With the events of recent months, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has increasingly come to be associated in the media with its so-called “watchdog” role in nuclear verification, particularly in relation to the resumption of inspections in Iraq. Today I would like to begin with a brief overview of all three areas of the Agency’s work — nuclear technology, nuclear safety and security, and nuclear verification — with an emphasis on the relevance of each area to current priorities in Arab and Middle Eastern countries.
I should first describe the basic overall mission of the IAEA. Since its establishment in 1957, the Agency has been dedicated to the achievement and promotion of a vision, “Atoms For Peace”: on the one hand, the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, with the aim of their eventual elimination — and on the other, the sharing of safe and secure nuclear technologies in peaceful applications that benefit humankind.
The focus of the Agency’s nuclear technology and technical co-operation programmes is on putting advanced science to work to meet the needs of our Member States in fundamental areas such as human health, agricultural productivity, water resource management, environmental restoration and energy.
Human health is the largest single area of IAEA technical co-operation. In helping Member States to use radioisotopes for cancer diagnosis and therapy, we have been working to enable countries to produce isotopes themselves, both for their own use and for export. For example, in the Syrian Arab Republic, with Agency support, a new cyclotron facility has been made operational for the production and use of radioisotopes for both medical and industrial purposes. The Agency also supports its Member States in installing internationally acceptable quality assurance and quality control measures for radioisotope production.
In the area of agriculture, nuclear technology in plant breeding programmes is used to produce crop varieties with improved yield, quality and ability to tolerate unique environments. The Agency has been leading a successful interregional demonstration project to support more productive agricultural use of saline groundwater and wastelands. For countries with large areas of saline lands, these techniques can be expanded at relatively low cost, and thereby increase the number of farmers who can operate in harsh environments. The Government of Egypt, for example, has allocated $2 million to expand this project to new regions of the country. And the Agency has recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Center for Bio-saline Agriculture in the United Arab Emirates to promote sustainable utilization of saline groundwater.
The Mediterranean fruit fly (medfly) is an insect pest that causes widespread economic damage. The sterile insect technique (SIT) uses radiation to sterilize healthy male flies which, when released into the environment, suppress and eventually eradicate the medfly population. A transnational medfly SIT project between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority has effectively suppressed this pest in the Arava region and the Lower Jordan valley, allowing the export of vegetables to medfly-free countries without quarantine restrictions, with considerable economic benefit. The project has been expanded to cover Gaza, Israel’s western Negev region, and fruit producing areas in eastern Egypt.
Another example of our work relates to water management. Under TC projects, scientists in recipient countries are trained in isotope hydrology to map underwater aquifers, estimate groundwater resources, combat the risk of pollution. Considerable capacity building in this area has taken place in a number of countries of the Middle East — national projects using isotope hydrology for water resource management are ongoing in Jordan, Syria, Yemen and here in the United Arab Emirates — but even greater effectiveness could be achieved if bilateral and multilateral approaches were adopted to conduct cross boundary water resource studies. Radioisotopes can be used similarly to map and enhance the productivity of oil fields, as well as for troubleshooting in various operational aspects of petrochemical complexes.
A recent area of Agency research lies in the development of nuclear instruments to detect land mines, an ongoing problem in many Arab and Middle Eastern countries, such as the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Egypt. A number of de-mining instruments tested so far have performed well in detecting simulated explosives buried below the surface. One such instrument was selected for performance checks in Vienna and is being prepared for field trials in Croatia. If successful, this approach would be much less labour intensive and more efficient than conventional methods because of the capability of nuclear instruments to detect explosives remotely.
The Agency also assists Member States in carrying out comparative assessments of different sources of electricity generation to determine the optimal energy mix — and for those that choose to pursue nuclear energy, we assist with capacity building and technical expertise. For many countries — particularly developing countries — an important potential use of nuclear power is for seawater desalination. The focus of the Agency’s nuclear desalination activities is being shifted to country specific projects; for example, — a joint study of a nuclear desalination plant is under way between Tunisia and France. In Egypt, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority completed a feasibility study one year ago for a nuclear electricity and desalination plant at the El-Dabaa site, and has submitted its proposal to the Government for consideration. And the Indian nuclear desalination project at Kalpakkam is now in its commissioning test stage. These projects and related developments were discussed during the International Conference on Nuclear Desalination in Marrakesh in October.
My point in giving these illustrations is that the IAEA is actively engaged in transferring peaceful nuclear technology in a way that will serve the needs and priorities of Member States, just as we are committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our technical co-operation programme is normally extended either directly to individual States or through regional projects and other regional arrangements. I should note, in this context, that a “Co-operation Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology,” referred to as ARASIA, has been concluded this year, with 5 States now party to it. This agreement should be an effective vehicle for promoting mutual co-operation on peaceful nuclear applications that could support economic and social development objectives in the region. The Agency intends, within its mandate and available resources, to provide technical co-operation support to States party to this agreement.
The second area of IAEA activity involves nuclear and radiation safety and security — that is, the safety and security of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities on the one hand, and safety and security in the use of nuclear material and radioactive sources on the other hand. While safety has improved significantly worldwide in the last decade, global performance is still uneven — that is, it varies from country to country and region to region — and much of the IAEA’s work in this area is to upgrade safety practices in all countries to the highest levels. We do this in three ways: by developing legally binding norms, in the form of “conventions”; by promulgating high level safety standards for use by nuclear operators and national regulators; and third, by organizing “safety services” — international peer reviews in which experts visit a given country or facility to observe safety practices, point out weaknesses and submit recommendations meeting best international practices.
The establishment of an adequate radiation protection infrastructure — comprised of a national legal framework, the formation of a regulatory body, and the implementation of rules and practices consistent with internationally accepted basic safety standards — is an essential requirement for the use of nuclear techniques involving radiation sources. Such sources are used extensively in industrial, medical and other applications in nearly every Arab and Middle Eastern country. The IAEA provides extensive assistance to its Member States in this area, especially through training and shared expertise. For example, since 2001 we have been supporting a one year regional postgraduate traning course in Arabic on radiation protection and radioactive source safety at the Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology in Damascus. I am pleased to say that significant progress has been made among Arab and Middle Eastern countries in upgrading their radiation protection infrastructures. Just this past January, for example, the United Arab Emirates passed a radiation safety law that was developed with Agency assistance.
Protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism has recently been the focus of heightened attention worldwide. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, the detection of illicit trafficking, and the assessment of vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities and the security of radioactive sources have been the subject of numerous IAEA training courses, peer reviews, and assistance missions in the past year. In November 2001, for example, we sent a fact finding mission to Tunisia to assist in evaluating the physical protection of their nuclear research installation. In May of this year, we held a training course on physical protection in Cairo. Security and safety workshops were also held this year in Pakistan and Iran, on methods for assessing the protection and vulnerabilities of their nuclear installations. We provided grants for several Middle Eastern participants to attend our international conference on environmental monitoring and nuclear forensics in Karlsruhe, Germany. And we have been heavily involved in the search for so-called ‘orphaned’ sources— radioactive sources that have been abandoned or otherwise have escaped from regulatory control — in Georgia, Afghanistan, Uganda and other locations.
As I said at the outset, the third area of IAEA activity — nuclear verification — is the one that has been receiving the most prominent attention in recent months, and it is to this area that I will devote the remainder of my talk today.
The IAEA’s verification or safeguards mandate — one of the three pillars of its work — relates to the verification of compliance with non-proliferation obligations undertaken by States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — and other legally binding international non-proliferation agreements. We use an increasing array of techniques for such verification — material accountancy, remote surveillance, on-site inspections, and satellite monitoring. Our authority is based on the “comprehensive safeguards agreement,” which a State is required to conclude with the Agency under the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements. The safeguards agreement provides us with the authority mainly to verify that a State has not diverted any of its “declared” nuclear material (that is, the inventory provided by the State) for non-peaceful purposes.
But our experience in Iraq in the early 1990s, and the discovery there of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, made it clear that the IAEA verification system, with its focus on declared nuclear activities and its limited rights of access to information and to other locations, was neither sufficiently robust nor comprehensive. This new reality prompted the international community to adopt a number of measures to strengthen the system, and to provide the IAEA with the authority necessary to provide comprehensive and credible assurance.
The most important measures were those incorporated into a model protocol additional to safeguards agreements, which was approved in 1997 by the IAEA Board of Governors. The additional protocol greatly enhances the IAEA’s verification capability by endowing it with expanded rights of access to information and to sites. The Agency is now able to provide credible assurance not only about the diversion of declared nuclear material but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. But this authority exists only for those States that have concluded both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the IAEA. For States with no additional protocol, the IAEA rights of inspection are essentially the same as in pre-Iraq days. In the Middle East all States, with the exception of Israel, are party to the NPT. Out of 23 States, only 13 have safeguards agreements, and only one — Jordan — has an additional protocol in force. Thus, nine Arab States parties to the NPT have yet to conclude or bring into force their NPT safeguards agreements, and almost all have yet to conclude an additional protocol. I would again urge these States to fulfil their NPT obligation to bring these agreements into force.
This IAEA verification role, however, is only one component of the efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Despite the end of the Cold War, non-proliferation and disarmament challenges remain in all categories of “weapons of mass destruction” — nuclear, biological and chemical. And while we have not reached the predictions of the 1960s — of an eventual 15 to 20 nuclear-weapon States — the unfortunate reality 40 years later is that at least eight countries are believed to possess nuclear weapons, a number of States possess or are suspected of possessing biological and/or chemical weapons, and the goal of a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction remains elusive.
It is clear that nuclear-weapon-free-zone arrangements and adherence to other multilateral and regional arms control agreements and arrangements have reduced or controlled the proliferation potential in some regions; in other regions, security is provided by a so-called “nuclear umbrella” arrangement — in which a nuclear-weapon State commits to extend the deterrent effect of its nuclear arsenal to shield non-nuclear-weapon States party to the arrangement or alliance. Thus, in regions where security is provided for through some mechanism there is little or no ‘demand’ for mass destruction weapons. But it should not come as a surprise that the regions facing a security deficit, unresolved conflict, and incomplete coverage of arms control agreements and other security arrangements are the regions with a continuing ‘demand’.
To understand how to move forward, I believe we must examine not only the symptoms but also the underlying causes — the motivations that give rise to nuclear proliferation. Why, for example, is the Middle East an area of recurring proliferation activity, as opposed to, say, Scandinavia? Clearly, it is the situation of enduring conflict and tension that creates this potential. The same might be said of Northeast Asia or of South Asia. Addressing the fundamental issue of security — in its broadest definition — is central to achieving a resolution to these conflicts, and thereby to resolving associated proliferation issues.
None of these ‘hard cases’ is new – all have been around for differing periods of time — each sheltered or ignored as a result of political considerations of the day. Traditional strategies have relied on export controls, embargoes, exhortations aimed at the universality of the multilateral regimes, and in extreme cases even the use of force. What is abundantly clear is that the traditional strategies are no longer sufficient or have run their course; new thinking and new strategies need to be developed and implemented.
Within this context, the Middle East remains one of the most complex and difficult regions for developing a common strategy leading to mutual security for all States of the region. The region’s defining characteristics include a long and bitter history of conflict and continuing and escalating arms races. During the Cold War, the Middle East was second only to Europe in amassing the engines and tools of war. Per capita military expenditure concomitantly was and remains among the highest. With the end of the Cold War, the Middle East is the fastest arming region in the world. Is there — can there be — a light at the end of this tunnel of insecurity and instability? Can the creative potential and the energy of this region — the cradle of history and faith — be harnessed for peace rather than for war?
With the collapse of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks in September 1995 and of the peace process in 2000, there is presently no meaningful dialogue involving the various States of the Middle East. Comprehensive security in the region cannot be advanced in the absence of a dialogue. In my view, once the peace process is back on track, an indispensable parallel discussion should be initiated on the development of a regional security system that deals not only with weapons of mass destruction but also with all other aspects of security. Peace cannot exist without an undergirding system of security, and security cannot be attained without peace.
As far back as 1974, the Islamic Republic of Iran with the support of Egypt proposed the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. And for over 20 years, the UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution annually to this effect, garnering the support of all Arab States, Iran and Israel.
In 1990, Egypt proposed in addition the establishment of a Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone, as an objective to be pursued in parallel with a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The concept of such a WMD-free zone was universally supported by States party to the NPT in their meetings in both 1995 and 2000.
Moreover, for many years my predecessor and I have been requested by IAEA Member States to consult with the States of the Middle East as necessary to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region, and to prepare model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Regrettably, none of the above proposals and initiatives have been followed through with specific measures or met with much success.
While States of the Middle East region have agreed in principle on the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear material and facilities in the region, differences remain on whether this can be divorced from a broader peace agreement. Israel takes the view that safeguards, as well as all other regional security issues, cannot be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process but only within the context of a comprehensive peace settlement. The other States of the region maintain that there is no automatic sequence which links the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East — or the establishment of a NWFZ in the region — to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement. In their view, these former initiatives could support the latter.
It has often been said that regional arrangements can both supplement and go beyond global non-proliferation and arms control arrangements. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East could therefore be tailored to the specific characteristics and features of the region and thus contribute dramatically to both regional and international peace and security. The establishment of such a zone will in my view also facilitate the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
I should mention in that context that adherence to the widely adhered to Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is held up in the Middle East due to the reluctance by several States to adhere to these conventions in the absence of adherence by Israel to the NPT. Ten Middle Eastern States have not signed or ratified the BTWC, and nine have not signed or ratified the CWC.
A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East could ensure, inter alia: universality of membership of the States of the region; the total absence of nuclear weapons within the area encompassed by the zone; the establishment of an international system of verification and control to monitor compliance — possibly supplemented by a regional nuclear verification mechanism; and the provision of assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to unconditionally refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zonal treaty. Additional features could include provisions for: verified dismantlement and destruction of any existing nuclear weapons; conversion of all existing weapon-useable nuclear material to a form not suitable for weapon use; prohibitions on dumping of nuclear and radioactive waste and attacking nuclear facilities; co-operation in the field of nuclear safety; and enhanced physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.
Resumption of Inspections in Iraq
The inspection activities in Iraq that came to a halt in December 1998 had successfully thwarted Iraq’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons programme. At that time the Agency was of the belief that we had neutralized Iraq’s nuclear weapon programme, and that Iraq no longer had the capability to produce the nuclear material needed for weapons purposes.
The resumption of inspections in Iraq has been the subject of intensive diplomatic effort in the last few months. These efforts have culminated in the acceptance by Iraq of the resumption of inspections without conditions, and in the adoption of Security Council resolution 1441 [.pdf file] on 8 November. With the adoption of this resolution, the use of force no longer appears as the first option but is now regarded as the last resort. This is a positive development.
The new Security Council resolution, inter alia, affirms the unified resolve of the Council to fully support the inspection process. It grants additional authority in a number of areas to the inspecting organizations — the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), responsible for verifying the status of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and the IAEA, responsible for verifying the status of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme — including immediate access to all sites in Iraq without distinction, the right to determine the modalities and locations for interviewing relevant persons, and the ability to freeze activities during the inspection of a site. The new resolution also encourages all States to provide timely information to the inspecting organizations that is relevant to their mandate, with a view to improving inspection effectiveness.
The first inspections by the IAEA and UNMOVIC began on 27 November, with the co-operation of Iraq. On 7 December, Iraq submitted to the IAEA and UNMOVIC the declaration required by SC resolution 1441 [.pdf file] of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems — as well as all other chemical, biological and nuclear programmes not related to weapon production or material. Both inspection organizations are assessing this important document within their respective mandates, to ensure that it is currently accurate, full and complete. It is of course too early to come to a conclusion. The declaration will be thoroughly investigated on the basis of information we already have, information we may receive from Member States, information from past and current inspections and information we gain from interviewing relevant Iraqi personnel. This process may take some time; however, if we can use the inspection process to come to a peaceful resolution of this issue, this is time not lost.
At times, some have criticized the inspection process as being effective only if the inspected country is fully co-operative. This is a misunderstanding, because by its very nature the inspection process, in Iraq and elsewhere, is not based on “trust” as such, but on a thorough process of fact finding, through access to all available information. Naturally, information available to States that is relevant to the purpose of the inspection is key to success, particularly if the inspected country is not fully co-operative. If all such information is made available to the inspecting organizations, then legally sanctioned and internationally endorsed inspections are, in my view, the most effective mechanism for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Inspection is sometimes time consuming, but its results are predictable and, if successful, will certainly spare innocent lives.
Naturally, the Agency will make every effort to effectively discharge its mandate, with the aim of bringing to verified compliance the disarmament process required by the Security Council. How successful we are going to be in Iraq will depend on four interrelated prerequisites: (1) immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of al the authority granted to us by the Security Council — including the additional authority provided for in the new resolution; (2) ready access to all sources of information — including timely intelligence information available to States; (3) unified and unequivocal support from the Security Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in case of non-compliance — this, in my view, is the best support that inspectors could have and the best deterrence against non-compliance; and (4) active co-operation from Iraq, with a sustained demonstration of its full co-operation not only with regard to access to sites and locations but also with regard to the presentation of credible evidence relevant to its compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions — in other words, co-operation both on process and on substance.
I hope and trust that full co-operation by Iraq will lead to the avoidance of the use of force, and will open the way for the suspension and eventual elimination of sanctions under which the Iraqi people regrettably have lived too long. Should full co-operation be absent, however, it is obvious that the consequences, as the Security Council made it clear, will be serious. In this context, it important that all the States of the region make it clear to Iraq that complete and sustained co-operation is an absolute prerequisite if the region is to avoid a war with unpredictable consequences. As President Jacques Chirac said recently “war is always the worst solution”.
I should add here my belief that progress in and resolution of the Iraq issue will clearly contribute to improving the prospect of peace in the Middle East — and hopefully, in the context of that peace, the prospect of regional security arrangements that should include nuclear-weapon-free and WMD-free zones in the Middle East.
I would like to conclude by emphasizing that our efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a work in progress on many fronts. In my view, however, the most important challenge is to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that do not include nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as part of the security portfolio, approaches that are functional and upon which all can rely with confidence. As the Canberra Commission stated a few years ago, the present situation “cannot be sustained, [because] the possession of nuclear weapons by any State is a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them.” The same might be said for any weapons of mass destruction. We must all do our part to support the non-proliferation and disarmament process, if we are to avoid a situation that will ultimately and inevitably lead to self-destruction.