THE REGULATOR’S TOOLS TO SUPPORT THE OPERATOR’S SECURITY CULTURE

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Talking points

• Why fostering a robust security culture?
• What are the main challenges?
• What actions the regulator may support?
• Summary
**Security Culture, where to find it?**

### IAEA Nuclear Security Series

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<td>NSS No 13 (2011)</td>
<td>“Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” (INFCIRC/225/ Rev. 5)</td>
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<td>NSS No 14 (2011)</td>
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**Sustaining A Nuclear Security Regime**

(c) Developing, for the IAEA, and maintaining a robust **NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE**;

“**A NUCLEAR SECURITY culture** should be present at all levels of an organization, including physical security and individuals involved in the possession, handling, or transport of radioactive material should give due regard to the NUCLEAR SECURITY with regard to radioactive material”

**The State should implement relevant elements of the NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE for the trustworthiness program**

“**A robust computer SECURITY CULTURE is an essential component of any effective security plan**”

- + UN SCR 1540 (2004)
- + EU CBRN Action Plan (2009)
Facility potentially dangerous (ECBRN!)

Self-responsible operation

Citizens, Stakeholders, Activists, … high expectations to feel safe and secure

Operator responsible for safety, security…

State with its officials

International Obligations
UN, IAEA, bi-/multilateral resolutions, contracts…

regulation

operation = safe and secure operation
On the other hand: is physical protection sufficient?

How to “retrain“ a terrorist?
loosely based on e.g.
• F.E. Bird, G.L. Germain, F.E. Bird, Jr., Practical Loss Control Leadership, International Loss Control Institute, Atlanta, GA 1986

Why considering even low level events pays off...

Fostering a positive security culture is not confined on nuclear facilities, it is mandatory for any area with potentially dangerous materials and/or technology!
Some examples for security culture in practice?

- stolen or lost radioactive sources (*laid back attitude toward security rules*)

- people ignore or even do not know security rules (*apathy, laziness*)

- bored, apathetic or even sleeping guards (*security is an unnecessary obstacle to hinder effective production*)

- managers refuse to follow security rules when entering protected areas (*claiming special rights for them no time*)

- maintenance of security systems postponed due to financial reasons (*short cuts due to business goals*)

- missing feedback culture (*“my bosses know exactly what to do“ vs. “I frequently reported gaps and however nothing happen“*)
What about the contribution of the regulator do? (Part I)

- Giving the **initial impulse** to the operator to start a self-assessment campaign

- Developing an **appropriate** and **tailored** self-assessment plan

- **Evaluating the results** and helping to derive an action-plan

- **Monitoring** the progress of the action plan

- “**Appreciating**” the effectiveness of the action plan
What about the contribution of the regulator do? (Part II)

- Specifying a **subsequent** self-assessment campaign

- Offering **help** to create tools to raise the awareness level of the staff

- Offering **realistic examples** (e.g. taken from the IAEA ITDB)

- Organizing regional or national **workshops** on NSC or applying for IAEA workshops on NSC

- Offering participation in national or international **conferences** and workshops
root causes of complacency

- The absence of security-related crises
- Scarcity of resources
- Organizational structures that focus employees on narrow functional goals
- Failure of senior management to act as role models
- Low priority of security in operational activities
- The lack of security performance feedback from external sources
- Too much smoothing talk from senior management
- Human nature with its capacity of denial and skepticism
- A kill-the-messenger-of-bad-news, low confrontation attitude

Folie 10
Attitudes toward security

Avoidance
people regard security as inherently dangerous, unnecessary, or even harmful

Apathy
people don’t care one way or another about security

Participation
people follow the rules while acting like security is not their problem

Ownership
people assume responsibility and regard security as their programme
easy to see:
• behaviours
• habits
• appearance

difficult to see:
• values
• priorities
• assumptions
• beliefs
• expectations

our national experience:
most of the observed and analysed security related events (also low-level) are highly influenced by “weak spots“ of the practised nuclear security culture!
To be more precise...

characteristic indicator

personalized statement
How to crack the (cultural) iceberg?

Initial impulse: from regulator

Start: Decision to carry out initial or subsequent self-assessment

Stage 1. Launch an Outreach Campaign and Establish a Self-Assessment Team

Stage 2. Draft a Self-Assessment Plan and Prepare for its implementation

Stage 3. Start the Data Collection Phase: Survey, Interview, Document Review, and Observation

Stage 4. Analyse Data and Consolidate Assessment Results

Stage 5. Develop the Three-Tiered Outcome Model: Red, Yellow, and Green.

Stage 6. Discuss Results, Submit Final Report, and help Development of an Action Plan
The data collecting and evaluation method and its processes have to be regularly checked (and modified)!
Summary

• Security culture is essential to grant **efficient security** (…human factor!)

• Before improving s.th. you have to **know the current state** (…improving something unknown?)

• Biggest benefit: raising **awareness** and a feeling of **self-responsibility** to security!

• The regulator is a team player with **various opportunities** to support the operator.
Thank you for your attention!

“Organizational culture means to the organization the same thing as the oil in the gearbox: It supports the long-term effectiveness and functionality“

(A. Hagemann)

Any questions?

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...and C. Speicher says:

“Taking care of the oilcan and its content is the duty of and the task for any operator and regulator!“