HOW FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE HELPED US BUILDING JOINT TRAINING PROGRAMME

Graded approach gives results, increase cooperation and efficiency

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Organisation of the Police

- **State level** (…anti-terrorism – Special Unit, Air Support, OCC)
- **Regional level** (…HQ, CID, Operation and Communication Centre)
- **Local level** (Police Stations…)}
NPP Krško

Westinghouse Pressurised Light Water Reactor; 2.000 MW thermal power; 696 MW net electrical power; Connected to the 400kV grid supplying power to consumer centres in Slovenia and Croatia. First nuclear reaction launched in 1981. NPP came into commercial production in 1983.
Security regime

- NPP’s own Guards (on-site).
- Local Police Stations(s) (off-site).
- Regional Police forces / State (anti-terrorism).
- Decades of correct and close cooperation.
- 2011: regional reorganisation of the Police.
- 2012: New Contingency Plan (Police).
- “NEVTRON 2014” force-on-force exercise.
- “NEVTRON 2015” force-on-force exercise.
• Evaluation of effective, sufficient and timely response on real physical threat.
• First FOF exercise, unannounced.
• Six months of planning – confidentiality.
• Cooperation with state authorities.
• Security & Safety procedures.
• Real-time observation from state authorities (evaluation and input to analyse).
Force-on-Force Exercise 2014 (2/2)

• Complete surprise and personal under real stress (30 years of peace and tranquillity).
• Outside events (situation in the region – Greenpeace protests days before added reality awareness).
• Seven different areas for improvement with fourteen recommendations were set and approved (analyse):
  – crisis (incident) management,
  – communication and tactics protocols,
  – technical improvements and IT modernization,
  – joint training required (familiarization with the site…),
  – situation awareness and security culture.
• Announced and in day time.
• Large police unite to enter the facility.
• Observers, Analyse (surprises) and Follow-up.
The main objectives were:

- improvement of the physical protection regime (nuclear security) of the guards and the police,
- consolidation of cooperation, preparedness and competence,
- to ensure timely, adequate and efficient response to the nuclear security event.

Overall experience with force-on-force exercises was unexpected good, useful and had huge practical implication to the cooperation, communication, coordination and tactics.

Modernisation/modification of certain systems allows faster detection, better evaluation and adequate response.
A need to have tailored training programme

- The major identifier of a need to improve training process arise from results of behaviour of the participants in the exercise – *human factor and human reliability under severe stress.*

- Ad-hoc solution in follow-up after exercises organised with NPP.

- Evaluation of a training process.

- Initiative for a joint training programme for on-site and off-site response forces.
Challenges of a programme

• The training programme would be:
  – simple,
  – robust,
  – not to extensive,
  – flexible but comprehensive.

• Time limitations (8/1).
• Existing safety and security trainings.
• Build effective and accepted programme.
• Graded (practical) approach and diversity.
Structure of a programme (1/2)

- Graded approach – modules.
- Module 1 – Basic Training Programme.
- Module 2 – Advanced Training Programme.
- Module 3 – Table top and Force-on-Force Training Programme.
Structure of a programme (2/2)
Module 1 - Basic

- **Objective:** first responders have basic knowledge about radiological safety, familiarization with the site, site procedures, safety precautions to consider when respond to security event, they have understanding of the security & safety interface.

- **Scope:** 8 hours to allow participants to received minimum of required skills and familiarization with emergency plans and procedures and security protocols.

- **Participants:** guards and police officers.
Module 2 - Advanced

• **Objective:** participants can adequately cope with first response to the NPP in case of security event, they understand the limitation to the tactics used because of the safety reasons, and they can safely enforce the response tactics on the site.

• **Scope:** 8 hours to allow participants to effectively coordinate command and control of the response at the site.

• **Participants:** team and shift leaders, commander and assistant commanders of the police station, Operation and Communication Centre staff, police inspectors from the regional level (Command and Control HQ).
Module 3 – TTX, FOF

- **Objective:** participants know how to effectively work in the security incident, regardless of the potential safety concerns, they have the knowledge and understanding of safety & security interface, have understanding of each other’s obligations, responsibilities and powers.

- **Scope:** to enforce table top exercise in regular fashion and with scope agreed among entities, to introduce FOF exercise as a second step after TTX.

- **Participants:** organisation level participants from local, regional (state) level.
In conclusion...

- FOF exercise was stressful but a big leap for awareness of the reality and preparedness (for the Guards and the Police).
- New initiatives were raised for long-term and systematic (practical) approach to training in the field of Nuclear Security and Safety.
- On-going training is required to maintain preparedness and efficiency.
- International and regional situation may change rapidly (migrant in-flux, terrorist threat, future potential expansion of the site – waste storage facility, new unite…).
- Cooperation, Coordination and Communication are required (security and safety awareness and interface) among stakeholders.
We are stronger when we work together!

Thank you!

All photos by: Police Directorate Novo mesto, Slovenia.