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Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Report by the Director General

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on activities related to centrifuge component manufacturing transparency. It provides an update on developments since the Director General's previous reports.

Activities related to centrifuge component manufacturing transparency

2. As previously reported,³ on 19 January 2022, Iran informed the Agency that it intended to produce centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows at a new location in Esfahan, instead of at the centrifuge component production workshop at the TESA Karaj complex (Karaj workshop). On 22 January 2022, Agency inspectors applied Agency seals on all the production machines at the Karaj workshop and then removed the surveillance cameras installed therein. As a result, the production of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows at the Karaj workshop ceased. On 24 January 2022, Agency inspectors installed and set up cameras in a new workshop at the aforementioned location in Esfahan. Without access to the data and

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¹ JCPOA, 'Annex I – Nuclear-related measures', Section R.

² GOV/2022/4 and GOV/INF/2022/8.

³ GOV/2022/4, para. 5.

recordings collected by these cameras, the Agency is unable to confirm whether the production of centrifuge components at the workshop in Esfahan has begun.⁴

On 4 April 2022, Iran informed the Agency that it had moved all of the aforementioned production machines from the Karaj workshop and placed them in a location at the Natanz site. On the same date, Agency inspectors verified that all of these machines remained under Agency seals in this location at the Natanz site and, therefore, were not operating.

⁴ It is the Agency's understanding that, as is the case for other locations where its surveillance and monitoring equipment is

installed for activities in relation to the JCPOA, surveillance data from Agency cameras will continue to be stored and made available to the Agency if and when Iran resumes implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.