



GC

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## TEXT OF A RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. On 19 June 1981 the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously adopted, under its agenda item "Complaint by Iraq", resolution 487(1981) concerning the military attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre and referring to the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Agency's Board of Governors and reproduced in document GC(XXV)/643. The text of the Security Council resolution is reproduced below.
2. The Director General was invited to participate in the debate of the Security Council on this matter. The text of the statement made by the Director General to the Security Council on 19 June 1981 is reproduced in the Annex.

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The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/2280,

Having noted the contents of the telegram dated 8 June 1981 from the Foreign Minister of Iraq (S/14509),

Having heard the statements made to the Council on the subject at its 2280th through 2288th meetings,

Taking note of the statement made by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Agency's Board of Governors on the subject on 9 June 1981 and his statement to the Council at its 2288th meeting on 19 June 1981,

Further taking note of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 12 June 1981 on the "military attack on the Iraq nuclear research centre and its implications for the Agency" (S/14532),

Fully aware of the fact that Iraq has been a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since it came into force in 1970, that in accordance with that Treaty Iraq has accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities, and that the Agency has testified that these safeguards have been satisfactorily applied to date,

Noting furthermore that Israel has not adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty,

Deeply concerned about the danger to international peace and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June 1981, which could at any time explode the situation in the area, with grave consequences for the vital interests of all States,

Considering that, under the terms of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations",

1. Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct;
2. Calls upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof;
3. Further considers that the said attack constitutes a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards régime which is the foundation of the non-proliferation Treaty;
4. Fully recognizes the inalienable sovereign right of Iraq, and all other States, especially the developing countries, to establish programmes of technological and nuclear development to develop their economy and industry for peaceful purposes in accordance with their present and future needs and consistent with the internationally accepted objectives of preventing nuclear-weapons proliferation;
5. Calls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
6. Considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel.
7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the implementation of this resolution.

A N N E X

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL TO THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 JUNE 1981

I regard the invitation extended to me by the Security Council to participate in its present debate as recognition of the importance of the statutory responsibilities of the IAEA. I am here today to report on the Agency's position regarding the consideration by the Security Council of the agenda item entitled "Complaint by Iraq" concerning the Israeli air attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, on 7 June. You will appreciate that my statement is naturally confined to only those aspects of the matter which directly pertain to the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I am, of course, at your disposal for any other relevant information on technical matters which you may wish in your consideration of this agenda item.

May I begin by recalling that this matter was considered by the Board of Governors of the IAEA last week, on 9 June and thereafter, at its regular session, as a special item entitled "Military attack on Iraqi nuclear research centre and its implications for the Agency". In this connection, the resolution adopted by the Board on 12 June as a result of its deliberations was placed before you in Security Council document S/14532 in accordance with the request of the Board. The Board also requested me to transmit to the Security Council the summary records of the relevant proceedings of the Board and these have been dispatched from Vienna to you.

I considered it my duty to report immediately to the Board of Governors of the Agency on this air attack, which is a source of grave international concern. In my statement at the opening meeting of the Board, on 9 June, I informed the Board that, according to the Agency's records, the following nuclear facilities exist in Iraq:

- (i) IRT-200, 2 MW(th), pool-type, light water moderated research reactor, using fuel with 10%, 36% and 80% enriched uranium. This reactor was supplied by the Soviet Union and came into operation in 1967. Agency inspections started in May 1973 following Iraq's adherence to the NPT and the subsequent conclusion of the required safeguards agreement. Since then

periodic inspections, the last of which was in January 1981, revealed no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement;

- (ii) TAMUZ-1 and TAMUZ-2 reactors, which are of the Osiris type.  
TAMUZ-1: 40 MW(th) tank-pool research reactor. TAMUZ-2: 500 kW(th) research reactor is associated with the TAMUZ-1 reactor. The fuel of these reactors has 93% enriched uranium. These two reactors have been supplied by France. The construction of the reactors was first inspected by Agency safeguards inspectors in September 1979. An initial quantity of fuel, containing about 12 kg of uranium, was delivered in June 1980 and inspected upon arrival. This fuel was inspected the last time in January 1981. These inspections revealed that no nuclear material was missing;
- (iii) Separate storage where natural and depleted uranium is stored. The storage was last inspected in January 1981 and all material was accounted for.

All these facilities and fuel are located at the Tuwaitha research centre and, as indicated above, are covered by Agency safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement between Iraq and the Agency. The task of the Agency in the implementation of safeguards is to verify that no safeguarded nuclear material is diverted from peaceful purposes. To this end the Agency develops for each facility under safeguards an approach for detecting, by accountancy and inspection at the facility, an anomaly which would indicate diversion, i.e. the absence of nuclear material which cannot be properly explained. In a research reactor of the type in question, two diversion strategies are technically possible and therefore have to be countered. The first consists in removing fuel elements and extracting the highly enriched uranium. Safeguards operations therefore in the first place have to ensure that fuel elements supplied from abroad are checked on arrival and that from that moment on continuity of knowledge is maintained regarding their location and integrity. The primary measures used for this purpose are counting of the fuel elements and their identification in order to detect dummies. The design of the facility and of the fuel elements is such that it provides assurance that the diversion of fuel elements would be detected easily.

The second possibility of diversion in a research reactor of the type in question is based on the undeclared production of plutonium. As the fuel elements consist of highly enriched uranium, only very small quantities of plutonium can be produced in them, and, of course, this plutonium would be under safeguards. Larger quantities of plutonium, perhaps up to the order of one significant quantity (8 kg) per year, could only be produced if the core of the reactor were in addition surrounded by a blanket of fertile elements made of natural or depleted uranium. The size and location of this blanket would certainly be such that ordinary visual inspection would reveal its presence.

It has been stated by the Israelis that a laboratory located 40 metres below the reactor (the figure was later corrected to four metres) which allegedly had not been discovered by IAEA inspectors was destroyed. The existence of a vault under the reactor which apparently has been hit by the bombing was well known to the inspectorate. This vault contains the control rod drives and has to be accessible to the staff for maintenance purposes. In order to protect the staff from radiation, the ceiling of the vault consists of a thick concrete slab which in turn is lined with a heavy steel plate, and therefore this space could not be used to produce plutonium.

Mr. President, Iraq has been a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty since it came into force, in 1970. In accordance with the Treaty, Iraq accepts Agency safeguards on all its nuclear activities. These safeguards have been satisfactorily applied to date, including during this period of armed conflict with Iran. The last safeguards inspection at the Iraqi nuclear centre took place in January of this year, and, as I stated earlier, all nuclear material was satisfactorily accounted for. This material included the fuel so far delivered for the TAMUZ reactors. Another regular safeguards inspection had been planned by the Agency for early June, but, taking into account the Board of Governors' and other meetings scheduled to be held in Vienna during the first part of June, it was postponed until the end of the month. In view of the attack it was decided to advance the date of inspection. The members of the Security Council will be interested to learn that Agency safeguards inspectors left a few days ago for Baghdad for the inspection of the Iraqi nuclear research centre. They returned today. According to a telephone conversation which I had early this morning with the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, the inspectors were not able

to approach the damaged storage facility because of suspected unexploded bombs. The Iraqi Government, however, suggested that the facility be inspected anyway on the condition that the inspectors sign a waiver removing all responsibilities from the Iraqi Government. The inspectors were not in a position to do this.

Mr. President, as I observed in my statement to the Board of Governors of the Agency, this attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre is a serious development with far-reaching implications. The International Atomic Energy Agency, since its establishment, has not been faced with a more serious matter as the implications of this development. The Agency's safeguards system was conceived as and is a basic element of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The same system of safeguards is applied to facilities covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty and facilities under bilateral safeguards agreements with the Agency.

The Agency's safeguards system is the product of extensive international co-operation. Its basic principles and modus operandi were devised, and are constantly upgraded, by foremost international experts in that field. Results of the application of the system are periodically reviewed by the Board of Governors and the General Conference and have not been found wanting. Its application is extremely wide. By the end of 1980 approximately 98% of the nuclear facilities of which the Agency was aware outside the nuclear-weapon States were under Agency safeguards.

In fulfilling its responsibilities the Agency has inspected the Iraqi reactors and has not found evidence of any activity not in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, a non-NPT country has evidently not felt assured by our findings and by our ability to continue to discharge our safeguarding responsibilities effectively. In the interest of its national security, as was stated by its leaders, it has felt motivated to take military action. From a point of principle, one can only conclude that it is the Agency's safeguards system which has also been attacked. This, of course, is a matter of grave concern to the International Atomic Energy Agency and has to be pondered well.