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President: Mr. SETHNA (India)

CONTENTS

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80-2831

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1978 (GC(XXIII)/610) (continued)

1. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he would like to take the opportunity of expressing sincere gratitude to the Government and people of India for their hospitality and to convey to them his good wishes for the further strengthening of the traditional ties of friendship and co-operation between the two countries.

2. Certain progress had recently been made in the struggle for peace and international security. Political détente continued to be the dominant trend in world politics and it was exerting a beneficial effect on all aspects of international life. The persistent efforts of all peaceloving forces had averted the threat of a thermonuclear war and had highlighted the problem of putting an end to the arms race.

3. It was notable, within that context, that the world public and leading statesmen in many countries had supported as an act of very great importance the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-II) between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and were in favour of its immediate ratification.

4. The Soviet Union's firm adherence to the cause of peace had found expression in the new initiative shown by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in Berlin during October 1979.

5. The importance of the programme proposed by the Soviet Union for strengthening peace and for a military détente in Europe went far beyond the bounds of the European continent. It confirmed once again the consistency of the Soviet Union's policy of ending the arms race and reducing international tension. In that connection it should be recalled that the Soviet Government had recently put forward proposals, in the august forum of the United Nations, on ceasing production and gradually reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons of all types, right up to the point of doing away with them entirely, and on the full and universal prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union had proposed the conclusion of an international convention on the non-utilization of nuclear weapons against States which eschewed the production or acquisition of them and which had no such weapons within their territory. The Soviet Union was willing to formalize the relevant commitment with any interested State.

6. That new initiative on the part of the Soviet Union, together with the broad range of earlier Soviet proposals on problems of peace and disarmament, showed that, given good will, it was possible to make steady headway in the process of further reducing international tension and ensuring the security of all peoples.

7. One of the most important tasks facing the Agency under the terms of its Statute and under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The importance of the task was dictated, above all, by the fact that the truly successful development of nuclear power production and its fuel cycle, together with fruitful international co-operation in that field in the interests of all countries, could be ensured only when the international community was in possession of firm guarantees that such co-operation would not become a pathway for the spread of nuclear weapons.

8. That fact had been stressed once again at the Soviet-United States summit meeting in Vienna. Declaring their intention to continue working in order further to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, the two parties had noted the importance of applying universal international Agency safeguards and declared their intention to continue efforts directed at strengthening such safeguards.

9. An important instrument for ensuring such conditions was NPT itself, which would be celebrating, in 1980, ten years of effective existence, and which had now been acceded to by some 110 countries. The Treaty covered most of the non-nuclear-weapon States with highly developed nuclear industries.

10. A number of countries, however, were still not party to the Treaty, a fact which reduced its effectiveness. The Soviet delegation shared the concern which the Director General had expressed in that connection in his opening statement, and associated itself with the Director General and the delegates of Japan and of the German Democratic Republic in urging all countries not party to the Treaty, first and foremost those with a high industrial and scientific-technical potential, to accede to the Treaty, thereby making it univeral in nature, particularly in view of the forthcoming Second NPT Review Conference.

11. Among measures aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime, the Agency's programme for development of the concept of international or regional nuclear fuel cycle centres deserved serious attention. Studies in connection with that programme were being made both by the Agency and as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle (INFCE).

and the practical implementation of the programme would make it possible not only to organize the most effective Agency safeguards, but also to promote more rapid development of nuclear power production, primarily in countries with a small industrial potential.

12. The Soviet Union was willing to assist in setting up such centres on the basis of the experience acquired in the USSR and the technical facilities that were available.

13. Nearly all countries having a programme for the peaceful use of atomic energy had taken part in INFCE, the final document of which contained a balanced and objective review of the most important aspects of all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle - economics, ecology, non-proliferation - and contained recommendations which would undoubtedly be useful to many countries in their national nuclear power programmes. The documents also identified complex problems which would have to be solved.

14. The development of nuclear power was being accompanied by a considerable growth in world trade in nuclear materials and equipment, and in the volume of such items transported from one State to another. It was vital that trade in nuclear materials and equipment should be conducted within the framework of a strict non-proliferation regime, so that it should not develop into a form of lucrative business to the detriment of international security.

15. The Soviet Union was pleased to note that work on drafting an international convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, intended to protect nuclear material under international transport from unauthorized use, had been successfully concluded in Vienna in October.

16. Signature and entry into force of that convention would be a further significant step towards consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In that connection the Soviet delegation wished to express its indebtedness to the Agency for the important contribution it had made to the drafting of the convention.

17. The programme of development of nuclear power in the USSR had continued at the rates laid down in the directives of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There was also no change in the nuclear power strategy which, as had already been indicated several times, consisted in a combination of thermal and fast nuclear power stations and the radiochemical reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium and unused uranium for recycling.

18. Throughout the period of growth of its conventional nuclear power capacity, massive research had also been conducted in the Soviet Union on the physics, engineering and design aspects of thermonuclear fusion reactors. True to its traditions of friendship and co-operation the Soviet Union had, with the Agency's support, initiated the development of such fusion reactors for future power production on an international basis.

19. The Soviet Union was constructing its nuclear power base in close collaboration with other socialist Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which had recently celebrated its thirtieth anniversary. An important step in the collaboration among Member States of the CMEA had been the drafting of a long-term programme of co-operation on such questions as the design and introduction of generating units embodying 1000-MW water-cooled and -moderated reactors and the further development of reactors of that type, and the development of high capacity fast-neutron reactor facilities. In the Soviet Union and other CMEA member countries, research was being conducted to derive benefits to man from atoms in yet another way - by building nuclear heat-and-power plants and nuclear heating stations for district heating and process steam production. That was a very important matter for northern countries: about 40% of the total energy generated was used for such heating purposes. Moreover, replacing fossil-fuel boilers by nuclear boilers would significantly reduce pollution of the atmosphere of large cities and the surrounding countryside.

20. In order to achieve that programme the heads of Government of the Member States of CMEA had signed an agreement in Moscow in June 1979 for wide-ranging international specialization and co-operation on production and mutual exchange of nuclear power equipment during the period 1981-90. In terms of output and facilities produced in common (to a value of several thousand million roubles), that agreement was the biggest ever in the context of the CMEA. Around 50 industrial combines and enterprises in eight countries would be involved in the project.

21. One of the main factors determining the prospects for nuclear power was the safety question. Recently a wide-ranging study and evaluation of operating experience with existing nuclear power stations had been carried out in the Soviet Union. Using the results of scientific research carried out, basic standards had been revised and introduced, which should make a more specific contribution to ensuring radiation safety.

22. On the whole, the first standard-unit-type nuclear power stations with WWR-440 and RBMK-1000 reactors had operated reliably and had demonstrated superior operational characteristics. Nevertheless, an extensive programme of work on nuclear power plant safety was being pursued both in the context of the Soviet national nuclear power programme and in conjunction with other socialist countries.

23. The problem of ensuring reliable and trouble-free operation of nuclear power stations under conditions of accelerated development of nuclear power engineering was becoming one of global significance. The Soviet Union recognized the important role being played by the Agency in organizing international co-operation in that sphere, and considered that the Agency's activities in connection with the production of codes and guides on nuclear power station safety deserved maximum support. However, that alone was not enough: there was need for broad international exchange of the results of research and development work in the field of nuclear power station safety which, the Soviet Union believed, would considerably speed up the solution of that vital problem. He expressed his country's readiness to take an active part in such a programme of exchange.

24. The Soviet Union had rendered and would continue to render technical and economic assistance to other countries in the construction of nuclear power stations and in the development of national nuclear power programmes. An important condition for such assistance was that receiving countries should undertake not to use the nuclear material and equipment received in order to develop or manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and also that such material and equipment should be placed under Agency safeguards. Countries operating nuclear power stations constructed with technical assistance from the Soviet Union could count on a guaranteed supply of fuel for the stations and also on the re-acceptance of the spent fuel by the USSR for storage and reprocessing. Such arrangements solved the energy problems of those countries while ensuring strict observance by the supplier and recipients of contractual conditions and nuclear non-proliferation requirements.

25. As could be seen from the annual report of the Agency for 1978 and the statement by the Director General, the Agency's activities had been further expanded in 1978-79 and were contributing to the development of international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and international security.

26. The Soviet delegation wished to acknowledge the role played by the IAEA Secretariat in organizing co-operation in such important areas of the Agency's scientific programme as nuclear power and its fuel cycle, nuclear power station safety and environmental protection, safeguards, controlled nuclear fusion and the International Nuclear Information System (INIS). The Soviet Union would continue to give extensive support to the Agency's activities connected with those matters.

27. The Soviet delegation noted with satisfaction that in 1978, as in previous years, the Secretariat had reported that as a result of the Agency's safeguards programme it had not detected any discrepancy which would indicate that a significant quantity of nuclear material under safeguards had been diverted to the production of any nuclear weapon or other kind of nuclear explosive device or used for any military purpose. That conclusion was evidence of the political success of the Agency's international safeguards system applied both inside and outside the framework of NPT.

28. A feature worth noting was the increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities coming under Agency safeguards.

29. However, the introduction into the international safeguards sphere of nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as plants for uranium enrichment, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the preparation of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel necessitated the development of qualitatively new safeguards techniques.

30. In addition to the development of safeguards methods and procedures for the "sensitive" stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, it was of extreme importance to make a radical improvement in the instrumental equipment available to the Agency's surveillance activities and also to implement to the fullest extent the new automated system for the processing of safeguards data.

31. The Soviet Union would assist in that work; one way in which it would do so was by making an additional voluntary contribution towards the development and increased efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

32. Since the Soviet Union attached considerable value to the Agency's work on the technical improvements of safeguards, it was ready to arrange in 1980-1982 on a cost-free basis a series of studies at Soviet scientific research institutes designed to strengthen the technical basis of the Agency's safeguards. The work would involve the expenditure of up to one million roubles in national currency.

33. The Soviet Union attached great importance to the provision of technical assistance to the developing States Members of the Agency in order to promote the extensive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in those countries. It insisted of course that, in accordance with the Statute, such assistance should not be used for any military purpose. Out of the total sum of 5.7 million roubles paid in voluntary contributions in national currency by the USSR between 1969 and 1979, 4.5 million roubles had been spent or committed. That had been greatly aided by the Agency's general policy of implementing long-term large-scale programmes, as reflected in the guiding principles for the provision of technical assistance from the Agency's own resources laid down in 1978 by the Board of Governors. In expressing its satisfaction with the activities of the Department of Technical Assistance and Publications, his delegation wished to assure the Director General that, as far as the utilization of Soviet voluntary contributions was concerned, he could always count on full awareness of the importance of that work on the part of the USSR.

34. In recent years the Agency had begun to make greater use of the possibilities in the Soviet Union for training specialists from the developing countries. The Soviet Government was willing to expand further that type of co-operation with the Agency by arranging courses in the USSR on the application of nuclear techniques in industry, agriculture and medicine.

35. The Soviet delegation had been authorized by its Government to announce an increase in the voluntary contribution of the USSR to the General Fund from 750 000 roubles in 1979 to 950 000 roubles in national currency in 1980. The USSR voluntary contribution could be used for supplying the developing States Members of the IAEA with equipment, instruments and materials, including small amounts of nuclear materials for research purposes and fuel elements slightly enriched in ^{235}U for experimental reactors. It could also be used for providing those countries with uranium enrichment services (up to 5% ^{235}U) using raw material supplied by them, and for training their specialists in the USSR.

36. In that connection his delegation wished once again to stress the need effectively to combine technical assistance with reliable measures for international control over it.

37. With respect to the Agency's annual report for 1978, the Soviet delegation had, on the whole, no objection to approving it, apart from the reservation in connection with nuclear facilities in West Berlin which had been entered at the June 1979 meetings of the Board of Governors.

38. The experience of recent years had demonstrated that broad and equitable international co-operation on the peaceful utilization of atomic energy was impossible without a whole series of measures designed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and ensure international security. Those measures, as his delegation had already mentioned, included an increase in the number of countries signing NPT, thus imparting a universal character to that Treaty; further improving the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system, which was the most important instrument in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; strict control of nuclear exports; the improvement of national systems of accounting for and controlling nuclear materials and facilities; the evolution of a system whereby States would undertake collective action in cases which posed the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons; the establishment of guarantees for the security of States which did not possess nuclear weapons and did not have them on their territory; and the further development and implementation of plans for the assured supply of nuclear fuel, international centres and facilities associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, international plutonium storage and spent fuel management.

39. The Soviet delegation believed that the existing institutions and machinery for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, first and foremost among which were the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, represented a secure basis for the successful accomplishment of those tasks.

40. In conclusion, he wished the IAEA further success in its noble work of promoting the widespread use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

41. Mr. BARTOLOME (Philippines) said that, as a developing country, the Philippines could not but feel proud of the high level of technology which India had attained in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That achievement had been rendered all the more meaningful by India's continuing willingness to share that technology with other developing countries.

42. The Philippines vividly remembered the inception of the India-Philippines-IAEA(IPA) project related to a regional joint training and research programme using a neutron crystal spectrometer, a project that had been the first co-operative agreement in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between two developing countries and the Agency. In 1972, it had matured into the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA), and had sown trust and confidence where previously only suspicion had reigned. The RCA co-operative programmes covered an extremely wide spectrum of activities, and with the recent participation of Australia and Japan the RCA had found renewed vigour and potential for expansion. That would, however, require additional financial resources, and the continuing support of the Agency would therefore be essential.

43. The primary objectives of the Agency, which were too well known to require quoting, should be continually reflected in the organization's programme and budget. In recent years, the developing countries had come to realize that nuclear energy could become an instrument for economic development, and consequently there were now seven developing countries operating nuclear power plants with an aggregate output of 4000 MW(e). By 1985 those figures were expected to increase to 17, and 30 000 (MW(e) respectively. However, public misgivings about the safety of nuclear power plants and the risks of further nuclear proliferation, perceived above all by nuclear supplier countries, had seriously threatened nuclear power plant construction. Therefore the Agency, assisted by all its Member States, should continue to improve its safety and safeguards operations in order to ensure greater public acceptance and to diminish the risks of nuclear proliferation.

44. Economic sanctions alone would not stop nuclear proliferation. The necessary political conditions had to be created in order to convince a country or Government inclining towards the nuclear option that the total benefits in going nuclear would not outweigh the total costs. The adverse effects of vertical proliferation on the effort to contain horizontal proliferation had to be recognized. It was indeed difficult to accept the argument that some countries had the unquestioned privilege of continuing to make more and better nuclear weapons, while others were restrained from acquiring technology that might, at most, enable them to make a few nuclear explosive devices.

45. Clearly, the nuclear-weapon States should accelerate their negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and indeed for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. The non-nuclear-weapon States, on their side, should accept full-scope safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, and should undertake not to acquire, develop or manufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

46. While admittedly not capable of stopping nuclear proliferation, the Agency's safeguards system was intended as a deterrent against such proliferation.

47. His delegation was gratified to note that, following the Three Mile Island incident, the Agency had prepared a supplementary nuclear safety programme. The Philippines supported the Agency's efforts in connection with nuclear safety and looked forward to the immediate implementation of the recommendations of the Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (SAGSTRAM).

48. It also noted with satisfaction the increasing number of Member States which had become party to NPT, and urged Members to sign and ratify at the earliest possible date the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPNM).

49. The main preoccupation of the developing countries was with the daily struggle for existence. It was in that context that Article IV.2 of NPT was extremely important. While that Article guaranteed the "fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy", the Philippines found itself unable to secure an export licence for a nuclear power plant ordered under a contract signed several years previously. That situation had arisen in spite of the fact that the Philippines was a party to NPT and met all the non-proliferation conditions required by the supplier country for the export of a nuclear power plant.

50. Yet the supplier country had unilaterally changed the conditions for supply, and had applied them retroactively in violation of existing international treaties and agreements. Such breaches of existing international agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been considered by some supplier countries to be an acceptable form of conduct in international relations, but clearly the application of double standards in that way could only lead to chaos in international affairs.

51. There could be no question of the delay in supplying the plant being due to doubts about its safe use by the recipient. His Government had on many occasions expressed to the supplier country its willingness to improve the safety factor of the plant in any way that might be required in order to secure the grant of the export licence. It had received no specific replies to those overtures.

52. As long as the regulatory body of the supplier country took time to decide whether it had jurisdiction on the matter of export of the plant, the Philippines construction schedule continued to fall behind. So far, there had been a delay of one year in construction because of the new export requirements. For every year of delay, the Philippines had to pay interest rates of 9% per year on the loan, bear the cost of escalation, and pay for replacement power, equivalent to 5.5 million barrels of oil per year from 1983 onwards, at a price of at least $50 per barrel. In all, that meant that each year of delay in construction cost his country well over $500 million. Since the Philippines per capita income was under $500 per year, that meant that at least a million Filipinos would have to work one year to pay for every year of time required by the supplier country to determine jurisdiction on the matter.

53. That situation obviously could not be permitted to continue. If it did continue, countries would attempt to develop individually and without safeguards their own fuel cycle arrangements, leading to increased risks of nuclear proliferation.

54. He felt that the time had come for the Agency to play a more active role in international nuclear commerce. The Board of Governors should establish a committee, with membership open to all interested States, with the aim of drafting an international code of conduct for international nuclear commerce. That code should be binding and should contain provisions for assured supplies in exchange for acceptance of non-proliferation conditions. Changes in conditions for supply should be accepted only when mutually agreed to by all the parties concerned.

55. The Agency's technical assistance programme was indeed small compared to the needs of the developing countries, but its implementation had none the less improved and the Secretariat was to be congratulated on that achievement.

56. Coming as it did at a time of economic difficulties, the large increase in the Regular Budget for 1980 was a cause for serious concern. He felt that the Director General should undertake a desk-to-desk evaluation of work performance

in the Secretariat to determine where reductions in staff could be made. The Director General should also assign the costs of all supporting activities to the functional operations of the Agency. He had observed that the Agency's budget for 1980 already allocated costs to various functional programmes, although that still had to be done in respect of the new Permanent Headquarters. The operating costs of the VIC were at present shared with the United Nations on the basis of net floor space assigned. His delegation was certain that the same procedure could easily be applied to determining the Department of Safeguards' share in the operating costs.

57. The Conference would recall that by Resolution 3417 A (XXX) of 8 December 1975, the United Nations General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to increase the number of nationals of developing countries appointed to senior posts in the Secretariat. In 1978, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to take further steps in that direction. His delegation had observed, however, from an examination of the Agency's staff list, that out of 113 P-5s only 16 (14%) were nationals of the developing countries, out of 17 D-1s only 4 (23%) came from the developing countries, and out of 7 D-2s there was no one from the developing countries. Finally, out of five Deputy Directors General, there was only one from a developing country.

58. It was thus clear that on the question of personnel there had been a strong reluctance by the Agency to conform to the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly. It was time for that to change.

59. The Philippines set great store by the efforts of the Agency, and had expressed its interest in it by actively participating in its relevant activities. It was his Government's intention to continue that policy.

60. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of the delegation of the Principality of Liechtenstein, said he wished first to take the opportunity of expressing his gratitude to the Indian authorities for their invitation to hold the General Conference in India, and likewise to thank the Austrian authorities for placing the recently inaugurated Vienna International Centre (VIC) at the Agency's disposal.

61. It was to be noted that the Regular Budget of the Agency had increased considerably in the course of the past three years, as illustrated, for example, by the percentage increase in assessed contributions of Member States. A major part

of the increases were due to inflation, fluctuations in the exchange rate for the dollar and various other factors beyond the Agency's control, but over the same period there had also been an increase in real terms, corresponding to a growth of the Agency's activities. It was therefore gratifying to see a down-trend in the 1980 budget, the overall increase for that year being 22%, as opposed to roughly 30% for the previous two years. Even more gratifying was the fact that the increase in real terms in the assessed contributions of Member States was only slightly above 1%, i.e. 10 times smaller than for 1979.

62. It was to be hoped that the trend would continue and that the Agency would be able, in line with other international organizations, to fix a budget ceiling for real term expenditure that would remain stable during the years to come, even though recent discussion of the matter on an informal basis had suggested that such would not necessarily be the case in 1981.

63. As far as Switzerland's activities in the field of nuclear research and development were concerned, work on advanced reactors continued to focus on the high-temperature reactor and was being carried out in collaboration with the Federal Republic of Germany. The Swiss contribution was geared especially to the type of reactor design based on a direct cycle with a high-power gas turbine. In addition, study of gas-cooled fast breeder reactors was being continued and the headway already made was encouraging.

64. The leading light in the project was the Swiss Federal Institute for Reactor Research, which was also implementing a programme for the development of nuclear fuel in the form of mixed uranium and plutonium carbides to be used in the gas-cooled fast breeder reactors. The Institute also had a 5-MW pool-type reactor - to be stepped up to 10 MW later on - which had taken over from the DIORIT heavy-water reactor no longer in operation.

65. Research was also under way in the field of nuclear safety, for example, as related to loss-of-coolant accidents, and the results obtained were being passed on as a contribution to the loss-of-fluid test facility project in the United States.

66. Radioactive waste management and disposal were likewise a priority consideration in Switzerland. Special attention was being given to dispersion and diffusion in geological formations, and a national company representing combined public and private interests had begun a broad-ranging geological survey programme in order to localize suitable storage sites in the country.

67. At the organizational level, the Institute for Reactor Research had already been diversifying its research activities in non-nuclear power production for several years, more especially in the solar energy sector.

68. Lastly, Switzerland had stepped up research in the area of controlled thermo-nuclear fusion and was participating in the corresponding European Atomic Energy Community's (EURATOM) programme. The Swiss effort was focused mainly on plasma physics and the development of high-power magnets.

69. With regard to Switzerland's nuclear power programme, the three light-water power plants at Beznau and Muehleberg, which had a total output of 1000 MW(e), continued to operate quite satisfactorily, using river water as the coolant. A fourth light-water power plant at Goesgen had just been put into commercial operation. It would produce more than 900 MW, thereby nearly doubling the installed nuclear power in Switzerland, where nuclear energy now accounted for almost 30% of the electricity produced. A fifth plant, under construction at Leibstadt, was to be commissioned in 1981/1982. Construction of a sixth nuclear power plant at Kaiseraugst had been held up due to opposition to the project, but a general licence for it had now been applied for under the new procedure adopted in Switzerland in 1979.

70. Under the new system, which was in effect a revision of the Atomic Energy Act of the late 1950s, every new nuclear facility required a general licence issued by Parliament. One of the basic conditions for the issue of the licence was that the future operator had to demonstrate convincingly that the plant was indispensable from the standpoint of energy supply. A further condition was a guarantee that there would be satisfactory management of the radioactive waste produced.

71. The problem of the public acceptance of nuclear energy in Switzerland required elucidation. The development and production of nuclear energy, which had been unanimously accepted during the 1950s and 1960s, had met with considerable opposition from the public in the 1970s. Growing awareness of the environment and apathy towards scientific and technical progress were among the factors that had brought about a marked change in the public attitude and had made nuclear energy a bone of contention, despite the fact that so many international organizations had come out in support of it as an essential contribution in solving the problem of meeting mankind's energy requirements.

72. The misgivings felt by a certain section of the population were rooted mainly in three problems - high-level waste disposal, the safety of nuclear facilities, and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The solution of those problems, all of which had international implications, largely depended on international co-operation, especially with the major industrial countries.

73. The Swiss population, which had had occasion to vote twice on the subject of nuclear energy in the first half of 1979, was greatly divided in its opinion and there was now an urgent need for considerable efforts in the three areas mentioned in order to restore confidence in nuclear energy. Such efforts should take the following form: first, it was essential to devise systems for the final disposal of high-level waste as soon as possible. The delay in doing so was being interpreted by the public as an indication of uncertainty. It was hoped that international co-operation would result in multinational regional projects which would provide an optimum solution to the problem and that the Agency could play the part of a promoter.

74. Second, in the area of nuclear safety, a thorough analysis of the accident at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, should make it possible to see what changes were necessary in all countries concerned to further reduce the probability and consequences of reactor accidents. The analysis should encourage industry to consider nuclear safety problems in a new light and help the relevant authorities to handle their work more effectively, though without making the procedures more complicated. In that connection the new efforts made by the Agency in the area of nuclear safety were greatly welcomed and the viewpoint that such activities should be funded from the Regular Budget deserved support.

75. Lastly, with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it had to be recalled that the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons constituted in effect the two arms of a balance. It was not possible to change one without altering the other at the same time. If something were added to one side, it would have to be added to the other as well to restore the balance. It was therefore regrettable that the balance had not always been maintained in the past years. The present period was one of transition and all such transition was accompanied by situations involving imbalance. It was essential to restore the balance as soon as possible and provide clear-cut guidelines for the development of nuclear energy. If a stable situation was not brought about, the damage done to the energy policy of different States would increase beyond repair.

76. Within that context, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) would be expected to submit a report that could be adopted by all participating States as a basis for the future development of nuclear energy. The report would have to be followed by specific agreements and action at international level in certain parts of the fuel cycle and in the protection of nuclear materials, equipment and services. Such action, which would be a basis for the new international nuclear order, would require a great deal of work and all States interested in the utilization of nuclear energy should be invited to participate in it, since international collaboration was the only way to bring about an international nuclear regime acceptable to all concerned. Here again the Agency could play the role of promoter.

77. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would remain the keystone of the new international nuclear order; it was encouraging in that connection to see the increase in the number of States party to the Treaty.

78. In conclusion, it had to be stated that the present year had been marked by mixed feelings on the part of the public at large with regard to all aspects of nuclear energy. People now felt that they must be given a great deal more information on the problems involved so that they would be in a position to give a considered opinion. Accordingly, it was up to the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide such information, with particular emphasis in the three areas of international importance described above.

79. Sir John HILL (United Kingdom) said that the Government of the United Kingdom believed that nuclear power had a vital role to play in meeting further energy requirements. A positive nuclear policy was being pursued in the United Kingdom and nuclear power already accounted for over 12% of electricity supply. That would grow to 20% in a few years' time with the commissioning of the three advanced gas-cooled (AGR) stations now nearing completion. Orders for two more AGR stations, each comprising two reactors and planned for operation in the late 1980s, had been confirmed and work had started on the sites. In addition, work was continuing on the development, design and safety analysis of the prototype water-fed reactor (PWR) option for the United Kingdom, and licensing arrangements were being explored.

80. The prototype fast reactor (PFR) at Dounreay had continued to operate and had proved to be a development facility of considerable flexibility. In particular, a series of experiments had demonstrated that, for the pool design of reactor, the natural circulation of the sodium coolant would remove shutdown heat from the core

even with the primary pumps switched off. The transition from pumped flow to natural flow took place smoothly and it would be many hours before the temperature of the sodium reached boiling point and required any means of powered heat removal. Those experiments had demonstrated the ability of the fast reactor to withstand total power loss and had enhanced existing confidence in the safety of the system.

81. The fuel had performed particularly well in PFR and the designers were confident that it would withstand the requirements of a commercial reactor. In September, the Prime Minister had formally opened the fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant at Dounreay. That plant was now reprocessing the enriched uranium fuel from the first Dounreay fast reactor, which had been shut down in 1977, and would then go on to reprocess the plutonium fuel from PFR. That would represent a very significant step towards closing the fast reactor fuel cycle.

82. Within the next few weeks, the United Kingdom Government would receive a report from the British nuclear industry on the various strategies by which the fast reactor system - of which the United Kingdom already had many years' development experience - could be further pursued.

83. It was the United Kingdom's policy to reprocess irradiated fuel from thermal reactors as well as fast reactors on the grounds of both efficient energy usage and the efficient management of radioactive waste. Design and development work on the thermal oxide reprocessing plant at Windscale was progressing rapidly and contracts had been secured for the full rated capacity of the plant. As far as waste disposal was concerned, all the design and development work for the active pilot vitrification plant at Windscale had been completed and construction was well advanced. The United Kingdom continued to hold the view that that technology would prove to be a fully satisfactory method of immobilizing highly active waste.

84. Decisions had been taken during 1979 to further increase the capacity of the Urenco centrifuge enrichment plants - a joint United Kingdom, German and Dutch project - at Capenhurst in the United Kingdom and Almelo in the Netherlands, and a site had been designated for the construction of a plant in the Federal Republic of Germany. The slowdown in world nuclear power construction programmes had inevitably limited the growth in demand for enriched uranium and the centrifuge programme was as a result proceeding at a rate significantly slower than that envisaged some years ago.

85. The United Kingdom's experience of the peaceful uses of nuclear power extended over more than two decades and it had never had an accident at a commercial power station which had given rise to any public hazard. Nobody, however, could afford to be complacent where nuclear safety was concerned and every effort would be made to ensure that the existing high safety standards in the United Kingdom were maintained and the search for further improvements continued.

86. The Tokyo Summit countries had agreed that the expansion of nuclear power should proceed under conditions guaranteeing people's safety. They had also recognized that the Agency could play a key role in meeting that objective. Although national Governments had to accept responsibility for the safety of their own nuclear facilities, it was nevertheless vital that nuclear safety issues should be discussed internationally, so that knowledge and experience could be shared world wide. The United Kingdom considered that the Agency was the best body to sponsor international work on nuclear safety. It hoped that the Agency would also make every effort to co-operate with other international bodies, such as the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and EURATOM, which were also keenly interested in nuclear safety.

87. Nuclear energy was a significant and vital aid in promoting the economies of the under-developed countries, particularly in the fields of medicine, agriculture and electricity generation. The United Kingdom Government attached great importance to the work being done by the Agency to develop the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and accordingly had pledged its full voluntary contribution for 1980 to the Agency's technical assistance programme. In addition, the United Kingdom would continue to make available to the Agency separate funds for the provision of fellowships in the United Kingdom for training scientists.

88. The United Kingdom Government also attached great importance to safeguards. The application of Agency safeguards in the United Kingdom under the terms of the voluntary agreement, for example to the Dounreay fast reactor and the fast reactor reprocessing plant, would provide the Agency with valuable experience in various plants of advanced design.

89. The United Kingdom had continued to seek ways in which to give practical assistance to the Agency in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards operations and would continue to organize training courses as in

previous years. In addition, it was considering undertaking a programme of research in areas in which the Agency had asked for assistance.

90. The effectiveness of the operations of the Agency inspectorate was vital if the nations of the world were to succeed in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. He was pleased to see from the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1978, that once again the inspectorate had not detected any discrepancies which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material and that, as a consequence of those observations, the Director General considered it reasonable to conclude that the nuclear material under Agency safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities. That was a praiseworthy achievement on the part of the safeguards system. At the same time, the system still lacked the universal application which his Government supported and which it considered to be in the interests of the whole international community.

91. The risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons were a matter of concern for every nation. In the decade since its entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been at the centre of efforts by States to deal with that problem. The Second NPT Review Conference, to be held in Geneva in August 1980, would be a major event. As a depositary Power of the Treaty the United Kingdom had been involved in the preparatory arrangements for the Conference. It had been much encouraged both by the considerable progress made in the Preparatory Committee and also by the recent new accessions to the Treaty. There were now 111 parties to NPT and it was to be hoped that there would be further accessions before the Review Conference.

92. To those who were sceptical about the achievements of NPT, he wished to point out that there had been no breaches of the Treaty involving proliferation nor had there been any violation of the international safeguards accepted by Member countries as part of their Treaty obligations. To that extent it had enjoyed a decade of success. The dangers of proliferation would continue to exist, however, and the political commitment by the parties to NPT was the most important single barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons.

93. The nuclear-weapon States had their part to play in strengthening and maintaining the Treaty. His Government welcomed the SALT-II agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and earnestly hoped that it would be ratified and implemented. The United Kingdom was continuing to work actively with the

United States and the Soviet Union to draw up the text of a sound comprehensive test ban treaty.

94. The United Kingdom also recognized that the NPT enshrined a balance between the availability of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis and the acceptance of reasonable non-proliferation restraints. Coming, as it would, six months after the completion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the Review Conference should contribute to further strengthening of international consensus on the way in which that balance should be implemented in the interests of all.

95. With regard to INFCE he observed that, when it had been launched two years previously, certain experts had pointed out that they knew of no technical fixes which could make any fuel cycle proof against misuse for nuclear explosives. It seemed likely that the conclusions of INFCE would confirm that view and point to the limited role of technical measures in preventing proliferation. In drawing attention to that conclusion, he did not wish to underrate the value of the evaluation as a whole. Never before had Governments, together with the Agency, co-operated on such a scale to examine and argue the merits of different fuel cycles and alternative technologies. The economic, technical and environmental assessments in the eight working group reports would be a valuable basis for decision-making by nuclear authorities and their Governments over the coming years. In addition, INFCE should prove of assistance in the task of educating public opinion about nuclear energy and in winning acceptance for nuclear programmes. It was a challenge of immense importance to all concerned to see that the true facts were understood, and it was a challenge which had to be taken up urgently and won.

96. His Government believed that, when the final plenary conference of INFCE had taken place, its conclusions and the items which were already on the international agenda in the linked fields of nuclear trade and non-proliferation should be carefully reviewed and each pressed ahead in its appropriate forum. The United Kingdom saw a role for the Agency in that which was all-important. As he had already said, he looked forward over the coming years to the development and strengthening of the international consensus on nuclear co-operation and trade. It had to be based on a balance between the rights and the obligations of Governments, and the United Kingdom considered the Agency to be the appropriate place for such a consensus to be developed.

97. He wished to single out two topics for particular comment. International plutonium storage was now being examined by an Agency expert group. The United Kingdom saw that as a logical and necessary extension of the safeguards system, foreseen at the time when the Agency's Statute was drawn up and provided for in Article XII.A.5. He very much hoped that a scheme for that most important area could be agreed and submitted to the Board of Governors by February 1981.

98. The other INFCE subject on which he wished to comment was the need for consensus on both assurances of supply and conditions of supply. That consensus should cover a number of related needs: first, the need for reliability in supplies of nuclear material and equipment; second, the need for common approaches to non-proliferation in national import and export policies; third, the need for an agreed procedure through which those non-proliferation undertakings could be updated; and finally, there was a need to examine further the requirement for short- and medium-term mechanisms to ensure the availability of nuclear material in the event of delays or cut-off in supplies.

99. The United Kingdom therefore welcomed the proposal which the Director General had put forward in his address, that a committee should be set up by the Board of Governors to explore those issues. It supported the idea for two reasons. First, because it regarded them as important issues and ones which were not being discussed internationally at the present time; and second, because it believed that it was appropriate for the Agency to take the lead in following up issues of that kind identified by INFCE. There was no other suitable forum where that could be done. There was no point in creating another international body to undertake such tasks when a suitable one already existed in the form of the Agency, in which his Government had the fullest confidence following more than twenty years' experience of successful operation.

100. Mr. GEORGE (Australia) wished to express his delegation's thanks to the Government of India for offering to host the Conference, and for the excellent arrangements that had been made.

101. The events of the past year had emphasized the seriousness of the energy crisis. If the living standards of the developed world were to be maintained and those of the developing world raised, it would be necessary not only to expand the use of traditional sources of energy but also to take maximum advantage of less conventional ones, including nuclear energy. Australia was doing what it could to promote the achievement of that objective. It was

already a significant exporter of coal, had committed itself to the export of large quantities of natural gas, and was also undertaking the regulated and responsible development of its substantial uranium resources. In several areas of the country uranium mining was being initiated or resumed and uranium concentrates were being stockpiled or released for export.

102. Since his Government wished to see the maximum processing of Australian raw materials prior to export, it was studying the feasibility of establishing a commercial uranium enrichment industry in Australia. It was fully conscious of the non-proliferation and safeguards issues raised by uranium enrichment, and in the course of the feasibility study he had just mentioned, multination participation would be carefully examined.

103. Australia recognized that for the developing countries it was not only access to energy source materials but also the existence of their own technological base which would allow them to gain maximum advantage from nuclear energy. That was why Australia attached particular importance to the Agency's technical assistance activities. The report for 1978 stated that the total volume of technical assistance provided by the Agency rose by 44% during the year in question - a particularly satisfactory result. He was pleased to announce that in 1980, as in previous years, Australia would contribute its full assessed share to the General Fund for the financing of technical assistance.

104. Australia would also continue to support activities under the Agency's Asian Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA). Indeed, the increasing interest shown in RCA by countries in the region seemed to assure its successful future. It was moving into a second, and more ambitious, phase with the proposed UNDP project on the industrial applications of isotopes and radiation technology, and Australia was giving careful study to ways in which it might contribute to that new development.

105. It had long been Australian practice to make nuclear facilities available to countries in the region in order to assist in training their nuclear scientists. Malaysia had recently decided to take advantage of that arrangement, and Malaysia's first nuclear research reactor would in due course be operated by Australian-trained personnel.

106. There were two other areas of the Agency's programme which his Government considered to be of fundamental importance. Those were nuclear safety and safeguards.

107. Nuclear safety was a matter of legitimate public concern, and in that connection he wished to commend the Agency on its prompt reaction to the Three Mile Island incident by introducing a supplementary nuclear safety programme.

108. Australia also shared a common interest in ensuring that efforts to render nuclear energy widely available did not increase the risks of proliferation. In that context there had been some recent developments, most of which were cause for a certain degree of satisfaction, although others gave cause for alarm. There had been disturbing indications, since the preceding session of the General Conference, that some countries were proceeding with the construction of unsafeguarded facilities. Irrespective of the purpose for which they were intended, the construction of unsafeguarded facilities would introduce a new degree of uncertainty, and would also threaten the development of international trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government urged all Member States to accept full-scope safeguards and to discourage unsafeguarded facilities.

109. Happily, the past year had also brought several encouraging developments in the sphere of non-proliferation. A number of countries had become party to NPT during the year, bringing it closer to the goal of universality, and Australia particularly welcomed the accessions of Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. NPT remained the best achievable guarantee that peaceful nuclear development would not lead to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and he urged those countries which had not yet acceded to NPT again to give consideration to doing so.

110. A further encouraging development was Argentina's expressed intention to conclude with the Agency a full-scope safeguards agreement pursuant to Article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

111. Australia's firm commitment to non-proliferation was fully reflected in its safeguards policy, which his Government believed to be an effective barrier to the diversion of material of Australian origin to other than peaceful purposes. Australian policy was designed to strengthen and reinforce the international non-proliferation regime. He was pleased to report that during the past year his country had concluded three more bilateral safeguards agreements - with the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Those agreements would provide the necessary non-proliferation framework for exports of Australian uranium to the countries concerned. Negotiations on safeguards agreements were continuing with a number of other States.

112. The Agency was to be commended on its continuing careful implementation of existing safeguards arrangements, and its work in developing safeguards techniques for application to enrichment plants, reprocessing plants and fast-breeder reactors. The progress made in finalizing facility attachments relating to installations in non-nuclear-weapon States Members of EURATOM was also to be welcomed. The annual report for 1978 noted, as in previous years, that the Secretariat had not detected any discrepancy which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material for military purposes or for the manufacture of any explosive device. That assurance was most gratifying, and he wished to stress that the significance of the safeguards programme in providing an orderly basis for the development of peaceful nuclear trade and co-operation could not be overestimated.

113. The Australian Government attached major importance to international efforts to counter nuclear-weapon proliferation, and in particular favoured the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

114. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which was nearly completed, had been a most productive exercise and had provided a sound basis for achieving greater stability and predictability in peaceful nuclear co-operation through the gradual development of an international consensus. Australia was pleased that it had been able to play a constructive role in INFCE, to which of course all participating States and the IAEA itself had made valuable contributions.

115. A measure of common agreement had emerged in INFCE on the problems associated with the various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. One important result already apparent was the greater attention which possible new institutional barriers to proliferation were receiving. However, appropriate follow-up action in political circles would be necessary if concrete results were to be achieved, and the IAEA would have an important role to play in that regard.

116. Many Governments were giving consideration to the international handling of nuclear issues in the post-INFCE period. Australia did not see the need to maintain a study of broad scope beyond the conclusion of INFCE in February 1980, but favoured a more pragmatic approach aimed at erecting "building blocks". The way would then be open to reaching the broader and longer-term objective of an international consensus on arrangements covering the nuclear fuel cycle and international trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including non-proliferation arrangements. The recently concluded convention on the physical

protection of nuclear materials and the studies on plutonium storage and spent fuel management at present being carried out under the auspices of the IAEA were examples of "building block" activities. He welcomed the finalization of the text of the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials as an addition to the growing network of measures to improve conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The text would be given careful consideration by his Government.

117. In taking specific action during the post-INFCE period care would have to be exercised in choosing the timing of such action and the forums in which it uld be staged. Unduly hasty action might contribute to opportunities for confrontation - for example, between developed and developing countries or between suppliers and consumers of nuclear materials and services and related equipment and technology. One of the major achievements of INFCE was that confrontations of that kind were avoided. Discussion of nuclear issues in the post-INFCE period should be carried out in a context which ensured an appropriate balance between the various countries and interests concerned. For example, Australia as a major potential supplier of uranium would not wish to see questions of uranium supply isolated from discussion of the supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology in general.

118. In that connection some countries had sought to focus attention solely on the supply of nuclear fuel. It was, however, clear from the report of INFCE Working Group 3 that the likely causes of interruption in supplies were not specific to any one stage of the fuel cycle. Working Group 3 dealt with nuclear supply issues as a whole and its work laid the foundations for possible future international action in that area. Such action should, inter alia, ensure that commercial and non-proliferation issues were clearly separated.

119. Finally, he wished to emphasize that the IAEA continued to enjoy Australia's full support. As the principal international agency charged with promotional and regulatory responsibilities in the nuclear field, the Agency was faced with tasks of growing technical and political complexity. At the same time it was placed under budgetary constraints which made implementation of its statutory responsibilities increasingly difficult. The Agency should therefore undertake further efforts to keep its administrative expenses to the absolute minimum, in order that implementation of its substantive programmes should not be jeopardized. In facing up to the challenges before it, the IAEA could look to Australia for steadfast support.

120. Mr. COPITHORNE (Canada), after expressing his delegation's appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended by the Government of India in inviting the General Conference to New Delhi, recalled that Canada had been an active participant in the negotiation of the Agency's Statute almost a quarter of a century previously. The Agency's record of achievement had amply fulfilled the expectations of its founders, and its stature could be expected to grow with the coming years.

121. In his statement the Director General had made a trenchant analysis of the energy situation which confronted all the nations of the world. Conventional hydrocarbon reserves were diminishing at an alarming rate and the need to develop and apply alternative technologies was acquiring increased urgency with each passing day.

122. It seemed paradoxical that, at a time when Governments were being pressed to develop and apply all available energy technologies, the use of nuclear energy for the generation of electricity was being called into question on a number of grounds. At the same time, there had been continuing concern that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not lead to the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

123. The Agency, as was well known, had been established "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". Canada, as a developer and supplier of reactor technology, and as a major exporter of uranium, shared that objective and had strongly supported the Agency's efforts over the years to attain it. The Agency's technical assistance activities, its work in the fields of nuclear safety and environmental protection, life sciences and food and agriculture, and its support for the International Centre for Theoretical Physics were all reflections of those efforts.

124. He was pleased to announce that, as in previous years, and despite a policy of severe fiscal restraint, Canada would contribute in 1980 its full share to the Agency's General Fund for the financing of technical assistance. Canada continued to attach great importance to the dissemination of nuclear technology and its support of the Agency's technical assistance programme bore witness to a desire to ensure that developing countries had access to the benefits of nuclear science.

125. Canada, in its nuclear export policy, had followed a course of action designed to fulfil its obligations as a Member of the IAEA and as a party to NPT. It had exported nuclear material and technology to a large number of developing as well as developed countries. The CANDU reactor had over many years proved to be a highly effective, efficient and safe generator of electricity at an economical cost. In Canada, a nuclear capacity of approximately 5500 MW(e) was now installed with another 10 000 MW(e) under construction or committed. A further 1800 MW(e) were under construction or committed abroad.

126. At the same time, Canada recognized the complementary obligation under the Agency's Statute and NPT to ensure that its nuclear exports did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. Since 1976 those non-nuclear-weapon States which had acceded to NPT or had otherwise made an equivalent binding commitment regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and had accepted international safeguards on all their nuclear activities had been eligible for Canadian nuclear exports under new contracts. At the same time Canadian nuclear exports to nuclear-weapon States could be used only for peaceful purposes not involving explosions. Canada remained convinced that those conditions provided the necessary framework for developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while minimizing the risk of proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. Unless assurances could be provided that nuclear power would not lead to such proliferation, the public support necessary for a viable nuclear industry and international nuclear commerce would melt away. People must be convinced that nuclear power could be developed with minimal proliferation risk.

127. In that context Canada strongly supported the IAEA's safeguards operations and appreciated the efforts of the Secretariat to improve those operations in a realistic and pragmatic manner in the light of ever more stringent requirements. The international non-proliferation regime was heavily dependent on the existence of an effective and objective safeguards system, and Canada looked forward to being able to continue to co-operate with the Agency in the further development of such a system.

128. Nuclear safety was clearly an area of high priority if public confidence in nuclear development was to be maintained. His Government particularly welcomed and supported the Agency's intention to expand its work in that field.

129. The results of INFCE, and also the 1980 Review Conference on NPT, would constitute important elements in the international effort to create a framework for the global sharing of the benefits of nuclear energy.

130. He wished to close his remarks on an optimistic note. With the necessary political will the international community could devise the means to deal effectively and in a farsighted manner with the various issues that had given rise to doubts and difficulties. The remarkable potential of nuclear science could be, and had to be, utilized exclusively for the benefit of all mankind.

131. Mr. LUCZKIEWICZ (Poland) said that Poland was a strong supporter of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and was in favour of the development of nuclear power. Poland also supported the consolidation of the non-proliferation regime and, in particular, the universal application of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that connection he wished to stress the vital importance for world peace and disarmament of speedy implementation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-II) and the recent initiatives by the Soviet President, Leonid Brezhnev, during his visit to Berlin. Poland considered that prompt ratification of SALT-II and a constructive approach to the Berlin proposals would be a further step towards making disarmament a continuous irreversible process and creating better prospects for the widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

132. Poland, like many other countries, had energy problems. One way in which it was tackling those problems was to accelerate the programme of construction of nuclear power stations and nuclear district heating stations.

133. Poland had been a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) for over 30 years and was participating in the CMEA's extensive nuclear power programme by developing plant for nuclear heat supply stations.

134. The development of nuclear power in the world was encountering difficulties of a political character inspired by various groups which based their arguments on the risk associated with possible accidents at nuclear plants.

135. He stressed that Poland placed the greatest confidence in the safety systems employed over the years in power reactors produced in the USSR, and Poland therefore, like other socialist countries, was embarking on its nuclear power programme without any misgivings.

136. In the coming year the Agency should concentrate its efforts on research programmes designed to promote the further development of nuclear power in Member States on the basis of maximum possible reactor safety. Poland considered the elaboration of new safety guides for nuclear power station operation to be one of the Agency's most important technical programmes. The Agency

should also continue with its traditional programmes on health physics, the application of nuclear technology to agriculture, etc.

137. Poland supported the new draft budget for 1980 that had been approved by the Board of Governors.

138. In executing its scientific programmes, the Agency should aim to expand the volume of technical assistance rendered to developing countries. However, that assistance should be directed only to those countries whose policies guaranteed that the assistance supplied would not be used for non-peaceful purposes.

139. One of the Agency's most important tasks was to reinforce the non-proliferation regime through the development of safeguards techniques. Poland welcomed the progress that had been achieved in that area by the Agency and also the bringing under safeguards of plants operated by the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

140. However, Poland continued to feel that NPT still suffered from lack of universality, and recent events had shown that the risk of nuclear proliferation was increased when NPT ceased to apply.

141. The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which would be concluded early in 1980 had played a positive role in the quest to strengthen NPT. The concluding conference on INFCE in February 1980 would be formulating recommendations which, on the one hand, could form a basis for establishing international guarantees for long-term fuel supplies and, on the other hand, pave the way towards solution of the problem of ensuring non-proliferation with full-scale development of nuclear power.

142. In Poland's opinion, the Agency should have the task of executing the INFCE recommendations.

143. The "International plutonium storage" and "International spent fuel management" programmes being undertaken by the Agency corresponded to the spirit of the INFCE programme, and the Agency should complement those with any other programmes that might be decreed necessary by the concluding conference.

144. The Polish delegation wished to take that opportunity of expressing its full support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the drafting of which had recently been finalized in Vienna.

145. At the same time Poland wished to declare its readiness to make scientific staff and laboratory facilities available to help the Agency with its work on developing effective methods of control in the safeguards and physical protection field.

146. Poland supported all projects aimed at developing new applications of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind, a good example of that being international collaboration under the aegis of the Agency on the development of an international fusion reactor for power production. The Agency's technical programmes and the technical assistance being rendered by the Agency also served that goal. Accordingly, Poland was pleased to announce that it would be making a voluntary contribution to the General Fund for 1980 of 4.5 million zlotys.

147. The way in which those resources were used would depend largely on the Agency's activities. For its part, Poland was ready to co-operate with the Secretariat in seeking more effective ways of using existing resources to deliver technical assistance to developing countries.

148. In addition, Poland would be offering ten fellowships in 1980 at its most advanced research centres.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.