What Next for the NPT?

Facing the Moment of Truth

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by Roland Timerbaev

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First NPT Review Conference, Geneva, 5 May 1975


First NPT Review Conference

Partial view of the presiding table. Left to right: Dr. Sigvard Eklund, DG of the IAEA; UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim; and Mrs. Inga Thorsson (Sweden), President of the Conference.

The sine qua non condition is an even-handed and balanced approach by the NPT States to reviewing the operation of the treaty in its totality in order to help achieve its universal compliance. Some of the needed steps to assure an orderly and generally accommodating conduct of the Conference are discussed here.

  1. First and foremost, there must be a positive movement towards the earliest entry into force of the CTBT. Only 33 of the 44 states, whose ratification is needed for the CTBT to become effective, have ratified it. While it is hardly realistic to expect the US Senate, in its present composition, to give by two-thirds majority its advice and consent to the treaty ratification in the near future, the reaffirmation by the US Administration of its support for the treaty would be very helpful in reassuring the international community as to where the United States stands vis-à-vis the nuclear test ban. The leadership of the China has on many occasions announced its intention to obtain the ratification of the CTBT, and the approaching Review Conference is the appropriate time for fulfilling this pledge. Pending such time as the CTBT legally enters into force, a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions should be newly reaffirmed.


  2. Next, it would be highly important for all the NWS to jointly or independently proclaim their serious intention to diminish the role of the nuclear factor in their security and foreign policies. This should be accompanied by more intensive efforts to implement their disarmament commitments under Article VI of the NPT, as well as the pledges made by them at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.


  3. After reviewing the operation of Article III on safeguards, the Conference should strongly urge those countries, which have not yet acceded to the IAEA additional protocol to nuclear safeguards agreements, to do so at the earliest time. So far, more than seven years after the IAEA Board of Governors approved the protocol, it has been ratified by some 60 countries and Euratom, while two more (Iran and Libya) have agreed to provisionally abide by it. This situation is far from being satisfactory and should be urgently corrected.


  4. The Conference should strongly support recent initiatives aimed at expanding the extent of non-proliferation activities and preventing the possibility of nuclear materials being used by potential terrorists. Such initiatives include the Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), the US Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and any other useful measures that may be designed to reduce and discontinue the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies.


  5. Article IV of the NPT reaffirms the "inalienable right" of all the NPT States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes "in conformity with Articles I and II". During the negotiation of the NPT it was one of the most important elements of "grand bargain" between the NWS and NNWS. This treaty provision, however, may be used by some NNWS as a justification for developing uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, which, under certain conditions, could be utilized for nuclear weapon proliferation. Attempts are being made by the IAEA and some governments to solve this issue in accordance with international law, and in the letter and spirit of the NPT, through diplomatic means.


    6. This approach should be continued until such time as the situation does not go out of control. The Review Conference could make a decisive contribution to the settlement of this issue if all its participants, and especially the NNWS, take a strong position in favor of restraints on the use of modern technologies for purposes that may be in contravention of their non-proliferation commitments.A suggestion has recently been made for a multilateral approach to sensitive phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. Personally, I do not believe in the feasibility of such a scheme. A comparable idea was considered a quarter century ago (under Article XII.A.5 of the IAEA Statute), which would have resulted in the creation of International Plutonium Storage. Participants of that study, however, were unable to agree on where to set such a facility, and how and under what conditions the stored fissile materials would be returned to governments for use in their civilian nuclear projects.
    Countries that have not yet acceded to the IAEA additional protocol to nuclear safeguards agreements should do so at the earliest time.
  6. Finally, we can expect that the perennial problem of the NPT universality will occupy a significant place during the 2005 Conference. No solution to this recurrent issue is yet in sight, though some ideas on how to facilitate at least a provisional result of this so-called "three-State problem" have recently been circulating among interested experts.


    7. One possibility, suggested by some experts, would be to stop requiring that India, Pakistan, and Israel immediately give up their nuclear weapons and join the NPT as NNWS. Instead, these countries are to be persuaded to commit themselves politically to accepting the non-proliferation obligations undertaken by the NPT States. For example, the three States would agree to prevent proliferation exports, to secure the safety of nuclear weapons and materials, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, and eschew nuclear testing by joining the CTBT.Although I do not believe that such an arrangement could be acceptable to most NPT States, this or some other possible ideas leading to non-proliferation objectives should be carefully explored. They should certainly take into account the views of interested parties and the requirements for strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Retired Russian Ambassador Roland Timerbaev is a leading expert in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, and one of the founding fathers of the NPT. He has been chairing the Executive Council of the PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia since 1999. In 1988-1992, he headed the USSR/Russian Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. He participated in negotiating the NPT, the ABM Treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the PNE Treaty and other arms control agreements and in the work to establish the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Mr. Timerbaev took part in all six NPT Review Conferences. Author E-mail: Timerbaev@pircenter.org.

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