GOV/2816/Add. l-GC(39)/10/Add. 1
4 September 1995

Item 25 of the Conference's provisional agenda

The Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 707 and 715 (1991)
Relating to Iraq

Report by the Director General

(Editor's note: This is an addition to document GC(39)/10.)


  1. Since document GOV/2816-GC(39)/10 was issued, on 2 August 1995, events have occurred that call for an Addendum to that document.

  2. Following the arrival in Jordan, on 8 August 1995, of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majid, the former Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization of Iraq, the Director General was invited to send an IAEA delegation to Baghdad to acquire new information. This information had been purportedly held back at the instruction of General Hussein Kamel.

  3. On 17 August 1995, the IAEA delegation arrived in Baghdad. Meetings were held with Iraqi authorities who provided new information and added further clarification concerning their past covert nuclear programme. On 21 August 1995 the delegation proceeded to Jordan where a meeting was held with General Hussein Kamel.

  4. The attached report summarises the new information received.

  5. The document is being issued simultaneously for the Board of Governors and the General Conference


  1. Following the arrival in Jordan, on 8 August 1995, of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majid, the former Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), the Director General was invited by a letter dated 12 August 1995 to send to Baghdad an IAEA delegation to acquire new information, purported to have been withheld at the instruction of General Hussein Kamel.

  2. An IAEA delegation, headed by the leader of the Action Team, went to Baghdad and held a round of talks with the Iraqi authorities, from 17 to 20 August 1995. Statements made by the Iraqi counterpart during these talks provided clarification of some aspects of the previous clandestine nuclear programme and identified a course of action that Iraq had initiated shortly after the invasion of Kuwait. Had this course of action been implemented through a crash programme, it could, assuming satisfactory solution of the technical problems, have shortened the time required to obtain sufficient nuclear material to fabricate a nuclear device compared to the indigenous uranium enrichment approach. Without prejudice to the result of the analysis of the documents and materials referred to in paragraph 5 below, these statements, if verified, do not substantially alter the conclusions in section VIII of the IAEA's seventh semi-annual report to the Security Council.

  3. Items of significance arising from the discussions are summarized as follows:

    It was stated that soon after the invasion of Kuwait (2 August 1990), a crash programme had been initiated aimed at producing a nuclear weapon by using highly enriched uranium contained in the safeguarded fuel of the Russian and French supplied research reactors at the Tuwaitha site. General Hussein Kamel was stated to be the initiator of this crash programme and the deadline for completion of the first part of the programme, namely the recovery of the highly enriched uranium from the reactor fuel and its conversion into metal, was stated to be April 1991. It was also stated that when this programme had to be stopped in the second half of January 1991 as a consequence of the destructions inflicted by the air raids of the coalition forces, programme progress was slow and all activities were behind schedule. Documents were provided to support their statements.

    It was confirmed that, as the IAEA has long believed, the centrifuge enrichment programme was carried out in the so-called Engineering Design Centre in Rashdiya - a locality in the northern suburbs of Baghdad - and not in Tuwaitha as heretofore declared. It was also stated that some limited work continued, at Rashdiya during 1988/1989, which led to the successful development of a gas diffusion barrier. This latter activity - discontinued in 1989 - is unlikely to have any practical significance to the nuclear weapon's programme but is indicative of the capabilities of Iraqi scientists and engineers and of their perseverance despite repeated failures.

    An oral description was given of the progress made by the Al Atheer project team responsible for the design and fabrication of nuclear weapons during the second half of 1990 including an explanation of the extent of the contribution by the Al Qa Qaa establishment in the development of the implosive package. To help to substantiate their statements the Iraqi counterpart provided a copy of the progress report of the Al Atheer project team, covering the period from 1 June 1990 to 7 June 1991, which had been issued on 10 September 1991. This detailed document, of a total of 198 pages, is particularly important since it relates to a period of time not covered by the documents seized by the sixth IAEA inspection team in September 1991. The report, which is in course of translation, appears to indicate that the work on weaponization ceased at the end of January 1991, in Al Atheer and in Tuwaitha and that post-war activities were concentrated on the salvaging of equipment.

  4. While the assessment of the above summarized information will take some time, it is clear that the crash programme would have involved a blatant and readily detectable violation of the Safeguards Agreement between Iraq and the IAEA. This violation was not committed because of the damage inflicted on the Iraqi installations during the Gulf War. No safeguarded fuel was diverted. It is however clear that the crash programme could have reduced the time needed for Iraq to demonstrate its nuclear capability, depending on the ability of the Iraqi scientists and engineers to overcome the technical challenges involved in the recovery of a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium of the necessary specification.

  5. On 20 August 1995, when the UNSCOM/IAEA teams were preparing to leave Iraq, the UNSCOM team was led to a farm, purportedly owned by the family of General Hussein Kamel, where, in farm buildings, the UNSCOM team was shown more than one hundred metal trunks and boxes containing documentation and ton quantities of metals in various forms. Cursory scanning of some of the trunks showed the documentation to relate to technical and administrative matters concerning the past programme and dealing with all categories of weapons, including nuclear. These documents and materials were removed to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre during the following two days and are now in the process of being inventoried and characterized. It is expected that their analysis and evaluation will require considerable time.

  6. Following the talks in Baghdad the UNSCOM and IAEA teams went to Jordan in order to hold joint opening talks with General Hussein Kamel. The nuclear weapons related topics covered in these opening talks, which took place in Amman on 22 August 1995, included the initiation of the above described crash programme, the stage of development of the centrifuge and other uranium enrichment programmes and the nature of any activities continued after the entry into force of UNSC resolution 687 (1991). In this latter regard General Hussein Kamel's statement was compatible with statements made in the Baghdad talks, that all nuclear weapons related activities had effectively ceased at the onset of the attack on Iraq by the coalition forces. It is expected that further contact will be made with General Hussein Kamel in the near future.