Abstract
This paper explores the susceptibility of Pebble-Bed Reactors (PBRs) to be used overtly or covertly for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The basic assumption made for the consideration of overt production is that a country would purchase a PBR with the ostensible motive of producing electric power; then, after the power plant was built, the country would divert the facility entirely to the production of weapons material. It is assumed that the country would then have to manufacture production pebbles from natural uranium. The basic assumption made for covert production is that the country would obtain and use a PBR for power production, but that it would clandestinely feed plutonium production pebbles through the reactor in such small numbers that the perturbation on power plant operation would be very difficult to detect. This paper shows the potential rate of plutonium production under such constraints. It is demonstrated that the PBR is a very poor choice for either form of proliferation-intent use.
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