Safeguards Statement for 2009

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In 2009, safeguards were applied for 170 States1/ with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat´s findings and conclusions for 2009 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

  1. 89 States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:
    1. For 52 of these States2/, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
    2. For 37 of the States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
  2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 73 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. While the Secretariat concluded that, for 2009, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran´s declarations remains ongoing.
  3. As of the end of 2009, 22 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.
  4. Three States had safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, which require the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.
  5. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer safeguards agreements in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in four of the five States. For these four States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.


Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary

1. THE SAFEGUARDS CONCLUSIONS

  1. The Safeguards Statement for 2009 reflects the safeguards conclusions resulting from the Agency´s activities under the safeguards agreements in force. The Secretariat derives these conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of the results of its verification activities and of all the safeguards relevant information available to it. This section provides background to the Safeguards Statement. A detailed description of the Agency´s safeguards system can be found on the Agency´s website: http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf [pdf]. A summary of the status of States´ safeguards agreements and other information presented below is given in Tables 1 to 5 in Section 6.

    1.1 States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
  2. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices3/.
  3. Comprehensive safeguards agreements consist of Part I, Part II, and Definitions. Part I consists of general provisions and Part II describes the procedures for implementing those provisions. These procedures include the record keeping and reporting obligations of the State with regard to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs). They also include procedures related to Agency access to nuclear material, facilities and LOFs.
  4. The procedures set out in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement include certain reporting requirements related to the export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment. Nuclear material which has reached that stage of processing, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage, is subject to all the other procedures specified in the agreement. An inventory of such nuclear material is established on the basis of an initial report by a State, verified by the Agency and maintained on the basis of subsequent reports by the State and by Agency verification. The Agency performs its verification activities in order to confirm that these declarations by the State are correct and complete - i.e. to confirm the peaceful use of all nuclear material in the State.

    Small Quantities Protocols
  5. Many States with minimal or no nuclear activities have concluded a small quantities protocol (SQP) to their comprehensive safeguards agreement. Under an SQP based on the original standard text submitted to the Board of Governors in 19744/, the implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a State´s comprehensive safeguards agreement are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met. In 2005, the Board of Governors approved the revision of the standard text of the SQP5/. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for an SQP, making it unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility, and reduced the number of measures held in abeyance. Of particular importance, the requirement that the State provide the Agency with the initial inventory report, referred to above, and the Agency´s right to carry out ad hoc inspections are not held in abeyance under the revised text of the SQP.

    Additional Protocols
  6. Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State´s declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited. The Model Additional Protocol6/, approved by the Board of Governors in 1997, equips the Agency with important supplementary tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol thus significantly increase the Agency´s ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

    State Systems of Accounting and Control
  7. To enable the Agency to perform its verification activities effectively and efficiently, States need to comply with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Of particular importance is the requirement under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to establish and maintain a State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). The effectiveness of SSACs, and the extent of their cooperation with the Agency, has a direct impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards.

    1.1.1 States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols in Force



    Status of Implementation
  8. As of 31 December 2009, 89 States7/ had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.
  9. Safeguards implementation involved, as appropriate, activities carried out in the field, at Regional Offices and at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. The activities at Headquarters included the evaluation of States´ accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources. In implementing in-field activities, the Secretariat carried out 1650 inspections, 440 design information verifications (DIVs) and 136 complementary accesses utilizing 11 080 calendar-days in the field for verification (CDFVs) in these States8/.

    Deriving Conclusions
  10. A safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the Secretariat´s finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The Secretariat draws such a conclusion only where a State has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and the evaluations described below have been completed.
  11. To ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in a State, the Secretariat needs to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of all information available to it, which includes information provided by the State with regard to the design and operation of nuclear facilities and LOFs, the State´s nuclear material accounting reports and the results of the Secretariat´s in-field activities carried out in order to verify the State´s declarations. In addition, the Secretariat evaluates the information acquired through the implementation of the State´s additional protocol.
  12. To ascertain that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State, the Secretariat needs to carry out an evaluation of the consistency of the State´s declared nuclear programme with the results of the Agency´s verification activities under the relevant safeguards agreement and additional protocol and with all other information available to the Agency. In particular, the Agency needs to have:
    • conducted a comprehensive State evaluation based on all information available to the Agency about the State´s nuclear and nuclear-related activities (including declarations submitted under the additional protocol, and information collected by the Agency through its verification activities and from other sources);
    • performed complementary access, as necessary, in accordance with the State´s additional protocol; and
    • addressed all anomalies, questions and inconsistencies identified in the course of its evaluation and verification activities.
  13. When the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12 above have been completed, and no indication has been found by the Secretariat that, in its judgement, would give rise to a possible proliferation concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State has remained in peaceful activities. Subsequently, the Secretariat implements an integrated safeguards approach for that State whereby - due to increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole - the intensity of inspection activities at declared facilities and LOFs can be reduced.
  14. In drawing safeguards conclusions, the Agency evaluates whether the safeguards activities carried out during the year have satisfied certain performance targets. In those cases where integrated safeguards were not implemented for the whole year, the Safeguards Criteria function as the performance targets9/. Under integrated safeguards - an optimized combination of measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols - the performance targets are those set out in the State-level integrated safeguards approach approved for each State10/.

    Overall Conclusions for 2009
  15. On the basis of the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12, the Secretariat drew the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the Safeguards Statement for 2009 for 52 States11/ - Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark12/, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands13/, New Zealand14/, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. For one of these States - the Seychelles - the conclusion in paragraph 1(a) of the Safeguards Statement was drawn for the first time.
  16. Because the evaluation process described in paragraph 12 had not yet been completed for 37 States, the conclusion drawn for these States related only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities. The conclusion in paragraph 1(b) was drawn for Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Fiji, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, and the United Republic of Tanzania.

    1.1.2 States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements but no Additional Protocols in Force

    Status of Implementation
  17. As of 31 December 2009, safeguards were implemented for 73 States15/ in this category. Safeguards implementation involved activities in the field and at Headquarters, including the evaluation of States´ accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources. The Secretariat carried out 202 inspections and 140 DIVs utilizing 1670 CDFVs in these States.

    Deriving Conclusions
  18. For a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone, the Agency´s right and obligation are as described in paragraph 2 above. Although safeguards strengthening measures under such an agreement16/ have somewhat increased the Agency´s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, the activities that the Agency may conduct in this regard are limited for a State without an additional protocol. Thus, the conclusion in the Safeguards Statement for a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone relates only to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities.
  19. In the course of its evaluation, the Agency also seeks to determine whether there is any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State which would need to be reflected in the Safeguards Statement. However, without the measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol being implemented, the Agency is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.

    Overall Conclusions for 2009
  20. On the basis of the evaluation performed and as reflected in paragraph 2 of the Safeguards Statement, the Secretariat concluded that for the 73 States17/ referred to in paragraph 17 above, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion was drawn for Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Côte d´Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People´s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

    1.2 States with no Safeguards Agreements in Force
  21. As of 31 December 2009, 22 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to the Treaty.

    Overall Conclusions for 2009
  22. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the Safeguards Statement, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions for the referenced States. These States are Andorra, Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Federated States of Micronesia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Rwanda, São Tome and Principe, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Togo and Vanuatu.

    1.3 States with Safeguards Agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2
  23. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency applies safeguards in order to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

    Status of Implementation
  24. As of 31 December 2009, safeguards were implemented at a number of facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. None of these States had an additional protocol in force with the Agency. In 2009, an INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement between India and the Agency for the application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities was signed and entered into force. The Secretariat carried out 50 inspections and 15 DIVs utilizing 529.5 CDFVs in these States.

    Deriving Conclusions
  25. The conclusion described in paragraph 4 of the Safeguards Statement is reported for these three States, and relates to the nuclear material, facilities and other items to which safeguards were applied. To draw such a conclusion in respect of these States, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

    Overall Conclusions for 2009
  26. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied in India, Israel and Pakistan remained in peaceful activities.

    1.4 States with Voluntary Offer Agreements
  27. Under a voluntary offer agreement, the Agency applies safeguards to nuclear material in those facilities which have been selected by the Agency from the State´s list of eligible facilities in order to verify that the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the agreement. In selecting facilities under voluntary offer agreements for the application of safeguards, the Agency takes into consideration factors such as: (i) whether the selection of a facility would satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the State; (ii) whether useful experience may be gained in implementing new safeguards approaches or in using advanced equipment and technology; and (iii) whether the cost-efficiency of Agency safeguards may be enhanced by applying safeguards, in the exporting State, to nuclear material being shipped to States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force.

    Status of Implementation
  28. During 2009, safeguards were implemented at facilities selected by the Agency in four of the five States with voluntary offer safeguards agreements in force: China, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and the United States of America. Safeguards activities in the Russian Federation were limited to the evaluation of accounting reports on the export and import of nuclear material and of additional protocol declarations, since no facilities were selected in 2009 from Russia´s list of eligible facilities. By the end of 2009, additional protocols were in force for all five States with voluntary offer agreements. The Secretariat carried out 81 inspections and 14 DIVs utilizing 768.5 CDFVs in order to verify declared nuclear material in the facilities selected in these States.

    Deriving Conclusions
  29. The conclusion contained in paragraph 5 of the Safeguards Statement is reported for the four nuclear-weapon States in which safeguards were applied to nuclear material in selected facilities. To draw the safeguards conclusion, the Agency evaluates all relevant information, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

    Overall Conclusions for 2009
  30. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded for China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. In two of these States there were no such withdrawals from the selected facilities.
  31. 1.5 Islamic Republic of Iran
  32. During 2009, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors on the implementation of Iran´s comprehensive safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions (GOV/2009/8, GOV/2009/35, GOV/2009/55 and GOV/2009/74) and the Board adopted one resolution on the subject (GOV/2009/82).
  33. Since March 2007, Iran has not implemented the modified text of Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information. Iran continued to turn down the Agency´s request to carry out a DIV at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) until access was finally granted on 17 August 2009 and subsequently on 7 November 2009. Iran also failed to notify the Agency of the construction of the new enrichment facility at the Fordow site until September 2009.
  34. In 2009, Iran did not implement the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, including implementation of the additional protocol. The implementation of these requirements is essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of Iran´s nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions. In particular, Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in clarifying the outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear programme. The issues relate to: the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle; the circumstances of the acquisition of the "uranium metal" document; procurement and research and development (R&D) activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.
  35. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, Iran did not suspend its enrichment related activities, and continued with the operation of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the construction and operation of the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to construct an additional enrichment facility, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. Subsequently, Iran announced its intention to build ten new enrichment plants.
  36. Iran continued its work on heavy water related projects, again contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, including the construction of the IR-40 heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak and operation of a Heavy Water Production Plant.
  37. For 2009, while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran´s declarations remained ongoing.
  38. 1.6 Syrian Arab Republic
  39. During 2009, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors on the implementation of Syria´s comprehensive safeguards agreement.
  40. In 2009, the Agency continued its verification activities in relation to the allegations that an installation destroyed by Israel in September 2007 at the Dair Alzour site in Syria had been a nuclear reactor under construction. Syria has maintained that the destroyed building was a military non-nuclear installation.
  41. The Agency was provided with access to the Dair Alzour site in June 2008, at which time it was permitted to take environmental samples. Analysis of these samples revealed a significant number of anthropogenic natural uranium particles. Syria has yet to provide a credible explanation for the origin and presence of these particles and has yet to provide further access to the Dair Alzour site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored. Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and has not provided the Agency with access to the three other locations to which the site is allegedly functionally related.
  42. By the end of 2009, the Agency had not been able to confirm Syria´s statements regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building.
  43. At the end of 2009, the Agency was continuing its verification activities in order to resolve questions relating to the origin and presence of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), revealed in samples taken at the MNSR site in August 2008 and in July 2009, and of a type not reported in Syria´s declared inventory.
  44. For both the Dair Alzour and the MNSR sites, given the passage of time and the possible degradation of information, the Agency has requested Syria to provide prompt access to all relevant information for the verification of Syria´s declarations.
  45. For 2009, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material in Syria. Therefore, the Agency was able to conclude for Syria that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
  46. 2. OTHER VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
  47. Democratic People´s Republic of Korea
  48. Since December 2002, the Agency has not implemented safeguards in the Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and, therefore, cannot draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the DPRK.
  49. In the context of the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement, as agreed between the Agency and the DPRK and foreseen in the Initial Actions agreed at the Six-Party Talks, the Agency continued in 2009 to implement the monitoring and verification measures related to the shutdown of three installations, and construction of one installation, located at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the construction of one installation in Taechon. On 14 April 2009, the DPRK informed the Agency inspectors at Yongbyon that it had decided to cease all cooperation immediately with the Agency; to request Agency personnel at the site to remove all Agency containment and surveillance (C/S) equipment from the facilities; not to allow Agency inspectors access to the facilities after the removal of the C/S equipment; and to require the Agency inspectors to leave the DPRK at the earliest possible time. The DPRK also informed the inspectors that it had decided to reactivate all facilities and to go ahead with the reprocessing of spent fuel. During 2009, until 14 April 2009, the Agency did not observe any operation of the three shutdown installations at Yongbyon, nor any construction activities at the two installations under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon.
  50. On 15 April 2009, the Agency inspectors at Yongbyon removed all seals and switched off the surveillance cameras. Since that date, the Agency has not implemented the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement in the DPRK.
  51. On 16 April 2009, the Agency´s inspectors departed from the DP
  52. Following the DPRK´s announcement on 25 May 2009 that it had conducted an underground nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1874 (2009) which, inter alia, demanded that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and Agency safeguards; decided that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities, act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of its safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) and provide the Agency with transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the Agency; and called upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition.
  53. 3. STRENGTHENING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF SAFEGUARDS
  54. The implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements with additional protocols is essential to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. One of the greatest challenges for the Agency is to be able to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. For States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force, the tools available to the Agency for doing so are limited. During 2009, comprehensive safeguards agreements entered into force for eight States: Bahrain, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Sierra Leone. Additional protocols entered into force for five States with comprehensive safeguards agreements: the Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Kenya and Mauritania; and for one State with a voluntary offer safeguards agreement: the United States of America. At the end of the year, 94 of the 170 States where safeguards were applied18/ had additional protocols in force. Seventy three States with comprehensive safeguards agreements did not have an additional protocol in force19/.
  55. Following the decision taken by the Board on 20 September 2005, the Secretariat initiated, with relevant SQP States, exchanges of letters to give effect to the modifications in the standard text and the change in the SQP criteria referred to in paragraph 5 above. During 2009, operative SQPs were amended to reflect the modified text for five States: Lesotho, Nicaragua, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. Five States brought into force SQPs based on the revised text: Bahrain, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Kenya and Qatar. At the end of 2009, there were 29 States with operative SQPs based on the revised text and 59 States with operative SQPs yet to be amended.
  56. In 2009, further progress was made in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards. Improvements were made in many areas through, for example, the implementation of integrated safeguards, the development of safeguards approaches, procedures and technology, the analysis of covert nuclear-related trade, cooperation with State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs/RSACs), training and quality management.
  57. Integrated safeguards were implemented during the whole of 2009 in 36 States20/ Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. Integrated safeguards were approved and implemented for part of 2009 in eight States: Armenia, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Denmark, Estonia, Madagascar, Slovakia and Sweden. In addition, State level integrated safeguards approaches were developed and approved for three States: Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain.
  58. The Secretariat continued to develop and implement more efficient safeguards approaches, including approaches for verification of spent fuel transfers, approaches involving unattended monitoring and surveillance systems, and approaches based on short notice and unannounced inspections to verify SSAC declarations of facilities´ operational plans and data using a "mailbox" system.
  59. In 2009, the Secretariat continued its endeavours to develop and diversify sources of safeguards relevant information on covert nuclear-related trade. The procurement outreach initiative, launched in 2006, continued to expand and several States are now either voluntarily providing information on certain nuclear-technology-related enquiries and export denials, or have stated that they are actively considering doing so. The analysis of such information augments the Secretariat´s knowledge of covert trade activities and can provide an early indication of undeclared nuclear activities.
  60. Effective, cooperative SSACs and RSACs are fundamental to the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards. The Secretariat continued to work with SSACs and RSACs on safeguards implementation issues such as the quality of operators´ systems for the measurement of nuclear material, the timeliness and accuracy of State reports and declarations, and support for the Agency´s verification activities. Many training courses were held at the national, regional and interregional levels and one IAEA SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) mission was carried out.
  61. The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) held two plenary meetings in 2009. The main issues considered by SAGSI were departmental strategic planning; guidelines for SSACs; the State level concept, including cost methodology; the resolution of anomalies under integrated safeguards; and the Safeguards Research and Development (R&D) Plan 2010-2011. SAGSI also finalized its work on cooperation between the Agency and SSACs, and the strategic objectives, structure and content of future SIRs.
  62. The Department of Safeguards continued to implement its quality management system (QMS). Responsibility for all key processes has been assigned to specific staff members within the Department. This helps ensure consistency in process implementation across the Department.
  63. 4. SAFEGUARDS EXPENDITURES AND RESOURCES
  64. In 2009, safeguards expenditure from the Safeguards Regular Budget (including essential investments) amounted to €114.4 million at the UN exchange rates in 2009, which is equivalent to €122.1 million at the budget exchange rate of €1.00 to $1.00. In addition, €13.1 million (US $18.7 million) was spent from voluntary contributions received from Member States. Regular Budget implementation for Major Programme 4 was 93.4% whereby €8.1 million remained unspent from the 2009 Regular Budget and 2008 carry over fund due to delays in some projects. Significant additional resources are required to address urgent needs, including the replacement of equipment and upgrading of infrastructure at the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at Seibersdorf.
  65. Figure 1 shows the expenditures of the Safeguards programme since 1999, the year the Agency began conducting significant implementation activities related to additional protocols. To allow comparison between years throughout the period, the figures have been adjusted to 2009 prices and converted to euro21/.
  66. 5. FURTHER ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
  67. During 2009, the monitoring scheme approved by the Board of Governors in 1999 regarding separated neptunium and americium continued. The Secretariat received information from eight States22/ and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) about separated neptunium and americium. Flow-sheet verification also continued to be implemented. By the end of 2009, evaluation of the information that had been obtained under the monitoring scheme and from open and other sources had not indicated any issue of proliferation concern.
  68. In 2009, the Agency continued to receive reports from Member States on incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Twenty-six events were reported to have occurred in 2009 involving relatively small amounts of nuclear material.
  69. 6. STATUS OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS (AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2009)
  70. This section contains information - presented in the five tables that conform with the structure of the Safeguards Statement - on safeguards agreements providing the basis for the Agency´s safeguards implementation in 2009. It does not include agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended in the light of implementation of safeguards pursuant to another agreement. For full details see the Agency´s website: http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf [pdf].

1/ The 170 States do not include the Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Secretariat did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

2/ And Taiwan, China.

3/ Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153(Corrected).

4/ GOV/INF/276/Annex B.

5/ GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1.

6/ INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.

7/ See footnote 2.

8/ CDFVs comprise calendar-days spent in performing inspections or complementary access, DIV, inspection travel and rest periods.

9/ The Safeguards Criteria specify the activities considered necessary by the Secretariat to provide a reasonable probability of detecting the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from declared facilities and LOFs.

10/ A State-level integrated safeguards approach, although based on safeguards verification objectives common to all States, takes into account the features of the individual State´s nuclear fuel cycle and other relevant State-specific factors.

11/ See footnote 2.

12/ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. Denmark and the Faroe Islands, which excludes Greenland. Denmark has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement for Greenland (INFCIRC/176)), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto. Denmark was encouraged to conclude an additional protocol in connection with INFCIRC/176 so that a broader conclusion can be drawn for the territory covered by that agreement.

13/ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of the Netherlands which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. the Netherlands in Europe, which excludes the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The Netherlands has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement for the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (INFCIRC/229), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto. The Netherlands was encouraged to conclude an additional protocol in connection with INFCIRC/229 so that a broader conclusion can be drawn for the territories covered by that agreement.

14/ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of New Zealand which is covered by INFCIRC/185 and INFCIRC/185/Add.1; it is not drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are covered by INFCIRC/185, but not by INFCIRC/185/Add.1.

15/ The 73 States do not include the Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Secretariat did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

16/ Such measures include the early provision of design information, environmental sampling and the use of satellite imagery.

17/ In addition, this conclusion is drawn for those territories of Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand referred to in footnotes 12, 13 and 14 for which the broader conclusion is not drawn - i.e. Greenland; the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba; and the Cook Islands and Niue respectively.

18/ See footnote 2.

19/ The 73 States do not include the DPRK.

20/ See footnote 2.

21/ From January 2006, the euro has been adopted as the functional currency for the Agency´s Regular Budget Fund. The exchange rate of 1 euro to 1 dollar is used for comparison purposes only.

22/ See footnote 2.