NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement\(^1\) and the Additional Protocol thereto\(^2\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). It describes the Agency’s efforts and interactions with Iran to clarify information relating to the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

B. Evaluation of safeguards-relevant information

2. The comprehensive evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information available to the Agency is essential in ascertaining that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

\(^2\) Iran’s Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/214/Add.1) was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003. Iran implemented voluntarily the Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006. Since 16 January 2016 Iran has been provisionally applying the Additional Protocol in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force.

\(^3\) See, for example, ‘The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2019’, GOV/2020/9, paras 11 and 12.
3. The Agency’s evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran are ongoing. All safeguards-relevant information available to the Agency related to Iran is subject to an extensive and rigorous corroboration process. As previously reported, as a result of its ongoing evaluations, the Agency had identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three specified locations in Iran other than those declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and had requested access to two of them. The accesses were to carry out location-specific environmental sampling for the purpose of assisting the Agency to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at these locations and to resolve the Agency’s questions.

C. Recent Developments

4. In its resolution adopted on 19 June 2020, the Board of Governors, inter alia, called on Iran to “fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency” and requested the Director General to report any developments to the Board of Governors.

5. In a letter dated 26 June 2020, the Agency informed Iran that it proposed to send designated inspectors to Iran to access two of the three specified locations in July 2020 to carry out location-specific environmental sampling.

6. In a letter dated 15 July 2020, following further exchanges between Iran and the Agency, Iran welcomed the “readiness” of the Deputy Director General for Safeguards “to resume the negotiations” and invited him to Tehran “in the second week of August 2020 for that purpose”.

7. On 11 August 2020, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards had technical discussions in Tehran with officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

8. The Agency, in three annexes attached to a letter dated 22 August 2020, provided Iran with information relating to the technical basis underlying the reasons for the Agency’s questions in relation to the three aforementioned locations and for the requests for access related to two of them.

9. On 25 and 26 August 2020, the Director General had discussions in Tehran with H.E. Dr Hassan Rouhani, President of Iran, H.E. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of Iran, and H.E. Ali Akbar Salehi, Vice-President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The objectives of the Director General’s visit were to establish a direct channel of communication and dialogue between the Director General and high-level Iranian officials, and to make concrete progress in addressing the Agency’s outstanding questions related to safeguards; in particular to resolve the issue of access.

10. On 26 August 2020, the Director General and Iran issued a Joint Statement (see Annex) in which, inter alia, Iran and the Agency agreed to further reinforce their cooperation and enhance mutual trust to

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4 The Agency follows the same process for all States with a safeguards agreement in force.


6 These locations do not include the location at which the Agency has identified particles of anthropogenic natural uranium (see GOV/2019/55, para. 29, GOV/2020/5, para. 32, GOV/2020/26, para. 33 and GOV/2020/41, para. 32).

7 GOV/2020/34, paras 4 and 5.

8 As previously reported, the Agency had assessed that there would be no verification value in conducting a complementary access at the third location (GOV/2020/30, para. 4, first bullet point).
facilitate the full implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol thereto and reached an agreement on the resolution of the safeguards implementation issues specified by the Agency.

11. Following the issuance of the Joint Statement, the Agency conducted a complementary access, under the Additional Protocol, at one of the two locations specified by the Agency. Iran provided Agency inspectors access to the location to take environmental samples. The Agency took environmental samples as planned. These samples will be analysed by laboratories that are part of the Agency’s Network of Analytical Laboratories, including the Agency’s own analytical laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria.

12. The Agency will conduct a complementary access, under the Additional Protocol, at the second specified location later in September 2020 on a date already agreed with Iran, to take environmental samples.

13. In relation to its questions concerning the other location, the Agency will conduct an additional nuclear material inventory verification at a declared facility in Iran in September 2020 on a date already agreed with Iran.

D. Summary

14. The Director General welcomes the agreement between the Agency and Iran, which has the aim of reinforcing cooperation and enhancing mutual trust while resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues in Iran.

15. The Director General will continue to keep the Board informed, as appropriate.

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9 GOV/2020/30, para. 4, first bullet.
10 GOV/2020/30, footnote 9.
NOTE

BY THE SECRETARIAT

Joint Statement by the Director General of the IAEA and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the AEOI, Tehran, 26 August 2020

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) agreed to further reinforce their cooperation and enhance mutual trust to facilitate the full implementation of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocol (AP) thereto, which is provisionally applied by Iran since 16 January 2016.

After intensive bilateral consultations, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement on the resolution of the safeguards implementation issues specified by the IAEA, in good faith. In this regard, Iran is voluntarily providing the IAEA with access to the two locations specified by the IAEA and facilitating the IAEA verification activities to resolve these issues. Dates for the IAEA access and the verification activities have been agreed. The IAEA verification activities will proceed in accordance with the CSA and the AP, and the IAEA’s standard verification practice as implemented for all States with CSAs and APs on equal basis and without discrimination.

In the context of resolution GOV/2015/72 adopted by the Board of Governors on 15 December 2015, the IAEA and Iran recognize that these safeguards implementation issues are exclusively related to nuclear material and activities subject to safeguards under the CSA and the AP.

In this present context, based on analysis of available information to the IAEA, the IAEA does not have further questions to Iran and further requests for access to locations other than those declared by Iran under its CSA and AP.
Both sides recognize the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA continue to be essential in the fulfilment of its verification activities.

The IAEA will continue to take into consideration Iran’s security concerns, by protecting all safeguards confidential information in accordance with the IAEA’s Statute, the relevant provisions of the CSA and the AP, and the established IAEA confidentiality regime, standards and procedures.

26 August 2020

To all IAEA Member States