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Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna  
on Monday, 21 September 1981, at 3.20 p.m.

President: Mr. XUTO (Thailand)

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\*\*/ GC(XXV)/640.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXV)/INF/201/Rev.2.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FUND FOR 1982

1. The PRESIDENT said that according to the Statute technical assistance was one of the principal functions of the Agency. Activities under that programme had increased considerably over the years but their extent and the method of financing them continued to be the subject of intense debate amongst Member States. Since the previous year, the Board of Governors had tried to make the technical assistance budget more predictable and more stable so as to permit better planning and in particular a better evaluation of the needs of Member States through multi-year predictions of available sources. It was extremely important to know as soon as possible whether the target adopted for 1982 would be achieved. In order to permit an early assessment of the total funds available, all delegations who were in a position to do so were urgently requested to announce the voluntary contributions to be made by their countries before the end of the session. He would then be able to report that a large percentage of the target figure for 1982 had been reached.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GENERAL CONFERENCE

2. The PRESIDENT said that Article V.E.4 of the Statute required the General Conference to examine the annual report irrespective of the decisions taken on the other items on the provisional agenda. He therefore proposed that the provisions of Rule 42(a) of the Rules of Procedure should be waived and the Conference proceed immediately to the general debate, while waiting for the meeting of the General Committee which would examine the provisional agenda.

3. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980 (GC(XXV)/642, 642/Corr.1, 642/Corr.2)

4. Mr. DAVIS (United States of America) reaffirmed the central importance of the Agency as the principal international institution devoted to realizing the peaceful uses of atomic energy under safe and secure conditions and expressed his heartfelt appreciation to Mr. Eklund for the capable way in which he had led the Agency over so many years. It was of great importance for the success of the Agency's mission to have at its head an effective Director General who enjoyed unanimous support. It was to be hoped that a new Director General would be appointed before the end of the session.

5. He then read to the General Conference the following message from the President of the United States of America:

"On behalf of the American people I send warm greetings to all participants at the twenty-fifth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"As this session opens, the international nuclear community continues to face major challenges. Nuclear energy offers the prospect and the promise of helping many nations achieve greater energy abundance and security. At the same time, it is more apparent than ever before that we must remain vigilant in preventing the misuse of nuclear technology and material. The proliferation of nuclear explosives will threaten international security. The United States is firmly committed to meeting these challenges.

"The International Atomic Energy Agency has a critical role in promoting the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, protecting against its misuse, and contributing to international security. World attention will continue to focus on the Agency's role. Success requires an effective and credible safeguards system.

"As noted in my July 16 policy statement on non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear co-operation, I am committed to strong support of the Agency and to active international co-operation in the civil nuclear field.

"At home in the United States, my Administration is determined to create a climate that would permit a revitalization of civil nuclear power without compromising health and safety. I am confident that nuclear power will be an important energy source for the United States and other nations. Internationally, we are determined to strengthen the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier under effective safeguards, at the same time that we work together to avoid the spread of nuclear explosives. We will also work towards verifiable and equitable nuclear arms control to reduce the chances of nuclear war.

"I extend my best wishes to the participants at the Conference and wish you every success in your constructive efforts."

6. Describing the new look in the nuclear energy policy of the United States, he noted that, first, the United States Government, working in close collaboration with industry, was endeavouring to breathe new life into the domestic nuclear energy programme, which had lost its momentum during the preceding years. Secondly, the Government was well aware that, in an inter-dependent world, other nations were seriously affected by its nuclear and energy policies and its attitude towards nuclear exports. It was therefore determined to be a major participant in international nuclear affairs and to

co-operate actively with other countries, working on the principle that nuclear energy was an essential element for ensuring energy supplies and guaranteeing the economic development of many countries. Thirdly, it believed that the full benefits of nuclear power could only be realized if the non-proliferation regime was maintained and strengthened.

7. In many respects, the health of the United States nuclear programme was linked to domestic economic recovery. That was why the Government was actively working to bring down inflation, and it had already made significant progress in that direction.

8. The light-water reactor (LWA) had proved to be a stable and reliable energy source and its fuel efficiency had been substantially improved. The United States Government would try to promote accelerated use of such reactors by improving the regulatory, safety and financial climate in which the United States industry had to function.

9. The lessons drawn from the events at Three Mile Island were being incorporated into plant design and operation, and the goal of the United States was to further reduce the already low probability of nuclear accidents. The possibilities of streamlining licensing procedures without compromising safety was being explored and the new measures would be put into effect as soon as possible. The United States was also expanding its uranium enrichment capacity - a step which would enable it to remain a major supplier of enrichment services.

10. In connection with the safe disposal of radioactive waste, a detailed evaluation of a limited number of possible sites for underground depositories situated in stable geological formations was under way and the United States hoped to be able to pass to the demonstration stage at the beginning of the 1990s.

11. It was seeking ways to overcome regulatory, economic and political barriers to the establishment of a private industry for the reprocessing of spent LWR fuel. Such reprocessing was essential for the commercial deployment of breeders. For economic and non-proliferation reasons, however, the number of reprocessing plants in the world was expected to be limited. The United States was now moving forward again with the development of breeders so that they would be available when needed. Since in the last analysis, the future of

breeders would depend on the attitude of domestic industry, the United States Government would invite industrial concerns to play a major role in defining the future nature of the programme. All those steps should lead to new orders for LWRs and re-establish momentum towards the development of advanced technologies.

12. On the international front, the United States intended to re-establish its role as a reliable supplier of nuclear equipment, fuel services and technology under appropriate safeguards and controls. Since it was essential that countries which made large investments in nuclear plants should enjoy long-term security of supplies, the United States Government would operate to facilitate long-term planning by its partners.

13. At the same time, the United States intended to combat vigorously the risks of proliferation. Apart from the evident danger which it represented to the security of all countries, the spread of nuclear weapons would jeopardize the ability of all Member States to profit fully under co-operation arrangements from the advantages offered by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, the United States considered that material violation of safeguards agreements or the explosion of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapon State would have profound consequences for international order and for bilateral relations with the United States.

14. The United States would continue to support the accession of new countries to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Tlatelolco Treaty, which were critical cornerstones of the international non-proliferation system. The President of the United States had announced that he would seek the Senate's advice and consent for the ratification of Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The United States would also continue to give preference, as far as technical assistance was concerned, to countries which were parties to those treaties. It would also continue to seek a consensus on the principle that the application of Agency safeguards to all the nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States should be a condition for any significant new supply commitment. In any event, no significant transfer of nuclear equipment, materials or technology should be made without the application of safeguards. The Agency's safeguards system was obviously essential for the international non-proliferation regime.

15. The key to the success of the Agency was often the ability of all Member States to exclude extraneous political considerations from the Agency's work. In connection with the initiatives which certain Members intended to take following the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor the previous June, it should be noted that any punitive action in that sense could do great harm both to the Agency, which was a technical organization, and to the non-proliferation regime as a whole. His Government would view such punitive action with grave concern.

16. The United States delegation strongly urged that the Agency and its Members should instead promote universality of the safeguards system and strengthen its effectiveness. It would be necessary still further to improve surveillance and containment measures and the application of safeguards to bulk handling facilities and continuously fuelled reactors. Safeguards inspectors should be charged to perform their duties rigorously and should recognize the trust that had been placed in them by the world community. For its part, the United States would continue to provide the Secretariat with the results of its extensive research and development programme on safeguards. It would also support work in progress aimed at the possible development of an international plutonium storage system, which might provide useful supplements to the Agency's safeguards. The Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) could also prove a valuable instrument for achieving better mutual understanding and confidence in the field of nuclear trade.

17. The United States Senate had recently voted in favour of the United States acceding to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and it was to be hoped that many other countries would ratify that instrument. The United States also intended to continue working with others for the replacement of highly enriched uranium by low-enriched uranium as a fuel for research reactors, and for the development of methods for enhancing the security of the international transport of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

18. The technical assistance programme and the international training courses would continue to receive the strong support of the United States. In collaboration with the Secretariat, the United States would develop new manpower training programmes for countries intending to establish a national nuclear power industry.

19. The United States delegation continued to hope that a multilateral convention on nuclear safety co-operation and mutual emergency assistance would be negotiated.

20. The nuclear policy of the United States rested on three principles: firstly, the creation of a favourable climate for revitalization of the United States domestic nuclear power programme; secondly, the assignment of high priority to the international non-proliferation regime; thirdly, a firm commitment to international co-operation, including the determination to be a reliable nuclear supplier. The United States delegation hoped that the Agency would continue to play a central role in those three areas. The achievements of the Agency had been unmatched in the past and it was up to the Member States to ensure that they were even better in the years to come.

21. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said it was a matter for regret that the Board of Governors had not yet been able to settle the fundamental question of the appointment of a new Director General. He hoped that the Board would ultimately come to a decision, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical distribution, both on the Board and in the Secretariat, and also the necessity of promoting technical assistance. In addition, he was in favour of an amendment of Rule 86 of the Conference's Rules of Procedure which would make it possible to include Arabic among the official and working languages of the General Conference.

22. In the name of the Government of Iraq he wished to affirm that all countries had an inalienable right to develop the peaceful applications of nuclear energy independently and without hindrance. That right was recognized by the Agency's Statute, notably Article II, and by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Article IV in particular. Both the Statute and NPT ensured that all Member States had the right to engage in the economic and technological development of their peaceful nuclear activities under Agency safeguards designed to ensure that those activities would never serve military purposes. Iraq had tried to utilize the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for its own development, while respecting both the Statute and NPT. Iraq had been party to NPT since 1970; it had signed a general

safeguards agreement in 1972, and the Agency had since then been applying safeguards to all of Iraq's nuclear activities. The Agency had always considered that Iraq was fulfilling its obligations, and Iraq had always co-operated fully with the Agency by participating in the sessions of the General Conference and in meetings of the Board of Governors and its various committees, notably CAS; also it had participated in studies such as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), as well as in numerous seminars and scientific conferences organized under the auspices of the Agency. The Government of Iraq had invariably discharged its financial obligations and had always co-operated with the Agency in an effort to ensure an appropriate balance between promotional and safeguards activities.

23. Iraq attached special importance to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had concluded bilateral co-operation agreements with several Member States - notably with France, in 1975, with a view to developing co-operation between the two countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, subject to existing bilateral and international arrangements concerning non-proliferation. A number of facts relating to that co-operation deserved to be recalled: France, though it had not signed NPT, had invariably said that it would act as though it were a party to the Treaty and would moreover ensure that effective non-proliferation measures were applied to transfers of nuclear technology to any second party. The Franco-Iraqi co-operation agreement provided that Agency safeguards should be applied to all equipment and nuclear materials transferred, even if Iraq should cease to be a party to NPT. Under that co-operation agreement Iraq had accepted measures - in particular physical protection measures applicable to all materials and equipment furnished by France - which went well beyond the requirements of NPT. That was a fact familiar both to EURATOM and the Agency. Furthermore, Iraq and France had concluded a co-operation agreement in the area of peaceful nuclear research with a view to making joint use of the installations constructed by France in Iraq. That being so, French personnel would always have been present on the site if the reactor had entered into service. Finally, Iraq had entered into negotiations with other countries in the hope of establishing co-operation in peaceful scientific research with them, too.

24. Despite all those measures, Israel, which was not a party to NPT and had refused on a number of occasions to allow safeguards to be applied to its nuclear installations, had bombarded the Iraqi nuclear research centre on 7 June 1981, seriously damaging certain installations and causing loss of human life among both Iraqi and French personnel. That aggression, universally condemned, had been judged to be particularly serious by the international community. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, had immediately declared his profound concern at an attack that was contrary to international law, an attack which deserved condemnation not only because it was extremely serious in itself, but also because it would have grave consequences for international peace and security. On 10 June 1981, replying to an intervention by the representative of Israel at the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim had again stated that the Israeli attack might have serious consequences for international peace and security, for which he bore clearly defined responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. The Secretary-General had also said that the attack called NPT into question, and in particular the Agency's system of safeguards and inspections, required by the Treaty, which had in fact been applied to the Iraqi nuclear facility.

25. Recalling that the Board of Governors had made known its views on the issue at its series of meetings beginning on 9 June, he requested the Secretariat to distribute the records of the 564th, 565th, 566th and 568th meetings of the Board.

26. The Israeli military action, the first of its kind against a nuclear plant, increased the danger of nuclear war by adding the new dimension of a preventive strike. It constituted a flagrant violation of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations as well as an attack upon the Agency, its objectives, its responsibilities and its safeguards system, and it was a serious blow to the credibility of NPT. It set a very dangerous precedent in international relations, for co-operation between Israel and South Africa already existed - among other things in the nuclear field - and South Africa could well resort to a similar act of aggression in order to prevent the African States from developing their science and technology. It was thus clear that Israel was guilty of violating its obligations under the Statute, particularly under Article IV.B.

27. Furthermore, the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear installations was just one more in a series of premeditated crimes and acts of aggression against personnel and facilities belonging to Iraq. As soon as the Franco-Iraqi mutual co-operation agreement had been signed in 1975, Israel had launched a press campaign aimed at undermining NPT and the Agency's safeguards system, discrediting France's commitment to act as if it were a party to NPT and convincing the world that France was helping Iraq to make an atomic bomb. In 1979 Israeli agents had, by acts of sabotage, procured the destruction in France of equipment destined for Iraq. Two Iraqi scientists had died in mysterious circumstances at Geneva and Paris, and an Egyptian physicist associated with the project had been assassinated in Paris. French and Italian experts working on projects with Iraq, together with their families, had been threatened with death. Bombs had been planted and exploded in offices in Rome. Israeli aircraft had staged a preliminary aerial attack on the Iraqi nuclear centre on 27 September 1980. The Richter case was another example of the unceasing effort by Israel and its supporters to undermine the credibility of the safeguards regime. Moreover, the Israeli Prime Minister had told the world that his American-made aircraft stood ready to destroy the Iraqi reactor again if it were rebuilt.

28. The arrogance of Israel could only be explained by the help it was constantly receiving from the United States of America. Two months after the attack the United States had resumed its supply of F-16 military aircraft to Israel and had even formed a strategic alliance with the aggressor. The Security Council's efforts to apply sanctions to Israel had been frustrated by the veto power of the United States. The Security Council had nevertheless adopted a resolution calling upon Israel to submit all its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards, but that appeal had been immediately rejected by Israel.

29. All those actions constituted persistent violations of the provisions of the Agency's Statute, and thus made it plain that Israel had no right to be a Member of the Agency. To invoke the principle of universality in that connection was to contradict the provisions of the Statute, Article IV.C in particular. Moreover, under Article XIX.B any Member which persistently violated the provisions of the Statute could be suspended by the General Conference from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership.

30. Israel had violated the principle of sovereign equality by arrogating to itself the right to judge unilaterally the nuclear intentions and actions of other States and by taking the law into its own hands, even while exempting its own clandestine nuclear activities from international inspection and safeguards.

31. If condemnation of that criminal act was not followed by sanctions such as expulsion, if Israel was allowed to continue to enjoy the privileges and rights of membership in the Agency, if the Israeli act of aggression went unpunished - then a very serious blow would have been dealt to the IAEA and NPT. All who defended the continued membership of Israel in the Agency would be implicitly condoning the Israeli attack and would be violating their non-proliferation obligations, particularly with regard to co-operation in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

32. It was the solemn duty of the General Conference to act powerfully in defence of NPT, the Agency and the safeguards system, and in defence of the inalienable right of all States to develop research in the nuclear energy field, and the production and use of nuclear energy, for peaceful purposes. It was absolutely essential to expel Israel from the Agency. Failure to take steps in that direction would have profound consequences for the future of the Agency.

33. Mr. MANLEY (United Kingdom) noted with satisfaction that the General Conference had approved Zimbabwe's application for membership of the Agency and welcomed the accession of another Member State of the Commonwealth.

34. Describing the progress of nuclear energy and the substantial increase in the use of radioactive isotopes in medicine, industry, food and agriculture in the last 20 years, he pointed out that those accomplishments were largely due to the efforts of the Agency and particularly to the Director General, whom he thanked on behalf of the United Kingdom.

35. Energy needs in the year 2000 could only be met if there were a very sizable increase in the role played by nuclear power. Unfortunately, the new opportunities coincided with a wavering of public confidence. In those circumstances, the Agency must continue to fulfil the dual role which it had been assigned when it was established by promoting the civil applications of nuclear energy while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The adoption of nuclear power policies which would be accepted by the public was the responsibility of Governments. The Agency should continue to draw up standards and recommendations on the basis of which Governments would be able to demonstrate that nuclear power could, with confidence, be regarded as a key element in national energy policies. It was of great importance that the Agency maintain the proper emphasis on its two objectives. Whatever their state of development, all Member States had an interest in each of those objectives since they were both vital to mutual confidence in nuclear power in the world as a whole.

36. It was important to countries to have the assurance that trade in nuclear materials was not a threat to security and peace. In that respect, his Government welcomed the progress made by the Committee on Assurances of Supply and would contribute to the development of mechanisms which would permit nuclear trade to flow more freely under reliable and equitable non-proliferation arrangements.

37. If nuclear energy were to play its full part, two basic conditions had to be satisfied. First, arrangements for international nuclear trade must be secure, transparent and predictable so that the development of nuclear energy would not be jeopardized by delays or interruptions in the supply of nuclear

equipment and materials. In that context, his delegation welcomed the policies of some of the major uranium suppliers, particularly the declaration by the United States of America that it would once again become a reliable supplier. The second condition was that the suppliers and the international community generally must have adequate assurances that freer international trade in nuclear materials would not increase the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. Progress towards an improved and universal non-proliferation regime, including the safeguards system, would facilitate trade in nuclear material and equipment. At the same time, if the supplier countries introduced more reliable supply arrangements the customer countries would have less incentive to set up independent fuel cycles.

38. The United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to be held in Geneva in 1983 would help establish better international understanding of the problems of public acceptance, non-proliferation, supply arrangements and economic restraints.

39. Speaking on behalf of the Member States of the European Community, he recalled that those States had already strongly condemned the Israeli action and remained deeply concerned at its consequences. Iraq was a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all of its nuclear activities were therefore under Agency safeguards. Those safeguards were being applied to the facilities in a normal and satisfactory way: inspections had taken place as planned. He noted that the Agency intended to carry out further inspections when conditions at the site permitted, and reaffirmed the strong support of the Member States of the European Community for the Agency's safeguards system and their full confidence in its efficacy.

40. The United Kingdom had, in its own right, already condemned the Israeli attack particularly because it called into question the Agency's safeguards system. The concept of international safeguards applied by the Agency was essential to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to the prevention of proliferation. He therefore appealed to States which had not yet done so to accept Agency safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.

41. It would be desirable to consider whether future steps could be taken to enhance the non-proliferation regime without impeding nuclear trade by introducing additional controls. One possibility would be to consider reducing significantly the response times of Member States and institutions to a signal from the Department of Safeguards that diversion might have occurred and the practical form that the response might take.

42. Member States must continue to verify the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system, especially in view of the increasing number of facilities and the problems that entailed for the Agency and its resources. Member States should support the Agency's efforts to rectify shortages if the credibility of the system were to be maintained. To that end, the United Kingdom had offered the Agency a support programme for safeguards amounting to £600 000 for each of the three years from 1981 to 1983.

43. The Agency's activities regarding the safety of nuclear facilities and their effect on the health of workers and the general public should be increased. His delegation considered the Agency's guides and recommendations to be particularly useful, and welcomed in particular the revision of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection.

44. His Government recognized the value of the technical assistance programme for the world's less developed areas and noted with satisfaction that the resources available to the Agency for technical assistance in 1980 had increased by 27% by comparison with 1979. For its part, despite budgetary restraint, it could support the substantial increase in the target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund, which was fixed at US \$16 million for 1982, as well as the indicative planning figure of US \$19 million for 1983. In addition, the United Kingdom Government would contribute US \$1 million in the coming years for assistance to developing countries which were either parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or had accepted similar obligations.

45. Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he wished to begin by welcoming the delegation of Zimbabwe. Recent events had re-emphasized the importance of sufficient and secure energy supplies for the economic and political stability of all nations. In June 1981 the economic summit at Ottawa had stressed the need for countries to conserve fossil fuels and to be less dependent on oil in order to achieve greater energy security.

He referred to a resolution adopted at that summit encouraging greater public acceptance of nuclear energy. The United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, held at Nairobi in August 1981, had underlined the possibilities for using alternative energy sources and had called for further action within the framework of the United Nations. Energy would certainly be one of the key topics for future global negotiations. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with its vast and proven potential both for the industrialized and for the developing countries, should therefore be promoted, and the Agency should continue to play a central role in encouraging the development of that indispensable energy source.

46. With regard to the energy situation in the Federal Republic of Germany, his Government's measures aimed at reducing the consumption of energy, and particularly of oil, had begun to yield results. During the first six months of 1981, primary energy consumption had been reduced by 5.8% compared to the same period in 1980, and oil consumption had dropped by approximately 13%. The share of oil in overall energy consumption in 1981 was estimated at less than 47%, the lowest figure for 15 years. However, the level of oil imports remained high enough to place a heavy burden on the balance of payments. The policy of saving and substituting for oil was, therefore, being vigorously pursued. Nuclear energy accounted for approximately 18% of electricity generated, and that percentage would be increased in the future. His Government was taking measures to simplify and expedite licensing procedures.

47. Further progress had been achieved in the establishment of a commercial fuel cycle through, for instance, the expansion of the URENCO centrifuge capacities and the construction of the first production plant on a German site. Licensing procedures had begun for two interim storage facilities and for a reprocessing plant to be built in the State of Hesse. Deep drillings had been successfully concluded at Gorleben on the site of a potential radioactive waste repository.

48. In all fields relating to nuclear power production, including the fuel cycle, his Government's aim was that industry and especially the utilities should take over increased responsibility for the financing of commercial or demonstration projects such as the prototype high temperature and fast breeder reactors currently under construction and scheduled for commissioning in 1983 and 1985.



49. With regard to the controversy in his country surrounding nuclear energy, the discussion was turning more and more towards the risks and benefits of modern technologies as such and was becoming more rational and less violent. In that connection, the very satisfactory performance of commercial nuclear power plants and of the KNK II experimental fast breeder reactor at Karlsruhe should be stressed. Significant progress had also been made in designing research reactors using a recently developed low-enriched fuel; a first reactor of that type would be built in co-operation with Indonesia.

50. The interest shown by the Federal Republic of Germany in international co-operation in safety was demonstrated by the efforts being made by his Government, in collaboration with the United States of America and Japan, concerning an emergency core cooling project and by the construction of a facility for the vitrification of high-level nuclear waste in the EUROCHEMIC reprocessing plant at Mol, Belgium.

51. An effective policy of non-proliferation was essential in order to preserve regional and global stability and security. The Agency occupied a central position in that regard, and the implementation of its safeguards system played a leading role in all international non-proliferation undertakings. Every effort should therefore be made to enlarge the scope of application of political agreements - particularly NPT, which formed the basis for safeguards. His country welcomed the decision by the Government of Egypt to ratify NPT.

52. On 7 June 1981 a serious attack on a nuclear facility had taken place, and his Government shared the concern already expressed by the United Kingdom delegation on behalf of the European Communities. He remained convinced that only a policy based on the principle of renunciation of violence could lead to a permanent solution in the Middle East. After that attack, political attention throughout the world had been focused on the Agency's safeguards system and at times the reliability and efficiency of that system had been questioned. Nevertheless, the detailed report submitted by the Director General to the Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council had demonstrated that the Agency's safeguards had been applied satisfactorily. He was pleased to learn from the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1980 that, as in the past, the Agency had not detected any anomaly which would indicate the

diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material. As representative of a country with long and comprehensive experience of safeguards, he wished to reiterate his country's support for the safeguards system in general and to recall the active part his country played in safeguards activities, both in the working groups on safeguards for reprocessing and enrichment plants and through its support programme aimed at increasing the reliability of safeguards, improving the cost-benefit ratio and minimizing the burden on operators, the Agency and Member States.

53. The Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had made a promising start. The 50 or so participating States represented a wide range of levels of development of the nuclear industry, and it was quite clear that at the present stage of the discussions in CAS different approaches existed. Nevertheless, the first year of CAS had shown a considerable amount of common ground on key issues both of substance and of procedure. Practicable and reliable supply conditions were now generally recognized to be of paramount importance for stable international relations in the nuclear field. Furthermore, assurances of supply and safeguards against non-proliferation were clearly complementary. His country was aware of the confidence that CAS could generate and would therefore continue to contribute actively to its work.

54. The international storage of plutonium could lead to an improvement of the non-proliferation system. He was convinced that acceptable results could be achieved through patient negotiations, even if it was not easy to reach compromises on a number of key issues. His country, together with France and the United Kingdom, had therefore submitted a comprehensive proposal to the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage which seemed to have been well received.

55. The technical assistance programme was regarded as one of the main tasks of the Agency. The United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy at Nairobi had stressed the need to strengthen multilateral co-operation in order to enable all States to reduce their dependence on oil and to diversify their energy sources. The Agency had already shown how technology transfer in a particular field could be organized very effectively on the basis of carefully prepared programmes for specific projects. His Government firmly

supported the technical assistance programme not only by pledging its share of voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund but also by providing additional contributions for fellowships, experts and equipment, training courses and co-ordinated research programmes of special interest to the developing countries. Subject to parliamentary approval, his country would pay a total voluntary contribution of \$2.5 million in 1982. His country was following with great interest the Agency's study on how to provide effective practical training in nuclear technology.

56. The Federal Republic of Germany was pleased to know that nuclear safety had been accepted as one of the priority programmes. It would continue to co-operate actively with the Agency by providing experts and hosting expert meetings. The Nuclear Safety Standards programme was one of the most successful elements of the Agency's activities, and the Stockholm Conference held in October 1980 had been extremely useful. It had helped to clarify a number of safety issues of real importance and had also highlighted the need for increased co-operation in that field beyond national borders. Missions to promote the adoption and implementation of the Agency's Codes of Practice and Safety Guides were certainly valuable, especially for countries starting a nuclear programme.

57. The events of the past year had provided ample proof that the peaceful use of the atom and an effective non-proliferation policy remained topics of great priority and of great interest for all countries. The mandate and activities of the Agency were at the heart of those matters.

58. Lastly, he wished to refer to the work accomplished by the IAEA under the direction of Dr. Eklund, who had rendered invaluable service to the Agency and whose personality had been essential in inspiring the Agency's talented and dedicated staff with a great sense for the common cause.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.