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> President: Mr. SETHNA (India) later: Mr. SAMANIEGO (Ecuador)

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1978 (continued)

1. <u>Mr. OLIVARES BAQUE</u> (Spain) said the world energy crisis had shown the importance of muclear technology for the production of electricity. The Spanish parliament, during its consideration of the National Energy Plan in July 1979, had approved a resolution recognizing that muclear power was indispensable and requesting the Government to implement a muclear programme corresponding to the needs of the country, without neglecting to take the strictest safety precautions.

2. According to the approved Energy Plan, muclear power would by 1990 represent 27.1% of the total installed electric power and 39.3% of the electricity produced (as against 3.7% and 7.8% at the present time): that showed the importance of muclear power for future power generation in Spain. Currently, Spain had three muclear power plants with a total output of 1.2 GW. Seven additional units would be put into operation during the next two years and a total of 17 should be operating in 1990 (with an output of 15.55 GW). The contribution of Spanish industry to the construction of those power plants was also noteworthy: 66.5% for the first seven and 80.9% for the remaining plants.

3. The National Energy Plan also assigned great importance to nuclear safety. It provided for the establishment of a nuclear safety council which would have various responsibilities. The structure of the Nuclear Energy Board was to be modified: while continuing its traditional activities in fundamental research and staff training, it would also be able to participate in industrial activities.

4. The nuclear power debate had crossed all frontiers and become international. The Spanish delegation wished to stress the importance for all Member States of full implementation of the supplementary nuclear power safety programme approved in June 1979 by the Board of Governors, and supported the recommendations put forward in that connection by the Governments of Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden (document GC(XXIII)/INF/186). The standards established by

the Agency could serve as a basis and frame of reference for national bodies and could even furnish an argument to counter the objections raised by the opponents of nuclear power. The establishment within the Secretariat of standing expert groups to give technical advice to Governments interested in that field would be extremely useful.

5. The Spanish Government supported without reservation the Agency's programmes of assistance to developing countries. Naturally, Spain co-operated most closely with Spanish-speaking countries. In that connection, he wished to mention the supplementary agreements concluded by Spain with Argentina, the Federal Republic of Germany, Venezuela and Uruguay; Spain had by now signed 16 such agreements altogether. The co-operation with Ecuador was progressing well, and should result in the construction of a research centre with a 3-MW reactor. The collaboration of Spain with the Chilean Atomic Energy Commission was going forward as planned.

6. The Agency had entrusted Spain with the task of organizing an interregional training course on nuclear power project planning, development and construction, which had been held in Madrid at the end of 1978, and an interregional training course on quality assurance, which had been held recently, also in Madrid. Moreover, since the previous General Conference session, Spain had welcomed 31 fellows of various nationalities, of whom 25 were Spanish-speaking.

7. The Spanish Nuclear Energy Board had undertaken co-operation programmes with Colombia, Peru and Mexico for uranium ore prospecting and mining. In addition, Spain was considering with Peru and Mexico the possibility of extracting uranium during the production of phosphoric acid by a technique developed entirely by the Nuclear Energy Board. It had also assisted various countries in the field of nuclear law and in the preparation of nuclear safety standards.

8. In conclusion, he wished to stress that as a result of the system of rotation tacitly established within the Board of Governors, Spain was a Member of the Board only once every four years. That situation was regrettable, and Spain would be unable to increase its contribution to the Agency's activities in the

future unless its position on the Board corresponded to its position in the nuclear field. His delegation would consider carefully any proposal for modification of the Board's composition that satisfied Spain and other countries in the same situation.

9. <u>Mr. KORHONEN</u> (Finland) said that muclear power had not yet fully played the role expected of it, and that at a time of rising prices and decreasing availability of energy sources efforts should be made to enhance that role. The criticisms levelled at muclear power related to safety, waste and proliferation, and it was essential to find solutions to those problems on an international level, in particular within the IAEA. That would call for adequate funding of the Agency's activities and for a reappraisal of its programmes.

10. In view of the experience gathered by the Agency over more than twenty years, it was only natural that the international conference on nuclear energy to be convened in 1983 in accordance with Resolution 34/68 of the United Nations General Assembly should enjoy the full co-operation of the Agency, both during the preparatory work and during the conference itself, and should make use of the results of the final plenary conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the second NPT Review Conference and the second Salzburg-type conference.

11. One of the great objectives of the foundation of the Agency had been that it should become a kind of "atom bank" which would make nuclear fuel available to Member States. That had not come to pass, and the Agency had concentrated on nuclear technology. However, nuclear power had become essential to a growing number of Member States, and it was appropriate to ask whether the Agency had been able to adapt its programmes to the new situation. Similarly, the new demands concerning, in particular, safety and waste had perhaps not received as much attention as was needed. In view of the rapid expansion expected of the Agency's activities, the necessary financial and other resources must be assured.

12. It had become clear that more attention must be paid to nuclear safety and environmental protection. Finland approved of the prompt action taken by the Director General to strengthen the Agency's safety programme, and had lent its full support. The fact that it was the responsibility of national authorities to ensure nuclear safety must not hamper international co-operation and the establishment of international criteria and guidelines. In that context, it was crucial that countries should develop their safety and regulatory capabilities in parallel with their nuclear power programmes.

13. The Government of Finland considered that technical assistance activities should be given high priority. The Agency should be capable of helping countries to implement their nuclear power programmes, it being understood that those programmes must take into account the existing infrastructure and the available options in order to make the best possible use of resources.

14. Apprehensions concerning the proliferation of muclear weapons could not be dispersed as long as effective safeguards were not applied to all muclear activities of non-muclear-weapon States and as long as assurances against diversion were insufficient.

15. The Agency's annual report made reference to a possible increase in the number of States having unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. That would undoubtedly affect efforts to promote the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. As a supporter of the NPT regime, Finland, together with the other Nordic countries, had recently circulated a document during the General Assembly of the United Nations stating that the manufacture of nuclear explosives by any additional State would constitute a grave threat to the international community. In that document, the Nordic countries had also expressed the hope that no non-nuclear-weapon State would attempt to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

16. The Government of Finland was fully aware that other considerations had a bearing on the issues of non-proliferation. It was clear that assurances of supply should be included in any agreement on nuclear co-operation and non-proliferation. States that had renounced nuclear weapons and accepted safeguards on their territory had a right to expect that their energy needs would not be overlooked. The Agency seemed to be the appropriate body for the consideration of measures that would facilitate access to nuclear materials for States that were committed to the objectives of non-proliferation and had accepted the application of safeguards.

17. In his delegation's view, better use should be made of the Agency's expertise in waste management, a problem that had undoubtedly obstructed the use of nuclear energy in many countries. 18. The examination of various institutional and multinational mechanisms was, in the post-INFCE period, one of the most important activities to be carried out within the framework of the IAEA to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

19. <u>Mr. COLOMBO</u> (Italy) said that further economic growth would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without the assistance of nuclear energy, which was the only alternative to fossil fuels and was needed by both developed and developing countries. In that situation, the essential role of the IAEA was to promote international co-operation and technical assistance to developing countries, to contribute to the preparation of codes and standards and to participate in all action aimed at preventing diversion of nuclear materials.

20. The Italian Government wished to confirm its commitment to those endeavours, and had decided, in particular, to contribute 260 million lire to the Agency's fund for technical assistance. It also commended the International Centre for Theoretical Physics on its efforts to promote scientific progress in the developing countries.

21. His delegation wished to stress the importance of a close examination of the Agency's priorities with a view to checking the increasingly rapid growth of the budget and limiting all general expenditure not directly linked to the operational and institutional programmes of the Agency.

22. The Italian Government shared the concern of other countries at the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, but remained convinced that existing international agreements should not be departed from. There was no need to create new types of safeguards, but to make the best use of existing instruments, particularly NPT, to which more countries should accede. Moreover, it was vital that Articles IV and VI of NPT should be duly applied. In that context, his delegation hoped the negotiations on a complete nuclear test ban and on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) would soon be brought to a conclusion. Regarding Article IV of NPT, which was closely connected with the application of Articles I, II and III, the Italian Government was convinced that the second NPT Review Conference would pay due attention to that fundamental issue. 23. His country had taken part with great interest in INFCE and was satisfied with the results obtained, which should assist in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The INFCE studies had shown that no cycle was ideal from the point of view of non-proliferation, and that the strategies to be adopted must therefore vary from country to country. Italy was currently contributing to the studies concerning international plutonium storage and spent fuel management, but naturally recognized that the political, legal and economic problems involved could be solved only with the assistance of all concerned. Italy was already applying all the safeguards measures deriving from its international commitments, in particular where spent fuel storage was concerned. As to the storage of plutonium, Italy was prepared to consider the outcome of the activities undertaken in that field in a spirit of co-operation, provided that the new mechanism was objective, reliable and non-discriminatory.

24. The Italian Government welcomed the successful conclusion of the meetings to consider the drafting of a Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and hoped that the scope of the Convention could eventually be enlarged.

25. At home, Italy had produced 4400 million kWh of nuclear power in 1978. At the end of 1977, the Italian parliament had adopted a national energy plan, the nuclear section of which provided for twelve new reactors of 1000 MW(e) each. Those projects had met with the opposition of bublic opinion, a problem that might be reduced by improved public information and education. To that end, the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) had proposed amendments to the existing laws, and the Italian Government had recently established a Permanent Committee on Energy and a Special Commission on Nuclear Safety. Concerning research and development activities, the Government was currently examining a five-year plan (1980-84) drawn up by CNEN, the objectives of which were to improve plant safety and the protection of the population, to master the available technology, to continue research and development work on fast breeder reactors (in close collaboration with the French Commissariat à l'énergie atomique), and to continue efforts towards nuclear fusion.

26. Abroad, Italy was encouraging international co-operation in reactor safety research and was taking part in the multilateral collaboration on fast breeders which was focused on the construction of the Superphénix power plant.

27. <u>Mr. HOESS</u> (Austria) congratulated the President on his election and thanked the Indian Government for its hospitality. He reminded the delegates that the Permanent Headquarters of the Agency in the Vienna International Centre had been inaugurated on 23 August 1979, and expressed the hope that the new facilities would enable the Agency to work under more favourable conditions. The temporary laboratory at the former Headquarters had been moved to the Austrian Research Centre in Seibersdorf, where the Austrian Government had constructed new buildings to house the dosimetry laboratory and the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory. Thus, it had been possible to concentrate all of the Agency's laboratories in Austria on one site. He thanked the Director General for the kind words he had addressed to the Austrian Government, which would continue to grant full support to the Agency's work.

28. He had listened with great interest to the Director General's statement, and he wished to stress the importance of technical assistance, non-proliferation and INFCE. The Austrian Government welcomed the fact that the target for voluntary contributions had been fixed at US \$10.5 million. Subject to parliamentary approval, he was able to pledge for 1980 the amount of \$71 400, which was \$13 600 more than in 1979.

29. The Austrian delegation had noted with satisfaction the increase in the number of States party to NPT and in the number of safeguards agreements concluded by the Agency with its Member States. The second NPT Review Conference would be meeting in Geneva in August and September 1980. It should enable all Members to outline their objectives and the means of attaining them. The articles which deserved the most attention were Article IV and Article VI. Concerning the former, the Agency should make transparent the assistance already provided to the less developed countries and the areas in which such assistance should be expanded. In connection with Article VI, it would be up to the nuclear-weapon powers to demonstrate their commitment to peace and détente. It was to be hoped that the result of SALT II would be a first step in that direction. Closely related to non-proliferation was the question of the physical protection of nuclear materials. As a result of a lengthy effort begun by the Agency in 1972, a convention on that question had been concluded in Vienna on 26 October 1979. Although it dealt exclusively with the transport of nuclear materials, that convention might facilitate the adoption by all countries of common rules applying to the use, storage and transport of such materials.

30. The latest results of INFCE made it easier to understand how techniques developed and how they depended on each other. Those results would enable the developing countries to identify, on the one hand, the areas where nuclear energy would be most useful to them, and on the other, the problems entailed by non-proliferation. The evaluation would soon be concluded, and a conference would meet in February 1980 to consider the results. As the Director General had suggested, there should be some follow-up to the evaluation, and the Agency should be responsible for it.

31. Austria attached particular importance to the question of nuclear safety. The Austrian Government approved of the launching of a supplementary nuclear power safety programme, and would participate in it; it also welcomed the convening of a conference to examine questions connected with nuclear safety in Stockholm in 1980. A serious matter directly related, in his view, to that supplementary programme was the question of what might be called the "transfrontier aspects" of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

32. At the present time, 227 nuclear power plants were in operation and 219 power reactors were under construction throughout the world. Since the beginnings of nuclear energy the international community had been concerned about the impact of its applications on safety. It was with a view to enlarging the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity, and also to ensuring safety, that the Agency had been established, and it was thus responsible, inter alia, for establishing and adopting safety standards for the protection of health and the minimization of accident risks. The Agency had, moreover, developed various instruments and formulated recommendations

maximum safety in their facilities. which was no

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which had enabled its Member States to ensure maximum safety in their facilities. Austria had always approved of the Agency's activities and its efforts to increase safety, but felt that the transfrontier problems that might be raised by nuclear power plants required further examination.

33. The supplementary nuclear power safety programme would certainly allow the study of all possible safety measures, but such measures should not be considered simply on the national level, because the consequences of an accident occurring in one country might be felt in other, neighbouring countries. It was thus an international matter which should be considered in terms of international environmental law. According to the Stockholm Declaration, States must ensure that activities within their jurisdiction did not cause damage to the environment of other States. Many different mechanisms were conceivable for regulating all the transfrontier problems that might be raised by nuclear power plants. Those mechanisms should be adapted to all possible situations and should take into account essential factors such as the distance between a power plant and a frontier, without losing sight of the general problem. Countries could certainly conclude bilateral agreements directly, but a global treatment of the question was also required. The Agency could draw on its vast experience in studying the appropriate mechanisms. Austria hoped that a debate would arise. that the problems which might be encountered in future years would be identified and that solutions would be found. It was necessary to define terms such as "transfrontier" and "vicinity to borders". The study should cover aspects of geography, geology, hydrology, meteorology, and so on. The best method of establishing international collaboration should be sought; reference might be made for that purpose to information derived from ecological accidents in the past and to the evolution of international law on environmental questions. The Agency might prepare the conclusion of international agreements and assist countries which had little experience of such matters. Each country should determine how to protect not only its own population, but also that of other countries. Austria hoped that consideration would be given both to the interests of various countries and to those of the international community.

which was not possible without the co-operation of all concerned. In conclusion, his Government believed that the Agency, which had so far studied questions related to safety mainly on the national level, should now turn to the international aspects of safety. The Director General might appoint an expert group to consider the matter under the supplementary nuclear power safety programme. The Agency was clearly the appropriate body to examine that problem, although it might also be considered by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

34. He approved of the Director General's efforts to strengthen the role of the Agency, especially by improving the dissemination of information on nuclear matters, and wished to congralulate him and the Secretariat on the excellent work performed in the course of the past year.

Mr. CASTRO MADERO (Argentina) said that 1979 had been a good year for 35+ his country in the nuclear field. The national executive authority had approved by decree the construction of four 600-MW power stations and auxiliary plants which were due to enter into service between 1987 and 1997. The longterm programme involved had made it possible to carry out realistic planning of a number of basic elements (participation by local industry, size and date of entry into operation of supply facilities). It was, moreover, consistent with two main aims of nuclear development in Argentina, namely to provide the country with the necessary infrastructure for the construction of its own power stations and to enable autonomous use to be made of its uranium resources in the national interest. After a call for tenders, followed by careful examination of the offers submitted, the National Atomic Energy Commission had been instructed to draw up contracts for the building of a heavy-water plant and to form an engineering company for the construction of the third nuclear power plant. Atucha II. That work should start at the beginning of 1980. Atucha II would in fact be the first power station for which the Agency's safety guides and codes and the regulations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) would be applied for the purpose of obtaining the requisite licences. Moreover, the Atucha I power station had had the highest load factor of all reactors over 150 MW in 1979, and work on the Embalse power station, in the installation of which Argentina was taking an important part, had progressed very considerably.

36. Prospecting activities had been continued. Argentina had 37 250 t of uranium in reasonably assured reserves and 15 900 t in additional reserves, at an estimated cost of up to US \$50 per pound. The National Atomic Emergy Commission had also been instructed to develop a policy which would enable a rapid determination to be made of the total reserves of nuclear ores (with outside help) and part of the new resources discovered to be exported. Uranium production capacity had risen to 220 t of yellow cake per year. From 1983 onwards, the uranium requirements for Argentina's nuclear programme should be completely covered.

37. Activities related to the production and application of radioisotopes had continued to increase by comparison with the previous year (17% increase in production and 45% rise in the number of users). The high level attained by Argentina could be explained by the fact that the National Atomic Energy Commission had responsibility for the subject and maintained excellent relations with the other organizations involved. The Commission had continued its general activities in research and development and training.

38. The peaceful intentions of Argentina were sufficiently well established to make it unnecessary for anyone to try and intervene in its nuclear programme under the pretext of preventing proliferation. Those intentions had in any case been proved by its active participation in international organizations and by the bilateral agreements on co-operation signed with other countries, especially in Latin America. Argentina supported, for example, the activities of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission. As a member of the Co-ordination Group of the Non-Aligned Movement, Argentina had offered to host the next meeting. At the General Assembly of the United Nations, it had, along with other countries, presented a draft resolution requesting the convening of an international conference to examine all aspects of co-operation in the muclear field. 39. Argentina had increased its participation in the activities of the Agency, motivated by the fact that the Agency's aims coincided with those of the national nuclear programme. At meetings of the Board, the Argentine delegation had, as appropriate, spared neither praise nor criticism. It had for example several times protested about the constant reduction in the funds at the Agency's disposal for providing technical assistance to developing countries caused by the restrictive policies of the technically advanced countries. The Argentine Government had just decided to forego from 1980 the assistance that it had been receiving under the Agency's regular programme, since that assistance did not meet the real needs of the country. On the other hand, Argentina had in 1979 greatly increased its own contributions in cash and in the form of fellowships. In 1979, it had accepted responsibility for two projects which had been requested by Latin American countries and which the Agency had been unable to finance. It had also hosted two symposia and had provided more experts than the other countries of the region.

40. Finally, the Argentine Government had decided to make a voluntary contribution of \$94 500 to the General Fund. As it had already pointed out in the Board, the Argentine delegation much regretted the fact that, despite its general increase of 9.8% over 1979, the Regular Budget involved a reduction of 1.1% in the funds allocated to technical assistance. Although the target for voluntary contributions had been raised, the reduction was aggravated by the accumulation of contributions paid in non-convertible currencies.

41. Voluntary contributions should not be tied to the condition that the beneficiary countries be parties to some particular treaty: that was a form of discrimination contrary to the Statute. It was regrettable that certain Member States had adopted that attitude in 1979, without any opposition from the Board. The Argentine delegation also deplored the fact that in February 1979 the Board had broken with the tradition of the consensus by voting on paragraph A.1(i) of the Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance. A criterion foreign to the Statute had been introduced thereby , namely accession to a treaty which Argentina considered to be discriminatory.

42. Argentina firmly believed in the safeguards system. All its important plants were subject to safeguards and it had acceded to various non-proliferation treaties, including the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty). However, the safeguards system was a severe burden on the Agency's budget. Efforts should be concentrated on essential activities and all waste should be avoided. The Director General should, in addition, draw up a draft safeguards agreement consistent with the text of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The only draft which had so far been prepared was inappropriate since it was based on an NPT-type agreement. Negotiations on the question were continuing between Argentina and the Agency.

43. Argentina was also concerned about the negative effect that could be produced by a different system of international control which might be superimposed on the safeguards system. It was to be hoped, more specifically, that the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage would not go outside its terms of reference.

44. Finally, certain of the Agency's activities had merited unstinted praise in 1978 and 1979: they included protection of the environment, agriculture, treatment of foodstuffs, the physical and biological sciences, INFCE and the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme. The Agency was also to be congratulated on the action it had taken at the time of the Three Mile Island incident and on its programmes related to nuclear waste. Recognition should also be given to the work done by the Trieste International Centre for Theoretical Physics.

45. <u>Mr. COSTA ALONSO</u> (Nexico) said that there was a clear need for his country to develop the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Such development would of course involve a number of problems; the scientists would have to make a careful study of the safety measures to be taken and public opinion would have to be correctly informed so that any possible risks were seen in the proper light and humanity was not deprived of certain options as a result of unreasoned fear. For that reason the Agency's activities were of special importance.

46. Mexico held the sixth place in the world in terms of oil reserves and was conscious of the responsibilities that involved. At the General Assembly of the United Nations, the President, Mr. Lopez Portillo, had stressed the need for a world energy plan which would, among other things, rationalize the use of primary energy and ensure a smooth transition to the utilization of new sources. The rich countries, the largest consumers of energy, should make maximum use of the new sources and leave the traditional ones to others. It was also essential that all potential reserves, traditional or new, and including of course nuclear energy, should be systematically exploited.

47. For its part, Mexico intended to diversify its sources and to give special importance to muclear energy. The necessary legal framework had already been set up with the formation of a number of specialized and co-ordinated organizations. Mexico was trying to establish the necessary infrastructure and to train the personnel required for the implementation of an overall nuclear development programme because it did not want to have recourse to importing complete nuclear power stations, leaving only minor installation work for national enterprises and largely excluding Mexican technicians from participation.

48. Apart from the installation of the necessary power stations to satisfy the growing demand for electrical energy, Mexico's nuclear programme also included the setting up of a national reactor and fuel-cycle industry. Mexico would need international co-operation, but such co-operation would have to respect the plans and priorities of the country without imposing conditions incompatible with its sovereignty.

49. Mexico had never accepted any form of direct inspection by another country, believing that that would constitute an infringement of its sovereignty and that all responsibility in the matter of safeguards rested with the Agency.

50. The peaceful intentions of Mexico could not be doubted. A party to NPT, Mexico was also one of the initiators of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The resources devoted to armaments, including muclear weapons, should be used for the benefit of humanity and in particular for that of the developing countries. Mexico held fast by the principles of the Agency and was concerned to see that certain countries were trying to modify their commitments even before carrying them out. The nonmuclear-weapon States, including Mexico, who had fulfilled their obligations under NPT had the right to insist that the muclear powers carried out in turn all the obligations which they had assumed under Article IV of that Treaty.

51. <u>Mr. EHSAN</u> (Bangladesh) congratulated the President and the eight Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and the other members of the General Committee on their election, and thanked the Indian Government for its hospitality.

52. Bangladesh had recently signed NPT and had thus reaffirmed its commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Peace could only come through the elimination of all weapons, including nuclear weapons. All moves towards limiting those armaments were a contribution to peace. The smaller countries were of course making their contribution by unilateral acts such as acceding to NPT. However, disarmament depended mainly on the great Powers, who should slow down the arms race until they eventually ceased producing arms altogether and destroyed their stocks.

53. The Bangladesh delegation highly appreciated the presentation of the Agency's budget for 1980. Although the total increase in the budget over the 1979 figure was 21.6%, the increase in the technical assistance programme was only 11.9% (without allowance for the rise in the cost of services and for inflation). Technical assistance was being relegated to second place, behind safeguards; the Agency did not have the means to grant all sound requests for assistance. The poorest countries were therefore hampered in their development; they needed the Agency's assistance to procure spare parts since they could not build up stocks owing to lack of funds. The Bangladesh delegation urged therefore that the total funds allocated to technical assistance should be raised to the same level as those for safeguards. The Agency should also set up a revolving fund of about \$10 000 to aid the developing countries in cases of emergency and should organize seminars and symposia in those countries.

54. The Bangladesh delegation had noted from the annual report for 1978 that the cost of nuclear energy was going to become more competitive. The main reason why the developing countries had difficulties in producing nuclear energy was that there were few small and medium size reactors available and the initial investment costs were high and constantly increasing. The Agency should encourage suppliers to produce such reactors and should try to persuade the various international finance organizations to provide special credits for their purchase. Bangladesh was negotiating to buy a small reactor and was grateful to the Agency for providing assistance in evaluating the offers. It hoped that the Agency would continue its support and provide training for the necessary personnel. The developing countries which embarked on nuclear energy programmes required help in all activities connected with the fuel cycle. The INFCE results would provide them with valuable information. Bangladesh strongly supported the idea of setting up regional fuel-cycle centres.

55. Bangladesh wished to thank the Agency for encouraging regional collaboration, particularly in connection with an industrial project on the applications of isotopes and radiation under the Regional Co-operation Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA). The Agency should establish a regional centre and a regional office to handle such projects, and it could count on the support of Bangladesh for that purpose.

56. Bangladesh was committed to the utilization of atomic energy for its national economic development. It had, for example, continued the construction of various institutes at the Savar Atomic Research Centre and completed the building destined for the Irradiation and Pest Control Research Institute. Orders had been placed for a computer at the Centre and for a research reactor intended for the Institute of Nuclear Technology. In the field of agricultural research, the Institute of Nuclear Agriculture had continued to study the problem of plant improvement and had obtained a number of new mutants. Bangladesh had also completed studies on zinc deficiency in the soil and the means by which it could be overcome. It had received assistance in that programme from the Agency and from the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). Work had been started on the construction of two new centres for the medical applications of nuclear energy. Exploration work for uranium and other heavy metals along the coast was being carried out with the aid of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

57. Bangladesh was grateful for the Agency's help but hoped that the amount of technical assistance it received could be increased. It pledged its support and was confident that the Agency would successfully carry out its mission.

Mr. BARABAS (Czechoslovakia) noted that there were a number of 58. international political factors which were currently of great importance for the Agency's activities; they included in particular the SALT talks, at which the Agency had been asked to strengthen its safeguards system. Of equal importance was the Soviet initiative towards disarmament and detente taken on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic. For its part, Czechoslovakia had suggested that it would be useful to adopt. preferably under the auspices of the United Nations. a document which would impose on States the obligation to unite their efforts towards resolving the urgent problems of disarmament and would define specific political principles relevant to that end. In that context, the draft declaration on international co-operation for achieving disarmament which Czechoslovakia had presented at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly should contribute to the aims unanimously agreed on at the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

59. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supported the safeguards activities of the Agency and wished to stress the need to increase the efficiency of the existing system and to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

60. Czechoslovakia continued to give unfailing attention to multilateral scientific and technical co-operation. It was trying to satisfy its own energy needs and to forestall the effects of the world crisis on its economy, in particular by developing nuclear energy, though without neglecting other available resources.

61. Since the last session of the General Conference, Czechoslovakia had put into operation its first WER-440 reactor, and a second unit was in the process of being installed. The Soviet-designed equipment would enable the first stage of the nuclear energy plan, for which an installed capacity of 5280 MW(e) was foreseen, to be achieved by 1988; the second stage was to be completed in 1995. Czechoslovakia had become a very important partner of the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries in the field of nuclear power station technology and was among the ten industrialized countries of the world which manufactured complex nuclear equipment. Its rapid progress would not have been possible without the assistance of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was planning for an installed muclear capacity of 9280 MW(e) in 1990 and 22 000-24 000 MW(e) in the year 2000. It believed that muclear energy offered a satisfactory solution to the problem of supplying heat to large cities and was planning to construct muclear power stations for the production of process heat so that oil imports could be reduced. Czechoslovakia would not have been in a position to undertake its nuclear energy development programmes without the close collaboration of the Soviet Union and the other members of CMEA.

62. Czechoslovakia was working in systematic co-operation with the Agency in various fields, including nuclear safety and the use of radionuclides and ionizing radiation. In 1980, the Czechoslovak Government would be organizing in Czechoslovakia an international course as well as other technical functions related to the Agency's work, and would provide five long-term fellowships in higher educational establishments, four one-year fellowships and supplementary financial support towards three one-year fellowships financed by UNDP. Czechoslovakia's contribution to the Agency's technical assistance programme would be increased in 1980 to 300 000 crowns.

Mr. OSZTROVSZKI (Hungary) said that the Hungarian Government would 63. continue to give constructive support to all initiatives, proposals and talks aimed at ensuring the maintenance of peace and security and at bringing about political and military detente throughout the world. Hungary would support the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on disarmament. It much welcomed the conclusion of the talks leading to the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, ratification of which would greatly improve the international situation. Hungary also welcomed the statement made on 6 October 1979 by Mr. Leonid Brezhnev that the Soviet Union was ready to make a unilateral reduction in the number of troops and the amount of military equipment temporarily situated in the German Democratic Republic. Hungary hoped that the member countries of NATO would respond in a positive manner to Mr. Brezhnev's proposals. In conjunction with the Warsaw Pact countries, it had proposed to NATO that all the States involved in the European Security Conference should renounce the first use of muclear and traditional weapons.

64. Hungary had supported all the proposals on disarmament made at the 34th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and was gravely concerned to see that there were forces in the world acting against the spirit of non-proliferation. It welcomed the fact that the 6th conference of the non-aligned countries in Havana had made an important contribution to the maintenance and defence of peace throughout the world. It was strongly in favour of the irreversible process of political and military détente and urged NATO to give up its plans to enlarge its nuclear rocket arsenal in Western Europe.

65. Hungary had few raw materials and energy resources, and the construction of its first nuclear power station was essential for the supply of electricity. It was planned that one third of its electricity would come from nuclear sources by the end of the century. Research was also being carried out with a view to improving methods for the utilization of radioisotopes in industry, agriculture and medicine. Ever closer bonds of co-operation were being established, both bilateral, as with India for example, and multilateral (especially within CMEA). Thus, for example, a high-voltage line had been installed in Hungary to provide a connection with the grids of other CMEA countries. Hungary was moreover involved in the construction of a nuclear power station for the production of electricity in the USSR. A scientific expedition had been arranged to study the radioactivity of the Danube, and at the request of the Agency Hungary had organized a meeting of experts on the subject.

66. Hungary continued to support the Agency's activities and believed that questions related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be examined by a Salzburg-type world conference held under the Agency's auspices. The Agency's work in the field of nuclear safety was likewise important, especially that concerned with the formulation and publication of standards. Hungary had taken an active part in the preparation of the text for the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. It welcomed the Agency's efforts in safeguards and its contribution towards the organization of the second NPT Review Conference.

67. With regard to the Department of Safeguards, the Hungarian delegation believed that it was essential to increase the efficiency of the inspectors' work so that the number of inspectors could be reduced. It was concerned at the tendency of some countries to introduce various criteria so that they could refuse to accept the inspectors proposed by the Agency. That practice militated against rational and economic use of the inspectors' time. 68. The Agency's technical assistance programme was of great importance and in that connection Hungary was providing four fellowships per year. It benefited from the services of Agency experts and in turn was making available a number of Hungarian experts. It welcomed the fact that the Agency was making good use of its voluntary contribution to the technical assistance fund, in particular for the purchase of nuclear equipment destined for medical purposes. In 1980, it would make a voluntary contribution of one million forints. During 1979, Hungary had organized two meetings of experts and a course on the use of research reactors.

69. In certain countries, public opinion was coming out against the use of nuclear power stations for the production of electricity. The Agency's response should be to reinforce its public information work in an effort to right that situation.

70. In spite of certain reservations, Hungary had approved the Agency's budget for 1980. It had learned with regret, however, that the Agency had presented supplementary estimates for 1979 and 1980, since that meant a significant rise in expenditure without any programme increase. The Hungarian delegation wished to stress that expenditure should be covered not only by an increase in the budget but also by rational economies and a redistribution of the available funds.

71. <u>Mr. GHEZAL</u> (Tunisia) congratulated the President on his election and expressed the gratitude of his delegation to the Indian Government for its warm welcome. He paid tribute to the work of the Director General, who had given a clear and objective presentation of international energy problems and the activities of the Agency.

72. If the energy crisis were to continue, as seemed likely, all countries would be affected and would have to turn to other sources of energy, including renewable sources. Nuclear energy, even if it did not solve all problems, was therefore a necessity. The use of nuclear energy had recently been questioned as a result of changes in public opinion and the Three Mile Island incident. The significance of that incident had, after examination, been reduced to its proper proportions. Moreover, the Agency had reacted immediately by adopting a supplementary safety programme. It had also proved itself by the effective support it had given to INFCE, whose work was now practically complete, and to the conference on the physical protection of nuclear materials.

73. His delegation had noted with interest that additional States had signed NPT, but hoped that the Treaty would not become an obstacle to the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The funds allocated to the safeguards programme were increasing too rapidly in comparison with those for technical assistance. The provision of technical assistance was after all one of the two main activities of the Agency, and the Statute accorded it equal importance with safeguards.

74. The Tunisian Government was giving special attention to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the country, especially in the fields of agriculture, public health, standards laboratories and oil exploration. The Tunisian plan for the development of energy up to the year 2000 involved a growing reliance on renewable sources and especially on nuclear energy, which would provide solutions to some of the problems peculiar to the developing countries, such as encroachment of the desert.

75. The Agency should give greater assistance to the developing countries in the field of training and should arrange for the transfer of the technologies they lacked. It could for example set up a long-term training programme on a special reactor for the benefit of scientists and technicians from the developing countries.

76. With regard to the proposed amendment of Article VI.A.2, the Tunisian delegation believed that the change conformed to the spirit of the Statute, which laid down the principle of equitable representation for the various regions. Moreover, the countries from Africa and the Middle East and South Asia, and indeed the developing countries as a whole, had too few nationals employed by the Agency and were being unfairly treated. It was time that the Agency remedied that situation.

77. <u>Mr. NICULESCU</u> (Romania) thanked the Indian Government for offering to host the twenty-third regular session of the General Conference. He requested the Vice-President to congratulate Mr. Sethna on his election.

78. He was certain that all participants would try to find ways to ensure the unhindered transfer of the nuclear technologies, materials and equipment necessary for all countries, and particularly the developing countries, to profit from the most advanced applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He recalled the proposal made by his Government concerning the setting-up of definite programmes of co-operation. The attempt to establish monopolies under the pretext of preventing proliferation was unacceptable.

79. The President of Romania, Mr. Nicolae Ceaucescu, attached great importance to international peace, security and co-operation and accordingly also to the organizations of the United Nations family. He had stated in his report to the XIIth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party that the new international economic order should be based on the principles of equality and justice so that the least developed countries could have access to scientific and technical progress to facilitate their economic development, and so that conditions could thus be created for the equitable evolution of all regions in the world.

80. The Romanian Government believed that in 1978 the Agency had successfully discharged its obligations towards Member States, especially through the provision of technical assistance and through its programmes in nuclear power and reactors, nuclear safety, plasma physics and controlled nuclear fusion, the applications of isotopes and radiations and training. Even so, the Agency ought to increase its technical assistance to the developing countries. It should in fact establish a reasonable balance between the technical assistance and safeguards activities, since the latter derived solely from the desire to develop the applications of nuclear energy for purely peaceful purposes. Romania would therefore be making a voluntary contribution to the technical assistance fund in proportion to its rate of assessment. It would also make available six training fellowships of 10 months each.

81. Nuclear power was essential in Romania for progress in technology and the development of energy-based schemes. It was planned to install 660 MW of nuclear power by 1985 and 10 000 MW by the year 2000. In carrying out its nuclear power programme, Romania would endeavour to co-operate as broadly as possible with the competent international organizations in an attempt to solve the energy problems of mankind.

82. Romania attached great importance to its collaboration with the Agency and hoped that the links which it and other countries had with the Agency would be strengthened. It supported the initiatives taken to ensure more equitable representation of the developing countries on the various bodies in the Agency.

83. During 1979 Romania had been closely involved in the Agency's programmes. The Agency, for its part, had provided considerable technical assistance for Romania's nuclear power programme (supported by UNDP), for its heavy-ion physics programme, and for the training of a number of Romanian experts. The Agency could be assured of Romania's continued support.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.