

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Report by the Director General

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It provides an update on developments related to Agency monitoring and surveillance equipment in Iran since the Director General's previous reports.¹

2. In his report to the Board of Governors of 7 September 2021,² the Director General indicated that the Agency's lack of access to its monitoring and surveillance equipment at facilities and locations in Iran was seriously compromising its technical capability to maintain continuity of knowledge, which is necessary for the Agency to resume its verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments in the future, and that the situation needed to be rectified by Iran without delay.

3. As previously reported,³ on 12 September 2021, the Vice-President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, H.E. Mohammad Eslami, and the Director General met in Tehran, following which they issued a Joint Statement (hereinafter "Joint Statement"). The Joint Statement provided, inter alia, that the "IAEA's inspectors are permitted to service the identified equipment and replace their storage media which will be kept under the joint⁴ IAEA and AEOI seals in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The way and the timing are agreed by the two sides".⁵

¹ GOV/2021/39 and GOV/INF/2021/42.

² GOV/2021/39, paras 20 and 21.

³ GOV/INF/2021/42, para. 5.

⁴ The storage media will be kept under Agency seal and AEOI seal.

⁵ GOV/INF/2021/42, Annex, para. 3.

4. In a letter to Iran dated 16 September 2021, the Agency reiterated⁶ that it was essential that the Agency replace the cameras at the centrifuge component manufacturing workshop at the TESA Karaj complex before Iran resumed the production of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows. The Agency further requested that during the servicing of the Agency's monitoring and surveillance equipment, scheduled for 20-22 September 2021 as agreed with Iran, Iran provide the assistance necessary to enable the Agency to replace the four cameras at the aforementioned workshop.
5. From 20-22 September 2021, Iran permitted Agency inspectors to service the identified Agency monitoring and surveillance equipment and to replace storage media, at all necessary locations in Iran with the exception of the centrifuge component manufacturing workshop at the TESA Karaj complex, where the Agency has not been provided with access in order to install new surveillance cameras.⁷
6. In a letter to Iran dated 22 September 2021, the Agency provided Iran with an updated schedule for the Agency's planned activities related to its surveillance and monitoring equipment in Iran, including the availability of Agency inspectors between 23 and 26 September 2021 to install new cameras at the centrifuge component manufacturing workshop at the TESA Karaj complex. In a letter to Iran dated 23 September 2021, the Agency requested that Iran provide Agency inspectors with access to the workshop by 26 September 2021. In a letter dated 24 September 2021, the Agency informed Iran that Agency inspectors would arrive at this workshop on 25 and/or 26 September 2021, either to install new cameras, if the workshop was ready for operation, or to confirm that the workshop was still being refurbished and that the production of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows had yet to resume. As of 26 September 2021, Iran had not replied formally to any of those letters.
7. On 26 September 2021, Agency inspectors arrived at the TESA Karaj complex and requested access to the workshop. However, Iran did not allow the Agency access to the workshop. The Agency, therefore, was neither able to install new cameras inside the workshop or to confirm that the production of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows had not resumed at this workshop.
8. The Director General stresses that Iran's decision not to allow Agency access to the TESA Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing workshop is contrary to the agreed terms of the Joint Statement.
9. The Director General reiterates that all of the Agency's activities referred to in the Joint Statement for all identified Agency equipment and Iranian facilities and locations are indispensable in order to maintain continuity of knowledge.
10. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

⁶ See GOV/2021/39, paras 16, 18 and 19.

⁷ See GOV/2021/39, paras 18 and 19.