Celebrating 25 Years of the Belgian Support Programme to the IAEA

It is a pleasure for me to be here with you to celebrate the 25^th anniversary of the Belgian Support Programme to the Agency Safeguards. Let me start with formally thanking, on behalf of the Agency, the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre, SCK, and through you, the Belgian Government, and the Industry, for the contributions they have made to the Department of Safeguards. Your contributions have been invaluable in the development of Safeguards Approaches for facilities in various countries (reprocessing, LEU fuel fabrication, MOX fuel fabrication, research and power reactors, and waste handling facilities). The Belgian Support Programme has also assisted in improving the performance of equipment and methods used to reach the safeguards goals, such as solution monitoring techniques for reprocessing input tanks, testing a variety of NDA instruments and methods used for qualifying and quantifying uranium and plutonium in various geometries, spent fuel assembly measurement devices and methods and, more recently, the testing of a Fork Detector as a partial defect tester for spent fuel assemblies, using Monte Carlo simulations.

You have also been actively participating in the group of experts for Application of Safeguards to Geological Repositories, ASTOR, and I am pleased to hear that you are going to host the ASTOR experts meeting in June.

All this support has been very much appreciated and I hope it will continue.

Much can happen in 25 years. If we think back to the world of Safeguards 25 years ago, we surely could not have predicted the world we are in today. Nuclear material accountancy, for example, is no longer the sole centre-piece of Safeguards. Safeguards has evolved to now encompass, in parallel to nuclear material accountancy, a comprehensive system of information collection and analysis, drawing upon expanded legal authority, and making full use of advances in technology for nuclear verification. If we do not maintain the flexibility to continue to evolve and be ready to respond to changing future needs of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Safeguards system may become vulnerable. One thing is certain: to maintain the flexibility of the Safeguards system, intensified cooperation between the Agency and Member States is a must. So, as we look towards the future, what does our current vision hold for the future trends of Safeguards? How much can we anticipate and begin to prepare for?

Looking ahead of us today, we can see a two-layered vision of the future. We are able to identify with confidence the areas that we can prepare for the next 5 years; but we can also see a less focused and evolving landscape of what the world of Safeguards might be beyond that time-frame. With regard to the longer-term vision in particular, it is important that the Agency and its Member States be receptive to indicators of changes and challenges that may lie ahead for Safeguards, and more importantly remain able to evolve and adapt to a changing vision, as it becomes more focused with time.

The Agency, with support of its Member States, has already identified a number of areas that should be given priority as we head into the early years of the next decade, in order to ensure that Safeguards continues to evolve. Some of these include:

1. 1. advances in nuclear technology and increased dissemination of nuclear "know-how,"

1. 1. making use of advances in capabilities for detection of undeclared nuclear activities,

1. 1. enhancing information acquisition, analysis and evaluation capabilities, and

1. seeking closer cooperation with Member States.

Specific objectives in these areas have been identified and steps are already underway to address some of them:

1. 1. Advances in Nuclear Technology:

1. 1. • To develop, implement and revise, as appropriate, safeguards approaches for new safeguards challenges (e.g. integrated safeguards), new facility types and new operating conditions (e.g. LWR and Advanced HWR).

1. 1. Making Use of Advances in Capabilities for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities:

1. 1. • To optimize safeguards equipment and technology development with the view of further improving present detection capability and increasing the reliability of equipment.

1. 1. • To continue to pursue R&D activities searching for novel technologies that would be capable of identifying nuclear fuel cycle process signatures.

1. 1. • To enhance capabilities in the area of environmental sampling and satellite imagery acquisition and analysis.

1. 1. • To maintain competence in the Agency and ensuring that staff is well-trained in advances in technology, including for example, the latest NFC technology and the latest detection technology.

1. 1. Enhancing Information Acquisition, Analysis and Evaluation Capabilities:

1. 1. • To extend evaluation capabilities for measurement data and information collected during inspections and visits, as well as on clandestine networks for the supply of nuclear items.

1. 1. • To continue to develop processes and tools to maintain the knowledge required for the Department to draw credible conclusions.

1. 1. • To maintain a unified approach to addressing preservation of institutional memory and the promotion of knowledge management.

1. 1. Continuing Close Cooperation with Member States:

1. 1. • To intensify cooperation between the Agency and Member States to strengthen arrangements for safeguards implementation, including support of the development/improvement of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSACs) capabilities where appropriate and other relevant infrastructure with a view to ensuring more efficient and effective safeguards.

1. 1. • To contribute to expanding outreach activities and public awareness of verification activities through improving the quality and timely availability of information.

1. • To seek closer cooperation with Member States in order to jointly address current and future non-proliferation issues and challenges.

One of the major shifts since the commencement of Safeguards has been the collection, analysis and evaluation of information. Collection, analysis and evaluation of information is an area that is experiencing a "renaissance" in Safeguards, and will continue to evolve in the years to come. Information is at the heart of modern verification; in fact, we frequently refer to our work as being "information-driven safeguards".

The safeguards conclusions that we draw every year for each State with a safeguards agreement in force are based explicitly on the evaluation of all information available to the Agency. However, with current resources and techniques there are clear limits to how much information can be evaluated - and the amount of information available is constantly growing. New technologies and well-trained staff can offer real solutions for the collection and analysis of these increasing volumes of information.

But we also need to further enhance the effectiveness of nuclear verification, if the nuclear non-proliferation is to be regarded as credible, and it seems clear that the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol must become the universal non-proliferation standard.

As we look even further into the future, beyond the early years of the next decade, we can see that proliferation resistance issues will require consideration. We have begun to explore better control of access to nuclear fuel cycle technology through initiatives such as multinational approaches to parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and ensuring reliable supply of reactor fuel; these initiatives will continue to take shape over the next few years. Advancements as INPRO, GEN IV and fast reactors will also need to be monitored with a view to their needs for safeguards. Additionally, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty may add another dimension to safeguards.

Our objective is to continue to verify, in an impartial and independent manner, that States are honoring their safeguards obligations. To do this, we must ensure that safeguards systems at the State level and at the Agency remain capable of evolving and responding to changing world needs. If we are to stay "ahead of the game", it is essential that we are capable of being decisive and able to respond quickly: the Agency can only do this through appropriate Member State support and today we thank Belgium for 25 years of formal partnership with the Agency. We look forward to its continued commitment to supporting us in providing the international community with the best possible assurances about the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thank you.