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NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement^{1,2} in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). It covers the period since the issuance of the Director General's previous quarterly report.³

B. Safeguards implementation

2. The Director General, on 13 June 2025, reported to the Board of Governors (Board) and to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council) that the Agency had been informed of a military operation launched by Israel, which included attacks on several of Iran's nuclear facilities.⁴ These attacks took place between 13-24 June 2025. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities

¹ The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

² Iran's Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/214/Add.1) was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003. Iran implemented voluntarily the Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006. On 16 January 2016, Iran began provisionally applying the Additional Protocol in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol. As of 23 February 2021, Iran stopped the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including the Additional Protocol (see GOV/INF/2021/13).

³ GOV/2025/25.

⁴ See Director General's 'Statement on the situation in Iran' of 13 June 2025.

in Iran. By the end of June 2025, the Agency had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. On 2 July 2025, Iran enacted a law suspending cooperation with the Agency.⁵ Since 13 June 2025, the Agency has not received nuclear material accountancy reports and updated design information questionnaires (DIQs), and has not had access to any safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, with the exception of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). The Agency, through the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery and open sources, continues to monitor developments at Iran's nuclear facilities.

Chronology

3. The Director General, in his statement to the Board of Governors on 13 June 2025, recalled the relevant General Conference resolutions on the subject of military attacks against nuclear facilities, which provided, *inter alia*, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”.⁶ The Director General also reiterated that he had repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as it could harm both people and the environment, and that such attacks have serious implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as regional and international peace and security.

4. Following the commencement of the military attacks on several of Iran's nuclear facilities, the Agency stopped all in-field verification and monitoring activities in Iran for safety reasons, to which Iran agreed.

5. The military attacks, in which the United States of America also later participated, lasted until 24 June 2025. During this period the Director General provided updates on the status of Iran's nuclear and nuclear-related facilities, based on the Agency's assessments of commercially available satellite imagery, to the Board and the Security Council (see GOV/2025/50 for details).

6. The facilities known to have contained nuclear material affected by the military attacks were: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP); the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP); the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP); the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF); the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP); the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP); and the Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP). In addition, the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), which was under construction and did not contain nuclear material, was also affected.

7. In a letter to the Director General dated 13 June 2025, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, HE Mr Abbas Araghchi, indicated that Iran would “adopt special measures to protect our nuclear equipment and materials”. The Director General, in his letter of reply of the same day, indicated that any transfers of nuclear material from a safeguarded facility to another location in Iran must be declared to the Agency, as required under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, and expressed his readiness to work with Iran on the matter.

8. As noted above, by the end of June 2025, taking into account safety considerations arising from the military attacks, the Agency had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran.

9. On 2 July 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian reportedly signed a law adopted by the Parliament of Iran to suspend cooperation with the Agency. According to this law, such cooperation must be

⁵ <https://president.ir/en/160022>.

⁶ In particular, GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provided, *inter alia*, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”.

suspended pending determination by Iran's Supreme National Security Council that certain conditions have been met.

10. The Director General, in a letter to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi dated 12 July 2025, indicated that it was important to re-establish normal collaboration between Iran and the Agency in order to ensure compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. He also indicated that in view of the possible impact on the implementation of safeguards in Iran deriving from the recently adopted Iranian domestic law it was essential and urgent to arrive at an agreement on the modalities that could guarantee the necessary compliance. To that effect, he indicated his willingness to meet in Vienna or elsewhere.

11. Following discussions between the Director General and Iran's Permanent Representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Reza Najafi, on 23 July 2025, Iran agreed to a technical team from the Agency visiting Iran for high-level consultations on "temporary practical arrangements" to address Iran's concerns and to enable the resumption of Agency verification activities.

12. The Agency, in a letter dated 30 July 2025, reminded Iran that the Agency's timeliness⁷ for the detection of the diversion of one significant quantity (SQ) of high enriched uranium (HEU) is one month⁸ and, therefore, verification of Iran's declared inventory of HEU was overdue.

13. On 11 August 2025, a technical team from the Agency held discussions in Tehran with senior Iranian officials on "temporary practical arrangements" to address Iran's concerns and to enable the resumption of Agency verification activities. Iran referred to the need for "separate arrangements" between Iran and the Agency relating to how they intend to proceed in their future dealings with one another, including procedures for conducting verification activities. The Agency, while taking into account concerns expressed by Iran, emphasized that any new arrangement should be implemented in the framework of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

14. Iran, in a letter dated 14 August 2025, provided a detailed draft of "a new Arrangement". This included a number of elements beyond the Agency's verification responsibilities under the NPT Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangements. In relation to the resumption of Agency verification activities, Iran proposed that, for undamaged facilities, the Agency "shall submit its requests [for inspection] on a case by case basis" and, with regard to damaged facilities, Iran undertook to provide the Agency with a report "up to one month after the finalization of this Arrangement". Following the submission of such a report, Iran and the Agency would "negotiate and agree on the arrangements for cooperation".

15. The Director General, in his reply dated 15 August 2025, made clear that it was indispensable and urgent to restart safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and that implementation of the Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances. He also presented a number of concrete steps, including the preparation by Iran of special reports for HEU and low enriched uranium (LEU) for the affected facilities and updated DIQs.⁹ The Director General also expressed the Agency's readiness to discuss with Iran the modalities for accessing those facilities and conducting inspections and DIVs. For facilities unaffected by the military attacks, the Agency would continue to provide advance notice for inspections and DIVs.

⁷ The Agency establishes timeliness goals (performance targets) which set out the verification effort – in terms of the frequency and intensity of the verification activities to be carried out – needed in order to provide assurance that declared nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful use and that undeclared production or processing of nuclear material has not taken place at a declared facility (see GOV/2014/41, Section C.4).⁷ The longer the Agency is unable to verify the inventories of declared nuclear material in Iran, therefore, the greater the risk that the Agency is unable to provide such assurance.

⁸ HEU is defined as uranium enriched to 20% U-235 and higher.

⁹ As provided for in Article 68 of the NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214).

16. In the same letter, the Agency indicated its readiness to discuss updated safeguards approaches for facilities under safeguards in Iran to take into account Iran's security concerns, provided that such approaches remain consistent with the rights and obligations of Iran and the Agency under the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

17. On 19 August 2025, the Agency provided advance notice to Iran for inspections and DIVs to be carried out by the Agency at three unaffected nuclear facilities.

18. On 22 August 2025, a technical team from the Agency held further discussions with senior Iranian officials in Vienna on practical steps on safeguards implementation in Iran pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement following the military attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities. No agreement was reached on such practical steps, and the Agency and Iran decided to continue the discussions.

19. On 27 and 28 August 2025, the Agency conducted two inspections at the BNPP as part of its routine verification activities at this facility.

20. As of the date of issuance of this report, further discussions between the Agency and senior Iranian officials on practical steps relating to safeguards implementation in Iran pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement are planned to take place in Vienna in the next few days.

C. Unresolved safeguards issues

C.1. Comprehensive Assessment

21. The Director General's previous quarterly report,¹⁰ in response to the Board's request contained in resolution GOV/2024/68, provided a "comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme". The report identified a number of unresolved safeguards issues related, inter alia, to Iran not declaring nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at undeclared locations; the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran; and the limited cooperation from Iran.

C.2. Board Resolution

22. The Board considered the Director General's report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 in which the Board, inter alia:

- found that "Iran's many failures to uphold its obligations... constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement" (operative paragraph 3);
- found that "the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material" (operative paragraph 4);
- reaffirmed its decision that "it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations" (operative paragraph 7);
- called upon Iran to "urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement" (operative paragraph 10); and
- decided to remain seized of the matter (operative paragraph 13).

¹⁰ GOV/2025/25.

C.3. Recent developments

23. There has been no engagement between Iran and the Agency on the unresolved safeguards issues described in the Director General's previous report (GOV/2025/25) during this reporting period.

D. Other issues

24. Following an inspection at FFEP on 14 May 2025, the Agency inspectors at the end of the inspection kept some pages of the DIQ that were used during the inspection and brought them to Vienna instead of returning them to the Agency's working place at the facility. It should be stressed that while these pages contained some description of the interior of the facility, they did not include content that compromised the security of the facility. In a letter to Iran dated 27 May 2025, the Agency informed Iran that as soon as the oversight – which the Agency regretted – was noticed, the pages were returned to the State authority at the earliest opportunity – on 26 May 2025. Iran, in a letter dated 14 August 2025, indicated that the actions of the two inspectors involved “constitute a breach of certain provisions under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement” and objected to “the continued designation of the two inspectors”. The Agency considers Iran's decision to withdraw the designation of these two experienced inspectors as unjustified because the incident did not involve any breach of confidentiality.

E. Summary

25. The withdrawal of all Agency inspectors from Iran because of safety concerns arising from the military attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities was necessary given the overall security situation. Iran's subsequent decision to suspend cooperation with the Agency is deeply regrettable. Despite this development, the Agency has repeatedly reached out to Iran. The Director General, in letters to Iran's Foreign Minister, has reiterated his own and the Agency's disposition to take into consideration Iran's security concerns, bearing in mind the law adopted by Iran.

26. While acknowledging the need to agree on technical, practical steps to enable the resumption of safeguards implementation, it must be recalled that Iran's inventory of HEU, the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced such nuclear material, is a matter of serious concern which must be addressed. The Agency has not had access to verify this specific nuclear material in Iran for over two and a half months, which means that its verification – according to Agency standard safeguards practice – is overdue.

27. Without the full implementation of safeguards in Iran being resumed, the Agency will not be in a position to provide any conclusion or assurance regarding Iran's nuclear programme.

28. In that context, technical modalities to enable the full resumption of Agency inspections should be concluded without delay. The Director General expresses his conviction that agreement on such modalities is possible.

29. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.