



International Atomic Energy Agency

GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC

GC(XXIV)/OR.220
February 1981*

GENERAL Distr.

ENGLISH

TWENTY-FOURTH REGULAR SESSION: 22-26 SEPTEMBER 1980

RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,
on Monday, 22 September 1980, at 3.10 p.m.

President: Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the provisional agenda**</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
6	General debate and annual report for 1979 (continued)	1 - 92
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	France	1 - 11
	Iraq	12 - 16
	Federal Republic of Germany	17 - 22
	India	23 - 33
	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	34 - 60
	United Kingdom	61 - 74
	Zaire	75 - 79
	Australia	80 - 92

*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 15 October 1980.

**/ GC(XXIV)/626.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in documents GC(XXIV)/INF/193/Rev.3, 193/Rev.3/Mod.1 and 193/Rev.3/Mod.2.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979 (continued)

1. Mr. PECQUEUR (France) said that the current energy crisis, the gravity of which had been emphasized by the eleventh World Energy Conference, made nuclear power even more indispensable. Decisions should be taken without delay to resolve that crisis instead of resigning oneself to the almost general slowing-down of nuclear programmes which was paradoxically taking place. As early as 1973 analyses had shown that all available energy resources must be utilized. The action taken at that time had been inadequate, and since 1979 the world had been suffering the consequences of a second oil crisis. Although they were affected in different ways, all countries should co-operate and mobilize their resources to satisfy the world's need for energy, which was expected to increase by 80% by the year 2000.

2. Oil would remain the primary source of energy. However, there was a danger that oil production would not increase as quickly as the demand because of constraints due to prices or production level limitations imposed by the exporting countries. The consequences of that shortfall might place a heavy strain on national economies and international economic relations.

3. Energy saving was another means of reducing the gap between supply and demand, and it had already shown some effect. However, wastage could not be suppressed indefinitely, and energy savings, which should not be taken to include those associated with economic decline, would call for ever greater investments as the number of possibilities decreased.

4. Thus, something must be found to replace oil. Although solar energy and biomass were promising, they could not provide real solutions before the end of the century, even if more funds were made available for research. Coal, in view of the size of the reserves and the production capacity, could constitute an important energy source, but constraints connected with the environment, the setting-up of infrastructures, financing problems and the sluggishness of demand were serious obstacles to an increase in production.

5. It was mainly nuclear power which could offer a solution. The installed nuclear capacity was already considerable, amounting to 122 GW(e) in the Western countries. It should be possible to increase its share in world energy production

to 15% by the end of the century, and even to 30% in certain industrialized countries such as France. Moreover, nuclear power was immediately available and competitive. Nevertheless, for several years, under the pressure of irrational arguments, the progress of world nuclear power generation had been slowing down. It was up to the industrialized countries - which in respect of nuclear energy bore a responsibility toward the developing countries comparable to that of the oil-exporting countries in relation to oil - to develop nuclear energy.

6. The French nuclear power programme showed that the production of nuclear energy could be expanded, since the installed capacity would reach 13 000 MW(e) by the end of 1980 and the share of nuclear power in total energy consumption should increase from 2% in 1975 to 20% in 1985. Vigorous programmes were being carried out in various fields. In that of breeder reactors, which offered independence of uranium supplies, the fast breeder Phénix, which had produced over 7500 million kilowatt-hours since start-up, and the prototype Super Phénix, the construction of which was half completed, deserved to be mentioned, as did technical and economic studies for other breeders which had already made much progress. As to fuel enrichment, EURODIF had recently attained a production capacity of 6 million separative work units (SWUs) per year, and construction of the last unit, which was to raise the annual capacity to 10.8 million SWUs in 1982, was being continued. Research on the chemical enrichment process had progressed, and it had shown that the method could compete with other techniques in small-scale facilities. Finally, spent fuel reprocessing was being carried out at Marcoule and La Hague under excellent conditions. The cycle of the Phénix plant had been closed, since the plutonium from the reprocessed fuel had been re-used in the Cadarache fuel assembly fabrication plant. In order to ensure optimum management of spent fuel, two light-water fuel reprocessing facilities of 800 tonnes per year each and high-level waste conditioning facilities modelled on the Marcoule vitrification plant were to be constructed at La Hague.

7. Nuclear power production could not be developed unless those responsible for it had confidence in that type of power. It was the Agency's task to create and maintain conditions under which nuclear power could develop without diversion to military purposes. France, true to its principles and aware of the role that nuclear power might play in world economic development, confirmed its intention to take part in that development and to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons. France was in favour of research on non-proliferative techniques, respect for national decisions justified on technical and economic grounds, development of an organized nuclear market which would assure users of a guaranteed supply at a reasonable price, and the peaceful use of transferred items.

8. France fully supported the Agency's activities. In particular, it was taking part in the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage which, it was hoped, would establish a storage system strengthening the application of safeguards to plutonium. The new Committee on Assurances of Supply should make it possible to establish a more stable regime in which national non-proliferation policies could be applied to exports and imports in a manner acceptable to both producer and consumer countries.

9. Confidence could not be strengthened by imposing supplementary conditions on the supply of uranium to user countries, as that would encourage the users to look for sources of supply not under such control, and thus introduce distortions into the uranium market. The essential thing was for both suppliers and users to accept institutional measures which would guarantee supplies and at the same time prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

10. The French Government attached great importance to the Agency's safeguards activities and hoped that the agreement concluded between France, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the IAEA would lead to the application of Agency safeguards to those French facilities which it intended to place under safeguards. His Government was in favour of developing and improving the Agency's safeguards system and continued to submit its nuclear exports to that system. Problems relating to non-proliferation should be discussed in the Agency objectively, with the sole purpose of preventing international nuclear co-operation from being diverted towards military applications.

11. With regard to financial questions, the French Government commended the Agency on the spirit of restraint in which the budget for 1981 had been prepared. A permanent search for cost reductions was necessary to balance the expansion of the Agency's activities in the two priority areas of safeguards and technical assistance. In view of that spirit of restraint the French Government would contribute to the Technical Assistance Fund in proportion to its rate of assessment, subject to parliamentary approval. The French Government had also made efforts to increase its contribution in the form of experts' services and equipment. It had organized two international courses at the Saclay Research Centre and an international symposium on biomedical dosimetry. It had also welcomed eight groups of experts. The Secretariat, whose work was highly valued by the French Government, should seek to ensure that the Agency's activities did not duplicate those of other organizations.

12. Mr. AL-ASHIMI (Iraq) stated that his country had adopted an ambitious economic programme based on science and technology and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in particular. As part of that programme, it had undertaken to develop nuclear research facilities and the applications of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture, biology, physics and materials science, and had decided to build its first nuclear plant. Iraq regarded nuclear energy as one means of resolving current energy problems. It was not, however, unaware of the problems which it might encounter as regards safety and supplies.

13. The Iraqi Government, which attached great importance to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, had concluded co-operative agreements with a number of Member States. In 1980, in Buenos Aires, it had taken part in a meeting of non-aligned countries devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and would work to realize the aims of that group. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, in collaboration with other bodies, had already organized several conferences and seminars, and in 1981 would act as host to an international symposium on nuclear power plant safety in the developing countries.

14. Iraq had been one of the first countries to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), despite the discrimination introduced by that Treaty. Although the non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT had fulfilled their obligations, the arms race had continued at such a pace that at the Second NPT Review Conference the parties entrusted with examining the operation of the Treaty had been unable to reach a consensus. Iraq, which had already clearly explained its views at that Conference, recalled the position of the Group of 77 regarding the two racist regimes in South Africa and in occupied Palestine, which, having refused to sign NPT, had acquired nuclear arms and established an increasingly close collaboration between themselves which had been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with a resolution passed by the General Assembly, the Group of 77 had requested all the nuclear-weapon States no longer to collaborate with those two regimes unless they subjected all their nuclear activities to Agency safeguards. The Iraqi Government hoped that the recommendations made by a number of working parties at the Review Conference could be applied. In particular, countries which wanted to obtain supply guarantees should not be required to satisfy conditions other than those stipulated in Article III of NPT.

15. The Iraqi Government had always given its full support to the Agency's activities with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the control of proliferation. It attached particular importance to the Agency's promotional activities and technical assistance, and wished to pass one or two comments on that subject. Firstly, the budget for 1981 was inadequate; technical assistance should be financed from the Regular Budget. Also, countries which wished to increase their contributions would not be inclined to do so while the Agency continued to assist countries with policies based on aggression and the constant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Second, it was regrettable that the Agency did not possess sufficient funds to meet all justified requests for technical assistance. Third, it was vital that measures be taken to ensure a fairer distribution of seats on the Board of Governors. In the fourth place, activities relating to international plutonium storage and spent fuel management should not lead in the final analysis to the introduction of additional controls.

16. All countries were entitled to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, without which the developing countries would not be able to catch up with the industrialized ones. The measures taken by the Iraqi Government regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were under continuous attack from the Zionist regime and its supporters. The Iraqi Government was asking the Agency and all countries to denounce those attacks, to refrain from giving direct or indirect support to the campaign of vilification and to stop trying to convince it (Iraq) that it was not fulfilling its obligations with respect to NPT. Iraq, which had proved itself capable of defending its interests both inside and outside its territory, would continue its work to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the obligations it had assumed under NPT.

17. Mr. LOOSCH (Federal Republic of Germany) recalled that, since the last session of the General Conference, the energy crisis had been one of the key topics of international political debate and had underlined the necessity of nuclear energy programmes. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had tried to reduce its dependence on oil. Accordingly, it had decided not to authorize the construction of any new oil-fuelled power stations and had taken action to reduce energy demand, to increase the efficiency of energy utilization and to generate more electricity from coal, the production of which had been stabilized, though at prices which were higher than those on the world market. It had also launched a large-scale programme for producing synthetic fuels from coal. The share of nuclear energy, which had been 14% in 1979, would continue to grow when the plants under construction had been completed. There had, however, been only a few applications for new licences over the past few years. The overall generating capacity at the present moment showed a relative surplus, priority was being given to coal and, in addition, nuclear energy had become a controversial issue. It was important to note in that regard that a special commission on nuclear energy, which had been set up by Parliament and had recently submitted an interim report to it, had succeeded in reconciling the opponents and supporters of nuclear energy by

simultaneously advocating stringent energy conservation measures and continued investment in the nuclear sector; it was stated in the commission's interim report that the situation should be reviewed in 1990. The Government had taken measures necessitated by the adoption of a new fuel cycle, and had decided to build two intermediate storage facilities for spent fuel; it had also set in motion the licensing procedure for a reprocessing plant and had initiated drilling work with a view to the underground storage of nuclear waste. Finally, it was studying alternative solutions for the final stages of the fuel cycle.

18. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany felt that the Agency should play a major role in the nuclear field. The safety of nuclear plants was essential if a social and political climate conducive to the development of nuclear energy was to be created. The Agency could promote the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge to benefit developing countries by providing experts and sending safety missions. Among its main activities one could cite the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme, the forthcoming International Conference on Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues in Stockholm and co-operation projects for reactor safety research.

19. The Agency had acquired an excellent reputation with respect to technical assistance. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany noted that over the years the resources available for technical assistance had increased appreciably. After a discussion on the financing of the technical assistance programme, it had been decided that the target would be set at \$13 million for 1981 and that, in order to take account of the concerns of many developing countries, indicative figures would be set for the following years. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany hoped that that decision would enable the establishment of the technical assistance programme to be improved. It should be kept in mind, however, that the voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund were more than doubled by other budgetary and non-budgetary resources. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany would pay an amount corresponding to its share of the assessed budget for 1981 and would also organize courses, provide fellowships and lend assistance for additional projects and co-ordinated research programmes such as protein improvement, nitrogen residues in fertilizers, hydrology and tsetse-fly control. Subject to the approval of Parliament, that would bring its total voluntary contribution to around \$2 million.

20. The Agency's safeguards activities had increased substantially because of the growing number of nuclear plants and amounts of nuclear material covered by safeguards. As in previous years, the conclusions of the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) had been reassuring, and the Second NPT Review Conference had confirmed the value of the Agency's safeguards system; that should not only generate support for the Agency's safeguards operations but also facilitate the reaching of understandings on international co-operation and exchange in the nuclear field. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supported the study and further development of safeguards techniques and instruments and the discussion of safeguards approaches, with a view to improving both the efficiency and the cost-effectiveness of safeguards and to minimizing cost and operational impacts. Also, it attached great importance to containment and surveillance measures. It was on such improvements in safeguards techniques and technology that the safeguards R&D support programme agreement concluded between the Government of the Federal Republic and the Agency concentrated. In supporting the Agency's safeguards efforts his delegation could speak from experience, as a considerable part of the Agency's inspection activities was devoted to verification operations in EURATOM countries, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany.

21. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) had produced very satisfactory results because it had created a climate of better understanding conducive to the joint solution of problems, particularly with respect to reprocessing and fast breeders. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany felt that the outcome of INFCE had confirmed its international nuclear energy policy, which aimed at integrating as many countries as possible into a system of co-operation both for sharing the benefits of nuclear energy and for joint responsibility in keeping its use exclusively peaceful. Control of proliferation was essentially a political problem and could not be solved by purely technical means. It was not possible to make a general judgement valid both now and in the future that one fuel cycle was more susceptible to proliferation risks than another. That was why the choice of a fuel cycle - determined by many other factors, such as economics, assurances of supply, environmental protection and the state of the art - might and would legitimately differ from one country to another. One of the main results of INFCE had been the setting up of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), in which the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany would take an active part. The Government of the Federal Republic hoped that all interested countries - industrialized and developing nations, supplier and recipient nations, and countries in different stages of

nuclear energy programmes and of international non-proliferation commitments - would participate in its discussions. Also, the Second NPT Review Conference had stressed the usefulness of such a committee. The task of CAS called for great patience and a gradual approach. In its discussions, the complementarity of assurance of supply and assurance of non-proliferation should be recognized. CAS's advice would be essential in restoring confidence in international nuclear relations. The international storage of excess plutonium (IPS) under Article XII.A.5 of the Agency's Statute might become a test case for reaching mutually acceptable solutions. Only an IPS scheme that was operative under reasonable conditions and took into account the importance of fuel assurance would be generally acceptable. In that connection, it should be borne in mind that IPS could draw on the established system of Agency safeguards, thereby avoiding a duplication of measures.

22. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany had stated two years before and at the previous session of the General Conference that only a set of co-ordinated and gradual measures could lead to a consensus by which each State could freely take decisions according to the technical, economic and political conditions operating in its own territory, while at the same time observing the rules established by - and for - the international community. That was where the Agency could play a fundamental role by using its experience to provide technical assistance and foster international co-operation with a view to increasing safety and reinforcing security through its functions in the non-proliferation field.

23. Mr. SETHNA (India) pointed out that his country had begun to take an active interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy at a time when that field had been still very new territory, even for the developed countries. Since then, India had remained faithful to its undertaking to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and had consistently maintained that all States had the inalienable right to implement their own nuclear programmes for the purposes of economic and social development, according to their priorities and needs, since the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation was fully justified for some of the developing countries. Against that background, India had been watching with some concern the developments which had taken place since 1979. Decisions of the greatest importance for the Agency's future were being contemplated, and a good number of those decisions would need to be approved at the

present session of the General Conference. In that regard, it was important to remember that the Agency had a central role to play in the development of international co-operation and the dissemination of information relating to nuclear energy.

24. India would continue to support all the Agency's promotional activities, as they were far and away the most important part of its work and also the basis from which its regulatory activities were derived. It was regrettable, therefore, that, despite the repeated requests of an overwhelming majority of the Agency's Members, the imbalance between promotional and regulatory functions, far from being corrected, had actually become worse. Thus, although India had decided to accept no further technical assistance from the Agency for the reasons explained at the last session of the General Conference, it was continuing to provide technical assistance to other developing countries: in 1981 its voluntary contributions would reach a total of \$79 300, and it would grant 12 fellowships to developing countries.

25. A provisional solution to the problem of financing technical assistance had been found as a result of informal consultations: a target of \$13 million had been set for voluntary contributions for 1981, and indicative planning figures had been agreed for 1982 and 1983. While approving those arrangements, India felt that the targets were still far from being adequate to meet the needs of the developing countries, and the provisional solution in no way changed its conviction that technical assistance should be financed from the Regular Budget. Finally, it was regrettable that the provision of technical assistance was still subject to conditions.

26. It was quite appropriate that the Agency should be concerned with the crucial matter of assurances of supply, and the decision taken by the Board of Governors to set up a Committee to examine that question had long been overdue. India would take part in its work and hoped that it would result in a definition of responsibilities and obligations of suppliers and consumers, and would also lead to the formulation of binding commitments regarding the assurance of supplies; without such commitments, consumers might be forced to absolve themselves of their existing obligations.

27. He noted with satisfaction that through the revised arrangements adopted for the financing of additional safeguards expenses, the latter would be met by the developed countries. That need not imply that it was impossible to make economies in the running of the Safeguards Department. The question of the allocation of both direct and indirect costs of safeguards activities should also be examined more thoroughly in due course.

28. Furthermore, it seemed rather pointless to pay for the application of limited safeguards to certain supposedly civilian plants in nuclear-weapon States; that amounted in effect to subsidizing national accounting and control systems. Such discrimination between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, together with the refusal to consider in their true perspective the real threats posed by existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the theoretical threat posed by the development of nuclear weapons by those countries which did not possess them, was an obstacle to disarmament. Vertical and horizontal proliferation should be approached simultaneously and in the same way.

29. Regarding the budget for 1981, he was particularly concerned about the concept of zero growth, which would obviously be applied to technical programmes and would hamper activities aimed at meeting the needs of the developing countries. That was totally irreconcilable with the Agency's aims.

30. Concerning the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, he recalled that his country had consistently supported the principle of equitable geographical representation on the Board. He hoped that a universally acceptable formula would be worked out in due course.

31. In the excellent annual report for 1979, stress was quite rightly laid on activities relating to nuclear plant safety. India welcomed the fact that the International Conference on Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues was to be held shortly. However, the report totally misrepresented the safeguards situation: while it referred to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States, there was no mention of such facilities in nuclear-weapon States. In reality, unsafeguarded facilities and material in nuclear-weapon States were greater by many orders of magnitude. That misrepresentation should be rectified in the report for 1980.

32. India continued to take a very active part in activities relating to the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA). At present most of the promotional activities relating to RCA were gradually reaching the stage of semi-commercial operations, which called for a higher level of financing from bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). However, he was concerned about the recent trend towards linking some operations under RCA to the technical assistance programme.

33. Finally, he announced that negotiations with the Agency regarding the subsidiary arrangements for the power reactor fuel reprocessing plant at Tarapur had been successfully completed. The Agency had come to the determination that safeguards could be satisfactorily implemented when the plant was reprocessing power reactor fuel. The subsidiary arrangements had recently entered into effect, and India was ready to commence the reprocessing of power reactor fuel.

34. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the General Conference had to examine a number of important questions which would influence the Agency's work in coming years and to take decisions regarding those questions. The Soviet delegation hoped that the decisions at the present session would enable progress to be made in international co-operation on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the interests of Member States and would reinforce the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime and the effectiveness of safeguards.

35. It should be borne in mind that the Second Review Conference of States party to NPT had finished just before the opening of the present session of the General Conference. The Soviet delegation wished to make some comments on the results of the Conference which concerned the problems with which the Agency was faced. It had every reason to welcome the candid and useful discussions which had taken place at that Second Review Conference; they had demonstrated a similarity of views on many questions concerning the examination of NPT. The main conclusion his delegation had drawn was that the Conference had confirmed the vitality and effectiveness of NPT. It had been pointed out that the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime set up by the Treaty had created optimum conditions for international co-operation, in a way which would effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons while fostering the widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful development. The participants had unanimously called upon those countries which were not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible.

36. Considerable attention had been paid not only to the control of nuclear weapons proliferation but also to the cessation of the arms race, especially where nuclear weapons were concerned, and to disarmament. Serious concern had been expressed with regard to the present situation. The Soviet delegation was convinced that all the conditions needed for détente to remain a key element in world politics had been fulfilled, so that a renewal of the arms race could be avoided and specific measures adopted in that sphere. As had been stated by Mr. Brezhnev, the Soviet Head of State, in his message to participants at the Second NPT Review Conference, the Soviet Union considered it essential, especially in present conditions, that the provisions of the Treaty relating to the adoption of effective measures with a view to halting the nuclear arms race and disarmament be applied. The Soviet proposals relating, among other things, to ending the manufacture of nuclear weapons, to the destruction of such weapons and to the complete banning of nuclear weapons tests were well known. The Soviet Union would continue to do all it could to ensure that steps were taken quickly. Halting of the arms race and disarmament were the concern of all countries, and if those objectives were achieved in the near future, broad opportunities would clearly be opened up for the development of co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

37. No participant at the Conference had contested the obvious fact that the Treaty had provided a solid basis for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had brought about an atmosphere of mutual confidence between States, which was essential for genuinely widespread international co-operation in the nuclear sphere. The Agency had been highly praised by participants for the work it had done in all its spheres of activity. They had concluded, notably, that in the performance of its safeguards functions the Agency was respecting the sovereign rights of States without hampering the economic and technical development of States party to the Treaty and without causing any obstacle to international co-operation in the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

38. During the discussions criticisms, sometimes quite far-reaching, had been made in connection with the application of certain provisions of the Treaty and with matters which closely concerned the Agency's activities. In particular, different views had been expressed about nuclear export policies and principles. It was, however, remarkable that, even among participants who had demonstrated more or less plainly their dissatisfaction with the situation relating to nuclear exports or the transfer of nuclear technology, hardly anyone had called into

question the value of a fundamental understanding on the main outlines of a nuclear export policy. In that connection an important role would be played by the committee of the whole which had been set up at the Board's meetings in June and which would be responsible for studying problems of the assurance of supplies of nuclear fuel, of the transfer of technology and equipment and of the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services. Similarly, criticisms made of the Agency in connection with its safeguards system had related to an increase in the effectiveness of safeguards, their universal application and the development as soon as possible of ways of applying safeguards to all facilities pertaining to the nuclear fuel cycle.

39. After examining carefully the evolution of international co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, the participants at the Review Conference had in effect reached the conclusion that such co-operation could not develop successfully unless the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime was reinforced by all possible means, with all the relevant provisions of the Treaty being adhered to strictly. It could, therefore, be concluded that the work of the Conference at Geneva constituted a new step towards reinforcement of the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation regime in conditions enabling all States to have access, without any discrimination, to the applications of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes under effective international control in accordance with the principles of the Agency.

40. Nuclear energy was becoming an important factor in the economic and social development of many countries in the world. For various reasons, some objective and some subjective, that development was not proceeding in a regular fashion, but it was already irreversible. That being so, co-operation among countries in the search for solutions to energy problems was becoming increasingly important, and the important role played by the Agency in the organization of that co-operation deserved appreciation. The Soviet Union had supported and would continue to support the Agency's scientific and technical programmes. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Agency's activities in that sphere were being carried out with due account for the needs of developing countries; that was in fact directly reflected in almost all its scientific and technical programmes. The Department of Research and Isotopes provided an example: data available on activities over the past five years showed that the developing countries had received technical assistance worth some \$11 million in areas for which the Department was responsible. The Department of Technical Operations constituted another example.

41. Each year, the voluntary contributions of Member States to the Technical Assistance Fund were increasing. In accordance with the principles which it applied to technical assistance to developing Member States, the Soviet Government had decided to raise its voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund to 1 050 000 roubles in national currency, which represented an even more generous rate of contribution than that recommended by the Secretariat. As in previous years, those resources could be used by the Agency for the acquisition in the USSR of equipment, small quantities of nuclear material for research purposes and fuel elements containing low-enriched uranium for research reactors, and for organizing scientific visits to the USSR by specialists from developing countries. Where the training of professionals was concerned, the Soviet Union was spending, in addition to the sum already mentioned, 100 000 roubles for the organization of technical activities. At the twenty-second session of the General Conference it had said that it would donate to the Agency over a period of five years 50 kg of uranium-235 in order to contribute to the Agency's activities in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It intended to supply those materials, which were to be used as fuel for research reactors, with an enrichment not exceeding 20% uranium-235.

42. In order to respond to the wishes of a number of developing countries the Soviet Union had decided not to oppose the setting of indicative figures for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund for 1982 and 1983 of \$16 and \$19 million respectively, but its understanding was that the principle of a voluntary fund using the national currencies of Member States would remain unchanged. The Soviet Union was prepared to continue its technical and economic assistance to interested developing countries in the future, but his delegation felt bound to point out that such assistance was being provided and would continue to be provided only within the limits of what the Soviet Union could do, and in the forms which had already proven themselves.

43. Broad utilization of nuclear energy for the good of humanity as a whole depended to a large extent on results obtained in that sphere at the national level. At present, the experience of a few countries was in process of becoming the common possession of a large number of others, and the contribution of many countries to the achievements of nuclear science and technology continued to increase. A good example of that was provided by the results of INFCE.

44. Turning to the development of nuclear power in his country, he stated that that source of energy was widespread in the Soviet Union and that it would necessarily have a very great impact on the national economy; its preferential development in the European part of the USSR made it possible to solve fuel and energy production problems in the most economical way.

45. At present, the total installed power of nuclear stations in the USSR was approximately 13 million kW. The unit output of individual reactors was gradually increasing, as was the total installed power at a given site. Economic and technical calculations showed that for the USSR the optimum size of nuclear power stations was of the order of 4-6 million kW(e) and that of individual reactors 1-1.5 million kW(e). The first nuclear power station - and so far the largest - which had reactors of the RBMK type was the Leningrad power station, the third unit of which had been connected to the grid on 7 December 1979; the commissioning of the fourth and last unit was foreseen for late February 1981, when the total power of the station would be 4 million kW. A nuclear power station which was currently under construction at Ignalinsk would have RBMK reactors with a unit power of 1.5 million kW, and its total output would be 6 million kW. The installed capacity of stations with reactors of the WWER type with a unit power of 1 million kW would be of the same order. The first reactor of that type, construction of which had been completed during the present year, had been put into operation at a new site.

46. An important event had occurred during the spring of 1980 when a fast reactor of the BN-600 integral type had gone critical. Operation of that reactor and of a BN-350 loop-type reactor should provide important information for the future development of commercial fast reactors in the Soviet Union.

47. The USSR was actively engaged in work on the utilization of atomic energy for urban heating. The first units of heat-producing nuclear power stations with a unit output of 500 000 kW were already under construction in the towns of Gor'ki j and Voronezh; that type of application was expected to become widespread in the future.

48. In the immediate future the USSR proposed to increase its installed nuclear capacity considerably. Its nuclear power industry was at present putting units with an aggregate output of approximately 2 million kW into operation each year and by the end of the decade some 5 million kW would probably be going into service annually; by the end of the century that figure would rise to some 10 million kW per year, which was equivalent to the present rate of increase in all electrical power being installed in the USSR. All nuclear fuel cycle operations would expand at the appropriate rate in support of the growth in nuclear power generating capacity.

49. In studying and solving the problems presented by the development of nuclear power and its fuel cycle, the Soviet Union gave high priority to the operating safety of nuclear power stations and other facilities. It greatly appreciated the Agency's activities involving the drawing up of safety codes and guides for nuclear power stations and was participating actively in that work.

50. While developing its own nuclear power industry, the Soviet Union was also engaging in very extensive international co-operation in that sphere both on the bilateral level and within the framework of the Agency. The achievements in nuclear science and technology of Soviet specialists were being made known to all countries through publications and papers presented by Soviet scientists at international conferences and symposia and also through the participation of Soviet specialists in the Agency's activities.

51. Effective co-operation in science and technology had become established with the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Some 50 industrial groups and enterprises from eight socialist States were combining their efforts to produce equipment of high complexity. Among them were the Soviet factory "Atomash" at Volgodonsk, the Czechoslovak "Škoda" group, the machine-tool complex for heavy industry at Magdeburg (German Democratic Republic), the Hungarian "Chemimash" group, the Polish "Zemak" company and so on. Through joint measures aimed at intensifying the development of nuclear power, the CMEA member countries were making considerable progress towards the achievement of the long-term objectives adopted in 1978 at the twenty-second session of CMEA, concerning co-operation between member states of the Council in relation to energy, fuels and raw materials.

52. Parallel to the development of conventional nuclear power based on the fission of heavy nuclei, extensive studies and research were in progress in the Soviet Union with a view to constructing facilities of the next generation, i.e. thermonuclear fusion reactors. The Soviet Union was participating actively in the INTOR project, under which an international fusion reactor was to be constructed under the auspices of the Agency, and, as in the past, it would continue to give that project all necessary support.

53. For many countries, long-term nuclear power programmes faced the problem of the assurance of fuel supplies. The concerns of those countries about the nuclear fuel problem had given rise to the Board's decision in June to set up a committee of the whole which would be given the task of examining problems of the assurance of nuclear supplies linked with effective non-proliferation measures.

54. The Soviet Union, aware of the needs of developing countries and of their desire to see a stable and reliable nuclear materials and equipment market become established, had decided to participate in the work of that committee. It guaranteed long-term supplies of nuclear fuel for the nuclear power stations which were being or had been constructed with its technical co-operation, and it also offered enrichment services, the uranium supplied by customers being enriched to a maximum of 5% in uranium-235. However, in the interests of an effective system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union was guided strictly by the agreements in force which related to the control of nuclear exports. Its decision to participate in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply was subject to the understanding that that Committee would take the agreements in force in that sphere fully into account. It was only on that basis that conditions appropriate for the elaboration of a reliable system of nuclear fuel supply assurances, which would not lend itself to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, could be created.

55. He recalled that an essential instrument of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime was the system of safeguards applied by the Agency to the nuclear materials of non-nuclear-weapon States which had submitted all their nuclear activities to its control. However, not all non-nuclear-weapon States had yet placed their nuclear activities under Agency safeguards. At the Second NPT Review Conference in Geneva concern had been expressed about the intention of Israel and South Africa to manufacture their own nuclear weapons, which would

destabilize the international situation and undermine the foundations of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime as it was at present. It was necessary at all costs to ensure that those countries placed all their nuclear activities under Agency safeguards and thereby contributed to international efforts aimed at reinforcing the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime.

56. The Soviet Union considered the Agency's safeguards activities to be very important. It noted with satisfaction that, as in previous years, in 1979 there had been no diversion of safeguarded nuclear materials for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or to further any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other explosive device.

57. In recent years the volume of the Agency's safeguards activities had increased considerably, and complex facilities such as reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment plants and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facilities had been placed under safeguards. For the Agency that had resulted in a number of tasks which it had to perform in order for its safeguards to be as effective as was desirable. The Soviet Union considered that the following were included in those tasks: standardization of safeguarding procedures and techniques; refinement of methods of applying safeguards to "sensitive" stages in the nuclear fuel cycle and systematic improvement of the equipment of the Department of Safeguards; and rationalization of the processing of the safeguards data provided by inspectors. It was also important that the Department of Safeguards should have the number of staff established in the Agency's budget and that thorough training should be given to recently recruited inspectors, including on-site training in key nuclear facilities.

58. The Soviet Union was participating actively in scientific and technical studies designed to ensure the proper functioning of the Agency's safeguards system; work relevant to that purpose was in progress at the main scientific research centres of the USSR. In order to help the Agency train recently recruited inspectors, the USSR was offering courses and study tours for them, during which they were able to study in detail the organization of effective safeguards at nuclear power stations using reactors of the WWER type. In the context of such training, test inspections had taken place at the Novovorenzh power station,

during which accounting documents had been verified and fresh and irradiated fuel had been measured using non-destructive techniques, whereby measuring equipment belonging to the Agency and demonstration devices made in the Soviet Union had been used. The Soviet Union would continue to give its full support to the Agency's safeguards activities. In that respect it should be noted that for the years 1980-82 the Soviet Union had earmarked one million roubles for carrying out technical support activities for safeguards in the USSR; the programme for those activities was being drawn up.

59. With regard to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the application of safeguards measures, the delegation of the Soviet Union wished to emphasize the important role played in that sphere by the Agency and its Director General, to whom it expressed its deepest gratitude.

60. In conclusion, his delegation was convinced that the present session of the General Conference would further the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy on the basis of equal rights and in conditions which effectively prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it would thereby contribute in a more general way to the strengthening of mutual confidence between States and to détente, and accordingly to the peace and well-being of all States and peoples.

61. Sir John HILL (United Kingdom) felt that the events which had taken place in the world since the last session of the General Conference had underlined the necessity of being able to count on assured, adequate supplies of energy. The participants at the Venice Summit had stressed that all countries should conserve fossil fuels and endeavour to depend as little as possible on oil imports; and they had emphasized the increasing role which nuclear energy would be called upon to play in that regard.

62. The United Kingdom, for its part, was pursuing a dynamic nuclear policy. In addition to confirming an order for two advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGR), the authorities had announced their intention of placing orders for at least 15 000 MW of installed nuclear capacity over a period of ten years from 1982 onwards. Thus, by the end of the century, roughly one third of the United Kingdom's electricity would be generated by nuclear plants. The Government had also announced that, subject to the necessary safety clearances and licences and after a public enquiry, the first of those new plants would be equipped with a pressurized water

reactor (PWR). In addition, the United Kingdom was engaged in a review of its fast breeder policy in the light of advice from the nuclear industry. The authorities were studying the various options open to them in that area and considering, in particular, the construction of a full-scale fast reactor power station. They were also studying the extent to which such a plant - if that were the course chosen - could be constructed in collaboration with other countries.

63. The United Kingdom was actively pursuing its policy of fuel reprocessing on the grounds of both cost-effectiveness and the efficient management of radioactive waste. The reconstruction and reinforcement of the Windscale plant, along with design and development work for a new reprocessing plant, were under way: preparation of the site had already begun. Regarding waste disposal, vitrification had been proved an absolutely safe method of storing highly active waste. The construction of the full-scale plant would begin within about three years and would make it both easier and less costly to store highly active waste, pending decisions on ultimate disposal.

64. In 1979, a decision had been taken to increase further the capacity of URENCO's Capenhurst and Almelo centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. Those programmes had made good progress despite the fact that the slower rate at which nuclear plants were being built throughout the world had decreased the demand for enriched uranium. Development work on gas-cooled reactors was going ahead satisfactorily.

65. Much of the work on the pressurized water reactor (PWR) was oriented towards safety, and the proposals to be submitted to the public enquiry would have to meet all the safety requirements. Major advances had been made in the development of fast breeders, and research in that area had confirmed the results previously obtained on the prototype fast reactor at Dounreay, thus further strengthening confidence in the safety of that system. In addition, the fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant had been commissioned and was currently reprocessing irradiated plutonium fuel: when the latter had been returned to the fuel fabrication plant, before the end of the year, the complete fuel cycle of a fast reactor would have been closed for the first time.

66. Nuclear safety was the key factor determining the rate of construction of nuclear plants throughout the world: they could not contribute towards meeting energy needs unless they satisfied the most rigorous safety standards and unless the public at large perceived that they did so. No country could place itself outside that requirement. The United Kingdom Government and the country's nuclear industry had always considered that question to be paramount and were making sure that the existing standards were not only fully applied, but improved wherever possible. Furthermore, while the United Kingdom believed that each country should accept responsibility for the safety of its own nuclear facilities, it was also convinced that it was vital to study the question of safety on an international level. It would continue to participate fully in international exchanges of information relating to safety, and fully supported the Agency's work in that area. He particularly welcomed the role played by the Agency in organizing the International Conference on Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues to be held shortly in Stockholm, in which his country intended to take an active part.

67. The Agency was fulfilling admirably one of its main tasks, namely that of promoting the use of nuclear energy for peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, and particularly in the underdeveloped regions. In its desire to support the Agency's work, the Government of the United Kingdom had committed itself not only to pledging its full voluntary contribution for 1981 to the Technical Assistance Fund, but also to contributing one million dollars for technical assistance over the next four years to developing Member States which were either party to NPT or had accepted similar obligations in other ways. That money should help to provide experts and equipment for projects which could not be financed from other sources. It would be additional to the contributions made available each year by the United Kingdom for the provision of training fellowships.

68. The United Kingdom attached no less importance to the Agency's safeguards activities. The agreement signed by the United Kingdom, EURATOM and the Agency which would enable the Agency to apply its safeguards to nuclear materials in United Kingdom facilities had come into force in 1978, and measures were currently being taken to implement that agreement. The application of safeguards under that agreement would allow the Agency to gain valuable experience with respect to facilities of advanced design such as the Dounreay plant. In addition,

the United Kingdom was continuing to give the Agency practical help to enable it to improve the effectiveness of safeguards procedures, by organizing training courses for inspectors and providing the services of an expert on fast reactors. The Government had also decided to make available to the Agency a sum of £500 000 in each of the next three years as aid for its safeguards programme. That money was to be used in areas where the Agency felt financial support was most needed.

69. The effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards was vital for the success of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He was pleased to read in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1979 that no diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material had been detected and that, consequently, nuclear material under Agency safeguards continued to be confined to peaceful activities. That was extremely important. However, the system had still failed to achieve that universal application which would be in the interests of the whole international community.

70. At the beginning of 1980 the Agency had published the report of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The work carried out under INFCE had led to a better understanding not only of the risks of proliferation but also of the contribution that nuclear energy could make to resolving world energy problems. The pressure on traditional energy sources was growing relentlessly and could only aggravate international tensions. While any expanded use of materials which could be employed in weapons inevitably entailed certain risks, it should nonetheless be borne in mind that nuclear energy could contribute greatly to world peace. The main task ahead was, therefore, to follow up the conclusions of the INFCE report, the most important of which was perhaps that proliferation was essentially a political problem.

71. Although it was regrettable that the Second NPT Review Conference had not been able to adopt a final declaration based on consensus, it had nonetheless obtained some positive results: all the Parties had confirmed their commitment to the principles and objectives set down in the Treaty, and Articles III and IV had given rise to a thorough and constructive exchange of views. The Agency's role in operating the safeguards system had been universally approved and there was broad agreement on the way the Parties should approach nuclear trade in the years ahead: what had been said on that subject at the Conference should be taken into consideration when the question was examined in greater detail.

72. The United Kingdom had taken an active part in formulating the resolution of the Board of Governors setting up the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which was to meet very shortly, and it would also take an active part in the Committee's work. The issues involved were complex, and great patience would be needed to reach the consensus desired by all parties. He hoped that, in the long term, it would be possible to find a more predictable way of operating the non-proliferation regime. The application of more uniform arrangements would present many advantages over case-by-case controls: in particular, countries would be less inclined to seek their own independent fuel cycle, and the universal application of safeguards could provide a basis for international nuclear trade. Developing a more reliable regime would take time and involve bilateral as well as multi-lateral discussions: the Committee on Assurances of Supply would have a vital part to play in that regard.

73. In that connection, the development of a new international plutonium storage system would be particularly useful; he hoped that such a system could be developed by the expert group convened to examine that question and approved by the Board of Governors. It should form a logical extension of the safeguards system and be based on Article XII.A.5 of the Statute. The United Kingdom hoped that the work of the expert group would continue to make good progress, as plutonium was an energy source which could last hundreds of years, and specification of the conditions required for the storage and utilization of plutonium was thus a matter of high priority deserving the support of all countries.

74. In conclusion, he felt that priority should be given, in following up the work of INFCE, to reaffirming the importance of safeguards and NPT and also the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage - their common aim being to develop a safer and more solid non-proliferation regime. The Agency was the place for such work, not only because of its Statute, but also because it had succeeded in gaining universal confidence.

75. Mr. NGONGO KAMANDA (Zaire) noted that in 1980, as in preceding years, Africa had been under-represented on the Board of Governors and the Secretariat of the Agency; yet the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute had still not been adopted. The past year had been marked by three political events which were important from the point of view of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The first was the conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). Although the cost of that evaluation had perhaps been excessive compared with the final result, the latter was nonetheless far from negligible. While it was quite a good idea to set up a special committee to look into ways of providing fuel cycle equipment, technology and services with a greater degree of assurance and reliability, it would clearly be more useful still to ask that committee to consider what the Agency's role and responsibilities ought to be in that connection.

76. The second event had been the opening for signature of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to which the Government of Zaire subscribed fully. It was important, however, not to place an undue burden on the procedures regulating international trade in nuclear services and materials, since that might cancel out the Agency's efforts to help Third-World countries acquire a civilian nuclear industry.

77. The third event was the tenth anniversary of the date on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had come into force. It was appropriate on the present occasion to point out, at the risk of stating a commonplace, that nuclear non-proliferation should be vertical as well as horizontal: the fact that in ten years not one of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT had manufactured nuclear explosive devices, although many of them possessed the technical resources to do so, should not divert attention from the fact that endeavours to reduce vertical proliferation had met with little success. Nevertheless, NPT had succeeded in diminishing to some extent the fears of that section of the international community which regarded nuclear energy as an unnecessary evil.

78. In that regard, he felt that more could be done by the Agency and its Member States to dispel the "nuclear phobia" which the popular press was creating throughout the world. The Agency should explore all possible means of placing nuclear energy in a more balanced and calmer perspective. He was afraid that the supplementary nuclear safety programme introduced the year before for that purpose, which was to be financed from voluntary contributions, had not received sufficient funds to achieve its aims. That programme should be integrated into the Agency's Regular Budget.

79. The same applied to the technical assistance programme, also financed from voluntary contributions, which, since 1972, had palpably been slowing down. Those developments were especially worrying as the restrictive policies of a number of States supplying nuclear materials and equipment were, on the one hand, resulting in the stagnation of voluntary contributions in real terms, and, on the other, prompting a great many States to seek an independent fuel cycle, which would increase the danger of proliferation. Consequently, many Third-World countries, including Zaire, were requesting that the technical assistance programme should be funded entirely from the Agency's Regular Budget. Experience demonstrated that long-term planning was impossible for a programme financed by voluntary contributions, a fact which was, moreover, implicitly recognized in the proposal of the Secretariat and Board of Governors to integrate the supplementary nuclear plant safety programme into the Regular Budget from 1981 onwards.

80. Mr. WILSON (Australia), recalling that the General Conference was being held two weeks after the end of the Second NPT Review Conference, said his delegation wished to underline the positive results obtained by the Conference regarding Articles III, IV and V of NPT concerning co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - results which would be of great help in furthering the examination of those questions, particularly in the Agency.

81. The year 1980 had also been marked by the conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. That evaluation had confirmed that governments were expecting nuclear energy to assume increasing importance over the next 50 years and were accordingly anticipating that the Agency would have an ever greater part to play in promoting peace and prosperity throughout the world. Moreover, the fact that INFCE had succeeded in producing a report which was not content with merely defining the problems, but also put forward methods of resolving them, augured well for the future of international co-operation. INFCE had concluded that it was necessary to provide international nuclear co-operation with a framework guaranteeing stable and mutually advantageous trade relations with respect to nuclear supplies, a framework which would simultaneously minimize the risk of proliferation. The conclusion reached by INFCE that assurances of supply also constituted a guarantee of non-proliferation encapsulated the viewpoint of the Australian Government. Australia was keenly aware of the desire of

consumer countries for greater stability with respect to supplies, as it had demonstrated on many occasions. It would continue to supply nuclear material on fair commercial terms, if it could be assured that such material could not be diverted for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.

82. Through INFCE, the international community had laid the foundations of a new and more effective structure for nuclear co-operation. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the work on international plutonium storage and spent fuel management were also part of that structure, which should be built gradually and systematically.

83. Significant progress had been made in 1979 in the study on international plutonium storage, to which Australia continued to attach great importance. However, it might well take a long time to develop a system meeting the concerns of suppliers, consumers and the international community as a whole. The Committee on Assurances of Supply was to begin its work very shortly. Many of the problems involved had already been examined by Working Group 3 of INFCE, whose report should serve as a basis for the work of the new Committee. In such an extremely complex area, a definition of common approaches could only be achieved by gradual stages: oversimplifying the problems or not taking account of the diversity of the interests represented on the Committee would distort its work from the outset. Australia would adopt a constructive attitude towards the Committee by seeking co-operation and avoiding confrontation.

84. Those complex and contentious issues should not be allowed to push the Agency's technical programme, which was fundamental, into the background. It was through that programme that the Agency was seeking to achieve its aim of increasing the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Because of the economic problems encountered by its Member States, the Agency was finding it difficult to maintain the dynamism of its technical programme. In real terms, the growth rate of the budget for 1981 was already zero, but the Agency had to face up to the possibility that its resources might not increase fast enough even to keep pace with its inflating operating costs. It should, however, find a way of enlarging its contribution towards achieving the aims set down in the Statute, by constantly seeking to increase its efficiency through wise and firm management. The administrative services and maintenance of the Headquarters buildings should not be allowed to absorb funds meant for technical activities, and donor Governments should be able to demonstrate

to the public in their own countries that the money they were providing was being channelled to the developing countries alone. The Agency should strive harder than ever to achieve those objectives, if it was to overcome the problems facing it at the present moment.

85. With regard to the financing of technical assistance from voluntary contributions, Australia had noted the concerns expressed by the developing countries. It recognized that the provision of technical assistance was one of the Agency's key responsibilities, since the developing countries often lacked the technological basis which would enable them to assimilate nuclear techniques quickly and introduce a nuclear power programme. Australia would continue to lend its full support to the Agency's programme by contributing to the Technical Assistance Fund and providing aid (in the form of training, in particular) under the Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA) and bilateral programmes. Australia attached particular importance to the Regional Co-operative Agreement and was pleased to report on the progress made in the RCA project on isotope hydrology and sedimentology. The programmes begun in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea would continue in 1981. Australia was encouraging direct co-operation between participating Member States. It would also support the regional project on the industrial application of isotopes and radiation technology, which should do much to create nuclear expertise and further the use of nuclear techniques in the region. In 1980 a substantial training programme had also been organized in Australia for Malaysian personnel who would be operating Malaysia's first research reactor. That programme was going ahead, and Australia had also decided to help the Philippines through a five-year training programme in uranium exploration. It also intended to continue making its nuclear facilities available to scientists from countries in the region which were party to NPT.

86. In taking stock of the Agency's technical assistance programme, greater attention should be given to its impact than to the expenses it entailed. He hoped that the Director General and the Secretariat would continue to seek more effective ways of enabling the recipient countries to derive maximum benefit from the funds available for technical assistance.

87. In the annual report for 1979 the Director General had concluded that the nuclear material placed under safeguards had remained in peaceful activities or else was otherwise accounted for satisfactorily. Australia congratulated the Director General and his Secretariat on the way they had implemented the Agency's

safeguards programme, which Australia considered to be the corner-stone of international co-operation in the nuclear field. In view of the high cost of that programme and the growing number of safeguarded facilities, the strictest possible financial management was essential. It was clear that, soon, when large plants handling special nuclear materials in bulk were placed under safeguards, the Agency would have to confront new types of problems. Australia therefore welcomed the fact that the Agency had started gaining experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants as well as conversion and fabrication plants. Some Member States were providing the Agency with extra-budgetary aid with a view to developing new cost-effective methods of applying safeguards to such plants. For its part, Australia intended to begin a research and development programme relating to enrichment plants. It would also endeavour to contribute to the design and development of safeguards equipment and instrumentation. The Australian Government was also studying the practicability of establishing a uranium enrichment industry in Australia, and a group of Australian companies had decided to carry out a feasibility study. The Government was currently looking into the question of whether such a plant could be set up under some multinational arrangement. The definition of a common approach regarding multinational arrangements was therefore of paramount concern to Australia.

88. The Agency was also engaged in a whole range of technical activities from providing information on the fuel cycle to the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme and the publication of safety guides. The Director General and the Board should ensure that those activities were always in line with the Agency's aims and that they made a real contribution towards achieving them. Where the Agency's work was on a small scale compared with that of other bodies, as in marine biology for example, the Agency should perhaps leave the field to those more directly involved.

89. The Agency's nuclear safety standards activities, which were obviously international by nature, were of great importance to the Australian Government, which hoped that efforts could be increased to encourage the implementation of the safety documents and standards established under the NUSS programme. In that regard, consideration might be given to the organization of further Agency-sponsored missions and training courses.

90. In view of the Agency's budgetary difficulties, it was particularly important that it should co-operate closely with other international organizations engaged in related activities, particularly regarding predictions of the demand for and supply of nuclear energy and fuel and nuclear fuel cycle services.

91. In conclusion, his delegation welcomed the fact that the Agency was working to expand the applications of radioisotopes and nuclear techniques in the developing countries. That was an area where the value of the nuclear contribution was widely recognized and where the Agency's work could only enhance its credibility. The Agency should continue to provide expert advice on radioisotope applications wherever practical results could clearly be expected within reasonable periods of time.

92. Finally, he stressed that throughout 1981, which promised to be as busy as 1980, the Agency could count on Australia's full support.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.