


SECURITY OF MATERIAL

PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE

To improve Member States' ability to protect nuclear and other radioactive material, through exchange of information, provision of standards and guides, training, expert assistance and equipment, from subnational, terrorist or other illegal activities that could impose a proliferation threat, or could endanger health and safety; and to detect and respond to such incidents



KEY ISSUES AND HIGHLIGHTS

- The tragic terrorist attacks that occurred in the USA on 11 September 2001 have resulted in considerable attention being focused on assuring the effectiveness of security measures for the protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other radioactive materials. Of utmost concern is the level of protection against terrorist activity and subnational threats.
- The Agency organized an international conference entitled 'Security of Material: Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources', which was held in Stockholm in May.
- Responding to a resolution from the General Conference, the Secretariat presented a report, 'Measures to Improve the Security of Nuclear Materials and other Radioactive Materials', which included a plan of activities for the Agency's work in this area. This was endorsed by the Board of Governors, and the General Conference took note of the plan in September.
- The expert meeting to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), convened by the Director General, completed its work, concluding that there "was a clear need to strengthen the international physical protection regime". Upon the recommendation of the meeting, an open-ended group of legal and technical experts began to prepare a draft amendment to the CPPNM.
- The Board of Governors also endorsed the 'Physical Protection Objectives and the Fundamental Principles' as a Security Fundamentals document. This endorsement was welcomed by the General Conference.

Note: The headings in this chapter reflect a rearrangement of activities during 2001 in the Agency's programme on the security of nuclear and radioactive material.

- Responding to a resolution from the General Conference in September, which requested the Director General to review thoroughly the activities and programmes of the Secretariat with a view to strengthening work relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear materials and other radioactive sources, the Director General presented a report to the Board of Governors in November. Entitled 'Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism', it outlined the Secretariat's response to the resolution adopted at the General Conference; activities in the field of the security of material were a major component of the report.
- In response to requests from Member States, the Secretariat continued to organize advisory missions, training courses and workshops to improve the effectiveness of measures for the security of nuclear and radioactive material. Following the events of September, the demand for these services increased greatly.

PROTECTING AND CONTROLLING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Continuing its support to Member States in evaluating their national systems of physical protection, the Agency conducted International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions to Indonesia and Ukraine. Good practices and recommendations for improving physical protection were provided to the government authorities in these countries. Preparatory meetings were held with two Member States to conduct missions to follow-up previous IPPAS missions. A fact-finding, broadened IPPAS mission, covering the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and evaluating the need for security arrangements at a nuclear research centre, visited Tunisia.

In response to an increased need to incorporate a 'design basis threat' (DBT) as part of a State system of physical protection, the Agency conducted three workshops, in Kazakhstan, Romania and Slovakia, to assist the competent authorities in those States with the development and maintenance of a national DBT.

Another workshop to foster regional co-operation in common physical protection issues was held in Lithuania. A regional training course on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities was held in Brno, Czech Republic. Finally, a new hands-on physical protection training course on the practical aspects of physical protection equipment installation and maintenance was held in Obninsk, Russian Federation.

Efforts to assist Member States in establishing and implementing norms and guides for nuclear material accountancy and control continued to make an important contribution to the effective physical protection of nuclear material. During 2001, close co-operation with several States and regional organizations continued and courses were held in Argentina and the USA. Assistance with the application of norms and guides was also facilitated through self-assistance programmes using self-assessment questionnaires.

A conference entitled 'Security of Material: Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources' was held in Stockholm in May. Organized by the Agency in co-operation with the World Customs Organization, Interpol and the European Police Office (Europol), it was hosted by the Swedish Government. The conference focused on measures to reduce the possibilities of illegal activities such as theft, sabotage and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, and on associated proliferation and radiation risks. A summary document which covered observations, summary statements and steps for the future was subsequently issued by the Secretariat as a note.

ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVING NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

In the case of a failure in the system of physical protection of nuclear material, Member States should be able to detect and identify nuclear material as well as radioactive sources illegally crossing international borders. In order to enhance Member State capabilities for detecting

shipments of radioactive material at borders and at internal checkpoints, the Agency sponsored courses on a national level for front line officers in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Additionally, the Agency sponsored a first ever meeting of heads of customs authorities of the Newly Independent States (NIS) in the Russian Federation. It was decided at the meeting that representatives from each NIS customs authority would participate in two train the trainers courses at the Russian Customs Academy in St. Petersburg. By August, some 60 participants had graduated from the course.

The Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), which relies on Member States reporting information on incidents and seizures, continued to be expanded. Periodic reports were issued on highlights and trends in illicit trafficking incidents. Information from the ITDB is also utilized to assist the Agency in its efforts to better inform the public about the threats to nuclear material security. An improved CD-ROM version of the ITDB was released that offers both a report on the highlights plus data on trends in illicit trafficking incidents for use by Member States. In

response to suggestions from the Member State Points of Contact, the database software was modified to allow for the tracking of additional attributes of incidents reported, for example better descriptions of the circumstances of seizures, including the technical properties of material and criminal attributes.

In related work, analysis of information in the ITDB provided a foundation for the internal planning and prioritization of strengthened measures against nuclear terrorism. This is because the ITDB, while containing information only on known cases, provides a useful starting point for understanding the types and quantities of nuclear materials and radioactive sources seized in trafficking, the types of facilities that have been targets for theft, the kinds of persons who have engaged in trafficking, and what is known about terrorist interest in nuclear or radiological materials. As a result, the Agency continues its efforts to collect post-incident information and reporting, from laboratory analysis and forensics to the eventual outcomes of criminal cases in order to increase the usefulness and effectiveness of the ITDB.

VERIFICATION IN IRAQ PURSUANT TO UNSC RESOLUTIONS

PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE

To provide credible assurance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that Iraq is complying with the provisions of UNSC Resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, through the implementation of a system of verification able to detect, in a timely manner, prohibited equipment, materials and activities.

In 2001, extrabudgetary programme expenditures amounted to \$2 503 745.

KEY ISSUES AND HIGHLIGHTS

- Since the end of 1998, in spite of the adoption of Resolution 1284 (1999) which confirms its mandate in Iraq, the Agency has not been in a position to implement its UNSC mandated activities in Iraq. It could not, therefore, provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations under these resolutions.

OPERATIONS

During 2001, the Agency was unable to implement its inspection programme as mandated by the relevant UNSC resolutions. However, its Action Team has maintained its readiness to resume monitoring activities in Iraq.

Regular contact has been maintained by the Action Team with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

(UNMOVIC) since the latter's establishment in order to co-ordinate efforts as required under UNSC Resolution 1284 (1999). These contacts have included exchanges on such topics as the definition of the logistical support to be provided by UNMOVIC to the Agency, the co-ordination of resources for the resumption of inspection activities, database and communication requirements to facilitate operations and the implementation of export–import monitoring.

With the support of several Member States, the Action Team co-ordinated field trials of air particulate sampling in order to evaluate the capabilities of such environmental monitoring for the detection of clandestine activities under various operational conditions. Technical conclusions are expected during 2002.

ANALYSIS

Activities were focused on the improvement of computer based inspection and analytical tools as well as on the detailed analysis of information accumulated from previous field activities and on recent information such as that provided by commercially available satellite imagery. These analytical activities have confirmed the validity of the Agency's technically coherent picture of Iraq's past clandestine nuclear programme and nuclear related capabilities as of December 1998.

The Action Team revised the list of items and technologies to which the export–import mechanism, approved by UNSC Resolution 1051 (1996), apply.