

# **Knowledge Gaps in Toughness and Irradiation: Lessons of the Past, Prospects for the Future**

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# Themes

- **What can we learn from the past?**
- **What can we expect in the future?**
  - **What can we do about it?**
- **Answers - we need to:**
  - **Develop understanding**
  - **Find and fill gaps**
  - **Prepare for unexpected issues**

# Failure during hydro-test (chemical plant pressure vessel)



Witnesses heard “a kind of dull thud”.

A two tonne piece landed 45m away in a car park.

Fortunately, there was only one injury, and that was minor.

Fig. 1.12. Failure by brittle fracture of thick-walled cylindrical pressure vessel during hydraulic test (By courtesy of John Thompson Ltd., Wolverhampton)

# Past technical surprises (1)

- **Unexpected (at least to most people) sensitivity to irradiation damage variables:**
  - Impurities (copper, phosphorus, etc.)
  - Alloying elements (nickel, manganese, etc.)
  - Irradiation environment (spectrum, flux, etc.)
- **Unexpected (- ditto -) phenomena:**
  - No loops in steels (?)
  - Grain boundary embrittlement
  - CRPs, MNPs, UMDs, LBPs (?)
  - etc., etc,


# Past technical surprises (2)

- **Manufacturing and operational issues**
  - Underclad cracking
  - Segregation in large forgings
  - External corrosion (Davis Besse)
  - Hydrogen flaking (Doel3, Tihange 2)
  - etc.
- **The solution of these issues relied on good understanding of materials degradation and structural integrity assessment (SIA)**

# Past technical improvements

- **Some examples:**
  - **“Better” materials**
  - **Better analysis methods:**
    - **Fracture Mechanics**
    - **Finite Element Analysis**
    - **Master Curve / Unified Curve**
  - **Better Non-Destructive Examination techniques**
  - **Better testing methods**
    - **Mechanical: small fracture toughness, reconstitution**
    - **Microstructural: AP, SANS, FIB ...**
  - **Better computers enabling MS/MP models**


# Improvement in toughness with date



A508-2; A508-3; 20NiMoCr26; 22NiMoCr37

Data compiled by Mark Kirk


# Compositional changes with date




Materials have changed




# Past and Future



1960  
Calder Hall # 4  
60MWe  
40 years



2010  
EPR  
1650 MWe  
60 years?



2060  
??R  
????? MWe  
??? years

## Changes in past 50 years

- Larger, thicker RPVs (forgings)
- Changes to steelmaking and fabrication practice
- Changes to supply routes (including mineral sources)
- International collaboration
- Increasingly tight regulation (demonstrable safety)
- Losing experienced staff
- Changes in the ways that organizations work
- Need to extend RPV life (due to nuclear hiatus)

## Changes in next 50 years

- Much the same?
- Always moving beyond experience

# Engineering failures



Tay Bridge Disaster



Titanic



Aloha Airlines Flight 243

# Disaster theory


- **Unforeseeable (?)**
  - **Natural accident theory**
  - **Epistemic accidents**
- **Foreseeable**
  - **Failures of foresight**
    - **In the UK TAGSI four-legged safety case, the fourth leg, forewarning of failure (through surveillance, development of knowledge, etc.), is intended to provide protection against such failures**

*Anatomy of a Disaster: Why Some Accidents Are Unavoidable, John Downer Discussion Paper No: 61, Centre for Analysis and Risk Regulation, London School of Economics, March 2010*

# Causes of failure when engineers were at fault



Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, analysis in 1976 of 800 cases of structural failure in which 504 people were killed; causes were:

- **Insufficient knowledge** 36%
- **Underestimation of influence** 16%
- Ignorance, carelessness, negligence 14%
- Forgetfulness, error 13%
- Relying upon others without sufficient control 9%
- Objectively unknown situation 7%
- Unprecise definition of responsibilities 1%
- Choice of bad quality 1%
- Other 3%




M. Matousek and Schneider, J., (1976) Untersuchungen Zur Struktur des Sicherheitproblems bei Bauwerken, Institut für Baustatik und Konstruktion der ETH Zürich, Bericht No. 59, ETH.

# Issues for predictions for 80 year irradiations?



The areas of dataspace investigated are incomplete, even in two dimensions

# Variability of irradiation damage




Data are from surveillance and test reactor irradiations for a wide range of materials and irradiation environments

The highest Charpy shift values have been estimated from hardness change data via correlations

- **Confidence in predictions for 80 year irradiations?**

# Issues for predictions for 80 year irradiations?

Set: All (27/08/11)



Data plot thanks to Mark Kirk

# What do we do? (1)

- **Develop mechanistic understanding**
  - Knowledge not information
  - Reduces dependence on ‘time-served’ experts
  - Enables MS/MP models (eg PERFORM60)
  - Increases confidence in extrapolation
- **Assume guilt until innocence is demonstrated**
  - eg Late Blooming Phases – until it is demonstrated that there is no late embrittlement effect, we have to assess the risk of such an effect
    - Risk = (probability that it exists) x (consequences of ignoring it)



# What do we do? (2)

- Challenge codes, procedures and assumptions
  - (Aloha Airlines Flight 243 disaster)
- Actively investigate gaps
- Survey of ASTM Radiation Damage Symposium and IGRDM presentations
- >90% of papers on the ‘popular’ topics: copper, nickel, manganese, flux, transition region toughness, correlations, RPV annealing
- All undoubtedly important, but are we to some extent ‘following the ball’?



# Less-popular topics

- **Unimportant?**
  - **Effect of flux on low copper materials**
  - **Influence of reactor duty cycle**
  - **Superposition of hardening**
  - **Lüders strain**
  - **Effect of irradiation on fatigue crack growth**
  - **Heat affected zones**
  - **Stress effect on irradiation**
  - **Irradiation-enhanced tempering**
  - **Effect of irradiation on upper shelf toughness**

# What do we do? (3)

- **Prepare for unexpected issues (D3/T2)**
  - **Additional surveillance samples**
  - **Archive materials and records**
  - **Develop tools**
  - **Maintain expertise**
    - **Funding issues**
    - **Use resource effectively**
    - **Collaborate**

**Many thanks for your attention**