



International Atomic Energy Agency

# GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC(XXV)/OR.230

April 1982\*

GENERAL Distr.

ENGLISH

TWENTY-FIFTH REGULAR SESSION: 21-27 SEPTEMBER 1981

RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna  
on Tuesday, 22 September 1981, at 10.50 a.m.

President: Mr. XUTO (Thailand)

## CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda**</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
5	Arrangements for the Conference	1 - 4
	(a) Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items for initial discussion	1 - 2
	(b) Closing date of the session and opening date of the next session	3 - 4
7	General debate and annual report for 1980 (resumed)	5 - 116
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	Argentina	5 - 27
	German Democratic Republic	28 - 44
	Pakistan	45 - 54
	Holy See	55 - 74
	Tunisia	75 - 91
	Sudan	92 - 100
	Australia	101 - 123

\*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 25 September 1981.

\*\*/ GC(XXV)/640.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document  
GC(XXV)/INF/201/Rev.2.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION  
(GC(XXV)/640)

1. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee, at its meeting the previous day, had authorized him to report on the results of its consideration of the agenda and the allocation of items for initial discussion. The General Committee recommended that the agenda should consist of all the items contained in the provisional agenda, as set out in document GC(XXV)/640, and that the items should be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in that document, except that item 8, "Military attack on Iraqi nuclear research centre and its implications for the Agency", should be discussed in Plenary and not in the Committee of the Whole.

2. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

3. The PRESIDENT further informed the Conference that the General Committee had authorized him to report that it recommended tentatively fixing Friday, 25 September 1981, as the closing date of the twenty-fifth regular session and Monday, 20 September 1982, as the opening date of the twenty-sixth regular session of the General Conference.

4. The recommendations of the General Committee were accepted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980 (GC(XXV)/642, 642/Corr.1, 642/Corr.2)  
(resumed)

5. Mr. PULIT (Argentina) welcomed Zimbabwe as the youngest Member of the Agency.

6. Describing the progress Argentina had made in its nuclear programme since the preceding session of the General Conference, he pointed out that the Atucha I power plant had operated satisfactorily, generating 1 783 402 MWh in the first eight months of 1981, i.e. at a load factor of 88%. A new facility for storage of spent fuel up to 1990 had been completed.

7. The Embalse nuclear power plant had reached the stage between the final assembly and commissioning and it was expected to go critical and be connected to the grid in late 1982. The containment building had been pressure-tested.

8. As regards Atucha II, the civil engineering works had started and orders had been placed for major equipment. The steam generators, the pressurizer and exchangers for the moderator were being built by an Argentine firm. The industrial architect of the project was ENACE S.A., set up jointly by the Argentine Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEA) and Kraftwerk Union (KWU).

9. The final siting and design studies for a fourth nuclear power plant were under way.

10. A heavy-water plant was under construction at Arroyito, which was expected to produce 250 tons per annum from 1984. It was worth mentioning that the Board had approved a safeguards agreement for the first time for a plant of its kind, and he wished to express his appreciation for the goodwill and co-operation of the parties involved in the agreement.

11. Besides, a heavy-water pilot plant based entirely on indigenous technology was at an advanced stage of construction, and would serve as the basis for future plants.

12. As regards the fuel cycle, the uranium concentrate needed for the nuclear programme was being provided. The facilities for the production of sintered UO<sub>2</sub> and of Zircaloy tubes and for fuel element fabrication were making marked progress, and the first batch of 200 fuel elements made entirely in the country for the Atucha I power plant had been delivered. They would ensure that 50% of the core was made indigenously.

13. As regards the back-end of the fuel cycle, the construction of a reprocessing plant, with a view to the re-use of plutonium in the recycle mode and in possible future fast reactors, was proceeding normally; it was hoped that the plant would start "cold" operation the following year.

14. Thus, his country was optimistic about reaching its objective of being independent in the fuel cycle from 1982. Such progress could not have been made without a corresponding effort in developing technology.

15. The CNEA was also very active in the field of research. The installation of a 20-MV tandem accelerator would ensure continuity of work in nuclear physics and make a major contribution to research in the Latin American region.

16. In the area of radioisotopes and their application, mention must be made of the installation of a new industrial radiosterilization plant, the completion of the infrastructure for low-, medium- and high-activity cells (where all kinds of radioisotopes and sealed sources would be produced) and the co-ordination of medical applications in the whole of Argentina by joint efforts of the CNEA and the Ministry of Public Health.

17. In connection with radiation protection and nuclear safety, Argentina was implementing the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and had made progress in the matter of nuclear safety standards, especially those relating to design requirements.

18. As for training, which was of vital importance for the success of the nuclear programme, post-graduate courses in nuclear engineering and in radiation protection and nuclear safety had been added to the numerous courses held normally at the CNEA. The first batch of 15 nuclear engineers had graduated from the Balseiro Institute at Bariloche which, with the Agency's assistance, would produce a similar number every year to meet the demands of the CNEA and the private firms participating in the nuclear plan.

19. The year 1981 had been a busy one for Argentina as regards international co-operation, both multilateral and bilateral, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Aware of the inconvenience to developing countries caused by the lack of funds for approved projects, his Government had offered to execute a project for Mexico and one for Peru.

20. Argentina was in a position, as in the previous years, to pledge a voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund in an amount corresponding to its base rate of assessment, apart from offering the same number of fellowships.

21. At the multilateral level, within the framework of the Organization of American States, his Government had repeated its offer to the Pan-American Nuclear Energy Commission to provide technical assistance to a number of States Members of that organization.

22. In the area of bilateral co-operation, several agreements to which his country was a party had yielded fruitful results, as was shown by the uninterrupted progress in the construction of the Huarangal Nuclear Research Centre in Peru and the considerable exchange of goods and services with Brazil. Mention should also be made of the loan of uranium and the contract for the

supply of Zircaloy tubes for Brazilian reactors by Argentina and the fabrication of the lower part of the pressure vessel for the third Argentine nuclear power plant by a Brazilian firm.

23. Those activities demonstrated a mutual confidence in technical development and in the ability of countries linked by common objectives in the nuclear sphere to carry it out. Co-operation agreements had also been signed with other countries, especially Latin American countries, and had opened up new and potentially fruitful avenues for co-operation activities already taking place. Argentina was prepared to co-operate with any country in the world on a basis of equality and mutual respect, since the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear power should be made available to all peoples. The peace-loving nature of Argentina's policies had been demonstrated once again by the signing of a safeguards agreement with the Agency for the Atucha II nuclear power station and by the Board's approval of the agreement for the Arroyito heavy-water production plant. Negotiations with the Secretariat had also been under way with a view to drawing up a safeguards agreement under Article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty).

24. Turning to the Agency's activities in the previous year, he congratulated the Secretariat on its considerable achievements in the sphere of technical assistance, and in particular on the increased use of non-convertible currencies. However, certain countries were still providing technical assistance through the Agency on a discriminatory basis in that adherence to a given treaty was used as a criterion, which was expressly prohibited by the Agency's Statute. He welcomed the increase in the funds available for technical assistance, but considered that a real measure of the increase would be provided by a comparison not with the figures of previous years but with the requirements of Member States. The latter comparison showed that the increase in the funds for technical assistance was still insufficient. On the other hand, if the target fixed for voluntary contributions for the Technical Assistance Fund had actually been met, all technically feasible requests could easily have been granted.

25. It was gratifying that once again none of the materials under Agency safeguards had been diverted. However, the Agency's safeguards system would make better progress if, instead of having larger sums allotted to it at the expense of the Agency's main functions, the funds available for safeguards were used rationally by the emphasis being placed on special fissionable materials with

which nuclear weapons could be made. In the Regular Budget approved by the Board for 1982, funds for technical assistance represented less than 16% of those for safeguards. It should be borne in mind that the cost of applying safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapon States amounted to some 50% of the cost of implementing the technical assistance projects which could not be implemented owing to a lack of funds. Although the cost of safeguarding installations which were obviously non-military represented only 3% of the total cost of safeguards, it nevertheless amounted to at least one fifth of the total available for technical assistance. In any case, there was no advantage to be gained from applying safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, since, when the time came for provision to be made for the transfer to the Agency's jurisdiction of special fissionable materials produced from irradiated fuel, Article XII.A.5 became unenforceable.

26. Turning to the Agency's technical activities, he said that its work on nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle had ensured a satisfactory exchange of information between Member States. It was important that the Agency should continue its work on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Agency's work on physics, life sciences and agriculture had been, as in the past, of great value, as had been the activities of the Trieste Centre. Of particular significance were the Agency's achievements in radiation protection and nuclear safety, including the preparation of revised Basic Safety Standards and the continuing satisfactory pursuance of the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme. Its efforts in relation to the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes had the dual advantage of furthering nuclear power and of protecting humanity from its possible deleterious effects. The safety criteria applied in the nuclear industry were much stricter than in any other industry.

27. Finally, he regretted the fact that the Board of Governors had not yet been able to select a candidate for the post of Director General and stressed that efforts should be redoubled to ensure that a solution be found in the near future; otherwise the Agency would suffer from a dangerous lack of continuity.

28. Mr. SITZLACK (German Democratic Republic) wished first to express his highest appreciation and warmest thanks to the Director General, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, who had guided the Agency's affairs through two decades in an excellent and outstanding manner.

29. His delegation deeply regretted that the twenty-fifth regular session of the General Conference was overshadowed by an event that had given rise to grave concern throughout the world: the air strike against the Iraqi nuclear research centre had been a flagrant violation of international law and the act of aggression also called into question both NPT and the Agency's safeguards system. *His Government shared the view that that completely indefensible aggression could not possibly have been carried out without backing by the most reactionary circles of imperialism.* The attack resulted from a general effort by those forces to aggravate international tensions and to escalate the arms race.

30. The German Democratic Republic therefore deemed it necessary to press all the more insistently for the cessation of the arms race and the strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, that included the demand that IAEA safeguards be applied to all the nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States, above all those of Israel and South Africa, and that all co-operation with those States in the nuclear field cease.

31. In view of the serious and complicated international situation it was *encouraging to note that the International Atomic Energy Agency had made great and successful efforts towards solving the tasks before it.* That had been clearly demonstrated by the Director General in his report and could be inferred from the well drafted documents presented to the General Conference. He wished to comment on a few selected items from the programme.

32. Regarding nuclear power and nuclear safety, his Government continued to take the view that nuclear power was indispensable in meeting future energy needs and that it would play an ever-increasing role in electricity and heat production. Precisely because progress in nuclear energy utilization had recently slowed down throughout the world, he considered the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience scheduled for 1982 to be a necessary and an important step in the interest of accelerating the universal use of nuclear power. It was to be expected that that conference would provide useful input for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy planned for 1983, in the preparation and conduct of which the Agency, as the competent international organization in the nuclear field, should play a leading role.

33. His Government had repeatedly expressed the view that the solution of all relevant nuclear safety problems was a prerequisite for promoting nuclear energy utilization. After the International Conference on Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues convened by the Agency in Stockholm in 1980, it could be stated with satisfaction that there were no safety-related factors limiting the use and development of nuclear power. However, the Agency was, quite rightly, not guilty of complacency. That was clearly shown, inter alia, by the progress made under the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme, by the efforts to promote the acceptance and use of NUSS principles in Member States, by emergency assistance activities, and by the intention to become more active in promoting international co-operation in safety research.

34. Turning to the development of the Agency's safeguards programme, he felt it could be stated with truth that the course pursued and the measures initiated had proved successful. It was particularly gratifying to learn from the latest Safeguards Implementation Report that again in 1980 all nuclear material under Agency safeguards could be adequately accounted for.

35. He welcomed the recently introduced safeguards support activities, particularly the establishment of the Safeguards Training Unit, since the availability of well-trained inspectors played a key role in the safeguards system. That was why his country had made available a number of nuclear facilities for the basic training of newly recruited inspectors. It was ready to continue that assistance in the future.

36. Despite the generally positive development of events in the safeguards sphere, there were a number of persistent shortcomings. Besides the existence of non-safeguarded nuclear activities in some non-nuclear-weapon States, they included problems relating to the designation of inspectors and to the uniformity and timeliness of reports. In the interests of strengthening the Agency's safeguards effort, he was in favour of the measures which were proposed in that connection in the Safeguards Implementation Report, and which deserved and needed the support of all Member States.

37. On the matter of technical assistance, the report before the General Conference on the technical assistance provided by the Agency in 1980 revealed an impressive programme of activities that were of specific benefit to the developing countries. Not only had those activities made significant

contributions in the fields of agriculture, medicine and training, but they had also contributed to the overall technological development that was a prerequisite for a country's embarking on the course of nuclear power. The German Democratic Republic therefore considered the technical assistance programme to be one of the most essential activities of the Agency and welcomed the progress made under it.

38. In support of the Agency's various technical assistance activities his country duly contributed its share to the target for voluntary contributions and was seeking a sound balance between the supply of materials and equipment and the provision of training facilities. Accordingly, since the last session of the General Conference it had taken part in the organization of two study tours and had conducted one training course. Another five-week training course had started early in September 1981.

39. His Government had repeatedly expressed reservations regarding the provision of technical assistance to certain countries. In the light of recent developments he wished strongly to reaffirm those reservations.

40. Apart from technical assistance, the Agency had to its credit outstanding achievements in other promotional areas such as nuclear power, nuclear safety and the life sciences. Another of those achievements was the International Nuclear Information System (INIS), which represented a prime example of successful international co-operation in the sharing of scientific and technical information among nations. Through INIS it had become possible for all Member States to keep abreast of the many advances made in the nuclear field.

41. All endeavours to expand the use of nuclear energy, however, made sense only if the politically vital task of securing peace was fully met, and specifically if the threat of nuclear weapons was checked. His Government therefore strongly supported the far-reaching proposals put forward by one of the world's leading statesmen, Leonid Brezhnev, in February 1981 with the aim of ending the arms race, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

42. If awareness that nuclear weapons could not solve the world's problems took root in the minds of all men, then the forces capable of calling a halt to the nuclear danger would grow. Everyone knew about the power of the atom - the constructive, life-giving one as well as the destructive one. From that

followed the particular significance for the Agency of the Soviet proposal to establish an authoritative international committee which would inform the peoples of the world about the devastating consequences of nuclear war.

43. According to its Statute, the Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency were obliged to support the enlargement and acceleration of the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Peace was the main problem facing mankind. In the atomic age, success or failure in securing peace meant "to be or not to be", life or death. The Agency should have an important voice in that all-decisive matter.

44. The German Democratic Republic was fully aware that in the long run the arms race could not result in consolidating peace. Political wisdom now consisted not in gambling on force or in struggling for confrontation, but in a willingness to negotiate and in the desire to secure peace by limiting the arms race and striving for the ultimate goal of eliminating all weapons from the earth. The abolition of nuclear weapons would be a decisive milestone on that road. If the world wished to survive it had to replace nuclear deterrent with world-wide confidence. It was his hope that the nuclear community would closely co-operate in that spirit. In any event his country would continue to participate in such co-operation to the best of its abilities.

45. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) said that the present Conference session marked the Agency's 25th anniversary. The Agency had come a long way over a relatively short period and had made major contributions to the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But although it had started with a sense of mission and with great expectations, in the passage of time the original optimism had been tempered with harsh realities. Nuclear energy could no longer be regarded as a panacea. In fact, its very viability was being seriously contested in several countries. It was ironic that the promise of nuclear energy had been replaced by fear and that its promotion was being hampered by preventive measures. The over-riding concern seemed to be to control, not to share, to deny, not to transfer, and to withhold, not to provide, peaceful nuclear technology to those who needed it most. Whether or not that stemmed from a genuine concern about proliferation, from the fears expressed by the environmentalists or from the attitude of the advanced countries towards the developing countries, he believed that nuclear energy had a most vital role to play in meeting world energy needs.

46. In spite of all the difficulties involved, there was no other choice but to rely increasingly on nuclear power, as it offered the only viable alternative for meeting the world's power requirements for decades to come. The available soft technologies or renewable resources were not adequate or near-term options for the world, as had been concluded after a five-year study by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).

47. Turning to the developing countries, it was clear that their energy problems had become very serious. The import bill for the oil-importing developing countries, which was US \$74 billion in 1980, would in constant dollars double by 1990. Those countries would need a staggering amount of money - US \$450 billion - in the present decade for their energy development programmes. Little doubt remained that the developing countries needed to introduce nuclear power on a substantial scale and on an immediate basis. In so doing they would have to overcome insurmountable problems. Foremost among them was the attitude of the advanced countries who had equated the spread of nuclear power with nuclear proliferation and prescribed a restrictive regime based on denial of nuclear technology. Such policies were already retarding the growth of nuclear power domestically and were becoming counterproductive internationally. They had created a deep sense of insecurity among the "have-nots", who were being compelled to develop the necessary basic technologies and know-how independently for peaceful purposes. The time had come to reappraise those policies, and, instead of seeking confrontation between North and South, to develop a partnership for common survival.

48. For those reasons, among others, the holding of the United Nations-sponsored Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy at Geneva in 1983 was to be welcomed. Pakistan was actively participating in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, which, it was convinced, could make a major contribution to recreating a climate of trust and co-operation.

49. The 25th session of the General Conference was a time for charting a new course to meet the challenges ahead. The Agency was entering a new era, and the increasing presence of and the genuine aspirations of the developing countries, who desired to play their legitimate role in the organization, could no longer be ignored. The developing countries, which constituted the overwhelming majority of the Agency's membership, were grossly under-represented

at the various policy-making and management levels. The overall representation of the developing countries in the Professional staff was only 14%. Their share of the senior posts was also very small. That was one reason why the Agency was not able to communicate effectively with the developing Member States.

50. There was a growing feeling that technical assistance was being relegated to the background and attention focused primarily on regulatory activities. Pakistan fully supported the safeguards functions of the Agency, but at the same time felt that equal importance should be attributed to its technical assistance programme. Those two functions constituted the two pillars of the organization and had to have parity in terms of the total resources and budgetary allocations. That could be done only if funds for technical assistance were provided through predictable and reliable sources, in the same way as for the safeguards activities.

51. For the last four years the General Conference had studied the problem of amending Article VI.A.2 of the Statute so as to ensure better representation for the areas of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia (MESA), which accounted for nearly 40% of the Agency's membership but had little over 20% of the seats on the Board. To begin redressing that injustice Pakistan had advocated a modest increase of one seat each for Africa and the MESA; that had met with the support of the majority of Member States at the 22nd session of the General Conference. That compromise formula still deserved to be approved. If there was further delay, it would mean facing the inevitable prospect of a much larger increase in the membership of the Board, for which the pressures were already building up.

52. In 1980 the Board of Governors had taken the important decision to establish the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which offered a forum for a constructive dialogue between the supplier and recipient States. The formation of the Committee was tacit acknowledgement of the failure of the policies of unilateralism pursued by certain suppliers, who sought to impose their own set of rules on the conduct of nuclear trade in the world. The Committee could help to establish acceptable norms, arrived at through negotiation, for the promotion and regulation of world nuclear trade. Monopoly in nuclear know-how, materials and services was fast eroding and there now had to be evolved a system based on co-operation and interdependence. Irrevocable safeguards had to be linked with equally irrevocable supply agreements and contracts. As

was known, some of the more powerful supplier States were putting increasing pressures on the Agency to follow their own example of taking arbitrary decisions and action which were not consistent with the provisions and obligations provided for in the safeguards agreements approved by the Board. The Agency should be extremely careful to resist such pressures and to preserve its image of complete impartiality and objectivity.

53. His country viewed with the utmost gravity and concern the unwarranted, premeditated and unjustified military attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Centre by Israel in June. One could not overestimate the far-reaching and serious consequences of the attack for the Agency, the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the security of the region. The Director General and the Board were quite right in seeing it as an attack on the Agency's safeguards system. Pakistan had complete confidence in that system and did not want such an act of aggression to be exploited so as to cast doubts on or create complications for either the Agency's own safeguards system or the system linked with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The attack not only constituted a serious set-back for the development of nuclear energy throughout the world, but it would also be used by uninformed politicians, legislators and environmentalists as an excuse to oppose or block the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. That precedent was most dangerous, since it would undermine the security of the region. Pakistan would therefore join others in supporting any resolution for the expulsion of Israel from the Agency.

54. His country continued to make progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the growing needs of its economic development. In spite of an arbitrary cut-off of supplies, fuel and services, Pakistan's nuclear power plant had continued to operate through indigenous efforts. A feasibility report on the economics of nuclear power had indicated that, within the Pakistani context, the cost of power from a nuclear plant was about one third of that from an equivalent oil-fired station at the prevailing international oil prices. The economic advantage of nuclear power was thus overwhelming and the necessary infrastructure in terms of trained manpower, equipment, materials and services to support its nuclear power programme was now being established.

55. Mr. PERESSIN (Holy See) observed that the Conference was being held at a time when humanity was asking ever more searching questions about the

value, significance and use of atomic energy, and its consequences, not only for the present time but also for the generations to come. Thanks to the discovery of atomic energy, twentieth-century man now had in his hands the great but frightening power of either improving the world he lived in or of destroying the whole of humanity.

56. The Agency's annual report for 1980 indicated that the total installed nuclear capacity in the world had increased by about 11%. That development had been greeted by some as a great step forward, but was looked at askance by others. The uncertainties, doubts and even open hostility manifested in certain quarters had forced some Governments to cut down, to suspend or at least to retard the expansion of nuclear power.

57. The use of nuclear energy, even for peaceful purposes alone, was not proof against certain doubts stemming from its very nature. In addition, the debate was rendered even more complex by elements of interpretation that differed strongly. Some people, on the basis especially of ecological considerations, wished to bring nuclear technology into the general stream of modern science and technology. Others wondered whether it was really a good thing that man should use all the possibilities that science revealed to him.

58. The nuclear energy debate perhaps showed more widely than any other the uncertainty and in some cases the bewilderment of a society that was scientifically and technologically advanced, but which was not sure what criteria to adopt and what use to make of its knowledge, discoveries and power.

59. The questions at issue being so complex, the present debate demanded to be tackled on a world-wide scale, on the basis of rigorous scientific research, with alert awareness of the human values involved, and with responsible political orientation.

60. The debate likewise called for an attitude inspired by complete truthfulness. While it had to go beyond mere emotionalism and preconceived ideas, it also had to avoid one-sided or partial information and also the possibility of its being manipulated for the advantage of particular interests, whether economic or political. It had to be realized that, without truthfulness and objectivity, ordinary people could not be expected to give their consent, and still less to offer the solidarity needed for the carrying out of options as important and full of consequences as the development of nuclear energy.

61. The more one reflected on the information that the Agency had provided, the more convincing was the argument that the search had to continue and that scientific exchanges had to go on. The commitment to continued scientific and technological research was obviously not isolated from the practical realities of political options and economic considerations. But it was important to stress that one of the great aims of the Agency was to foster that research and to encourage the commitment of talents which would not only open up new capabilities, but which would also promote greater safety and sounder understanding of the enormous power represented by nuclear energy.

62. Of particular interest and importance among the many scientific meetings sponsored by the Agency would be the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience to be held in 1982. The delegation of the Holy See expressed the hope that the Conference would be carefully prepared, with the effective collaboration of scientists, technologists and experts, and also of the leaders of the international community.

63. The Agency was called upon to play an important part in the present debate on nuclear energy. Through its many programmes, through the activities of its scientific experts, through its setting of safety standards and its enforcement of safeguards, it was contributing in so many ways to ensuring that nuclear energy was placed at the service of humanity and of the international community.

64. Its contribution would be seen to be of capital and decisive importance for the good of humanity if the Agency could convince the international community and public opinion that it had the competence, capacity and means to engage in, develop and control the safe, beneficent and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

65. Together with other institutions, the Agency was implementing in that field a programme aimed at ensuring that the exploitation and application of nuclear energy did not involve unacceptable risks. In that regard, it had to be stressed that the notion of risk referred, first and foremost, to man and his environment. That principle, which was self-evident and concerning which there was an ever growing awareness, had constantly to be borne in mind in all nuclear options and activities, and had to prevail over all other considerations of a purely economic, industrial and political nature.

66. The effectiveness of the Agency's system of safeguards deserved particular recognition. The present year had witnessed an attack by one country on the



nuclear power installations of another, on the grounds that the latter State was developing - in contravention of international obligations undertaken - nuclear facilities for the building of an atomic bomb. Such an event could easily jeopardize the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the supervisory institution under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. The Agency had responsibility for clearly establishing that nuclear power plants constructed in various countries for the peaceful use of atomic energy were and could be used only for such purposes. The least possibility that the safeguards system administered by the Agency might not be foolproof, and the slightest suspicion that a non-nuclear-weapon State could - contrary to the provisions of NPT - acquire nuclear weapons, would be disastrous for the whole future of the system envisaged under the Treaty.

67. Under those circumstances, the delegation of the Holy See could only appeal to all States to let their actions be governed by the dictates of reason and by the need for stable peace in the world, according to the norms established by the United Nations Charter.

68. The delegation of the Holy See also wished to draw the Conference's attention to the crucial matter of nuclear weapons.

69. In the first place it had to be noted that the present international climate differed from the cautiously optimistic one prevailing after the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty (1967) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968).

70. A number of observers were now of the opinion that the existing international instruments were insufficient or inadequate for stopping the development of nuclear weapons, and no longer represented an effective stimulus for disarmament and peace. Dr. Eklund, the Director General of the Agency, in his statement at the twenty-fourth regular session of the General Conference in 1980, had made reference to the crisis in NPT and had expressed the hope that there would be "an early conclusion of a comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty" which on the one hand would be acceptable to those countries that now refused to accede to NPT and on the other hand would put a brake on vertical proliferation. Subsequently, the Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), in a statement presented at the meeting of OPANAL in Mexico City in April 1981, had observed that the failure of the Second NPT Review Conference demonstrated the existence of a possibly fatal

crisis in the system established by NPT, and he had added that the present situation called for reconsideration of the whole question of nuclear disarmament at the world-wide level.

71. The delegation of the Holy See was convinced of the need to overcome the present precarious situation in international relations, a situation based on the balance of terror and the system of deterrence.

72. There was no other rational path than that of disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons, by means of worldwide agreements supported by effective safeguards. It could of course be objected that the history, both ancient and more recent, of attempts at disarmament had proved to be a series of illusions and delusions. That demonstrated a fundamental truth: treaties were not effective unless they arose from and were sustained by a sincere and real desire for peace, because, in the final analysis, the danger and threat come not so much from the weapons as from him who had them in his hand: man.

73. Therefore it was man, and groups and nations, that should abandon myths of power and supremacy and be converted to a new order of international relationships based upon mutual respect, trust and collaboration. As John Paul II had warned at Hiroshima: "... the future of humanity depends, as never before, on our collective moral choices. ... from now on, it is only through a conscious choice and through a deliberate policy that humanity can survive".

74. In that spirit, the delegation of the Holy See called upon the Agency to commit itself resolutely and actively to sustaining and, when appropriate, promoting initiatives aimed at overcoming present tensions and at putting an end to the threat of nuclear weapons, from whatever source.

75. Mr. GHEZAL (Tunisia) said that, from the Agency's point of view, the year 1981 would unfortunately be remembered for the unjustifiable Israeli air attack on the Tammuz Nuclear Research Centre in Iraq, a country which was a Member of the Agency and a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which had submitted all its facilities and equipment to Agency safeguards.

76. That attack was a further illustration of the aggressive and expansionist policy of Israel, which, after depriving the Palestinian people of its homeland, occupying by force Arab territories which it wished to annex and visiting massive destruction and devastation on the Lebanon, was now setting itself up as the policeman of the Middle East. Further, while cynically trying to use

the attack to gain an electoral advantage, the Israeli Government had arrogated the right to forbid an independent State access to technology and science, threatened to repeat its offences against other Arab countries and shown no reluctance to jeopardize peace and safety in the region and throughout the world.

77. No one was now fooled by claims that Israel was anxious for its safety and feared the possibility of a nuclear threat from Iraq. Surely the Palestinian, Lebanese and other Arab peoples had much greater reason to fear for their safety? Israel had shown no sign that it adhered to non-proliferation. What the Member States were now faced with was the ideology of a nation which believed that for it everything was permissible, including the denial of the rights of all other peoples.

78. In judging the Israeli attack, the Director General had informed the Board of Governors on 12 June and the United Nations Security Council on 19 June that the Agency had inspected the Iraqi reactors and had found no evidence of any activity whatsoever which was not in conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite that, he continued, a country which was not a party to NPT had clearly remained unconvinced by the Agency's conclusions and its ability to continue to carry out its safeguards responsibilities effectively and had felt itself justified, in the interests of national security, to undertake military action. The Director General had concluded that the attack had also struck the Agency's safeguards system.

79. The Director General had pointed out earlier that the Agency had never been faced with a problem as serious as the consequences of that incident. He had also stressed that the Agency's safeguards system had never before been found wanting.

80. The Tunisian delegation felt that in view of the seriousness of the attack, which had also dealt a blow to the credibility of the Agency and its safeguards system, and in view of the open display of contempt for the Agency and its basic activities and for the Charter of the United Nations, the General Conference should follow the recommendation made by the Board of Governors on 12 June 1981 and take a decision to expel Israel from the Agency. Such a decision would be one simple method of defending the Agency and its objectives and was indeed necessitated by the urgent need to restore the Agency's credibility in the spheres he had just mentioned.

81. In his statement to the General Conference, Dr. Eklund had outlined the problems which the international community continued to face in its bid to meet constantly growing energy needs.

82. His delegation was grateful for the comprehensive and detailed picture he had given of the development of nuclear programmes throughout the world. That picture clearly indicated the full extent of the gap separating the industrialized and developing countries in the realm of the expertise and utilization of nuclear technology.

83. It was becoming increasingly urgent and necessary to use nuclear technology and energy, first, because of the need to satisfy the requirements of economic and social development and, secondly, because of the progressive exhaustion of the sources currently in use and the uncertainty and limitations of the alternatives.

84. In general, in attempting to establish and execute a nuclear power programme, a developing country found itself confronted not only with the difficulties associated with a conventional technology, which could be classified as those of a human or economic nature, those due to a lack of general scientific development and those stemming from inadequate knowledge of the technology in question, but also with the problems peculiar to the nuclear field, which had their roots in politics, ecology, safety and protection.

85. The purpose of establishing the Committee on Assurances of Supply had been to overcome some of those difficulties and rectify the present state of the international market, which - it was clear - did not offer conditions of assured and adequate supply. At the Committee's meetings, almost all participants had stated their views on the Committee's objectives and the procedure to be adopted in pursuing them.

86. The Tunisian delegation had also outlined certain guiding principles for the Committee's work and described the mechanisms to which that work should lead. It had stressed three points in particular. First, assured supplies of nuclear materials, equipment, services and technology must be guaranteed for all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Tunisia's priorities concerned the fields and techniques involved in the front end of the fuel cycle, which included areas such as mineral exploration, the treatment and purification of materials, nuclear metallurgy and radiation protection. In addition, as a

country bordering on the Sahara, Tunisia set great store by the contribution of nuclear energy to solving the serious problem of desertification and any progress made in desalination technology involving nuclear energy. Secondly, priority must be given to training. His delegation had recalled its support and the support of many other countries for the creation, under the auspices of the Agency, of an international nuclear technology centre designed to respond to the pressing needs of the developing countries. Thirdly, it was necessary to establish a climate of mutual confidence and genuine co-operation to achieve the assurance of free access to the required technology, material, equipment and services on the one hand, and adherence to agreements on the other.

87. The Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage and its working group on safeguards had held several meetings since the last session of the General Conference but, although some progress had been made, a large number of major questions were still outstanding.

88. While giving full support to the Agency's safeguards system, Tunisia would continue to denounce the imbalance between the funds allocated in the 1982 budget to the two principal activities of the Agency - an imbalance which was to the detriment of technical assistance. Rather than being subject to the uncertainties of voluntary contributions, technical assistance ought to be funded under the Regular Budget in the same way as safeguards.

89. He welcomed the Zimbabwe delegation; Zimbabwe's admission to the Agency would increase the number of African Member States. However, Africa was still under-represented on the Board of Governors. Both the Board and the General Conference had been discussing the amendment of Article VI.A.2 since 1977 in an attempt to overcome the serious under-representation of the areas of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia. It was high time that the number of seats allocated to those two areas was increased so that they could participate fully in the Agency's activities.

90. The Tunisian delegation supported the Syrian draft resolution on the amendment of Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously. The General Conference should recognize, as the United Nations and other international organizations had already done, the rightful place of Arabic - the official language of

22 countries (of which more than half were already Members of the Agency) and the cultural language of the entire Islamic world.

91. In connection with the problems facing the Board of Governors and the General Conference, the Tunisian delegation joined with other members of the Group of 77 in hoping that they would arrive at new solutions leading to fruitful collaboration in the interests of the Agency and all its Member States. In particular it was to be hoped that agreement would be reached on appointing someone from a developing country as new Director General, on amending Article VI.A.2 so as to increase the number of seats for Africa and the Middle East and South Asia, on financing technical assistance under the Regular Budget and on ensuring that a greater number of persons from developing countries were appointed as Secretariat staff members, especially at the higher levels.

92. Mr. EL AGIB (Sudan) observed that the Agency had made considerable progress in its safeguards activities, although many important countries still remained outside the scope of NPT.

93. An increase in technical assistance and in the transfer of technology and financial resources was necessary in order to meet the growing needs of the developing countries, to accelerate their development and to bridge the technological gap between them and the developed world. The efforts of the international community to establish a just international economic order would be further strengthened if the developed countries responded positively to the legitimate aspirations of the developing countries.

94. The President of Sudan had recently declared the 1980s a decade for "Building the Modern Scientific State - a Model for Sudan". The President had called on Sudanese scientists and intellectuals to prepare a programme to meet Sudan's objectives and invited contributions from the international community. It was hoped that all international organizations would bring their extensive experience in planning and policy-making to bear on that programme. One major objective was to use modern scientific approaches and techniques to improve the country's infrastructure and services and to renovate its production plant. It was also intended to make extensive use of training in order to assimilate modern technologies and to modernize indigenous technologies through a determined drive in the field of research and development. The draft programme would be presented at a conference to be held in Khartoum from 19 to

24 October 1981, to which experts from the international organizations were invited. The Agency and donor countries were urged to provide the necessary support and assistance so that specific programmes and projects could be implemented. The programme was directed at the basic sectors of the national economy, i.e. agriculture and its associated industry, energy and communications. Great importance was also attached to the popularization of science.

95. Sudan continued to use nuclear techniques in solving some of its wider development problems. From his country's own resources and through technical assistance provided by the Agency and from other sources, effective programmes had been developed to deal with agriculture, water resources, animal husbandry and medicine. Sudan was sharing its experience with neighbouring countries and had hosted Agency-sponsored trainees in nuclear medicine from those countries. Sudan looked forward to additional assistance in order to promote such technical co-operation between developing countries. Although modest progress had been made, the full potential of nuclear techniques in his country had not been exhausted, and Sudan could absorb more assistance from the Agency and other sources. In conclusion, his country attached very great importance to the Agency's technical assistance programme, which should remain flexible in order to accommodate the needs of the developing countries.

96. In supporting the Agency's budget for 1982, his delegation reiterated its firm view that technical assistance should be financed from the Regular Budget since that was the only way to provide regular and predictable support to the developing countries. For the same reason, the near-zero growth of the Regular Budget should not be achieved at the expense of technical assistance.

97. Moreover, it was to be hoped that the needs of the least developed countries would be accorded special priority. His delegation welcomed the proposal made by the Director General to the Board at its June series of meetings regarding the inclusion of an item on the agenda of a future Board meeting concerning the representation of the developing countries in the Professional and higher categories. United Nations General Assembly resolutions 33/143 and 35/210 had reaffirmed the need to increase the representation of the developing countries in the Professional category and especially in senior and policy-making posts. He hoped that the guidelines in question would help the Board to redress the balance in the Secretariat. In that context, and in accordance

with the principles of rotation and equitable geographical distribution, it was also high time for the developing countries to assume their responsibility for the leadership of the Agency.

98. The necessary amendment to Article VI.A.2 of the Statute was long overdue. If other agencies had already made the necessary amendments in their statutes, there was no reason why the Agency's Statute could not be amended to give developing countries and particularly Africa, which was the most under-represented region, fair representation. It was to be hoped that the necessary resolution to amend the Statute would be adopted before the twenty-sixth session of the General Conference.

99. Sudan condemned in the strongest possible terms the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and he wished to commend the Director General on his important statement to the Board concerning that matter. The Israeli attack had also been directed against the Agency's safeguards regime and against the efforts of the international community to curb the dangers of nuclear energy and to maintain peace and security. It was a flagrant violation of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations. It was also an expression of Israel's colonial, racist and expansionist policies in Palestine and the Arab countries. It was not surprising that Israel continued to refuse to accede to NPT and maintained close nuclear collaboration with South Africa, which had also made an unprovoked attack recently, against Angola. His country strongly supported the expulsion of Israel and South Africa from the Agency. Although his country believed in the universality of the membership of the Agency, that principle should apply only to those countries which valued the ideals of universality and respected the Statute of the Agency and the Charter of the United Nations.

100. Sudan fully supported the adoption of Arabic as one of the official and working languages of the Agency. Arabic had contributed tremendously towards the advancement of science and was already an official and working language of the United Nations and many other agencies and organizations. The introduction of Arabic would help the Arab countries to enjoy a closer relationship with the Agency and thus contribute more effectively to the realization of the Agency's objectives.

101. Mr. GEORGE (Australia) said that the past year had been one of steady development in the Agency's responsibilities and one in which the Agency had increasingly been the subject of international attention. Despite the growing complexity of its tasks and the budgetary constraints within which it had had to operate, progress had been made in the handling of a range of difficult tasks, including the administration of a large and growing technical assistance programme. Australia appreciated the fact that technical assistance was to remain a growth area.

102. The Agency's safeguards responsibilities were also increasing. Indeed, when technical assistance had its intended effect, and as nuclear power represented a growing proportion of world energy production, the extent and cost of the Agency's safeguards work would increase commensurately.

103. During the past year, Egypt had ratified NPT and the relevant safeguards agreement had been drawn up. Australia warmly welcomed that action and hoped that it would encourage universal acceptance of NPT, which remained the most effective instrument available to the international community for reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. At the same time, Australia welcomed further developments in the Agency's safeguards relationship with certain of the nuclear-weapon States, and had noted with appreciation that certain non-NPT countries in Latin America and Western Europe had accepted a broader range of safeguards obligations. There was room, however, for some rationalization of arrangements in order to facilitate safeguards procedures and enhance confidence in the system.

104. Progress had been made in narrowing the gap between safeguards goals and safeguards application. Moreover, through the co-operation of Member States and regional organizations there had been progress in the development of safeguards for sensitive facilities. Australia acknowledged, however, that there were practical problems associated with the significant increase in the number of nuclear facilities requiring to be safeguarded and, consequently, in the magnitude of the Agency's task in the application of safeguards. Also, the reluctance of some Members to finance safeguards adequately, despite the benefits of the system which accrued to the international community as a whole, was a matter of concern.

105. With regard to Australia's own nuclear activities, a number of developments had occurred. Australia's uranium mining industry continued to expand, with exports from new mines already making their contribution to world energy needs. Since the last session of the Conference, bilateral safeguards agreements with the United States of America, France, Sweden and Canada had entered into force and an agreement had been signed with EURATOM. Australia had concluded a total of nine agreements covering a total of 16 countries. In many of those agreements Australia had pioneered an approach to the exercise of consent rights over sensitive processes and retransfers. That was known as the "programme approach" to reprocessing, whereby it was agreed that relevant consent rights were exercised in advance and on a generic basis.

106. In addition, Australia was continuing its support for Agency safeguards through a bilateral programme involving the expenditure of US \$620 000 over a period of three years. The programme was making good progress. His Government would continue to provide firm support for the Agency's safeguards activities, convinced as it was of the importance of those activities to the cause of non-proliferation.

107. A number of unfavourable trends affecting the Agency's role had emerged, which his Government regretted. There had been a military attack by one Member State on the nuclear facilities of another Member State. That action had been promptly condemned by the Board of Governors. Furthermore, certain facilities which were sensitive from the proliferation point of view remained unsafeguarded, or inadequately safeguarded, thus denying the world community the full confidence which the Agency's safeguards role had been designed to give. The efficacy of the international safeguards system could be weakened by particular national attitudes and policies. In his view, all Member Governments had an interest in strengthening the safeguards system, and a responsibility to work to that end.

108. The other main responsibility of the Agency was the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind. Australia recognized that the provision of technical assistance that would enable developing countries to gain maximum advantage from nuclear energy was a high priority for the Agency, and it was aware that for the areas of the world which lacked sufficient energy the development and dissemination of energy technologies

were of great urgency. His Government had always accepted and stressed the importance of the Agency's technical assistance functions.

109. In 1981, Australia had discharged in full its obligation towards the Technical Assistance Fund by contributing in line with its base rate of assessment. Australia had also allocated US \$114 000 for projects under the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA). Further assistance to the value of US \$345 000 had been made available to Malaysia under a bilateral programme for the training of 54 personnel at the Australian Atomic Energy Commission Research Establishment at Lucas Heights.

110. The RCA Isotope Hydrology Project, in which Australia played a major role, had continued to record positive results throughout 1981. Australia's "in principle" commitment to participate in the RCA Regional Project on the Industrial Applications of Isotopes was a further indication of its continuing commitment to the provision of technical assistance to developing countries. Also, Australia would contribute US \$296 000 - the full amount corresponding to its base rate of assessment - to the Technical Assistance Fund in 1982.

111. The developing countries' desire for more predictability in the provision of technical assistance by the Agency and for increased levels of funding was legitimate. His country would be concerned, however, if debate on future methods of funding were to obscure the progress made in recent years, for instance by the setting of indicative planning figures, which provided for annual increases in the size of the Fund exceeding those in the Regular Budget allocations for safeguards. Australia would continue to give high priority to the provision of nuclear technical assistance in all its forms, but disbursements must continue to be determined voluntarily, in the context of domestic economic considerations, policy priorities, the performance of the Agency, and the demands of its Members.

112. Optimum efficiency of the Agency's technical assistance programme should be achieved by setting objectives and targets realistically and in accordance with the needs of developing countries. Efficiency in the implementation of that programme would enhance the continuity of its funding. As the programme grew, there would be a corresponding need to improve the Agency's capacity to evaluate and review projects.

113. Australia was firmly committed to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. It had therefore been active in the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and the International Plutonium Storage (IPS) and International Spent Fuel Management efforts, which were aimed at strengthening international assurances of non-proliferation and nuclear supply.

114. Australia acknowledged the importance of stable international nuclear trade to the development of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Modest progress had been made in the Committee on Assurances of Supply over the past year; the Committee was developing into a valuable forum for the discussion of nuclear supply and non-proliferation questions. Australia would help to develop common approaches to non-proliferation conditions of supply meeting the interests of both consumers and suppliers. The Committee also had a key contribution to make to the preparations for the 1983 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

115. The international community was as concerned as it had ever been about the threat of nuclear proliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries would create a major setback to international trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and would have serious consequences for peace and stability. International confidence that nuclear trade would not be disrupted on non-proliferation grounds increased in proportion to international confidence in measures against proliferation. Conversely, supply based on respect for non-proliferation objectives was jeopardized by actions which did not properly respect those objectives.

116. Australia had hoped for greater progress in the IPS Expert Group over the past year beyond the substantial measure of agreement which already existed, and continued to accord priority to the Expert Group's work as an additional means of reducing proliferation risks. Prior assessment by the Agency of requests for the return of plutonium and effective verification of end-use were fundamental to an IPS scheme. Australia would continue to take part in the exploration of practical alternatives which might serve to resolve the issues remaining before the Expert Group.

117. Australia had noted with pleasure the progress of the International Spent Fuel Management study. The examination of technical and institutional aspects

of the storage of spent fuel on both a national and an international basis would help to improve spent fuel management in the future.

118. The budget for 1982 took into account the need for additional resources to ensure implementation of priority programmes while limiting real growth to a minimum, for which thanks were due to the Director General and the Secretariat. The need to effect economies would remain pressing, involving the Agency in a continuing process of review and reassessment. Particular attention should be given to minimizing growth in the costs of administration. His country would co-operate in every way in ensuring maximum programme implementation at a minimum of cost.

119. As regards the Agency's other programmes, it was desirable that, as far as possible, Member States should adopt consistent standards applicable to nuclear safety and to health and environmental protection. The Agency had an important role to play in formulating such standards. Australia would continue to lend strong support to the work of the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme, and especially the efforts to ensure the effective implementation of the NUSS documents in Member States. It was also necessary for the Agency to be active in recommending international standards and guidelines relating to radioactive waste management and the transport of radioactive materials. In those areas, too, emphasis should be placed on measures to assist in the implementation of standards and guidelines.

120. Another valuable Agency activity was the promotion of programmes aimed at increasing the use of radioisotopes and radiation techniques in developing countries. In South East Asia and the Pacific, that activity was being largely facilitated under the Regional Co-operative Agreement.

121. Insofar as Australia's own research activities were concerned, promising progress was being made in developing the SYNROC process for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste.

122. The Agency, through its safeguards system, provided the confidence which the international community sought about the peaceful use of nuclear energy and also the basic framework for international nuclear trade and technical co-operation. All Member States had a fundamental stake in the effective and stable operation of the Agency. In order to play its role, the Agency would continue to need the full support of all Member States.

123. Lastly, he commended the Agency's Secretariat for the manner in which it carried out its responsibility of implementing the Agency's programme despite various constraints; in particular he wished to pay a tribute to the Director General, Dr. Eklund, who had ably guided the Agency for the preceding twenty years. The present development of the Agency's programmes and activities was a fitting tribute to the efforts of the Director General.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

