BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED IN LANL APPROACHES TO TRANSPORTATION SECURITY



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Introduction

- Programmatic mission
 - unwanted radioactive and nuclear sealed sources of US origin
- During transportation of nuclear material the risk of sabotage or theft is heightened.

Physical Protection of Material in Transit

- Prevent theft and/or diversion for malevolent use
- Prompt detection, assessment, and reporting
- Prompt Local Law Enforcement Authority (LLEA) response



Graded Approach for Implementation Controls

Risk Category	Security Plan	State / City Notification s	Engineered Delays	GPS Tracking	Intrusion Alarm	Additional Requiremen ts
High	Y	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	Y
Medium	0	N	Y	Υ	N	N
Low	N	N	0	N	N	N

Y = yes, O = optional, N = no

Security Requirements

Engineered

- Hardened locks and doors
- Stop Boxes
- Real Time GPS tracking with or without intrusion notification

Administrative

- Notifications to appropriate authorities
- Background vetted drivers
- Transportation security plans
- Procedure changes

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LANL Lessons Learned

#1 Shipping Violation

- Air shipment of fissile material
- LANL-wide pause of all Class 7 shipping operations.
 - Corrective Action Plan
 - New Procedure
 - Use Every Time Checklists

#2 Unmonitored Shipment

94 sealed sources at a US commercial licensee

 The shipment quantities did not trigger any supplemental physical security or tracking requirements.



#3 Foreign shipment

- May 24th 2005 one 293Pu/Be was packaged in Uruguay for transportation to the US.
 - No support
 - Conflicting priorities
 - High costs

Conclusion

- DOE owned truck
 - Real-time tracking
 - Stop box
 - Reliable drivers
 - Minimized transport time

Improvements from Lessons Learned