

OPERATED BY SAVANNAH RIVER NUCLEAR SOLUTIONS

Authenticated Sensor Interface Device for Securing Sensors and Data Transmission



Background Cyber Threats & High Reliability Operations

- Cyber threats challenge the safety, security, and operation of all industries, including nuclear facilities and the protection of nuclear materials
- What requires high reliability operations?
 - Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
 - Dependent on the consequence of failure
 - Risk to the public
 - Risk to the workers
 - Risk to the environment
 - Loss of production
 - Financial cost
 - Reputation/Trust









Savannah River National Laboratory™





Background Innovating Cyber Techniques and Tools

- New techniques and tools are required
 - Data security
 - Authentication
 - Protection
 - Detection
 - Mitigation
- More than just policies, plans and procedures
 - Bolster resiliency through diversity and defense-in-depth
 - Explore non-traditional methods
 - Next-Generation cyber









Safeguards, Security, & Process Sensor Applications

• Drivers

Background

- Increasing number and capacity of nuclear facilities and the amount of nuclear material in the world
- Increase in cyber attacks on security, data, and industrial process control systems
- Increased cyber capability of all adversaries
- *Remote attacks* on processes can now be carried out
- Cyber-hardened sensors and control systems have not provided by industrial vendors
- ASID provides an "After-Market" Solution to secure vital sensors and aid in securing networks







Secure

ASID

- Protect Each Party from attack or intrusion from all other parties
- Protect the Sensor from manipulation from any party
- Authenticate
 - Authenticate Data transmitted to each party
- Share Data
 - Among a number of parties (if necessary)





Sensor Interface

- Diverse input capabilities including digital protocols, voltages, mA, thermocouple, etc.
- Bidirectional communications to sensor

Microcomputer Core

- Provides capability for adaptation to diverse applications
- Predictable Data Source
 - Available for authentication and/or encryption services

Data Diode Function

- Physically isolates each party and the sensor from attack
- Non-volatile Memory & Battery Backup
- Modular Design
 - Expandable number of inputs and outputs
- Tamper Indicating Enclosure
 - Protects ASID electronics from attack



ASID

Data Diode

ASID

- Malicious or fraudulent data cannot be sent back into the device from a receiving party or external attacker
- Sensor Integrity
 - Even with two-way communications to the sensor, sensor integrity is maintained due to data diode protection
- Segregation
 - One party cannot attack or manipulate data being received by another party, or their systems
- Authentication
 - External attacker could not "spoof" data being sent to a party
- Confidentiality
 - Data is encrypted, preventing external attackers from reading the original sensor data stream
- Anti-reply
 - An external attacker cannot replay encrypted packets

"Secure, Authenticate, Share"



ASID

Additional Features

On-board Memory

- Stores raw sensor data
- Stores each party's data to permit retrieval in case of loss of communications

• Bypass Switch

 In the event of a failure of the ASID, the operator could enter bypass mode to bypass the ASID to ensure operations are not impacted

"Secure, Authenticate, Share"





Field Testing of ASID

- ASID tested with the Wohwa Accountancy Scale
 - SRNL conducted a joint use demonstration using a 20,000 kg Wohwa Accountancy Scale
 - Prototype ASID designed with custom software to autonomously retrieve data from the Wohwa scale controller
 - The Wohwa controller required a bi-directional digital communications
 - ASID controller/sensor module requested data from the Wohwa controller
 - ASID controller module transmitted the data to each output module
 - Each output module transmitted the data to its respective data collection computer
 - Note that authentication and encryption was not tested or implemented prior to this testing.







We put science to work.™

ASID

Summary

- Drivers
 - Increasing number and capacity of nuclear facilities and the amount of nuclear material in the world
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Summary

- Cyber threats challenge all aspects of industry, including the ability to secure nuclear materials and nuclear facilities
 - Attacks can have severe consequences on the operations of a facility or the validity of safeguards data
- Many cybersecurity challenges must be considered when designing a networked industrial monitoring and control system
 - Securing the networks, sensors, controllers, and data transmissions is vital

ASID can be a key component in ensuring the cybersecurity of a critical system and ensuring the validity of vital sensor data

"Secure, Authenticate, Share"





ASID

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OPERATED BY SAVANNAH RIVER NUCLEAR SOLUTION

Thank You



Cyber Security

Authenticated Sensor Interface Device

- Secure
 - Each Party from attack or intrusion from all other parties
 - The Sensor from manipulation from any party
- Authenticate Data
 transmitted to each party
- Share Data among a number of parties



Security Features

- Data Diode
- Segregation
- Sensor Integrity
- Authentication
- Confidentiality

Functional Features

• Data Diode

Remote receiving party computer

TIE

Two-way

Sensor

Data

receive

encrypted serial data

transmitters

comm. with

Predictable data from

secondary

source

Data

Transmit

Local receiving

party computer

Data Aggregate

Encrypted

data packets

Optoisolators

Data

Internet

- Micro-Computer Core
- Sensor Interface
- Modular Design
- On-board Memory

