a threat to the very existence of mankind. Guarantees of non-proliferation therefore constituted an important component in a system of measures for preventing nuclear war. The Soviet Union, for its part, had striven and would strive resolutely to end the nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. That intention had been officially re-emphasized during the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The main basis for the non-proliferation regime was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - a Treaty which for more than 10 years had formed a reliable barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons and a firm basis for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The task now was to seek in all possible ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. That end would be furthered by extending the number of countries party to the Treaty, mainly through the addition of States possessing the material and technological basis for manufacturing their own nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. There were still a number of States possessing a considerable nuclear potential which were not parties to the Treaty. By persistently refusing to accede to the Treaty and to accept the Agency's international safeguards on all their nuclear activities, those countries were causing justifiable concern to the world community.

20. The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime had also been promoted by the strict manner in which countries placing their nuclear facilities under international safeguards had observed their obligations and by the greater effectiveness of Agency controls. On the basis of experience already gained, it was quite clear that the Treaty, and the Agency's international safeguards system devolving from it, effectively served the interests of all countries of the world - both developed and developing, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The Agency was devoting considerable effort to increasing the effectiveness of international safeguards, constantly expanding and improving its activities in that sphere. However, it should be borne in mind that as the number of complex facilities under Agency safeguards increased - and that included facilities for which the Agency had not yet acquired sufficient experience in the application of safeguards - the matter of improving the effectiveness of safeguards assumed increasing importance and would become one of the Agency's top priorities. Particularly significant aspects of that were the early completion of the development of a whole range of safeguards methods and procedures for all types of nuclear facility, especially those at the "sensitive" stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, and further improvement in the basic equipment and techniques used in safeguards.

21. For its part, the Soviet Union was carrying out wide-scale research aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system. His country's technical support programme for the Agency had already been drawn up and was being put into effect by the leading scientific research organizations in the Soviet Union. His Government had earmarked more than one million roubles in national currency for the programme's implementation up to the end of 1982. His country was continuing to assist the Agency with the training of inspectors by organizing study tours, special courses and seminars for their benefit. One part of those activities in recent years had been the practice of training inspections at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant. In the previous year, a "school" had been arranged which had enabled a group of newly recruited inspectors to familiarize themselves with inspection methods at nuclear power plants using WWER-type reactors.

22. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which had been drawn up under the Agency's auspices, was an important contribution to averting the potential risk of the illegal seizure and use of nuclear material. Rapid entry into force of the Convention with the participation of a large number of countries would help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

23. An ever-growing number of countries were beginning to develop their own nuclear energy programmes. The Soviet delegation noted the significant contribution made by the Agency both to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in general and to the provision of technical assistance to developing countries in line with their national interests and needs. Each year, the voluntary contributions of Agency Member States to the Technical Assistance Fund were increasing. In accordance with the principles which it applied to technical assistance for developing Agency Member States, the Soviet Government had decided to raise its voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund to 1 400 000 roubles in national currency, an amount which exceeded the indicative figure calculated by the Secretariat. Those resources could be used by the Agency for the purchase in the USSR of equipment, instruments and facilities, including the reloading of radiation sources, for the acquisition in the USSR of small quantities of nuclear material for research purposes, fuel elements containing low-enriched uranium-235 for research reactors and, finally, for the organization of Agency training courses in the Soviet Union for the benefit of specialists from the developing countries. In addition to the sum already mentioned, the Soviet Union was allocating further resources for the organization of technical activities in connection with the training of nationals from the developing countries in the USSR. The Soviet Union was in favour of fixing the target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund for 1982 at $16 million. In giving its approval to that target its understanding was, of course, that the principle of a voluntary Technical Assistance Fund, using the national currencies of Member States, would remain unchanged. That principle had become well established through practice and had stood the test of time.

24. In the 27 years elapsed since the world's first nuclear power plant had come into operation, in the Soviet city of Obninsk, nuclear power had been transformed from an unconventional power source into an integral part of the world's energy balance with a total of more than 2000 years of reactor operating experience accumulated at the end of 1980. Great credit was undoubtedly due to the Agency in that regard. One of the Agency's major achievements was the successful operation for more than ten years of the International Nuclear Information System (INIS), through which an effective international exchange of

scientific and technical information on all aspects of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy was carried out and all the scientific and technical data gathered in the main by the developed countries were put at the disposal of the developing countries virtually free of charge. He also wished to draw attention to the substantial work the Agency was doing in the dissemination of information and exchange of experience on the reliability of nuclear power plant operation, on improvements in nuclear safety, and environmental protection. That useful work was being performed by the Department of Technical Operations within the framework of international working groups on basic aspects of nuclear power plant operation.

25. He was confident that the Agency would organize and conduct the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience in 1982 in an efficient manner and that it would participate actively in preparing and conducting the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development in 1983. That conference should play an important role in promoting such co-operation; it would succeed in doing so if the imperatives of strengthening the non-proliferation regime were consistently borne in mind when questions relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy were examined.

26. Increasing attention was being devoted to nuclear power as one of the ways of meeting the increasing demand from energy consumers. At the beginning of 1981, the installed nuclear power capacity of the USSR had exceeded 13 million kW(e), and in 1980 Soviet power plants had generated 73 000 million kWh. The V.I. Lenin nuclear power station in Leningrad was one of the largest operating in the world, consisting of four reactors, each of 1000 MW(e). The total capacity of the Novovoronezh nuclear power station was 2500 MW, and in the future the Soviet Union was intending to construct stations with a unit capacity of 4-8 million kW(e). It was planned to increase the installed nuclear power capacity to 24-25 million kW altogether, corresponding to an output of 220-225 000 million kWh in 1985. The Soviet Union was extensively engaged in the development of fast power reactors and was endeavouring to increase the rate at which plutonium was reprocessed and returned to the fuel cycle. The first full-scale nuclear plant for both electricity generation and the production of heat for industrial use and urban heating was operating successfully in the settlement of Bilibino in the

Chukotka region; further such plants would be constructed near Odessa, Khar'kov, Minsk, Volgograd and other towns. Large heat-producing power stations were being built in the towns of Gor'kij and Voronezh, and the first units were due to go into operation towards the end of the current five-year period.

27. The spread of nuclear power across the globe, the pace and scale of its development, the growth in unit capacity and the siting of power plants in densely populated areas posed a number of major problems which had previously attracted less interest from experts. Those problems included the safe operation of the power plants and fuel cycle facilities, together with their impact on the environment, the underground disposal of high-level wastes, and the problems of operating nuclear power plants in existing energy supply systems. All those problems were receiving the closest attention in the Soviet Union. In deciding on an accelerated nuclear power plant programme his Government had taken into account a number of important factors, including the safe operation of nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union over a period of almost thirty years, extensive research at national level into the reliability and safety of nuclear facilities, and the exceptionally favourable results of radiation monitoring of the environment outside operating nuclear power plants as well as monitoring of conditions within them.

28. In the context of power production great hopes were pinned on the quest for a solution to the problem of controlled nuclear fusion. The theoretical principles of the problem had been solved or were approaching a final solution and it had become possible to move on from pure scientific research to the practical design of thermonuclear reactors and to establish the foundations of fusion power. In 1978 the Soviet Union had put forward a proposal to design and build a demonstration Tokamak reactor on an international basis. That proposal had received the support of the International Fusion Research Council (IFRC), the Agency and its Director General. An international group of scientists and experts from the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan and Europe had drawn up a conceptual design for the International Tokamak Reactor (INTOR) in a short time, and in August 1981 that design had been approved by the IFRC and published. It was expected that by the beginning of 1983 recommendations would be ready for the transition to the technical and detailed design phases. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the organizational and legal principles to govern the project should also have been worked out by

that time. The Soviet Union was convinced, now as in the past, that through the co-operation of scientists from different countries under the INTOR project it would be possible, beyond any doubt, to accelerate the solution of the fusion problem - the problem of generating electric energy by means of controlled thermonuclear fusion - which would serve the interests of all countries.

29. In developing nuclear power and performing related research, the Soviet Union was also engaging in broad international scientific and technological co-operation, both on the bilateral plane and within the international organizations, and was sharing its achievements generously with many countries, in particular the developing countries. A striking example of prolonged and effective collaboration was offered by the Soviet Union's scientific and technological co-operation with the countries beloning to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The member countries of CMEA had been co-operating for ten years in a complex programme of socialist economic integration. The programme covered more than 200 topics relating to scientific, economic and technical co-operation, and it provided for the marked development of nuclear power in the CMEA member countries. The installed power in those countries currently exceeded 18 000 000 kWh: that figure was to double during 1981-1985 and reach a final target of more than 100 000 000 kWh by the end of 1990. In order to carry through that programme, the member countries of CMEA were establishing a solid nuclear engineering infrastructure based on co-operation and specialization. The Soviet Union had full understanding for the desire which many countries felt to establish their own nuclear power industry. With its assistance a network of nuclear power stations had grown up rapidly in the socialist countries, and many countries were taking advantage of the uranium enrichment services offered by the Soviet Union.

30. The Soviet delegation supported the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, believing as it did that the Committee's recommendations concerning the supply of nuclear materials, equipment, technology and fuel cycle services could provide important assistance to many countries, in particular the developing countries, when it came to realizing their national aims in the nuclear power field. Obviously, in following those recommendations it would be essential to take account of existing agreements governing the regulation of nuclear exports, and to ensure further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

31. In conclusion the Soviet delegation wished to associate itself with other delegations in expressing approval of the Agency's annual report for 1980 as

presented to the Conference. The Soviet Union was confident that despite certain difficulties the Agency would continue to be a reliable instrument for the further development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

32. Mr. GILLON (Belgium) expressed his appreciation to the Director General and said it was essential that the person chosen as his successor should perceive his responsibility solely as that of serving the general good of the Agency, irrespective of his own nationality or his area of origin. A Director General could not accept any directive whatsoever from a group of countries, and competence should be the sole criterion taken into account by the Board in the selection process.

33. Belgium did not possess large oil or coal resources and was obliged to use nuclear energy to cover part of its energy needs, particularly for the production of electricity. At present, 25% of that production was accounted for by nuclear plants and that proportion would increase to 50% within the next two or three years. Belgium was involved in many activities relating to the various stages of the fuel cycle: it participated in the EURODIF enrichment facility, a fuel fabrication facility for light-water reactors and a facility for fast breeder fuel as well as in the processing of medium-level wastes and a project for the establishment of a high-level waste processing facility. The Mol Nuclear Research Centre was carrying out an intensive research programme on waste management and final disposal in clay. By comparison with some other countries in western Europe, Belgium thus played a very active role in the use of nuclear power.

34. The Agency had a triple function to fulfil: public information, studies on facility and transport safety and the provision of assistance to countries requiring it. The nuclear programmes of several countries had been slowed down by public opposition and the Agency would, it was hoped, increase its public information activities, as that was a role which it was often in a better position to fulfil than national institutions. In addition, he welcomed studies by the Agency on reactor and transport safety as well as the documentation which it put at the disposal of Member States. Thirdly, the assistance provided by the Agency to countries requesting its help could take the form of personnel training or of studies on the feasibility of establishing nuclear power plants. With regard to technical assistance, Belgium was co-operating

with the Agency, inter alia, on a project to study tsetse fly control in Central Africa and also helping with the operation of the Regional Nuclear Energy Centre in Zaire.

35. The Agency had a fundamental and statutory role to play in the application of safeguards. Belgium, which was a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, believed that it was only through the wider application of full-scope safeguards that the world community would come to have complete confidence in the pursuit of peaceful nuclear activities. He hoped that countries which had not signed NPT would consider doing so, and that those with limited agreements with the Agency would extend them to cover all their nuclear facilities. The application of safeguards to facilities in nuclear-weapon States was essential if economic and commercial conditions which did not discriminate between those countries and non-nuclear-weapon States that had signed NPT were to be achieved. Also, it was an urgent matter for the Board of Governors to clearly define the conditions for the reimbursement of extraordinary costs entailed in inspections. Lastly, it should be stressed that the information obtained by Agency inspectors in the course of their duties was confidential.

36. Belgium deplored the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear research centre. That unjustifiable act cast unacceptable doubts on the Agency's safeguards system and the validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation wished to reiterate its full support for the Agency's safeguards system and its total confidence in its effectiveness.

37. His country participated actively in the meetings of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and, as a country which did not possess natural uranium resources, had a particular interest in the successful outcome of the Committee's work. However, assurances of supply had to be accompanied by adequate safeguards to prevent any type of proliferation.

38. His delegation recognized the Agency's role in the training of qualified personnel, particularly in the less developed countries which were unable to establish proper training facilities of their own.

39. With regard to the international plutonium storage (IPS) study, Belgium was taking an active part in the working groups and was striving to ensure that there was no discrimination between nuclear-weapon States and States which had voluntarily refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons. As a member of EURATOM,

Belgium believed that all provisions concerning international plutonium storage centres should be compatible with treaties to which it had acceded.

40. With regard to revision of the Statute, the existing balance between regional representation and representation of the technically most advanced countries should not be disturbed by an ill-considered increase in regional representation such as to radically alter that balance.

41. He thanked the Director General for his efforts at severe limitation of the Agency's budgetary growth which, once the dwindling value of money and dollar fluctuations had been taken into account, had to be maintained strictly at zero.

42. Finally, in view of the importance of present and future energy problems, decisions should be taken in a fresh spirit of co-operation between all interested parties. In that connection, the Agency had a vital role to play in restoring a climate of mutual confidence. He hoped that all Member States would contribute in every way to that international co-operation so that it might have a successful outcome.

43. Mr. PECQUEUR (France), recalling the events that had taken place in the history of energy over the past ten years, pointed out that the successive energy crises, or rather the erratic increases in the price of oil per barrel, had played an important part in the current world-wide economic recession. The policies pursued to deal with the crises essentially called for rational use of energy and for the development of energy sources that could replace hydrocarbons. The efforts to save energy in the industrialized countries were beginning to take effect; however, owing to the urgent need to improve the standard of living in the least favoured countries and to the inexorable demographic trends on the planet, world energy consumption was hardly likely to fall below 12 000 million tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) by the end of the century. Meeting such increased needs would require the mobilization of all available energy sources. Coal and nuclear power were the two main substitute sources for oil. Even though the spread of nuclear power had in recent years been slower than expected, that new source of energy already occupied an important place in the world energy balance: in 1980 it had accounted for 8% of the world's electricity, or 10 million tonnes of oil equivalent.

44. In France the contribution of nuclear power to national electricity production had increased from 16% in 1979 to 24% in 1980, and to 37% for the

first seven months of 1981; that major increase was due both to the excellent availability factor of the equipment in operation and to the start-up of new PWR units. At the same time, the development of the fast breeder was being vigorously pursued. Significant progress had also been made with the fuel cycle. The EURODIF enrichment plant at Tricastin would reach its full capacity of 10.8 million separative work units (SWU) in October 1981. During the last reprocessing campaigns the La Hague plant had operated at close to its rated capacity - about 400 tonnes per year. High-level waste conditioning in the Marcoule vitrification plant was also progressing satisfactorily.

45. The French Government, aware of the problems presented by the implementation of an energy independence plan, had decided to launch a vast democratic parliamentary debate, which would be held in October, in order to fix the principal energy options. The debate would be followed by discussions at the level of regional authorities dealing with regional energy plans. Pending receipt of the results of that vast national consultation, the operation of existing nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities would continue normally, as would the operation of the COGEMA facilities at La Hague, and commercial obligations of France to other countries would be honoured. In practice, the debate in autumn would affect only plans to which there was as yet no commitment.

46. In the international sphere, France remained greatly in favour of the development of the world's nuclear programmes. It would thus continue to support the Agency's activities by paying a voluntary contribution in accordance with the Secretariat's proposals. It was desirable that some priority be given to long-term projects, which had the advantage of permitting plans embracing a whole sector of activities, in which various experts from a single country would participate. In 1981 France had provided expert services for technical assistance missions, equipment for the Seibersdorf and Monaco laboratories, as well as for Malaysia, and had organized three training courses at the Saclay and Cadarache Centres.

47. However, France made its co-operation subject to undertakings in respect of peaceful uses verified by the Agency, and was concerned to strengthen the effectiveness and credibility of the Agency's safeguards system constantly. For that reason it had strongly condemned the military attack by Israel against nuclear facilities subject to Agency safeguards on the territory of another Member State.

48. In the opinion of the French delegation there was no alternative to the Agency's safeguards system, which had to be constantly improved. In that spirit and in order to encourage the acceptance of safeguards by an ever increasing number of States, the French Parliament had last July authorized the approval of the agreement between the Agency, EURATOM and France on the application of Agency safeguards on French territory. Agency safeguards provided the only instance of on-site inspection by international inspectors which was more or less universally accepted by sovereign States. Its effectiveness and acceptability should thus both be strengthened. Even those criticizing the system had not claimed that it had ever failed in its task of detecting attempts to divert nuclear materials for explosives. That fact was due not only to the high quality and conscientiousness of the responsible inspectors, but also to the role played for over twenty years by the Director General, in which he had shown prudence and perspicacity.

49. With regard to the problem posed by the appointment of a new Director General, he said that at a time when the world was being shaken by an energy crisis the Agency had an essential role to play in the promotion of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. In those circumstances the appointment of a Director General able to forge the destiny of the Agency was without doubt in the interests of all Member States. He therefore appealed to the sense of responsibility of all concerned in expressing the hope that the Board of Governors would find a solution to that important problem in the very near future.

50. Mr. do NASCIMENTO e SILVA (Brazil) said that nuclear energy would play a crucial role during the coming decade and provided a solution to the energy problems of many countries. Rises in the price of oil since 1973 had been an incentive for the development of other energy sources, and such questions had been discussed at the recent United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy.

51. Brazil accorded the highest priority to increasing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For that reason its programme included, in addition to projects developed independently in Brazil, activities in conjunction with the Agency and with other Latin American countries, which would certainly be implemented satisfactorily thanks to the good will and mutual confidence existing among those countries. Brazil intended to attain self-sufficiency and

independence in all peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Describing the energy situation in his country, he said that Brazil's hydroelectric potential exceeded 200 000 MW and represented 90% of the electricity produced. However, the estimated increase in demand for energy indicated that by the year 2000 its hydroelectric potential would no longer be sufficient. For that reason nuclear power was a logical option for the country. Uranium prospecting had been going on intensively in Brazil for ten years, and 1981 would stand out in history as the year in which Brazil's first nuclear power station (Angra I) was started up. Routine operation would begin in 1982. The foundations of Angra II had been completed and construction of the reactor buildings was to start soon. The geological studies for Angra III had been terminated and civil engineering work should begin early in the following year.

52. In the nuclear field international co-operation should be developed on a broad scale and without discrimination. Safeguards were necessary in order to ensure that nuclear energy was not used for other than strictly peaceful purposes. The effectiveness of safeguards, however, would be seriously limited if they could not be applied universally. Unfortunately, safeguards were not applicable in checking the arms race, and it was through the very fact of its peaceful tradition that Brazil could not accept the idea of such a situation continuing indefinitely. What should be recognized, first and foremost, was the inalienable right of every country to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to exercise that right without hindrance whenever its energy needs justified it. Brazil had consistently followed a policy of firmly supporting the principles of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, it had signed and ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, to which it strictly adhered. As regards bilateral co-operation, it had accepted stringent safeguards which went far beyond the non-proliferation provisions of the Agency's Statute.

53. Among the international organizations, the IAEA was one of the most effective, and any action which was incompatible with its objectives had to be avoided. In that connection, he wished to point out that, the day before, in the United Nations General Assembly the Brazilian delegation had strongly condemned the attack by Israel on the nuclear facilities in Iraq.

54. He recalled that amendment of Article VI of the Statute was once again on the agenda. While he agreed that the Board's membership should not be increased to the extent where it would make that body ineffective, it must nevertheless

be recognized that three regions were under-represented on the Board. His delegation considered that it was time to re-examine Article VI and wished to emphasize that, if the membership of the Board was enlarged, the representation of the Latin-American region would have to be given consideration.

55. Mr. SIAZON (Philippines) observed that the twenty-fifth session of the general conference of an organization was usually an occasion for reviewing the past and previewing the future. The Agency was no exception. On the contrary, the increasing number of intractable issues on the General Conference's agenda called for a thorough and realistic review of the Agency's activities since its establishment.

56. The success of the Agency in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was not being called into question. The weakness of the Agency and some of its Member States lay in their failure to recognize the changing political realities. For example, between the late 1950s and the early 1980s a number of colonial territories had become independent States and were firmly resolved to exercise their national sovereignty; for them nuclear energy, which had been considered in the early days by most developing countries to be a useful instrument for military purposes only, was now an essential part of economic progress. The failure to make a correct assessment of the political aspirations of the developing countries had led to international agreements which had clearly provided for unequal treatment of the developed and developing countries. For example, the implementation of Article IV of NPT had been modified substantially by the London Suppliers' Guidelines to the detriment of developing countries. Another example was the rather non-committal reactions of many industrialized countries in the case of the pilot enrichment plant in South Africa, which had been put into operation without Agency safeguards, as compared to the drastic measures, both economic and military, imposed on one developing country which was reportedly building the same type of facility.

57. In the Agency's Board of Governors, where the developing countries had for some time been seeking equitable representation, certain dubious practices had been encouraged. The Director General had been requested to apply retroactively the new guidelines for technical assistance in spite of strong protests from developing Member States and despite the well-known legal position in many countries that ex post facto laws were unconstitutional. Moreover, the

Director General was being advised in some quarters to improve the Agency's safeguards procedures contained in document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2.

58. The most flagrant inequality was reflected in the staffing pattern of the Agency, where 73 developing countries constituting 66% of the membership accounted for only 15% of the Professional staff. It must be added that since its establishment the Agency had never had a Director General from the Third World. In the past, developing countries had of course received tokens of sympathy, but the fundamental problems had not been solved and had become serious enough to have delayed the appointment of a Director General by the Board.

59. The present session of the General Conference should afford an opportunity for both developed and developing countries to co-operate in the future. In that connection he quoted the recent statement by President Reagan, according to which the United States of America would become a reliable partner for peaceful nuclear co-operation under adequate safeguards. In particular, the United States had decided to eliminate the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by working to improve regional and global stability and by promoting understanding of the legitimate concerns of other States for their security. It was the first time that an important link between proliferation and security had been publicly recognized. That recognition would provide a basis for limiting nuclear proliferation by means of measures which were wider in scope than those which had been considered within the context of existing international agreements and national legislation.

60. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that security should not be misinterpreted, since it did not relate solely to military aspects. In most developing countries there could not be political stability without stable economic growth, and without political stability there could be no security. Hence it was not possible to pursue a successful non-proliferation policy without granting the economic assistance required for ensuring economic progress in developing countries.

61. The request by the developing countries for parity between the Agency's technical assistance programme and its safeguards activities was based on Article II of the Statute. The developed countries should be able to accept that parity because of their support for a strong non-proliferation policy. All Member States should endeavour to finance the technical assistance programme and safeguards in the same manner. The Board of Governors could then fix the

indicative figures for technical assistance on a five-year basis, which would enable developing countries to plan their technical assistance projects better.

62. With regard to national policies, States should include in their non-proliferation policies measures to ensure that adequate economic assistance was available to developing countries. In that connection he appealed to the United States to allocate funds for the implementation of Title V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, which called on the United States to assist developing countries, particularly those parties to NPT, in identifying and utilizing energy sources such as solar energy and other renewable forms of energy.

63. His Government strongly supported the Agency's safeguards system and NPT, and he shared the view expressed by the Director General and contained in resolution 485(1981) of the United Nations Security Council that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre constituted a serious threat to the IAEA safeguards system, which was the very foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Agency's safeguards system must also take into account technical progress made in the field of safeguards. However, if changes were to be made in the safeguards provided for in document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, they should first be approved by the Board of Governors as part of a document INFCIRC/66/Rev.3, and then accepted by States which had concluded safeguards agreements with the Agency in accordance with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2.

64. Another important point which had not been raised during the session was the adoption of a zero-real-growth budget for 1982. In 1982, Member States' contributions would be lower than in 1981. At the same time, the Agency's cash surplus for 1979 and 1980 was US $17 million, and for 1981 it would be about $14 million, which made a total cash surplus of about $31 million for the last three years.

65. At the present time, the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system was being questioned by certain developed countries, while the stagnation of its promotional activities was criticized by the developing countries. There was also considerable concern about nuclear safety. It would therefore not be reasonable to maintain zero growth in the programme and budget for 1982 and 1983. The Agency was a purveyor of services and its effectiveness had to be

measured in terms of the services it could provide in a given year rather than in terms of the level of its budgetary surplus.

66. At the time of the twenty-fourth session, his delegation had proposed the conclusion, within the framework of the Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA), of an agreement for emergency assistance in Asia, and he hoped that the proposal would be considered by the General Conference. Certain countries in the region intended to dump radioactive waste into the sea. Although that method had been used in the past in the Atlantic, such dumping had been observed internationally by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and other observers from different countries. Until an organization similar to NEA was established in Asia, it would be difficult for the Philippines and other countries in the region to accept the dumping of radioactive waste into the Pacific Ocean. The Regional Co-operative Agreement might serve as the forerunner of a nuclear energy agency for Asia and the Pacific. The Philippine Government was aware of the growing volume of radioactive materials being shipped to Asia and therefore regarded the transport of radioactive materials as an important component of nuclear safety. His Government supported the Agency's programme in that domain and the proposed revision in 1983 of the Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials.

67. Finally, he informed the General Conference that the Philippine Government had ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 3 September 1981.

68. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country's interest in the Agency's role in the international community prompted him to raise certain issues which it was hoped would help to consolidate that role.

69. A comparison of the funds allocated to technical assistance and to other Agency activities showed that the former represented only 16.26% of the budget for 1982. Moreover, 96% of the technical assistance funds came from voluntary contributions, which marked that assistance as a non-essential activity and denied it any continuity. The real growth in technical assistance between 1974 and 1982 in terms of purchasing power would certainly be close to zero. With regard to the regional distribution of assistance, the figure for the Middle East had dropped from 4% during the 1970s to 2% in 1980. Adequate methods should therefore be sought to have technical assistance financed from the

Regular Budget, and the amount involved should not be smaller than that for administration or safeguards. Voluntary contributions would then serve to finance research contracts, and technical adjustments could be made to ensure a better distribution of assistance.

70. The composition of the Board of Governors should be changed to take into account the present composition of the Agency. The areas of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia should occupy on average five seats according to the rule of proportional representation, and not 3.33 as was the existing situation.

71. Turning to the subject of the Arabic language and its position in history, he remarked that for six hundred years, from the seventh century, Arabic had occupied an important place in science, commerce and philosophy. Its importance had been considerable up to the Renaissance, and even in the eighteenth century Arabic had been in use at the universities of Tübingen and Montpellier. The Arab world had undergone a scientific renaissance in the present century, and science was now being taught in Arabic at most Arab universities. The United Nations, ICAO, FAO and ILO had already adopted Arabic as an official language and, in terms of the number of Member States using it, it would now take second place behind Spanish in the Agency. It was therefore high time for the Agency to adopt it as an official language. Such a move would have the advantage of standardizing the terminology in the documents translated into Arabic and would help to increase the awareness of nuclear science and technology in the Arab world.

72. Resolution 487 of the Security Council had strongly condemned the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre and labelled it a serious threat to the Agency's safeguards system. The Syrian delegation also supported the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 12 June 1981, recommending the General Conference to expel Israel. The nuclear history of that country had in fact always been of a military and aggressive nature. Israel had refused to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and since 1970 had even been avoiding the inspections which American experts were supposed to carry out in its installations under a technical assistance agreement with the United States. Violating the sovereignty of its neighbours and usurping the responsibilities of the Agency, the Security Council and the great Powers, Israel was playing the role of nuclear gendarme in the Middle East and was arrogating to itself the right to destroy all the nuclear installations of the

countries in the region - in other words, of the Arab and Moslem world. In that connection he was surprised at the statement made by the delegate of the United States at the previous meeting: from that statement he had gained the impression that the delegate of the United States, who had refrained from condemning Israel, was not very concerned about the legitimate fears the raid had caused and considered the act of aggression itself less dangerous than the protests it had raised. Israel had in fact deliberately cut itself off from the community of peaceful users of atomic energy, and by expelling it the Agency would do no more than recognize an existing situation.

73. His delegation wished to reiterate its support for the Agency in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. All the proposals it had made were aimed in the final analysis at consolidating the Agency's role so that it could contribute effectively to progress in the least advanced countries of the world.

74. Mr. PANDEV (Bulgaria) said that the political context of the present session was marked by a resurgence of international tension and of the armaments race and by a very worrying situation in the Middle East. The Israeli air raid on the Iraqi nuclear research centre - a facility belonging to a country party to NPT which had placed all its nuclear activities under Agency safeguards - was beyond any doubt fraught with serious consequences, not only for the Middle East but for the whole world. Israel, in violation of all the rules of international law, had committed an act whose purpose was to aggravate the international situation and to discredit the Agency and its safeguards activites. That being so, he invited all Member States to give strong reaffirmation of their confidence in the Agency.

75. The nuclear power industry, which had already demonstrated its efficiency, could provide a solution to the energy crisis the world was passing through. The Agency had, ever since its creation, contributed to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while applying effective non-proliferation safeguards. Strengthening of NPT and the Agency's safeguards activities should be adequate guarantees for the invulnerability of peaceful nuclear activities.

76. The Bulgarian Government attributed great importance to the development of nuclear power, and accordingly supported the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development, to be held in 1983, as well as the

International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience scheduled for 1982. Moreover, the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply should give fresh impetus to the development of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and the Bulgarian delegation wished to stress that assurances of supply were closely bound up with non-proliferation guarantees.

77. Nuclear safety was also a matter of the utmost importance, as had been convincingly pointed out at the Stockholm Conference, and contributed to strengthening public confidence in nuclear power. His delegation felt that the Agency's role in that area should be further strengthened. Bulgaria had signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, had an important role to play in matters of security, and hoped that countries which had not yet done so would follow its example.

78. His delegation approved the budget for 1982 as presented by the Secretariat but asked that further efforts be made to reduce unproductive expenditures and administrative costs.

79. Recognizing as it did the importance of technical assistance for the development of national programmes for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, his delegation thanked the Secretariat for the assistance it was giving Bulgaria. Recalling that Bulgaria regularly made its contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund and would do so again in 1982, he reiterated his Government's conviction that contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund should be voluntary and should be payable in national currency.

80. On the question of the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, he felt that an increase in the membership of the Board would not improve the efficiency of that body's work, which was quite satisfactory at present.

81. Bulgaria had just adopted a programme of economic, social and cultural development for the 1980s which placed considerable emphasis on the use of nuclear energy. The entry into service in the near future of a fourth unit would bring the aggregate installed capacity of the Kozloduy nuclear power station up to 1760 MW(e). The operation of that station had been giving complete satisfaction for seven years already. At the same time, the construction of new power stations equipped with water-cooled and water-moderated reactors was going ahead. In 1985 the first unit with a rating of 1000 MW(e) was to go

into service, at which time nuclear power would account for 26% of the country's total electricity generation; that figure would rise to 40% in 1980 after the start-up of two further 1000-MW units.

82. In constructing and operating its nuclear power stations Bulgaria was making good use of Agency documents concerning nuclear and radiological safety and had profited from the experience of the Soviet enterprises that were largely responsible for the design of the Bulgarian facilities.

83. The increasingly numerous applications of nuclear techniques in various sectors of the Bulgarian economy, the manufacture of nuclear instruments for control and automation of industrial processes, the irradiation of seeds and of foodstuffs, work on the automation of nuclear power plants - all those activites also merited mention.

84. The nuclear research institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences was completing a centre for isotope applications in 1981, and the success of that enterprise was due in part to effective action taken by the Agency. But Bulgaria also owed a great deal, in connection with its nuclear programme, to collaboration between the socialist countries within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). For the period 1981-1985 Bulgaria had worked out a national scientific research programme in the nuclear energy field which was closely bound up with co-operative activities of CMEA Member States and which involved 1000-MW(e) reactors as well as large fast reactors.

85. Bulgaria was trying as far as possible to contribute to the development of scientific and technical co-operation under the auspices of the Agency, in fields as various as the International Nuclear Information System (INIS), the network of secondary standards dosimetry laboratories, the Agency's research programme and its schedule of scientific meetings, and in the endeavour to bring yet further refinements to the safeguards system. It would continue to give full support to the activities of the Agency, on which, in the opinion of the Bulgarian delegation, the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy depended.

86. Mr. LALOVIĆ (Yugoslavia) said that the growing gap between nuclear development as practised in the developing countries and the system applied among the great nuclear Powers and other countries possessing nuclear weapons had given rise to monopolistic tendencies in the latter, to the point where

they had succeeded in maintaining a form of international co-operation which left them absolute control over the development of nuclear energy in the non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear Powers justified that policy by invoking the dangers of proliferation, but the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must not be regarded a priori as constituting a proliferation danger, even if such a danger did exist and even if the problem was an important one.

87. The President of the United States of America had declared on 16 July 1981 that his Government would no longer oppose reprocessing for civilian purposes, nor the development of breeder reactors, in countries which had established advanced nuclear power programmes and where those activities presented no risk of proliferation. Thus, where the transfer of nuclear technology was concerned there were two types of countries: on the one hand, a group of developed countries not in possession of nuclear weapons which, even though they could manufacture such weapons, would never compromise the non-proliferation regime; and, on the other hand, a large group of countries, particularly developing countries, many of which were party to NPT, that did not enjoy the same confidence. That distinction meant that a selective policy was being applied in matters of non-proliferation, when in fact the danger itself was indivisible; non-proliferation was the responsibility of the whole international community, and the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was compatible with the principles of liberty, sovereignty and equality among nations.

88. His delegation was convinced that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development would give serious attention to most of those problems. Within the framework of its programme for 1982 and 1983 the Agency would have an extremely active role to play, both in the preparatory phase and at the conference itself.

89. It was evident that the Agency's safeguards system was an indispensable element in non-proliferation, though non-proliferation concerns must not be taken as a pretext to prevent countries from exercising their right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, one could not but interpret the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor as being directed among other things against the Agency's safeguards system - in

other words, against international agreements and the confidence they inspired. Sanctions should be applied to Israel immediately; the General Conference should call upon Israel to accede to NPT and accept Agency safeguards.

90. That incident showed quite clearly that a nuclear war could easily be triggered by the use of conventional arms. The problem had been dealt with only partially in the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949; the Protocol prohibited military attacks against nuclear power plants, but it did not cover other nuclear installations.

91. His delegation felt that it was time to take steps on the international plane with a view to drafting a convention prohibiting the bombardment and destruction of all nuclear installations, whatever their purpose, and providing for general international sanctions against offenders. A convention of that kind should make it possible to prevent such attacks and would likewise contribute to a softening of anti-nuclear attitudes in countries where there was strong public opposition to broader application of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy because the public feared the possible destruction of nuclear installations.

92. The problem of technical assistance was still a burning issue and in fact constituted one of the most important questions for the developing countries, which regularly criticized the imbalance between promotional and regulatory activities in the Agency's programme. His delegation believed that the realistic proposals put forward by the developing countries - to raise the target for technical assistance, to include technical assistance in the Regular Budget and to increase the funds allocated to that activity - should at last be accepted.

93. Yugoslavia wished to reiterate its support for the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and hoped that the Committee's deliberations would soon lead to tangible results, in view of their exceptionally great importance for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

94. Recalling the views expressed in the course of the past year by some Member States, including Yugoslavia, on the International Plutonium Storage (IPS) study, he said it was a matter for regret that the work of the IPS Expert Group had never been examined by the Board and that the Group had failed to present a single report to the Board during the last four years. Consequently, his delegation wished to reiterate the reservation it had previously stated concerning the financing of the IPS study from the Regular Budget in the absence of a Board decision on the subject; in that connection, his delegation's understanding was that financing of the IPS study from the Regular Budget had been proposed only for 1982. Subject to the reservation already mentioned, his delegation endorsed the draft budget for 1982.

95. The Yugoslav delegation fully endorsed the proposal aimed at remedying the present imbalance in the regional distribution of seats on the Board of Governors and appealed to the General Conference to adopt a resolution on the subject which would satisfy the aspirations of Member States.

96. In conclusion, he said that his delegation was pleased with the co-operation existing between the Agency and Yugoslavia; in particular, the extremely useful technical assistance which the Agency had granted Yugoslavia during the last phase of construction of the Krško nuclear power station gave every reason for satisfaction.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.